ML20203B092
| ML20203B092 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/1998 |
| From: | Schopfer D SARGENT & LUNDY, INC. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 9583-100, NUDOCS 9802240204 | |
| Download: ML20203B092 (31) | |
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Don K. Schopfer Senior Vice President 312 269-6078 February 20,1998 Project No. 9583-100 Docket No. 50-423 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Independent Corrective Action Verification Program l
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Enclosed are t en (10) discrepancy reports (DRs) identified during our review activities for the ICAVP. These DRs are being distributed in accordance with the Communications Protocol, PI-MP3-01.
DR No. DR-MP3 1016 DR ho DR-MP3-1058 DR No. DR-MP3-1046 DR No. DR-MP3-1060 DR No. DR-MP3-1049 DR No. DR-MP3-1061 DR No. DR-MP3-1051
- DR No. DR-MP3-1063 DR No. DR-MP3-1053
- DR No. DR-MP3-1066 I have also enclosed the following two (2) DRs for which the NU resolutions have been reviewed and accepted by S&L.
DR No. DR-MP3-0331 DR No. DR-MP3-0847
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55 East Monroe Street Chicago, IL 60603-5780 USA + 312-269-2000 l
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.o United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission February 20,1998 Document Control Desk Project No. 9583-100 Page 2 I have also enc!osed the two (2) DRs for which the NU resolutions have been reviewed but not accepted. S&L comments on these resolutions have been provided.
DR No. DR-MP3-0725 DR No. DR-MP3-0738 Please direct any questions to me at (312) 269-6078.
Yours very truly, 4
in D. K. Schopfer Senior Vice President and ICAVP Manager DKS:spr Enclosures Copies:
E. Imbro (1/1) Deputy Director, ICAVP Oversight T. Concannon (1/1) Nuclear Energy Advisory Council J. Fougere (1/l) NU mwvpwswo220-m l
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DR No. DR MP3-0331 ICAVP Northe :tUtilities Mittt:ne Unit 3 Discrcpancy Report DR RESOLUTION ACCEPTED Review Group: system Review Element: Syelem Des 100 poem pq w D6scipane: Mechanical Dwign O va D6screpency Type: Drev4 e No system /Procese: Hvx NRC Signincancelevel: 3 Date faxed to NU:
Date Putmehed: 10/227 D6screpency: Filter Unit Drain Valve Normal Position Descripuon: During the review of ths P&lDs for the Supplemeritary Leak Collection and Release System (St.CRS) and the Auxillary Building Ventilation System (ABVS) a discrepancy regarding the normal position of valves 3HVR V964,3HVR V970,3HVR V993, and 3HVR V999 was identified.
FSAR Table 1.8-1, Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2, position C.3.h states that normally closed manual valves instead of water seals and traps will be provided.
P&lD EM-148E 10 and operating procedure OPS Form 33141-1&2 show valves 3HVR-V964 and 3HVR V970 as normally open valves.
P&lD EM 148A 24 and operating procedure OPS Form 3314A-2&3 show valves 3HVR-V993 and 3HVR V999 as normally open valves.
Since the drain valves are not provided with water seals and traps and the housing operates at a negative pressure, the normally open drain valves would allow ah drawn thru the drain line to bypass the demister.
N Date Vaud invalid inttnetor: stod, M. D.
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10/13/87 IRC Chmn: sin 0h. Anand K G
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toriale7 Date:
INVAUD:
Date: 2/16/98 REsOufTION: NU has concluded that the Discrepancy Report, DR-MP3-0331, has identified a condition not previously discovered by NU which requires correction.
CR M3-97-3935 was initiated and the corrective action plan has been approved. CR M3-97-3935 corrective action will evaluate the exception to Reg. Guide 1.52, Rev. 2, section C.3.h with regard to the SLCRS and ABVS moisture separator drain valve configuration. The FSAR will be revised, as requit d, to reflect the evaluation for the exception to Reg. Guide 1.52, Rev. 2, section C.3.h. CR M3-97-3935 corrective actions are required to be completed pdor to startup.
Page 1 of 2 Printed 2/20/9e 235:20 PM l
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DR N1 DR-MP3 0331 N:rthe:st Utilities ICAVP Millst:ne Unit 3 Discrepancy Report NU concurs with the Significance Level 3 as determined by DR-MP3-0331. The bypass flow will still pass through the heaters and fibers to filter and remove particulate and gaseous lodine from the air before discharging to the atmosphere. Therefore, the SLCRS and ABVS are capable of performing their intended function.
Attachments:
CR M3 97-3935 Prev 6ously identined by Nu? (,) Yes (9) No Non DiscrGpers Constkm?() Yee @ No ResolutionPend6ng?O vos @ No ResoiuiionunresoeveerO vee
- No Review inittetor: Skot, M. D.
VT Leed: Neri, Anthony A VT Mgr: Schopfer, Don K IRC Chmn: Singh, Anand K oste:
2/16/98 sL Conwnente-i
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4 Pege 2 of 2 Prtnted 2/20/9e 2-3525 PM
Northeast Utilitios ICAVP DR No. DR MP3 0447 Millst ne Unit 3 Discrepancy Report Review Oroup: system DR RESOLUTION ACCEPTED Review Element: system Doo30n p
y l
Discipline: I & C Design gg Discrepency Type: Calculeuon Om SystemProcess: HVX NRC SigntAconce level: 3 Date faxed to NU:
Dele Published: 1/10s6 i
Discrepancy: The setpoint value specified by calculation SP-3HVR 22 exceeds the Technical Specification limit.
Ducription: Calculation SP 3HVR 22 documents the setpoint for temperature switches 3HVR TIS 109A, B, and C which trigger an alarm on high temperature in the charging pump cubicles. The Technical Specification requires that the temperature in this area shall not exceed 110'F, however, the calculation specifies the setpoint for each switch to be 119'F.
Aeview Vead invaad Needed Date initletor: Reed,WWiem.
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O 12rias7 VT Lead: Neri, Anthony A G
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2/19s7 VT Mor: schopfer, Don K O
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1eaS7 IRC Chmn: Sin 0h, Anand K G
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12rais7 Date:
INVAUD:
Date 2/16/98 RESOLUTION: Disposition:
NU has concluded that Discrepancy Report, DR MP3-0847, has identified a condition previously discovered by NU which requires correction. This issue was previously identified and documented on UIR 1077 and CR M3-97-0856, dated 3/30/97.
During review of UIR-1077 an apparent discrepancy was noted conceming the setpoint calculation for the non-safety related temperature Indicating switches 3HVR-TIS 109A/B/C. The setpoint calculation for these switches has a setpoint value of 119 oF whereas the Technical Specification temperature limit is less then or equal to 110 oF. Resulting in a temperature excursion above the Technical Specification limit subsequent to alerting the control operators of the abnormal temperature condition within the Charging Pump Cubicle. Such that the operators could not take predetermine actions to prevent exceeding the Technical Specification temperature limit.
