ML20199H251
| ML20199H251 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1986 |
| From: | Russell M EG&G IDAHO, INC. |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13324A929 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-A-6808 NUDOCS 8607030240 | |
| Download: ML20199H251 (70) | |
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- l Attachment 2 AUDIT AND INSPECTION REPORT FOR THE SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 LONG-TERM SERVICE PROGRAM FOR PIPING AND ASSOCIATED SUPPORTS, MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT AND ASSOCIATED SUPPCRTS, ELECTRICAL RACEWAYS AND ASSOCIATED SUPPORTS, AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ANCHORAGES t M. J. Russell May 1986 EG&G Icaho, Inc.
tcano .-al,is, Icano sa,a,,
2a Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com. mission Washington, D.C. 20555 Under 00E Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 FIN No. A6808 l
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SUMMARY
A substantial audit was performed on the calculations done in support of the Long-Term Service Program for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 (SONGS 1}. Calculations for piping, piping supports, mechanical equipment and supports, electrical raceways and supports and supports for electrical equipment were audited. Several issues were raised as a result of the audits, all of which were satisfactorily resolved. Two plant inspections were conducted in conjunction with the audits. The first ,
involved 00servation Of tne collection of as-built data usec in analysis.
The second was held to check conformance between the configurations of ccmpleted analyses and the field configuration. Based on the audits, the
- ulation of calculations representec by the auditec calcula: dens 9as Oser f0ccc :: :e in c09 0cmance with :ne recuirements. The plan ins:ecti0ns indicated that the analyses accurately reflect existing plant conditiens.
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. e CONTENTS
SUMMARY
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- 1. INTRODUCTION ...........................-......................... 1
- 2. AUDIT RESULTS FOR PIPING AND ASSOCIATED SUPPORTS ................. 4 2.1 SER Related Findings--Pipi ng and Supports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1.1 Large-bore pipi ng criteria ( 3.1.1 and 2.1) . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1.2 Branch line decoupling for large-bore pioing (3.1.2) .............................. ..... 6 2.1.3 Seismic /non-seismic decoupling criteria for large-bore piping (3.1.3) .......................... 7 2.1.4 Generic support stiffnesses for finite element piping analysis (3.1.4) ....................... .... 8 .
2.1.5 Small-bore picing and tuoing criteria (3.2 and 2.2) .............. .. .... .................... 3 2.1.6 Pipe support criteria (3.3) ...... ................. 10 2.1.6.1 Pipe supoort structural steel criteria (3.3.1) ......................... 10 2.1.6.2 Pipe support concrete exparston anchor bolt criteria (3.3.2 and 2.5) ............ 11 2.1.6.3 Pipe support catalog com:enent cr'teria ( 3. 3. 3) . . . . . . . .... ... . . 12 2.1.6.4 Pipe suc ert weld criteria (3.3.4 anc 2.3) ........ .... ......... . . .. 13 2.1.7 Envelope res;cnse scectra method Of piping analysis (1.11.1) ............... . .. .... ..... l' 2.1.3 Multiple-level rescense s;ectra me-hed of piping analysis (3.11.2) ............. .................... la 2.1.9 Other oicing analysis metneds (3.11.3. 3.11.4, 3.11.5) .............................. ... ........ 15 2.1.10 Pipe su::cr analysis me:necs (3.12) ... .... ...... 15 2.2 General .:indings--Picing and Su::cr s ..... ...... . ... .. 15 2.2.1 Use of 1/2 SAM icads in ASME C1 2/3 Ecuation 10 .... 16 2.2.2 Inclusion of su::ce:s failing seismic criteria in nermal analysis ......... .... ... . .... 13 2.2.3 co ten:tal for missing tne analysis Of a ecuncary sup;crt ............. .. .. ........ ........ ...... 13 2.2.4 Regional plasticity concern ........................ 18 2.2.5 Reference to document outside scope of criteria review .................................... 19 2.2.6 Consideration of three directions of excitation in smail-bore piping calculations .................. 19 tii l 5
_ .wzw . w=
a o 2.2.7 Negligibly loaded critical small-bore supports qualified by inspection ............................ 20 2.2.8 LTS qualification using RTS calculations ........... 20
- 3. AUDIT RESULTS FOR MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORTS .............. 22 3.1 SER Related Findings--Mechanical Equipment and Supports .... 23 3.1.1 Miscellaneous mechanical equipment criteria and methodology (3.5) .............................. 23 3.1.2 Valve criteria and methodology (3.6) ............... 24 3.1.3 Penetration criteria and methodology (3.8) ......... 24 3.2 General Findings--Mechanical Equipment and Supports ........ 24 3.2.1 Small-bore piping no:zle load calculation methodology for equipment analysis ................. 24 3.2.2 No::le load combination methodology for, cenetra:icns .................. ............ .. .. 25 3.2.3 Censiceration of inside and cutside small-bore piping no::le loads in penetra:10n analysis . . . . . 26 3.2.4 Qualification of the unreinforced sphere shell for penetration no::le loacs ....................... 26 4 AUDIT RESULTS FOR ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ANCHORAGES, RAC EWAYS , INCLUDING RAC EWAY SUP DORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 a.1 SER Related Findings--Electrical Ecui: men: Anchorages, ard Raceways, Inclucing Raceway Su::c-:s ... ...... ... .. .... 29 4.1.1 E.iectrical raceway anc su::or: criteria and me:necciogy (3.9 anc 2.4) ...... ........... ..... 29 4.1.2 Electrical ecui: ment ancnorage criteria and me:nocology (TER Section 2.5) .......... ......... 29 4.2 General Findicgs--Electrical Equipment Anchorages, Raceways, anc Raceway Su;;0r:s ......................... ... 30 1.2.1 Use of full secticn crecerties for c:ic-relied teams ....... ......... .... .. .. ....... .. ... 30 a.2.2 Use of raceway su;:or: concrete ancnor =alts in masonry walls ............ ........ .............. . 3C 4.2.3 Assurance of emoecmen: evaluation .. .......... .... 31 4.2.4 Top-mounted cable loacs ..... ..... . ........ ... . 31 4.2.5 Shor:ccmings in natural frecuency calcula icns .... 32 4.2.6 Base #12: flexibility ........ ....... . . ... 33 a.2.7 Cem leteness of the calculations ................... 34
4.2.8 Oversign
of support load .......................... 34
- 5. CASE-BY-CASE REVIEWS ............................................. 36 5.1 Piping Strain Criteria Applications Over 1% (3.1.1.1 and 2.1) .......... ........................................ 37 iv
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5.2 Piping Support Concrete Anchor Bolt Factor of
- Safety Between 2 and 4 (3.3.2 and 2.7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
- 6. PLANT INSPECTIONS ................................................ 41 6.1 Inspection Scope ........................................... 41 6.2 I n specti o n Fi nd i n g s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 6.2.1 Inspection Findings for Piping and Supports ........ 42 6.2.2 Inspection Findings for Electrical Raceways and Suoports ....................................... 42 6.2.3 Inspection Findings for Electrical Equipment and Anchorages ..................................... 42 6.2.4 Inspection Findings for Degradation of Piping and Equipment Supports ............................. 43
- 7. CCNCLUSICNS ... . .. .. ..................................... .... 45
- 3. _____
KOF;M;; _ ,4 ; c . .......... . .......................... ............. 60 TABLES 1.1 Audit participants ............................................... 48 1.2 List of audi ec pr:cecures .... ... .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '9 1.3 Lis of acronyms ... .. . . .. ............................ . . 50 2.1 List of aucited large-bore pioing calculations ................... 52 2.2 Li st of audi ted small-bore pioing calculatiens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 2.3 List of acci ed oipe suoport calculations ...... ......... .... . 55 2." List of auci ec pice support mocifica-ion calcu:a-ions .... . . 57 3.1 List of auditec m scellaneous ecutoment and valve i
calcula-ions .... .......... ............................... ..... 53 3.2 List of audited penetration calculations ....... ......... ....... 59
?.'. Lis of aucitec elec rical raceway calculations . .... . . . . . . . 50 4.2 List of auditec electrical equioment supper calculations . . . . . . 61 5.1.1 Calculations included in the case-by-case review of strain criteria applications above IP. .......................... 62 5.1.2 Critical components reevaluated as a result of the strain criteria application review .................................... 63 y
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5.2.1 Calculations included in the case-by-case review of applications of pipe support anchor bolt factors of safety 64 between 2 and 4 ................................................
