ML20202B100
| ML20202B100 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000036 |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1998 |
| From: | Alkier B, Freeman B, Hayes K ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202B091 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9802110109 | |
| Download: ML20202B100 (200) | |
Text
_... _ _. -. _ _ _ _ _ _ _.. _ _.. _. _. _ _ _. _.. _. _ _ -. _. _- _ _..._._. _..._ _. _. _ _ _ _. _
w
. linclosure 11 to RA98/684 1
{
i t
t INTEGRATED SAFETY ASSESSMENT
)
HF ABSORBER / SCRUBBER SYSTEM i
f a
i 4
i 4
1 4
FEllRUARY 1998
- i..
)
9802110109 980206 PDR ADOCK 07000036 B
A ID B
MEDID To Gi' Page February 6.1998 Ilill Sharkey From: llill Alkier llob Freeman M Kevin llayes i
Jamie 1.ong
\\
llryan McCarty Frank Tidd Sub:
Final ll AZOP Study Sununary for System 316, Oxide Conversion liF Absorbers Occupational and process hazards of this new system have been assessed as required in Nis 216, llazard livaluations. That procedure.:pecifies our assessment methodology to be either a What-If analysis or a llazard and Operability (ll AZOP) study. The li A7OP study method was selected in accordance with criteria established in NIS 216. A team consisting of the project engineer, the process engineer, on oxide process operator, a maintenance mechanic, and staff safety professionals was assembled to conduct the study Experts in the design and operation of hydrofluoric acid facilities were consulted to ensure the team's familiarity with the hazards posed by this system and its contents.
Conseque, ces of particular concern for the ll AZOP team were those involving system integrity and reliability, personal exposure to hydrogen fluoride vapors and liquid, and the accumulation in any tank of enough uranium to affect critical;ty safety or product quality. Physical factors considered by the study team include facility siting, strucures and equipment, personnel, and meteorological and seismological events. Assumptions used by the study team inchde:
1.
Criticality safety for the absorbers,6 tank array, and 18 tank array is provided by geometry / interaction control This is achieved by the shape and dimension of these components.
2.
Criticality safety for the bulk storage tank is provided by mass / concentration control. This is achieved by the acceptable analysis of two samples, each separated by approximately 30 minutes, from the 18 tank array before pumping its contents to storage.
3.
The system's use of solutions and saturated vapors results in negligible airborne radiological hazards from the oxide conversion offgas. Radiological safety is therefore achieved by industrial safety controls.
4 The construction. operation, and location of the offgas piping, absorbers, and exhaust stack result in negligible risk for a fire or explosion from the hydrogen content of the offgas.
5.
Chemical safety and system reliability is improved by minimizing the number of valves, tiltings, gauges. pumps, and actuated devices.
ABB CENO Fuel Operations
.k
{
h 9.
Y
1k(
9'1 f
i' ' ( W. i H <a I-J LL
$ t 1111 ? 101 WU 60 un Us n o t z it '
f.e v ) ' t i l'J '
6
The system was subject to a two-phased il AZOP study. The first phase was a design review conducted between June 3 and 12,1997. Its intent was to identify any d: sign or planned operational issues that could adversely affect the consequences of concern, and to reconunend appropriati changes An interim report consisting of IIAZOP study worksheets was issued to conununicate a variety of procedutal and as built verification issues, and the following design changes:
Pressure switches and alarms on the deionized feedwater, installing isolation valves around each u.he absorber recirculation pumps.
e Installing a drain line to ensure that the absorbers and their pumps can be emptied for maintenance activities.
Interlocking the 6 tank array high liquid level switch to an existing automatic shutof f for UF.
=
and dissociated anunonia in the oxide conversion facility.
Providina one vent header and pressure control valve for the 6 and 18 tank arrays, and another vent header and control valve for the bulk storage tank and tanker loadmg station.
Installing an actuated, fait closed valve to automaticall" isolate the 6 tank array from the 18 tank array once the latter is filled.
Installing a 3-way directional valve after pump 4 to minimize manual valving errors.
Installing an actuated, fail closed valve to automatically limit the dun. tion in which hydro 0uoric acid may be pumped to the storage tank.
The second phase was a final review of the as-built system conducted between January 21 and 23, 1998. Its intent was to determine the status of recommended changes from the ir,t' rim II AZOP, consider the effects of any other design or procedural changes, rank the risk of post 'ated deviation consequences while considering existing protective measures, identify any new recommendations for improvement, and identify items that are important to safety. The mmt new significant changes were removal of the exhaust connection to the stack 121 blower intake, and adding a recirculation loop for the bulk storage tank. The final llA7.OP study report, including tables for recommended action items and items important to safety, is attached for your review Action items are risk ranked as follows:
9,12, and 16: Acceptable; no action necessary, ahhough consideration should be given to the cost / benefit of additional patective measures.
8:
Low priority; should be addressed by protective measures without interruption to production but with reasonable speed.
4 and 6:
Medium priority; should be addressed by protective measures with preference over low priority risks.
2 and 3:
liigh priority; should be addressed by protective measures with preference over medium and low priority risks.
1:
Urgent; shall be immediately addressed by protective measures; operation shall be suspended until risk is reduced.
The team has concluded, based on the results of its two llAZOP studies, that the as-built system complies with generally accepted good engineering practices, and that it can be safely operated Unul il AZOP Study Summary for System 316 Oxide conversion llF Absorners Page 2 oil
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET Syst:m 316, HF Absorbers, Study Nods Sumrnary NODE DESIGN INTENT V
1 Use 25% HF and/or deionized water to quench 400 degree Fahrenheit offgas containing up to 105 pounds per hour hydrogen fluoride,130 pounds per hour nitrogen, and 10 pounds per hour hydrogen to the saturation point of 210 degrees Fahrenheit.
2 Recirculate up to 34% hydrogen fluoride solution through first stage packed column to remove approximately 30% of hydrogen fluoride from the offgas.
3 Recirculate approximately 25% hydrogen fluoride soluuon through second stage packed column to remove approximately 60% of hydrogen fluoride from the offgas.
4 Recirculate up to 5% hydrogen fluonde solution through third stage packoo column and polisher to remove 99.5% from the offgas stream, with deionized water addition interlocked to conductivity to ensure 5% solution limit is maintained 5
Cool 34% hydrogen fluonde solution from 210 degrees Fahrenheit to less than 150 degrees Fahrenheit in a graphite heat exchanger '.a.ng the deionized water feed 6
Store 34% hydrogen fluoride solution in the 6 tank array while sampling the 18 tank array.
7 Fill 18 tank array, isolate it for double recirculation and sampling / analysis, and pump hydrogen fluoride solution containing less than 1.5 ppm uranium to the storage tank.
8 Recirculate the bulk storage tank, obtain and analyze a sample, and pump hydrogen fluonde solution containing less than 1.5 ppm uranium to the tanker truck.
9 Transfer up to 34% hydrogen fluonde solution into cnticality and chemically safe containers from the 18 tank array or storage tank, a.;d back into those tanks from containers.
10 Environmental safety controls: double wall storage tank,10,200 gallon sumped con.
,e dike.
11 Industnal safety controls: segregation of incompatible chemicals, equipment integrity, minimal personal contact, and emergency shower / eyewash.
Note: Numerical values in this study are approximates based on reasonable inquiry and/or measurement.
i v
HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Dates: 1/21-23/98 Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd Page 1 of 1
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET Syst:m 316, HF Absorbers, it:ms import:nt to S f ty (g
ITEM SAFETYIMPORTANCE FV23 Chemical safety Pnmary HF containment integrity Chemical safety PSV14 Chemical safety Safety shower operability Chemical safety Trrinit l w aty and operations Chemical safety
~
FV21 Cnticality safety FV21 actuation Cnticality safety F1 st pre-transfer uianium sample from 18 tank array Cnticality safety Second pre-transfer uranium sample from 18 tank array Cnticality safety V29 Cnticality safety V29A Criticality safety q
V7 Cnticality safety V8 Cnticality safety V8A Cnticality safety Secondary HF containment integnty Environmental safety (V
HAZOP Team. Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Dates: 1/21-23/98 Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd Page 1 of 1
. - - - - _. -... - - ~ ~. ~- - -.~. - - -..
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET Systsm 316, HF Absorbers, Action item Summary ACTION RISK -
SYSTEM-NODE-NUlWl5hR install splash denector on Pump 4 6
316-6 4 1
Establish a calibration cycle for AE2 8
-316-4-25 t
Add redundant valves VBA and V29A 8
316-8-56
- Establish procedure foi security guard rounds in system area 8
316-10 Venfy at start-up that emergency water supply valve is labeled 9
316-1 27 1
Leak cheek absorber system so that the dry scrubbers are not used 9
316 1 126 and only a specified amount of N2 is put into system l
Evaluate installing an in-line gamma counter for the 18 tank array 9
316-7 12 Establish procedure to notify Engineering if the tanker truck is 9
316-8 34 overfilled i
Establish procedure to notify Engineenng if V18 (tanker truck) must 9
316-8-48 be used Establish procedure for using a drum level indicator for pumping to 9
316-9-5 drums Establish procedure for using Special Evaluahon Travelers when 9
316-9-27 pumping material into system from containers i
Establish procedure to sample container contents befoie allowing it to 9
319 9-28 be pumped into the system Venfy seismnic design with contractor 12 316-10-13 Install an emergency alarm station in the limestone storage building 12 316-11-40 Put a high oxide offgas pressure alarm in the control system.
16 316-2 19 O
HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Dates: 1/21-23/98 Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd Page 1 of 1
k HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers, Node 1 Design Intent Quench 400 degree F offgas containing up to 105 lbs/hr HF,130 lbs/hr N2, and 10 lbs/hr H2 to the saturation point of 210 degrees F.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS
[
WORD no no quench with HF pump 1 failure overheat absorber, emergency water at 1
9 possible lining damage FV3 interlocked to TE3 and TISH3 emergency water at 2
FV3 interlocked to LSL4 and LAL4 JSHL17 alarms if pump 3
starved, off, deadheaded lining good to 275F 4
V26 cr V2 closed overheat 3sorber, JSHL17 alarms if pump 5
9 possible fining damage starved, off, deadheaded emergency water at 6
FV3 interlocked to TE3 and TISH3 emergency water at 7
FV3 interlocked to LSL4 and LAL4 lining good to 275F 8
plugged quench overheat absorber, off gasses pass through 9
12 nozzie possible lining damage two sets of 1-micron filters, minimal particulates using DI waterlimits 10 mineral deposits TE3 alarm 11 LSL4 alarm 12 lining good to 275F 13 V2 closed overheat absorber, not easy to reach, 14 8
possible lining damage accidental closure uni kely Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Frecman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd.
Page 1 of 9
p
~
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316 HF Absorbers, Node 1
{
Design Intent: Quench 400 degree F offgas containing up to 105 lbs/hr HF,130 lbs/hr N2, and 10 lbs/hr H2 to the saturatica point of 210 degrees F.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES i PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD PG4 used when 15 l
adjusting V2 l
emergency water at 16 FV3 interlocked to TE3 and TISH3 emergency water at 17 FV3 interlocked to LSL4 and LAL4 lining good to 275F 18 V24 installed wrong overheat absorber, pre-startup testing 19 12 possible lining damage emergencywater at 20 FV3 interlocked to TE3 and TISH3 emergency water at 21 FV3 interlocked to LSL4 and LAL4 lining gocJ to 275F 22 HF quench pipe burst overheat absorber, materials of construction 23 9
possible lining damage emergency water at 24 FV3 interlocked to LSL4 and1AL4 I
pump incapable of 25 generating sufficient pressure to burst a pipe no emergency water V1 closed overheat absorber, HF quench must failfor 26 9
possible lining damage a problem to exist Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Aikier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd.
Page 2 of 9
s
' HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
, System 316, HF Absorbers, Node 1 Design Intent Quench 400 degree F offgas containiag up to 105 !bs/hr HF,130 lbs/hr N2. and 10 lbs/hr H1 to the saturation point of 210 degrees F.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION /COIMIENTS WORD valve will be labeled 27 ACTION: venfy at start-up i
emergency water supply TP't etsem 94 FV3 fa: led closed overheat absorber, HF geench must fail for 29 12 I
possible fining damage a proi;%m to exist TE3ebnn 30 i
water quench pipe overheat absorber, low pressure feed 31
.9 burst possible lining damage PSL16 alarm 32 detectable as a general 33 t
system failure pipe frozen overheat absorber, redundant heat traced 34 9
possible lining damage and insulated pipe PSV30 35 PSL10 alarm 36
_{
V25 installed wrong overheat absorber, pre-startup testing 37 12 possible lining damage i
4 emergency water at 38 FV3 interlocked to TE3 f
and TiSH3 emergency water at 39 FV3 interlocked to LSL4 t
and LAL4 lining good to 275F 40 i
f clogged heat general system failure using DI water limits 41 12 exchanger mineral deposits causes general system 42 failure, control system wi!! alarm
[
deionizer failure overheat absorber, reverse osmosis unit 43 9
-l possible lining damage provides good short-term capacity PSL16 alarm 44 l
.l
[
Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd.
Page 3 of 9 t
l t
f i
O HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
. System 316, l Absorbers, Node 1 Design Intent Quench 400 degree F offgas containing up to 105 lbs/hr HF,130 lbs/hr N2, and 10 lbs/hr H2 to the satura+Jon point of 210 depees F.
]
GUIDE [
DEVIATION -
.CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD TV13 left open general system failure drain sized to prevent 45 12 loss of water service j
more of more than 105 lbs/hr
' opeiating oxide decreased absorber currently incapable of 46 16 j
HF conversion at greater efficiency; increased HF rurining greater than 200 i
than 310 lbs UF6 per emission Ibs UF6 per hour
)
f hour more than 130 lbs/hr failed blow-back valve less absorber efficiency failure causes high filter 47 12
- }'
N2 on N2 system pressure, alarms on oxide control system flow control valve not less absorber efficiency control system inte' sock 48 12 read flow and hand not to have N2 on when
[
controlvalve leaking steam;s on multipte concurrent 49
[
~
fGure required ccv trol sys'em interlock 50 12 faulty DA flow control less absorber efficiency a
- valve
. not to h3ve N2 ca when steam is on multiple concurrent.
51
- failure required more than 10 lbs/hr H2 flow control valve less absorber efficiency pressure drop across 52 12 faulty reactor would ircrease, detected on control system HF system is oversized 53 4
for current operation more temp than 400 F oxide process heaters absorber redundant high temp 54 9
test run up to 240lbs/hr and j
overheat / damage offgas alarms temp did not exceed 390F
[
{
! piping
.[
thermocouple where 55 back-up fdter fumaces alarm i
Teflon piping starts will above 400F-alarm f
Date' 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill A!kier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd.
Page 4 of 9 I
a 1
.i
p q
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316, HF Absorbers. Node 1 Design Intent Quench 400 degree F offgas containing up to 105 lbs/hr HF,130 lbs/hr N2, and 10 lbs/hr H2 to the saturat:on point of 210 degrees F
~
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTIOf4 No.
RISK ACTIONICOMMENTS WORD
-200 uninsulated monel 56 cooling water can be pipe before absorber provided on the monel pipe provides for radiant if necesserv l
coofing monel pipe is good to 57 500F absorber tining good to 58 275F HF and emergency 59 water quench before absorber
~
more than 210 F after quench fail overheat absorber, same as 'no quench 60 12 quench possible fining damage water flow" excess HF quench maintenance / wrong high pressure drop in high pressure indication 61 16 flow / pressure size pump installed offgas on oxide controlsystem V2 62 excess DI water Di system pump excess DI water added FCV1 interfocked to AE2 63 8
flow / pressure problem PSV30 64 burst pipe PSV30 65 12 pipe pressure rating 66 greater than pump output less of low HF quench flow V2 and/or V1 same as "no quench same as "no quench 67 9
misaligned water flow" water flow" nozzle partially same as "no quench same as "no quench 68 12 p!uggad water flow" water flow" pump prcbem same as "no quench same as "no quench 69 9
water flow" water flow" low DI quench flow FV23 problem same as "no quench same as "no quench 70 12 water flow" water flow" V30 open when should overheat absorber.
PSL16 alarm
?1 8
be closed possible fining damaae Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier Bob Freeman. Kevin Hayes, Jamie Lcng Bryan McCarty. Frank Tidd.
Page 5 of 9
. ~ _ -
l HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET.
System 316. HF Absorbers Node 1 Design Intent: Quench 400 degree F offgas containing up to 105 lbs/hr HF,130 lbs/hr N2, and 10 lbs/hr H2 to the saturation point of 210 degrees F.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD
~
observable occurrence 72 LSL4 alarm 73-AE2 74 JSHL19 alarm fromlow 75 absorber 3 feedwater less temp winter quench line freezes uses 34% HF, freezing 76 9
point is -70F -
HF condensation in desirable -is a 77 16 Innes are sloped from oxde piping -
protection for other to prevent trapping consecuences coridensation in fine emergency quench the heat traced 78 12 freezes preheated by heat 79 exchanger as well as NH3 in system dissociator fails product contamination low temp alarm on 80 12 dissociator NH4F buildup will plug 81 oxide reactor filters pressure drop of oxide 32 reactors increases -
UF6 in system oxide process upset -
product quality problem multiple R1 steam flow 83 12 interiocks double sample required 84 j
before transfer
[
~
super /isor cf#ecks 85.
sample results before f
transfer to storace
{
lost enticality barner if 18 and 6 tank arrays are ' B6 9
potential 91-01 investigation transferred to t>torage safe geometry, transfer recuired for a problem multiple R1 steam flow 87 interlocks j
double sample requi :d 88 j
before transfer i
h Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tdd.
Page 6 of 9 1
- l.,
I
s p
7s
~ N./
N HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers, Node 1 Design Intent Quench 400 degree F offgas containing up to 105 lbs/hr HF.130 lbs/hr N2, and 10 lbs/hr H2 to the saturation point of 210 degrees F.
GUIDE ~
DEVIATION CAUSE CONSELUENCES PROTECTION No.
Risk ACTION / COMMENTS WORD superviscr checks 89 sample resuits before transfer to storace urantm in system sintered metal fdter product quality problem ce!ta o alarms on 90 12 4 to 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> response failure secondary fi!ters off gasses pass through 91 dimbtshed protection if 2 sets of sintered metal secondary breaks. but filters experience indicates this is not likely if process is shut deem a8Mr n BUF break BUF pressure is 92 indicated and trended by control system double sample required 93 before transfer supervisor checks 94 sample results before transfer to storace lost enticality barrier if 18 and 6 tank arrays are 95 9
pnienhaf 91-01 rnvestigation transferred to storage safe geometry, transfer recuired for a ort' fem delta-P alarms on 96 secondary filters off gasses pass through 97 2 sets of sintered metal filters BUF pressure is 98 indicated and trended by control system double sample required 99 before transfer supervisor checks 100 sample results before transfer to storace t
l Date: 1/21-23/98 HMOP Team: B:ll Alkier. Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd.
Page 7 of 9 y
~
O O
O HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316 HF Absorbers, Node 1 Design intent: Quench 400 degree F offgas containing up to 105 lbs/hr HF.130 lbs/hr N2, and 10 lbs/hr H2 to the saturation point of 210 degrees F.
GUIDE DEVIATION I-CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION /CORARIENTS.
WORD'
- boiler chemicals mixing error at boiler product contamination customer to analyze HF 101 16 product quatrty concem solution upon receipt hard water improper plumbing -
product contamination pre-startup verification 102 16 connections customer to analyze HF 103 l
solution upon receipt plugged quench nozzle properties of sJ!utbn 104 16 pre-startup venfication 105 debris backflowinto DI blocked r-tench nozzle V35 106 9
. system from dike sump rump TV13 normally closed 107 TE3 alarm 108 HF quench must fail for 109 problem to exist FV23 blocked open V35 110 12 TV13 normally closed 111 reverse HF offgas into quench low or lost quench flow pipe corrosion of requires concurrent 112 16 line emergency quench line norma! and emergency quench failure FV23 normally closed 113 V25 114 damage to recirculation requires mncurrent 115 12 line from heat normal and emergency quench failure PTFE lined steel good to 116 500F PVDF pipe good to 250F ii/
other than transfer offgas to dry misaligned flange HF corrosion in dry dry scrubbers normally 118 9
scrubbers scrubbers isolated by blind flange operator's startup'
'119 procedere -
Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tedd.
Page 8 of 9 h
~
jx
- O O
O HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316, HF Absorbers,. Node 1 Design intent Quench 400 degree F offgas containing up to 105 lbs/hr HF,130 lbs/hr N2, and 10 lbs/hr H2 to the saturation point of 210 degrees F.
GUIDE DcVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION /CGMMENTS WORD supervisor procedure to 120 verify flange position before kevino to different scrubber system greater header pressure 121 i
from using dry scrubbers detectable on control system dry scrubberinlet and 122 outlet valves normally closed personnel exposere dry scrubbers normatly 123 9
.solated by blind flange operators pre-startup 124 checklist supervisor overcheck 123 environmentalrelease dry scrubbers nonna!!y 126 9
ACTION: leak check system isolated by blind flange so that the dry scrubbers are not used and only a specified amount of N2 is putinto system operators startup 127 procedure supervisor procedure to 128 verify flange position before keying to different scrubber system operator's leak check 129 procedure l
HAZOP Team Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tida.
Page 9 of 9
-23/98 1/21 Date:
(
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absort>ers, Node 2 Design Intent' 4 circulate up to 34% HF solution through first stage packed column to remove approximataly 30% of HF from the offgas.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION -
No, 16SK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD no no rectrculation pump 1 failure
~11.9 lbs/ hour HF JSHL17 a! arm for pump 1
t' motor likely to bum out, released, or -90%
starved, off, minor consequence efficiency deadheaded UF6 and DA intericc,ked 2
to closed if JSHL17 triggers efficiency is based on 3
310 lb. UF6/ hour, currently <200 roughly equivalent to -
4 existing dry scrubber ernissK>n extended operaton 5
required fer air permit issue to result spare parts 6
<34 % HF solution JSHL17 alarm for pump 7
8 motor likely to bum out, produced starved, off, minor consequence deadheaded customer to analyze HF 8
solution upon receipt V26 or V3 closed
<34 % HF solution JSHL17 alarms if pump 9
8 produced starved, off, deadheaoed PG34 10 plugged transfer pipe
- loss of efficiency off gasses pass through 11 16 2 sets of sintered metal filters, unlikely to have solids DI water unlikely to have 12 solids nature of solution 13
[-
prevents accumulation I
of solids l
LSHS and LAH5
-14 HAZOP Tearn-Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tedd.
Page 1 of 4 Date: 1/21-23/98 T
.........m.
LO HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET-System 316 HF Absorbers, Node 2
. Design Intent Recirculate up to 34% HF solution through first stage packed column to remove approximately 30% of HF from the o" gas GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION -
No.
RISK.
ACTION /COAAAAENTS -
WORD bilnd flange installed in 15 the wet system side for extended shttfowns plugged column drain increased off gas off gasses pass through 16 16 pressure drop would be 12 pipe pressure from overfilled 2 sets of sintered metal psiif absorber was filled sump filters, unlikely to have past off gasinlet solids DI water unhkely to hofe 17.
solids nature of solution 18 l
precludes solids header pressure 19 ACTION: put a hg!3 offgas monitored by control pressure aermin the control system systent no column oacking installation error
' loss of eiT,c.ci,cy pre-startup wn;Tn;ation 20 12 more of excess DI water added emergency quench increased off gas waiciwill tum off when 21 16 water activated pressure from overfilled LSL4 alarm clears water will tum off when 22 TE3 alarm clears LSH5 almtu, will tum 23 off DI water feed if t~
emergency feed must be rin Jairred header pressure 24-h monitored by control system excess HF solution pump 1 oversized increased off gas pre-startup venfication 25 16 added pressure from overfilled V2 26 V3 and PG34
'27 FO27 28 LSH5 alarms, will turr.
-29
~
off DI water feed l
HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes "Jamie Lcng, Bryan McCarty Frank Tidd.
Page 2 of 8 Date: 1/21-23/98
- P
O HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers, Node 2 Design Intent Recirculate up to 34% HF solution through first stage packed column to remov 2 approximately 30% of HF Nm the o# gas.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD header pressure 30 monitored by control system less of less recirculation pump problem up to 11.9 lbs/ hour HF solution strength 31-12 released, or notless monitored in third stage than 90% efficiency to checir system efficiency V3 misaligned up to 11.9 lbs/hmir HF PG34 32 8
released, or not less than 90% efficiency LSL4 interlot.k to 33 emergency quench limits loss of efic.ety solution streincth 34 monitored in third stage to check system efficiency s
<34 % HF solution JSHL17 alarm 35 8
produced customer to anaipe HF 36 solution upon receipt partial plug same as no recirculation 37 16 low liquid level sptem on N2 for damage to pumps LSL4 38 12 startup, shutdown, or operating dry standby JSHL17 alarm 39 up to 11.9 lbs/hout t1F LSL4 interlocked to 40 12 released, or not less FV23 than 90% efficiency AE2 interlocked to FCV1 41 V29 open drains absorber to 18 or norma!!y locked closed 42 8
- 6 tank arra','s l
Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd.
Page 3 of 4 4
i
.i
(,.
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers. Node 2 Design Intent Recirculate up to 34% HF solution through first stage packed column to remove approximately 30% of HF from the offgas.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD LSL4 alarm id!es oxide 43 conversion, stops HF ceneration LSL4 interlocked to 44 FV23 JSHL17 alarms if pump 45 starved, off, deadheaded tank arrays and pipes 46 good to 225F 47 as well as same as node 1 48 part of same as node 1 l
l Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin hayes, Jamie Long. Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd.
Pagc 4 of 4 4
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers, Node 3 Design intent: Recirculate approximately 25% HF solution through second stage packed column to remove approximately 60% of HF from the offgas.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUTNCES PROTECTION -
No.
RISK.
ACTIONiCOMMENTS WORD no no recirculation pump 2 failure
~11.9 lbs/ hour HF JSHL18 alarms if p imp 1
8 released, or -90%
starved, off, efficiency deadheaded efficiency is based on 2
310 lb. UF6/ hour, currentiv <200 roughly equivalent to 3
existing dry scrubber emission extended operaison 4
required for air permit issue to result
<34% HF final solution JSHL18 alarms if purnp 5
8 starved, off, deadheaded customer to ana!yze for 6
HF concentration V27 or V4 closed overheat absorber, JSHL18 alarms if pump 7
8 possible lining damage starved, off, deadheaded PG33 8
plugged transfer pipe loss of efficiency off gasses pass through 9
16 2 sets of sintered metal filters, unlikely to have so! ids DI water unlikely to have 10 solids l
l nature of solution 11 prevents accumulation of solids LSH5 alarm 12 plugged column drain increased off gas off gasses pass through 13 16 pipe pressure from overfilled 2 sets of sintered metal i
sump filters, unlikely to have d
solids Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie t_ong, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd.
Page 1 of 3
,3 Y
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316 HF Absorbers, Node 3 Design Intent. Recircutate approximately 25% HF solution through second stage packed column to remove approximately 60% of HF from the offgas.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION N o.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD DI water unlikely to have 14 solids nature of soluton 15 precludes solids header pressure 16 monitored by control syste.a no column packing installation error loss of efficiency pre-startup verification 17 12 more of excess HF solution pump 2 oversized increased off gas pre-staitup verification 18 16 added pressure from overfilled V4 and PG33 19 FO28 20 header pressure 21 monitored by control system less of less recirculation pump 2 problem up to 11.9 lbs/ hour HF solution strength 22 12 released, or not less monitored in third stage than 90% efficiency to check system efficiency V4 misaligned up to 11.9 lbs/hout HF PG33 23 8
released, or not less than 90% efficiency LSL4 interlock to 24 emergency quench limits loss of efficiency so!ution strength 25 monitored in third stage to check system efficiency
<34 % HF final scrution JSHL18 alarm for pump 26 8
for starved, off, deadheaded customer to analyze for 27 HF concentration l
Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin. Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd.
Page 2 of 3 o
,-~g p)
(ss)
(v)
' \\.w HAZO" STUDY WORKSHEET System 316, HF Absorbers, Node 3 Design Intent Recirculate approximately 25% HF solution through second stage packed column to remove approximately 60% of HF from the offgas.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUST CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION /CCMMENTS WORD l
partial p!ug same as no recirculation 28 16 I Cf A storm Mioc myireo
?Q
'?
2 inw tim,H fouet e actom en hf? fnr domsgo in netmne startup, shutdown, or operating dry conversion, stops HF standby ceneration JSHL18 alarms 30 up to 11.9 lbs/ hour HF LSL4 interlocked t-31 12 released, or not less FV23 than 90% efficiency AE2 interlocked to FCV1 32 V29 open drains absorber to 18 or normany locked closed 33 8
6 tank arrays LSL4 alarm idles oxide 34 conversion, stops HF cenorntinn LSL4 interlocked to 35 FV23 JSHL18 alarms if pemp 36 starved, off, deadheaded tank arrays and pipes 37 cood to 225F l
38 1
as we!! as same as node 1
)
39 part of same as node 1 i
Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tkid.
Page 3 of 3 l
.._)
s Q,1 a
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316 HF Absorbers, Node 4 Recircutati 5% HF solution through third stace packed c.Jumn/ polisher to remove 99.5% of offgas HF; add Di sater based un conductivity.
Design intent:
GUIDE DEVIAtON CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD no no recirculation pump 3 failure
~11.9 !bs/nour HF JSHL19 alarms if pump 1
8 released, or -90%
starved, off, efficiency deadheaded efficiency is based on 2
310 lb. UF6/ hour, currently <200 roughly equrvaient to 3
existing dry scrubber a emission extended ooeratton 4
required for air permit issue to result
<34% HF final solution JSHL19 alarms if pump 5
8 stcrved, off, deadherded customer to analyre for 6
HF concentration V28 or V5 closed ovarheat absorber, JSHL19 alarms if pump 7
8 AE2 could read OK if HF possible lining damage starved, off,
%cped in recircu.ation line deadheaded PG32 8
plugged transfer pipe loss of efficiency off gasses pass through 9
16 2 sets of sintered metal s
filters, unlikely to have sofids Di water unhhe'y to have 10 solids nature of solution 11 prevents accumulation of solids LSHS alarm 12 plugged column drain increased off gas off gasses pass through 13 16 pipe pressure from overfilled 2 sets cf sintered metal sump filters, unlikely to have solids Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Tecm: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd.
Page 1 of 8
I c
o
. HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET -
System 316, HF Absorbers, Node 4 Design Intent Recirculate 5% HF so!ution through third stage packed column / polisher to remove 99.5% of offgas HF; add DI water based on conductivity..
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD DI water unlikely to have 14 solids nature of solution 15 precludes solids header pressure 16 monitored by control a
system no conductivity loss of recirculstion inadequate DI wa'.er AE2 alarms if no signal 17 12 detection addition
' received LSL4 alarm 18 JSHL19 alarm 19-PM system 20 AE2 unplugged same as loss of AE2 alarms if no signal 21 12 recirculation received AE2 sample tee same as loss of off gasses pass through 22 16 obstructed reckculation 2 sets of sintered metal i
filters, unlikely to have sol ids
}
DI water unhkely to have 23 l
solids nature of solution 24 prevents eccumulation of solids t
AE2 out of calibration same as loss of AE2 calibration cycle 25 8
ACTION: establish
[
recirculation calibration cycle -
loss of power same as loss of AE2 alarms if no signal 26 12 recirculation received no polishing section no packing minor efficieng loss pre-startup venfication 27 12 no DI water flow mir.or efficiency loss water flov. required only 28 12 if solution >S% HF AE2 interlocked to FCV1 29 AE2 alarms if no signal 30 jl received PSL16 alarm 31 Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team:. Bill Aikier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd.
Page 2 of 8
c) 3 n/
b i
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers, Node 4 Design Intent Recirculate 5% HF solution through third stage packed column / polisher to remove 99.5% of offgas liF; add D1 water based on conductivity.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD LSL4 atarm 32 no column packing insta!!ation error loss of efficiency pre-startup venfication 33 12
' no DI water added
' supply shut off loss of efficiency detectable as general 34 12 system failure AE2 afarm 35 LSL4 alarm 36 f
PSL16 alarm 37 increase in HF detectable as general 38 12
_, concentration system failure AE2 alarm 39 LSL4 alarm 40 PSL16 alarm 41
~
f increased absorber TE3 alarm 42 12 temperature some quench will occur 43
[
if liquid is present LSL4 alarm 44 JSHL19 alarm 45 PSL16 alarm 46 FCV1 malfunction diminished efficiency detectacle as general 47 8
syster. failure AE2 alarms, r.,t likely to 48 i
reset LSL4 alarm and 49 interlock to FV23 TE3 alarm and interlock 50 to P
)
AE2 malfunction diminished efficiency LSti arm and
$1 8
interlock to FV23 TE3 alarm and interlock 52 i
to FV23 JSHL19 alarms for 53 pump starved, off, AE2. caltoration cycle 54 Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOF Team: Bi!! Aikier, Bob Freeman, Keyh Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd.