However, NU does not credit these switches or subsequent operator actions to satisfy Technical Specification section 3/4.7.14 " Area Temperature Monitoring" requirements.
Technical Specification section 3/4.7.14 " Area Temperature Monitoring
- requirements are satisfied by the EEQ temperature monitoring system. The area temperature monitoring system is a contir.uous on-line data acquisition system and provides continuous alarm function to the control room operator. This monitoring system use three RTDs 3CES-TE23,3CES-TE24, and 3CES-TE25 to monitor temperatures in Charging Pump Prtnted 2/20s8 2 30Ao PM PeGe 1 of 3 1
Northe:st Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP3 0847 Miitst:ne Unit 3 Discrepancy Report Cubicles A, B, and C respectively, in addition the Millstone Unit No. 3 Operation:; Department utilizes a personal computer in the control room to retrieve information from the data acquisition system to verify area temperature limits. Operating procedure (SP 3670.1
- Control Room Surveillances' In partice!ar item 57 on OPS Form 3670.1 1, Rev. 21, Page 12 of 19) re:lulte that, once per shift, the computer be observed for any error messages. Should the data logger or control room personal computer become unavailtMe operations would perfctm Ops Form 3670.2 3 ' Manual Area Temperature Monitoring' once per shift.
Fal!ure of the temperature monitoring system alarm function could result in a temperature excursion or malfunction of the data-logger. However, additional measures are in place to monitor ares temperature H%)ts through use of a personal computer in the control room should the alarm become Inoperable. Operating proceduto (OPS Form 3070.2-3 Manual Area Temperature Monitoring) require that, once per shift, the area temperatures be recorded. Furthermore ' is failure would not adversely affect any Charging Pump Cubicle equ!pment important to safety presently addressed by the Equipment l
Qualification Program (EQP). Nenher the Technical Specification tempert.ture limit or the EQ limit form the basis for the qualified life of N componeras. The basis for the qualified life of Charging Pump Cubicles components is determined by the I
normal maximum everage temperature listed in the '"nal Safety Analysis Report. Therefore, temperature excursions have no significant impact on the qualified life of EQ components. In addition, temperature excursions would not affect any Charging Pump Cubicle equipment important to safety presently addressed by the EQP which could be called upon during ihe excursion period. Equipment important to safety presently eddressed by it e EQP is qualified to remain functional for conditions in excess of those to be expected during the one shift perl6d the data-logger function may not be svallable.
Although the non safety related temperature Indicating switches 3HVR TIS 109A/B/C are not used to satisfv Technical Specification section 3/4.7.14 requirements. NU concluded that the discrepancy identified in DR MP3-0647 is valid. The setpoint calculation will be revise to lower the alarm value to less then the Technical Specification limit providing an additional level of redundancy. NU considers this setpoint change to be a non-startup issue. Corrective actions will be performed par to refuel outsce 06 c. are brin 0 tracked by AR 970006934.
j NU has concluded based on the above that Discrepancy Report, DR MP3-0847,is not a Significance Level 3 Discrepari.,y and should be down graded to a Lignificance Level 4.
==
Conclusion:==
NU has concluded that Discrepancy Report. DR MP3-0847 has Printed 2/20'96 2.30 44 PM Page 2 or 3 v
~e
Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR44P3 0447 Milletone UnN 3 Discrepancy Report identified a condnlon previously discovered by NU which requires correction. The discrepancy wnh calculation SP 3HVR-22 was previously identified and documented on UlR 1077 sad CR M3-97 0856, dated 3/30/97. The setpoint calculation will be -
revise to lower the alarm value to less then the Technical Specification limR providing an additional level of redundancy.
NU considers this setpoint change to be a non startup issue.
Corrective actions will be performed prior to refuel outa0e 06 and is being tracked by AR 970006934. NU has concluded that Discrepancy 9eport, DR MP3-0647, is not a Si9nificance Level 3 Discrepancy and should be down graded to a Significance Level 4.
)
Prev 6ously idetWesed try Nu? (e) Yes V No Non D6ecrepent condneon?U Yes @ No Mesolution Pend 6ngtO Yes @ No Resolution UntosolvedtO Yes @ No Review initiator: Reed,Witem.
VT Lead: Nort, Anthony A VT Mgr Schapler, Don K 1RC chmn: singh. Anand K O
O Date:
2/13/98 Li. connente: S&L 80rees that the item documented by this CR is documented in CR M3 97 0856 dated 3/'0/97.
Pnnled 2/2098 Z39 4 PM Page 3 of 3
DR No. DR MP3 0725
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Northert Utiliths ICAVp Millstone Unn 3 Discrepancy Report DR RESOLUTION REXCTED Review Group: Systen l otential Operability lasue Discipsine: Mecheneel "*
O ve.
Dncrepancy Type: Calculekvi
@ No system' Process: HVX NRC signitcarnw level: 3 Date F Axed io NO' Date Putdided: 1/1096 Discr*Peacy SLCRS Exhaust Fans 3HVR*FN12A/B Operating Point Descrirdion: During review of the supplementary leak collection and release system (SLCRS) exhaust fan compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2, paragraph C.3.1 a discrepancy was identified regarding evaluation of f an operation under all operating conditions.
Reg. Guide 1.52, Rev. 2, paragraph C.3.1 requires the spiem f an, mounting, and ductwork connections to be designed, constructed, and testi,J in accordance with Section 5.7 and 5.0 of ANSI N5091976.
ANSI N5091976 Section 5.7.1 requires that:
- 1) The system desigrer shall prepare a system characteristic curve for design and ilmiting conditions under which the fans will be required to operate.
- 2) The f an shall be selected to operate on the stable portion of its pressure curve under all operating conditions.
Note 2 on P&lD EM 148E 10 states that the 6LCRS flow rate of 9500 cfm represents the specified design flow rate also used for system balancing. System operability is demonstrated by technical specification surveillance flows of 7,600 to 9,800 cfm.
On an SIS signal, with power available to both divisions, fans 3HVR*FN12A and 3HVR*FN128 both start and operate in parallel until one fan is shut down.
1 Discrepancies:
- 1) Review of the fan curve included in PDCR MP3-92-024 for the 38.5 inch diameter wheel indicates that at an airflow of 7,600 cfm the f an could be operating at or very near the unstable portion of the fan curve. A calculation that evaluates this condition was not found.
- 2) Operation of 'ans 3HVR*FN12A and 3HVR'FN12B in parallel wound result in the fans operating in a potentially unstable portiori of the fan curve. A calculation that evaluates this cond;;lon with tha new fan wheels installed was not found.
