ML20203C162
| ML20203C162 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 12/04/1997 |
| From: | Lyons J NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203C167 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9712150247 | |
| Download: ML20203C162 (12) | |
Text
. _ _
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k UNITED STATES g *-
P; NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION wAswiwoToN, D.C. See4Hr91
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i VIRGINTA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY OLD DOMINION ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE DOCKET NO. 50-338 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION. UNIT NO 1 AMENDMENT TO FAClllTY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 207 Li ^nse No. NPF 4 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Virginia Electric and Power Company et al.. (the licensee) dated May 14. 1997, as supplemented by letter dated October 15, 1997, complies with the standards and recuirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), enc the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 1:
B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission:
C.
There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations:
D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
l.
9712150247 971204
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yDR ADOcM 05000338 POR
2 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Speci-fications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.D.(2) of facility Operating License No. NPF 4 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2) Technical Snecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Ap>endices A and B. as revised through Amendment No. 207. are here)y incorporated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
. {.
n
.es E Lyons. Director s
Pr iect Directorate II 1 Divisi:n of Reactor Projects - 1/11 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical 6pecifications Date of issuance: December 4, 1997
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 207 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF 4 DOCKET NO. 50 338 Replace the following pagu of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed aages as indicated.
The revised pages are identified by amendment num)er and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.
Renove Paoes Insert Paaes 3/4 7 15 3/4 7-15 B 3/4 7-4 8 3/4 7 4 B 3/4 7 4a B 3/4 7 4a 2,
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PLANT SYSTEMS IfRBINE OVERSPEED LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.7 At least one turbine overspeed protection system shall be OPERABLE.
I APPLICAB_1LITY:
MODE 1,2 and 3 ACIIDE:
I With the above required turbine overspeed protection system inoperable, within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> either restore the system to OPERABLE status or isolate the turbine from the steam supply.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.7.1.7.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.
4.7.1.7.2 The above required turbine overspeed protection system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
By cycling each of the following valves through at least one complete cycle from the running position and verifying movement of each of the valves through one complete cycle from the running position by direct observation:
1.
Four Turbine Throttle valves at least once per 31 days, 2.
Four Turbine Governor valves at least once per 31 days,
- 3.
Four Turbine Reheat Stop valves at least once per 18.nonths, and 4.
Four Turbine Reheat Intercept valves at least once per 18 months.
b.
At least once per 18 months, by performance of CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the turbine overspeed protection instmments.
At least once per 40 months ", by disassembly of at least one of each of the above c.
valves and performing a visual and surface inspection of all valve seats, disks and stems and verifying no unacceptable flaws or corrosion. If unacceptable flaws or excessive corrosion are found, all other valves of that type shall be inspected unless the nature of the problem can be attributed to a service condition specific to that valve.
Testing of the turbine governor valves may be suspended during end of-cycle power coastdown operation between 835 MWe and 386 MWe.
" For reheat stop and reheat intercept valves, the inspection cycle may be increased to a maximum of once per 60 months provided there is no indication of operational distress.
NORTH ANNA UNIT 1 3/4715 Amendment No. 16,56,!36,195, 207
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.6 and 3/4.7.L2 SIfdM TURBINE and OVERSPEEREROTECTION The turbine generator at the North Anna facility is arranged in a nonpeninsular orientation. Analysis has shown that this arrangement is such that if a turbine failure occurs as a result of destructive overspeed, potentially damaging missiles could impact the auxiliary building, containment, control room and other structures housing safety related equipment. The requirements of these two specifications provide additional assurance that the facility will not be operated with degraded valve performance and/or flawed turbine material which are the major contributors to turbine failures.
The turbine governor valves are required to be tested through one complete cycle from the running position. In normal operation, one or more governor valves may be less than fully open.
Based upon the Westinghouse Technical Manual Operating Instructions, these valves are tested from the operating position to the full closed position and back to their pretest position. The deliberate opening of the last governor valve beyond its nomial operating position would likely result in an unstable valve configuration. The purpose of the test is to verify that the governor valves will close from their normal operating position to the fully closed position.
3/4.7.2 lilEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70 F and 200 psig are based on average stcam generator impact values at 10*F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
3/4.7.3.1 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SUBSYSTEM - OPERATING The component coolint water system normal ly operates c( ttinuously to remove heat from various plant components and to transfer the heat to the service water system. The system consists of four subsystems shared between units, with each subsystern containing one pump and one heat exchanger.
The current design basis for the component cooling water system is a fast cooldown of one unit while maintaining normal loads on the other unit. Three component cooling water subsystems need to be OPERABLE to accomplish this functio... The fourth subsystem is a spare and may be out of service indefinitely. With only two component cooling water subsystems a slow cooldown on one unit while maintaining normal loads on the opposite unit can be accomplished.
The component cooling water system is designed to reduce the temperature of the reactor coolant system from 350*F to 140'F within 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> during plant cooldown, based on a service water temperature of 95'F and on having two component cooling water pumps and two heat exchangers in service for the unit being cooled down. Therefore, to ensure cooldown of one unit within 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> and maintain the other unit in normal full power operation three of the four subsystems must be OPERABLE.