5.2.2 Results of the review of applications of pipe support anchor bol t f actors of safety between 2 and 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 vi
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n AUDIT AND INSPECTION REPORT FOR THE SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 LONG-TERM SERVICE PROGRAM FOR PIPING AND ASSOCIATED SUPPORTS, MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT AND ASSOCIATED SUPPORTS, ELECTRICAL RACEWAYS AND ASSOCIATED SUPPORTS. AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ANCHORAGES
- 1. INTRODUCTION In November of 1984, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 (SONGS 1) resumed cower oceration in accordance with specified terms (Reference 1), the terms being implementation of the Return to Service (RTS) Plan. Plant operation was authoriced provided that a seismic evaluation program be completed and resulting plant modifications be
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imolemented orier to start uo from the cycle IX refueling outage. The Long Term Service (LTS) Plan is intended to camonstrate ca:acility to reach and maintain a cold shutcown condition, including cacability for accicent mitigation, in the event of tne reevaluation basis earthquake, the 0.67 g mocified Housner earthquake. Southern California Edison Company, holcer of the operating iicense for SONGS 1 (the licensee), and its consultant, Imcell Corocration, have formulated criteria and methodology for the tegrade which have been reviewed by :ne staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Cc. =f s si on (NRC) . These criteria and metnccology havs caen acceptec by tne NRC staff, witn cualification, in a Safety Evaluation Re; ort (SER)
(Reference 2). In a number of cases, criteria and methecology acce:racle to tne NRC staff had not been obtained at tne time Reference 2 was uclished. Since that time, criteria and method:l:gy acce: table to tre NR sta## nave Oeen 00:ained in all such cases. These cases are ciscussac in a Tecnnical Evaluation Recor: (TER), oublisnec in conjunction witn tnis
- report. Audits of :ne licensee's calculations have ceen :erformed :0 assure comoliance with the criteria and methecology acceptable to the "RC staff contained in these two decuments.
This recort provices the results of the audits for piping an" associated succorts, mechanical ecuipment and associated su ports (pumos, l small tanks, heat exchang?rs, filters, valves, and containmeet )
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o penetrations), and electrical equipment and raceways, and supports. The procedures governing the calculations were included in the audit scope, but their role was limited. The September, 1985 SER (Reference 2) and the TER governed the calculation audits. The procedures were reviewed prior to the calculation audits to identify any areas where acceptable requirements were not clearly delineated, and hence likely to be violated in the calculations. There were two exceptions to this. The procedures governing the large-bore piping analyses were not audited in full because of their size. In acdition to the normal aucit practice, variations from common practice allowed by the Septemcer, 1985 SER and the TER were specifically audited in the documents. A relatively large number of such piping calculations audited fell in this category. The procedure governing electrical ecuipment ancnorage analyses was not accitec cecause the au:nor hac reviewed it in association with prior work, and was alreacy familiar with it. The procedures were also used during the audits as an aid in cetermining if issues were equipment specific or generic in nature.
Revisions to tne procecures generated by the audits were also aucited. In addition to the audits, case-by-case reviews in areas specified by the Sep:e cer, 1955 SER anc tne TER were performed anc are repor:ed here.
Results of tne audits are presentec in Sections 2 :nrougn'a, anc results of :ne case-cy-case reviews are presented in Section 5. Section 5 also ciscusses the areas of tne crite-ia icentifiec in Section 5.0 of the Sectemoer, 1955 SER as needing particular attention. Table 1.1 contains a list o' all wno particioated in :ne aucits. Tacle 1.2 lists :ne crocecures governing the auditec calculations. Tacle 1.3 contains a its: of acronyms usec in tnis recort. Taoles 3.1 througn 5.2.2 list :ne calculations auci;ed. Inc those inclucec in tne case-by-case reviews.
In Tables 3.1 :nrougn 5.2.2 tne exten: of :ne a.ci: is icentifisc for eacn calculation. The specific version of eacn calculation is icantifisc by revision nuccer and date. The calculations without a case were not fully signed off. Including such calculations in the lists of calculations from which audit candidates were picked allowed timely audits without compromising the auditor's control over which material was audited. This 2
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- 4 caused little problem because the licensee invariably addressed the issues directly without reference to tha_ incompleteness of the calculation's review. In the cases where none of the audited calculations of a particular type had been formally reviewed and approved, the audit was extenced to include one that had been reviewed and approved.
In addition to the audits, a plant inspection was conducted. This is discussed in Section 6. Section 7 contains a conclusion.
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- 2. AUDIT RESULTS FOR PIPING AND ASSOCIATED SUPPORTS Several audits were performed on piping system and pipe supports calculations. The audits occurred during portions of the weeks of September 16, October 7, December 9,1985, and January 6, January 28, February 17, April 14 and April 21, 1986 at the Walnut Creek office of Impell Corporation. Audits were also performed on October 11 and December 14, 1985, at the Los Angeles office of Impell. Specific audit dates are provided in Tables 2.1 through 2.4.
Three large-bore piping / support problem sets were chosen for full audit to obtain a variety of piping systems, sizes and stress levels (Calculation Nos. AC-06. CA-55, and SW-02a ). An additional seven large-bore pipe calculations and six pipe supper: calculations were partially audited to help resolve issues generatec by :ne full audits and to audit features net found in the calculations fully audited. These are identified in Tables 2.1 and 2.3.
Three small-bore p' ping cal:ula:'ons were initia'ly chosen for '2 '
aucit as follows: One was cncsan based on the highes stress founc ameng tne :arcen steel lines (RW-352), one casec on :ne hi; est stress fcunc
$am:rg the stainless steel lines (MW-02), and one chosen from the remairder at rincem (CA-350). The two hignly stressec calcula-icns were :nosen from a list of 13 such problems, and CA-350 was chosen from a list of all small-core calculations. The fccus of :ne audit was enangec folicwing auci:s of the two higniy stressed calculations cue 0 ne issues -aisec tnere. CA-350 was dr:cced from the full audit list, and f:ur acditi:nal highly stressed calculations were acced (AF-03, SI-51, RC-120, anc RS-51).