Rev6ew Vaud tr'valk!
Needed Date initletor: stout, M. D.
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12/2297 Page 1 of 3 Pnnted 2/20967.3726 PM 2
Northeast utilities ICAVP DR No. DR44P3 0726 Millst:ne Unit 3 Discrepancy Report IRC Chmn: singh. Anand K Q
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12/31/97 Dese:
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oste: 2/16/98 REso8 U11oN: NU has concluded that Discrepancy Report DR MP3-0725 has identified a condP.lon not previously discovered by NU which requitas correction.
(item numbers correspond to the two ce ncies listed above)
(2) The SLCRS System is not designed for parallel operatio 1 of fans 3HVR*FN12A/B, however, a Safety injection Signal does actuate both fans. Surveillance testing with both ?!ns running verifies that systern performance mects the requirements of the Technical Specification, it is not known whether f ans 3HVR*FN12A/B are performing near or in the unstat4e region of the f an curve in this mode of operation. FSAR section 6.2.3.4 states
- Capacity and performance of (the SLCRS) fans conform to the required conditions and ratings and are in compilance with AMCA test codes a-d certified ratings program." NU has no calculation to sury;rt this statement when both SLCRS fans are operating simalt:eneously. CR MS-98-0404 has been wrttten to address thlF Jiscrepancy. The approved corrective action plan to this CR requires preparation of a calculation to evaluate the -
performance of both fans 3HVR*FN12A/B during the phenomenon of parallel operation. Need for further corrective action will be determined depending upon the results of the calculation. Completion of calculation /corTective action required prior to startup.NU concurs that this is a Significance Level 3 issue (1) At 7600 CFM, which is the minimum acceptable airflow per the Technical Specification, the fan curve prepared by the Buffalo Forge factory, and based on the system total pressure loss determined by calculation PBV 45AF, confirms that each fan (equipped with a 38.5" diameter wheel) will operate just to the ri;ht of the peak. This is the lower end of the stable region, but 7600 CFM is the minimum acceptable airflow, so there is very low probability that the fan will enter the unstabl3 region of operation. Normal operation of the SLCRS System places fan performance well within the stable region of the fan curve. No -
calculation is considered necessary because the f an manufacturer, Buffalo Forge, prepared the fan curve based on our system pressure loss calculation and the operating charaderistics of their model 730 L 17 SWSI centrifugal fan fitted with a 38.5" diameter wheel. This condition is not a t
discrepancy.
Attachments:
CR M3-98-0404 with approved corredive action plan.
Previously 4dentined by I.U7 Q Yes @ No Non D6ecrepent CondM6on?U Yes @ No Resolution PendmgtO ves- @ No n.coiouon unre.avodtO Yo.
@ N.
Review Printed 2/2096 2'37:12 PM Page 2of 3 n
DR No. DR MP3 0725 Northeast Utilities ICAVP Millst:ne Unit 3 Discrep6,#cy Report intenstors stout, M. D.
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2/16/98 SL comments: Disagree with response to item 1. At 7,600 cfm the fan curve included as Attachment 2 in PDCR MP3 92 024 shows the operating point at essentially the top of the curve. Small chan0es in t,ystem pressure due to wind gusts or Unit 1 or 2 airflows in the Unit i stack could result in the f an operating in an unstable portion of the fan curve. NU should confirm with the fan vendor what the minimum altflow for stable fan operation is and revise the allowable f an airflow accordingly.
Agree with response for item 2. Results of the calculation that evaluates parallel f an operation is needed to determine final significance level of the DR.
1 Prwed 2/2096 2.37I4 PM Page 3 of 3
l Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR4P84738 Mill:t:n. Unit 3 Discrepancy Report Review Group: system DR Resolution REJacTED Review Element: system Design Diecipens: Mechenkel Dest'"
O vee F:, :y Type: compenort Deen gg systerr."*reeses: HVX NRC sientasense level: 3 Does faxed le NU:
Date PuWiehed: 12/2097-D6screpeacy: Supply and Retum Air Registers Desertpe6sn: Dt ring review of the charging pump and component cool 6n0
. water pump area ventilation system and the MCC and rod control area air conditioning system a discrepancy regeding the safety and seismic classification of the supply and retum air registers was identified.
FSAR Table 3.21 identifies these systems as QA Category I and Seismic Category I systems.
Specification 2170.430 565 states that the supply air registers shall be A0ltair Type DDHO with Type "O" opposed adlon valve and the retum air registers shall be A06tair Type DHFO with Type "O" opposed action valve. The specification does not identify the registers as QA 1 Susmic Category I components.
Failure of the opposed edion valve in the supply and totum air registers to remain in position follov4ng a seismic event would affect the air distribution and the ability of the ventilation system to perform it's safety function.
Review veed invahd Needed Does inntener: stout, M. D.
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Does:
2Al/98 ResoluTum: NU has conduded that DR MP3-0738 does not represent a 6screpent condition. As indicated in the MNPS 3 FSAR Table 3.21, the charging pump and component cooling water pump area ventilation system and the MCC and rod control area mir conditioning system are QA Category 1 and Seismic Category 1 systems This is confirmed by correspondence letter from NU to the NRC dated 9/26/65, that in accordance to Amendment 15 of the FSAR, these systems are QA 1 Seismic Cat 1
)
The question, The specification does not identify the registers as QA 1, Seismic Cate0ory I components' can be clarified by referencing to specification 2170.430-565 Rev.9, installation of Ventilation and Air Conditioning Systems, whdi is a Nuc, ear Safety Related document. As specified on page 13, Fumished By The Contractor, item k, registers and diffusers with accessories, are work covered by this specification. Also, on Printed 2/2006 2:4126 PM Page1or 3~
I
Northeast UtilRies ICAVP DR No DR MP3 6738 Millet:rw unit 3 Discrepancy Report page 211, HVAC Systems Classification, identifies those systems which are Seismic Category 1, this implies that all components at, part of the HVAC system will be QA 1. Seismic Category 1. Page 216 identifies the charging pump and componerd cooling water pump area ventilation system enr1 the MCC and rud control systems as QA Cologory I and SM, the 'S' meaning Seismic, which determines its construction requirements. On page 2 22 en explanation of the dud syst.n mentions all fittings, cross joints, tuming vanes, hangers, etc.,
and accessories as shown on the Engineers drawings.
On cYawings 2170.430 565131D through 1340, this shows the dudwork identified by Spec 2170.430 565, which includes the l
Grilles, Registers, Diffusers and Accessories, as identified on l
page 2 41 of the Spec. Therefore, since the dudwork is installed I
to the requirements of QA Category i Seismic Category 1, then the registers, being an integral component of the ductwott, are also QA Catof,ory l Seismic Category 1. Details of the registers and dampers (valves) are on reference drawings AS-401 1 and AS-6031 from Spec 2170.430 565 Rev.9.
