ML20203C661
| ML20203C661 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 07/10/1986 |
| From: | WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203C645 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-62045, NUDOCS 8607210056 | |
| Download: ML20203C661 (4) | |
Text
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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM u-m, 3/4.A.2 SAFETY / RELIEF VALVES i..
LIMITING CONDITION FOR GPERATION 3.4.2 The safety valve function of at least 12 of the following reactor coolant system safety / relief valves shall be OPERABLE with the specified code safety valve function lift settings:"
safety / relief valves S h psig e n
- 3 24 safety /reliaf valves 9 1175 psig +M
-ri/./-3%
4 safety /reifef valves 0 1185 psig :n w/,/. A 4 safety / relief valves 9 1195 psig M
+,y,/.3 4 4
safety / relief valves 0 1205 psig g
,,.fg.3 g 4
APPLICA9ILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.
ACTION:
a.
With the safety valve function of one or more of the above required safety / relief valves inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTCOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in CCLO SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,
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b.
With one or more safety / relief valves stuck open, provided that suppression pool average water temperature is less than 90*F, close f"_
the stuck open safety / relief valve (s); if unable to close the open
- =3 valve (s) within 2 cinutes or if suppression pool average water tempera-ture is 110*F or greatar, place the reactor mode switch in the Shut-down position.
c.
With one or more safety / relief valve acoustic monitors inoperable, rest:ra the inoparable monitor (s) to CPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTCCVN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in CCLD SHUTCOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Sbb/EILLANCEREOUIREuENTS
- 4. t. 2 The acoustic monitor for each safety / relief valve shall be cemonstrated CPE?ABLE by perfcrzance of a:
a.
CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 31 days, and a b.
CHANNEL CALIERATION at least once per 13 months."*
1 "The lif t setting pressure shall correspond to ambient c:nditions of the valves at norsinal operating temperatures and pressures, y
"*The orovisions of Specification a.O.4 are not applicable provided the surveillance is performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after reactor steam pressure is acequate to parform the test.
45HINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2 3/4 4-7 8607210056 860710 PDR ADOCK OD000377 p
,..O 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.1 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM Operation with one reactor recirculation loop inoperable has been evaluated and been found to be acceptable during the first fuel cycle only, provided the unit is operated in accordance with the single recirculation loop operation Technical Specifications herein.
An inoperable jet pump is not, in itself, a sufficient reason to declare a recirculation loop inoperable, but it does, in case of a design-basis-accident, 1
increase the blowdown area and reduce the capability of reflooding the core; thus, the requirement for shutdown of the facility with a jet pump inoperable.
Jet pump failure can be detected by monitoring jet pump performance on a prescribed schedule for significant degradatien.
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Recirculation loop flow mismatch limits are in compliance with the ECCS LOCA analysis design criteria. The limits will ensure an adequate core flow coastdown from either recirculation loop following a LOCA. Where the recircula-tion loop flow mismatch limits cannot be maintained during two recirculation loop operation, continued ration is permitted in the single recirculation loop operation mode.
In order to prevent und ress on the vessel nozzles and bottom head region, the recirculation loc eratures shall be within 50*F of each other prior to startup of an idle locp e loop temperature must also be within
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50*F of the reactor pressure vess lant temperature to prevent thermal C.
shock to the recirculation pump and irculation nozzles. Since.the coolant -
in the bottom of the vessel is at a temperature than the coolant in the upper regions of the core, undue stre the vessel would result if the temcerature difference was greater tha F.
3/4.4.2 SAFETY / RELIEF VALVES
- h'e shfety valve function of the safety /.elie.' valves-opera'EHo p. event the reactor coolant system frem being.pressurizid T ove the Safety Limit of 1375 psig in accordance_with-the'ASME Code. A total of 12 OPERABLE safety /
relief valyes-is% fred to limit reactor pressure to within ASME III allowable values for the worst case upset transient.
)MedT A- -> Demonstration of the safety / relief valve lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Specification 4.0.5.
3/4.4.3 REACTOR-COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE 3/4.4.3.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS emminum l
The RCS leakage detection systems required by this specification are y
provided to monitor and detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary. These detection systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45, " Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems," May 1973.
WASHINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-1 l
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TECH. SPEC. BASES i
INSERT A 3/4.4.2 Safety / Relief Valves The safety valve capacity is designed to limit the primary system pressure,?
including transients, in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III,1971, Nuclear Power Plant components-(up to and including Summer 1971 Addenda). The Code allows a peak pressure of 110% of design pressure (1250 (design) X(1,10 = 1375 psig maximum) under upset conditions.
In addition ~, the Code specifi-cations require that the lowest valve setpoint be at or below design pressure and the highest valve setpoint be set so that total accumulated pressure does not exceed 110% of the design pressure.
The safety valve sizing evaluation assumes credit 'for operation of the scram protective system which may be tripped by one of two sources; i.e., a direct position switch or neutron flux signal. The direct scram signal is derived from position switches mounted on the main steamline isolation valves (MSIV's) or the turbine stop valve, or from pressure switches m=nted on the dump valve of the turbine control valve hydraulic actuation system.
The position switches are actuated when the respec-tivt valves are closing, and following 10% travel of full stroke. The pressure switches are actuated when a fast closure of the control valves is initiated.
Further, no credit is taken for power operation of the pressure relieving devices.
Credit is only taken for the dual purpose safety / relief valves in their ASME Code qualified mode (spring lift) of safety operation.
The overpressure-protection system must accommodate the most severe pressurization transient. There are two. major transients that represent the most severe abnormal operational transient resulting in a nuclear system pressure rise.
The evaluation of these events with the final plant configuration has shown that the MSIV closure is slightly more severe when credit is taken only for indirect derived scrams; i.e., a flux scram.
Utilizing this worse case transient as the design basis event, a minimum of 12 safety / relief valves are required to assure peak reactor pressure remains within the Code limit of 110% of design pressure.
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Request for Amendment to Technical STATE OF WASHINGTON
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Subject:
Specifications 3/4.4.2 SRV
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County of Benton
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I, G. C. Sorensen, being duly sworn, subscribe to and say that I am the Manager, Regulatory Programs for the WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM, the applicant herein; that I have full authority to execute this oath; that I have reviewed the foregoing; and that to the best of my knowledge, information and belief the statements made in it are true.
/ G. C. Sorensen, Manager Regulatory Programs On this day personally appeared before me G. C. Sorensen to me known to be the individual who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledge that he signed the same as his free act and deed for the uses and purposes therein mentioned.
GIVEN under my hand and seal this day of Ali /
,1986.
Sbhwkh a
Notary Publ ic fn'andifor tW State of Washington Residing at l'(hl#ll )
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