ML20203C812

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Notice of Violation from Insp on 860210-14
ML20203C812
Person / Time
Site: 05000054, 07000687
Issue date: 04/14/1986
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203C794 List:
References
70-0687-86-02, 70-687-86-2, NUDOCS 8604210243
Download: ML20203C812 (2)


Text

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APPENDIX A NOTICE OF VIOLATION Cintichem, Inc. Docket No.70-687 Tuxedo, New York 10987 License No. SNM-639 As a result of the inspection conducted on February 10-14, 1986, and in accord-ance with the NRC Enforcement Policy (10 CFR 2, Appendix C), the following violations were identified:

A. Section 7.2, " Internal Transfers," of ycur NRC approved Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan (FNMCP) states, in part, that transfer of special nuclear material (SNM) between MBA's on site is controlled through the use of logbooks and transaction reports which detail all the transactions involving the movement of SNM from one MBA to another. In each trans-action, the amount of material (element and isotope) and the date are recorded in the logbook of the issuing MBA as a transfer out of that area, and initialled by the person responsible for that MBA. The same infor-mation is transcribed into the logbook of the MBA accepting the material, and initialled by the person receiving the material. Transaction reports contain the signatures of both individuals. These entries are made promptly at the time of transfer, thus assuring timeliness and accuracy of the record systems.

Contrary to the above , on February 10, 1986, the inspector identified that the licensee had transferred and returned 319 grams of U-235 between MBA 1 and MBA 2, without the completion of an internal transaction report, or the recording of the transfers in the MBA logbooks.

This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement III, E).

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t B. 10 CFR 70.51(e)(1)(1) states, in part, that the licensee shall maintain procedures for tamper-safing containers or vaults containing special nuclear material not in process, which include control of access to the devices and records of the date and time of application of each device to a container or vault.

Paragraph 2.b. of the. licensee's' procedure " Security Seals for the Protec-tion and Control of Special Nuclear Material," states, in part, that a seal will be applied immediately after the samples and data to identify and measure the contents have been taken.

Contrary to the above, on February 11, 1986, during a review of the licensee's records, the inspector found that ten barrels of waste material had been radiometrically analyzed on January 15, 1986, but had not been

.I tamper-safed immediately after the completion of the analyses. The ten barrels of waste were not tamper-safed until January 17, 1986.

This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement III, E).

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Appendix A 2 C. Section 4.2.1.4.f of the licensee's FNMCP, states, in part, that the Standard Waste Barrel will be made with waste laboratory material that has been calibrated against primary standard reference material.

Standard Waste Barrels will be representative of the full range of the normal process waste barrels.

Contrary to the above, on February 11, 1986, the inspector found that, with respect to the radiometric analyses of the ten waste barrels identi-fied in Violation B above, the licensee failed to use Standard Waste Barrels that had been calibrated and that were representative of the full range of the waste barrels being analyzed. Three waste barrels that were analyzed contained 15.01 grams U-235, 19.58 grams U-235, and 19.25 grams U-235; however, the highest concentration of the Standard Waste Barrel used for radiometric analyses was 13.99 grams U-235.

This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement III, E).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Cintichem, Inc. is hereby required to submit to this office within thirty days of the date of the letter which transmitted this Notice, a written statement or explanation in reply, includ-ing: (1) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved; (2) corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending this response time.

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