Page 3 of 8
p
,,-~.
%)
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316 HF Absorbers, Node 4 Design Intent Recirculate 5% HF solution through third stage packed column / polisher to remove 99.5% of offgas HF; add DI water based on conductnnty GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION" No.
RISK ACTIONICOMMENTS WORD frozen pipe diminished efficiency redundant heat traced 55 12 and insulated pipe l
water is heated in heat 56 exchanger PSV30 57 LSL4 alarm and 58 interlock to FV23 detectable as general
- 59 system failure water normatty flowing 60 more of excess HF solution pump 3 oversized increased off gas pre-startup verification 61 16 added pressure from overfilled V5 and PG32 62
~
FO29 63 LSHS alarms, will tum 64 off DI water feed header pressure 65 monitored by control system excess DI water added AE2 malfunction excessive dilution LAHS alarm 66 8
AE2 calibration cycle 67 increased off gas header pressure SE 12
)
pressure from overfifted monitored by control sumo system Di system pump excessive dilution AE2 interlocked to FCV1 69 12 malfunction PSV30 70 greater than 5% HF AE2 malfunctior.
diminished afficiency same as 'no DI water 71 8
solution added" FCV1 malfunction diminished efficiency same as "no DI water 72 8
added" DI water supply shut diminished efficiency same as "no D1 water 73 12 off added" Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Atkier, Bob Freeman. Kevin Hayes, Jamie Lor:p, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd.
Page 4 of 8
O O
O HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316, HF Absorbers. Node 4 Design Intent Recirculate 5% HF solution through thed stage packed cotumn/ polisher to remove 99.5% of offgas HF; add D11 rater cased on conducbvity.
GUIDE DEv > TION CAUSE CONSEQUENCcS PROTECTION i No.
RISK ACTIONICOMMENTS WORD t,
' vapor ooltshrng secbor.
increase off gas header off gasses pass through 74 16 obstructed pressure 2 sets of sintered metal r
fittes unlikely to have sords DI water un!;kely to have 75 soids cxde rupture dsk set at 76 l
-20 psig icud leak at joints pgs are self gasketed 77 12 joints are sealed, 78 torqued, or welded prpe burst oxde rapture disk set at 79 12
-20 psig p pe rated to 150 psg 83 less of less recircu!abon pump 3 problem up to 11.9 lbs/ hour HF AE2 interlock to FCV1 81 12 released, or not less limits loss of ef5ciency than 90% ef"iciene<
PG32 82 V5 mesa igned up to 11.9 lbs/ hour HF PG32 83 8
released, or not less than 90% erriciency LSL4 interkx,k to FV23 84 limds loss of e*foency AE2 intenxk to /CV1 85
<34 % HF tinal solubon JSHL19 alarms for 85 8
pump sta ved, off, deadheaded customer to analyze for 87 HF conceiraton parbal plug same as no revicol;: bon same as no reeicolabon 88 16 low liquid level system on N2 for damage to puups LSL4 a! arm idles oxde 89 12 startup, shutdown, or operating dry conversion, stops HF standby oeneraton Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Alk;er, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes Jamie Long. Bryan McCarty Frank Tidd.
Page 5 of 8
O O
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Au%rs, Node 4 Design intent Recirculate 5% HF soluton through third stage packed column / polisher to remove 99.5% of ofgas HF; add DI water based on conductanty GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEOUENCES PR ; TECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD JSHL19 alarms for 90 pump starved, off, deadheadad up to 11.9 lbs/ hour HF LSL4 interlocked to 91 12 released. or not less FV23 than 90% e*Sciency AE2 interlocked to FCV1 92 diminished DI water up to 11.9 ibs/ hour HF opens only when heat 93 16 feed from TV13 open released or notless exchanger inst.15cient than 90% ef5ciency pnmary quench 94 TE3 atarm and interivck 95 toFV23 LSL4 alarm and 96 in*eriock ta FV23 V30 open when should up to 11.9 Ibs/ hour HF PSL16 a! arm 97 8
be closed released, or not less than 90% e*5ciency observable occurrence 98 LSL4 alarm dies oxde 99 conversion, stops HF caneraton AE2 alarm 100 JSHL19 alarms for 101 pump starved off, deadheaded nuiir# hcked closed 102 8
V29 open drarns absorter to 18 or f
6 tank arrays LSL4 alarm dies exde 133 converson, stops HF ceneration LSL4 intericcked to 104 FV23 Page 6 of 8 Date. 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bi!! Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jams Long. Bryan M$a,4y, Frank Tdd.
J
i HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET j
i System 316 HF Absorbers, Node 4 j
. Design intent Recirculate 5% HF soluton through third stage packed co!umn/poitsher to remove 99 5% of offgas HF. add DI water based on conductvey.
('
GUIDE DEVIATION l
CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTIONICOMiglENTS
)'
WORD
~
AE2 interlocked to FCV1 105 4
JSHt19 alarrasif pump 106 starved, off, deadheaded i
tank arrays and pipes 107 l
cood to 225F i
as weU as debns in DIwater backflowinto DI obstructed D1 water V35 108 12 system system from dike nozzle sumo cump TV13 rormally closed 109 AE2 110 LSt4 alarm 111 TE13 alarm 112 5
PSV30 113 l
HF incompatible backflow into Di chemcal reacdon in V35 114 12' materialin DI water system from dike absorbers system sumo cump steel cased vessels 115 i
oxide ruoture drsks, 116 i
retef valves DIwater normany into 117 absorber with low HF concentraton and closest to #_rk sump contents must be 118 sampled before bemg pumped physcal and procedural 119 barriers to bringing uwipabble material into d ke f.
part of same as node 1 120 reverse exhaust gas into DI -
FCV1 closed corrosion V31 121 12 water pipe Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill A!kier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long Bryan McCarty. Frank Tidd.
Page 7of 8 i
4 1
1
~
j HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316, HF Absorbers Node 4 Design Intent Recirculate 5% HF solution thmugh third stage packed column / polisher to remove 99.5% cf cMgas HF; add DI water based en macbytty.
j GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTIONICOMMENTS WORD PVDF pipe on both 122 sides of V31 DI water fcw is 123 associated w2 cMgas HF cof' tent i
Da'te:.1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bi!! Aikier Bob Freeman. Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long Bryan McCarty. Frank Tidd.
Page 8 of 8
.~
p U,,
V HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316, HF Absorbers. Node 5 Desgn Intent Cool 34. h~drogen fluende solution from 210 degrees F to less than 140 degrees F in a heat graphite exchanger using D1 water feed GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD no no Di water feed shut ett damage to heat Iqud boding potnt is 1
8 higher nsk only due to new exchanger 248F heat exchancer lead tme y
heat exchanger good to 2
500F PSL16 alarm 3
damage to transfer detectable as a general 4
8 prpes 18 tank array, and system failure 6 tank array PSL16 alarm 5
(
TE3 alarms first 6
AE2 atarm 7
Iquid in rirst stage 8
l 4
column provides lirruted Quench soluton prp:ng and tanks 9
are good to 275F I
TE13 alarm 10 increased vapor AE2 alarm 11 16 pressure. more errntted TE3 abnn 12 TE13 alarm 13 vented to third stage 14 column offgas inlet b
loss of efficiency same as " damage to 15 12 y
transfer prpes,18 tank k
arra't and 6 tank array" suppfy kne frozen sama as " shut off" redundant heat traced 16 8
and insulated pipe e
PSV30 17 water nonna9y flowmg 18 Di water hne through same as shut off' D1 water un;ikely to have 19 16 3
exchanger is sohds i
obstructed t
Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Biff A!kier. Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long. Bryan McCarty. Frank Tidd Page 1 of 2
~
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Abscrbes. Node 5 Design Intent Cool 34% hydrogen fluoride solution from 210 degrees F to less than 140 degrees F in a heat graphite exchanger usmg Di water feed.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD dmnished flow 20 activates TE13 and TV13 interlock, wtich 4
flushes cbstruction same as " shut off-21
- 2 and #3 absorber 22 sumps and outlets are heat traced. insulated more than inlet temperature quench snadequate outlet temperature temperature limited to 23 12 greater than 210F creater than 150F boiling point of 248F TE3 alarm and interlock 24 to FV23 solution peptng and tanks 25 cood to 275F heat exchanger good to 26 500F TE13 alarm and 27 interlock to TV13 increased vapor same as " outlet 28 16 pressure, more emitted ten > store greater than 150P vented to third stage 29 column off gas inlet vent pipe good to 225F 30 DI water supply same as "no DI water same as "no DI water 31 8
problem feed" feed" as well as debns backflow into DI blocked heat exchanger V35 32 12 system from dike sump pump TV13 norma!!y closed 33 TE13 alarm 34 water norma!!y flow =ng 35 through exchancer Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bs: Aikier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jame Long. Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd Page 2 of 2 e
=
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET -
System 316. HF Acsorbers, Node 6 Design Intent Store 34% hydrogen fluonde soluton in the 6 tank array wisle sampling thr! 18 tank array.
GUIDE -
DEVIATION :
CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTONICORABAENTS WORD
.no no automate dryerson FV21 actuaton failure non-.epiewtobve
%,ivis check 1:st to 1
8 to 6 tank array sample close V7 before recrculaton LSH7 alarm 2
FV21 possbon andcated 3
on valve body prevenhve mainierern.e 4
forvalve actuabon more of overfdl6 tank array delay in drscharging sman amount unsampled LSH6 intein.n,k to 5
8 into vent pipe 18 tank array to HF solution discharge to automate dissociated storage sampled 18 tank array ammonia and UF, shutoff LSH6 alarm 6
LSHS alarm 7
vent pipe cuirpabble 8
with solution vent pipe good to 275F 9
favorable tank geometry 10 could rrvahdate any samples taken, resamphng may be approveie unsampled HF soluton separate vent headers 11 12 potentra! 91-01 investgiten transferred to storage for tank arrays and tank storaoe tank vent pipe elevruc6 12 greater than maximum system fioud level LSH6 alarm 13 LSH5 atorin 14 vent ppe wn@tble 15 with solution vent pipe good to 225F 16 as well as FV21 leaks during 18 wom valve seat non-representative Operator closes V7 17 8
tank recirculation sample before recirculation Date: 1T21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Allaer, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tdd Page 1 of 2 y.
f. -
w,.
a
.-4w' S W e-
<*r*
m-S-w-
+--e6
- --t
- wrF uu-w-
-w-m--
m-*e-+
w*-.
HAZOP STUDY WORrCSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers, Node 6 Desgn Intent Store 34% hydrogen fluonde solution in the 6 tank array whae sampling the 18 tank array.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
rusk ACTIONICOMMENTS WORD valve currpuvucn and 18 construchon provdes Good inteanty preventn/e martenance 19 system ensures valve inteenty low pressure 6Op 20 across valve Imts rate off gasses pass ituvagh 21 2 sets of sintered metal fifters, unlikely to have sohds experience indicates 22 worst case contaminabon would meet release enteria oxde readvi 1 steam 23 interlocks prevent uranium contamination other than drscharge to wrong valve mesalgnment d scharge to storage requires w6 current 24 9
destination tank pump operation requires concurrent 25 misalignment of V9 and FV22 FV22 autuisWucisify 26 closes after set time Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Fmnk Tidd Page 2 of 2 4
e
' ' - - ' - - ~ ' -'
O O
O HAZOP STUDYWORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers, Node 7 Design intent Fill 18 tank array, isolate it for double reorculation and sampling /anafysis, pump <1.5 ppm U sokdon to storage tank.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD no no rectreutaten pump 4 fatture non-representatve operator checkhst 1
9 operator present to start 2
and stop pwnp PG35 3
supervisor checks 4
sample resu!ts before transfer to storace may rep! ace with 5
sma!!er pump from inventory if necessary valve misabgnment lost enticahty bariner if multrple concurrent 6
9 potenta! 91-01 investgaton transferred to storage errors required without proper analysis valves clearly labeled 7
off gasses pass through 8
2 sets of sintered metal fi!!ers, unlikely to have sohds expenence indcates 9
worst case contamination would meet releasa enteria oxde reacci 1 steam 10 interlocks prevent uranium contairanistrcr.
no sample step omitted lost enticahty bamer if operator's checkks:
11 9
patental 91-01 investgaton transferred to storage without proper analysis superviser checks 12 ACTION: evaluate snstamng sample resuits before in-line gamma counter transfer to storace off gasses pass th. ugh 13 2 sets of sintered metal fitters, unlikely to have so9ds Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Alluer, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tdd Page 1 cf 10
- v. s
O O
O HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316, MF Absorbers, Node 7 Design Intent Fill 18 tank array, isolate it for doubie recirculaton and samp!:nglana!ysis pump <1.5 ppm U soluton to storage tank.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION! COMMENTS WORD j
l expenence indicates 14
)
worst case contaminaton would meet release cri+eria I
onde reactor 1 steam 15 interlocks prevent I
uranium contaminaten plugged sample hne lost crtreakty bamer if immediate!y detectable 16 9
potental 91-01 investgaton transferred to storage by operator without proper analysis supervisor checks 17 sample resu!!s before transfer to storace off gasses pass through 18 2 sets of sintered metal filters, unlikely to have solids oxide reactor 1 steam 19 interlocks prevent uranium contaminaten no venting on tanks PCV25 failure pressunze system PSV14 20 12 increased off gas PSV14 21 12 pressure from overfilled sump LSHS alarm and 22 intedock to FCV1 plugged vent prpe pressunze system PSV14 23 12 off gasses pass through 24 2 sets of sintered metal fi!!ers, un!*ely to have sofids Di water unkkely to have 25 soids Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Tem: Bill Aikier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long. Bryan McCarty Frank Todd Page 2 of 10 e
m
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers. Node 7 Des 4gri intent FBI 18 tank array, isolate it for double reorculation and samp!ing'anafysis, pump <1.5 ppm U soludon to storage tank _
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTIONICOMMENTS WORD header pressure 26 l
morutcied by contro!
l system overfa!! third stage PSV14 27 12 Coiumn sump LSHS alarm and 28 interlock to FCV1 off gasses pass truvugh 29 2 sets of sintered metal
~
filters, unlikely to have scids D1 water unkkely to have 30 solids header piessure 31 monitored by control system more tanks overfiited operator euer non-representatrve LSH7 afarm 32 9
sample LSH7 interlocked to 33 FV21 a@mton supervisor enteraG,vn 34 required to manipulate several vafves greater than 1.5 ppm UF6 discharge to product quakty protMem multiple R1 steam flow 35 8
interlocks U in solution absorbers double sample required 36 before transfer supervisor cht..ks 37 sample resuits before transfer to storace sintered metal filter product quahty problem de!*a-P afarms on 38 8
4 to 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> resyvuse secondary filters failure Page 3 of 10 Date: 1f21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier. Bob Freemen, Kevin Hayes. Jamie Long. Bryan FAcCarty. F~..Mk Tidd
~
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers, Node 7
. Design Intent FW 18 tank ar ay, iso:ste it for double recirculaton and sampirngfanalysis, pump <1.5 ppm U soluton to storage tank.
GUlOE -
DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
fc5n ACTCNICOSARAENTS
-WORD offgas passes through 2 39 dium ui.hed ciciG. if sets of sintered iw.al sewudary breaks, but fi!!ers expericac.= indcates this is not I:ke!y d pror:ess is shut down aftera BUF break BUF picssure is 40 indcated and trended by control system double ssuv;c requiad 41 before transfer superv6cicteec,ks 42 sample results before transfer to storace greater than 1 gram U UF6 dnisige to lost enticahty bamer d qualisc Don tanks are 43 9
potenMI 91-01 wiveMgs;+,
. per liter in solution absorbers transfermd to storage safe geometry, transkr recurred for a problem multrple R1 steam flow 44
~
interlocks double s uip;c requied 45 before transfer supervisor chec.ks 46 sample resutts before transfer to storaoe sintered metal filter lost entcahty bamer sf quahfcaton tanks are 47 9
pctenta191-Of investgabon failure transferred tc siurage
- wfe geometry, transfer recuired for a problem de!!a-P alarms on 48 l
secondary filters off gasses pass tricogh 49 2 sets of sintered metal fiMers BUF piessore is l 50 indcated andIrended by control system Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill A!kier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Sayan McCarty, Frank Tidd Page 4 of 10
. - - ~ _ -
-. =. _ -
O r
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. MF Absorbers Node 7 Design intent Fi!! 18 tank array, isolate it for double reorculaton and sampnnglanalysis, pump <1.5 ppm U sotudon to storage tank.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTIOMCOGRAAENTS WORD double sampb requred 51 before transfer supervisor checks 52 sample results before l
transfer to storace less insuffcent pump 4 failure non-representatve PG35-53 9
potental 91-01 invengb>
recirculation sample -lost ent!cality barrierif transferred to storace double sample required 54 hrrut on d "Twier.ce 55,
between double sample values operator checkhst 56 supervrsor checks 57 sample resutts before transfer *o storace rec:rculadon pipe non-representabve conservabve trne Imt 58 9
potendal 91-01 investgaton obstructed
' sample-lost entica! sty for each reorculabon bamer if transferred to cycle storage PG35 59 double sample required 60 kmst on d:fference 61 between double sample va!ues operator checkhst 62 supervisor checks 63 sample results before transfer to storace operator error non-representatve double sample required 64 9
potental 91-01 inv6t9b.
sample -lost enticahty bamerif transferred to storage Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Tearrt Bill Aikier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long. Bryan McCarty Frank Tidd
- Page 5 of 10 a
..u..
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers, Node 7 Design Intent Fin 18 tank array, isolate it for doubie recrculation and s. r.finglanalysis, pump <1.5 ppm U solubon to storage tank.
GUIDE 1 DEvtATION
&ak CONSEQUENCES PROTECT @N No.
fusK ACisN#COGARRENTS WORD
~
Opennsor checks 65 sample resutts before transfer to storace irm;t on dd'cicnce 66 between double sample values murup;s R1 steam flow 67 interlocks off gasses pass through 68 2 sets of sintered metal filters as weH as extra speces present V10 open dunng 18 possibly exceed e* fluent Operator's C=ckfest 69 8
tank rearculation release entena superwsor in wiacLcxi 70 required to glate several valves supervisor ct=cks 71 sample resuts before authorizing transfer to tanker storage tank contents Ti previously sampled off gasses pass ti.rcogh 73 2 sets of sintered metal filters, unlikely to have soids expenence andcates 74 worst case contaminabon would meet release entena oxide reactoi 1 steam 75 interlocks prevent uranium conta.i.;riatica V29 opea dunng 18 non-repesent Lie normally locked closed i
8 l
tank reorculation sample Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: bib Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes,Jamie Long. Bryan McCarty, Frank Tdd Page 6 cf 10
- .s ;.e -
U C~
C m
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers. Node 7 Design Intent Fill 18 tank array, iso! ate it for double recirculation and samp6ng/anafysis, pump <1.5 ppm U solut:on to storage tank.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS d
WORD supervrsor interacten 77 l
required to manipu! ate several valves off gasses pass thicogh 78 2 sets of sintered metal fi!!ers, un!;kefy to have so!ds expenence endrcates 79 worst case contaminabon would moet release cm. aria oxde reactor 1 steam 80 interlocks prevent uranium contam nat'on overfi!! to 6 tank array via LSH6 alarm dies oxde 81 8
vent pipe conversion, stops HF caneraten vent pips good to 225F 82 V10 leaks dunng 18 non-representabve vafve ccirsvvuon and 83 8
tank recirculaten sample construcbon provdes cood intecnty storage tank contents 84 previous!y sampled low pressure drop 85 across valve limt. s ra*e off gasses pass through 86 2 sets of sintered metal filters, unlikely to have schds e4+nence indcates 87 worst case contaminaten would meet retease enteria Date: 1/21-2.T98 HAZOP Team: Bi:1 Alicer. Bob Freeman Kevin Hayes Jamie Long. Bryan McCarty. Frank Tdd Page 7 of 10
- M g
a-
f'%.)
J HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers, Node 7 Design Intent Fill 18 tank array, isolate it for double recutabon and sampling! analysis, pump <1.5 ppm U soluten to storage tank.
PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION! COMMENTS l
CONSEQUENCES GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE WORD oxide reactor 1 steam 88 1 interlocks prevent uranium contamination V29 leaks dunng 18 non-representatve valve compostten and 89 8
tank recirculaton sample construcbon provdes cood in+ecnty low pressure drop 90 across va!ve limits rate off gasses pass through 91 2 sets of sintered me*al filters, unlikely to have sofids expenence odicates 92 worst case contaminaten would meet re: ease enteda oxde reactor 1 steam 93 interlocks prevent uramum contami@n part of only cne sample taken operator error lost cnbcalsty bamer if lirrat on dif'erence 94 9
improbable for uranium to transferred to storage between double sample be present beyond entcahty values femit supervisor checks 96 sample results before transfer to storace muitple R1 steam f' w 96 c
interiocks off gasses pass through 97 2 sets of sintered metal filters day tank not isolated operator error non-representatve tirnst on difference 98 9
potendal 91-01 investgaton before double sample -lost enticahty between double sample recirculation and bamer if transferred to values samo!e storace Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Atkier. Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long. Bryan McCarty. Frank Tidd Page 8 of 10
~.
O w
O p
K.
V HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316 HF Abscibers, Node 7 Design Intent Fill 18 tank array, isolate it for double recirculabon and samphngfanatysis, pump <1.5 ppm U solution to storage tank.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION! COMMENTS 1
WORD supervisor cf'ecks 99 samc e resu ts before transfer to storace FV21 is fait closed vaW 100 interlocked to LSH7 alarm, also by manual sdtch valve labehng 101 incomplete transfer of operator error operabihty problem operator records tank 102 8
contents to storage start and stop levels PG35 pressure drops 103 quickfy when done levelindimbon by 104 Nanscarent pping known time limit to i 105 about 13 mrnutes trans%r fuil tanks other than pump to truck tank mtsaltgt.ed vatve deadhead the pump diaphragm pump 106 8
fittings instead of p W oes storace tank FV11 interlocked to 107 tankerlevel switch V12 is remote relative to 108 pump V12 norma!!y closed 109 concurrent misabgned valve l lost cnt:cahty bamerif V9 and FV22 remote to 110 9
pote.4tw 91-01 inve ;tgaton recirculation and transferred to storage each other transfer to storage V9 is a 3-way vaive, 111 directs discharge one of two ways FV22 is normally closed 112 actuated valve Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZO? Tearrr Bi!I Aikier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty Frank Tidd Page 9 of 10 s.
4 HAZOP STUDYiff0RKSHEET j-Sydem 316. HF Absorbers, Node 7 i
Desgn Intent Fill 18 tank array esolate it for double recrculabon and samplingtanalysis, pump <1.5 ppm U solubon to storage tank.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE
.C R QUElkW.s PROTEUTrON No.
RISK ACTIONICOM l
M I-FV22 is actuated valve 113 with automabc time out l
forclosure FV22 bed into control 114 system. mpares supennsor key to coen valve latWing 115 Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Teant Bill Akier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jame Long. Bryan McCarty, Frank Tsdd Page 10 of 10
, ~.
~
9-
O H;UOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. MF Absorbers. Node 8 Design Intent Recrculate the bulk storage tank, obtain and analyze a sample, and pumo HF cv..I ints less than 1.5 ppm urannam to the tanker truck.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
a ACTION /CORARIENTS WORD no no transfer pump 4 tanure operabi!rty probem scare parts 1
6 PG35 2
Operator present dtdig 3
transfer personal exposure ~ vin dduser on pump exhaust 4
6 ACTION: need to ristas sprayed HF splash (,chivi fun persw ievim.tve 5
entspment required Op=..ivi not Ovin.isy 6
close to pump
=po e parts 7
8 pump enlet closed Operabil:ty puiAeir.
r PG35 8
%.ivi picxat dtug 9
transfer V12 C,0seG dead-headed pump space paits 10 8
PG35 11 Opci.ivi present duiu g 12 transfer LSH15 incpc,.1 ve dead-headed pump spare poi ^s 13 8
PG35 14 a Operator piesent duirig 15 transfer FV11 fails closed dead-headed pumo spare poils 16 8
PG35 17 Opci tv. present duiu g 18 transfer no recirculation pumoa failure possibly exceed effluent urn to pu. p to 19 8
a m
k release entena ta 1kerwithout pump 4 PG35 20 i;t.
7 cperator piesentto 21 start /stop pump
- spore _c.its 22 valve mrsa!3nn,ent possibly exceed emuent Opei idschecklist 23 8
release entena t
HAZOP Team: Bin Alloer, Bob Freeman. Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long. Bryan McCarty, Frank Tair Page 1 cf 6 Date: 1/21-23/98
+
E h
- 4
m s
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Abscutreis. Node 8 Design Intent Rectreulate the bulk storage tank, obtain and ana!yze a sample, and pump HF containng less than 15 ppm uranium to the tanker truck GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD supervisor interacten 24 regtnied to irsaipulate several valves supennsor checks 25 samps :=.sults before authonang transfer to tamer off gasses pass I!uvagh 26 2 sets of smtered metal filters, unlike?y to have soMs e4 ei. cia andcates 27 worst case contamination wou:d meet reMase entana oxde reactor 1 steam 28 interlocks prevent uranham contammabon no sample step omrtied poss:biy edesd efSuent 69ersters check!:st 2L2 8
release cri*ena superv@r chc-cks 30 sample results before authoriang transfer to tanker off gasses pass th.wh 31 2 sets of sintered metal f!!!ers unlikety to have roms expenence Mcates 32 worst case contamsnabon would maet retease entaria cxde reactor 1 steam 33 interlocks pmvent uranium contammaton Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill A!kier. Bob Freeman Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long. Bryan McCarty. Frank Tdd Page 2 of S
- e..
..5
(
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316 HF Absvi'veis, Node 8 Design Intent Recirculate the bulk storage tank, obtain and analyze a sample. and pump HF containing less than 1.5 ppm urannam to the tanker tru GUIDE DEVIATsON CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
fusK ACTKnWCOMMENTS WORD 1.SH15 inupeioLee maffunct on overfitt tankerinto vent eu e wrcy A-p on 34 9
. ACTION. put snto piucedure line, pcssibly back to tanker fiDing ploLin to nc^w"f =>gaei g af tank truckis overfiBed --would storage tank use V18 to drain overSow two pecfAE present 35 isn. cunt transiwired can 36 be L^..na.ed from storage tanklevet indicator on tanker A;; o wnLvi system 37 calculates and limits e
amount to be pumped no verdng V14 and/orV15 closed inessunze tanker reisef valve on tanker 38 9
two pecple are present.
39 check each other pump can eisoiw only 40 v
40 foot water column, or 20 psi more LSH15 reads high matfuncbon stop transfer too early, cr+;k levelind coLcn on 41 8
i coerability issue storage tank Opmotvi checKhst 42 includes storage tank level start'stoo values i
g conLvisystem 43 I.a calcutates andIrnts amount to be RL...;cd have trend abshty in 44 control s,rstem Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: bib Alkier, Bob. Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jame Long, Bryan IWLM, Frank Tdd Page 3 of 6 O
O O
O HAZOP STUDYWORKSHEET System 316. MF Absorbers. Node 8 Design Intent Rectrculate the bulk storage tank, obtain and anatyze a sample, and pump HF containmg less than 15 ppm uranium to the tanker inack.
GUIDE OFVIATION l
CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTIONICOMMENTS
" WORD transfer too truch coerator error overfill tanker LSH15 interlock to FV11 45 9
l errergency stop 46 intertock to FV11 tanker reaches weght 47 hm:t before volume Errut use V18 to drarn excess 48 ACTION. provnbre must into container (s) before require ergseer;.vg breaking tanker not5 cation before V18 used connec'xn as weIIas extra species present V8 or V29 open dunng lost enticahty bamer if operators check!tst 49 8
potental 91-01 inveMgaton storage tank unanalyzed HF reGetion transferred to storace V29 ncnir#y locked 50 closed supennsor interacLcra 51 required to manipulate u
several vah,*s l
supervisor ct+2 52 samp're resuits before authorizing transfer to tanker off gasses pass through 53 2 sets of sintered metal filters, unkkely to have sofids experence indicates 54 worst case contaminaten would meat release entaria oxide reactor 1 steam 55 interlo%s prevent umnium contamination i
HAZOP Teant Bill Aikier, Bob Freeman. Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long. Bryan McCarty. Frank Tdd Page 4 of 6 Date: 1/21-23/98 g
O O
~
HAZOP STUDY VUORKSHEET Syh 316. MF Absorbers. Node 8 Design Intent Recirculate the bulk storage tank, obtain and anatyze a sample, and purnp HF w.L=ni.9 less than 1.5 ppm uramur i to the tanker truck.
GUIDE DEVIATION l
CAUSE CONSEQ C ES i-ROTECTiGN No.
Ann
.. ACisuM/CORIAfENTS VWORD V8 or V29 leaks cunng devi ded vde;di valve c.vu p:N and 56 8
ACTION: Add redundisnt storage tank bamerit unana!yzed HF cons wo provides.
valves VBA and V29A redccolaten transferred to storage good integnty prevenLve (i ntenisnce
, 57 potenLis' 91-01 evestc3-E-:-.
system ensures valve ritegnty low piessure drop 58 acroes valve Irmits rate off gasses pass ti.icaigh, 59 2 sets of sritered metal fitters, unliket to have f
sofKis expenence inda.aies 60 worst case contamatabon would ir d &- entena oxide reactor 1 steam 61
.dwi'ccks prevent urarwum w 4-iO >
reverse tanker filland vent operator error dead-heisd=d pump fLsieges and pipes are.
62 -
8 d.1!erent sizes connections are e usM FV11 =deficck to LSH15 63 depiu,3.n pump 64 piDQuiin=5 punving out of 18 tank 65 12 array to truck other than transfer from 18 tank V8 and V10 lost c d1cishty Lau rci rf valves re..cte to each 66 9
array instead of misaligned transferred to tanker other storace tank wdhcot Oceper analysis
[
. HAZOP Tearrt bib Alluer. Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes. Jamie Long. Bryan McCarty. Frank Tdd Page 5 of 6 Date: 1/21-23t98
-: ~
,.a
m
,- m
<~
i HAZOP STUDY WOFKSHEET System 316. MF Absorters. Node 8 Design Intent Recircritate the bu!k storage tank, obtarn and analyze a sample, and pump HF corranrng less than 1.5 ppm uranrum to the tanker truck.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD procedure for lock out 67 on V12 that gets removed and p! aced on V8 by supervisor meMri7M 6,6r vatve timih rgs 68 transfer to 18 tank V9 and V12 overfill 18 tank array LSH7 alarm 69 8
array instead of tanker misar.gned LSH6 alarm 70 vafve tabe!mg 71 vafves remote to each 72 other two people are present.