Two more small-bore piping calculations were partially aucited :0 hel esolve issues generatec ey the full accits. Audi ec small-core :icir; calculations are identified in Table 2.2. Altncuch there is ne cistin:ti:n l
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- a. The first two letters of the piping calculation number are acronyms identifying the associated piping system. These are contained in the list of acronyms, Table 1.3.
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' 4 between large-bore and small-bore pipe support calculations, two small-bore calculations were chosen for full audit to provide thorough coverage by the audit process. These are identified in Table 2.3.
Some piping and supports qualified in the Return to Service (RTS)
Program were not directly reevaluated for Long-Term Service. Instead, they were checked for usage of RTS criteria that is not acceptable for LTS.
This work was audited (calculation RTS--Review). Three subcalculations, each containing tne review of an RTS piping system analysis, were audi ed.
These are icentified in Table 2.1.
The following methodology was applied during the full audits. An ini:da! pass was mace through the calculation to c::ain an overview of i .
This was folicwed by a more detailed, but still essentially general, re.'ew of tne most highly stressed areas. Findings from these activities are reporte in Section 2.2 below. The final pass consisted of a eneck for use of criteria anc me:nodology ciscussec in the Septemoer, 1985 SER and tne TER. These are identified in the findings which follow, where each is cis:ussec. Cue : nsicera-i n was given in :ne findings : the fa:: :na:
mucr c' :n*s analysis was core be#cre cri eria and me: red: logy acceptacle
- :ne NRC s aff were fully s:ecifiec. :
.incings frc: this activity were re orte in Section 2.1 bel:w. Parital audi:s consisted of a check of specif': fea ures of ne calcula-ions. These were performec to aid resolu: ice of issues raisec by tne full audits. Their findings are inclucec in :ne accrocriate areas of cath Sections 2.1 anc 2.2.
A'.' of ne audits ciscussac a ve were condue:ac a: :ne Walnu- Cree <,
California office of Im:sil Corp. The evaluation of :ipe su::cr:
modiff:ations and the design of new supports was performec ey engineers at ne '_0s Angeies of#fce Of Impell. In Order :0 assure nat all Orgar.i:ations invcived in ne work nere audited, ne su:calcula:icns for three support mocifications were fully audited in Los Angeles. This was followec by cartial audits of nine more support subcalculations to resolve issues generated by the full audits. These calculations are identified in Table 2.4.
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.. 4 2.1 SER Related Findinos--Pioing and Succorts 2.1.1 Laroe-Bere Pioine Criteria (3.1.1 and 2.1)a Allowable stress values, as scecified in the September,1985 SER, are 1.8 S for C1 1, and 2.4 S h h f r C1 2/3. When these values are exceeded, strain limits of 1% for carbon. steel and 2% for stainless steel are allowed, provided that additional requirements are met if the 2% limit is used. Details of the methodology associated with the strain criteria had not been approved at the time of publication of the Septem:er, 1985 SER and are contained in the TER.
In all cases audi ec, the stress limits were correctly applied and are accepta:ie. Since the strain criteria were not supportec Oy an a:ce:vec methodology at the time of the audits, their audit was incorporated into the case-cy-case review of strain acclications recuired by the Septemcer 1985 SER. Details of the review are contained in Section 5.1 of this recort. The acplications were found acceptable.
2.'.2
. Eranch Line 2e:cu:1'ec for Lar:e-Ecre picin: (3.1.2) 3rance line cecou l'rg based en a ciameter rati of 3:1 was r :csec.
This was founc accectable, provided that: (a) a ratio of moment of inertia of 25:1 was main ained, (c) no other branch line nor anchor is in close
- xi-ity, and (c) the affected cice segment does not inc'ude a term'9at'On onica cefines a reaction load.
In :ne full aucits, tnree cases of Oranch line cecoucling were founc:
- 1. A 3/4-in. tu:ing line was cecoupling from a 6-ir, run 'n :re::em CA-55. This was acceptacle per :ne criteria.
- a. Numcers in parentheses refer to the appropriate area of the September 1985 SER and the TER. The first number refers to the SER. If just one number appears, it refers to tne SER.
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- 2. Two cases occurred in problem SW-02 where three 2-in. lines were decoupled from a 12-in. line. This violated two of the criteria -r because the lines were in near proximity to each other and adjacent to a heat exchanger no::le. The calculation was reviewed in detail, and the decoupling was found acceptable in this particular case. The 2-in, lines have a moment of inertia of 0.66 in.;4 the 12-in. lines, 300 in.4 Based on this, the ratio of moment of inertia for the run to the sum of the branch inertias is 152:1. However, due to the limited nature of :nis audit, the licensee was requested to provide a list of all piping calculations in which the decoupling criteria were not met. The list, included in calculation LTS-REVIEW, was provided. It cecur. entec the results of a creck by :ne licensee Of tne valicity of -he decoupling. Three calculations chosen fr:m this list (calculation No. AC-04, AC-23, anc MW-04) were aucited anc the ce:oupling found acceptable.
- 3. Four 3-in. lines and one 2-1/2-in. line were left coupled to a I?-in, nsacer in calculation AC-05. The a:ic cf run te ne-branch mcment of inertia was 32:1. The bra cres were in relatively ci:se proximity, but ne applica:i'ity Of -he croximity criteria was argua:Te. There were no reaction loads affected by the brancn lir.es. The decision to leave the orancn lines coupled in this case was en the conservative sice.
Based on ne licensee's incetendent reevalua-ion of ne :eceucling acciications wnica cic not meet criteria anc :ne posi-ive auci Of ne
-eevaluation, :ne cec:uoling emoloyed is acce:tacle.
2.1.3 Seismic /Nen-Seismi: De cualia.c Cri e-i a for Larce Bore :':'a: (3.1.3)
Entension of the piping mocel beyond the hydraulic councary to :ne next ancnce point or to the second support in all three directions was pecposed and accepted for use with response spectrum analysis.
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In two piping models (Calculation Nos. AC-06 and CA-55), all
. boundaries occurred at anchor points. In the SW-02 model, the model was extended to include two supports in all three directions. This is in exact agreement with the criteria. Impell's application of this criteria is acceptable.
2.1.4 Generic Suecort Stiffnesses for Finite Element Picing Analysis (3.1.4)
The use of generic support stiffnesses, except in areas where the support structure is excessively flexible, was proposed and accepted.
In all calculattens ful'y auct:ed, all su: pert s.iffnesses corres:cccec to tne generic values. Since none of the suppor designs auditec appeared to be excessively flexible, this is acceptable. Impell's applica-ion of the generic support stiffnesses is acceptable.
Because none of the sue: orts audited in the three fully audited calcu'.a-icas were flexitie, uc su:perts on :ner systems (SI-1"-5CC3--i309, anc SI-02-3907-HC01), unien were flexible, were chosen for audi: Of the stiffness calcula-icns. The calculation of stiffness was casec On tne calculation of deflection resulticg from an acclied uni- 1:ac. This 's a stancarc metn:c in current practice, and is accepta:ie.
2.1.5 Small-30-e Picine and Tubine Cri teria (3.2 anc 2.2)
A walkdown metnod was ro 0sec and ac:eptec for eval ation of small-bere picing anc tucing wnien was very similar : na: usec f r -he 1
RTS evaluation. The methec involves calculation of allowable unsu :Or:ed J
s:an leng:ns for straignt s:ans and a limited num er of simple gecme. ries. l These calcula:icns are casec on a limitation of stress in the ciping to large-core aliewable stress limits. For configurations -hat ce not ma cn i those developed for the method, hanc calculations are allowed, as are large-bore criteria and metnodology. Critical supports are analyzec to the same criteria as large-tore supports.