Because subsystems are placed in standby by shutting down pumps and isolating heat exchangers and this system serves no accident rnitigation functions, the subsystem is considered OPERABLE in the standby conditions since it can be easily placed in service quickly by manual operator actions.
NORTil ANNA - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-4 Am:ndment No. 76,152,159, 207
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.3.2 COMPONENT COOLINO WATER SUBSYSTEM - SHUTDOWN The OPERABILITY of the component cooling water system when both units are in COLD SliUTDOWN or REFUELINO ensures that an adequate heat sink is maintained for the residual heat removal system.
3/4.7.4.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTF.M - OPERATING The OPERABILITY of the service water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available far safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The system is detigned to meet the assumption of a single failure. During a design basis accident, both loops of service water cross-connect at tne affected units recirculation spray heat exchangers to create a single large service water system. The affected units component cooling heat exchangers isolate so that sufficient Dows are provided to both the non affected and affected units componerts.
With four '.oimal serCce water pumps OPERABLE, the unthrottled How resistance of the system is such that greater than design Hows are achieved if a single pump or power supply failure occurs following an accident. When three normal service water pumps are OPERABLE, the flow resistance of the system is adjusted to ensure that design flows are achieved if a single pump or power supply failure occurs following an accident. The required resistance is determined during periodic flow balance testing and is obtained by throttling now through the component ecoling water heat exchangers. Rather than marking and specifying exact component cooling water heat exchanger outlet throttle valve positions, operating procedures have been established to set system resistance at or greater than the required ivsistance. When only two normal service water pumps or a single loop are OPERABLE, the design basis function can still be met provided that the now resistance of the system is adjusted and no additional failures occur. The allowed outage time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is consistent with other LCOs for loss of one train of ESF systems, and is based upon an industry accepted practice considering the low probability of an accident occuring, if more than two normal service water pumps or both service water loops are inoperable, the units are not prepared to respond to the design basis events for which the service water system is required. Both units must be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within twelve hours and actions initiated within one hour thereafter to place the units in COLD SliUTDOWN. Twelve hours is a reasonable time based on operating experience to place the units in llOT SHUTDOWN from full power without challenging safety systems or operators. The units may remain in HOT SHUTDOWN until a methcd to further cool the units becomes available, but actions to develop the method must be started within one hour after reaching HOT SilUTDOWN.
Auxiliary service water pumps are strictly a backup subsystem and are not taken credit for in a design basis accident. However, these pumps are taken credit for in the 10 CFR 50,
)
Appendix P., analysis. Therefore, these pumps are maintained OPERABLE in MODES 1,2,3, and L
4 to meet these requirements.
NORTH ANNA - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-4a Amendment No. 452, 207
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k UNITED STATES po s
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. asetweM
- v, VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY OLD DOMINION ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE DOCKET NO. 50-339 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.188 License No. NPF-7 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:
et
- l. plication for amendment by Virginia Electric and Power Company A.
The ap
, (the licensee) dated May 14, 1997, as supplemented by letter dated October 15, 1997. complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 1:
B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission:
C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations:
D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Speci-fications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of facility Operating License No. NPF-7 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2) Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B. as revised through Amendment No. 188, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
. C.
~
Jam s E. Lyon.
1 rector Pi' ?ct Directorate 11-1 Division of Reactor Projectc I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: December 4, 1997
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDHENT NO. 188 TO FACillTY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-7 DOCKET NO. 50 339 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed aages as indicated.
The revised pages are identified by amendment num>er and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove Paaes Insert Paaes 3/4 7 12 3/4 7-12 B 3/4 7-4 8 3/4 7 4 B 3/4 7 4a B 3/4 7 ia l
l.
l
PLANT SYSTEMS IUj@lNE OVERSPFFri LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.7 At least one turbine overspeed system shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODE 1,2 and 3 ACTION:
With the above required turbine overspeed protection system inoperable, within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> either restore the system to OPERABLE status or isolate the turbine from the steam supply.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT i
4.7.1.7.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.
4.7.1.7.2 The above required turbine overspeed protection system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
By cycling each of the following valves through at least one complete cycle from a.
the running position and verifying movement of each of the valves through one complete cycle from the running position by direct observation:
1.
Four Turbine Throttle valves at least once per 31 days, 2.
Four Turbine Governor valves at least once per 31 days,
- 3.
Four Turbine Reheat Stop valves at least once per 18 months, and 4.
Four Turbine Reheat Intercept valves at least once per 18 months, b.
At least once per 18 months, by performance of CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the turbine overspeed protection instruments, c.
At least once per 40 months ", by disassembly of at least one of each of the above valves and performing a visual and surface inspection of all valve seats, disks and stems and verifying no unacceptable f%ws or corrosion if unacceptable flaws or excessive corrosion are found, all other valves of that type shall be inspected unless the nature of the problem can be attributed to a service condition specific to that
- valve, Testing of the turbine governor valves may be suspended during end-of-cycle power
- coastdown operation between 835 MWe and 386 MWe,
" For reheat stop and reheat intercept valves, the inspection cycle may be increased to a maximum of once per 60 months provided there is no indication of operational distress.
NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 3/4 7-12
- Amendment No. 38,81, ! !9, !?f,188
~
e PLAW SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.6 and 3/4.7.1.7 STEAM TURBINE and OVERSPEED PROTECTION The turbine generator at the North Anna facility is arranged in a nonpeninsular orientation.
J Analysis has shown that this arrangement is such that if a turbine failure occurs as a result of destmetive overspeed, potentially damaging missiles could impact the auxiliary building, containment, control room and other structures housing safety related equipment. The
, requirements of these two specifications provide additional assurance that the facility will not be operated with degraded valve performance and/or flawed turbine material which are the major contributors to turbine failures.
The turbine governor valves are required to be tested through one complete cycle from the running position. In normal operation, one or more governor valves may be less than fully open.
Based upon the Westinghouse Technical Manual Cperating Instructions, these valves are tested from the operating position to the full closed position and back to their pretest position. The deliberate opening of the last governor valve beyond its normal operating position would likely result in an unstable valve configuration. The purpose of the test is to verify that the governor valves will close from their normal operating position to the fully closed position.
3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSUREffEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70 F and 200 psig are based on average steam generator impact values at 10 F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
3/4.7.3.1 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SUBSYSTEM - OPERATJNQ The component cooling water system normally operates continuously to remove heat from 4
various plant components and to transfer the heat to the service water system. The system consists of four subsystems shared between units, with each subsystem containing one pump and one heat exchanger.
The current design basis for the component cooling water system is a fast cooldown of one unit while maintaining normal loads on the other unit. Three component cooling water subsystems need to be OPERABLE to accomplish this function. The fourth subsystem is a spare and may be out of service indefinitely. With only two component cooling water subsystems a slow cooldown on one unit while maintaining normal loads on the opposite unit can be accomplished.
The component cooling water system is designed to reduce 'the temperature of the reactor coolant system from 350 F to 140'F within 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> durinF plant cooldown, based on a service water temperature of 95'F and on having twe component cooling water pumps and two heat exchangers in service for the unit being cooled down. Therefore, to ensure co >ldown of one unit within 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> and maintain the other unit in normal full power operation three of the four subsystems must be OPERABLE.
Because subsystems are placed in standby by shutting down pumps and isolating heat exchangers and this system serves no accident mitigation functions, the subsystem is considered OPERABLE in the standby conditions since it can oe easily niaced in service quickly by manual operator actions.
l NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-4 Amendment No. 4%4-9,188 l
3 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.3.2 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SUBSYSTEM - SHUTDOWN The OPERABILITY of the component coolir.g water system when both units are in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING ensures that an adequate heat sink is maintained for the residual heat removal system.
3/4.7.4.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM - OPERATING The OPERABILITY of the service water system ensures that sufficient cooling caret y is available for safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The systc e w designed to meet the assumption of a single failure. During a design basis accident, both a:.ps of service water cross-connect at the affected units recirculation spray heat exchangers to create a single large service water system. The affected units component cooling heat exchangers isolate so that sufficient flows are provided to both the non affected and affected units components.
With four normal service water pumps OPERABLE, the unthrottled flow resistance of the system is such that greater than design flows are achieved if a single pump or power supply failure occurs following an accident. When three normal service water pumps are OPERABLE, the flow resistance of the system is adjusted to ensure that design flows are achieved if a single pump or power supply failure occurs following an accident. The required ruistance is determined during periodic flow balance testing and is obtained by throttling flow through the component cooling water heat exchangers. Rather than marking and specifying exact component cooling water heat exchanger eutlet throttle valve positions, operating procedures have been established to set system resistance at or greater than the required resistance. When only two normal service water pumps or a single loop are OPERABLE, the design basis function can still be met provided that the flow resistance of the system is adjusted and no additional failures occur. The allowed outage time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is consistent with other LCOs for loss of one train of ESF systems, and is based upon an industry accepted practice considering the low probability of an accident occuring.
If more than two normal service water pumps or both sersice water loops are inoperable, the units are not prepared to respond to the design basis events for which the service water system is required. Both units must be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within twelve hours and acta,.:s initiated within one hour thereafter to place the units in COLD SHUTDOWN. Twelve hours is a reasonable time based on operating experience to place the units in HOT SHUTDOWN from full power without challenging safety systems or operators. The units may remain in HOT SHUTDOWN until a method to further cool the units becomes available, but actions to develop the method must be started within one hour after reaching HOT SHUTDOWN.
Auxi!!ary service water pumps are strictly a backup subsystem and are not taken credit for
. in a design taQ accident. However, these pumps are taken crmit for in the 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, analysis. Therefore, these pumps are maintained OPERABLE in MODES 1,2,3, and 4 to meet these requirements.
NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-4a Amendment No. 446,188
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