73 check each other Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes. Jamie Long. Bryan McCarty Frank Tdd Page 6 cf 6 m
3
\\
f
/
%d HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorters, Node 9 Dessn Intent Transfer up to 34% HF solubon into sa'e containers from 18 tank array or storage tank, and back into those tanks from contarners.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CCf4 SEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION 1 COMMENTS WORD more of overhil container operator error spill recircutate wtwe 1
9 pumptng so that full force is not going into container contarner on secondary 2
should pur7 into conta.ners containment cuiside of d;ke because of I@ng dif5cultes - need portable secondary containment.
i fbw adjustable by V19 3
hose seed so flowis not 4
excesswe container levelindcator 5
ACTION: ensu e this is in procedure personal exposure full persuce; protectrve 6
9 equipment required recirculate whde 7
purrping so that fuit force is not going into container flows adjustable by V19 8
hose sted so flowis not 9
excessrve contarner levelindcator 10 container level same as " operator error' same as " operator 11 9
indica *cr failure error", except for level indcator protectwon excessrve pump rate same as operator error' same as" operator error' 12 9
connect to wrong side same as " operator error ' same as ' operator error" 13 9
of pump -container filled when intended to l
empty D te: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bit! Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long. Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd Page 1 of 3 I
~
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers,. Node 9 Design I-tent Transfer up to 34% HF solution into safe containers from 18 tank array or storage tank, and back into those tanks from containers.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTIONICOMMENTS WORD less than not enough transferred level andcator fa:!s operabil;ty problem - too operator v:sualcheck of 14 12 many containers used container W a?.er
~
trans%r nr. creased chance for fu2 perscruid g 0;cc^ove 15 9
operator en Osure equ'pinefit requied because of more transfers operator error cperabil:ty problem - too Operator visual Cec.k of 16 12 many containers used containerlevelaRer transfer contarnerleve! ndcator 17 increased chance for fuD persc6al r iecLve 18 9
c operator exposure equipment required because of more transfers contarnerlevel andcator 19 as well as fill a container with contarner reuse reaction of enconpatbles contamer labeitng 20 12 something else already in it.
container insgMon 21 before reuse mistabeled contarner reaction of uicvsipat:btes n.spect contarner 22 12 segregated conta:ner 23 storage other than wrong matenalinto mistabeled container reacten of inwnpatibles PCV12 and PCV25 24 9
system PSV14 25 tank and pipe matenals 26 of constructen 1
Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier. Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long. Bryan McCuty Frank Tdd Page 2 of 3
- --.,...i...
O
~
~'
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers, Node 9 Design intent Transfer up to 34% HF sow into safe containers from 18 tank array or storage tank, cnd back into those tanks from w essis.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCFS PROTECTIOfi No.
RISK
- ACTCN/CORIGAENTS WORD Sp=wi Evaluation
.27 ACTION emiure this is in Traveler require 6 -
procedure abnormalto add materialto system irp;irg requied 28 ACTIO*f ensuretfusisin
(
before matenalmay be procedure added to system seyegated csitainer 29 storage connect to wrong sde lost enticality bamer d Spec 4 Evalu.Lun 30 9
poie >bal 91-01 m&;2_-:-i of pump -container material having uranium Traveler required -
empted when is transferred to storage abnce J to add intended to fill w:thout proper analysis matenalto system s nphng requieci 31 before matericimay be added to system segiegated c.vnterner 32 storage quahficaten tanks are 33 safe geometry Date: 1/21-23/98 HAZOP Team: Bal A!kier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jame Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tdd '
Page 3 of 3
I f'
')
J V
k HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers. Node 10 Design intent Doub!e walled storage tank,10,200 ga5on sumped concrete dike.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD no loose bu!k storage corroson/errosen of spilt doubkr wa!! tank 1
12 tank integnty primary tank wa 1 provdes fuH containmant tank construc.bcn 2
matenais compatbie with creater than 34%
LSH8 atarm 3
4 dike provdes tnple,
containment defective tank spill doubie wa4 tank 5
12 provdes fun containment LSHS alarm 6
dike provides tnpre 7
containment impact or penetraten spin double was tank 8
12 provides penehoben absvibers.18 tank 9
array, and 6 tank array are encased by carbon dike prcnedes vehcie 10 barrier LSH8 alarm 11 d:ke provdes sec.Ordary 12 containment earthquake lost pnmary contarnment seismic design 13 12 ACTION venfy with contractor double wan storage tank 14 l
provides its own conta+ ment severe weather lost pomary containment tank is secured to dike 15 12 (tomado, etc.)
by facqed steel beams Date: 6/12/97 HA2.OP Team: Bin Alkier, Bob Freeman. Kevin Hves, Jamie Long. Bryan McCarty, Frank Tdd Page 1 of 3
O O
O HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers, Node 10 Design intent Double waited storage tank,10,200 gallon sumped concrete dike.
GulDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD double wall prevents 16 debris penetration to
' primary containment ces:gn minimizes wina u
drag containment dike -
18 loose dike integrity corrosion /errosion lost containnent spi!! required for a 19 12 problem to exist need multiple spills or 20 unmitigated significant spill to breach dike double wap storage tank 21 regular operator 22 tanks and pipes are 23 constructed of HF compatible materials sump pump running lost containment double wall storage tank 24
.9 when should be off tanks and pipes are 25 constructed of HF compatible materials normally locked closed 26 vehicle impact lost containment reinforced concrete 27 12 minor traffic area.
28 primarily by forklift dnll through
' lost cod ~ainment spill required for a 29 16 problem to exist preset anchors for targe 30 equipment thickness of concrete 31 pumps mounted on 32-framework, not corictete earthquake lost containment seismic design 33 9
Date: 6/12/97 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Lorig. Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd Page 2 of 3 4
..i-,....a.
~Y HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316, HF Absorbers, Node 10 Design Intent Double walled storage tank,10,200 gallon sumped concrete dike.
-GUIDE DEVIATION.
CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD double wa!! storage tank 34 provides its own containment less of less Inan 10,z00 ramwater oveniow cike in case of couDie wail Duik storage do.
12 gallons capacity accumulation total system integrity tank provides own available in dike failure containment 10,200 gallons is 5%
36 greater than total system capacity regular operator 37 ACTION: make provisions presence for secunty guard rcunds dike sump pump 38 part of slow leak onto dike loose fitting corrosion /errosion preventive maintenance 39 8-to snug fittings and bolts regular operator 40 presence concrete damage readily 41 apparent other than discharge to Di system sump pump operating debris or foreign material V35 42 12 drain when TV13 open sent to absorber system atypical for TV13 to be 43 open sump pump pressure 44 less than DI water system cressure Date: 6/12/97 HAZOP Team: Bill Atkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd Page 3 of 3
m (3
(x HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers, Node 11 Design Intent Segregation of incompatible chemicals, equipment integrity, minimal personal contact, emergency shower / eyewash.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD no failure to segregate operator error reaction of incompatibles dike wall provides 1
9 l
barrier from improper incompatible chemicals storage leak or spi!! required for 2
incompatibles in containers sampfing required 3
before e.1 ding containerized material to system Engineering approvat 4
required before adding containerized material to system pressurize system from PSV14 5
12 chemical reaction PCV12 and PCV25 6
good to 150 psig 7
dike provides 8
containment for any fittino leaks double wall storage tank 9
generation of byproduct system designed for 10 12 chemicals from reaction compatibility with inorcanic chemicals lack of aggressive 11 organic chemica!s on site personalexposure from leak or spill required for 12 a
chemical reaction incompatibles in containers Date: 6/12/97 HAZOP Team: Bill ATier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd Page 1 of 6
O O
O HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF. Absorbers, Node 11 Design Intent Segregation of incompatible chemicais, equipment integrity, minimal personal contact, emergency shower / eyewash.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS l 1
WORD sampling required 13 before adding containerized material to engineenng approvai is required before adding containerized material to svstem full personal protective 15 equipment required emergency 16 shower / eyewash equipment integrity.
frozen pipe or tank spill 34% HF solution
-17 12 freezing point is -70F failure dilute HF, city water, 18 and DI water pipes have redundant heat tracing with insulation most of system operates 19 at elevated temperature dilute HF pipes are.
20 empty when system is not operating absorbers,18 tank 21 array, and 6 tank array are encased by carbon steel D1 waterlines equipped 22 with pressure relief double wall storage tank 23 containment dike 24 personal exposure 34% HF solution 25 12 freezing point is -70F l
Date: 6/12/97 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd Page 2 of 6
,n
]
N)
G' HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316 HF Absorbers, Node 11 Design Intent Segregation of incompatible chemicals, equipment integrity, minimal personal contact, emergency shower / eyewash.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS WORD dilute FF and D1 water 26 pipes have redundant heat tracing with insulation most of system operates 27 at elevated temperature dilute HF pipes are 28 empty when system is not operatm absorbers,1 -'
ik 29 array, and 6 tank array I
are encased by carbon steel double wall storage tank 30 full personal protectue 31 equipment required emergency 32 shower / eyewash impact or penetration coill double wall tank 33 12 provides penetration absorbers,18 tank 34 array, and 6 tank array are encased by carbon steel dike provides vehicle 35 barrie" l
pipe bridge provides 36 vehicle barrier LSH8 alarm 37 dike provides secondary 38 containment Date: 6/12/97 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob rieeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd Page 3 of 6
,m r,
/
e, HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET l
System 316, HF Absorbers, Node 11 l
Design Intent: Segregation of incompatible chemicals, equipment integnty, minimal personal contact, emergency shower / eyewash.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTIONICOMMENTS l
WORD personal exposure full personal protective 39 12 equipment required emergency 40 ACTION: install emergency snower/eyewasn aiarm stauon in hmestone buildino weathenng or wear of sp111 preventive maintenance 41 9
equipment same as impact or 42 penetration" personal exposure same as " impact or 43 9
penetration" severe weather spill equipment bolted to 44 8
(tomado, etc )
foundation materials of construction 45 design minimizes wind 46 drag containment dike 47 seveie weather 48 procedure personal exposure equipment bolted to 49 8
foundation materials of construction 50 design minimizes wind 51 draq containment dike 52 severe weather 53 procedure breach during spill procedure for control of 54 8
maintenance hazardous energy isolation valves 55 double wall storage tank 56 Date: 6/12/97 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty. Frank Tidd Page 4 of 6
_7 HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316. HF Absorbers Node 11 Design Intent Segregation of incompat:ble chemicals. equipment integrity, minimal personal contact, emergency shower / eyewash.
j GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTION / COMMENTS l
WORD c
deke provides secondary 57 j
containment l
l l
l personal exposure full personal protectnte 58 6
equipment required emergency 59 shower / eyewash no emergency water shut off personnel unable to full personal protective 60 12
~
shower / eyewash wash exposed areas equipment required parallel filters on supply 61 no reason to isolate periodic inspections 62 frozen water pipe personnel unable to water pipes have 63 12 wash exposed areas redundant heat tracing with insulation PSV31 64 full personal protect:ve 65 equipment required periodic inspections 66 no perscnal protective operator error lack of protection in case posted as entry 67 3
equipment of spill or splash prohibited without protective equipment equipment inventory 68 more of increased potential for transferring to or from personal exposure leak or spill required for 69 9
exposure containers incompatibles in containers i
sampling required 70 l
before adding containerized material to system Da e: 6/12/97 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd Page 5 of 6 l
l l
- l
(.
p O
O O
HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET System 316 HF Absorbers, Node 11 Design intent: Segregation cf incompatible chemicais, equipment integrity, rninimal personal contact, emergency shower / eyewash.
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION No.
RISK ACTIONICOMMENTS WORD Engineenng approval 71 required before adding containerized material to system fuIl personal protective 72 equipment required emergency 73 shower / eyewash obtaining samples personal exposure recirculate while 74 6
sampling so that full force is not coinc into flows adjustcble by V19 75 restnctive onfice in each 76 sample port hose sized so flow is not 77 excessive full personal protective 78 equipment required emergency 79 shower / eyewash maintenance personal exposure absorbers and pumps 80 6
can be fully drained throuch V29 isolation valves on c:ther 81 side of absorber pumps
~
procedures for 82 maintenance activities full personal protectue 83 equipment required buddy system for 84 maintenance activities emergency 85 shower / eyewash Date: 6/12/97 HAZOP Team: Bill Alkier, Bob Freeman, Kevin Hayes, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd Fage 6 of 6 2
' " " ' ' ~ '
~..
' ~' '
T HAZARD EVALUATION FJ. REQUISITE WFORMATION TABLE REVIEWTYPE: HAZOP DATE-1/21-23/98 PLANT / OPERATION: System 316.HF Absorbers DOCUMENTATION PREREQUISITE INFORMATION '
Process Chemical Hazards Toncityinformation Combustion Er.v;r.;;.19, Inc. MSDS for Hydrofluoric Acid, 34%, dated 1/98.
Permissible e90sure limits Combusbon Ers;r.;;;a4, Inc. MSDS for Hp vT.vei;c Acid, 34%, dated 1/98.-
Combusbon Engineenng, Inc. MSDS for Hp viiuoric Acid, Physicaldata 34%, dated 1/98.
Combusbon Engineenng, Inc. MSDS for Hpurivvi;c Acid, -
ReactMty data 34%, dated 1/98.
Combushon Ers;r.;;.1rs, Inc. MSDS for Hp vTver;c Acid, CorrosMtydata 34%, dated 1/98.
Thermal and chemical stabilitydata Combustion Ersir.;;.i4, Inc. MSDS for HAvTruoric Acid,.
34%, dated 1/98.
Hazardous effects of inadvertent mbing Hazardous Chemeals Desk Reference, Third Eddhon; NFPA 49.1994; NFPA 491,1997.
Process Technology Block cr simplified process flow diagram DocuiTieiit 316 flow 2.af2: Syme T. 316, HF Absorbers, Block Flow Diag am Document DBD-316R00-S00: Desen Basis DocuT, era, Process chemistry Plant System 316, OWde Conversion HF Absorber System Madmum intended inv'entory DocuiTiera DBD-316R00-S00: Desgn Basis Docurriera, Plant System 316. OWde Conversion HF A'asorber System Safe upper and lower limits for items such as temperature, Document DBD-316R00-S00: Desen Basis Dco-c.ers, Plant System 316. OWde Conversion HF Absorber System pressure, flows, etc.
Document 316deV2. doc: Evolushon of Devistoin Evaluation of deviation consequences Consequences, System 316. HF Absorbers Document D0D-316R00-S00: D-4-. Basis Docu,T.e4 Process Equipment Materials of construchon Plant System 316, OWde Conversson HF Absorber System Piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&lD)
Drew;rgs D-5007-1026 dated 1/9/98, D-5007-9001 dated 11/1297, and D-5007-9002 dated 11/12/97 Electrical classification None Relief system design and design basis Document DBD-316R00-S00: DM9 Basis Docu.T.64 Plant System 316, Ojede Comersion HF Absorber System Ventilation system desiDn None - outdoor location DesiDn codes and standards employed Good er-R.;;. irs piecG,e Page 1 of 2
^
O c
HAZARD EVAI IIATION FRtREQUISITE INFORMATION TABLE PLANT / OPERATION: System 316 HF Absorbers REMEWTYPEE HAZOP DATE: 1/21-23/98 DOCUIENTATION PREREQUISITE INFORMATION Process Equipment (cont.)
Material PfFt energy balances (after 5/26/92)
Document DBD-316R0(MIOO: Design Basis Dari-7 in, -
Plant System 316. Odde Comersion HF Absorber System Document DBD-310P0(MiOO: Design Basis Document, Safetysystems Plant System 316. Onde Conversson HF Absorber System j
PLC/Comptder System Block logic Eram orflow chart Not feasible i
Process step trioDerlist Plan fort &s HF S,2;r. VO and L-:97 Process step cordrol function list
. Plan fortes HF System 10 and L-:fT-Batch Step Configuration Summary of equipment position and condition for each step Plan for Testing HF System WO and Logic.
of batch formulabon Other Related accident reWs None - new 5yn1,v.
Interim Hazard Ewluation Fac5ty S5ine Review,6/3/97 Facity sting infonnation Human factors /eivarisinics studies interim Hazard Evaluation Human Fedors Review,6/3/97 Page 2 of 2
Matsrial Safety Data Shest Forms Putashed ty WWxbwChem (70D064484G Section 1. Chemical Product and Company identification j roduct Name Product Code L/ Hydrofluoric Acid, 34%
Manufacturers Name Emergency Telephone Number Combustion Engineering. Inc.
800-424-9300 Address (Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code)
Telephone Number for information 3300 State Road P 314-937-4691 Date Prepared P.O. Box 107 January, 1998 Signatureof Preparer (optional)
Hrmatite, MO 63047 K. R. Hayes, CHMM Section 2. Composition /Information on Ingredients Other Umits Component CAS #
OSHA PEL OSHA STEL Recommended Percent Hydrogen Fluoride 7664-39-3 3 PPM 6 PPM 30 PPM IDLH
<35 Section 3. Hazards identification Emergency Overview Extremely corrosive material whose fluoride content is also toxic. Speed in getting proper treatment after exposure is essential. NFPA hazard ratings are health = 4.
-fire = 0, reactivity = 1. Listed as extremely hazardous material in SARA Title III.
R* portable quantity (RO) for spills is 100 pounds. Consult 1996 North American Emergency Response Guide Number 157.
Potential Health Effects Eye Conjunctivitis, corneal burns. Failure to immediately treat after exposure may result in blindness.
SWn Severely painful, slow healing burns with ulceration. Signs or symptoms of exposure may be delayed 1 to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. >25 in* burn may be fatal.
Ingestion Severely painful, slow healing burns to mouth, throat, GI tract.
Even small, dilute quantities may lead to fatal hypocalcemia.
Inhalation Airway irritation at lower concentrations. Airway burns, laryngo-spasm, bronchospasm, delayed pulmonary edema at greater concentrations. May be fatal.
Chronic / Carcinogenicity Burns are slow to heal. Repeated exposures may cause bronchitis, fluoride toxicity to liver and kidneys, or bone changes. No carcinogenicity cited.
O Material Safety Data Sheet Page 1
Matcrial Safety Data Shast Product Name Hydrofluoric Acid, 34%
Product Code Toratology Teratogenic effects found in laboratory animal studies.
n V eproduction Reproductive effects found in laboratory animal studies.
R Mutagordcity Mutagenic data reported by EPA Genetic Toxicology Program.
Section 4. First Aid Measures Eye Immediately flush with copious running water for 5 minutes, then irrigate with 1% calcium gluconate in normal saline. Seek medical attention.
Skin Immediately flush with copious running water for 5 minutes. Remove contaminated clothing. Apply 2.5% calcium gluconate gel. Seek medical attention.
ingestion Do not induce vomiting. If person is conscious / alert, give antacid containing calcium, or milk / water with milk of magnesia. Seek medical attention.
Inhalation Move to fresh air. If exposed above a limit or breathing problem durolops, nebulize 2.5% calcium gluconate in normal saline. Seek medical attention.
- Section 5. Fire Fighting Measures Flammable Properties Flash Point NA Method NA Flarnr..able Limits Lower NA Upper NA Autolgnition Temperature NA Hazardous Combustion Products NA, material does not burn or support combustion.
Extinguishing Media As appropriate for surrounding material, but control use of water or water-based media.
Fire Fighting instructions Do not use solid water stream around a ruptured tank or spill.
Strong hose stream will splatter acid. In general, adding water to a larger volume of acid may cause fuming and/or splattering; acids may be added to a larger volume e
of water. Contain runo.'f for proper treatment and disposal.
Section 6. Accidental Release Measures -
Small Spm Isolate area and stay upwind until 'imes disperse. Personnel wraring PPE should contain spill and dilute with water or 1,eutralize with lime.
Large Spm Isolate area, stay upwind. Personnel wearing PPE should contain Apill and dilute with water, neutralize with lime, and/or pick up with vacuum tanker.
Section 7. Handling and Storage Handling Do not breathe vapor or mist. Do not get in eyes, on skin, in mouth, or on clothing. Wash thoroughly after handling. Note potential for delayed signs or symptoms of an exposure.
Material Safety Data Sheet Page 2
Material Safsty Data Sheet Product 'r4ame Hydrofluoric Acid, 34%
Product Code Storage Keep away from heat, sparks, and open flame. Keep container closed and away from areas where it may be damaged. Cont.ainers should be placed in A,,,/or on compatible secondary containment.
Section 8. Exposure Controls, Parsonal Protection Engineering Controls Ensure integrity of primary container. Ensure sufficient gtneral or forced ventilation to keep vapor concentrations below the exposure limit.
Respiratory Protection Air purifying respirator with acid gas cartridge for exposures 3
c.bove PEL or STEL, but below IDLH. Positive pressure SCBA in unknown or above IDLH concentrations.
Sidn Protection Heavy PVC, butyl, or neoprene gauntlet gloves. Acid resistant rubber or plastic clothing including hood, coat, bibbed coverall, and shoe covers.
Eye Protection ANSI Z87.1 face shield and chemical goggles.
Permissible Exposure Levels (see also Section 2)
Other Limits Component CAS #
OSHA PEL OSHA STEL Recommended Percent O
$V Section 9. Physical and Chemical Properties Boiling Point 120 C Specific Gravity (H2O = 1) 1.15 248 F Vapor Pressure (mm Hg at 20 deg. C) 22 Melting Point NA Vapor Density (AIR = 1) 1 Evaporation rate
<1 (Butyl Acetate = 1)
Solub6lity in Water Soluble Physical State Fuming liquid Appearance and Odor Colorlesa liquid with Other sharp, acrid odor.
Section 10. Stability and Reactivity Chemical Stability
_ Stable incompanbility Avoid uncontrolled contact with water and active metals. Reacts violently with alkalis. Incompatible with most metals, cyanides, sulfides, glass, ceramics, and concrete.
Material Safety Data Sheet Page 3
Material Safsty Data Shest Product Name Hydrofluoric Acid. 34%
Product Code Hazardous Decomposition Products Fluorides and hydrogen gas on contact with certain tals. Fumes and' vapors can be highly corrosive, and may be toxic.
. Hantdous Polymerization Will not occur, although non-hazardous endothermic polymerization may occur in both the liquid and gaseous phases.
Section 11. Toxological Information This material is corrosive, and extremely toxic. The fluoride ion readily penetrates th3 skin and other tissues. Effects include hypocalcemia, which may result in fatal cardiac arrhythmias, and systemic toxicity associated with liver abnormalities and ceute renal failure.
Section 12. EcologicalInformation Hzy be toxic and corrosive hazard to aquatic and terrestrial life. HF is highly soluble in water, but an aquatic toxicity level has not been assigned. Harmful aquatic effects may occur at concentrations as low as 10 mg/1. HF does not biodegrade.
Section 13. Disposal Contiderations Dispose of in accordance with local, state, and federal regulations. Neutralization la typically required.
v Section 14. Transport Infonnation Proper DOT shipping description: Hydrofluoric Acid, Solution, 8, UN 1790, PGII.
_ yportable quantity (RO): 100 pounds. DOT labels: Corrosive and subsidiary poison.
R DOT placard: Corrosive.
Section 15. Regulatory Information R:: ported in TSCA Inventory. SARA Title III classifications include acute, chronic, and reactivity hazards. Listed in SARA (toxic and extremely hazardous chemical),
RCRA, and CERCLA. OSHA has interpreted HF solutions as being exempt from 1910.119.
Section 16. Other Information p
Material Safety Data Sheet Page 4
r HYDROCYANIC ACID (unstabillzed) 686 SYNS:AGD0 CYANHYDRioVE (FRNOI)
- AODO minutes. In ICss aCutC CasCs, there is cyanosis, CONS CIANIDRICO(FrAUAN)
- AERO i,qued HCN headache, dizziness, unsteadiness of gait, a llazar
- DLAUsALUR C(OER MAN)
- BLAUWzUUR (DUTQl) feeling of suffocation, and nausca. Where Right.
- CYAANWATERsTor(DtrtOtj
- CyANwAs.
the patient recovers, there is rarely any dis.
ogy P stRsTorr tatRMAN)
- CYcLON
- CYCLONEa ability.
ventol
- CYJANOWoDOR(rousm
- HCN
- HYDRoCY.
Yery dangerous fire hazard when ex.
AsiC AOD bgueried(DOD
- HYDROCY ANIC AOD posed to heat, flame, or oxidizers. Can poly.
OSH/
teRuss C) un.ubikied(Dor)
- HYDROctN CYasiDe merize explosively at 5040C' or in the T%
l (OSHA. ACOM)
- IfYDROOLN CYANIDE anhydrous. sta.
presence of traces of alkali. Severe explosion ACGtt i
hazard when exposed to heat or flame or by DFGt uaed(Don
- rRUssiC AOD(noT)
- rRUssiC AOD, unstab0ued
- RCR A WASTE NUMBLR r%3 chemical reaction with oxidizers. The anhy, crer
- zACwN Disco Ds drous liquid is stabilized at or below room NIOS' i
temperature by the addition of acid. The gas 5.0 CONSENSUS REPORTS: EPA Extremely forms explosive mixtures with air. Reacts vio.
DOT llazardous Substances List. Community lently with acetaldehyde. To fight fire, ~use Lab Right To-Know List. Reported in EPA CO, non. alkaline dry chemical, foam. When 5"
TSCA 1nventory, 2
heated to decomposition or in reaction with (U(
l OSHA PEL: (Transitional: TWA 10 ppm water, steam, acid, or acid fumes it produces rosi (skin)); STEL 4.7 ppm (skin) highly toxic fumes of CN An insecticide.
ll See also CYANIDE.
SAFE ACGlH TLV: CL 10 ppm (skin))
DFG MAK: 10 ppm (11 mg/m ii NIOSH REL: (Cyani'de) CL 5 mg(CN)/ HHUOOO CAS: 74 90-8 HR:3 li "',
m'/10M HYDROCYANIC ACID (unstabilized)
Ob TO DOT Classification: Poison A; Label: Poison SYNS:HyDRoCYANIC AOD.unatabilaed (DOT) iment Gas and Flammable Gas; IMO: Poison B;
- rRUssiC 40D. unu.6,iaed Label: Poison (UN 1614); 1MO: Poison B; produ Label: Flammable Liquid and Poison; For. CONSENSUS REPORTS: Reported in EPA Inhal'-
bidden, Unstabilized.
TSCA lnventory.
I' 50 SAFETY PROFILE: A deadly human and ex-NIOSH REL CLS mg(CN),/m'/10M expos perimental poison by all routes. Ilydrocyanic DOT Classihcation: Forbidden.
vere s acid and the cyanides are true protoplasmic SAFETY PROFILE: A deadly poison to living subcu poisons, combining in the tissues with the en-tissue by all routes of exposure. A very dan-
- *i' zymes associated with cellular oxidation.
gerous storage hazard See also HYDRO.
tM af They thereby render the oxygen unavailable CYANIC ACID.
air co to the tissues and cause death through as.
phyxia. The suspension of tissue oxidation HHU500 CAS: 7664 39 3 HR: 3 nde; lasts only while the cyanide is present; upon HYDROFLUORIC ACID "9"
its removal, normal function is restored, pro-OXYS' vided death has not already occurred. HCN DOT: UN 1052/UN 1790 actior
.does not combine easily with hemoglobin, mf: FH mw: 20.01 ammc but it does combine readily with rnethemo-PROP: Clear, colorless, fuming, corrosive globm to, form cyanmethemoglobin. This property is utilized in the treatment of cya-liquid or gas. Mp: -83.1*, bp: 19.54*, d:
mde poisoning when an attempt is made to 0.901 g/L (gas); 0.699 @ 22* (liquid), vaP 0* )'
induce methemoglobin formation. The pres-press: 400 mm @ 2.5*.
mang ence of cherry red venous blood in cases of SYNS:ACiDE rwoRiiVDRious(vRENQti
- AODo (CY cyanide poisoning is due to the inability of rLUORIDRICO (iTALI AN)
- FLUORoWODOR(rOL!sH) the tissues to remove the oxygen from the
- rwoRwasstRsTOrr(ctRMAN)
- FLOOR-I blood. Exposure to concentrations of 100--
WATERS 1DF OtrTQl)
- ItYDROFLUORIC AOD.anhy-b I
200 ppin for periods of 3040 minutes can droun(DOD
- HYDROFwoRIC ACID. nolui,on(DoD P
cause death. In cases of acute cyanide poison-
- HYDROFLUoRIDE
- IlYDROGEN FLUORIDE ing death is extremely rapid, although some-(OSHA. ACGM, MAK. DOD
- RCRA WASTE NUMBLR
?
times breathing may continue for a few usu a
mtne
I W
687 HYDROGEN o
l u
l l is eyanosis, CONSENSUS REPORTS: EPA Extremely ene glycol (mixtures evolve gas which may P gait, a llazardous Substances List. Community burst a sealed container). Reacts with water i pVhere Right To-Know List. EPA Genetic Toxicol-or steam to produce toxic and corrosive e
dis.
ogy Program. Reported in EPA TSCA In-fumes. When heated to decomposition it i
- ventory, emits highly corrosive fumes of F' See also J when ex.
FLUORIDES.
t Can poly.
OSHA PEL: (Transitional: TWA 3 ppm (F))
or in the TWA 3 ppm; STEL 6 ppm (F)
HHW500 CAS: 1333 74 0 HR: 3 re explosion ACGlH TLV: CL 3 ppm (F)
HYDROGEN flame or by DFG MAK: 3 ppm (2 mg/m'); BAT 7.0 mg/g
. The anhy.
creatinine in urine at end of shift.
DOT: UN 1049/UN 1966 7elow room NIOSH REL: (1,1F) TWA 2,5 mg(F)/m'; CL mf:11 mw: 2.02 3
R a tsv D T C a s ca ion Corrosive Material; PROP: Colorless, odorless, tasteless gas. Mp:
ht fire use Label: Corrosive (UN1052, UN1790); Poi-
-259.18, bp: - 252.8, lel: 4.1%, uel:
I oam.Nhen y
son A; Label: Poison Gas, Corrosive 74.2%, d 0.0899 g/L, autoign temp: 752,F,
- action with d
(UN1052); Corrosive Material; Label: Cor-vap iit produces J
rosive, Poison (UN1790)
SYNS nyDnoctw(Don
- HYDRoGcN.comgiressed insecticidC.
I (dot)
- HYDRooEN refrignated hqmd(dot)
SAFETY PROFILE: A human poison by inha-lation. A poison experimentally by inhala. CONSENSUS REPORTS: Repc,rted in EPA HR: 3 tion, subcutaneous, and intraperitoneal TSCA lnventory.
3llized) routes. A corrosive irritant to skin, eyes (@ DOT Classification: Flammable Gas; Label:
0.05 mg/L), and mucous membranes. Exper-Flammable Gas.
Don imental teratogeme effects. Experimental re-productive effects. Mutation data reported. SAFETY PROFILE: Practically no toxicity ex-ted in EPA Inhalation of the vapor may cause ulcers of cept that it may asphyxiate. Highly danger-the upper respiratory tract. Concentrations ous fire and severe explosion hazard when of 50-250 ppm are dangerous, even for brief exposed to heat, flame, or oxidizers. Flam-10M exposures. liydrofluoric acid produces se-mable or explosive when mixed with air; 0 ;
3 vere skin burns that are slow in healing. The chlorine To fight fire, stop flow of gas, s Vliving subcutaneous tissues may be affected, be-Explodes on contact with bromine tri-A very dan-e ming blanched and bloodless. Gangrene of fluoride; chlorine trifluoride; fluorine; hy.
3 y.YDRO-the affected areas may folicw. it is a common drogen peroxide + catalysts; acetylene +
air contaminant, ethylene. Explodes when heated with calcium Explosive reaction with cyanogen fluo-carbonate + magnesium; 3,4 dichloronitro-HR: 3 tide; glycerol + nitric acid; sodium (with benzene + catalysts;vegetableoils + catalysts; aqueous acid); methanesulfonic acid (evolves ethylene + nickel catalysts; difluorodiazene oxygen difluoride that explodes). Violent re- (above 90'C); 2-nitroanisole (above 250'C/
action with As30 ; P 0 ; acetic anhydride; 2-34 bar + 12% catalyst); copper (II) oxide; 3
3 3 amino ethanol; NH.Oll; 11Bi0 ; bismuthic nitryl fluoride (above 200'C); polycarbon 3
acid (evolves oxygen); CaO; chlorosulfonic monofluoride (above 500*C).
1, corrosive acid; ethylene diamine; ethylene imine; F ;
Forms sensitive explosive mixtures with 3
19.54, d.
mercury (11) oxide + organic materials (above bromine; chlorine; iodine heptafluoride
,liquid), vap O'C); n-phenylazopiperidine; potassium per. (heat-or spark-sensitive); chlorine diox-i manganate; potassium tetrafluorosilicate(2-) ide; dichicrine oxide; iodine heptafluoride
- n ac Do (evolves silicon tetrafluoride gas);(HNO + (heat-or spark sensitive); dinitrogen oxide; 3
no, n.ouun lactic acid); oleum; p propiolactone; propyl. dinitrogen tetraoxide; oxygen (gas); 1,1,1-ene oxide; Na; Na011; 11 S0 ; vinyl acetate; trisazidomethylethane + palladium catalyst.
i 3
tuon.
IIg sodium tetrafluoro silicate; n-phenyl Mixtures with liquid nitrogen react with heat C ACID anhy.
azo piperidine. Incandescent reaction of lig-to form an explosive product.