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After finishing the audits of two of the three small-bore piping ,
calculations chosen for full audit (Calculation Nos. MW-02, and RW-352),
the scope of the audit was expanded and redirected as a result of the findings. In both cases, the explicit methodology defined in the criteria document was not used. A hand calculation methodology was used instead.
This was allcwed by the criteria, but was identified as an alternative methodology and was not well defined in the criteria document. In addition, strain criteria were applied in both cases using the results of the hand calculation of stresses. This was justified by the licensee as an application of the large-core piping criteria to small-bore piping per acceptable criteria. However, it was the auditor's interpretation that an aaplication of strain criteria should include a dynamic finite element analysis t Obtain the elastic stresses used in :ne strain calculation.
The foll wing actions were taken to resolve this issue. The scope of the audit was ex:anded and redire :ed. Four more of the ecst highly stressed calculations were sucjectec to full audit (Calculaticn Nos. AF-C3, SI-51, RC-120, anc RS-54). Based on :ne results of the six audits, the eigercus hand ca?:ulation methe::1:gy was f:end to be reascnacly unif:rm arc ::nsistent w':n be walkcown me:r:delegy cr'ginally :-Ocosec anc is ac:ectarie.
Twc accitienal n'gn'y stressec :alculations were nen :artially aucitec to cefine the region of nign stress. The area of nign stress was reviewec for all eignt calculations, an: two limiting cases were cnosen (i -120 arc ",7-15'). . Eacn Of trese ::n'igura:i:ns was su:je::ec c ceta'lec #ite elecent analysis, : n Oy tne licensee arc :ne acci Or.
RC-120, wni n was chosen ce:ause i: nac the longest, most flexfole unsuccorted scan r'eiative to its section crecerties, nac a hanc calculated s:ress of 6a ksi. This : : ares to tne 20 ksi calculated by the licensee's anc tne auci 0*'s nfi r at:ry #' nite elemen; analyses. CV-151, wnien was cnosen cecause it hac the largest concentratec mass in :ne critical scan, had a hand calculatec stress of 45 ksi. Finite element stresses for tnis piping were 20 and 29 ksi, by licensee and auditor, respectively. The large difference in finite element stresses was investigated and attributed to a difference in councary concitions. The auditor's model was truncated 9
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one support short of the licensee's model, and only translational stiffnesses were imposed at that point. This additional flexibility introduced three response modes into the auditor's model not found in the licensee's model, and all three modes contributed to the stress at the critical point. The finite element model was not modified because the results clearly show the hand calculation methodology to be conservative.
Based on the results, the hand calculation methodology was found to be an acceptable means for calculating stresses and strains for comparison to allowable values.
2.1.6 Pioe succort criteria (3.3)
Cri eria for pi;e su: ports are cefired in four areas: structural steel used in pipe sup Orts, concrete anchor bolts, catalog c =;0nents, and we'ds. Each are discussed separately in the subsections whicn folicw. The calculations aucited to verify correct application of these criteria are listec in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
2.'.5.1
. Pice Su:: r- 5 ructural Stee' Cri teria (3.3.'.). The c-i eria Irom :ne ASME cece, Summer 1933 Accenca, f - Level O icacs were Orc::sec and acce::ed. An increase of yielc streng:n for pipe su:: r materials of 305 was crocosed and acce:ted as a screening criteria f:r a:;iication of tre cuctility criteria. Supports not acceptable urcer :ne increased yield' strength would be evalua:ec with the ductility criteria.
Aucit results incicatec :na these criteria were uniformiy accliec in :ne
- a'culat iens witn ne following exce;-tecs.
- n tne analysis of sup or: SI-01-0961-H013 (data point 200, CA-55),
ne allowacle stress was increased by a factor of 1.33, 3% above tne agreed vaive. Im: ell staff indicatec :na- -nis was an a :li:ation of :ne fa: ce ai10wed :y :ne AISO : ce for ear neuake icads. This was found :: :e acceptacle, based on the margin cemonstratec in the argument supporting tne application of the factor of 1.3. Im ell staff also incicated that both factors would not be applied simultaneously. This was verified by the audits.
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. . - -- ps,sgwyr y )
In the analysis of support SI-14-0454-H002 (data point 100, SW-02) the allowable stress used was 0.7 Fu instead of 1.3 Fy. The licensee stated that the use of 0.7 Fu resulted from the criteria expression for allowable stress as the minimum of 0.7 Fu and 1.3 Fy. Since the predominate structural material used for pipe support structural steel is ASTM A36, for which 0.7 Fu controls the allowable stress, this error is inconsequential.
This was checked and found to be true for the support. The calculation is acceptable.
A similar error was detected in tne audit of the pipe support modifications. The support at data point 110 of the SI-04 piping (Calculation No. OC-1983) had an allowable stress calculated using 1.3 Fy, anc 0.7 Fu ::ntrols for ne A36 steel usec. The correction of this error lec to a cnange in status for tne cesign frem acceptable to unacceptable.
One beam was overloaded. However, the original evaluation of the beam took no credit for plates wnich had been added to tne beam to create a box section. When credit was taken, the beam was shown to be acceptacle. Inis information was taken from an audit of the amended calculation. Based on ne overall consistency of :ne work as found in ne aucits, :ne error was classifiec as an isolated incident. This was verifie: :y a car-tal aucit of 3 adcitional calculations (icentified in Table 2.->, all of which were f unc in Orcer.
The acclication of pice succort structural steel criteria fcanc in audd:s of the ca'culations is acce: table.
2.1.6.2 0' e Succo-: Cencrete Excansion Ancnce Ecl Crfteria (3.3.2 anc 2.6). A cecrease of the Factor of Safety (FOS) for existing ancnor colts was procosec. The preposed FCS was 2.0 (vs a current range of values of a.0-5.0), and was to te acclied Only if, amcng o:cer restrictions, :ne overali FOS for tne support was 4.0/5.0. Inis was accepted, proviced that load redistricution effects be adequately assessed.
, This methodology was used in the analysis of support SI-08-3056-H503 (data coint 135, AC-06). The licensee's interpretation of redistribution effects was found unacceptable. Bolts which could meet the FOS = 2 3
11
o ..
requirement were given full credit for carrying the load, which is equivalent to no load redistribution at all. The licensee would not accept the auditor's interpretation, that no load carrying capability be given to these bolts.
Discussions were conducted which resulted in the licensee's application of modified criteria and an agreement that audit of the application of the modified criteria be included in the case-by-case reviews. This is discussed in detail in the TER. Details of the audit are reported in Section 5 of this report. Applications of the criteria were found acceptable.
2.1.6.3 of:e Succor: Cataloc Cc cenen: Criteria (3.3.3).
Manufacturer's laac ca:acity cata was proposed anc acce::ec for use with new su ports. Qualification by analysis or comparison to test data with a minimum factor of safety (FOS) of 2 was proposed and acceptec, witn :ne understancing that the acceptaoility of the FOS of 2 was cependent on a conclusion by the auditor that uncertainties in the methods or data were aceauately c:nsicered.
