ML20202J397

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Forwards Request for Addl Info Re TMI Item II.E.4.2(6) Concerning Purge & Vent Valve Operability
ML20202J397
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook  
Issue date: 04/07/1986
From: Nerses V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Harrison R
PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
References
TASK-2.E.4.2, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8604160026
Download: ML20202J397 (7)


Text

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1 APR 7 1986 Docket Nos.: 50-443 DISTRIBUTION and 50-444 4Decliet File NRC PDR PD5 Reading LPDR MRushbrook Attorney, ELD Mr. Robert J. Harrison JPartlow ACRS (10)

President & Chief Executive Officer BGrimes Public Service Company of New Hampshire GBagchi Post Offfce Box 330 ERossi Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 NRomney EJordan

Dear Mr. Harrison:

VNerses

Subject:

Request for Additional Information from Seabrook Regarding TMI l

Item II.E.4.2.(6) l To complete our review of TMI item II.E.4.2.(6), we request you address the enclosed request for additional information.

To prevent any further delays from completing our review, I would appreciate it if you would provide an eg editious response.

Questions or additional information regarding this matter should be directed to me at (301) 492-8535.

Sincerely, h

\\

Victor Nerses, Project Manager PWR Project Directorate No. 5 Division of PWR Licensing-B

Enclosure:

As stated cc: See next page J

p/yt 4/7 /86

$[k A

Mr. Robert J. Harrison Public Service Company of New Hampshire Seabrook Nuclear Power Station cc:

Thomas Dignan, Esq.

E. Tupper Kinder, Esq.

John A. Ritscher, Esq.

G. Dana Bisbee, Esq.

Ropes and Gray Assistant Attorney General 225 Franklin Street Office of Attorney General Boston, Massachusetts 02110 208 State Hosue Annex Concord, New Hampshire 03301 Mr. Bruce B. Beckley, Project Manager Public Service Company of New Hampshire Resident Inspector Post Office Box 330 Seabrook Nuclear Power Station Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 c/o US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Post Office Box 700 Dr. Mauray Tye, President Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Sun Valley Association 209 Sumer Street Mr. John DeVincentis, Director Haverhill, Massachusetts 01839 Engineering and Licensing I

Robert A. Backus, Esq.

Yankee Atomic Electric Company I

1671 Worchester Road O'Neil, Backus and Spielman Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 116 Lowell Street Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Mr. A. M. Ebner, Project Manager United Engineers & Constructors William S. Jordan, III 30 South 17th Street Diane Curran Post Office Box 8223 Hannon, Weiss & Jordan 20001 S Street, NW Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Suite 430 Washington, D.C.

20009 Mr. Philip Ahrens, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General State House, Station #6 Augusta, Maine 04333 Jo Ann Shotwell, Esq.

Office of the Assistant Attorney General Mr. Warren Hall Environmental Protection Division One Ashburton Place Public Service Company of Boston, Massachusetts 02108 New Hampshire Post Office Box 330 D. Pierre G. Cameron, Jr., Esq.

Seaorook, New Hampshire 03874 General Counsel Public Service Company of New Hampshire Seacoast Anti-Pollution League Post Office Box 330 Ms. Jane Doughty Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 5 Market Street Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Diana P. Randall 631 Park Avenue 70 Collins Street King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Richard Hampe, Esq.

1 New Hampshire Civil Defense Agency 107 Pleasant Street Concord, New Hampshire 03301

Public Service Company of

. Seabrook Nuclear Power Station New Hampshire cc:

Mr. Calvin A. Canney, City Manager Mr. Alfred V. Sargent, City Hall Chairman 126 Daniel Street Board of Selectmen Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 Town of Salisbury, MA 01950 Ms. Letty Hett Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Town of Brentwood ATTN: Tom Burack RFD Dalton Road U.S. Senate Brentwood, New Hampshire 03833 Washington, D.C.

20510 Ms. Roberta C. Pevear Mr. Owen B. Durgin, Chairman Town of Hampton Falls, New Hampshire Durham Board of Selectmen Orinkwater Road Town of Durham Hampton Falls, New Hampshire 03844 Durham, New Hampshire 03824 Ms. Sandra Gavutis Charles Cross, Esq.