,,,,, cooy uid 1IF with oxides (e.g., arsenic trioxide, cal-Violent reaction or ignition with air +
vonme cium oxide). Dangerous storage hazard with catalysts (platinum and similar metals con-n Nuusta nitric acid + lactic acid; nitric acid + propyl-taining adsorbed oxygen or hydrogeni; bro-l
~
-.'..A
~
It AZ ulmus citf MICAL DAT A utttTs 49-77 lioll.ING POINF: -423*i 1-253*C)
NAMFc ilVDROGEN CYANIDf5, anhydrous, stabill ed,llVDROGEN CYANIDE, 4,
SPEClfIC GRAVilY: 0071 anhydrous, stabilhed absorbed in a
(]3 Sol UBil.lTY IN WATER not mluble porous inert material val'OR Di NSin 0 069 iNON) MS formomtrile. hydnuanc aciAl pruss acid VArdR PRESSURE: gas IORM1lA IICN ELEC1 RICAL f QUIPMI NT:'Clau I, Group B, DOI CLASS Class 61, Pononous matenal SillPPING LABEL: POISON and I'lAMMABLE LIQUID NAME: IlYDROGEN CllLORIDE, anhydrous ilYDROGEN CilLORIDE, s i ID NO.: UN 1051 (anhydrous) refrigerated liquid UN 1614 (absorbed in a porous material)
F ORMULA ilCl CAS NO : 74908 DOT CLMS. Class 2.3, Poisonous gas MOL. WF.: 27.0 SillPPING LABEL: POISON GAS and CORROStVI.
STATEMENT OF llAZARDS: Senre health hasard.. Flammable hquyd. Low ignition energy. May polymerire violently after a ID NO; UN 1050 anhydrous penod of ume.
UN 2186 refngerated hquid EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIP-CAS NOa 7647 01 0 MEN 1: hear special protective clothing and postuve pressure MOL hT.: 36.S self contained breathing apparatus STATEMENT OF llAZARDS: Corrosive.
SPILL OR LEAK PROCEDURES Releases may require holation or evacuation. Elimmate all igmuon sources. Stop or control the EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONAL PROTECFIVE EQUIP-leak, if this can be done without undue risk Use vapor-MENT: Wear special protective clothing and posiuve pressure supprening foam to blanket release.
self contained breathing apparatus.
FIRE FIGHTING PROCEDURES: fire situauons may require SPILL OR LEAK PROCEDURES: Approach release from cocuauon. Allow burning of material until flow of gas can be upwind. Stop or comrol the leak,if this can be don without stopped Use water spray, dry chemical. "akohol iesistant" undue risk. Use water fog or spray to knock down and absorb foam, or carbon dioxide. Water may be ineffective, Apprcach vapors. Releases may require isolation or evacuation. Control fire from upwind. Fight fire from protected location or maxi.
runoff and isolate discharged material for proper disposal mum pouible distance.
FIRE FIGifTING PROCEDURES: Use water spray to keep 6te-IlEALTH HAZARDS: Severe health hazard. May be fatal if exposed containers cool. Extinguish hre using agent suitable for absorbed through skin or inhated. May cause headache, nausea, surroundmg fire, vomiting, paralysis, convulsions, unconsciousness. death, c,anosis.
(v). llEALTil llAZARDS: Corrosisc. Causes severe eye and skin FIRE AND EXPLOslON llAZARDS: Flammable liquid. Burns in burns. May be haimful if inhaled. Irritating to skm, eyes, and air with a blue flame. Closed containers may rupture violently respiratory system. Contact with liquid may cause frostbite.
when heated.
FIRE AND EXPLOSION llAZARDS: Not combustible. Aqueous FLAsil POINT: 0*F (-18*C) hydrochloric acid solutions react with most metals, forming flammable hydrogen gas.
ALTTOlGNITION TEMPERATURF.1004*F (540*C)
INSTABILITY AND REACTIVITY llAZARDS: Anhydrous FLAMMABLE LIMIT 5: LOWER f.6% UPPER 40%
hydro en chloride is rapidly absorbed in water to form corro' INSTABILITY AND REACTIVITY ((AZARDS: May violently save h rochtone acid. Aqueous hydrochtonc acid solutions are polymerire spontaneously in absence ofinhibitors or ifimpure.
quite reactive. Reacts vigorously with alkahes and with many organic materials. Strong oxidizing materials cause release of STORACE RECOMMENDATIONS: Store in a cool, dry, well-chlorine.
venulated location. Shelf hfe not to exceed 90 days or as other.
wise speci6cd by manufacturer, STORAGE RECOMMENDATIONS: Store in a cool, dry, well-ventilated location. Separate from oxidizing materials, organic.
USUAL SHIPPING CONTAINERS: Steel cylinders from lecture materials, and alkalics.
bottle size to tank cars. Also' dissolved or ebsorberinto'watir, nen so ut ons, or other materials.
USUAL SillPPING CONTAINERS: Aqueous soluuons in glan boules and carboys and in rubber.imed tankers. Anhydrous PilYSICAL PROPERTIES: Colorieu gas or liquid. Distinctive hydrogen chloride in steel cylinders.
odor of bitter almonds.
PilYSICAL PROPERTIES: Colorless gas with an irntatin pun-MELTING POINT: TF (-14*C) gent odor. flydrochloric acid solutions are colorless or ightly yellow with irntating pungent odor; usually fuming.
BOILING POINT: 79'F (26*C)
MELTING POINT: -174*F (-il4*C)
SPECIFIC GRAVITY: 0.69 (liquid)
BOILING POINT: -121*F (-85*C)
SOLUBILITY IN WATER: soluble SPECIFIC CRAV11Y: 1.19 @ -85'C VAPOR DENSITY: 0 94 (gas)
SOLUP.!LITY IN WATER: soluble ELECTRICAL EQUIPM ENT: Clau I, Group C VAPOR DENSITY: 1.26 N AM E: IIYDROGEN FLUORIDE, snbydrous e
4 '
VAPOR PRESSURE: gas SYNONYMS anhydrous hydrofluonc acid. fluohydnc acid, liFA, hydrofluoric acid gas s
FORMl'LA IIF 1994 Edition
s e
4948 1147$tous CHF MIC413 :
~
TA
^
DUT CLASS: Class B.Corsosisc matenal SI Vl1Ml NI' Of IIAZARDS Corrosive. Strnng miditer SHIPplNG IAhEL;CORROStVE and POISON ITtLRGl;NCY RLSPONSE PERSONAL. PROTICFlVE EQUIP.
4 Alt.NT: Wear sp*cual proiceu.c clothing and positive pressure.
- VID NO UN 1032-self.comained breathing apparatus CAS NO 76644 NI
. SPILT.OR 11AK PROCEDl'RES-Sinp or conual the leal,if this yot wy 90 0 can be done wahout edu,e ral yse water spray to cool and dnperse sapors and proicct personnel
- STATLMENT OF HAZARDS Severe heahh harard Corrosne I1RE flGilFIN'G PROCLDURLS: Enunguish fire using agem
, EMERGENCY RE$PONSL Pf RSONAL PROF ECTIVE f QUIP-suitable for surrounding fire. Use floodmg quantities of water, M ENT: Wear spenal protenne clothing and poutive pressure self. contained breathing apparatus-llLALTil llAMRDS Corrosise. Causes severe eye and sk.m burns. Irruating to sLm, eyes and respiratory system SPILL OR LEAR PROCEI)URES Releases n.as require isolauon or esacuation Stop or control the leak,ifihn'can be done mith.
FIRL AND EXPLOSION llAZARDS: Strong ouidizer. Not com.
out undue enL Use water fog or sprai to knock down and bustible, but promotes combusuon m combinauon wnh com.
absorb vapors Absorb in noncombusubie snatetial for proper bunibles distesal INSTABILITY AND REACTIVITY HAZARDS: Reacts with alla.
FIRE flGilTING PROCEDURLS: Extmguish fire surroundmg hes. oxiditable materials, f nely divided metals, alcohols, pet.
anhydrous hydrogen fluonde containers usm8 agent suitable manganates Sec also N FPA 43A, Cedifer fAr Steragr ef he d ad Seld Oxdwo for surroundmg bre. Water spray is ver) eficcuve m absorbing HF fumes escaping from leaking con STORAGE RECOMMENDATIONS: Store m a cool, dry, well-hydrogen fluonde Use floochng,quanuutainers of anhydrous es of mater. Use mater semilated location. Separate from allahes. oiciduable materials, spray to keep fire exposed contamers cool. Approach fire from finely divided metals, alcohoh, permanganates. See also NFPA upwmd to avoid harardous vapors 43A, Cedt for sat Storagt of lagd ad Sehd Omdum.
HEALTil HAZARDS: Severe health harard. May be fatd if lyethylene bottles,
- USUALStilPPING CONTAINERS: Glass or 7tums with :pecial mhaled. May cause pulmonary edema. Corroute. Causes severe carboys, polyethylene Imed or aluminum eye and skin burns Contact with dilute solutions (<20% m and bulk in tanE barges.g in aluminum tank trucks or rail cars sent caps; bulk packagin water) may produce pain or visible damage; such as erythema within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the exposure.
E
~ FIRE AND EXPLOSION llAZARDS: Not combustible, but if insolved in a fire is extremely irritating. Esolves heat when com.
DOILING POINT: 226* to 237'F (108' to ll4*C)(35 to 50% solu-bined with water, tion)
INSTABill1Y AND REACTIVITY llAZARDS, Not compatible SPECIFIC GRAVITY: 1.13 @ 20*C with most metals, water, and alkali materials. Reacts to form SOLUBILITY IN WATER: soluble hydrogen gas on contact wuh metals. Eiches glass.
(
VAPOR PRESSURE: 18 to 23 mm lig (35% to 50% solution)
STORAGE RECOMMENDATIONS: Store in a cool, dry, well,
@30*C
. ventilated location. Separate from sihca, incompatible metals, concrete, glass, ceramics, and oxiduing materials Do not put even dilute solutions in glass containers.
NAME: HYDROCEN PEROXIDE, aqueous solutions, stablized (> 60%)
- s USUAL SillPPING COWAINERS: Anhydrous gas is shipped in -
steel cylinders; pressurized tanks on trucks, rail cars, barges.
SYNONYMS: h)drogen dioxide; peroxide Solutions are shipped in polyethylene, fluorocarbon, or was-FORMULA: H 0, imed bottles.
DOT CIASS: Class 5.1, Oxidizer PH),SICAL PROPERTIES: Colorless gas, fumes m. air. Irritating odor.
SHIPPING 1ABEL: OXIDIZER and CORROSIVE MELTING POlh*T: -Il7'r (-83*C)
ID NO.: 1)N 2015 BOILING POINT: 677 (20 C)
CAS NO.i 7722 84 1
.SPEbl'lb$1(Ab$036 MdhhT.: 34.0 SOLUBILITY IN WATER. soluble STATEMENT OF ll AZARDS: Corrosive. Strong oxidizer.
VAPOR DENSITL 0 69 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIP-MENT: year special prmecthe cloihing and positive pressure VAPOR PRESSURE: 760 mm lig @ 20*C self<ontamed breathmg apparatus.
NAME: HYDROGEN PEROXIDE, aqueous SPILL OR LEAK PROCEDURES: Stop or control the leak,if this can be done without undue rnk. Use mater spray to cool and salutions (40% to 60%)
- i P'"' '3Pon and prmect penannel a
SYNONYMS: hydrogen dmude, peroude FIRE FIGitTING PROCEDURES: Entmguish fire,usin agent FORMULA HgO8 suitable for surroundmg fire. Use floodmg quanuues o water.
DOT CLASS. Class 5.1, Oxidire, fight fire from protened location or maximum possible distance.
HEALTH HAZARDS Corrosive. Cau es severe eye and skin SHIPPING LABEL; OXIDIZER and CORROSIVI burns ID NOa UN 2014 FIRE AND EXPLOSION llVARDS strong oxidizer. Not com-CAS NO : 7722 801 busuble, bu romotes tombuuion m sembination with combue obles Clow contamers mas rupture uolently when heated
's MOL ht 34 0 199a Editon
H VAltllOLRHtTtity. Ri Act low 49[.93 l
llVDRAZINE PERCllLORATE li,NNII,Clo, Calcium PI osphMe See cal CldM filOhPillDE plus llydrochloric Acid
(
(self.r eactive )
L Da hydraime peu blorate can he detonated hs dun L en Cldorosulfonic Acid h u tum See CllLOROSbLf0NIC ACID plus flydrochlotic Acid A GS 146: 20't Ethylene Diamine e
E..
. A p us Hpiner onc Acid Ie p 2M (i N 7 Ethylencimine llVDRAZINE SEl. ENATE II,NNil,SeO.Olt See ETintENEIMINE plus 11ydsochloric Acid Oleum (self. reactive) l his salt is explosive.
See OLEUM plus flydrochloric Acid.
Airlim 8, Supp. 2 MS (1967).
Perchloric Acid
" I In'URAZOIC ACID N,Il
- gfi;o$c Cadmium Afillor2,Supp. I 613 (1956).
See CADMlUM plus flydrasoic Acid.
Propiolactone (nETA-)
See PROPIOLACI'ONE (nETA.) plus lipirochloric Acid.
Copwr See COPPER plus liydratoic Acid.
Propylene Oxide See PROPH.ENE OXIDE plus llydrochloric Acid.
g Silver Perchlorate and Carbon Tetrachloride See NICKEL plus llydrazoic Acid.
See SILVER PERCHLORATE plus Carbon Tetrachloride Nitric Acid and lijdrochloric Acid.
reaction of hydrazoic acid and nitric acid is ener.
g Afrilor 8, Supp. 2: 4 (1967).
See SODIUM inDROXIDE plus flydrochloric Acid.
Sulfuric Acid int)RIODIC ACID 111 Mixing 36% hydrochloric acid and 96% sulfuric acid in a
$ sed container caused the temperature and pressure to 1
(See also In'DROGEN IODIDE)
- increase, Fluorine 17ynn and Rassow (1970). See Note under complete refer-p)
See FLUORINE plus flydriodic Acid.
- ence,
(
Perchloric Acid Uranium Phosphide See PERCllLORIC ACID plus flydriodic Acid.
See URANIUM PliOSPHIDE plus llydrochloric Acid.
In'DROBROMIC ACID llBr e 1 ACETATE plus llydrochloric Acid.
Huorine See FLUORINE plus flydrobromic Acid.
In'DROFLUORIC ACID lif IlYDROCARBONS Acetic Anhydride Chlorine See ACETIC ANinDRIDE plus !!ydrofluoric Acid.
See CllLORINE plus flydrocarbons.
2.Am.moethanol Fluorine See 2.AMINOETilANOL plus flydrofluoric Acid.
See FLUORINE plus.!!ydrocarbons.
Ammonium Ilydroxide Magnesimn Perchlorate Mixing 48.7% hydrofluoric acid and 28% ammonia in a See MAGNESIUM PERCllLORATE plus llydrocarbons closed container caused the temperature and p essure to incre'se.
I IlYDROCllLORIC ACID llc 1 (7ynn and Rouow (1970). See Note under complete iefer-
""C#'
(See also inVROGEN CIILORIDE)
Bismuthic Acid Acetic Anhydride See BISMUTillC ACID plus flydrofluoric Acid.
See ACETIC ANinVRIDE plus Hydrochloric Acid.
Calcium Oxide 2.Aminoethano!
See CALCIUM OXIDE plus llydrofluoric Acid.
See 2-AMINOETilANOL plus llydrochloric Acid.
7 Chlorosulfonic Acid See CllLOROSULFONIC ACIh[lus flydrofluoric A Ammonium flydroxide Mixing hydrochloric acid and 28% ammonia in a closed Ethylene Dinmine contamer caused the temperature and prenure to in.
See ETintENE DIAMINE plus 1,1ydrofluoric Acid.
(teasc.
17 nn and Rosww (1970). See Note under complete refer.
Ethylencimine 7
g e nc e.
See ETlhtENEIMINE plus flydrolluoric Acid.
x 1997 Ed non 1
HVARoot s CHI unat. Et Aclioss 491-97 Rubidium hretyiea Carbide 4WDROGEN PEROXIDE lip, See RUPI'7kl ACETYLENE CARitIDE plus llyt to-Acetic Acta chiestic Acia.
Ewn ddote Indmgen pcmude added to dilute acetic Rubidium Carbide a I and heated wdi u:m,uc an exothennic reaction wnh i
P" * ""#
See RUBIDIUhl CARBil>E phn Ilydrochloric Acid Sodium Acetic Anhydride See SODIUM plus liydrochloric Acid Addition of hydmgen peroude to acetic anh dride S elds 3
i See SODIUM plus llydrogen Chlorid" pemx3 acetic acid; but an excess of acetic anhydride re-acts with perox> arctic acid yielding diacetyl peroxide, IWDROGEN CYANIDE IICN which n very unstable and explodes readily.
CArm Hmnes 45: 5 (1949).
(self rea-tive)
See also IliDROGEN PEROXIDE plus Acetic Acid.
llidrogen cyanide containing water up to it% was poly-See aho PERACETIC ACID plus Acetic Anhyttride.
merized in glass ampoules at 50-60*C or catalyred at room temperature under the effect of a minute amount Acetone of alkali. In view of the possibihty of running into danger.
See InDROGEN PEROXIDE phis Organic Matter.
ous conditions with a water content of 2-5%,it is impor-Alcohols and Sulfuric Acid cfd em Sec. 71 (8): 1119-1123 A
. ] on /
(1968).
Ammonium Ilydroxide Acetaldehyde A mixture of ammonium hydroxide and hydrogen per-See ACETALDEinDE plus Ammonia (Anhydrous).
oxide exploded.
Chem and Eng. Nacs, p. 2 (luly 23,1990).
IIYDROGEN DIPIIOSPillDE P,ll Antimony Trisulfide Air See ANTIMONYTRISUI. FIDE plus liydmgen Peroxide.
Ilydrogen diphosphide in air ignites when suddenly Arsenic Trisulfide heated to 100*C., or when struck with a hammer.
See ANTIklONYTRISULFIDE plus flydrogen Peroxide.
Afsllor 8: 83) (1946-1947).
O Brass V
IWDROGEN FLUORIDE lif See IRON plus liydrogen Peroxide.
(See also IlYDROFLUORIC ACID)
Bronze Se IRON plus llydrogen Peroxide.
Arsenic Trioxide 11ydrogen fluoride and arsenic trioxide react with incan-t-Butyl Alcohol descence.
The preparation of di tertiary butyl peroxide by the addi-Aftllor 9: 101 (194G-1947),
tion of tertiary butyl alcohol to a mixture of hydrogen peroxide and sulfuric acid (2 to I weight ratio of 78% sul-Phosphorus Pentoxide furic acid to 50% hydrogen peroxide) has resuhed in se-See PIIOSPilORUS PENTOXIDE plus flydrogen Fluo.
vere explosions particularly during the early stages of
- ride, large batches.
T. A. Schenach, CArm. and Eng. Nms. 51 (6): 39 (Feb. 5, IWEROGEN IODIDE lil 1973)-
Cellulose (See also IIYDRIODIC ACID) flydrogen peroxide plus cellulose (in rotton) ignites Magnes, m spontaneously.
m See MAGNESIUM plus 11ydrogen todide.
Afellor 1: 938 (194G-1947).
Nitric Acid Charcoal When hydrogen iodide is passed through fuming nitric Charcoal mixed with a trace of manganese dioxide ig-acid, each bubbh produces a red flame with the separa, nites immediately in contact with hydrogen peroxide.
tion ofiodine.
AI'llor I: 938 (I946-1947)-
Berichts 3: 3660.
Chlorine and Potassium flydroxide Ozone See CllLORINE plus flydrogen Peroxide and Potassium Hydma See OZONE plus liydrogen fodide.
Chlorosulfonic Acid See CllLOROSULFURIC ACID plus lhdrogen Perox-See POTASSIUM plus flydrogen Iodide-ide.
(
Potassium Cldorate Chromium See POTASSIUM CllLORATE plus t hdrogen todide.
See IRONplus tlydrogen Peroxide.
t 997 Eotion
491-126-mtAtoot's cur sucAt. atAcnous Glyosal 3.MethpEthylpyridine s
\\
Mixing 70% nitric acid ani ghoulin a closed contames Chen and Eng. News 51 (34) l42 (1973).
_d-caused the temperature and presmre to increase.
4.Methylcyclohexanone lhnn and Hmm (1970L See Nmc under complete s elci-The oxidation by niuic acid sd +ricthvic3clohexanone to form a dicartmxylic acid resuliet. m a violent explosion Ilydrarine The methylcyclohexanonc us added gtadually to the See llYDRAZINE plus Air.
mixture held at 69 to 77'C Alte r an hour of this proce-See llYDRAZINE plus Niuic Acid.
dure, the mixture exploded, Chen and Eng News 37 (34 3 (19M llydranoic Acid See li)DRAZOIC ACID plus Nitric Acid.
Neodymium Phosphide See NEODYMlUM PisOSPilll]E plus Nitric Acid.
Ilydrogen todide See liiDROGEN IODIDE plus Nuric Acid.
Nitrobenzene Mixtures of nitric acid and nitrobenzene are detonable, Ilydrogen Peroxide see ll)DROGEN PEROXIDE plus Nitric Acid.
depending on the amount of water present.
Chem. and Eng. News 41 (37):83 (1903).
Ilydrogen Selenide A series of mixtures of nitric acid with one or more of See llYDROGEN SELENIDE plus Nitric Acid.
mono and di-nitrobenzenes base been shown to possess ilydrogen Sulfide high explosive properties.
See llYDROGEN SULSIDE plus Nitric Acid.
U'eanski (1967),
Oleum Ilydrogen Telluride Cok. fuming nitric acid ignites hydrogen telluride, sMuc.
See OLEUM plus Nitric Acid.
times explosively.
Organic Matter Panal10: 505 (1931-1934).
Nitric acid ignites spontaneously with some organic com.
Indane and Sulfuric Acid pounds, such as furfuryl alcohol and butyl mercaptan.
See INDANE plus Nitric Acid and Sulfuric Acid _
S. V. Gunn,J. An Rocket Soc. 22: 33 (1952).
Barrere & Moutet, Symposium Corab. (fifth): 170-81 350Prene (1954),
See ISOPRENE plus Nitric Acid.
Phosphine Retones and Ilydrogen Peroxide See PilOSPillNE plus Nitric Acid.
[m\\
See KETONES plus Nitric Acid and llydrogen Peroxide.
'Aj Phosphonium todide Lactic Acid and llydrofluoric Acid See PilOSP110NIUM IODIDE plus Nitric Acid.
A mixture of 5 parts tactic acid,5 parts nitric acid,2 parts water, and I part hydrofluoric acid being stored in a plas.
Phosphorus tic bottle ruptured with explosive force.
See PilOSPilORUS plus Nitric Acid.
e Scott (1967). NSCNewsletter Acre. Sec. (May 1967).
Phosphorus Tetratriiodide Lithium See PilOSPliORUS TETRATRllODIDE plus Nitric Acid-See LITillUM plus Nitric Acid.
Lithium Silicide Phosphorus 'Dicidoride See LIT 111UM SILICIDE plus Nitric Acid.
See PilOSPilORUS TRICilLORIDE plus Nitric Acid.
Phthalie Acid Magnesium See MAGNESIUM plus Nitric Acid.
See PilTHALIC ANiiYDRIDE plus Nitric Acid.
Magnesium Phosphide Phthalic Anhydride See MAGNESIUM PilOSPillDE plus Nitric Acid.
See PilT11ALIC ANilYDRIDE plus Nitric Acid.
Magnesium. Titanium Alloy Poussium Ilypophosphite See TITANIUM MAGNESIUM ALLOYplus Nitric Acid.
See POTASSIUM llYPOPilOSPli!TE plus Nitric Acid.
Manganese Propiolactone (BETA-)
See MANGANESE plus Niaic Acid.
See PROP 10 LACTONE (nETA.) plus Nitric Acid.
Mesitylene Propylene Oxide During oxidation of mesitylene with nitric acid in an au.
See PROPYLENE OX1DE plus Nitric Acid, toclave at i15'C to give 3,5-dimethyl benzoic acid a vio-Pyridine lent explosion occurred.The reaction was attributed to See PYRIDINE plus Nitric Acid.
local overheating, formation of a trinitro compound Rubidium Carbide 1,3,5-tri(mtromethyl) benzene, and to violent decompo-See RUBIDIUM CARBIDE plus Nitric Acid.
sition of the latter. Smaller scale preparations with better temperature control were uneventful.
Scienium q
Wilrha et al. Angem Chen Intern, Ed Engl. 74: 465 (1962).
See SELENIUM plus Nitric Acid-
\\,]
Mesityl Oxide Selenium todophosphide See MESITH. OXIDE plus Nitric Acid.
See SELENIUM IODOPilOSPillDE plus Nitric Acid.
1997 Leten
SYSTEM 316, HF ABSORBERS BLOCK FLOW DIAGRAM 316 flow 2.af2
$05 lb./hr.
p Otido HF Vapor
,g,
(______.
l V
V I
l First Stage p
Second Stage 11F Vapor pg3,
j Absorber 4_
Absorber 4_
Absorber 4-1 4
i y
liF Lignid IIF Li<pid Is______________.,
l V
i DI Water i
D1 Water llent Exchanger 0.6 gpm Storr.e U conted Testina HF Wid V
V r V 6 Tank T 18 Tank Array Array Reject.
Storage nted Accept V
V V Safo Gallon Tank Truck g,
A Reject Accept pp v
ADD Combustion Engineering Nuclear Fuel DDD-316R00 S00 Criticality S:fety Upgrade Progr:m (CSPU)
Plant System 316 PegeI
(
Design llasts Docuraent Title l' age
Title:
l l'lant System 316. Oxide Conversion IIF Absorber S;. tem Revision Number: 00 Supplement Number: 00 Document Number: DDD-316
- 1) Assignment of Responsibility-Management assigns the following individuals to this Design Analysis. These individuals are qualified to perfonn the assigned task by virtue of training arid experience.
- 2) Approval of Cunpleted Analysis-lhis Design Analysis is cor.;31ete and verified. Management authorizes the use ofits results.
Printed Name Signature Date Cognizant Engineer (s)
R. S. Freeman
,gg _
,,/g 7 Mentor None g [g f
<%/
Independent Reviewer (s)
. W. Alkier Management Approval-R. W. Sharkey
{j((j jjgf47 o
- 3) Package Contents (this section may be completed atter Management approval):
Note: CD-ROM information is stored as a separate Quality Record -
CD-ROM Volume Path Names (to lowest directory which uniquely applies to this document)
Numbers DBD-3160SO Other attachments (specify):
- 4) Distribution:CDC Centralized Document Control File R.S. Freeman M. Eastburn -
W. Alkier
i*
ABtl Combustion Enginecting Nuclear Fuel DDD-316R00-S00 Criticality Safety Upgrade Program (CSPU)
Plant System 316 Page 2
' (%()
Document Function The infonnation herein shall be regarded as a quality record and is subject to revision if modifications to the facility which affect this operation occur. Changes to the facility are initiated in accordance with the formal Change Management Procedure (FAAP-118) A Change Modification Request (CMR) which has been authorized by the appropriate Focus Factory Manager is submitted to the director of Regulatory Affairs, at which time a unique identification number is assigned to the CMR. This CMR shall contain all pertinent information related to the change including affected Process and lastrumentation Diagrams (P&lDs) as well as individual component and system layout drawings which are affected by the proposed modification.
The information from the CMR shall be used to update or supplement the information herein.
This document is divided into two distinct sections. The first section contains a detailed description of how the system is designed, its intended function, the method of operation, the safety features, and an evaluation of credible upset conditions to be considered for criticality analysis. The second section consists of the System Specifications which references all the appropriate component drawings, and P&lDs for the system along with a detailed listing of those p
parameters which are used in both criticality safety analyses and evaluations. This section will V-also contain specific information regarding the safety features r.nd interlock mechanisms.
The intent of Section I is to furnish a complete outline of the system in addition to establishing documentation required for maintaining system configuration control. The basis for Section II is to provide a detailed summary of all parameters which directly pertain to criticality safety in one centralized location. The information in Section I will serve as a process description and an educational tool for the analyst whilc the data in Section 11 will serve as direct input into the criticality analyses and evaluations, if a CMR is proposed which does not alter the function of the system or the method of operation then Section I can be bypassed. If the CMR does not impact the information in Section II, then no update to this document is required. However, since Section II will contain reference to all relevant system layout and component drawings it is highly likely that some revisi.on v,ill be required.
\\)
A1113 Combustion Engineering Nuclear Fuel
. DSD-316R00 S00 Criticality Safety Upgrade Pr: gram (CSPU)
Plant System 316 Page 3 w/
1.0 Plant System 316-UF Vaporization 1.1 Purpose of System The purpose of this system is to capture th6 hydrogen fluoride 01F) contained in the off gas streams of the oxide conversion process and through a series of packed bed absorbing vessels, convert the HF gas into a concentrated HF solution using water as the dilutant agent.
1.2 Ilydrogen Fluoride Hydrogen fluoride a severe health hazard and a highly corrosive material.
HF is incompatible with most metals furming hydrogen gas on contact. Liquid HF is also corrosive to concrete, metal and glass. HF gas is colorless with an irritating odor and a specific gravity of 0.69.
HF and water solutions farm an azeotrope at highet than 35% HF concentration, therefore it is not possible to obtain a mixture higher in HF concentration than the azeotrope point using the absorber process. At the azeotrope point the vapors from the liquid have the (3) same concentration as the liquid itself so there is no mechanism to increase the r
concentration by evrporation.
There is a considerable amount of heat released during the absorption process of HF gas in water and the energy is released in the form of water vapor. The approximate energy released during absorption is 14,700 calories per mole of HF or 1,393 BTU /lb HF. For the HF Absorber system, assuming 300 lbs/hr UF6,105 lbs/hr HF will be generated which will produce (1,393 BTU /lb x 105 lbs/hr) 146,265 BTU's of energy per hour. This will evaporate water at a rate of 146 lbs of water per hour or 17.5 gallons per hour or 0.3 gallons per minute.
Cooling of HF vapor or re-circulating liquid will reduce the amount of fresh soft water required for saturation by causing condensation of more of the water vapor present in the HF vapor stream, however this will not increase the efliciency of the system and is therefore not incorporated in this design. Diagrams for the freezing point, enthalpy curves, and conductivity data are attached in Appendix A.
Since the HF gas is absorbeo into the liquid stream, no actual chemical reactions will take place in the absorber system
("J T
L
ABB Combustion EnE necting Nuclear Fuel DBD 316R00 S00 i
Criticality Saf.ty Upgrade Program (CSPU)
Pl:nt Syst:m 316 Page 4 Od 1.3 IIF Absorbing Process The HF absorbing process consists primarily of a series ofliquid absorbing / scrubbing vessels which allow conversion of the hydrogen fluoride off gas stream from the oxide conversion process into a concentrated HF solution. The solution is then passed through a h.at exchanger and stored within an array of favorable geometry qualification tanks, while the liF free vapors are continuously sampled and exit through a dedicated stack. Once the material within the i ualification tank a:Tay is qualified for release, it is pumped into a 8,500 l
gallon storage tank. The entire system is positioned within a thirty five by thirty three and a half foot square retention dike with a capacity of 9142 gallons for environmental protection.
Under normal operation, the system is designed to operate unattended until reaching the fill limitations of the qualification or storage tanks.
The initial design contains a series of three packed bed absorber vessels with provisions for expansion of two ad litional vessels if production requires. The three absorber vessels are designated as the first, second and third stages of the gas scrubbing process. As the reactor oft gas flows from stage one through stage two and three, the concentration of hydrogen fluoride in the gas vapors is reduced in each stage until a releasable level is reached. This process is possible, by increasing the concentration ofliquid hydrogen fluoride solution in the inverse direction. The lowest concentration of liquid HF exists in the third stage
/'
absorber vessel and becomes increasingly concentrated as it flows through stage two and k
stage one. The liquid is used as the absorbing agent to absorb the acid gasses into a concentrated solution.
The reactor off gas stream which contains, HF, steam, nitrogen, and hydrogen leaves the conversion building at a temperature of up to approximately 4000 F and prior to reaching the first stage vessel, is cooled to approximately 2l00 F through mixing with the circulating stream ofliquid HF.
Pure emergency cooling water is also available at this point in the event that the gases are measured above the expected temperature (200,2500 F), or if the liquid level in the sump of the first stage vessel become too low. Control of the emergency water is provided via an inline thermocouple or by a level switch at the base of the first stage.