Tnree succor: succalculations (5UP-SI-04-02/Z, SUF-MW-02-02/X, and SUD-5I-51-02/J) we-e fully audited to evaluate the a: lica: ten of catalog com:enent criteria. In all cases, a manufacturer's Level A allowable load, based on a FOS of 5, was modified for Level O to a FOS of 2. This was fcund unaccectatie. The resulting Level 0 stress was substaatially lower tnan :na: proviced cy the manufac urer, wn hac cone One tasting u:en wnicn
- ne Level A allowable loacs were casec. Rather than contenc :ne fincing, the licensee cid the following. Struts were recualified using manufacturer's Levei 0 leads increasec :: reflect the cifference ce: ween actual operating Emperature and tne limiting temperature u:On wnich :ne allowacle lead was based. This is acceptacle practice per Accencix XVII of the ASME Coda. Some struts were overicaced in tension due to a manufacturer's specification of a tensile allowable loac equal to the compressive allowable load. Since the compressive limit was based on buckling, a failure mechanism not available in tensile loading, the tensile limit was unnecessarily conservative. The tensile allowabic was modified 12
to account for this, which is acceptable based on common sense. The findings above resulted frem follow-up audits of subcalculations SUP-II-04-02/Z, SUP-SI-04-02/0, and SUP-SI-51-02/J. U-bolts were -
requalified using a Collapse Limit Analysis per Section F1341.3 cf the ASME Code, 1974 edition, Winter 1975 Addenda. Results of the analysis were verified by comparison to test data with excellent correlation demonstrated. The allowable leads were then used to qualify.all u-bolts which had been overloaded according to the original manufacturer's load rating. This resolved the concern raised by the audit of subcalculation SUP-Mi-02-02/X. These findings resulted from a full audit of calculation U50LT-FS.
Easec en tre results of tre accits, catalog ccmacnents nave ceen cualified ei-her :: manufa::urer's allowa:le leads or to allcwable I acs established a:Corcing to the provisions of the ASME Cede. This is acceptacle.
2.1.5.4 Pice Succer: Wele Criteria (~3.3.4 and 2.3). Pipe su;;crt weld criteri a basec en the provisions of the ASME Cece,1950 Edition.
Win er *.950 Addenca using Level C alicwable stresses have been cr::Osec anc at:e: ec.
The :aiculations sa:fec ed o ne initial full auci- (SU -AC-05-02, SUP-CA-55-02, anc SUP-5W-02-02) nac no su:ccrts with ca:aci-ies :n:rclied
- y weic ca:acity. Therefore, the audi-ing of weld Caicula-ions was :a--ie:
as a gere-al it em curing :ne retaircer Of ne audits. .N: issues were gene-1:ec concerning weid calcula-icrs curing -hese audi s, wni:n crem::ec
- ne fiacing nat :ne accli:a-fen of criteria : ne weld calcula-icns wi:nin ne LTS s:::e is at:ectacle.
Wei:s witnin :ne RTS sc:ce were cualifiec by a ccm:arison of T5 : _
RTS criteria. Two cractices were icentified that were a::e: able to RT5 but not LTS criteria, both involving only welcs subje:: Oc fiele verification due to either a ncnconformance recort (NCR) or a field change recuest (FCR). One practice involved the application of a factor of 1.5 to specified weld strengtn, wnich compares to an LTS fac:cr of 1.33. The 13
second practice involved the use of an allowable stress for E70XX electrodes in place of that for E60XX electrodes (21 ksi vs. 18 ksi). LTS practice is to use the lower allowable stress. All RTS calculations were reviewed for these practices, and checks made per LTS criteria when they were found. This work was documented in Calculation Weld-RVW. The review of six weld subcalculations (identified in Table 2.3) were audited in this document and found to be in order.
Based on aucit results, pipe sup; ort weld calculations have been done according to criteria and are acceptable.
2.1.7 Enveloce Resconse 5:ectra Methed of Dicina Analysis (3.11.1)
The following were er: posed and ac:eptec for envelope rescense s:ectra analysis: Complete Quacratic Comoination of mocal responses may be used in place of the standard Regulatory Guide (R.G.) 1.92 methodologies. Pressure Vessel Research C:mmittee (PVRC) damping may be used in place of R.G. 1.61 damping. Peak shifting may be used for response spectra in place of the s ancarc ;eak Orcadening metred:'egy. Seismic 'ner 'a (SI) arc an:n=r moti 0n (SAM) icacs ay be : mbirac Oy s: care rec: Of the sum cf :na scuares (SRSS) in piace of :ne stancarc aosolute summa:*on ('ES).
In bo:n fully accitec cases wnere -his analysis was usec (CA-55 anc SW-02) PVRC damping and SRSS com:inatien of SI and SAM load's were used; CQC c moination of modal resconses and ceak snift ng i were not usec. No a::iicationofCQCccmcina:{onerpeaksnif-ingwasfouncin sucsecuent auci s. The licensees a lication of tne enveicoec res:ense s ec ra analysis me:n cology is ac:e::acle.
2.1.5 Multi:le-Level Res ense 5:ectra Me:noc c' D':'c: Analysi s (3.11.2)
The use of multiple-level response spectra (MLRS) analysis was proposed and accepted, with the following limitations: Peak snifting and CQC combination of modal responses may not be used. SRSS of multiple level responses may be used instead of ABS if the input motion is shown to be uncorrelated, with the understanding that sucn uses will be reviewed on a 14
- e
~~
case-by-case basis. Combinations of modal responses and spatial components must be per R.G. 1.92 requirements. The use of response spectra generated by the FLORA computer code with MLRS analysis may be used, provided PVRC damping is not used. PVRC damping may be used, provided that FLORA is not, and with the understanding that such use will be subject to a case-by-case review audited to ensure that ABS combinati'on is used to combine level results.
In the one case audited where MLRS analysis was used (AC-06) the following was recorded: Peak Shifting, FLCRA, and CQC combination were not used. ABS combination was used for level combination, with R.G. 1.92 combination used for modal and directional combination. PVRC damping was usec.
These conditions were found uniformly in all subsecuent aucits, exce::
for PVRC dam ing usage. In sc=e cases, the more conservative R.G. 1.61 camping sas usec in place of PVRC damping. Four calculations (MW-02, SI-11, SI-52, and RC-102/CV-100/CV-101) using MLRS and PVRC damping were au:itec :: ensure cc--ect level c = ination. 11' used the correct AES te:n:c. The licensee's atelication of MLRS analysis meth:cci0gy is ac:e: acie.
2.'.9
. C her 31 ine Analys*s Me: nods (3.11.3. 3.11.a. 3.11.5)
The remaining analysis me nocs proposed for tne LTS evalua-icn (linear
-i e nistory, similari y, anc reniineaa analysis tecnniques such as :ne energy balance me ned. -he . secant sti## ness Te-hcd anc -he n:nlinear -f ?e nis:0 y metncd) were not used.
2.1.10 Pice Su:: ort Acalysis Metrods (3.12)
A load ccmcination metnocciogy with SRSS ccmbination of pice leads whose natural frecuencies differed by more than 1C% and AES ccmoination for those with natural frecuencies within 10% was proposed for gang support load combination. This was accepted with a provision that its use would be 15
- ' ~
reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Minimum limits on the distance between 4
~ snubbers and adjacent rigid supports to ensure snubber operability were proposed and accepted.
