ML20202D436
| ML20202D436 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 07/07/1986 |
| From: | Gagliardo J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Andrews R OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8607140132 | |
| Download: ML20202D436 (5) | |
Text
4 JUL T 1986 In Reply Refer To:
Docket:
50-285 Omaha Public Power District ATTN:
R. L. Andrews, Division Manager-Nuclear Production 1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Gentlemen:
We have reviewed the scenario for the emergency preparedness exercise scheduled for June 1986, which you transmitted to us with your letter dated May 9,1986.
The review was to determine if all the major elements of response required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and Appendix E to Part 50,Section IV.F were addressed as stated in your exercise objectives. Our comments which were transmitted to you by facsimile on June 6, 1986, are contained in the enclosure to this letter.
If you have any questions in regard to this matter, please contact Mr. J. B.
Baird at (817) 860-8185.
Sincerely, sWnal Signed by;"
J. E. Gagliardo, Chief Reactor Projects Branch
Enclosure:
As stated I
cc:
W. G. Gates, Manager Fort Calhoun Station l
P. O. Box 399 Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023 Harry H. Voigt, Esq.
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 Kansas Radiation Control Program Director Nebraska Radiation Control Program Director bcc:
(see next page) g 1
't.
1 RIV:EP S f
C:EP&S S fS C:
C:RPB D:RL {t rt p R unte JEGagl a f JBBair J LAYande Q /p1/86 4/p/86 go/86 7// /86 7/3
/
8607140132 860707 ADOCK 050 g 5 p
PDR L
I Omaha Public Power District bcc to DMB (IE35) bcc distrib. by RIV:
RPB Resident Inspector R. D. Martin, RA R&SPB Section Chief (RPB/B)
MIS System RIV File DRSP RSTS Operator RSB R. L. Bangart L. A. Yandell J. B. Baird t
O# %c, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS'flON y
r h
REGION IV k,
8 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SulTE 1000 ARLINGTON. TEXAS 70011 FORT CALHOUN SCENARIO REVIEW A.
OBJECTIVES, CONTROLLER INSTRUCTIONS, CONTINGENCY MESSAGES, OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE ITEMS
- No list of simulations is enclosed in the scenario.
Recommend adding some instructions concerning offsite use of protec-tive clothing.
- With the exception of the first three, the exercise control messages are unnumbered. When this is corrected, there should.be some method of differentiating routine messages from " contingency / prompt" messages.
- Utility response to accountability and evacuation orders is not identified as a simulation.
Therefore, it is assumed that 100%
accountability will take place and all nonemergency workers will evacuate the site when appropriate.
- In view of the off hours start, since no prestaging of ERF personnel is identified, it is assumed that emergency worker recall will actu-ally take place.
- Situation A in message 0840 est. is prompting.
If no entry was made, how could one conclude that the 7428 valve pins are sheared, that the disk is free, and that the 742A seals are misaligned?
- Several messages are delivered to an addee "thru" another addee (e.g., 0937 is for the administrative support coordinator thru the administrative logistic manager).
These messages prompt the addee j
by telling him who to delegate the work function to.
The addee should be required to follow procedures, and within those con-straints, should be free to delegate as he sees fit.
l
- 0937 message, paragraph 2.
Training on what?
- Section 5, 0903 expected action, delete " fuel;" the cause is loss of two fission product barriers, not loss of two fuel barriers.
l
- Some of the EOF coordination messages fail to caution the addee that the purpose is merely to determine if or how and that no firm arrangements or contractual obligations should be incurred.
The
" simulate only" is on the controller notes section, a section which will not appear on the message delivered to the player (e.g., 1130 l
message).
l B.
ACCURACY OF EPIP E0P ASSUMPTIONS BY AUTHORS l
- The man is injured at 0901, he is found unconscious at 0905 and moved to decontamination at 0920 where his vital signs are first taken at t
L
0925.