The seismic construction of the system ensures that the components, including the registert and dampers (valves) will perform their intended safety fundion in the event of a seismic occuffence.
==
Conclusion:==
Design of the charging pump and component cooling water pump area ventilation system and the MCC and rod control area air conditioning systems is a QA Category i Seismic Category 1 system based on the requirements of GDC 2, Design bases for protection agabst natural phenomena; GDC-4, Environmental and dynamic ofsets design bases; GDC-5, Sharing of structures, systems and components; and Reg Guide 1.29 Seismic desi(,,1 classifications of system components. The system is construded and components installed in accordance witn Spec 2170.430 565 to meet these requirements. The Jrawings reflect the implementation of the design and specification, so therefore, it is concluded that the registers being an integral component mounted to the ductwork in accordance with the seismic requirements of Spec 2170.430 565 are QA Category i Seismic 1
Category 1. Any future pu' chase of components,i.e., registers, will be in accordance will the NUQAP (Northeast Utilities Quality Assurance Program) which satisfies the requirements of RG 1.123 Quality Assurance Requirements for the Control of Procurement of items and Services for Nuclear Power Plants.
Since there is no corrective action redred, this DR is not a restraint to the unit start up.
Attachments:
- 1. Excerpts from Letter to the NRC from NU, dated 9/26/85
- 2. Spec 2170.430-565 Rev.9, drawings AS-401 1 and AS-6031 Prev 6ously Went.M ty Nu?. U Yes @ No Non Discrepent condeon?U Yes @ No mP.amastO Y=
@ No n ekeanu aro Yu @ No Pnnled 2/2o9s 2:41:29 PM Page 2 or 3
Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP3-0738 Millst:ne Unit 3 Discrepancy Report kansion stout.M.D.
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VILead: Nat.W A b
VT Men schopfw, Don K mc cm: singh. Anand K pese:
2/6/98 st.commwns: NU's response does not adequately address the seismic qualification of the supply and retum air registers fumished by Specifk.ation 2170.430 565.
Agree with NU's response that Specification 2170.4304G5 identifies the charging pump and cornponent cooling water pump area ventilation system and the MCC and rod control area air conditioning system as QA Category I and Selsmic Category I systems. However, the specification does not specify the seismic qualification requirements for the supply and retum air registers.
The opposed action valve (damper) In the supply and retum air registeis is typically used during air balance of the system to cdjust airflow at the register. Failure of the opposed action valve to remain in place following a seismic event would result in chanQes to the system air distribution that wuuld place the system in an unanalyzed condition.
NU's response should provide evidence that the supply and retum air registers have been seismically qualified and that the opposed action valve does not change position.
Printed 2/2096 2A131 PM Page 3 or 3 a
Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR N3. DR44P31016 v.iilst:ne Unit 3 Discrepancy Report Rev6ew oroup: system DR VAUD Review Lament: System De64p1 poeerdial Operebility lasue D6ecipl6ne: Mechanical De*4P1 O Yes D6ecrepency Type: Calculation
@ N2 Systerrerocess: N/A NRC sigrdecence level: 3 Date faxed to NU:
Dole Publish 6J: 2r&Be
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06ecrepency: 0econdary Containmesnt Byoass Leakage Penetrations
==
Description:==
Curing review of calculation P(R) 1150, Rev. 0
- Containment Bypass Leakage Penetrations" the following discrepancies were identified:
- 1. On page 20 of calculation P(R) 1150, penetration 121 was not considesed as a byoass leakage path because a blind flange is attached to the opening of the containment vacuum test line inside the containment. P&lD EM 153A 19 shows the blind flange installed on line 3-CVS-002 54-4. Since this is a class 4 line, pene,tration #121 should have been considered as a bypass leakage path similiar to penetration #35 & 36.
- 2. On page 17 of calculation P(R) 1150, penetrations 93,94,95:-
a) calculation references FSAR section 6.3.2.8 for minimum elapsed time from a LOCA signal to the receipt of the RWST low-low level signal Instead of referencing a design calculation.-
b) calculation does not provide a reference for the 25'-5" low low RWST water level.
c) Calculation uses a containment pressure of 0 psig at 1000 sec (max ESF) and 2000 sec (min ESF) based on calculation US(8)-273 Rev. 3. Calculation US(B)-273 Rev. 5 & 6 shows a containment pressure of approx. 5.5 psig at 2000 sec (min ESF).
The top elevation of the piping in the containment is approximately 19'. Calculation needs to address the impact of the higher containment pressure and elevation of the piping insioe containment has on the differential pressure across check valve 'V9 and *V3.
d) Calculation does not address the time it takes for the upstream and downstream pressure at valve 'V9 (or *V3) to eg size and if it occurs before isolation valve *n4V8809A/B is mt nually closed. With stagnant conditions and the ! solation valves open, diffusion of radionuclides back to the RWST should be addressed,
- 3. On page 18 of calculation P(R) 1150, penetrations 9t & 92:-
Calculation uses justification for penetrations 93,94, & 95 to exclude penetrations 91 and 92 as bypass leakege penetrations.
Comments on 93,94, & 95 also apply to penetrations 91 & 92.
- 4. FSAR Table 6.2-65
- Containment Penetrations
- Identifies bypass leakage penetrations. The table does not include the following penetrations that are identified in calculation P(R)-1150 as bypass leakage penetrations: #24,27,39,59,60,99,100, 102,103, 404r405,109,
- 10, *
- 1,142,113,114,
- 15,14:N2
% m a pg
Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR41P31016 Miiist:n Unit 3 Discrepancy Report 124.
- 5. OPS Form 3273 3/4.3.6.1.2 Table 3.6.1.21 'SecoMary Containment Boundary Bypass Leakage Paths' does flot include the following penetrations that are identified in calculation P(R).
1150 as bypass leaktge penetrations: #24,27,26,29,39,99, 100,102,103,104,105,109,110,111,112,113,114,115, and 120.
Review Vek kveN NoodWA Date initiator: Stout. M. D.