Following initial startup, a liquid stream of concentrated HF liquid is circulating through the packnd bed vessel. The gas stream enters the first stage at the base of the vessel where a small amount of the HF gas will be further absorbed until the saturation point of the solution (34-35% HF)is reached. The majority of the gaseous HF will continue on to the second stage vessel without being absorbed. Since the flow directions of the gas and liquid are invusely related, the makeup liquid for the first stage is supplied from the overflow of the second stage. The overflow of the saturated HF liquid from the first stage continues on through the heat exchanger and into the qualification tanks for further processing.
Since the majority of the gaseous HF will continue passed the first stage, most absorption g
j occurs in the second stage. The concentration of HF in the liquid stream circulating through
l ABil Combustion Engineering Nuclear Fuel DDD 316R00-500 l
Criticality Safety Upgrade Program (CSPU)
Pl:nt System 316 l
Page$
O g
the packed bed in the second stage vessel is predicted to be approximately 25%. This concentratior, allows for a significant amount of absorption to occur. Due to the amount of liF molecules absorbed in the first and second stage, a dilute IIF gas flows into the third stage for final puification. The liquid for the second stage is supplied from the overflow of the third stage and the overflow from the second stage supplies the first stage as mentioned above.
The third stage is somewhat different than the first and sec md stages in that the vessels contains two packed bed zones. The lower and larger zone contains a small concentration of IIF within the liquid (-5%) circulating throug' the packing material. Since the re-circulating liquid in the lower zone is so lightly concentrated, virtually all of the remairing IIF gas is absorbed in this zone. The liquid circulating through the lower zone is measured and used to control the amount of soft water added, both as a final polishing agent in the upper zone, and to maintain the desired IIF concentration in the third stage. The hydrogen fluoride free vapors exit through a dedicated stack and are continuously sampled for radioactivity ccntent.
The IIF concentration in the gas leaving the absorbers is minimized primarily by the concentration measurements and control of the soft water in the third stage. The IIF concentration in the liquid leaving the first stage into the qualification tanks is maximized for O
storage and removal. It should be noted that the concentration ofliF in the liquid in stage V
one is very insensitive to any addition of water in the third stage.
As mentioned, the liquid overflow from the first stage will flow to the heat exchanger where the temperature will be lowered from approximately 210* F to approximately 140' F. The heat exchanger medium will be the incoming system water.
The HF concentrated liquid will flow from the heat exchanger into one of the two groups of qualification tanks. The first group contains 6 tanks adjacerit to one another with a combined capacity of 282 gallons. This volume is estimated to allow approximately 9.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of operation assuming a 34% HF production rase of 0.5 gallons per minute. The liquid will normally be allowed to flow passed the first group of 6 tanks into the second group of 18 tanks. The combined capacity of the 18 tanks is 846 gallons which will allow approximately 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> of operation at the assumed production rate of 300 lbs of UF6 per hour.
Once the second group of tanks is full, a high level alarm will notify operations and automatially close an isolation valve. An additional isolation valve is closed manually to isolate the two storage tanks. The material in the second group of tanks can now be circulated with a transfer pump for sampling and qualification. Following acceptable sampling results, the material is pumped into the unfavorable geometry of the 8,500 gallon storage tank. and the isolation valves between the first and second group of tanks is opened to allow the process to be repeated. Transfer into the 8,500 gallon storage will occur 7
approximately every 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> at the assumed production rate of 300 lbs of UF6 per hour.
(Q
7 ABB Combusti:n Engineering Nuclear Fuel DBD-316R00.S00 Criticatity Safety U6rade Program (CSPU)
Plant System 316 Page 6
/^\\
O High level alarms on each group of tanks will alert operations that the system requires attention.
The storage tank contains a high level alarm and a tank interstitial wall level alarm. When the level indicator in the storage tank indicates that the storage tank contains a tanker tmek full of material, arrangements are made for an off site shipment of the material.
All process equipment is intended to operate at ambient pressure. The pressure limits for all piping types is significantly above the necessary level.
1.4 Safety Systems 1,4,1 Operational Equipment The safety function of the following equipment and the associated interlocks are described in general. The specific action of the interlocks may be more involved then described below.
... ID Description /Puntqa O
i D'
TI-16-1 Alarms in the event of high temocrature in HF off gas piping. Will shut off HF generation if temperature exceeds high alarm setpoint.
TI-16-2 Cooling water for HF heat exchanger, Cooling is normally supplied by process water. In the event that the process water does not provide the necessary cooling this valve opens to provide additional cooling water.
TI-16-3 Provides an indicatior of the inlet temperature of absorber 1. If the temperature is above the alarm setpoint the emergency cooling water is tumed on to quench the HF stream.
HCV-16-23 Emergency quench water valve. Pros to the system in response to high inlet tempertture (TI-k n absorber 1 or due to a low liquid levelindication.
PSL-16-16 Pressure switch on the process water supply to indicate loss of process
(
and emergency water. This alarm will shut c!THF generation.
Allli Cosntiustion Engineering Huclear Fuel D11D 316R00 500 Criticality safety Upgrade Prograrn (CSPU)
Plant System 316 l
Page 7 TCW16 3 Water valve at the liF heat exchanger which opens in response to a high temperature indication at the heat exchanger outlet (T1 16-2).
LSil 16 7 Level alarm which indicates that the qualification tanks are full. This alarm indicates that sampling of the qualification tanks is required as well as automatically shuts off the isolation valve between the oualification tanks and the day tanks.
IICW16 21 Isolation valve between the qualification tanks and the day tanks. This valve closes upon a high level indication (LSil 16 7) to ensure that a representative sample is obtained when the qualification tanks are blended.
LSil 16 6 liigh level alann on the day tanks. This alarm indicates that there is no room for additional llF in the v.orage tanks. This alarm will shut off
-i' lIF encration.
C O
LSil 16-8 Interstitial walilevel alann for bulk storage tank. This will provide an indication that a leak may have occurred in the primary tank wall.
LSil 16-15 liigh leve,I indicator in the tank tmck. This level switch will stop transfer into the tar.k truck ifit alarms.
IICW16-22 Automatic valve for transferiing from the qualification tanks to the bulk storage '.ank. This valve opens only afler authorization from the supervisor after verification of the results from the uranium content analysis are satisfactory. The valve will also remain closed if the qualification tank isolation valve is open, if the bulk storage tank interstitial alarm is on, or if the bulk storage tank cannot accept additional material due to high level.
IICW16 ll Transfer valve to tank truck. This valve will close upon a high level in thi tank truck.
V
f Allu Combustion F.ngineering Nuclear Fuel DilD.3161100 Sno Criticality S:Jety Upgt:de Program (CSPU)
Plant Systtn 316 Page8 O
PSV 16-14 This is a mechanical device designed to vent the bulk storage tank in the event of over pressure. The valve relieves at 6" of' water column and in normal operation pressure will be relieved by PSV 1612.
PSV 16-12 This is a mechanical device designed to vent the bulk storage tank into the third absorber inlet when the pressure exceeds 1" of water column.
The valve also vents air into the bulk storage tank when the vacuum of the tank exceeds 2" of water column.
PSV 16-24 This is a mechanical device designed to vent the tank truck when the pressure exceeds 40 PSIG. This is supplied on the tank truck and is not maintained by Ailll.
PSV - Pressure safety valve llCV -lland control valve pO PSL - Pressure sw tch low LS11 - Level Switch liigh TCV Temp Control Valve Tl Temperature Indicator 1.5 Preliminary Criticality llases The primary basis for criticality safety in the oxide conversion IIF absorber system is the use of favorable geometry vessels and' configuration management. Significant emphasis is placed on the preclusion of fissile material from exiting the oxide conversion filtering system. Although multiple independent controls exist which preclude significant uranium from entering either the wet or dry scrubbing systems, analyses should be performed assuming the wet scrubbing system becomes contaminated with any of the credible uranium compounds. By performing the analyses, conclusive results will be available which should clearly demonstrate the inherent safety of the system based on the g. ametry and configuration of the vessels.
~
Allu Combustion Engineering Nuclear l'uct DDD 316R00 500 Csiticality Safety U9 grade Program (CSPU)
Plant System 316 Page 9 m)
The analyses should encompass both uranyl fluoride ami uranium dioxide solutions at optimum concentration and moderation since the upstrea.u oxide conversion system is capable of producing both types of material. Uranium hexafluoride is excluded since it would readily react with the liquid solution in the HF absorber system and quickly be converted to uranyl fluoride. A variety of misting / environmental conditions should be examined such as heavy rain, hail, or snow buildup. Various degrees of reflection should also be examined since precautions or access restrictions are not physically in place.
Minimum or actual dimensions should be used between units with possible interacting characteristics.
The additional scenario of accumulation of material within the confmement walls of the retention dike should be examined in the event that a catastrophic breach of the system containment piping. The analysis should involve the geometry configuration and relative proximity of the sump cavity since this would be the most likely location for accumulation of a spill.
1,6 Iteferences None; n
- ]
V
Ailli Combustion Engineering Nuclear Fuel DBD416R00.S00 Criticality Safety Upgr:de Program (CSPU)
Plant System 316 Page 10 O
Section 11 System Specifications l
O 4
O
' AllB Combustion Engineering Nuclear l'uel DilD 316R00 S00 Criticality Saf-ty Upgrade Program (CSPU)
Plant System 316 Page 11 V(h 2.0 System 316 System Specifications 2.1 Component Drawings Since the system is being fabricated by an outside contractor, the design drawings are preliminary at this str.ge and have not been entered into the internal drawing retention system. The system vendor is under contract to supply as built drawings upon completion of the installation at which time ADD will verify each and take over configuration control of the drawings..The preliminary design drawings used to gather 'nfonnation for this document and the criticality analysis are listed below:
D 5007 3024 Rev Loading Platform, Assembly Plan & Elevation D 5007 3025 Rev Loading Platform, Stairs and llandrails D 5007-3026 Rev Loading Platform, liinge & liandrail Details D 5007 3027 Rev Loading Platform, Details D 5007 3028 Rev Main Storage Tank Restraint D 5007-3029 Rev Qualification Tank and Scrubber Support Structure D 5007 3030 Rev Scrubber Support / Ladder /lleat Exch. Details, Plan View D 5007 3031 Rev Qualification Tank and Scrubber Support Stmeture Details D 5007 3032 Rev Pump Ucse & Ileat Exchanger Detail, Plan View D-5007-3033 Rev liF Absorber System Concretc/ Foundation Plan & Notes D 5007-3034 Rev 11F Absorber System Concrete / Foundation Details D 5007-3035 Rev IlF Absorber Loading Apron Details D 5007-3036 Rev Scrubber Tower Platform Floor Grating Detail D 5007-8280 Rev Piping Detail Qualification Tank D-5007-8281 Rev liF Scrubber & Storage System Scrubber Details D 5007 8283 Rev IIF Sembber Packing Plate Detail D 5007-6025 Rev Electrical - Dinary Logic Diagrams, Sheet 1 of 4 D-5007-6026 Rev Electrical - Binary Logic Diagrams, Sheet 2 of 4 D 5007-6027 Rev Electrical - Binary Logic Diagrams, Sheet 3 of 4 D-5007-6028 Rev Electrical - Dinary Logic Diagrams, Sheet 4 of 4 D 5007-6029 Rev E!cctrical-3 Phase Diagram D 5007 6030 Rev Electrical - Loop Diagrams., Sheet I of 2 D 5007-6031 Rev Electrical-Loop Diagrams, Sheet 2 of 2
ABH Combustion Engineering Nuclear Fuel DBD-316R00 S00 Criticality Safety Upgrade Program (CSPU)
Plant System 316 Page 12 I
i i
2.2 System Layout Drawings D 5007 2024 Rev Site Plan liF Absorber System D-5007 2025 Rev Equipment Layout liF Absorber System -
D 5007 2Gio Rev Elevation Views liF Absorber System D 5007 5062 Rev liF Scrubber & Storage System Piping Isometric D 5007 5063 Rev liF Sembber & Storage System Piping Isometric 3
l 2.3 System Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&lD's) y l
D 50071026 Rev IlF Scrubber & Storage System P&lD f
l 6
t 4
l l
t 2
P eO L
...,_..,_.m..._.
. ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear F.sel DBD 316R00.S00 Criticality Safety Upgrade Prograrr (CSPU)
Plant Systeni 316 Page 13
[
2.4 Syatem 316 Specifications Scrubber Vessels Design Pressure Atmospheric l
Design Temperature
~210'F Maximum Pressure 215 Psi Maximum Temperature 275'F' inner diameter 7.68 inches
)
Thickness of Liner 0.186 inches Outside Diameter 8.625 inches Nominallength/ height 289.125 / 315.25 inches Materialtype Liner Kynar (PVDF)(-C112-CF2-),
Material type - Shell Carbon Steel Materialtype PackingBed Kynar(Number 2 NUPAC)
Absorber to Absorber Transfer Piping Design Pressure Atmospheric Design Temperature 210'F Maximum Pressure 215 Psi Maximum Temperature 275'F intemal Diameter 3.67 inches k
Liner Thickness 0,18 inches g
Outside Diameter 4.5 inches Materialtype Liner Kynar(PVDF)(-Cll2 CF2-),-
Materialtype Shell Carbon Steel lleight
~275 inches Distance from Absorber Vessels
~ 4 inches Storage and Qualification Tanks Design pressure Atmospheric 4
D, Design Temperature
<140' F Maximum Pressure 215 psi
ABil Comtmtion E:E ncerirg Nuclear Fuel DI1D 316R00 500 i
Criticality S:Jety Upgrade Program (CSPlf)
Ptr.nt System 316 P ge 14 x.
Maxirnum Temperature 225' F inner diameter 7.633 inches Thickness of Poly walls 0.210 inches Outside Diarneter 8.625 inches Length 240.0 inches Material of construction - Liner Polypropylene Material of construction - Shell Carbon Steel llorizontal Separation Center to Center 29.5 inches (asbuilt)
Venical Separation Center to Center 29 inches (asbuilt) 8.500 Gallon Storace Tank Outer Diameter
~12 feet Design pressure Atmospheric Desig.1 temperature
<l40* F Material of construction Crosslinked Polyethylene pd Pillnll5 Material type Metal pumps w/ teflon lining Volume
<3 gallons Ileat Exchancer Material type Metal w/ teflon lining Volume 1.5 liters Concrete Dike Length (Outer edge) 35 feet Width (Outer edge) 33.5 feet Maximum Depth 17.5 inches Minimum Depth 14.5 inches Material Re-inforced Concrete S
Sump internal diameter 7.625 inches
ABI) Combustion Engineering ZucLTr {7uel D3D.
Criticality Safety Upgrade l'sor, ram (CSPU)
Plant System 316 Pagel$
Sump Liner thickness 0.5 inches Sump Outside diameter 8.625 inches Sump Material CPVC Sump Shielding Piate Thickness Iinch Sun.p Shielding Plate Material Carbon Steel Sump Shielding Plate dimensions 2 feet square Sump Shiciding Plate location Approx l 2 inches below surface 2.5 Connected systems The system is physically connected to the following systems:
311 R1 reactor 312 R2 Reactor 313 R3 Reactor 610 Oxide control system 641 Power supply I
741 Soft Well Water 2,6 Adjacent systems The system adjoins to:
- UF6 storage yard and plant road to north
- Oxide production room to west Plant mad, storage yard to south
- Plant road to cast C\\
V
~
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuct:ar Fuel
.DBMOClMM69 Criticality Safety Upgrade Program (CSPU)
Plant System 316 Pege 16 Verification Method l
Title:
l l'lant System 316 Oside Conversion liF Absorber Systeni l
8"PP '**"' N"*N'; *
"'d'I"N"**' "
I Document Number: DDD 316 Instructions:
Describe the method (s) of verincation to be employed, i.e.. Design Review, Attemate Analysis, Qualineation Testing, a canbination of these or an attemative, Other elements to consider in fonnulating the plan are: methods for checking calculations; comparison of results with similar analys:s, etc.
Description of Verification Method:
f c2 v L P p 6-n "
.5ffcJffrAr7 & J VC&ffffb f]A J fb C) N furerge.+r-7.w f vff'-J-FNCb s>Ye 0 Tite! wrff fvff'kP!Lb
$ D/f' fA MVFA C YVff-M,
V HSAL fayJf fft f fff CFFTca-rxD~-r w FA'd vfAEPs6p 8V A c t-vs w
!*1 fAf V(Cfro i ~ 7 J OW SX7 6 Hew &VO2 77-/,r r
^ $ Y*
baki OYC
('057714/ H r7+C r,n.TdYa r 7}-
0F rA rff.'
7~h E Piit-1.re,c-Pfortm o A-7 +
z.s v rresisss S AfE.b od C/+ H Tc4t Enr77l-n /=,r p r' n r:t:0 W
/vl'f c-y to 4y t w rfcH t'rtap <e 7-s M.D
&A.nsa n MMO ds F fc/.
r fcz.Gypr~nB-r-ofDe+7xa d
&O f A f E ?? f: p s.yA,p 4:
,y
- Off C (?-E4 7'7M Z J /MFb Od 77tE C vi?tebr-- der.rH 70 PAY 2,
< J7 rt. E cy wpg rr /=.vpscrCD to THJ Of 57CN A r-77rr/
PoM -
Veri 0 cation Method perfonned by:
k/]/
//
W J&t24 m le-At-A-TED
'k,
O independent Reviewer p6nted name and signature
(&hRc3iiiLEsTi561CnigineeringRN euuaM%W44$
Criticality Safety Upgrede Progrtm (CSPU)
Plznt System 316 Page 17 APPENDIX A Supporting Data l
e I
,.n,-_,--,...n.,
n.
Criticality Saf:ty Upgrade Propam (CSPU)
Itnt Sysicm 31 Pzgc 18
/m
'J
\\
4LO.0C0
- 7
.. ygg...
j
. u,.m
, ne race 425,0CX) 5
. isiiei.
/
eennare 4(0,000
/ -
i< J
,}
a potum.
2: Wi. sus' 1 :
4;,
A m*M u.a.a;gg 3M,000
=paaw-
,J i :
, J.
350,(D0
[,'
7 Z
" ' n
^
- s
'd '
/
, /"
32$,000
..J,.
f.
- / '
<qp-"
-jq.<
i<
j/,
.I
=
W.000 t
. J.
rw
- ),
l 1 l
d r
,/
3,000 4
y j
..d
\\
j
.i..
v 2M M0 f I,II II e
- e e ma""n" n f 2 ,k $f m.ooo ' f e
- o. m.
d y- : , l! . f h M 000 <r 4 r f! d g ~ / 4 'l' g%g t.. r, s 3,, s.. p-g l ,d 4 4 l],M0 I 7 7 ~ 4 a d lt5,0M .,;-c 1 'L< q qs t <'p. ,f f. l,
- .f :
.p c. r 4 c,mo., i .I. ) l. < 4,j s i n,000 . f, . y.. N ,y d i p 1 4, i. ,..d ~ 50,W -g.- jj ,! g ,M ( ~ ,ap 25,000 0 s y - a, s f.g / L J- @0 -1 [g ~ ~ 2 4 6 8 to il 14 16 18 20 22 24 20 26 33 32 34 .o 43 44 e6 40 "tlGHI (m. x-wu,
Criticality Safety Up rade Program (CSPU) plant system 316 Page 19 _ -.-J-i. g e. ~~M, }~M*Mf.&g]-. W-. 7. M== O_]~~~~- - - =~=_. -s.- _/' ~~~ i ..-~ -.-.. -__ \\ g _s.,,, J._~.,5 g ~5. _ _ jg -\\ - -,.y,. .. g . _.m g.g- ,A..r.. \\ e,1~F. Mc, %.-M r. c--- -~ 5 y%y.:, s' ,s p,.sG f ".-. =%::- : _. r_ ,1 - -.._..~.. __. _g- .. ~ _. - = e-- E r. 4 _4 -i_- -\\ .-..~ -- .A_- 5_- __1 e p. - _ s. .g 1 7_ m_ .. x w gg. -4 .. -\\-__. -P_ ~ -.. s _q A. .p*_ j, - - -. .q.-------- ....n. i., q-q .-.._p .-__ _i-.- -- -,- ~ = - _ _. - y -. .g~.,.- .. ~ 3 l-- .\\.---___....-. j_.=q_..,,....... s _.L 1 r n --.t m note. A u w ....V_. .-t e'. - .N. ~-~, p.-. .~ g ..,f = _m._ -- _ .- L : ... r n 4 . ~... t ..m u a. i an,d. it 1 t 3 i-t ~ - l c v .q i i . ~ P _. g, i t"*-~~
- J.
a*
- .--.n,..
-_~. ~ _a } ~. 6 e ~ - - - _...e ~. ) .. s. < L i t C"'*. i 1 -_ - .. m.. w ~ - p r i .g-3. i _-w t_ \\, t..-.'.. r.. A,. - i C."".'".*.'.:.- t t e ~.1 --.. g s._ e.r m '-_ __ : '... -- S f... - 2 - ~ ~~- s 4.s. n i. .g-i. ,i p.-...-_--- ~ m,.,....r... .s.-.....- e. .J. -. ~.. _... 3.... t.- . -. s. s - - %..d . _..,!~ i_.-.- .=. _c....g.,.... 3 "***=a.a.=* ok.d.a.e.k.,.,..,... .m g w.. ,.....e 'i 4 ths eg --g .y .J ey e 9 o9. m _.._.e. e g". m.m - -..............4..ks. u p g .-.a g, gy. .b.- -kMeG ), ?*"**. ~ ~. ~ ~ " * " 4 .a.*s.--d.'..() ..g ( $...,. 3 g _. ~.. -=.g.k.6 x- -a=- 1_ 96W* 9 -6f m.. d h j p" ^.- g.a e g s. -..RI* h ..m 5 hw s. D. - a. ,4.
- .--==
=.. =. m-I p. 7 .k y,g.g ms-'.
- <-^".C'. " * - - *k'-'"'
.r.s-++.u-.T-4-7N'""'W. " ' "' ' _,,_,%---v.-. --e .,m._,,,--,,-~.~ur-
_ ~., - - - - - me " ~ - - - - - - - - - - yymy-ptW W.bUU_. Criticalit;* Safety Upgrade Pront.m (CSI U) l14tt! $ykttfil 3 Ib i i page 20
- .....-T~~'.~.~~~~'.*"""/j..,.s#'%.'."./U'*
- --C ta.
._ _..'_,,t".' t.a y. _e" "/g~~a.p'1 * ** '~Q.4 y -[ e,.,, Q.AT. ~ ..-.-._..-.a.. '-.-m..,,__ 4./._* L..- ..". C_r_ * ~. ~ r y.- _..~__._r n-- + .._-..--..--s-~ p..,..,.. -- ~__ .,jyy n - ~ -. - pp + w Lo s..,.f.v--. I @m.,. r4 - y- ,f g c a -..~ ~_..ej e---~ ....._..-.r ~ *. _i ~-- ~ ~.., -.. - --w y s.- f e,j }. - --_,, ,r .~.Q.P <.., C. e.yw.;,f --- s ---- 1 y._ l _ f --- ~ w.. 7 ** ;r -)3- -- - - - . ~. ?-.n * - -.. _- -. _.. L_. _ _. _ ** L _,; N .-~~.-: ---e.-- . _.. ~. ...r- .-~-.~-...,,r.,, _ _,,,,. _, ~. - -.. - -~.. ~,. ~~- M _.n._. &.4 .k==" . - - - ~ ~ ~ - -. _.. _. _,. _ p-e ~ -. -o. -^_,, - 1 ~. - _, _.. .. ~. .y- ^ ' _ Z,.! . e %. 5._ -.. -O--........... . ea. e. .-- _-. ~. ,s .~...%-A,,-..-a-_.. g----= ~~.r.. t. %,*%s p - w-**.. A 6 n.. .. ~ -. - -. - - - - -- --.u-7 .,c*, e,p ,.~ e,..g...,. _........ ~ _. g.. y--.=.. .g.Q% ,r - - - - ~ -- - -.-- *~ -.-.. -.-- s ~. ..,,,,,-.e4__.,%.. a .....?... r, m s. 6. .-.-.Aq.,,.. ~ -. - - - - w.,,. ~- ...%,g.,..,.,..'.~.,. - - --a.. -,/*,. ._e-.. ~ %%...m..A, m ---a=**e- . 6 .,k.\\-...._.==,.,+.'-.- _.j ---..--4 ~-.. - ^ -..-e.- s,. ... w % -. - - - ~ * - - - - -. -, - -~ -..n,...-.1...- '~ --9..e4.e..,.-.... ..N.. o -..... N s .A g. _.-a-%.,. e
- w. -., -
p..- 3... ...1....%.....%.'%., 1.N..... -J.. ...,.. -.. ~.,....
- 1...
...a.e.e. *.,,.. I'N g _ _ _ -,. ~ . ~. ..~~.y .r.-..~,N.,.-.~N. - - tm -.N.%. %.7.% 6, tg ,&...i.... 6 (....., ....,...l.~.-..-... S.. a b.- t_ 4 4. g 9...~%,%.*e...-....-._. .e... . ~. i .g ..-t.-c.. [ 6.
- d. - '
a.-...., s...4 ~...... g.-.......,.-.=_*==.=.=.**.=.,.....,..-9.,'... g _1*..* ./*..., -...-e.g..~.a**._.. *...4 4..-****~*.... - - e.. !... . Jw. p g..4.....e.,,. -I.d
- ".4
. L ~. e m. % *...e\\.t'..-.~-.9.*"~-*.w .,a s j -- a M .L ..~.#%,...- _1.-p-- ...e q. s~~~. ..__-.,,i..[*.4.,,..........,,.g~-.,..e.,.. [.*.. .l.---- ...,q,... a4 . =. -... = =, .eJ ......l.,..
- 7..
.s...... .4 ... $...p .h
- a. d g-.-..-'$,
6...--g _-._n...> .e =.- g /. ..p,.
- s.. m... e
.-..a-.. j ....].-, -.. ..(,.-,-,.....- e .)
- p * -. /t g
(v p. ...W.~.-g-._ . ~. -.a.-.--+ i i. =f --. - g ) .s. _-.t sm J .i.,4 v...-. --_.f.e. .-,p.l..,. 1 .....-e-= { 4. a. ,e..I .'.....,,.._4... .f..-.$....-._w..,. .~._we... p.. ...d { w t
- e. g
.i 6 .+... _ .. ~. ,,,*...,4_-..l...,.. I. ._..-.e.t- ,~.o. s..,.. .l. ... [. ./,.., .s...___.___.-.__o....,._......1 m -,j... ~ ... = -... - 4... ..,. p 1 . h_. _._f_.. ...e,.. 6. 4 _.. ... / 6...l.... T. _~ ...e .. l 4_ 1.__. l.... -w d.._-.....,_...t..,.._ 4 ......-_......4 i 7 ....- f., _. _. J...._-.. ..-.._....q.._1._....l _-....-.-_a ,. i. ,g.. -_. - _ -. _. _ _.._p ^ -......g...... u. ..d..__.... .]_._._...,.....,._._3/.- ,....._..,._._~1 ...... _, o_.. ....g. .. ~.. ~ f ..h__..._.....~._...,._.,7,s,...,,C.,.r..l'../~/.,. .m ....... -.....,J".'._.. , o i... _ ;j m .m. - m, .......1,. [....,. 1 u. ..g.. p .$.~ _._.__._.._._._ s. h %. L _ l.. t.:.,.z.... .-. -..._ -.A - f. _.._.t... 3 _ L.h.._. ., _ a _. .n., _,_.o....-Jn l. _. _..... __ _. L. r._..-" A . _. _ + ..4_...qa.. ,_____1__, . ~..-. - . _ L~_ ~1,L _ i._ ;._._._, t....1._ t..__. _ /. ;._,.. ___. i .......t._,..._._...i._, __. s_. : __a ..---4 ...,_1.u.__..__._...__,..__4. ,_ r A._._ s... . _x .4 _. _.../.,_._ .J.__- _..-.s__.. __t _.3 J r-2__., m. ._,__._...._,_.,._L__. )- g .i_..a.,.......__,._,_. _.._-N.._. ,_.__..-._.,.L,.-.4..__ .g.... ._._.. s_,. ..,/... _ _ _. _, a......__ .._..__.._,J___. .._.p._.,__<___t..._.__.._3_._...,. y _q. ..,..,.e 4.,. __ L.. _._-..J. _.. _. ...1 a... ~. ~- .w A.. <A,. t s a,. -.f__ _ p L. ,_a... _..
- w..
.-..e.._..,,9.,%___ _ -,_._ ..., _ _ _..1..~. .,..g.,.._!.._J_.__..___.,*'g N w __. y1 ...y .f. L ._. __. _p._ xx )._. w '.;(.._ ...l._.. y,_ . _ _. _...-u, _7_ .f _.-...g.. g .... r9._ g..._ t,. m y . _.. ~. _... ,p._,.
- u. ;
__ w, . tJ ..h. _.__.f,4L7_.... g.p..,2 a..,7 s _- _.g.t...- _.. _._ D _ j.. l _..._p . g.. _.1 , _ "..._, _,Q.. 6..- -..hj. p y __ J _ _a + ...,f.. _a ;' N.,.. L _, .,.,..q.. y_.L ..._.....)+-L,....+. ,. _. p__e. _. 7---d... . _ _.t _ _.,._._ g _ _. _. 4,... 1 ._.i.... 1. ._a_ 3 _., w- _..-t .-]'.__..._.-.. . _ m,. _p -. _ ~_ _I~,_._ <..._ _4, _~_ ___ _ h. ,4 _. y 9_.... \\,.. J.._...4 -- - ...a- ...J.*-".~1 _..__,a _ yg_ _...-., _. _.. _, _., ,s. _., m. 1... .._._.e .__(. ,,._... } d,..",e...a,.d ,,m_. l. _ - .a _.4. i _._ _,,.r,1,._ y _.... . _ ;r. ,..,.../. g ,4 ,.s ee.. ... _ _. 4. ,._.rdh.m.- g ...L_..a.. l _e _e_...L.......4.___e,........., gp o-4_ ._g., ...t. .., l..L /.T-ea._q,,,,,/~~..~_g, r' ge.q,, _ t' v.,,,, ,4 .t... ~ M.a 9.....e_.4 .a..,. . s. - l 4.- . + _,. _. _, .*.._..._.w_.. f_ '?,. s.3'"/ .4 ..8-) f,, .\\. ..u /*7,'T _ ... *l...w .3..y. .. -.....f..M M.._ Qs 's.s _.. 3. K..ard,,, _, .,.4 / ... [' _e a. ,j k /a-) 1., Lf. . 1 'g,a_g._, ,.,o.,.,4.a. ._.I,,..I. V. 4# 7 __J.d'_*._d._. M_ g.,, l.g
- n. l,: e...,,s _..
,s ..6. ..e.,., _.H..,.._.. .l._..,.,. ,.a ..,J.,,,. 1 1., . }.-. ),m_. -.).,,_.._.L__.,....... _..., .~ .'y...... 4, ~+ .. _ _...g _2-J. ......, _.....J. _ _,{. a_ ..m____ _..__.,_._.). ..~_^1.-.,._ 3..... - -.
