ML20199L128

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Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-445/97-12 & 50-446/97-12 on 970611
ML20199L128
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  Luminant icon.png
Issue date: 11/24/1997
From: Stetka T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Terry C
TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
References
50-445-97-12, 50-446-97-12, NUDOCS 9712010311
Download: ML20199L128 (4)


See also: IR 05000445/1997012

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AR LINGTON, fi X AS 76011 8064

November 24, 1997

Mr. C. L. Terry

TU Electric

Group Vice President, Nuclear

ATTN: Regulatory Affairs Department

P.O. Box 1002

Glen Rose, Texas 76043 -

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-445/97 12;50-446/97 12

Dear Mr. Terry

Thank you for your letter of C:tober 3,1997, in response to our letter dated

. September 4,1997, which requested additional information concerning your July 10,

1997, response to our letter and Notice of Violation dated June 11,1997. In this letter,

you provided additional information concerning the generic implications of multiple

diaphragm valve f ailures and the causes for previous failures to identify a slow stroking

main feedwater isolation valve. We have reviewed your reply and find it responsive to the

questions in our letter. We will review the implementation of your corrective actions

during a future inspection to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be

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maintained.

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Sincerely,

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Thomas F. Stetka, Acting Chief

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Engineering Branch

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Division of Reactor Safety

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TU Electric

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cc:

Mr. Roger D. Watner

TU Electric

Regulatory Affairs Manager

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P.O. Box 1002

Glen Rose, Texas 76043

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Juanita Ellis

President CASE

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1426 South Polk Street

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Dallas, Texas 75224

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TU Electric

Bethesda Licensing

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3 Metro Center, Suite 610

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Bethesda, Maryland 20814

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George L. Edgar, Esq.

Morgan, Lewis & Bocklus

1800 M. Street, NW

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Washington, D.C. 20036 -

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G. R. Bynog, Program Manager /

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Chief Inspector

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-Texas Department of Licensing & Regulation

Boiler Division

P.O. Box 12157, Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711

Honorable Dale McPherson

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County Judge

P.O. Box 851

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Glen Rose, Texas 76043

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Texas Radiation Control Program Director

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1100 West 49th Street

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Austin, Texas 78756

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John Howard, Director

Environmental and Natural Resources Policy

Office of the Governor-

P.O. Box 12428

Austin, Texas 78711

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E Mail report to T. Hiltz (TGH)

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DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\ REPORTS \\CP712.AK

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bec to DCD (IE01)

bec distrib, by RIV:

Regional Administrator

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DRP Director

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Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)

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DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\ REPORTS \\CP712. AK

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Log i TXX 97194

File # 10130

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October 3. 1997

C. l.arue hrty

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Attn:

Document Control Dest

Washington, D.C.

20555

SUBJECT : COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)

DOCKET NO. 50 445 and 50 446

NRC INSPECTION REPORT N05. 50 445/97 12 and 50-446/97-12

RESPONSE 10 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

REF:

1)

TV Electric Letter TXX 97143, dated July 10, 1997 to

the NRC

2)

NRC Letter, dated September 4.1997 to TV Electric

requesting additional information

Gentlemen:

TU Electric provided response to the Notice of Violation (NOV) for the

subject NRC Inspection Report via Reference 1.

V1a Reference 2. your

staff requested additional information with respect to examples 3 and 4 of

Violation B and V1olation D.

The information requested, as we understand it, and t-

'osponses are as

follows:

UDIAllDfL3.:

Example 3:

. provide details regarding your correct 1ve actions taten

fully assess the generic imp 11 cations of the Incorrect Installation of

the finger plates in the 500 diaphragm valves."

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Response:

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As stated in the subject inspection report section M7.1 (b). TU Electric '

initiated an Operations Not1fication and Evaluation (ONE) Form to document

the review performed for generic 1mplication; of the finger plate 1ssue.

It was also discussed with the NRC inspection team that the probable cause

for incorrect installation of the finger plates was c less than adequate

procedure, which did not provide guidance for installation of the finger

plates.

Please note that approximately 300 diaphragm valves (not 500 as

stated in reference 2) In both safety-related crui nonsafety-related

systems were reviewed

it was determined by engineering that further

actions were required for the valves which met all of the following

criteria.

a)

Valves that had a diaphragm replaced before the procedure was

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TXX-97194

Page 2 of 4

revised to provide guidance, regarding installation of the

diaphragm;

b)

valves that contain a finger plate;

c)

valves that fully open to perform a safety function; and

)

d)

valves that have not been flow tested to date.