They indicate he is in severe shock and suffering a probable concussion.
In spite of this he is put through the decontamination shower (see 0940 est message).
It appears that the scenario antici-pates that the first aid team will perform improperly by putting an injured contaminated man in severe shock with a probable concussion through the shower when life saving medical aid should prevail over decontamination.
- Alarms, alarms cleared, subcooling margin, and reactor vessel level nitoring system (RVLMS) readings are not provided on the status ms sheets.
This exercise artificiality may unfairly impede the control room staff in accident identification, classification, and in use of the emergency operating and restoration procedures.
C.
REACTOR PLANT, THERMAL-HYDRAULIC DATA ACCURACY
- The Summary (Section 2), Detailed Scenario (Section 5), and exercise Emergency Status Sheets (Section 6) are inconsistent with respect to containment pressure performance in that the first two discuss decreasing pressure from 1.5 psig to 0 psig and allowing the con-tainment to relieve pressure (e.g., containment venting positive pressure to atmosphere) while the corresponding status sheets show pressure decreasing from 1.4 psia to 0.1 psia (e.g., reaching an almost perfect vacuum).
It appears that the status sheet engineer-ing units are incorrect.
- The 0640-0740 message from the auxiliary building controller to the maintenance personnel states that " leak test will not allow pressure to hold."
It does not make sense but infers that a leak test was attempted and failed.
Usually, utilities do not leave leak test equipment in place since it is too expensive; I doubt that suffi-cient time has elapsed to rig for a conduct a leak test at this point in the scenario.
If not, how then can this statement be made?
- The 0900 status message, 3 minutes after the trip, indicates that average temperature has dropped 30 ; yet pressurizer level has remained constant.
Pressurizer level should be expected to decrease due to system shrink.
- I am unable to explain the lau'.' pressurizer level at 0930.
Although there is a 40 gpm LOCA with 90 gpm SI, the steam bubble has not shifted to the pressure vessel.
Did the operator lose level control?
- The LOCA increases to _1000 gpm at 0939 (Section 5, 0939 entry).
It would be immediately obvious to the operators in real life.
How-ever, it is not shown on the 0945 status sheet and the only indica-tion on the 1000 sheet is sprays on.
Pressurizer level has remained at 100% and the bubble has not shifted to the core as of 1000 (Tsat for a pressurizer pressure of 695 psia is 503, thus the pressurizer is still the hot spot).
The data is inconsistent.
Also, presenta-tion of data with a 20 minute time late is unfair to the control room operators.
2 Why does the minimum core exit thermocouple read 0 ? (Possible pos-tulated instrument failure but this should not be expected when maximum reading is 1545, e.g., 1045 status sheet.)
i
- p. ' ONSITE/IN-PLANT RADIOLOGICAL DATA ACCURACY The 0700 est. message to the HP technician prompts the HP by telling him he is taking air samples to determine what isotopes are present.
He should not be prompted by a controller but should instead know his job or be prebriefed on his mission prior to the survey.
- The 0700-0730 message to the auxiliary building operator /HP techni-cian is only delivered if the technician places his instrument up to the piping "which is blowing air slightly."
In actuality, there will be no audible air noisc, the controller should be instructed to inform the technician of the air noise.
Then, if he probes the area,-
the controller can tell him the counts increase noticeably.
E.
OFFSITE RADIOLOGICAL DATA ACCURACY
- Reactor power history is not provided.
It is relevant to source term determination.
- No beta / gamma separation of readings is provided for the purpose of locating the plume.
- Offsite radiological data is given at fixed monitoring points.
The data as presented does not allow accurate determination of plume location.
The specific concern is that controllers cannot provide accurate information on location of the plume centerline or bounda-ries with the data provided.
- Some radiological data tables were reproduced such that all data was not legible.
Assure that this does not occur with controller data.
- No post-accident sampling results of the reactor coolant system were provided.
i I
i l
3 i
l J