Evaluation of Deviation C:nsequenc:s Sy;t:m 316, HF Abs:rbers GENERAL DEVLATION CONSEQUENCE EVALUATION O Personal egosure T*ie solution in the third absort>er ls approWmately 5% HF,in the second absorber is approWmately 25% HF, and in the first absort>er bnd any tanks is up to 34% HF. These HF solutions can produce slow healing skin bums that are usually accompanied by sewre, throbbing pain with redness, swelling, and blistering. Burns larger than 25 square inches ] (160 square cm) may result h sewre systemic fluoride poisoning, and can be fatal. Skin contact with 20% to 50% HF solutions may not produce any sigr.s or symptoms of egosure for 1 to 8 hours, while the delay for less than 20% solutions may be up to 24 hours. E> posing the eyes to these solutions will result in immediate initation, and can easily result in comeal bums or blindness, injestion of these HF solutions can produce sewrely painful, slow heating bums to the mouth, throat, and gastrointestinal tract. Ewn small, duute quantities can result in sewre systemic fluoride poisoning, and can be fatal. I HF vapor has a detectable odor range of 0.5 ppm to 3 ppm, an 8 hour time-weighted awrage permissible emosure limit (PEL) of 3 ppm, a short term emosure limit (STEL) of 6 ppm, and is immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) at 30 ppm. In6mlation of HF vapors at 4 low concentrations can irritate the upper respiratory system, resulting in inflammation and a cough, Greater egosure can result in sewrely painful, slow healing bums to the upper respiratory system, spasm of the larynx (taryngospasm) or bronchi (bronchospasm), and flull accumulations in the larynx (laryngeal edema) or lungs (pulmonary edema). The dewlopment of pulmonary edema may be delayed for a duration of sewral hours to 2 days, and is potentially fatal. Fatal systemic fluoride poisonino is also possible. Enuronmental release HF may be todo and/or corrosiw to aquatic and terrestrial life, is highly soluble in water, and does not blodegrade. Harmful aquatic effects may occur at conceritrations as low as 10 mg/l. Aquatic effluent limits are established in the faculty's NPDES permit. Airbome emissions of less than 3 tons per year are considered de minimis, and are not subject to air permitthg. Solutions that are unmarketable or can not be reclaimed may I become hazardous waste. Uranium transferred into the Only the 6,500 gallon storage tank is of an unfawrable geometry, and system represents a critcally risk if enough uranium was transferred into it. A criticall'y accident could result in fatal radiation dose to people in the immediate Meinity of the accklent. Persons in the general area could recelw a non-lethat dose abow established emosure limits, it is unlikely that such an accident would haw any direct effect upon off site persons or the endronment. E)cced thermallimit of a plastic Components in contact with HF vapor or liquid, e) cept for the mone! off-component gas pipe, are constructed of plastic, including plastic lined steel. Falure of a lined compunent could result in corrosion and deformation of the casing. Falure of a single walled component could result in its deformation. Any of these fauures could also result in diminbhed or lost primary HF containment, which could result in personal eposures and enuronmental release. i O l Prepared by K R. Hayes, CHMM 316dev2. doc Page 1 of 2 ~
Ev:luation of Deviation Consequenc:a System 316, HF Absort>ers O / GENERAL DEVtATK)N CONSEQUENCE EVALUATION General absort>cr system The worst case scenario is no Chciency, resulting in the releasc of 70 to falure or diminished efficiency 105 pounds of HF vapor per hour unti the falure is detected. The former rate is based upon the current UFe processing rate, whle the latter is the UFe processing rate for which the absorber system was designed. Thh scenario would also result in off. specification He solution being generated. The worst case scenar6o for diminished efficiency is beliewd to be equkalent to the loss of an absortier section, or the release of about 12 to 17 pounds of HF vapor per hour untX the falure is detected. This would also result in off specFication HF beino oenerated. HF vapor transferred to the dry The worst caso scenario is no effk.%ncy, resulting in the environmental scrubbers release of 70 to 105 pounds of HF vapor per hour unti the falure is detected. This would also increase the risk of personal exposures. Damsge to pumps or ancillary Mechanical, chemical, or thennat damage to pumps, valws, fattings, or equipment gauges, could result in diminished or lost primary containment of the HF solution. Such an ewnt could lead to personal eposure. It could also lead to an enhonmental release. Generation of off specthcation Upset or maintenance actMiles could result in the generation of off. HF solution specification HF. The large tolerance of acceptable HF concentration, 20% t'. 34%, from the ex; ting customer makes that a slight possibility, ewn when considering the negligible possibilty of managing urankJm contamination. Off specification material could be managed in appropriate containers. increased HF solution vapor The syst ; ts designed to operate essentially at atmospheric pressure, ^ pressure The abso - rs are open to the air, and by their wry nature would control t.ny vapora. The 6 and 18 tank arrays are equipped with a pressure control valw that wnts into the third stage absorter. The bulk storage tank and tanker loading station are simlarly equipped. Only the bulk storage tank tself, which is not designed to nold any pressure, is equipped with a pressure relief valm that wnts to atmosphere. Modng HF WMh incompatible incompatible materials avalable on site include ammonium hydroxide, rnatorial nitric acid, sodium hydronde, and sulfuric acid. Mixing in b closed container with ammonium hydronde, sodium hydronde, or sulfuric acid results in an increase of temperatare and pressure. Mixing with nitric acid j and lactic acid results in an emlostw reaction; lactic ack1 ts not avalable on site. l l l O v Prepared by K. R. Hayes, CHMM 316dev2.dcc Page 2 of 2 1 1
r !~ IN f: W,] j L L '*/ 3 e 1 n f. %,p 1 5 J g,N ,w g.,E.,n f. N (r-) 1:40,i% \\s; w . w __ _ i gu n. i (h- ) (l')(**)1 j f) {l ?. f Ids il d ? Il ...__i J C b,(pT) g, i j pg t ,i RW My! 7 @Y M) ~,*g.rl. 5 -..g c y; g V g$?r h 1 h !I I.g i y !!!}$ ' $$ E { h8 >itl j!' l h h". i rwc.~/j'i ff -p g !; i j ~ O 2 i '@ Q-) il.__,.T [ [E ' lI --o MEC-<>V* (t)[E }/ t I' -h Ig .b t 3 D .. [. + " Iq,g I, @! (2 39 l f b)t);lfji: i = se) - ) M $ k' @,%'Y1 i_1 L C3 '0 ! 6 u Ju:!ritr; g)J @)* . g. kg ! 2; ; s G n -lo k' ht?g =b= ar+ - 55 K* gt('lt I A,~ i:- I I ll o 5)1 i 3 8 ij o7. -en .= o = i A-I V d *i. g s v },,]h;6 h i i r h}f 5
- f. k'U.
',,[ T ch } 1.i;te!!" s><a ' .n. l Cr ) 3,O,i.) Ib(i)I I l 8 i I s, m~. ..) N. bLtlyI. } l' li @& ;- ' k' [p'xlg+'; ~' y E!di ! i V i 1'_. ..\\..i pI ! f -- @)!l c\\ 4' t) t),q, I (V . "y' c lu I 6 a b+g t p- '9If ,e : N he 2
- y
@), 111m,B Il ~ 8.+ - ~ 44 l g Irt d ,5
- I l
6 Jg} (dpX j 3j j t, {. 1 e q 2) ht h I \\y - Ep*.yl(n l$,)i g fa/ ) } }V (t f I 15 I i ~ - ~ y pm a.)3 q1: -) - -f I s g i& l 'i (M-l, ~ } { .} p,) , e..[- I I I 9 .c _ !? y', y a
=== =fb k-k} "g I ! $$t) if n,n q I
- "I'f @) M,", E-a
+c[ h offk,y.p du {s/ j 'U E5 i (4+ i (r
- " 4m
-
- 9
- i t.
l.u... _ -; i s I L ilm i i er K 5"" 6 t n t h b s ta a h(r )v[ y n d= / h f.: j if' ~ 3)
- .p <o_ogqqngep(,,..q3 oc.y g gpeg
$ s!.!f i} d,g );1 7 !V4 i; t. ' ';,(O .?lr Y r gg Gs)lt;n.)(' Q'h '. ... "N1; I 1: gt w 5 g '. s,
- t m
i t :..:. -s q.i;t $lF ]} (q);tyf(p >- ?!yP. p pip j # M#J l
- v. r v
t g .? 4 7 v=isejj; v< t 7-~ 7 a. r, s g i! g; g, IP.;,.;a u S E, t s,I,IN \\ I f c. N:,t I sihMO t 5 1\\ ; J^ ,{r pry
- :. y s-t U b l*if f$
. 2 C 1YF -l' ~ t q$ < v <' " I-u" 6 4 6 V3: I-iI )i! if I! pp-4 4 ^ y E., 'i,j6.))')'jii L---+- 3 qd g ' f. O*);' 3 3 'E f a L i ' \\ 9 " 9.h ",[. ,J. _1
_.___._._____________.m, _ kt )T M $1 >'i' St v s ~ ( aps% n a t r - g k f [$ i p sf #, r-13 w& g \\\\ \\\\ ig\\\\ a f-h ':[,. g ,g-(f yg / ,s g ov \\ / \\ \\ / / g' /F' vg g 5 .\\~, O', g[# e i [ \\@AM gt - gr
- se \\s
\\,( ////g'y %gi' e e ggA,g% % > =. T m
- s. /
t w\\\\ \\. ,1 yx. t, <l - ,g gA 1 t sh '* ** Dde, ~'% }% ,u \\[, *g f,@. / \\ i 'k
- f h\\
"f / k,,,, (/ ~ lr }% f g \\ / ):lIi U t jd bII 3% , s,, f.. n
f , fo b E _. y 1 h h () ini eu# I v'gg'([f o c v . f $.0 f N i k E__. { i _, 7 N {2s Eh I 411l1
- dl,h fQ y
G t j-- i .IN \\ JJa m ,h/ j / r 5 _i N' \\_. t,a;7 p y j 3 -. f L / N T U,O g,g/j <g a s g +g \\. - ~ * ' ' \\ 4 ~? ...? f / \\ -.. l l l / / J J J J a o o a I ( ,2, %. i. - 's \\.... e,' 's s \\ \\~ 3-k k \\. \\. \\ b. g s N f\\ J' 7 \\ 4 ah 4 il
Stand rd Interpretations and Compliance Lette... Page1of1 The United States Department of Labor i Occupational Safety and Health Administration ifighly llazardous Chemicals as it applies to aqueous solutions of hydrofluoric acid. Record Type: Interpretation + Standard Number: 1910.119 Subjects liighly llazarcbus Chernicals as it applies to aqueous solutions of hydrofluoric acid. Information Date:03/18/1994 Mr. Robert A. Rusezek, President IInvirocomp 264 Cottage Street Springlicid, MA 01104 3240
Dear Mr. Rusezek:
This is in response to your letter of April 13, requesting interpretation of the Process Safety Management (PSM) of liighly llazardous Chemicals,29 CFR 1910.119 standard. Specifically, you requested clarification as to whether the PSM standard applies to aqueous solutions of hydrofluoric r acid. You indicated that anhydrous hydrofluoric acid and hydrogen fluoride are both listed in Appendix A of the PSM standard with the same Chemical Abstract Number. 4 Anhydrous hydrofluoric acid and hydrogen fluoride are the same hazardous chemical. A ucous o solutions of hydrogen fluoride, for example 49% hydrofluoric acid and $1% water, woul not be covered by the PSM standard. it is important to note that inhalation of gaseous vapors of aqueous hydrofluoric acid can cause 4 severe respiratory tract irritation that may be fatal. To prevent injury or illness, all contact with the acid must be avoided by the use of engineering controls and personal protective equipment, in addition, hydrofluoric acid has a latency 3eriod. In concentrations greater than 50%, hydrofluoric acid bums are felt immedi' tely, and tissue ( estruction is rapidly apparent. In concentrations of a 20 50%, the burn becomes apparent 1 8 hours following the exposure, and in concentrations less than 20%, the pain and erythema can be latent for as long r 24 hours aller the exposure, Latent symptoms can seriously delay proper treatment, Anyone working with anhydrous or aqueous hydrolluoric acid should have received prior instruction about its hazards, and should know the recommended procedare for treatment in the event of exposure. Thank you for your interest in occupational safety and health, if we may be of further assistance, please contact us. Sincerely, Raymond II Donnelly, Director - Ollice of GeneralIndustry Complitince Assistance s f o 1/20/98 8:21:20 AM ~, ~
Stand:rd interptct:tions and Compli:nce Lette... Page1of1 The United States Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration ilighly llazardous Chemicals applies to aqueous solutions ofIlydrogen Fluoride. Record Types interpretation + Standard Number: 1910.119 + Subjeef t liighly liarardous Chemicals applies to aqueous solutions ofIlydrogen Fluoride. + Information Date:01/28/1994 + Janusp~28,1994~ ~' ~~ '~ ~ Mr. Gerald W. Lancour, Director Safety,llcalth & Environmental Affalls McDonnell Douglas P.O.Ilox516 Salat Louis, MO 63166-0546
Dear Mi. Lancour:
This is in response to your letter of October 1, requesting interpretation of the process Safety Management (pSM) erliighly lla72rdous Chemicals,29 CFR 1910.119 standard Specifically you requested clarification as to whether the PSM standard applies to aqueous solutions ofIlydrogen Fluoride. Ilydrogen fluoride and anhydrous hydrolluoric acid, both listed in Appendix A of the PSM standard, are the same highly hamrdous chemical. Aqueous solutions of hydro ;en iluoride, for example,70 percent hydrofluoric acid and 30 percent water, would not be coverec by the PSM standard. s Thank you for your interest in occupational safety and health, if we may be of further assistance, please contact us. Sincerely. Roger A. Clark, Director Directointe of Compliance Programs O 1/20/98 8:21:55 AM
Stand:rd Intcrpretations and Compll:nce Lctte... Page 1 of 2 The United States Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration lillC's as it applies to hydrochloric acid, hydrofluoric acid, hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen cyanide. Hecord Type: Interpretation Standard Number: 1910.119 +
Subject:
lillC's as it applies to hydrochloric acid, hydrofluoric acid, hydrogen sulfide, + hydrogen cyanide. information Date:06/09/1994 + Mr. Gary F. Lindgreen Vice President, linvironmental Compliance lieritage IInvironmental Services, Inc. 7901 West Morris Street Indianapolis, Indiana 46231
Dear Mr.1.indgreen:
'lhis is in response to your January 26 letter, requesting interpretation of the Process Safety Management (PSM) ofIlighly llazardous Chemicals (lilICs) standard,29 CFR 1910.119. Please accept our apology for the delay in responding. Your questions and our response follow: Scenario: The following lillCs are listed in Appendix A of the PSM standard I,Ilydrochloric Acid, Anhydrous (llydrogen Chloride), Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) number (#) 7647-010
- 2. Ilydrofluoric Acid, Anhydrous (llydrogen Fluoride), CAS #7667 39 3
- 3. liydrogen Sulfide, CAS #7783 06 4
- 4. liydrogen Cyanide, Anhydrous, CAS #74 90 8 Question 1:
Are the preceding lillCs regulated when they are gases at conditions of standard temperature and pressure including mixtures or solutions? Question 2: Are the preceding lillCs regulated when they are contained in mixtures or solutions, including aqueous solutions? Question 3: If the preceding lillCs are regulated when contained in mixtures or solutions, including aqueous solutions, to what extent are the mixtures or solutions regulated? Reply: The PSM standard covers lillCs and lillC mixtures listed in Appendix A. With 1/203)8 8:17:48 AM
Standard Interpretations and Compliance Lette... Page 2 of 2 exceptions, other mixtures containing Appendix A listed lillCs are not covered by the PShi standard. Also with exception, the entire lillC mixture must be considered when determining the threshold quantity (TQ) of an Appendix A listed lillC substance. These O clarification are delineated in the following paragraphs, hiost of the lillCs listed in Appendix A are " commercial grade" concentrations including those listed above which are gaseous at standard temperature and pressure conditions. 'lhe Occupational Safety and llealth Administration (OSilA) defines " commercial grade" as a typical maximum concentration of the chemical that is commercially available and shipped. The term " commercial grade" includes reagent grades, which, in some cases, will be in different concentrations from the typical commercial grades. In cases where different concentration for commercial and reagent grades are typically shipped, the lower of the two maximum concentrations (and any concentration greater) is intended to be covered by the PShi standard, in order to determine the covered concentration, reference may be made to any published catalogue of chemicals for commercial sales. To determine the correct entry (s)in the catalogue, reference must also be made to the Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) number listed in Appendix A of the PSM standard. Other Appendix A lillCs are listed specifically as percentage by weight or greater concentrations. l'or example, hydrogen peroxide (52 percent by weight or greater) mixtures are covered by the PShi standard. The entire mixture would be considered to determine the TQ. Please note the 10,000 pounds (45.35 kg) or greater amount of flammable liquids or llammable gases includin : mixtures involving an lillC listed in Appendix A would be covered by the PSM stancard. Also, the manufacturing activity of a process containing any amount an explosive, including a mixture involving an lillC listed in Appendix A would be covered by the PShi standard. O-We appreciate your interest in occupational safety and health, if we can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact us. Sincerely. 4 John 11. hiiles, Jr., Director Directorate of Compliance Programs Ou 1/20/98 8:17:48 Ahi
Stand rd interpret.tions and Compliance Lette... Page 1 of 2 Tho United States Department of Labor O o c c o a ti # i = r tv d " 'ta ^ d imi *< t' m PSM Chemicals, unless specified, commercial grades less than 99 percent purity. Record Type: Interpretation + + Standard Number: 1910.119
Subject:
PSM Chemicals, unless specified, commercial grades less than 99 percent purity. + Information Date:06/22/1993 Mr. F. L. Lambert Environmental and Technical Division Westvaco-Chemical Division t 130x 70848 Charleston lleights, S.C. 29415 0848
Dear Mr. Lambert:
I This is in response to your April 30 letter requesting clarification of the Process Safety Management (PSM) ofliighly llazardous Chemicals (IlllC's) standard,29 CFR 1910.119. In your letter you specifically requested confirmation that,ifilllC's which are listed without specified concentration hmits in Appendix A of the PSM standard are at commercial grades less than 99 percent purity, the PSM standard is not applicable. pendix A without specified concentration limits are intended to bc The substances listed in A[ard at commercial grade percentages of purity because the covered by the PSM Stan grade of most of the lillC's is approximately 99 percent purity. Many of the lillC's, if not actually at 99% purity, are only one to two percent less than 99 percent pure. For example, the commercial grades of acrolein and allyl chloride are 97 percent purity. Some of these lillC's are considerably ess than 99 percent pure. For example, the commercial grade of hydrogen fluoride is 70 tvrcent l (30% is pyridine). Thank you for your interest in occupational safety and health, if we may be of further assistance please contact us. Sincerely, i 's Roger A. Clark Director Directorate of Compliance Programs April 30,1993 Mr. Roger A. Clark, Director Directointe of Compliance Programs U.S. Department of Labor O OccupationalSafety & llealth Administration 1/20/98' 8:16:52 AM
Standard Interpretations tnd Compliance Lette... Page 2 of 2 200 Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20210 l O lte: Applicability of 29 C17111910.119 \\j
Dear hir. Clark:
Appendix A to 29 CI lt 1910.119 contains a list of highly hazardous chemicals to which this standard applies. Some of the listed chemicals have specified concentration limits. Most of the listed chemicals have no specific concentration limits. During a recent outreach workshop in llouston, Texas, Mr. Itollie Stroup of OSilA indicated that for those chemicals listed without specified concentration limits, the PSM Standard was not applicable if the concentration of the listed chemical was less than 99%. I would suspect that the purity of commercial grades of many of the listed chemicals would be less than 99%. I respectfully request your clarification of this issue. Yours truly,
- 17. Lambert, Ph.D., P.l!.
linvironmental & Technical Director FLI.:ka O 1/20/98 8:16:53 AM
Plan for Testing HF System llO and Logic Simulate each 1/0 point by either creating the actual input in process or simulating the input in the field. This test is to indicate that the wiring is correct from the field device to the input at the control system. Outputs are tested by forcing ths output in the control system and observing the device actuate in the field. Indicate OK or Not OK Outouts HCV-16 22 (Valve to transfer HF to storage) HCV-16-23 (Emergency water supply valve) TGV-1613 (Heat exchanger drain valve) HCV-16 21 (18 tank isolation valve) HCV-16-11 (Truck fill valve) MS 16-1 (Absorber # 1 pump stop) MS-16-2 (Absorber # 2 pump stop) MS 16-3 (Absorber # 3 pump stop) MS-16-4 (Transfer /Recirc pump stop) Innuis Mi 16-1 (indicate 1 when pump is on) (Absorber # 1 pump) Ml-16-2 (indicate 1 when pump is on) (Absorber # 2 pump) Mi 16-3 (indicate 1 when pump is on) (Absorber # 3 pump) Mi-16 4 (indicate 1 when pump is on) (Tansfer/Recirc pump) LSL-16-4 (Absorber #1 Low Level) LSH-16-5 (Absorber # 3 High Level) O LSH 16-7 (18 Tanks High Level) 1
LSH-1610 (Bulk Storage Tank High Level) LSH-16-15 (Truck Level Probe High Level) LSH 16 6 (6 Tanks High Level) LSH 16-8 (Interstitial Wall Liquid Level) PSL-16-16 (Low Water Supply Pressure) HS-1611 ON (indicates 1 when button is pushed) (Truck Fill Start) HS-16-11 OFF (Indicates 0 when button is pushed) (Truck Fill Stop) HS-16 22/2 (indicates 1 when button is pushed) (Batch Transfer Start) Analoa FCV-16-1 (input water flow) (Water to Absorber #3) FCV-16-1 (output to control valve) (Water to Absorber #3) CIV-16 2 (Conductivity t.nalyzer for Absorber #3) LI-16-9 (Bulk Storage Tank Liquid Level) TI 16-13 (Heat Exchanger Exit Temp) TI-16-3 (Absorber #1 Temp) TI 161 (Off Gas Piping Temp) 9 2
1 .oatrol System Device State Teat HF systo, s a ytv-Verify the followina before tillina LSL-16 4 { Absorber 1 !ow level)Ic in alarm state. - { } Yes {}No LSH-16-5 (Absorber 3 high level)is in normal state. - { } Yes {}No LSL-16-G (6 tank high level) is in normal state. - { } Yes {}No LSH 16-7 (18 tank high level) is in normal state. - { } Yes { } No LSH1610 (Bulk storage tank high level)is in normal state - { } Yes { } No LI-16-9 (Bulk storage tarl' level) reads zero. - { } Yes { } No CIV-16-2 (Absorber 3 % HF) reads zero. - { } Yes {}No Mi 16-1 (Pump 1 monitor) roads alarm (pump off)-( ) Yes { } No Ml 16 2 (Pump 2 monitor) reads alarm (pump off)- { } Yes { } No Mi-16-3 (Pump 3 monitor) roads alarm (pump off) ~ { } Yes { } No v Mi 16-4 (Pump 4 monitor) reads alarm (pump off)- { } Yes { } No PSL-1616 (DI pressure) indicates alarm when water is off - { } Yes { } No Fill the system with water by over-riding the logic and keeping FCV-16-1 or HCV-16-23 open. Once water is introduced into the system, the pumps for the absorbers can be started. First verify that MS-16-1, MS-10-2, MS-16-3 are in the enable position on the control system. Then start the pumps at the panel in the dike. Verify the pumps are running by checking the indicator light on the panel and confirming that the pumps turn from green to red on the control system. MS-16-1 in enable position. { } Yes { } No Indicator light on panel shows pump running. { } Yes { } No Pump is green on control system. { } Yes { } No MS-16 2 in enable position. { } Yes { } No indicator light on panel shows pump running. I } Yes { } No Pump is green on control system. ( } Yes { } No MS-16-3 in enable position. { } Yes { } No c Indicator light on panel shows pump running. { } Yes {}No 'V) Pump is green on control system. { } Yes { } No 3
( interlock Testing STOPHF-11 STOPHF 2 Interlocks to terminate UF6 and DA flow. Interlock oascription. These interlocks will terminate the UF6 and DA flow for the following cases 1. Offgas temperature greater than 450F, 2. Absorber #1 temperature greater than 230 F. 3. Absorber #1 or#3 pumps Qpping. 4. Highliquidlevelin Absorber #3. 5. High liouldlevelin the 6 day tanks. 6. Low DI waterpressure. 7. High HF concentration in Absorber #3 8. Lowliquidlevelin Absorber #1. o in order to test this interlock, each input into it must be verified that it will cause the output of STOPHF-1.AND to be a 1 which will terminate UF6 and DA flow. Verify the output of the following blocks as given and if it is not put the bWk in manual with the given out put. General: STOPHF-2.GET (HS-16-10.DEV) output is a 1. p {}Okay { }ln manual Qf
- 1. TI-16-1.AIN is less than 450 F. { }Okay { }in manual
- 2. TI-16-3.AIN is less than 230 F. { }Okay { }ln manual
- 3. STOPHF-2.GE2 (MI-16-1.DEV) output is a 0. { }Okay { }ln manual
- 4. STOPHF-2.GE3 (MI-16-3.DEV) output is a 0. { }Okay { }ln manual
- 5. STOPHF-2.GE4 (LSH-16-5.DEV) output is a 1. { }Okay { }ln manual
- 6. STOPHF-2.GES (LSH-16-6.DEV) output is a 1. { }Okay { }ln manual 7; PSL-16-16I.GET (PSL-16-16.DEV) output is a 1. { }Okay { }ln manual
- 8. CIV-16-2.AIN is less than 5. { }Okay { }ln manual
- 9. LSL-16-41.GET (LSL-16-4.DEV) output is a 0. { }Okay { }ln manual Once the above are verified the output of STOPHF-1.AND should be a 0.
p, { } Yes { } No V Now each one of the above will be forced to alarm condition which will cause the output of STOPHF-1.AND to be a 1 4
C 1. Put TI-16-1.AIN in manual (if it isn't already) and change the output to 400. \\ Verty that you receive a high alarm. { } Yes { } No Change the output to 451. Verify that you receive a high high alarm and the output of STOPHF-1.AND changes to a 1. { } Yes ()No Put TI-16-1.AIN back into non-alarm state and verify STOPHF-1.AND changes back to a 0. { } Yes { } No 2. Put TI-1S-3.AIN in manual (if it isn't'aiready) and change the output to 220. Verify that you receive a high alarm { } Yes { } No Also verify that HCV-16-23 opens. { } Yes { } No Change the output to 230. Verify that you receive a high.high alarm and the output of STOPHF-1.AND changes to a 1.(This has a 2 minute delay. So you can verify the output of TI-16-3.CO2 changes to a 1 and put the delay in manual and change its out put to a 1. Or you can wait the 2 minutes.) { } Yes { } i4o = Change output to 0 and verify that you receive a low alarm and the output of STOPHF-1.AND changes back to a 0. { } Yes { } No 3. Put STOPHF-2.GE2 in manual (if it isn't already) and change the output to a 1. Verify that the output of STOPHF-1.AND changes to a 1. { } Yes { } No Put the output of STOPHF-2.GE2 back to a 0 and verify that the output of STOPHF-1.AND changes back to a 0. { } Yes { } No 4. Put STOPHF-2 GE3 in manual (if it isn't already) and change the output to a 1. Verify that the output of STOPHF-1.AND changes to a 1. {)Yes { } No Put the output of STOPHF-2.GE3 back to a 0 and verify that the output of STOPHF-1.AND changes back to a 0. { } Yes { } No 5. Put STOPHF-2.GE4 in manual (if it isn't already) and change the output to a 0. Verify that the output of STOPHF-1.AND changes to a 1. {}Yes { } No (. Put the output of STOPHF-2 GE4 back to a 1 and verify that the output of STOPHF-1.AND changes back to a 0. { } Yes { } No 6. Put STOPHF-2.GES in manual (if it isn't already) and change the output to a 0. Verify that the output of STOPHF-1.AND changes to a 1. {}Yes { } No 5 1
Put the output of STOPHF-2.G'.5 back to a 1 and verify that the output of STOPHF-1.AND changes back to a 0. { } Yes {}No 7. Put PSL-16-161.GET in manual (if it isn't already) and change the output to a 0. Verify that the output of STOPHF-1.AND changes to a 1. { } Yes { } No Put the output of PSL-16-161.GET back to a 1 and verify that the output of STOPHF-1.AND changes back to a 0. { } Yes { } No 8. Put CIV-16-2.AIN in manual (if it isn't already) and change the output to 4. Verify that you receive a high alarm. { } Yes { } No Change the output tc,5. Verify that you receive a high-high alarm and the output of STOPHF-1.AND changes to a 1.(This has a 30 second delay. So you can verify the output of CIV-16-2.COM changes to a 1 and put the delay in manual and change its out put to a 1. Or you can wait the 30 seconds.) { } Yes { } No Change output to 1 and verify that you receive a low alarm and the output of STOPHF-1.AND changes back to a 0. { } Yes { } No - O' 9. Put LSL-16-41.GET in manual (if it isn't already) and change the output to (_) a 1. Verify that the output of STOPHF-1.AND changes to a 1. (This has a 5 minute delay. So you can put the delay in manual and change its out put to a 1. Or you can wait the 5 minutes.) { } Yes -{ } No Also verify that HCV-16-23 opens. { } Yes { } No Put the output of LSL-16-41.GET back to a 0 and verify that the output cf STOPHF-1.AND changes back to a 0. { } Yes { } No When 1-9 above are complete put the previous 1-9 back in automatic. By performing the above tests, this also verifies the functionality of the following loops... TI-16-1 LSL-16-41 TI-16-3 4 PSL-16-161 CIV-16-2 6
l
- ]v Heat exchanger exit temp interlock TI 16-13 Interlock description
This interlock causes the heat exchanger drain valve to open when tne temperature of the liquid going though the heat exchanger exceeds 150 F. It will also give a high alarm if the temperature exceeds 170 F. Put TI-1613.AIN in manual with the output at 151. Verify TCV-16-13 opens. { } Yes {}No Change the output to 170 and verify you receive a high alarm. {}Yes ( ) No Transfer / Recirculation pump interlocks MS 16-41, MS-16-412, MS-16413 Interlock description: These interlocks verify that the transfer / recirculation pump car; ce stopped by the control system. It also verifies that the pump will stop if either the tank fill valve (HCV-16-22) or the truck fill valve (HCV-16-11) opens! closes while it is running. Finally it verifies that the pump can be restarted after one of the above valves was opened / closed. Verify that both HCV-16-11 and HCV-16-22 are closed or that the device (] state indicates closed. Also verify that HS-16-4 is in the enable position. (.J Start the transfer /recirc pump (pump # 4) using the push button on the panel in the dike. Verify the pump is running by confirming that the pump turns from green to red on the control system. Mi-16-4 in normal position. { } Yes { } No Indicator light on panel shows the pump is running. { } Yes {}No Pump is green on control system. { } Yes { } No Put HS-16-4 to disable and verify that the pump stops. Indicator light on panel she vs pump stopped. ( } Yes { } No Pump is red on control system. { } Yes { } No Put HS-16-4 back to enable and restart the pump. Then put HCV 16-11 to open and verify that the pump stops. Indicator light on panel shows pump stopped. { } Yes { } No Pump is red on control system. { } Yes ( ) No Also vonfy that the pump can be restarted with HCV-16-11 open. Indicator light on panel shows the pump is running. { } Yes ( ) No Pump is green on cor..rol system. ( } Yes { } No Put HCV-16-11 back to closed and verify that the pump stops. (^)s C Indicator light on panel shows pump stopped. { } Yes { } No Pump is red on control system. { } Yes { } No 7
T Start the pump again and put HCV-16-22 to open and verify that the pump stops. Indicator light on panel shows pump stopped. ( ) Yes { } No Pump is red on control system. { } Yes { } No Also verify that the pump can be restarted with HCV-16-22 open. Indicator light on panel shows the pump is running { } Yes { } No Pump is green on control system. ( ) Yes { } No Put HCV-16-22 to closed and verify that the pump stops. Indicator light on panel shows pump stopped. ( ) Yes { } No Pump is red on control system. ( ) Yes {}No Cross node get interlock CNG301TO302 Interlock description: This interlock obtains the state of the emergency shutoff switch and the STOPHF interlocks and will terminate the DA flow when required. Verify that CNG301TO302 GET has an output of 0 or put it in manual so it does. Also verify that the output of STOPHF-1.AND has an output of 0. Then the output of CNG301TO302.OR should be a 0. { } Yes { } No O V Put STOPHF-1.AND into manual and change the output to 1. Verify that the output of CNG301TO302.OR changes to a 1. { } Yes {}No Put STOPHF-1.AND output back to a zero and change the output of CNG301TO302 GET to a 1 and verify that the output of CNG301TO302.OR changes to a 1. { } Yes { } No Put CNG301TO301 GET output back to a 0 and in automatic. 18 Tank High Level !nterlock LSH-16-71 Interlock description.' This interlock will alarm when high liquid level is . indicated in the 18 tanks. It will also display a counter which tells how long it has been since it alarmed. Put LSH-16-71.GET in manual and make the output 0 and verify that HCV-16-21 is closed. Verify that the counter starts increasing. { } Yes { } No Change LSH-16-71.GET output to 1 and verify that the counter keeps increasing. { } Yes { } No q Open HCV-16-21 and verify that the counter returns to zero. b) { } Yes { } No 8
18 Tank isG valve Interlock HCV 16 211 Interlock description: This interlock opens and closes the 18 tank isolation valve (HCV-16-21). It will close the valve upon high lovel alarm in the 18 tanks. The valve can be opened once the alarm returns to normal and it is authorized to open by the key switch on the control system (HS-16-21). Put HCV-16-211.GET into manual with a 0 output and LSH-16-71.GET into manual with a 0 output and verify that HCV-16-21 stays closed. {)Yes { } No Change the output of HCV-16-211.GET to a 1 while leaving LSH-16-71.GET with an output of 0 and verify that HCV-16-21 stays closed. { } Yes { } No Leave the output of HCV-16-211 GET as a 1 and change the output of LSH-16-71.GET to a i and verify that HCV-16-21 opene. { } Yes { } No FCV-161 Interlock Interlock description: This interlock will add water to Absorber #3 when the conductivity in Absorber #3 begins to rise. It will not add water to Absorber #3 O if the 6 tanks show high level, if Absorber #3 shows high level, orif Absorber U pump #3is not running. Put the following blocks in manual 0: STOPHF-2.GE3, STOPHF-2.NOT, STOPHF-2.NO2. Next change the output of STOPHF-2.GE3 to a 1 and verify that the output of the PID block goes to 0. Then retum STOPHF-2.GE3 to a 0. { } Yes { } No Next change the output of STOPHF-2.NOT to a 1 and verify that the output of the PID block goes to 0. Then return STOPHF-2.NOT to a 0. { } Yes {}No Next change the output of STOPHF-2.NO2to a 1 and verify that the output of the PID block goes to 0. Then return STOPHF-2.NO2 to a 0. { } Yes { } No O v 9
Storage Tank Fill Valve Interlocks HCV-16-221, HCV-16 2212, HCV-16 2213 Interlock description: These interlocks determine when the storage tank fill valve (HCV-16-22) opens or closes. The valve will open for either of the following cases: Case 1
- 1) levelin the bulk storage tank is below 7500 gallons.