Town of Kensington, New Hampshire Shaines, hardrigan and RDF 1 McEaschern East Kingston, New Hampshire 03827 25 Maplewood Avenue Post Gifice Box 366 Chairman, Soard of Selectmen Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 RFD 2 South Hampton, New Hampshire 03827 Mr. Guy Chichester, Chaiman Rye Nuclear Intervention Mr. Angie Machiros, Chairman Committee Board of Selectmen c/o Rye Town Hall for the Town of Newbury 10 Central Road Newbury, Massachusetts 01950 Rye, New Hampshire 03870 Ms. Cashman, Chairman Board of Selectmen Jane Spector Town of Amesbury Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Town Hall 825 North Capital Street, NE Amesbury, Massachusetts 01913 Room 8105 Honorable Peter J. Matthews Washington, D. C.

20426 Mayor, City of Newburyport Office of the Mayor Mr. R. Sweeney City Hall New Hampshire Yankee Division Public Service of New Hampshire Newburyport, Massachusetts 01950 Company 7910 Woodmont Avenue Mr. Donald E. Chick, Town Manager Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Town of Exeter 10 Front Street Mr. William B. Derrickson Exeter, New Hampshire 03823 T&nior Vice President Public Service Company of New Hampshire Post Office Box 700, Route 1 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874

+

ENCLOSURE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SEABROOK STATION UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-443 PURGE AND VENi VALVE OPERABILITY - TMI II.E.4.2(6)

References:

N-1.

J. DeVincentis, Directo'r, Engineering and Licensing, Public Service of s

New Hampshire, New Hampshire Yankee Division letter to G. W. Knighton, Chief, Licensing Branch 3, Division of Licensing, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Seabrook Station Units 1 and 2.

Response to RAI 271.12; Containment Purge and Vent Valve Operability, 5BN-889, NRC Accession N. 8511110156, November 6, 1985.

2.

Operability Demonstration of the PSI C0P Valves for Public Service Company of New Hampshire, et al, perfomed by Stearns - Roger Manufacturers, Inc., Job No. 62483, United Engineers and Constructors, Inc. (UEAC) Foreign Print No. FP-97786-01, January 22, 1985.

3.

Nuclear Seismic and LOCA Analysis, performed by Posi-Seal International, Inc. Report No. 289885L - 001, UE8C Foreign Print No.,

FP-93610-03, August 22, 1985.

Questions:

1.

Identify the accident event and sequence which will pvoduce the peak containment pressure used in qualifying the valves.

(a) Cite the specific FSAR sections, tables, and figures associated with this worst case event.

(b) Indicate the maximum containment pressure and temperature after event initiation.

(c) Identify the minimum values of pressure and temperature which initiate containment isolation.

(d) Identify the maximum allowable closing times for valves COP-V-1,

-2,

-3, and -4.

(e) Describe the technical basis for using 17 psig as the containment Reference 3) pressure due to a LOCA event (page 17 of If appropriate, submit a cop of UEC Change Order 23 dated October 18,1982 (Document _(y) of Reference 3).

e 2.

It is not clear whether the valves have successfully passed the leak tests reported in Table I of Reference 2.

(a) Describe the purpose of the leak tests, as well as the basis for acceptance.

~ 1 (b) Describe the corrective action taken to address the leakage reported in Table I.

If known, describe the cause of the leak.

(c) Explain why the tests were not repeated despite leaks observed at valves COP-V-1,

-2, and -3.

(d) Confirm that the leak test results do not adversely affect the validity of the flow tests reported in Tables II and III, Reference 2.

3.

There are several test anomalies which were nct addressed in the Seabrook submittal references 2 and 3.

1 (a) Valves COP-V-1 and -4 were tested with their stems 45* off vertical (Drawings 23167-1 and -2 of Reference 2). Justify the test configuration. Confim that the flow test results simulate the worst case condition for valves COP-V-1,

-2, -3, and -4 (b) Confirm that the failure of the upstream pressure transducer (section 2.4.4 Ref. 2) does not invalidate interpretation of the flow test data.

