ML20202B088
| ML20202B088 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000036 |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1998 |
| From: | Sharkey R ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY, ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202B091 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-L30975, NUDOCS 9802110107 | |
| Download: ML20202B088 (2) | |
Text
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ABB Docket No. 70-36 License No. SNM 33 Director, Ofilce of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATFN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 0001
Subject:
Request for Additional Information, Unrestricted P-lease ofII drofluorie 3
Acid (TAC No. IJo975)
References:
A. CE's Request for Unrestricted Release ofIIF, dated August 12,1997.
B. NRC Request for Addit lonal Infbrmation (RAI), dated November 6,1997.
C. CE's reply to RAI, dated December 8,1997.
D. NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI), dated November 25,1997.
E. Supplemental Information Regarding Criticality Safety of the liF Absorber System, submitted by CE on January 30,1998.
Enclosures:
(1) Reply to NRC Request for Additional Infon intion (11) Integrated Safety Assessment (ISA) with drawings (111) Slides presented during January 15 meeting with NRC
Dear Dr. Soong:
Combustion Engineering hereby submits the additional infbrmation requested by yor r letter dated Novem'aer 25,1997 cor.cerning our application requeMing the unrerricted release of hydrofluoric acid. Enclosed is the response to the RAI, a copy of the Integrated Sarety Assessment (ISA) for the llF absorber system, copies of the slides presented at the meeting with NRC on January 15, 1998 and engineering drawings of the system. Supplemental infbrmation regarding criticality safety of the liF absorber system was furnished to Mr. liarry Felsher of the NRC on January 30, 1998. We expect to commence the operation of the oxide conversion plant the week of February 9th. We request that authorization to release llF fbr unrestricted use as requested in our April amendment ai, plication be granted by February 16th.
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If there are questions regarding this matter, please feel free to contact Dr. Earl Saito of my staff at (314) 937-4691 Ext. 46l or myself at (314) 937-4691 Ext. 399.
Sincerely,
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COMBUSTION ENGINEERING,INC.
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Robert W. Sharkey D /6 Ncf Director, Regulatory Affairs Date
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RA98!684 c.
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Post C%ce Box 107 St Louis (314) 2%5643 9002110107 900206 semaue ussoun eaia r ra 4314i 9a7 79w PDR
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Enclosure I to RA98/684 Reply to Request for Additional Information Application Dated August 12,1997 Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Docket 70-36 1,
According to your August 12,1997, letter, you have performed an integrated safety assessment (ISA) on the hydrogen nuoride (liF) scrubber liquid process.
Provide a copy of this ISA.
Enclosed is a copy of the ISA for the HF absorber system, in addition, on January 15 CE presented to NRC the results of the HF absorber system-ISA.
2.
Provide a detailed process description of all equipment associated with the liquid scrubbing process, include all equipment utilized from the off-gas metal tilters through the truck loading fill line. Include operating temperatures along the path, chemical concentrations, materials of construction, and chemical hazards-anticipated from the hazard analysis. Identify controls necessary to mitigate process upsets and normal controls. Explain how the liF scrubber and associated equipment piping is maintained to ensure integrity and confinement of IIF and g
uranium, if applicable.
The ISA, supplemented by :he presentation and discussions with NRC,L provides the requested information. Also enclosed is a copy of the slides presented at the January 15,1998 meeting at NRC headquarters and -
engineering drawings of the system.
3.
Is there any credible scenario where unrmcted UF6 gas could be carried over to the llF scrubber? If so, describe.
Operating the R-1 conversion reactor with inadequate steam flow could -
result in unreacted UF being carried over to the absorption / scrubbing 6
vessels. Although there are proc. safeguards or controls which do not allow operation with low steam flow to R-1, this was addressed as a credible upset condition in the ISA. The absorber system was shown to be critically safe under this accident condition in the information regarding criticality safety furnished to NRC on January 30,1998. This new design significantly enhances radiological safety in the event that unreacted UFe escapes the R-1 reactor, virtually eliminating UF discharge to the 6
environment during a process upset.
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