Two valves met the above criteria, the subject valves could not be flow

tested and were therefore disassembled and inspected.

The inspection

results were favorable, i.e., the finger plates were assembled correctly.

Example 4; L . .we considered your corrective actions stated in

LER 96-02, addressing the metal fragment problem in the main feedwater

isolation valve solenold, to be adequate.

However, your response did

not provide detatis regarding the ren ons that corrective actions were

not developed for previous slow stroking occurrences and the actions you

plan on taking to prevent a recurrence of this corrective action

problem."

Respunse:

The previous slow closures of the feedwater isolation valve were

documented on either an Op"ation Notification and Evaluation (ONE) Form;

or on the other documents such as a work request; or the Post Reactor

Protection System or Engineered Safety Features Actuation Evaluation

forms.

These events,

i.e.. slow closures were evaluated by engineering

and were dispositioned as limit switch problems.

Based on this

disposition. the limit switches were replaced and/or reworked, the valve

were tested and returned to Operable status.

TV Electric believes that

the valve was not left in an inoperable condition for an extended period

of time.

Nonetheless. TV Electric shares the concerns stated in the

inspection report that it missed an opportunity to correct the problem if

it had initiated a ONE Form for each occurrence.

Which would have

triggered a formal root cause and preventive action process.

The actions

to prevent recurrence with respect to failure to initiate a ONE Form have

been identified via Reference 1.

Please note that the slow closure of the feedwater 1 solation valves

(FWlVS) was not discovered before the January 1996 trip for the following

reasons:

e)

Before the January 1996 trips, there was no guidance for Plant

Operators to check the closure times of the FWlV's after 6 plant

trip.

b)

The last regularly scheduled time response tests showed proper

closure times of the valves.

c)

The feedeter regulating valves (FRVs). which function as non-

safety related backup to the FWlVs functioned properly to isolate

feedwater; as a result, no unusual plant response was identified

which may have suggested a problem with the FWlV closure time.

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TXX-97194

~Page 3 of 4

1 hat is, proper operation of the FRV masked the slow operation of

the FWlV.

Although the Plant Operators check their panel to verify that they have

proper shut indication from thc FWlVs. this check is to verify that the

valve; are in the correct position, and is not required to be performed

within the 6.5 second response time of the valve (such a requirement

would not be appropriate).

Therefore. FWlVs could close in greater than

6.5 second but still be closed at the time the Plant Operator verifies

proper indication on the panel.

The problem was identified during the January 1996 trip because the

failure that caused the trip shut the FWIVs. but did not shut the FRVs.

As a result, the number 2 steam generator (SG) water level behaveu

dif ferently for the other steam generators,

investigation of this

difference in equipment response led to the discovery to the slow closure.

To have a slow closure. either there must be a mechanical problem with the

valve / actuator (which would have shown up with the stroke testing), or

both Nitrogen solenoid valves (2 HV 2135 SV3 & 2 HV 2135 SV4), or both oil

dump lines (i.e., oil dump solenoid [2 HV-2135-SV1 & 2-HV 2135 SV2] or the

associated pilot check valve and oil drain lines) must be slow.

To prevent recurrence, during January 1996, all 4 solenoid valves were

caanged on the FWlV.

The stroke time tests were performed satisfactorily,

and train related time response tests did not reveal any matters of

Time response tests were repeated to verify consistency of the

concern.

closure times,

Additionally. Operations procedures were changed to

include checking closure time as part of the post tr1p checks.

VIOLATION _D:

.. Violation D did not specify when the temporary shielding procedure

would be revised.

We request that you prov1de a completion date for

these procedural revisions."

Response:

The procedure RPI-608. " Control of Temporary Shielding * was revised and

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approved on July 28. 1997.

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1XX-97194

'Page 4 of 4

Should you have any coments or require additional information, please do

not hesitate to contact Oba1d Bhatty at (254) 897-5839 to coordinate this

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effort.

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Sincerely,

e. $.1

C. L. Ter %

ry

By:R5ger%

l) Walker

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Regulatory Affairs Manager

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OB:ob

cc:

Mr. E. W. Merschoff, Region IV

Mr. J. 1. Tapia, Region IV

Resident Inspectors

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