During the course of the pipe support calculation audit, the licensee was asked about the use of the load combination methodology. All load combination has been by the ABS method, which is more conservative than that proposed. Supports either passed or were obviously overloaded and redesigned. This was verified by the audits of supports SI-08-3056-H503 and SI-06-h6002-H501. Since ABS combination is the most conservative of all load combination techn1gues used, the load combination's performed for gang succorts are acceptable.
The proximity criteria for snuceers discussed in Section 3.12 was satisfied by an indeoendent evaluation. All large-bore piping isometric drawings were reviewed to identify snutbers in use. All such snubbers either met the proximity criteria or had not been given credit for operation in the seismic analysis. The results of this evaluation were documerted in calculation LTS-REVIEW. This activity was audited by a
-eview of isometrics 'or three pioing systems (AC-04, 4C-23, anc MW-04),
anc founc to ce in orcer. The measures taken to ensure tnat snuceer o-crimity criteria have been met are acceotaole.
2.2 General ~indines--oicine anc Succorts 2.2.1 Jse of 1/2 SAM Loacs in ASME C1 2/3 Ecuation 10 i
- Review of tne loac comoinations used in the stress calculations cf oicing crocien AC-06 snowed that the seismic ancnor motion (SAM) icads for the 0.67 g Modified Housner Soectra Eartnouake (MHE) ,ere being civicec cy two cefore evaluation using :ne ASME C1 2/3 E;uation 10. This is not stancarc SED Methocology (wnere seismic inertia and SAM are comoinec for evaluation using the ASME C1 2/3 Equation 9 and SEP allowable stresses).
Discussion of this issue revealed that this was standard practice for LTS, and that the justification for this methodology is based on current methodology. In current methodology, Operating Basis Earthquake (CBE) SAMs i
i 16
., _ _ _ _ , _ m _
_ . ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - .
are included in the Equation 10 evaluation. Since CBE loads are one-half those for Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), the division by two was deemed acceptable by the licensee. Unfortunately, the MHE is not an SSE. Even if it were, CBE loads can be expected to exceed half of SSE loads because the camping used in the building analysts generating piping analysis floor response spectra for CBE is less tnan that for SSE. Therefore the practice was found unacceptable. SCE then proposed using the full SAM value in Equation 10. This was found acceptable because the MHE is considerably more severe than any reasonable postulated site CEE. Two things were cone to handle the mid-stream change in methocology. For new analyses, a new :
load case called SSAM was defined and used in the Equation 10 check. SSAM was defined to be the full SAM load for the MHE, and hence was twice OSAM, wr':n had =een usec in tre earlier analyses. This provided a ciear ,
a indication of which methecology was used in any given computer analysis.
For tne earlier analyses, accencices were acded in whicn the new requirement was satisfiec. Five such analyses were checked and found to be in order ( AC-13, AC-131, MW-02, CA-56, and FW-CS) . In addition, a eneck for correct inclusion of SAM loading in Equation 10 was implicitly in:Or:0ratec in the accit process. The check was :e-formed whenever a SAM value was associatec witn :ne audit process. All ca' ulations so checkec were founc :: :e in crcer witn one apcarent excep:10r. Calculation RW-352 Iacked the accendix satisfying the new criteria and usec the CSAM lead :ase in :ne Equaticn 10 : neck. Follow-up on this calcula:icn snewec :na: :ne SAM load case was a result of an incorrect assumption that tne structures
- wnien :ne picing was attacned moved out of chase. Since the SAM 10 acing was in :asecuential with the correct, in pnase assue::icn, :ne er ce was cnservative and :ne a::iticn of the as:encix unne:essary. All of :nis was cc:umented in calculation LTS-REVIEW, wni:n inclucec tre results of the
- necks of all earlier analyses. Based on the nuceer of calculations
- necked for SAM leading, the errer was classi'fec as ar 4 3: lated irci:er:.
- s dispost:icn is acceptable.
]
i i 17 7
l 4
2.2.2 Inclusion of Suoports Failing Seismic Criteria in Thermal Analysis )
Review of the highly stressed areas of piping calculation AC-06 established that there were two types of problems (failed" supports and stresses in branch connections beyond SEP allowables), both of which occurred in the same area. The area was a header with several branch lines rising from it all with pipe guides installed above the header (area of the failed supports). Since no branch line had both an overloaded branch connection and a failed support, and since the branch connection overloads resulted from nermal loading, a concern was developed that the thermal analysis did not include failed supports. Discussion of the concern I established that failed supports are included in thermal analysis. This was ve-ified by a cneck on the su:;:crt a: ca.a ocint 505. The reatment I of failed sup cr:s is acce tacle.
.I i
i 1 2.2.3 Potential for Missing the Analysis of a Ecundary Suctort One of the supports at the boundary of piping calculation AC-06 (data p; int 922) was founc :: :e lacking an analysis in -he pi;:e su:p:rt calcula: ices. This raised tre ::ssibility tna: :ne su::or. was 10:
analy:e: :ecause -he support analyst for the piping en ea:n sice of tne ocuncary assumed the Otner analy:ed the common succort. This was not the case. The su : Ort in question, a grouted penetration, nas inclucec in a list of similar sup orts whose analysis was deferred for contractual i reasons. Once ccmcie:ed, the calculation (containec in SUP-GR-PEN, Revision 0, Novem er 20, 1935) was at.ci.ec anc founc :: ce in eccer.
1 ,
2 . 2 . l. Racicnal last city Concern i
Wnen calculation FW-05 was :hecked for correct retroactive a::!ication
- Of
- ne mcdifie: Equati:n 10/ SAM :ethodolcgy (see Section 2.2.1), it nas noted that strain criteria had been applied to five acjacent locations in i
1 a. Failed supports are suoports which are shown to be overloaded by the l analysis, but shown to be unnecessary with a subsequent analysis which excluces them. The supports are not upgraced. Instead, the piping analyst envelopes seismic results with and without the failed supports. The piping is then shown to be acceptacle under the enveloped load.
. 18
.v, t
the piping. This was of concern because the strain criteria was accepted in part with the belief that areas of high strain would be isolated. With this much high strain in a ragion, there was a concern that dimensional stability (minimum fluid flow area) might not be maintained. In subsecuent action, the licensee modified the support configuration, reducing the number of points with strain criteria applied in the region to one. This resolved the concern. No other regions of cultiple strain application were found during the audits. This was classified as an isolated incident. Its discosition is accectable. -
2.2.5 Reference to Document Outside Scoce of Criteria Review Durirg tne aucit of small-bore :aiculation No. RS-54 a referer e was mace to a d: ument unfamiliar to the aucitor. The document. calculatten
' SPAN-1, was icentified as the source o# acceleration data used in the RS-54 calculations. A copy of -he document was cbtained and reviewed. It.was found to be a collection of data and calculation results done according to the small-bore piping walkdown criteria. The document provided span isng ns cal:uiatec for tne range of acceleration levels of pipe si:es, materials. ::eratin; pressures an: tem: era ures found at SONGS 1. :: als
- n aine: a lis Of ceak acceleratien values for all 30NGS 1 spec ra, anc cermutati:ns of SRSS ::mb' nations of cairs of accelerations { North - 5:uth, Nor:n - Ver . e::.). Sin:e the cata was calculated a::crcing o'the walkdown criteria, its use in small-:cre calcula-icns was found : be accectacle.