Q Q
O 2/1W96 VT Leed: Neri, Anthony A Q
Q 2/1346 VT Mgr: Schopfer, Don K D
Q 2/1W96 1RC Chmn: Singh, Anand K Q
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2/1996 Date:
aNALID:
Date:
l RESOLUTION:
Previously iderWHled by NU7 Q Yes () No Non D6ecrepent Condellon?O voo (9) No R..oMion P.asinerO va @ No ResoM6onUnendved?O vos @ No Review Acc6PteWe Not Acceptable Needed Date gggg g VT Lead: Neri, Anthony A VT Mgr: Schop8er Don K IRC Chmn: Singh, Anand K g
Date:
sL Commente:
Printed 2/2098 2:4221 PM Pope 2 of 2
Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR-MP31944 Millstone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report Rsview Oroup; system DR VALID R*vtew Element: Modhadon Design p,,
gy D6eciphne: M Doetm Ow DI-crepency Type? Componord Date gg system /Procese: NEW NRc stormaence level: 3 Date faxed to NU:
Dese Pubei hed: 2rnee
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D6ecrepency: New valves added by DCRs M3 97042,97045, & 97094 Descrl 88an: The FSAR contains specific requirements tvith respect to design P
of valves in the emergency core cooling systems.
New valves have been 9dded to the containment recirculation spray system as follows:
1.
DCR M3-97094 adds new safety related gate valves 3RSS*V890,891,892,893.
- 11. DCR M3 97042 adds new safety related gate valves 3RSS*V895,897.
Ill. DCR M3 97045 adds new safety related gate valves 3RSS*V899,901,902,903, 904,905,908, cnd safety related check valves 3RSS*V907, 908, 909,910.
The valves listed above are procured to design specification SP.
ME 574. Design drawings for these valves, excluding valves 3RSS*V890,891,892,893, have not been entered into the Millstone Unit 3 drawing systern. Drawing 2282.150 713-018 is added by DCNs DM3 00187197 and DM3-001872 97 for valves 3RSS*V890, 891, 892, 893. Based on the information in specification SP ME 574 Revir!on 0 and the available drawings for the new valves, discrepancies against system requirements are identified as follows:
- 1. Use of stainless sten is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.44.
(FSAR Sechon 8.1.1.a, and Tables 1.6 1 & 1.8N 1)
Compliance with the requirement for all new valves cannot be confirmed.
- 2. Cold-worked austenitic stanless steels do not have a yield strengh in excess of 90,000 psl.
(FSAR Section 8.1.1.1)
Compliance with the requirement cannot be confirmed for components of gate valves 3RSS*V895,897,899, 901,902,903,904,905,906, and check valves 3RSS*V907,908,909,910, (excludin0 the body & bonnet of the gate valves and excluding the body of the check valves).
The valve stem and bonnet studs for valves 3RSS*V890,891,982,893 are ASTM A 564 'rype 630.
The yleid stress for this stainless steel is greater than hhAnn 1
"' P' Pope 1 of 3 PrWed 2Cose 2A3 55 PM
Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR N3. DR MP31944 Millst:ne Unit 3 Discrepancy Report
- 3. Valve stem materials are corrosion & scoring resistant and have high tensile strength.
(FSAR Section 6.3.2.4) l Compliance with the requirement ccnnot be confirmed for gate valves 3RSS*V895,896,899,901,902,903,904, 905,906.
- 4. Valve seating surfaces are hard faced with Stellite number 6 or equivalent.
(FSAR Sedion 6.3.2.4)
Compliance with the requirement cannot be confirmed for 9ste valves 3RSS*V895,897,899,901,902,903,904, 905,306, and check valves 3RGS*V907,908,909,910.
- 5. Check va'lves are spring loaded lift piston for sizss 2 inches & smaller, (FSAR Sedion 6.3.2.2.5)
Compliance with the requireme'it cannot be confirmed for check valves 3RSS*V907,908,909,910.
- 6. Manual gate valves employ a straight throu9h wedge design with either split or solid wedge.
(FSAR Sedion 6.3.2.2.5)
Compliance with the requirement cannot be confirmed for gate valves 3RSS*V895,897,899,901,902,903,904, 905,906.
- 7. Aluminum and zine are not used in safety related components ttist fundion post accident.
(FSAR Sedion 6.1.1.2)
Compliance with the reouirement cannot be confirmed for components of gate valvas 3RSS*V895,897,899,901, 902,903,904,905,906 and check valves 3RSS*V907, 908,909,910, (excluding the body & bonnet of the gate valves and excluding the body of the check valves).
Compliance with the requirement cannot be confirmed for components of gate valves 3RSS*V895,897,899,901, j
l 902,903,904,905,906 and check valves 3RSS*V907,
(
908,909,910,(excluding the body & bonnet of the gate valves and excluding the body of the check va'ves).
The valve yoke nut, packing nuts, and bo;inet studs for valves 3RSS*V890,891,982,893 are ASTM B 183, A 582, and A 564 Type 630, respedively. These materials 00 aot conform to FSAR Table 6.1 1 for their respective parts.
Printed 2rK/96 2.4356 PM Page 2 or 3
Northeast Utilnies ICAVP DR No. DR-MP3-1944 Millst:ne Unit 3 Discrepilncy Report
- 9. High quarty coatings are applied to hems with small surf ace areas (c.g., valve hand wheels).
(FSAR Section 6.1.2.2)
Compliance with the requirement cannot be connrmed for gate valves 3RSS*V895,897. 899,901,902,903,904, 905,906.
10, Manual 9 ate valves have backseat and outside screw and yoke construction. Containment recirculation system valves are selected to reduce potential leaka90.
(FSAR Sections 6.3.2.2.5 & 6.2.2.2., respectively)
Compliance with the requirement cannot be confirmed for gate valves 3RSS*V895,897,899,901,902,903,904, 905,906.
No backseat can be identified on valver,3RSS*V890, 891,982,893.
Review vand invahd Needed Date initiator: Feingold, D. J.
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INVALID:
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RESOLUTION:
Previously identined by NU7 Q Yee @ No Non D6ecrepent Condit6on?U Yes @ No
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Resolution Per. Jing 70 Y.e
@ No Resoiuiion unreeoived70 Yee @ No Review ACC*Ptable Not A -r,"
Needed Date g,; y O
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sL Commente:
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N:rthe::t UtWties ICAVP DR No. DR MP31049 Millst:ne Unit 3 Discrepancy Report Rev6ew Group: system DR VALID Rev6ew Element: CorrectNo Achon Process tMecipl6ne: I & C LWign O Ya D6screpancy Type: CorrectNo Acton Irnpiementation gg systerWProcess: NEW NRC sigedecence level: 3 Date faxed to NU:
Date Putsshed: 2/2N96 D6*crepency: Inadequate technical closure of UIR 2451 Descri *on: UIR 2451 reported:"various Instruments are CAT 1 and the f
associated set point calculations are QA CAT 2*; the UIR specifically lists Emergency Diesel Generator (DGX) System instrument setpoint calculations SP 3 EGO 1 Rev 0 SP 3EGS-1 Rev 0, SP 3EGS-4 Rev 1, SP 3EGS 5 Rev 1, sad SP 3EGS 7 Rev 1. Resolution of this UIR was tracked via A/R 97018724-01 which, as of 9/6/97, stated:'MMOD MS-97511 has been conipleted that has corrected all these calculations,"
A review of the latest versions of these setpoint calculations revealed that they were re-labeled " CAT 1" but the calculation methodology itself was not upgraded to meet the requirements of RG 1.105 Rev.1 as committed to by NU. The latest versions of these calculations f all to analyze the impact of instrument inaccuracy, calibration uncertainty, and instrument drift upon their respective instrument setpoint values, Rev6ew Valid involki No W Date initiator: Reed,Wilhem.