- 2) authorized by the control system (HS-16-22),
- 3) The tank till push button (HS-16-22/2) on the absorber panel is pushed.
- 4) HCV-16-21 is closed.
- 5) Transfer /recirc pump is running.
Case 2
- 1) HCV-16-21 is closed.
- 2) The tank fill push button (HS-16-22/2) on the absorber panel is pushed.
For case 2 the valve will only stay open for 30 seconds unless the conditions of case 1 are satisfied. Once the valve is opened it can stay open for 30 minutes as long as conditions of case 1 are satisfied. 3 The valve wlIl close for the following conditions: (G
- 1) The 30 minutes have expired.
- 2) HCV-16-21(18 tank isolation valve) opens.
- 3) The bulk storage tank has high liquid level (LSH-16-10).
- 4) The transfedrecirculation pump stops.
- 5) The 30 seconds have expired.
Put HCV-16-2212.COM into man'ual with an output of 1 Put HCV-16-2212.GE3 into manual with an output of 1 Put HCV-16-2212.GE4 into manual with an output of 1 Put HCV-16-221.GET into manual with an output of 1 Put HCV-16-2212.GE2 into manual with an output of 0 Put HCV-16-22I2.GET into manual with an output of 0 Verify that HCV-16-22 opens { } Yes {}No Change the output of HCV-16-2212.COM to a 0 (When the output of HCV 221.AND changes to a zero, put the delay in manual with an output of 1 to reset the flip flop.). Verify that HCV-16-22 closes. Then put HCV-16-221.COM back to a 1 and the delay back to automatic. { } Yes { } No Change the output of HCV-16-2212.GE3 to a 0 (When the output of HCV 221.AND changes to a zero, put the delay in manual with an output of 1 to p(./ reset the flip flop.). Verify that HCV-16-22 closes. Then put HCV 2212.GE3 back to'a 1 and the delay back to automatic. { } Yes { } No 10
Change the output of HCV-162212.GE4 to a 0 (When the output of HCV 221.AND changes to a zero, put the delay in manual with an output of 1 to t s reset the flip flop.). Verify that HCV-16-22 closes. Then put HCV 2212.GE4 back to a 1 and the delay back to automatic. { } Yes { } No Change the output of HCV-16-221.GET to a 0 and verify that HCV-16-22 closes. _Then put HCV-16-221.GET back to a 1. { } Yes { } No Change the output of HCV-16-2212.GE2 to a i and verify that HCV-16-22 closes. Then put HCV-16-2212.GE2 back to a 0, { } Yes { } No Change the output of HCV-16-2212.GET to a 1 and verify that HCV-16-22 closes. Then put HCV-16-2212.GET back to a 0. { } Yes { } No Put the following blocks back into automatic mode: HCV-16-2212.COM, HCV-16-2212 GE3, HCV-16-2212.GE4, HCV-16-221.GET Push the button on the absorber panel to open HCV-16-22. Verify the valve opens and then closes after 30 seconds. { } Yes { } No Put HCV-16-2212.GE2 back into automatic mode. Truck Transfer Interlocks LI-16-9, LI-16 91, LI 16 912, Ll-16 913 Interlock description: These interlocks record the size of the batch that is to be transferred to the tank truck, open and closes the truck fill valve (HCV 11), determines when the batch transferis complete, and resets the operator i batch entry amount back to zero after the batch transfer is complete. The truck fill valve can open when the transfer pump is off and the start button (HS-16-11) is pushed. The truck lill valve will close when batch transfer is complete, a high level alarm from the truck probe (LSH-16-15) is received, or the stop button (HS-16-11) is pushed. Put Ll-16-9.AIN into manual with an output of 800. { } Yes { } No Enter amount to transfer on the transfer graphic as 300. { } Yes { } No Put HS-16-1112 on the transfer graphic to start. { } Yes { } No 4 Verify the output of LI-16-9.PU2 is 800. { } Yes { } No Verify HS-16-1112 goes back to stop after 1 second. { } Yes { } No Verify the output of Ll-16-912.SUB is 500. { } Yes { } No Verify the output of LI-16-912.COM is 0. { } Yes { } No Change the output of LI-16-9.AIN to 499. { } Yes { } No Verify the output of Ll-16-912.COM is a 1. { } Yes { } No Verify the output of L1-16-9.DAT goes to 0. { } Yes { } No Put LI-16-9.AIN back into automatic. { } Yes {}No 11
Verify LI-16-91.GET ha an output of 1. ( } Yes { } No Put LI-16-912.GET into manual with output of 1. { } Yes {}No s Put LI-16-912.GE2 into manual with output of 3. { } Yes {}No Verify HCV-16-11 opens. { } Yes { } No Put Ll-16-912.GE2 to a 0. { } Yes { } No Verify HCV-16-11 closes. { } Yes { } No Put LI-16-912.GE2 back to a 3, wait 5 seconds and change it to a 1. { } Yes { } No Verify that HCV-16-11.is open. { } Yes {}No Change output of Ll-16-912.GET to a 0. { } Yes { } No Verify HCV-16-11 closes. { } Yes { } No Change output of LI-16-912.GET back to 1. { } Yes { } No Put Ll-16-912.GE2 back to a 3, wait 5 seconds and change it to a 1. { } Yes { } No Verify that HCV-16-11 is open. { } Yes { } No Put Ll-16-912.COM into manual with an output of 1 { } Yes { } No Verify HCV-16-11 closes. { } Yes { } No Put the following blocks back into automatic mode: LI-16-91.GET, Ll 912.GET, LI-16-912.GE2, and LI-16-912.COM. Ov 12
V U b INTERIM HAZARD EVALUATION FACILITY SITING REVIEW REVIEWDATE-6/3/97 PLANT / OPERATION: Sy3 tem 316 HF Absorbers REV!EW TEAPA Bill Alkier, Kevin Hayes, Gene Jordan, Jamie Long, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd DETERMINATION SITING TOPICS General Location of on-site population relative to process Process area is outside, east of Buading 255 and southeast of BuBding 260. SRe Considerations population iswest of the process. Location of cr#ical systems Utilities and off gas feed across pipe bridge from limestone storage building, located approximately 15 feet west of the process. Power disconnects located on east wa'l of limestone storage buHding. Softwater shuto1Tlocated in Building 260. Main emergency power breakers located approximately 50 feet to west in Bulding 255 ammonia dissociator room. Dominant wind direction Typically from southwest at 10 mph. Climate and weather eMremes Temperatures from 0* to 115' F, severe thunderstorms likely, tomado remotely possible. Site topography Facilty is above 500 year flood plain; earthquake fault zones in area; faclity generalty level EMemal hazards or threats Single train track 35' feet south of perimeter securty fence; Highway P 100* north of plant. On-site traffic flow pattems and clearances Frequent shippng and receiving trafficwthin 15 feet to east of process, infrequent forklift traffic directly adjacent to west of process. Security / reliability of critical feeds and utilities Good. Main elecincel power provided by dedicated substation across Highway P. Emergency power generator and fire pump wthin securty fence. Emergency power breaker room montored for ammonia and lower emploshe level. Water provided by on-sRe well,wth 200,000 gallon mixed-use gravity tank. Primarylaltemate emergency command center Primary command center at BuBding 253 alarm panel; evacuation command center location at EmerDencyOperations Center. Evacuation routes, emergency exits, assembly Evacuation route to north around Bu5 ding 260, or to south around BuBding 256-2, then northwest to assembly at Emergency Operations Center. points Control Room Minimum occupancy Frequently occupied by single person. interior room, consisting of fiberglass insulated partitions, of a corrugated metal and Construction structural steel buiding. Fresh airintake location and isolation HVAC unt above men's locker room, north end of Building 255, which is typica!!y upwind of the process. Location relative to process and feed systems Southwest comer of BuHding 260, appi >imately 50 feet west of the process and within 20 feet of feed systems. Page 1 of 3
.r u O ~ O O INTERIM HAZARD EVALUATION FACIUTY SITING REVIEW REVIEWDATE: 6!3/97 PLANT / OPERATION: System 316, HF Absorbers REVIEW TEAM-Bil Alkier, Kevin Hayes, Gene Jordan, Jamie L.ong, Bryan McCarty, Frank Tidd DETERMINATION SITING TOPICS Process Fac8 Ries Electrical dassification General, non-hazardous. NEMA Type 12 enclosures in the limestone storage building, NEMA Type 4 in the outdoor process area. 8 Accessibaty for sampling, maintenance, repairs, Good Solution sample port at ground lavel, near recrcula* ion pump (#4). Tanks and anc2lary equipment have suifcient clearances for maintenance actrvlbes; etc. minimal maintenance eqeded on tanks. Ancillary eq6iprnent has apgog;ste isolation. Protedion of piping and vessels from traffc Pipe bridge has at least 12 feet dearance, proteds utity and off gas feeds. Reinforced concrete dike protects process tanks and ancitary equipment. Protection of small-bore lines from impact and No small-bore gocess lines smallest is 1-inch. personnel l Routing of piping, cable trays, entical utaties titilties and off gas feeds are through or across roof at north side oflimestone storage bulding, cross to the process area on a pipe bndge from the northeast comer of that buiding. Vent, drain, relief valve discharge locations Process discharges to ventiabon stack 121, wth a vacuum cc,,e vi device in the connecting pipe. Process area not enclosed, no ventisbon requir3d. Concrete dike drains to sump equipped wth a lockable velve, then to ground or storm water system. Qualifcation, day, and storage tank primary pressure relief to third stage column vapor inlet via PCV12 set at 1-inch water column (0.5 ps0; secondary pressure relief to atmosphere at greater than 15-foot c'evebon from PSV14, set at 6-inches water column (2 psi). H ndling and incompatible material segregation; storage, dites, Concrete dike provides physic &i barrier for accumulation of incomp--im material, the closest storage of which is in the Building 255 store room. Process area containment Storage Areas sumps, drains, waste isisolated from any containments. , Siting, labeling of unloading areas for Unloading area is used only for HF, ai^dnough incompatibles wil pass by I during normal site shipping and receMng. Area to be marked for prevention of inr< atibles incompahhles. D.5e !ank separation (to process, between Storage tank is.within same containment dike as gocess, and is separated from others by at lecst I feet. Double wall of storage tank increases process separation. tanks) Qualification and day tank centerlines separated by at least 2 feet. Page 2 of 3
7 { INTERIM HAZARD EVALUATION FACLITY StTING REVEW REVEWDATE: 6/3/g7 PLANT / OPERATION: System 316.HF Absorbers REVIEW TEAnt Bel Alkier, Kevin Hayes, Gene Jordan,Jamie Long, Brypn McCarty, Frank Tidd DETERhiMATION SITING TOPICS Handling and Spfl control, drainage direchon, treatment Storage tank equipped wth double well. Concrete dike wel contain 100% of process and storage volume. Concrete is subjed to maar* by W; avatable coelings would Storage Areas capacity also be subject to altack, and would conceal demoge to concrete. Dke drainage to (cont.) sump equipped wth lockable valve. Spil team deals wth spils before decharge to containers, ground, or storm drah sm. Fire Protection Access for fire fighting, other emergency activtses Very good. Appia.cii from north or souts,wth access from any side of the dRe. W.';j from nearest ha% tw =aaronmetely 15 feet. - Sman motors and incidental electrical eqt.v...e4 at yJ level. No flames or arcs - Igntion sources in process ares Access to hydrant Nearest ivyd..id, appro4TA, 50 feet south, has unobstructed arr**= Secondary hydrant is manNold on east side of &% 115. Level subches in absorber columns, dayRyeillication tanks, and storage tank. Accident Mitigation Detection ofleaks/ ruptures % present durinn tasks letely to have an incident. Emergencyshutdown swich location Process shutoff in containment dike and onde control mom, Power disconnects in limestone storage bueding. Tanker loading platform has emesgency stop for transfer pump (m). AccessibEty ofisolation volves Ground level access to manual isolomon Wves, +-. V2 and V3. Potential for firelegio?bn in process affechng Negligele. others Crtical control systems functional and accessbie Yes,i rnae;, located. AsW;J eventis a spE. afterintial event Personnel Protection Pedestrian traffic pattems vs. hazardous locations Traffic to and from warehouse and/or store room, p4T 1ly during days, separated from process area by dice marked for restricted access SCBA/ respirator location; accessitdly on each SCEiA stored near main emergency alarm penet in Buading 253, and in C.i-g.cy Opershons Center. Respirators stored in Bu5dLM 260 access hallway,near main shift. emergency alarm panel, and in Health Physics. Respralors accessible from Healih Physics on each shilt. 1 Page 3 of 3
p n INTERIM HAZARD EVALUATION HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW REVIEWDATE:6/3/97 PLANT / OPERATION: System 316 HF Absorbers REVIEW TEAM: Bill Alkier, Kevin Hayes, Gene Jordan, Jamie Long Bryan McCarty, Frank Tdd CATEGORY POSITIVE FACTORS NEGATIVE FACTORS PROCESS AREA PRACTICE +k + Equipment Labeling clear, unitt S_m labeling mislabeled or notlabeled planned Access immediately at hand hard to reach oraccess immediate + Operabsfity power-assisted operation difficult to operate / change manual / easy + Layout well-planned, logical confusing, inconsistent weft-planned!!ogical + Uniqueness only one in the area several similarcomponents only one in area + Controls Labeling clear, uniform labeling mistabeled/notlabeled clear, uniform + Mode fully autornatic, well tuned ailor many manual steps mostly manual Involwment operator always inwiwd operatordetached operator detached Displays clear / simple unclear / complex clear / simple + Feedback immediate/ concise none/ misleading immediate/ concise + + Deviations Alarms prioritized/ safety critcal simultaneous / false prioritized Coverage two operators at all times opera for not ahvays present not always present Time adequate time to respond inadequate time to respond adequate time + Preparedness periodic emerg. simulation no emerg. drill / simulation penodic simulation + Last-resort shutdown allowed, rapid shutdown discouraged / unsafe a!! owed, rapid + Transient Procedures complete / accurate / current incomplete / general / obsolete compt / accurate / current + Identifying device location identified unclear device location identrfied + Formal graphic identification aids confusing / inconsistent graphic + Aids checklist /suparvisor check task steps done by memory checklist & supervisor + eMreme/affects performance variable +/- Consistency permanent shift assignment shift / schedule rotation rotation l Scheduling Overtime Task wlume resources meet demand tarks ereed available time meet demand + Task frequency routine infrequent /no emerience routne + Task intensity regulartask at normal pace different/ rapid pace tasks regular, normal + Communication Shift changes verbal status + paperwork inadequate communication verbal, some paperwork + Supervision frequently present little/no oversight frequently present + Emergency rapid / clearly understood unclear forlocation/ type rapM/ understood + Environment Noise level off'ce noise level hearing protection req'd. protection not req'd + Ciimate indoors / climate coritrolled hot / humid /precipfwind outdoors Visibility clear / distinct foggy! limited clear + inadequate for task acceptable, need more +/- Lighting Page 1 of 1
O DEPARTMENT: NUCLEAR FUEL MANUFACTURING - HEMATITE CODE: O.S. 604.05 TITLE: HF Absorber Operation - -, ~.. w u,,b TEs ";e;jg$pgjfpgg .v, ugNAPPROVED:BY;GM,;. ~ ~.. ~.. w. ..-y ,,. ~ = EREV$ y6REVISEDW, DEPARTMENb 9, jsMg d G pfh,ggQ $;lg ;'h; ph NDATE g ag !jG y, @;;pj R fMQ-@b@ 0 Original 12/11/97 Quality Engineer Director, Uranium / Ndl)dNidiNdidNIf)h [Ddfga Operations /f Manufacturing Director, Regulatory Engine r Affairs f 7. $ A-ynuf I ts % _~ '~r M, MTN INiNGMM' Required, Not Required DISTRIBUTION LIST Oxide Control Room UO2 Team Leader 253 Library 230 Library -N-
- lCDC[ y; LEFFsCTIVE.DAT5$ ',
<!:l l' (
i OS No. HF Absorber Operction 12/11/97 604.05 Revision 0 1.0 PROCESS OUTLINE 1.1 The HF absorber system removes hydrofluoric acid (HF) gas from the off gas streams of the conversion process. Water in the absorbers removes the HF from the off gas by absorption. The system consists of three absorbers,18 qualification tanks,6 day tanks and a bulk storage (hold) tank. 2.0 NUCLEAR SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 2.1 Report violations of Nuclear Safety Requirements or loss of nuclear criticality safety (NCS) barriers listed in this section to the Nuclear Criticality Safety Specialist (NCSS). 2.2 Read, understand, and comply with the requirements of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Limits signs. If you do not understand the requirements, consult with your Team Leader or the NCSS. 2.3 The nuclear criticality safety basis of the absorbers and storage tanks is analysis and geometry. The safety basis of the bulk storage tank is mass, which is controlled by limiting the concentration of transferred liquids. A 2.3.1 Concentration of liquids transferred to the bulk storage tank must be less than 0.2 g U/L. 2.4 Upset Conditions which must be reported to the NCSS: 2.4.1 Any change in geometry in the HF absorber and qualification / storage tanks or the geometry of the array. 2.4.2 Exceeding transfer limits. 2.4.3 Failure to mix between samples as required. 2.4.4 Failure to run standard oetween samples. 2.4.5 A concentration above 0.2 g U per liter in any tank or any accumulation of material in the 8,500 gallon bulk storage tank. O Page 1 of 8
i OS No. HF Absorbor Operction 12/11/97 604.05 Revision 0 / V 3.0 RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS 3.1 The chemical safet.y precautions listed in the Industrial Safety section are sufficient to protect against any possible radiological exposure. 4.0 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY 4.1 Liquids in the absorber area will contain varying concentrations of HF, which are normally as follows. The third absorber has up to 5% HF, the second absorber has up to 25% HF, and the first absorber and any tanks have up to 34 % HF. Any liquid within the absorber dike shall be assumed to contain HF until proven otherwise. Except during maintenance activities, the team leader shall be immediately Informed of a verified (by pH paper or other test) HF leak. 4.1.1 Skin burns from HF acid solutions are usually accompanied by severe, throbbing pain with redness, swelling, and blistering. Burns larger than 25 square inches (160 square cm) may result in severe systemic fluoride poisoning, and can be fatal. Concentrated (greater than 50%) acid exposure may result in blanched, white patches of skin. Skin contact with 20% to 50% HF solutions may not produce any signs or symptoms of exposure for 1 to 8 hours, while the delay for less than 20% solutions may be up to 24 hours. 4.1.2 HF vapor has a detectable odor range of 0.5 ppm to ? ppm, has an 8-hour time-weighted average permissible exposure limit (PEL) of 3 ppm, a short-term exposure limit (STEL) of 6 ppm, and is immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) at 30 ppm because of the potential for respiratory system damage. Inhalation of HF vapors at low concentrations will irritate the upper' respiratory system, resulting in inflammation and a cough. Greater exposure can result in spasm of the larynx (laryngospasm) or bronchi (bronchospasm), and fluid accumulations in the laryrw (laryngeal edema) or lungs (pulmonary edema). The development of pulmonary edema may be delayed for a duration of several hours to 2 days, and is potentially fatal. 4.2 Personal protective equipment. 4.2.1 Neoprene or butyl gloves, heavy rubber rain gear for protective clothing, and an ANSI Z87 approved face shield with ANSI Z87 goggles shall be used to prevent contact with HF solutions. Protective clothing shall consist of a coat, bibbed coverall, long (3) (.. hood, and shoe covers. All protective equipment must be worn when in the dike area. Page 2 of 8
OS No. HF Absorb:r Operttion 12/11/97 604.05 Revision 0 4.2.2 Use a full face air-purifying respirator with acid gas cartridges, which will also meet the face shield and goggles requirement, as necessary to prevent the inhalation of HF vapors between 3 and 30 ppm. 4.2,3 Personal protective equipment shall be inspected for integrity before each use, i.e. before being donned. It shall also be neutralized, thoroughly rinsed, and towel dried as necessary after each use. 4.3 Exposure treatments. 4.3.1 Any skin exposure to HF acid solution requires prompt medical evaluation and follow-up. The affected area shall be immediately flushed with large amounts of running water for 5 minutes, after which a 2.5% calcium gluconate gel shall be applied. Any contaminated clothing shall be removed during the initial water flush. Calcium gluconate tubes shall not be re-used once opened. 4.3.2 Any eye exposure to HF acid solution requires prompt medical evaluation and follow-up. The affected area shall be immediately O' flushed with large amounts of running water for 5 minutes, after which the eye should be irrigated with a 1% calcium gluconate in normal saline, it is important to remove the goggles only after the head and face have been flushed. 4.3.3 Unprotected HF vapor exposure above the PEL or STEL, and any exposure above the IDLH limit, requires prompt medical evaluation and follow-up. Personnel having such exposure should be promptly moved to fresh air and receive a nebulizer treatment using 2.5% calcium gluconate in normal saline. 4.3.4 Ingestion of an HF solution requires prompt medical evaluation and follow-up. If the person is conscious and alert, eat Tums@ antacid tablets containing calcium or drink a large quantity of water or milk with added milk of magnesia. Do not induce vomiting. O Page 3 of 8
OS No. HF Absorber Operation 12/11/97 604.05 Revision 0 4.4 Operations involving personnel in me dike or at the tanker transfer station shall be done using the buddy system. The purpose of the buddy system is to ensure that timely emergency assistance will be summoned and provided as necessary. 4.4.1 For routino operations this involves at least one other employee being advised of the work to be done, when it will start, and when it is finished. The advised employee shall periodically check the status of workers within the dike by radio, telephone, or visual contact. Routine operations include obtaining uranium samples and operation of pumps, valves, and switches as necessary for generating, recirculating, and storing acid. 4.4.2 For special operations this involves at least one person keeping at least visual contact with another person performing operations within the dike. Two workers within the dike will meet this requirement. Special operations include tanker transfers, making or breaking pipe connections, transfer of acid to or from drums, and any maintenance to pumps, valves, or pipes. 4.5 An Operation Sheet, Special Evaluation Traveler, Temporary Shop Instruction, or Radiation Work Permit is required to bring any drum, carboy, or pail into the dike. 4.5.1 Color indicating neutralizer should be used to decontaminate incidental HF spills on personal protective equipment, absorber system equipment, or tools. If color indicating neutralizer is not available, the tools or protective equipment should be rinsed thoroughly with water. 4.5.2 Following authorization by engineering or the Emergency Director, lime, calcium carbonate, or sodium hydroxide may be used to neutralize HF accumulations in the sump. 4.6 Weep holes are located in the lined piping to indicate a leak in the liner. If a yellow material or corrosion is observed at the weep hole or flange connection then notify engineering. 5.0 STARTUP OPERATIONS 5.1 Verify the 4-way T on the 4th floor is open to the absorbers and the blind flange is blocking off the dry scrubbers. 5.2 Have the team leader put HS-16-10, located on the vaporizer graphic, into the wet position. This indicates the absorbers are the off gas process system in use. Page 4 of 8
OS No. HF Absorber Operation 12/11/97 604.05 Revision 0 5.3 Cpen the main water supply valve (V31) located near the preheat and heat trace furnaces. 5.4 Place the controllers for CIV-16-2 and FCV-16-1 in automatic. If the system is empty, some time may be necessary to fill the system prior to starting the pumps. 5.5 Place the following pump switches on the control system in the enable position: MS-16-1 (absorber #1 pump), MS-16-2 (absorber #2 pump), MS-16-3 (absorber #3 pump). 5.6 Put on the proper personal protective equipment and start the pumps for each absorber by purhing the following buttons, located on the panel in the absorber dike: Mi-16-1 (absorber # 1 pump), MI-16-2 (absorber # 2 pump), Mi-16-3 (absorber # 3 pump). Confirm that each pump is running by verifying the indicator light on the panel lights up for each pump or by checking the absorber graphic and verifying that each pump is green. 5.7 Once the pumps are running, the water supply valve is open and the control valves are in automatic, the absorber system is ready for use. O 6.0 CONTINUOUS OPERATION NOTE: When the conversion plant is running continuously, the main storage tanks (18 tanks) will fill up approximately every day depending on production rates. When these tanks are full, LSH-16-7 will high alarm and cause HCV-16-21 to close so the main storage tanks (18 tanks) are isolated. At this time, a timer will start counting indicating how long it has been since the isolation valve closed. You have approximately 9 hours to circulate, sample, and transfer the material in the 18 tanks to the bulk (8500 gallon) storage tank. NOTE: The material in the main tanks must be circulated for 30 minutes and sampled twice to determine the uranium concentration. As long as the samples have been " Released for Transfer" by the laboratory, the Team Leader will authorize transfer to the bulk storage tank by keying on HS-16-22. 6.1 Verify that switch HS-16-4 (pump # 4) on the control system is in the enable position. G 6.2 To circulate the mate.;01 in he 18 tanks, put on the proper protective k_) equipment and enter the dike. Close V7 and move V9 to the recirculate position. Verify that V10 and V29 are closed and that V8 is open. Page 5 of 8
OS No. HF Absorber Operction 12/11/97 604.05 Revision 0 6.3 Start pump # 4 using the push button switch on the panel in the dike and verify that it is running by checking that the corresponding light on the panel lights up or the pump turns to green on the storage graphic on the control system. 6.4 Circulate the material for 30 minutes. After 30 minutes, collect the firct HF sample. Slowly open V19 to obtain approximately 1 liter sample and then close V19. Continue to circulate the tanks for an additional 10 minutes and then take the second 250 ml sample. Close both samples and rinse thoroughly to verify there is no HF on the outside of the sample bottles. Send both bottles to the lab for analysis. Stop pump # 4 once samples have been collected. 6.5 The lab will determine if the material is ' Released for Transfer". Once the lab releases the transfer the Team Leader must key HS, 22 which will authorize HCV-16-22 to open. 6.6 Before transferring to the bulk storage tank, move V9 to the transfer position and verify that V12 is closed. 6.7 Start the transfer by pushing the button for HS-16-22/2 (batch transfer) and starting pump # 4 on the panel in the dike. A timer will allow the transfer to continue. The transfer should take approximately 15-20 minutes and if the time stops the transfer before it is complete, the Team Leader must be notified to okay the transfu again. Monitor the level in the qualification tanks and stop the pump when empty. 6.8 To resume to normal operation, move V9 back to the recirculate position, and open \\/7. 6.9 On the control system key on HS-16-21 which will authorize HCV-16-21 to open and material will fill the 18 tanks again. 7.0 STANDBY OPERATION 7.1 If the conversion plant is put on standby for any extended period of time all reactors must be switched to nitrogen. This is necessary since the steam will excessively dilute the HF causing the storage tanks to fill up with less than 34% HF. Page 6 of 8
OS No. HF Absorber Operation 12/11/97 604.05 Revision 0 OV 8.0 SHUT DOWN OPERATION 8.1 If solution is to remain in the absorbers during shutdown, the following steps must be completed once nitrogen is off of the system. 8.1.1 Turn off the pumps to absorbers 1,2, and 3. This can be done two different ways First by pushing the pump stops at the panel in the dike or by turning the switches on the control system (MS-16-1, MS-16-2 and MS-16-3) to disable. The pumps wil; show in red on the control system when they are off. 8.1.2 Turn off the water to the system by closing V31 iocated near the preheat and heat trace furnaces. 8.1.3 Put the controller for FCV-16-1 into manual with 0% output. 0.2 If the system is going to be down for an extei.ded period of time, in cold weather conditions, or if a maintenance activity is necessary then the absorbers must be drained. 8.2.1 Follow steps 8.1.1 - 8.1.3 8.2.2 To drain the absorbers, verify that V29 and V7 are open. Verify that V10 and V8 are closed and V9 is in the recirculate position. 8.2.3 Verify HS-16-4 is in the enable position on the control system. Then, start pump # 4 using the push button on the panel in the dike. 8.2.4 Pump material out of the aosorbers until LSL-16-4 alarms (indicating low level in absorber # 1) or the pump cuts out due to no liquid flow. 8.2.5 Once the absorbers are empty, turn off the pump using the stop button on the panel or by putting HS-16-4 into the disable position on the control system. Close V29 and open V8. 8.2.6 If material needs to be removed from the 18 storage tanks, key on HS-16-21 to close HCV-16-21. Then follow steps in Section 6 to transfer material to the bulk storago tank. Page 7 of 8
OS No. HF Absorber Operetion 12/11/97 604.05 Revision 0 9.0 ALARM ANDINTERLOCK DESCRIPTION 9.1 The following things will stop you from turning dissociated ammonia or UFe on or if they occur when the DA and UFe are on they will cause the control system to turn them off. 9.1.1 Absorber # 1 or # 3 pumps stop running. 9.1.2 Absorber # 3 has a high level alarm (LSH-15-5). 9.1.3 The 6 tanks have a high level alarm (LSH-16-6). 9.1.4 The conductivity in absorber # 3 (CIV-16-2) is in the high alarm state for more than 30 seconds. 9.1.5 HS-16-10 is switched to dry mode meaning the dry scrubbers are in use. 9.1.6 TI 16-1 (off gas temp) is greater than 450 *F. 9.1.7 TI-16-3 (absorber # 1 temp)is in the high alarm state for more than ( 2 minutes. 9.1.8 PSL-16-16 alarms indicating low DI water pressure. 9.1.9 LSL-16-4 alarms indicating low liquid level in absorber #1 for an extended period of time. O Page 8 of 8
1E Tank Recirculation / Sample / Transfer Checklist 1 HS-16-4 is in the enable position on the control system. 2 Close V7 and move V9 to the recirculate position. 3 Verify V10 and V29 are closed. 4 Verify V8 is open. 5 Start the transfer / recirculation pump. 6 Circulate material for 30 minutes. 7 Obtain 1 Liter sample of HF after 30 minutes. 8 Circulate material 10 more minutes. 9 Obtain 250 rnl sample after 10 minutes. 10 Rinse samples throroughly. 11 Send samples to lab for analysis. 12 Stop the transfer / recirculation pump. Completed by: Date: Time: O 1 Lab released material for transfer. 2 Team Leader releases transfer by keying on HS-16-22, 3 Move V9 to the transfer position, 4 Verify that V12 is closed. 5 Push HS-16-22/2 on absorber panel to start transfer. 6 Monitor level in tanks and stop transfer /recirc pump when tanks are empty. 7 When transfer is complete, move V9 back to recirculate position. 8 Open V7. 9 Key on HS-16'21 to open HCV-16-21 to fill the 18 tanks. Completed by: Date: Time: O
- G DEPARTMENT
- NUCLEAR FUEL MANUFACTURING - HEMATITE CODE: O.S.1006.00 TITLE: HF Tank Truck Transfer Operation wpp os.,.