2.2.c C:nsicera-for of Three 04-ecticns of Excitation in Small-30-e picin Ca':ula-ions Two small-core Dicing calculations acceared : a::Oun- for only Ore direc-icn Of acceleration (RS-5', anc R'd-352). However, f 1;ow u en nis issue cemonstrated tnat the single acceleration value wnich was used in the calculations was an SRSS combination of th.e two transverse peak accelerations taken frem the SPAN 1 calculation (see Section 2.1.5 acove).
Therefore, the calculations did account for three dimensional excitation.
19
The use of a SPAN 1 SRSS'ed acceleration is algebraically identical to using the peak transvense accelerations to balculate transverse stresses and then SRSS'ing the results, and is therefore acceptable.
2.2.7 Neglioibly Loaded Critical Small-Bore Succorts Qualified by Insoection The support load summary in small-bore piping calculation RW-352 identified three critical supports requiring analysis. However, review of the associated support calculation showed that only one had been analy:ed.
This was discussed with the licensee, who responded that the lead piping engineer had been alluwed to defer analysis of small-bore piping supports, if, in his opinion, the loading was negligible. This was based on the fact that there was no distinction between large ano small-bore pipe supports, and therefore the member si:e for small-bore supports was typically controlled by the minimum section si:e availaole rather than the applied loading. This resulted, in some cases, in supports that were so overdesigned that they could be qualified by inspectfon. Since engineering judgment was involvec, tne licensee was askea to provide a list of all supoorts so qualifiec. Of the 12 supports icentified, photographs of 4 of tne most highly loaced supports were chosen oy the auditor for inspection.
The most highly loaced support (3 kips on data point 30 of MS-05), was a grouted penetration in a 5 ft thick concrete wall - obviously adequate.
The weakest member observed was a 1 in, u-bolt with a 0.15 kips seismic load (data point 330 of SI-301). The u-bolt was also judged to be adequate, with a check performed on tne jucgment. Tne Level A loac rating for the u-colt is 425 lb (Reference 4), three times tne seismic loac.
Based on the inspection of the photographs, tne licensee's qualification of negligibly loaded small-bore piping supports by inspection is acceptacle.
2.2.8 LTS Qualification Usine RTS Calculations RTS calculations were used in two ways in the LTS program. In the first usage, RTS finite element analyses of significant portions of unmodified small-bore piping were used to obtain stresses for comparison to LTS allowable stresses. Areas of the piping which were qualified using RTS 20
criteria not allowed for LTS (such as the energy balance method) were requalified using LTS criteria, as were areas that were modified in the LTS effort. In four of the small-core calculations audited (AF-03, RC-120, MS-358, and RS-54) such usage was encountered, reviewed, and found acceptable. The second usage of RTS calculations involved a formal review of the calculation. This was accomplished with a checklist that identified all RTS criteria not used in LTS practice. Areas not in conformance with LTS criteria were then requalified. This work was documented in calculation RTS-REVIEW. The reviews ef three calculations in this document (RC-102, AF-02, anc FW-124) were audited. Two of tnese reviews (RC-102 anc AF-02) were encountered during the strain criteria case-by-case review, and audited as a part of that effort. The third was chosen randomly. The checklist icentifies all RT5 criteria not acce::able in LTS practi:e. arc provides assurance that all calculations were thercugnly -eviewed. Tne requalification calculations were also found to be in order, with one exception. RTS applications of the Energy Balance Methed were cualf' fed for LTS with the ecuivalent-static hand calculations used for small-core piping. This metnodology was approvec for LTS application to small- ore pi:ing only, and was also a::'ied to large-bore # ' ; in the review.
Altncugh the nanc calculations were snewn to be conservative for small-:cre a::itcations (see Section 2.2.5 Of this re:cr:), :nere was a concern :na: .
- nis conservatism may not exist for large-bore ciping. The licensee was asked to justify :n's ap:lication of smali-Ocre criteria to large- cre picing. This was cene in calculation Confirmatory Analysis. Piping calculations wnicn nac finite element analysis results availaole were reviewec to locate areas re:resentative of rcse t0 wcicn :ne me nocs oe-e
~
a::liec. no were cnosen, ce ween da a points 133 and 176 in :alculation AC-05, anc cetween data ceint 1230 and steam genera:0- E-1C in calcula:4cn
- W-124 The small-bore metnce was a : lied to :nese areas. and the
-esulting stresses were c:m:arec 10 ne finite elemen: results. The small-bcre meth:d was fc nc :: be conservative by factors of 2.'.7 anc 2.73, respectively. Based on this, the application of :ne small-bore ecuivalen static analysis methed to large-bore piping was four.c acceptable.
i l'
s 21 ,
,' 3. AUDIT RESULTS FOR MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORTS
/
e The following types of mechanical equipment were audited: pumps, building founded tanks (ground founded tanks and were audited by others),
heat exchangers, filters, valves, and containment penetrations. Audits of this equipment were performed at the Walnut Creek offices of Impell Corporation during' portions of the weeks of October 7, 1985, December 9, 1985, January 6,1986, January 27, 1986, and February. 17, 1986. An audit was also performed at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (the auditor's office) on November 8 anc 9, 1985. Specific audit dates are
.provided in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
The me nanical equipment' audit was subdivided into tnree tasks to
- reflect tne functional organi:ation,of tne groues that pr cuted the calculations: one for valves, one for containment penetrations, and one for the remainder of the ecuf pment (miscellaneous equicment). Of the 7 miscellaneous equipment calculations available, three were chosen for audit. The choices were made to obtain a representative sample of the e:ui: rent ty:es, and to maintain a balance between active and inactive ecui: ment. Tae'only type of ecuicmen: not incluced ~as :ne filter, whien sas all reoresentec Oy tne tans arc neat exchanger. Aucits of tne tnree calculations cnosen raised no issues recuiring furtner auciting.
Vaive calculation audit cancicates were nosen rancomly from the snelf on wnien all the valve calculations were (ept. The numcer of valve calculations avaiiatie for audit was no ce: ermined. :u tney :::ucied ao:roxfmately is in. of the shelf F ur calculations aere chosen rancemly. Cne of tne two most similar was tnen returned to tne sneif, anc another one cnosen. This crocess'was receated several times until the tn ee calculations in hand recresentec a variety of si:es, the various ty:ss of actuators usec, and both active arc inactive valves. Full aucits of nese three calculations showec all to ce complete, but none were formally reviewed and signed off. Therefore, acditional candidates were drawn fecm the shelf until one was found that had been formally reviewed and approved. This calculation was also fully audited. Since there were no issues' requiring further audit generated among the four full audits performed, no further audits were performed.
22
+ .
Three penetration calculations were chosen for full audit from amorg the fo'ur available at the time. Specific features of 9 additional calculations were then audited to aid resolution of issues raised by the full audits. In addition, another calculation was chosen for full audit to resolve concern raised by the limited sire of the population from which the original full audit candidates were chosen. Because of the large percentage of audited calculations which were not formally reviewed and approved, the final calculation fully audited was chosen from calculations which had been formally reviewed and approved. All of these calculations are identified in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
The audit methodology applied to full audits of mechanical equipment was icentical :: :na: used for piping exce:t that a single pass was used.