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RESOLUTION:
Prevlously identised by NU? O Yes @ No Nm D6scrW Condition?U Yes @ No Resolution Pending70 vos @ No Resoiuiion vare.oev.dtO vos @ No Rev6ew Acceptable Not Accardam Naoded Dele g
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Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP31061 Millst:ne UnN 3 Discrepancy Report Review aroup. sysism DRvAuD Review Element: correctw Action Procese p
Diecipline: Mechanical Design ypg Discrepency Type: Correctw Action implementation g
systemProcess: RSS NRC signiacence level: 4 Dele faxed to NU Deee Putdlehed: 2/239e 06screpancy: UIR 1035 D**cripe6en: UlR 1035 describes the sump compilance with RG 1.82, Position
- 10. Calculation PE 029 does not address all the requirements of Positlen 10. The calculation only considers the RSS spray nozzles, but should include all functions and systems which are served by tne sump including SlH, CHS and RCS for recirculation mode. The SlH ti.rottle valvbe are open less than the screen mesh size resulting in possible blockage.
The UIR Close Out Report concludes that CCN 2 to Calcula ~.i PE 029, Rev, O was approved, thus completin0 the necessary actions for closure. The CCN provides a resolution to the problem with the sump screens. but leaves compliance 'pending on the implementation of DCR # M3-96-077.' The DCR installs new o,1fices in the ECCS injection lines allowing a larger opening in the throttle valves; satisfying RG 1.62, Position 10.
This is an administrative error. There is no mechanism for track!ng the DCR closure to the calculation.
Review Valid invelld Needed Date initiator: Langel, D-G O
O 2/ir/se VT Lead: Neri, Anthony A Q
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Date:
RESOLUTION:
Prev 60usly identifled by NU? O Yes (ej No Non D6ecrepent cwlition?U vee (f) No Resolution Pending?O vos @ No ResolutionUnroselved?O vos @ No Review Accepte de Not ^= ;* "- Needed Date n
VT Lead: Nort. Anthony A VT Mgr: schopfer. Don K 1RC Chmn: Singh, Anand K g
Date:
bL Conwnerne:
Printed 2/2096 2A690 PM Pege 1 or 1
N:rtheast Utilitka ICAVP DR No. OR MP31983 Millst:ne Unit 3 Discrepancy Report Review Oroup: System DRVAUD Review Element: system Design g
O vee D6ecropency Type: Calculoaan g
systemiProcess: NEW NRC SterMconce level:3 Date MXed to W:
Date Publ6ehed: 2/ 3 96 D6*cropency: Calculation 17273.09-US(B) 341 Rev.2 Descript6nn:
REFERENCES:
- 1. Millstone FSAR Chapters 6 and 15,
- 2. SRP 6.5.2,' Containment Spray as a Fission Product Cleanup System', U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Standard Review Plan Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NUREG-800, Rev.2, dated December 1988.
- 3. SWEC Calculation 12179-US(B) 280, Rev.0, 'Estlinate:
Quench Spray lodine Removal Coefficients for Risk Assessment Purposes' dated 09/30/82.
- 4. Calculation 12179-US(B) 229 Rev.1 ' Quench and Recirculation Headers', dated 02/04/83.
- 5. Calculation 12179-US(B) 227, Rev 0, ' Containment Structure Free Volume *, riated 02/04/80.
- 6. Calculation 12179 US(B) 319 Rev.1, ' Containment Heat Sinks", dated 09/02/97.
- 7. Calculation 12179 US(B) 273. Rev.6, ' Containment Pressure and Temperature Analysis', Following A t.OCA', dated 10/23/97.
Calculation 17273.09 US(B) 341 Rev.2 calculates elemental and particulate lodine removal coefficients using the temperature and pressure response of the containment. The new reponse is based on epdated data for the heat sinks, recirculation flowrate and the consideration of an MCC failure.
I ICAVP has reviewed Calculation 17273.09-US(B) 341 Rev.2 and the above references and has tis following comments:
- 1. The quenched sprayed volume is made up of two aggregate values,902,000 and 264,000 ft3 as noted on page 11 of the calculation. Calculation US(B)-280 Rev.0 is the reference for 902.000 fl3, but has been volded. DR MP3-0682 has been written on this issue.
- 2. Within the body of Calculation 17273.09 US(B)-341 Rev.2 two (2) values of the containment free volume are used in the analysis,2.35 E+06 cubic feet on page 11 and 2.26 E+06 cubic feet on page 18. Researching the FSAR finds these values in Table 64.2 3 :-d4.2 00, recpe'N:y. Th::: vir dgeg p
g
(
Northe:st Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP31063 Millst:n. Unit 3 Discrepancy Report in the above References 5 and 7 respedively. One value of the containment free volume should be chosen for calculational purposes.
- 4. The time line described on pege 15 for Cases 1,2 and 4 does not use the starJstop time values 70.2,827.2 and 10,000.0 seconds on page 13 of US(Br253, Rev.5 and US(B) 273, ReV.6, page 18 Table 5.
- 5. On page ig, the diffusivity of lodine in the gas film surrounding the drop, Dg, for this analysis is obtained for four contain nent temperatures by linearly interpolating data on page 11 of this calculation. However, Case 1 and Case 2 temperatures exceed the highest tempe sture in the data that provides the basis for the interpolation. It is not clear how the Dg for Cases 1 and 2 are obtained.
- 6. The text on page 27 refer to particulate removal coefficients for quench spray only operation and for simultaneous quench and recirculation spray operation. On the same page two (2) tables of results are provided. One is for quench spray only operating and the other is for recirculation spray only operating.
There is no table for simultaneous quench and recirculation spray ooerstion provided. The text on page 28 again refer to l
particulate removal coefficients for quench spray only operation l
and for simultaneous quench and recirculation spray operation.
On pages 28 and 29 one table for particulate results are provided on each page. One is for quench spray only opeating and the other is for recirculation spray only cperating. There is no table for simultaneous quench and reci culation spray operation provided. Additionally the particulate removal coefficients in the Calculation Section on page 27 ce different than those in the Conclusion and Results Section on page 29.