mn.,,. + x,, !@m.v, -. w - n-.,va.,BQ -8 khsE TMENTdg ,,, ~.. a %as..-,.-sREVISEDh,w ..,-,v. n,DAT (REVj fpA {4.TEh $gn,EjM yi RPROVED,me u m s Jg *a+ m sams k+ u p' M3% .pq um mhe Ne p w. h u;e'u m at+e us EM~Ws -o m um
- Msys, wPAGESle ::hhegm eh 0
Original 1/19/98 Quality Engineer Director, Uranium ~.~,,. - n m g na p,,,0RIGINATORid; M,DATEg 9Peragions is O Manufacturing Director, Regulatory Engineer Affairs Z 24M.. ~ -.. ; g.l$,h u GTRAINING% O Required O Not Required DISTRIBUTION LIST Shipping Office 253 Library 230 Library h V:s iCDCI '[ N,'4% " N 1, i' ?EFEND$VE DATdkw 'AV
OS No. HF Tcnk Truck Trcnsf:r Operction 1/19/98 1006.00-Revision 0 AV 1.0 PROCESS OUTLINE 1.1 Approximately once per week the bulk storage (hold) tank which holds the HF liquid from the conversion off gas system is transferred to a tank truck for transport off site. Before transferring, the bulk storage tank must be circulated and sampled to determine PPM of Uranium and % HF. 2.0 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 2.1 Report violations of Nuclear Safety Requirements or loss of nur. lear criticality safety (NCS) barriers listed in this section to the Nuclear Criticality 3afety Specialist (NCSS). 2.2 Read, understand, and comply with the requirements of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Limits signs. If you do not understand the requirements, consult with your Team Leader or the NCSS. 2.3 The safety basis of the bulk storage tank is concentration, which is controlled by limiting the concentration of transferred liquids. 2.3.1 Concentration of liquids transferred to the bulk storage tank must O be less than 0.2 g U/L. V 2.4 Upset Conditions which must be reported to the NCSS: 2.4.1 A concentration above 0.2 g UIL in any tank or any accumulation of material in the 8,500 gallon bulk storage tank. 3.0 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS 3.1 The chemical safety precautions listed in the Industrial Safety section are sufficient to protect against any possible radiological exposure. 4.0 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 4.1 Liquids in the absorber area will contain varying concentrations of HF. The bulk storage tank will contain 34% HF or less. Any liquid within the absorber dike shall be assumed to contain HF until proven otherwise. dixcept during maintenance activities, the team leader shall be immediately informed of a verified (by.pH paper or other test) HF leak. O Page 1 of 8
OS No. HF Tcnk Truck Trcnsfer Operction 1/19/98 1006.00 Revision 0 O V 4.1.1 Skin burns from HF acid solutions are usually accompanied by severe, throbbing pain with redness, swelling, and blietering. Burns larger than 25 square inches (160 square cm) may result in severe systemic fluoride poisoning, and can be fatal. Concentrated (greater than 50%) acid exposure may result in blanched, white patches of skin. Skin contact with 20% to 50% HF solutions may not produce any signs or symptoms of exposure for 1 to 8 hours, while the delay for less than 20% solutions may be up to 24 hours. 4.1.2 HF vapor has a detectable odor range of 0,5 ppm to 3 ppm, has an 8-hot time-weighted average permissible exposure limit (PEL) of 3 ppm, a short-term exposure limit (STEL) of 6 ppm, and is immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) at 30 ppm because of the potential for respiratory system damage. Inhalation of HF vapors at low concentrations will irritate the upper respiratory system, resulting in inflammation and a cough. Greater exposure can result in spasm of the larynx (laryngospasm) or bronchi (bronchospasm), and fluid accumulations in the larynx (laryngeal edema) or lungs (pulmonary edema). The development of pulmonary edema may be delayed for a duration of reveral hours to 2 days, and is potentially fatal. O D 4.2 Personal protective equipment. 4.2.1 Neoprene or butyl gloves, heavy rubber rain gear for protective clothing, and an ANSI Z87 approved face shield with ANSI Z87 goggles shall be used to prevent contact with HF solutions. Protective clothing shall consist of a coat, bibbed coverall, long hood, and shoe covers. All protective equipment must be worn when in the dike area. 4.2.2 Use a full-face air-purifying respirator with acid gas cartridges, which will also meet the face shield and goggles requirement, as necessary to prevent the inhalation of HF vapors between 3 and 30 ppm. 4.2.3 Personal protective equipment shall be inspected for integrity before each use, i.e. before being donned. It shall also be neutralized, thoroughly rinsed, and towel dried as necessary after each.use. O Page 2 of 8
OS No. HF Tank Truck Transfer Operation 1/19/98 1006.00 Revision 0 h 4.3 Exposure treatments. 4.3.1 Any skin exposure to HF acid solution requires prompt medical evaluation and follow-up. The affected area shall be immediately flushed with large amounts of running water for 5 minutes, after which a 2.5% calcium gluconate gel shall be applied. Any contaminated clothing shall be removed during the initial water flush. It is important to remove the goggles only after the head and face have been flushed. Calcium gluconate tubes shall not be re-used once opened. ] 4.3.2 Any eye exposure to HF acid colution requires prompt medical evaluation and follow-up. The affected area shall be immediately flushed with large amounts of running water for 5 minutes, after which the eye should be irrigated with a 1% calcium gluconate in nonnat saline. E 4.3.3 Unprotected HF vapor exposure above the PEL or STEL, and any exposure above the IDLH limit, requires prompt medical evaluation and follow-up. Personnel having such exposure should be promptly moved to fre3h air and receive a nebulizer treatment using 2.5% calcium gluconato in normal saline. 4.3.4 Ingestion of an HF solution requires prompt medical evaluation and follow-up, if the person is conscious and alert, eat Tums@ antacid tablets containing calcium or drink a large quantity of water or milk with added milk of magnesia. Do not induce vomiting. 4.4 Operations involving personnel in the dike or at the tanker tra.isfer station shall be done using the buddy system. The purpose of the buddy system is to ensure that timely emergency assistance will be summoned and provided as necessary. 4.4.1 For routine operations this involves at least one other employee being advised of the work to be done, when it will start, and when it is finished. The advised employee shall periodically check the status of workers within the dike by radio, telephone, or visual contact. Routine operations include obtain;ng uranium samples and operation of pumps, valves, and switches as necessary for generating, recirculating, and storing acid. 4.4.2 For special operations this involves at least one person keeping at least visual contact with another person perferming operations G within the dike both in full PPE. Special operations include tanker transfers, making or breaking pipe connections, transfer of acid to or from drums, and any maintenance to equipment in the dike. l Page 3 of 8
OS No. HF Tcnk Truck Trensf:r Op:rction 1/19/98 f 1006.00 Revision 0 t 4.5 An Operation Sheet, Special Evaluation Traveler, Temporary Shop Instruction, or Radiation Work Perrait is required to bring any drum, carboy, or pail into the dike. N 4.5.1 Color ind:cating neutralizer should be used to decontaminate incidental HF spills on personal protective equipment, absorber system equipment, or tools. If color indicating neutralizer is not available, the tools or protective equirent should be rinsed thoroughly with water. 4.5.2 Following authorization by engineering or the Emergency Director, lime, calcium carbonate, or sodium hydroxide may be used to neutralize HF accumulations in the sump. 4.6 Weep holes are localad in the lined piping to indicate a leak in the liner. I' a yellow material or corrosion is observed at, the weep hole or flange connection then notify engineering. 5.0 BULK STORAGE TANK RECIRCULATION 5.1 The bulk storage tank must be recirculated for 20 minutes and sampled /] for PPM Uronium analysis and % HF analysis. V 5.2 Close HCV-16-21 by clicking on the valve icon on the control system and verify that HS-16-4 (enable switch for Transfer / Recirculation pump) is in the enable position. 5.3 Close V8 and have the Team Leader or Shipping Supervisor place a lockout on it. Verify that V29 and V12 are closed. 5.4 Open V10 s.1ove V9 to the transfer position. 5.5 Have the Team Leader authorize HS-16-22 (icon on the control system) to start. 5.6 Push HS-16-22/2 on the absorber area control panel. This will open HCV-16-22. Note: This valve has a timer on it and will only stay open for 30 minutes. 5.7 When all the valves are in the proper locations. the Transfer / Recirculation pump (pump #4) can be started. Then start the Transfer /Recirculat!an pump by pushing the pump start button on the panel in the dike. i O Page 4 of 8
OS No. HF Tcnk Truck Trcnsf:r Operation 1/19/08 1006.00 Revision 0 5.0 Recirculate the material in the bulk storage tank for 20 minutes. After 20 minutes, collect an HF sample. Slowly open V19 to obtain spproximately 1 liter sample and then close V19. Close the sample and rinse thoroughly to verify there is no HF on the outside of the sample uottle. Send the sample to the lab for analysis. Stop the transfer / recirculation pump (pump #4). HCV-16 22 will close automatically when pump #4 is stopped. 5.9 The lab will determine if the material is ' Released for Transfor". Once the lab releases the transfer proceed to section 6.0 for transfer to tank truck. 6.0 HF TRANSFER FROM BULK S s'ORAGE TANK TO TANK TRUCK 6.1 Test the safety shower to verify op6; ability. 6.2 Verify chocks are in place in front and back of the trailer tires. 6.3 Block traffic from entering the area. 6.4 Connect flex lines for truck transfer to the truck. Caution: When O' removing blind f!angeo residual HF may be present in the flextine. Loosen the bolts away from you first, 6.5 Connect truck level indicator (LSH 16-15). 6.6 Verify the following valves are closed: V8, V29, and HCV-16-22. S.7 Verify V9 is in the transfer position and that V10 is open. 6.8 Have the Team Leader or Shipping Supervisor remove the ball valve lock out on V12 and place it on V8. G.9 Open V12. 6.10 Open V14 (truck vent to Absorber #3) and verify that Absorber #3 pump is running. 6.11 input on the control system (Transfer Graphic) the amount in gallons to transfer from the bulk storage tank to the tank truck. 6.12 Key on HS 10-11/2 to set the ending bulk storage tank volume. Record this volume on the transfer checklist. 6.13 Ensure that the valves on the truck are in the proper positions by confirming this with the truck driver. Page 5 of 8
OS No. HF Tcnk Truck Trcosfer Operction 1/19/98 1006.00 Rtvision 0 0 6.14 Push HS-1611 on the panel at the truck platform. This will open HC%1611. 6.15 Start iu transfer / recirculation pump. Monitor the level in the bulk storage unk to ensure that the correct amount is transferred. Check for leaks at fittings and flex lines during the transfer. 6.16 HCV-1611 will stay open until the required amount has been trant,forred to the tank truck. When HCV-16-11 closes, verify'the transfer / recirculation pump has stopped. 6.17 Open V13 to allow the remaining HF in the pipe to drain into the tank truck. Leave V13 open for approximately 30 seconds and close the valve. 6.18 Close V14. Close V12 and have the Team Leader move the ball valve lock out from V8 to V12. 6.19 Disconnect flex lines from truck and place blind flanges on flex hoses. 6 20 Close V10, open V6 and move V9 back to the recirculate position. 6.21 Thoroughly rinse all hoses and any equipment, which may have come into contact with HF.
_ _
Page 6 of 8
i OS No. HF Tcnk Truck Trcnsf:r Operction 1/10/98 1006.00 Rovicion 0 Bulk Storage 's ank Recirculation Checklist 1 HCV-16 21(18 tank isolation valve) is closed on control system. 2 HS 164 is in the enable position on control system. 3 Close V8. 4 Team Leader or Shipping Supervisor placed lock out on V8. 5 V29 is closed. 6 V12 is closed. 7 Open V10. 8 Move V9 to the transfer position. 9 Team Leader authorizes HS-16 22 to start on control system. 10 Push HS-16-22/2 on the absorber are control panel 11 Start the transfer / recirculation pump. 12 Recirculate material for 20 minutes. 13 Obtain 1 Liter sample of HF. / 14 Rinse sample bottle thoroughly and send to lab for analysis. ~ 15 Stop the transfer / recirculation pump. Completed by: _ Date: .= Page 7 of 8
OS No. HF Tank Truck Trcnsfer Operction 1/19/98 1006.00 fluvision 0 I Tank Truck Transfer Checklist i Test Safety Shower. 2 Chocks in place. 3 Block traffic from entering area. 4 Connect flex lines to truck 5 Connect truck levelindicator, 6 Verify V8, V29, and MCV 16 22 are closed. 7 V9 is in transfer position. 8 V10 is open. ~ 9 Team Leader or Shipping Supervisor removed lock out from V12 and placed it on V8. 10 Open V12 and V14 11 Verify Absorber #3 Pump is running. 12 Enter amount to transfer on control system and record here 13 Record starting bulk storage tank volume here 14 Key on HS 16-11/2 to start. 15 Record ending bulk storage tank volu;ne here 16 All valves on truck are in proper position. 17 Push HS-1611 on truck platform panel. 18 Start transfer / recirculation pump. 19 HCV-1611 closed indicating transfer complete. 20 Transfer / recirculation pump stopped. 21 Open V13 to drain remaining HF into truck and then close valve. 22 Close V14 and V12. 23 Have Team Leader or Shipping Supervisor romove lock out from V8 and place back on V12, 24 Disconnect flex lines and replace blind flanges. 25 Close V10 and open V8. 26 Move V9 back to recirculate. 27 Thoroughly rinse all hoses and any equipment which may have contacted HF. O Cornpleted by: Date: Page 8 of 8
!i!lll llI l l' i: 1 fo 1 P OZ O eg a A P I I -E P 8 Y 99 T 1 W l E DE IV D ER N. t a a A 5 t t ( s N g h gg I AD z l. N yg 3 h z L_ 4 g E z CN d A r Wg M 4 g o 0 r l a s a A t N c l e a r O o i j r t 9A o t r a w - r y s e ~ E P t u e e f d n U N .r r a n I ee S I g c u i L L eg n n e A P ma y E o t I n i V C l s c ga n a = s e E S EM c e o i c r e I t D D s i I o e w r s r R e C m P a i A c a x a o e O u Z T rP A S H R E BRO SB A FH 6 E 1 3 M t A u N 1 3 N Y G S IS /
- N T
O S I IT R A P R y E n n s _ OO a P a e g r m y n c a e e a o c T k e L u r / i l l r l N A F n e n a i i A b v m a l i L i B K J B r o e r l a P B ! il} l 2 4 I l ia ii!i!i ) ) Ii ij,
i 1 linclosttre til to RA98/684 l' SLIDES PRESENTED DURING JANUARY 15 MEETING WITH NRC = = J
.,..a i Agenda for Combustion Engineering Inc. i
- L/:L 5/98 meeting with the NRC on RAI for l
HF absorber system I Introduction Sharkey Process Description Alkier - ec uipment, controls, maintenance l Scenario for unreacted EF Alkier 6 Hazards Evaluation Program Hayes 3F aasorber HAZOP Hayes Summary Sharkey i j t ..- J
I RAI QGSTIONS Copy ofISA for HF process (Hazards Evaluation) Detailed process description for equipment - fi ters through truck fill line - temperatures, concentrations, materia s Chemical aazards anticipated from HA Contro. necessary to mitigate process upsets and normal controls maintenance to ensure integrity and confinement of HF anc uranium crediie scenario fbr unreacted UF carried over to HF 6 absorber
Why change? << lower HF emission Improved operability Less maintenance Enhanced safety No spent limestone (CaF ) 2 Operational challenges of dry scrubbers
Process Description Filter system Absorber system Safe geometry array (qualification tanks) Bulk storage tank
Block Flow Diagram Liak 9 Water Y _ __ _.._ h p _______p .___ y HF Absorber 1 HF /.bsorter 2 HF Absorber 3 StAk Plant m, ,m Vapor V Fawreble Cialate Sample ^ Liquid Heat Exchanger Geometry ard / 4 e T Storage Arrav for Uranium T Authonze Tramfer Circulate Accumulate in And Tramfer to 4 ard Sample for 1 Bulk Storage 4
- E Tank Truck Uramum Content Tank
i Filters i j Sintered metal filters are used for each l reactor to prevent particulate from entering j tae off gas stream and the HF absorbers. Manufactured from metal powder that is " sintered" together at high temperatures. A seconc. set of filters is in use as a backup 7 to R-1 reactor. A second set of filters is in use as a backup to R-2 and R-3 reactors.
Filters - Cont. Fi.ters in the R-2 and R-3 system have a 1 micron rating and are constructed of Hastelloy-X. Filters in the R-1 system have a 5 micron rating and are constructed of Monel. Filter system is very reliable and effective.
4 l Materials of Construction Ma erials of construction for equipment in contact wit:1 HF include Teflon, Kynar, ?olypropy ene, Hastelloy C276, graphite, i viton, and XLPE. TeSon is used as a liner in the piping directly .eaving t:1e secondary filters. This material nas excellent resistance to HF and is rated for a maximum temperature of 500 F. i
Materials of Construction - Cont. Kynar (also known as PVDF) is used in all absorber components with the exception of the inlet connection at absorber 1. This material also has excellent resistance to HF and is rated for temperatures up to 275 F. This is above the maximum boiling point of HF which is 248 F at 34% concentration.
? + l L Materials of Construction - Cont. i Polypropylene is used as a liner for storage l tanks and vent piping which will not be l exposed to elevated temperatures. This material is rated to 225 F. f Hastelloy C276 is used for thermocouple l wells and flow orifices and is suitable for l his service at all temperatures. i i
Materials of Construction - Cont. Grap:1ite is used in the heat exchanger l construction and is suitable for this service a~ all temperatures. Vi':on is used in the internals of equipment suc a as valves and pumps. It is suitable for E? service at temperatures up to 450 F. XLP3 (crosslinked polyethylene) is usec for t:ae Julk storage tank. This material is suita3 e for this service up to 160 F.
l BF Absorbers l Tae process effluents incluc ing HF, steam, nitrogen, and hydrogen are conveyed to the j l first absoraer at approximately 400 F in Teflon lined piping. Prior to entering the first a 3sorber :he gasses pass through a quench section to ensure :aat the gasses are not superheated. Tae temperature is monitored to ensure that the temperature is within specifications. l l
HF Absorbers - Cont. Eaca aasorber consists of a favorable geometry Kynar lined vessel which recircu ates liquid through a packed 3ed. Tae Kynar pacring in the packed bed increases the surface area for the lic uid and HF to contact so that the HF will be absor 3ed into the liquid.
MF Absorbers - Cont. To maximize the liquid HF concentration and to minimize HF emitted, the makeup water is added to the last absorber to maintain a dilute liquid in this absorber. The concentrated HF is drawn from absorber 1 where the concentration is the highest. The maximum HF concentration is limited ay the physical properties ofHF to approximately 34%
= l HF Absorbers - Cont. t Tae makeup water to the third absorber is added based on the conductivity of the solution. j l Tae concentrated HF which leaves absorber 1 passes through a heat exchanger which l cools the HF to ~140 F prior to entry into a j favorable geometry storage array. l 1 i
HF Absorbers - Cont. By design the concentration and temperature of each absorber is different. The temperature cannot exceed the boiling point of the solution so a worst case temperature is 248 F. HF Concentration Temperature 1 ~34% ~210 F 2 ~25% ~208 F 3 ~5% ~186 F
HF Storage Array The HF so_ution is collectec in a favorab e geometry storage array which are cons :ruc':ed of polypropylene lined pipes c esignec. to aold at least 24 hours of production. When the qualification tanks are fillec two isolation valves are closed to a ow filling of a seconc set of favorable geometry
- ants.
r -ii.---..---.
I L HF Storage Array - Cont. t Two samples will be drawn from the c ualification tanks analyzed separately for n n is y r fled ateria 1 be transferred to the bulk storage tank. lectronic au-horization from the supervisor using the control system must be granted ) L prior to the transfer to ensure that the 1 sample results are acceptable. i
HF Storage Array - Cont. During tae transfer from the favorable geometry tanis to the bulk s':orage tant two .evel indicators will stop the tansfer to avoic. Overfilling the tank. i i i r i
HF Bulk Storage i i The bu k storage tank is a 8p00 gailon c.ou ble wall tank with an interstitial level I
- a. arm. It is constructed of crosslinked j
l po:yethylene which is suitable for this ^ service to 160 F. Once tae bulk storage tank nas sufficient material to fill a tank truck the contents of .ne Julc storage tank will be circulated and 3 I samplec. for uranium content and % HF. All ec uipment is located in a dike. l l i
l~ ~ i i l HF Transfer l ' A lined tank truck compatible with HF ~ i solution will be connected to the system and filled througiKynar piping. l The tank truck will be filled based on the l level indication in the bulk storage tank. Waen the setpoint is reached the transfer stops automatically. A high level alarm in the tank truck will stop j the transfer automatically. t
Other Controls The following conditions will shut down the conversion process. - High temperature of the HF off gas line. - Inadequate water supply to the absorbers. - High liquid level:is too high at absorber 3 or at the storage tanks. - Failure of the circulation pumps at absorber 1 or 3. - An emergency stop switch. - High conductivity indication at absorber 3.
Equipment Maintenance As part of the equipment startup testing the system was heated with steem on several occasions in order to temperature cycle the ec uipment. The bolt torque's were checked and adjusted as necessary. S :ar up testing included leak checking the favorable geometry storage array.
Equipment Maintenance - Cont. Tae flex aoses for the truck transfer will be replacec periodically as part of the preventative maintenance program. Tae pi; ping will be periodically checked for incications ofleakage or damage to the liner. Tae concrete dike will be periodical:y caec1ed for signs of HF exposure or crack.ing. .-,-m
Equipment Maintenance - Cont. The flexible joints at the pumps and elsewhere will be checked periodically for cracking or other indications of damage. Bo t torque's will be checked periodically as
- ] art of a preventative maintenance program.
l
e LF Controls 6 L F reacts with steam in the first reactor of 6 the conversion process where it is converted from a gas to a solid. If steam is insufficient then the EF would pass 6 through the filter system and enter the HF off gas piping. Yultiple interlocks are in place to prohibit unreacted EF6 from reaching the absorber process. l
HF Transfer A lined :ank truck compatible with HF so ution will 3e connected to the system and
- llled through Kynar piping.
Tae tank truck will be filled based on the l leve indication in the bulk storage tank. W1en the setpoint is reached the transfer s: ops automatically. A alig i.evel alarm in the :an1 truck will stop
- 11e :ransfer automatically.
Other Controls Tae following Conditions will shut down the Conversion process. - Hig 1 temperature of the HF off gas line. l -Inadequate water supply to t:1e absorbers. - High lic uid level is too high at absorber 3 or at t:ae storage tanks. - Fai:ure of t:1e circulation pumps at absorber 1 or 3. - An emergency stop switch. - Hig a concuctivity indication at absorber 3.
Equipment Maintenance As par: of the equipment s:artup testing the sys:em was heated with steam on severa. occasions in order :o temperature cycle the ecuipment. Tae bolt :orque's were checkec. anc adjustec. as necessary. S :artup testing included leak checking the favorable geome:ry storage array. i
Equipment Maintenance - Cont. Tae flex hoses for the truck transfer will be re1acec. periodically as par: of the preventative maintenance program. T1e piping will be periodically c::leckec for incications ofleakage or damage tc the aner. T:le concrete c ixe will be aerioc ically c leckec. for signs of HF exposure or crac1ing.
e Ecuipment Maintenance - Cont. Tae iexible joints at the pumps anc elsewhere will be checked periodically for crac1ing or other indications of damage. Bo. : torque's will 3e checked perioc.icaly as part of a preventative manr:enance program.
EF Controls 6 LF reac~:s with steam in the first reactor of 6 the conversion process where it is converted from a gas to a solid. If steam is insufficient then the LF would pass 6 througa the filter system and enter the HF of gas piping. Mu.tiple interlocks are in place to prohibit unreacted EF6 from reaching the absorber process. l
LT Controls - Cont. 6 Tae primary interlocks include: - Multire steam f ow and pressure indicators. Each may terminate UF in the event of a low 6 Sow or pressure indication. - Steam anc. nitrogen va ve indications. Unless a necessary steam and nitrogen isolation va_ves are in the proper position UF can not be 6 arecessec. - Mu tiale UF6 shutoff va ves with position inc ication. ................-ri1.-. in . i ' ii'
- -...=:.1-r ei-r
--. '. -i. - q s
HAZARD EVALUATIONS Deve..oped using Guidelines for Hazarc. Evalua~ ion Procedures, AIChE,1992. Consistent with 29 CFR 1910.119, Process Safety Management of Highly Hazarc ous i Chemicals Consistent with Draft NEREG 1513, Irr:egra~:ed Safety Analysis Guidance Document, and NEREG 1601, Chemical Process Safety at Fuel Cycle Facilities a
a WHAT-IF SELECTION CRITERIA ?rocess (nowlecge anc. ex;3erience Wi! consic.er a 3 road spectrum of hazarc s, accidents, and pro:ective measures Eaca e.emeir: of standard prerequisite informa: ion is not availaale, or is not germane to t:1e evaluation Accic err:s are postulatec. :o 3e :ne resu ~: of a sing e fai ure
HAZOP SELECTION CRITERIA Lac 1 of process knowledge anc. experience Neec. ~:0 c.evelop a detailed list of tae causes 1 anc consequences of c.eviations, anc. ~:0 eva uate ~:he adequacy ofprotective measures Consequences are or may ae significant, anc shou c. be quantified l
HAZOP SELECTION CRITERIA (cont.) Eaca e_ement of se adard prerequisite-information is available or required Accidents are postula1:ed to be the result of multip.e failures ~
~ STANDARD PREREQUISITE INFORMATION Hazarc s of process chemicals Process and corr:rol system technology Process equipment Summary of operating equipment positions for aatch processes Accident reports, facility siting reviews, human factors studies
EVATUATION TEAM l COMPOSITION Team leac.er Operations or Engineering PLC or computer control systems Process operator Pertinent safety cisciplines Scribe
HAZOP PROCESS Deve..op meaningful deviations by applying seven guic e words to the design intents of eaca study node Identi5r causes of each deviation De~: ermine consequences of each cause, assuming no protective measures 3 valuate presence, adequacy ofprotective measures for each consequence
HAZOP PRC) CESS (cont.) Jeterrnine risk factors, considering the effectiveness ofprotective measures l De: ermine any recommendations, priori::ized by risk - Areas neecing further evaluation - Corrective actions - Risk recuction opportunities A _ _ _. _ _ _,_____.m.__--. g
.,o HF SKIN 7 EYE HAZARDS S cin aurns, usual;y with severe, throbbing pain, redness, swelling, and blistering 2 2 - greater taan 25 in (160 cm ) burn may result in severe systemic iuoride poisoning, canbe fatal - 20% to 50% acic may not proc.uce any signs or symptoms of exposure for 1 to 8 hours - sign or symptom delay for less than 20% acid may be up to 24 aours. Immeciate eye damage 1
HF INHALATION HA7ARDS 8-aour PEL of 3 ppm, STEL of 6 ppm, IDLH at 30 ppm Low concentrations are irritating, resulting in inflammation and a cough. Grea:er concentration can result in upper airway burns, laryngospasm, aronchospasm, .aryngeal edema, or pulmonary edema Pu monary edema may 3e delayed for scvera. hours to 2 days, is potentia. ly fata.
HF EXPOSLRE CONTROLS Equipment integrity Segregation - Separatec. from other processes and chemicals - At. east double containment Yinimal personal contact - Restricted access - Persona. protective equipment Emergency response capability
HF EXPOSLRE TREATMENT Speec. in treatment is essential 5-minute shower or eye wash Calcium gluconate therapy - 2.5% topical gel for skin - 1% itTigation so..ution for eyes - 2.5% ne aulizer solution for inha. ation Mec.ical evaluation and follow-up
ABSORBER EVALUATION HAZOP selected Lack of process knowledge and experience - Desire to develop a detailed list of the causes anc consequences of process deviations, and to evaluate tae adequacy of protective measures - Consequences judged to be significant Intended to identify and correct deficiencies in ne c esign phase ~
ABSORBER EVALUATION Results - Opera aility issues Procedures Maintenance - Design caanges Pipe and valve conBgurations Interlocks Alarms and alarm set points - Start-up verification parameters
Summary Ter'iary + criticality safety controls No : ire safety concerns No racio ogica safety concerns Ro aust design / independently rsviewed HAZOP PM ;3rogram 2 :?e 3ruary start-up, need HF release by 12 Fe 3ruary
p I 'h); ,g A 1 4, \\, .1 s 3&s [ k \\ s g, a '/% /p' "_w ry k7 )/ '/ U \\'] av 4Tp! ^ [,4 3 s x e S , 7. S r _)y_ _..d-3 s = z,, V 'a 'ht. - "}}) ~ F.,3 ..___....,__,I., k4 w 3u, _ys g qk .g[ j i. 3,<o2 $ p& 0 9
j \\ 1
- l tl.ilt G
Y I T NI l R L I EC = I' EA ~c Mr Nr &Ea ] g Gg T' N R Sc E EY* = Ng BSo 9 B s w DT, U iE y R w
- 1TC, CGc S
S A~ p t a A F Ri U U Oe Bg reTi r Mr Sr A 1# OM g-C =. L e 3EEU r ti j 'T c '// N-IM '/, L G= / ~. Nr ) K, A- ~ "/" s /, 4 ,e f / f/ h /,/) /# Ip l -p61 ,# 'pJ ) [J I j h j a 's s d,, p 's su& e e-bd s N
- e g
e r a-4 / wu -. m. . r= ,. e ~ ,aE ,1 i n 4 I
2 L F e ad g l 11 rd l e Y. dj k j 4 ( 1 L, M /' i-PE r i,i
- (!!!
aa 7 Cb3 \\ e s.y:s // e bx / i V-3 9/ t / 2 .w ce j, ,, e g %( ~,, <t T / .~.~-es <In // i ......:,5 (\\ \\, !.!,j'; .. ~.... 7 5 }}7),) s + p,,, s g/ d d d d qy jb p ~ ~ ~ t /..
- i J
/ r i i i ' g. 4-_ Q 47 \\\\ Ya I s T... e,* 1 1 \\ 9* s w w ' ' \\,)k x, s, S., li s i 4 )
4 I P..n> 4 n. a e - 'J wu o L N ,g.a ye t j.? g.4 gp o r, a (e )
- d. W r,e,%
?? } k@,'}}, .m s 1 !I oI ou l hrj @e,a' (( j 3 -1 1 s, ..v V. i. m r tc a) ".:s ;l-5 g fo,'f ! p 1 }ihiff Le P I!!! .f' i !! !I [' $d E I:ht. J g0$# /"ud [ }
- )ill._y
.f t 1 7e p !q <.4 0 g)E :p. /< IF.}/xir'.,38) t v- =' .![ SM 'N 6 E-
- TN!
hp }}8 r
- b
'~ J)1)-)55 s t?..IQ)iPi @- )vs 4p 59 0 -J "', (' u : it n 3 of u:! f !~7 -@)* "rr (<p)[J- 'M 93@-!os! e2;> 6: ir
- V 9==y-
- 8i d" f.. g& t = 49::: t i a t=! o t o& s o if(Y !y\\ i..... o llg i v: f v
- I h.i t
{' !!Il5 Qo ! t') j!()h 1 p M )- g y-
- ). g}.)
ll i i o 1 B><l .gg -) e I E) p_ g'_ -r) g ie g i.,!!{p!:} @ S,, 7 q$[gsg} L"y:i!' ~ i q.t ( P 5i 6 (4){l ...i.i.. y ou, ;} t is l{( 9q bj' Eg .r v-P!'6 n{ E Tv,6
- 1 ie n
.t 111m !+ i .t 1,oin;d F.
- n i
J t, i-17, @geg-LX* [I!N!;}fd 'I
- 0
- s 1
= x n:m p) e u 4.). a q:-): t t = @HH !, [;,I i& }) i ,d'#1 l .o - . m t t I 4 p .c _. i; i x _.u =,L_ _F L t i 45 g-(pge gg
- g f
J.. t $ ltl,ii-E 3 +z .g s .e J er t -. {p. o r c,y;,,_ g 2 c o-1 +. ,m p. e. e. I ..4 J t -n i69 t ,,i, I;y..
- ,....r r
l' I ab 6 47 s. f> { !I yykg.. gad I!ij ; lk
- o
%;Av s
- en h:. E g r i;
di'f,3 ! G9 g= , u. en I: i; ,t i. !J rp,:S c O. @>! c 1 t
- M, ln qui y ' Hj&qr i;p
- Q si tih. 3; '
yes t
- 11 4 i r e
t m;r, ? i K:Js 45! y si u!!n Ff! i jl :q 6( r -!n p A, 3 c q.g@.)1In_ (W 5 !! 5-
- sptgg i
), o / is. L;VI:t 3 L
- iii!,!
Iq. vn 1 5 g I ., (u/ c 3 ,.: c:. 1 = FA) 1 .t w p Q \\Qd Q o F d ? h ~ ,. y y ,,,,-O y e t u n ^ ^ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _}}