(c) Calibration of the strain gage assemblies in section 2.5.1 Ref 2, only to 150 ft-lb, although the maximum value of 223 ft.-lb was reported in Table II.

Confirm that the calibration technique is capable of determining the 223 ft. Ib. value.

4 Reference 1 identifies the maximum torque developed by the valve at LOCA pressure (17 psig) as 2568 in - lbs in the preferred flow direction. However, Table II of Reference 2 and Addendum A of Reference 3 list the maximum torque as 223 ft-lbs (2676 in - lbs).

Clarify the apparent discrepancy.

5.

The stresses presented in Addendum A of Reference ~ 3 incorporate results of the actual LOCA flow tests (2676 in - lbs) into the seismic analysis. The torque output of the valve actuator with the valve fully closed is 3260 in - lbs (Reference 1).

(a) Provide the actuator torque output versus valve opening angle in tabular or graphic form. Compare the actuator output with the maximum torque required to operate the valves.

(b) As discussed on page 7 of Addendum A, leakage of valve COP-V 4 was reduced by allowing the valve disc rotation to be stopped by the actuator stop rather than by the valve body stop.

Indicate whether this arrangement is representative of the as-built configuration at Seabrook. Confirm that the valve internals will not be overstressed by the maximum actuator torque.

)

3-6.

There are several responses in Reference 1 which need to be clarified.

N (a) Response 1 to' Attachment I states that valves COP-V-1, -2, -3, s'

and -4 are maintained partially open during normal operation.

Describe the normal position of the valves in terms of opening angle. Describe how the normal valve position.is maintained.

(For example is the valve blocked to a maximum opening angle?)

Compare the as-built plant configuration with the configuration used to perform the flow tests and stress analyses, and justify any discrepancies.

(b) Describe the technical basis for determining that the sonic-flow condition occurs at 29 psig.

(Reference 1, Response IE to

'l ) Provide the derivation of the maximum valve torque required for this condition.

(c) Valve leaks were reported in Table.I of Reference 2.

On pa'e 7 g

of Addendum A to Reference 3, the following statement was made.

3, "This leakage [of valve COP-V-4 was attributed to foreign matter which became embedded into the seal. This foreign matter could have increased the torque". It is not clear that sealing integrity will be ensured by the response given in Reference 1, Attachment 2 (Demonstration). Describe the technical basis to support the conclusion that the use.of debris screens as well as the periodic inservice inspection of the valve assembly _ will be sufficient to preclude the build-up of corrosion products or debris that could " lock-up" the valve stem or damage the sealing surfaces.

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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SEABROOK STATION, UNITS 1 & 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-443 AND 50-444 ENGINEERING BRANCH, PWR-A N

The applicant's response to the staff request for additional information

\\

relative to Integrated Design Inspection Finding 2-20, " Evaluation of det Impingement Effects" was submitted in Attachment 3 to a letter from J. DeVincentis to V. Noonan dated December 26, 1985. Questions No. I and 2 in the staff request were not addressed in the response and the responses to Questions No. 3 and 4 require clarification. To resolve this issue, the staff requests the following additional information:

1.

Provide an explicit statement that the two example analyses submitted in the response are bounding calculations and therefore safe shutdown of the Seabrook Station can be accomplished when the jet impingement loads in question are included in the evaluation of all safety-related target piping systems.

2.

The two example analyses assumed for conservatism that the jet source was considered to originate two pipe diameters from the target. However, because of the closeness of the source to the target, the full fluid force is not achieved until after the fluid has already reached the target pipe. Therefore, the dynamic load factor of 2.0 was applied to a force equal to 1/2 Fimp. Based on the information submitted in the above letter, the staff does not agree that the assumption of two pipe diameters is conservative. Although the break opening time of one millisecond is longer than the time required to reach the target, it appears that an impingement force larger than 1/2 Fimp could be developed. Provide a discussion of how the relationship

.between break opening time and the distance to the target results in 1/2 Fimp.

.