CONCLUSION The lodine removal coefficients are calculated using the formulas in Standard Review Plan 8.5.2. The fadors in these formulas depend, di,ectly or indirectly, on mechanical parameters such as containment free volume, spray pump flow rates, temperatures, densitiec, etc. Therefore a slight variation in containment free volume, temperature time line or any other calculational parameter may propagate through the analysis to the iodine removal coefficients. After resolJtion of the DRs written against some of the paiemeters in this analysis, calculation 17273.09-US(B) 341 Rev.2 should be revised to incorporate the redocumented calculational inputs.
Review VeN Invalid Needed Date initiator: Schwartz, Barry G
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DR No. DR-MP31083 N:rtheest Utiliths ICAVP Millstone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report Date:
RESOLt/ TION:
Previously klontiflod by NU? Q Yes @ No NonbetepentConstion?Q Yes
@ No MaolctionPondiastO Ya @ No Re.uion un,.wvedtO v.
@ No Review Acceptable Not Acceptable Needed Oste initietor: (none)
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Northe:st Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP31064 Mill:t:ne Unit 3 Discrepancy Report
- n. view o,,: conne.non DavAup nevlow Elemeat: system instehnten pg D6ecipiena: E W Doolgn O va D6ecropency Type: Instenshan implementeten
@ No systemeroceda: N/A NRC sientacance level:3 Date faxed to NU:
Deee Putdlehed: 2/2ne D6ecrepency: Miscellaneous Difference:;in Insta; led Configuration / Drawings /
Standards.
DactiPilan: The following miscellaneous drawing discrepancies, differences in installed configuration, and deviations from standards were noted as part of the system reviews /walkdowns, ite m 1 The Electrical Installation Specification E 350. Procedure OA-g, and the Cable and Raceway Control Program (TSO2) require that cables be tagged lli the field, Contrary to this requirement the following cables were found not to have Idsntifications tags at the Indicated locations or as shoMi on the reference drawings,
- i. Cable 3EGPAOC405, Reference drawing EE 3ATA Rev.1
- 2. Cable 3EGEBPX400, Reference drawing EE 3ATZ Rev. 4 3, Cable 3SWPBPX235, Reference drawing EE 3NU Rev.
- 4. Cable 3SWPBPX400. Refeience drawing EE 3ABK Rev. 3
- 5. Cable for wires landed at terminal block 4T10 points 1 and 2, Reference drawing EE 3JD Rev. 4 Item 2 The following differences in the oterved Installed wiring and that shown on the connection diagram EE 3ATZ Rev. 4, at
. Panel 3CES*MCB-MB8, were noted during walkdowns:
- 1. Terminal Block HCG Point 21 has no conductors landed whereas the referenced drawing indicates two white wires should be terminated.
- 2. Terminal Block HCG Point 23 has e single white wire terminated whereas the drawing indicates a black wire should be terminated at this point,
- 3. Terminal Block HCG Point 24 has only one shield wire terminated whereas the drawing Indicates that two shleids should be terminated at this point.
Item 3 The following terminations were contrary to that shown on the reference drawings.
- 1. Cable 3RSSAOC501 is shown with its black conductor terminated - this wire is not terminated. (Reference Drawing EE-3JT, Rev. 3)
PrWed 2/2096 2:47:32 PM Pege 1 or 3 J
N >rtheast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP31068 Miltt:ne UnN 3 Discrcpancy Report
- 2. Cable 3RSSAOC502 is shown with its white condudor terminated - this wire is not terminated. (Reierence Drawing EE-3JT, Rev. 3)
- 3. Based on the color coding of the conductors, the wires at Terminal Block 820, Points 9 and 12 of Panel 3RPS*PNLSAFA1, are reversed. (Reference Drawing EE 3JQ, Rev. 6) llem 4 The Cable and Raceway Control Program (TSO2) Indicates thct cable 3HVRAOX251 is spare per DCH DMS-00-0256-96. This cable was observed in Panel 3CES*lPNLl22 as spare per DCN DMS-001569 97. GRITS shows DCN DM3-00-0256-96 as outstanding for the connection diagram for this location (EE-3NX, Rev. 4),
item $
The Single Line Diagrams fall to show the local / remote switch for the SWP, QSS, RSS pumps supplied from the safety related 4160V bused (340 and 340). The single line also falls to show the Lead / Lag switch for pump 3SWP*P18. (Reference Single Line Diagrams EE 1M, Rev. 30 and EE 1N, Rev 9)
Item 6 Conduits 3FX767N04, NOS, N06 entering the bottom of Panel 3CES*PNLBE2P were observed not to be sealed contrary to the requirements of Electrical Installation Specification E 350, Rev.
- 9. (Reference drawing EE 7G) ltem 7 Drawing EE 7BX, Rev. 6 shows two cables as 'F* terminating at TB4 The upper one cf these cables is actually cable 'E
- ltem 8 The *MCC Layout & Bill of Material * *~. ings for all of the MCCs have been voided. (Example drawing. 15.600 244 029 for MCC 3EHS*MCC1 A4) These drawings contain several pieces of information regarding the size, type and setting of control circuit components as well as MCC bus ratings and engravings. All of the setting / size information was to be relocated to Specification (ME)-EE 321. Review of this specification revealed a significant lack of inform ation that was included on the now voided drawings. It was further Indicated that the nameplati engravings were to be per the single line diagrams; comparison of the installed placards with the text for the loads on the single line found little (verbatim) agreement No other source for the information has been identified.
Review Vaud invalid Needed Dale init6elor: server. T. L y
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Northea:t Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP31064 Mill *t n* Unit 3 Discrepancy Report VT Lead Nort, Anthony A R
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Date:
RE.OLUTION:
Prw6ously ideMM by NU7 U Yes % No Non Descropont Conetkm7U Yes (e) No n**ikm reamastO va @ No Mu h m m untn W ed7 0 vos @ No ne*w Acc*ptable Not Acceptable Needed Date gg, gar; p )
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Northe:st Utilkies ICAVP DR No. DR MP31060 Millst:n UnN 3 Discrepancy Report
'teview Orcup: system DR VALID Review Element: ConectNe Action Procese p
g O Yee Diecrepency Type: CorrectNo Action implemertshon gg systemrerocese: Rss NRC sipreconce levet: 3 Date faxed to PA):
De'.e Published: 2r239e Deecrepmcy: ACR 12862 D* cription: ACR 12662 requests a review of the RSS MOVs with respect to the increased design temperature of 260 'F, Action item 3 (Action Request Tracking Number 96006441-03) was to evaluate the Torque / Thrust Calculations for the increased RSS temperature and revise as necesssry. Calculations 89-094-0899ES,89-094 0987ES,89-0941028ES & 89-0941030ES were not updated.
Tt.e action was transferred to the Action Request (A/R) Tracking Number 97003504 01. This Action Request is a review of test results to all the MOV calculations. This is due to changes in the MOV Program Manual and to industry issues. ' A/R 97003504 01 does not address the RSS temperature chan0e. Therefore, there is no mechanism to ensure the above calculations are revised to incorporate the revised RSS Temperature.
The due date for A/R 97003504-01 is 09/09/1999. The operability evaluation determined that the system is operable in Modes 5 and 6, but additional analysis is required to demonstrate operability for Modes 1 through 4.
Rev6ew Veild invalid Needed Date init6etor: Longel, D.
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RESOLUTION:
Preymoty identiaed by Nu? U Yee @ No Non Discrepent Condalon?Q Yee @ No Reeolution Pend 6ng?O Yee @ No Renaiuiionunreativ.deO Yee @ No Rev6ew Accepteble Not Accostchie Needed Date VT Lead: Nort, Anthony A VT Mgr: Schopfer, Don K IRC Chmn: Singh, Anand K O
O Date:
sL conynente:
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N:rtheC t Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR44P31961 Millst:rm Unit 3 Discrepancy Report n.w,. areu,:s, tem onvAuD neview timment: Modecanon Design concipane: Mechaniced Desi'"
O vee Deserepeney Type: Conoceve Acuan gg systerWPressee: DGX NRC signiscence level: 4 Date faxed to NU:
Date Puedlehed: 2/2s/es D weepency: Jacket Water Temperature Control Valve Classification r7.^
Review of the modification package for PDCR MS 96076 resulted in the following discrepancies:
- 1. FSARCR # 96-MP3 61 Initiated changes to the FSAR which included adding Jacket water temperature regulating valve to the list of engine-mounted components not covered by ASME Sedion lil, but which are designed in accordance with the diesel manufacturer's latest standards for reliability. The FSAR April 1997 issue confirms that the jacket water temperature regulating valve was incorporated into the list of components not covered by ASME Sedion lit. Thus, per FSAR, the valve is a non ASME lit ocmponent.
However, the seismic qualification report SQR No. 3 9' '26
. states thot the Jacket water temperature control valve L sel*mically qualified because it is an ASME Ill C!sss 3 valve. in addition, the Safety Evaluation No MS-96076, Sedion 1.3 also states that "The replacement is an ASME Section 111, Class 3 valve.' The r,afety evaluation is a part of the FSARCR # 96-MP3-61, and the FSARCR and the seismic report are included with the modification package.
- 2. The copy of the FSARCR # 96 MP3-61 submitted with the PDCR MS-96-076 modification package is different from the copy included with the implementation package for Unresolved item Report 579. The difference is that the sheets 2 and 4 of the copy of FSARCR la the modification package contain additional information; page 4 includes an additional change to the FSAR (adding the jacket water temperature regulating valve to the list of components not covered by C M Sedion 111). Per FSAR April 1997 update, this additional ego was incorporated in the FSAR. Therefore, the chenrps (
rporated in the FSAR per FSARCR # 96-MP3-61 do not match the changes identified in the copy of FSARCR # 96-MP3 61 enclosed with the implementation package for UIR 579.
noview vand invahd Needed Date inittster: Oberenal,Bejen.
y
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Date:
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Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR N2, DR MP31M1 Millst:n UnM 3 Discrepancy Report RESOLUTION:
Previously iderd6hed by NU? U Yes (e) No NonD6screpardCordn6on?U Yo.
(9) No ResolutkmPend6netO ve. @ No Re.ouwunte.avedtO v
@ No Revtew Acceptelde Not Me?7 ' '- Needed Date g,
VT Lead: Nort Anthony A O
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SL Coromonte:
i D
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Northeast UtilMes ICAVP DR No. DR MP31063 Millst:ne Unit 3 Discrepancy Report neview aroup: system DR VAUD Moview Elemord: Correcthe Action Procese Diecipune: Mechernoet
- O v.
D6screpency Type: Conoceve AWon implementclean g
systemerecese: Rss NRC s:,,J m tevel: 3 Date faxed to NU:
Deee Putdlehed: 2/23ee Dkrepancy: Closing MOV20s for Long Term Recirculation Descript6en: UIR 1189 requests clarification of the closing stroke for Valves 3RES'MOV20A/B/C/D. The valves close for containment isolation and for long term recirculation.
Forlong term recirculation:
Calculation NM-027 ALL states that two of the valves are closed during switchover.
The Pump and Valve Testing Basis Document states that the valve closes if the associated train is rerouted. The UIR changed this document to state that the A & B valves close for recirculation.
The SFR Manual states that only the A & B valves are closed and only valves 3RSSWOV6837A/B open.
The three documents are now in agreement. However, Modification DCR 97045 changed the logic for the system.
Valves 3RSS*MOV8838A/B (RSS Looos C & D) may be open for Injection or long term recirculation. The modification does not change or addrest any of the above documents with respect to this issue, noview belld Inveed Needed Date Intension Largel,D.
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INVAUD:
Date:
nEsoLUTgoN:
Previously identilled by NUf (.) Yee @ No Non D6ecrepent Conditiont( ) Yee @ No
- n. iunon p.adinstO va @ No nee *iw unr *edrO va @ No neview q_7 -. _ m_
g g '.-
Needed Date nameier: (none)
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Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR N3. DR-MP310H Millst:ne Unit 3 Discrcpancy Report Review 5oup: Programmenc DR VALIO Review Element: Correcthe Achon Process g
Diecipline: Other y
Diecropency Type: CorrectMr Acton g
systemProcese: Rss NRC signmcance level
- 4 Date faxed to NU:
Date Publ6shed: 2/2396 Dkrepency: Significance Level for ACR 10382 Dacript6en: The Reportability Evaluation which was performed determined that the concem was reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)0il) and 50.72(b)(1)01). The evaluation concluded that a seimic event could have resulted in the loss of one of two heat exchangers in each of the tym trains of RSS.
The ACR was assigned as significance level D. Given the circumstances, it is considered that the significance level assigned was not appropriate and that root cause determination should have been performed.
Review Velid loveNd Needed Date initiator: Neverro, Mark G
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2ri7aie VT Leed: Ryan, Thomme J G
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atiraie VT Mgr Schapter. Don K Q
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2/169e IRC Chmn: Singh, Anand K G
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2ris9e Date:
INVAUD:
Dele:
RESOLUTION
- Previously identmed by NU7 O Yes @ No Non Discrepent Condition?U Yes
@ No Resolut6cn Pending70 va @ No Resouwuntadv.d?O va @ No Review Mr,
Not F- ;' "- Needed Date VT Leed: Rpn, Thomme J VT Mgr: Schepier, Don K 1RC Chmn: Singh, Anand K g
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Date:
sL Comments:
Printed 2/20S6 2:54:11 PM PeGe 1 W 1
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