The si:e of :ne calculaticns was small encu;h that c,nly one general pass was needed, and tne number of specific criteria requirements for mechanical equipment was sufficiently low that the third pass was not needed. The conduct of partial aucits, consiceration of ne publication date of the September 1985 SER, and format for presenting the findings are identical to tha f:r :ne ; icing.
3.1 SER Related Fincines--Ve:nari:al E:uiemea and Su:: - s 3.1.1 Miscellaneous Mechanical Ecutoment Criteria anc Me:hecol::y (3.5)
Tne ASME Code,1953 Ecition, Summer 1983 Accenca. witn Levei 0 service limits was Orc:Osed anc a::e :sc for use in :ne seism : analysis of d
ina::ive cum:s, pump su:: Orts, cuilcing founded tanks. hea; ex:nangers an:
- '1:ers. Level C service limits were pr::csec anc ac:eptec for cumps. ne criteria apolication in the calculatiens has Oeen found at:e:tacie as a escit of the aucits.
The methodology proposed ano a:Capted for mechanical equipment analysis consisted of eitner equivalent static or dynamic analysis.
Bijlaard analysis wa's accepted for nozzle qualification, provided that its application included a check to ensure its accuracy for the particular 23
geometries analyzed. The audits established that the calculations co correspond to these methodologies, incl,uding the accuracy check.for Bijlaard analysis applications, and are acceptable.
3.1.2 Valve Criteria and Methodolocy (3.6)
Subsection NF of the ASME Code, with Level C service limits for active valves and Level D for passive valves was proposed and accepted for use in analysis. An equivalent-static hand calculation methodology which consicers gravitational, coerational and seismic loads was proposed and accepted. These criteria and methodologies were met in the calculations audited. In some cases, a verified computer coce, VALVCAL 4, was used in the calculati:ns. The : de :e-forms finite element analysis, which 4s generally more detailed and accurate than nand calculati:ns. Use Of the computer coce was also found : ce acceptacle.
3.1.3 Penetration Criteria and Yethed:lecy (3.9)
The :ertinent crit eria of the ASME C:ce, 1930 E:ition, Winter 1920 Accerca have been a: revec for the analysis of cene-rations. Piping
- porents associatec witn :ne peaetration nave een analy:ec accarcing tc the SCNGS 1 LTS ci:ing criteria. Acceptacle nethecoicgies in !ude text:: (
sciutions, axisymmetric finite element analysis, anc Bijlaard analysis.
Bijlaard analysis was accroved with the understanding that its a lication would incluce a : neck to ensure tne solution accuracy for the : articular
- eeme ries. The aucits of
- enetra-ion calculati:ns have establisnec ra:
they ::nferm :nese criteria and me necci0gies, and are accepta:'9.
3.2 General :incines- Mechanical Ecuitment anc Su :cr:s 3.2._ Small-Ecce o':ia; Nc::le L:ac Calculat on v e ned:'cey #:- E:ui: en-i Analysis Audit of the Hydrazine Tank calculation (No. EQ-28) revealed a calculation of small-bore piping no:zle loads for use in the tank analysis. Since the usual source for no:zle loads--the piping analysis 24
o , !
l calculations--was not expected to provide all necessary small-bore nozzle loads, the licensee was asked to provide a detailed description of the methodology used for this calculation. The methodology was reviewed and found to be an equivalent static analysis technique similar to that used in the small-bore piping calculations, which is acceptable based on the requirements of Section 3.9.2 of NUREG-0800 (Reference 5). The calculation of nozzle loads for the Hydrazine tank conforms to this methodology and is acceptable.
3.2.2 No::le Leac Com ination Methodolocy for Penetrations Audit of calculation No. LTS-PEN-03 revealed thot inside and outside
- le 1: ads were cc.ebined using "s:uare rect of the sum of the squares" ,
(SRSS) me:necology without a cneck te ensure that :ne significant piping natural frequencies involved differed by more than 10%, as suggested by Regulatory Guide 1.92. Discussions with the licensee about this calculation established that SRSS ccmbination had been allowed in a limited numcer of cases. Since this practice was not per Project Instruction guidelines, a detailed descr 0 tion of the methodolcgy was requested and 4
- revided. The me:nedology was reviewec and found acce::able per Regula:Ory Scice 1.92. SRSS comoinatien as allowec, provicec :na: tne 10% frecuency cneck ce successfully mace. Calculation No. LTS-PEN-03 was modified to inciuce the cneck, sucjectec : a cartial aucit, and found acce:tacle.
Since :nis calculation nac not been per the agreed methodology, an acc;;ienai nine calculations were sucjected tc a partial auci; ( nese are lis:ec in Table 3.2). As discussac in :ne 'olicwing two secticns, :ne
! cartial accit was in :nree areas, one of whicn was to ensure'tnat SRSS
- ination be acc:::aniec by the IC% frecuency cneck. The calculations were founc to con.41n :ne check where ap: opriate. The application of loac com ina:icn methocology in tne calculations is accea able.
25
- e 3.2.3 Consiceration of Inside and Outside Small-Bore Pioing Nozzle Loads
. In Penetration Analysis Audit of calculation No. LTS-PEN-01-SS revealed an unacceptable methodology for calculating no:zles loads for small-bore piping which did not have such loads provided by the associated piping calculation. The methodology involved an assumption of a bending moment associated with a linear elastic bending stress of twice yield in the associated pipe section. Although this moment is aoout 40P. nigher tnan that necessary to cause a full plastic hinge in a single pipe, it was found to be insufficient to represent two simultaneous ~(inside and outside) loadings.
The licensee then procosed increasing the loading by a factor of 1.4, 00m arable to an SRSS c:mbination of insice anc outsica no::le 10 ads asscciatec witn the twice yield stress value. This was accepted oecause it is algeoraically ecuivalent to an absolute summation of inside and cutside loacs, each associated with a full plastic hinge in the piping. A cneck for the use of the unacceptable metnodology was included in tne partial audits discussed in Section 3.1.2 above, and three more calculations were icentifiec nere it was usec (LTS PEN-02-MLT, 55, anc MLT). These calculations were cdified 0 reflect -ne acce :able methoccicgy, sucjec ec c car:fai aucits, end found to be in orcer. Since :ne par-ial aucits were a: piled :0 all cent: ration caiculations associated w'th smal'-b0*e ciping, ne acclica-fon of -his metnocology to tne calculations has :een found acce:tacle.
3.2.4 Cual'#ica-icn of the Unreinf:rcec S:he-a Sneli For :ene: cation l NO::'e Leacs Audit of calculation No. LTS PEN-03 revealec tha- tne unreinforced senere shell nac not :een cua'ified for tre :enetration no::le 1: ads. The licensee 5 atec :na: ne s ancarc practice is to perform sucn qualification, and that this calculation represents an isolated incicent.
This was verified by the partial audits discussed in Section 3.1.2 above.
e 26
<
- 3 All other calculations audited included the necessary calculation.
Calculation No. LTS-PEN-03 had been modified, and found to include the unreinforced shell calculation during the partial audits. Qualification of the unreinforced sphere shell for penetration no:Ile loads was found to be assured by the calculations.
e 27
a e
- 4. AUDIT RESULTS FOR ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ANCHORAGES, RACEWAYS, INCLUDING RACEWAY SUPPORTS Calculations for electrical equipment supports, raceways and raceway supports were performed by different corporations and were audited separately. The raceway calculations were audited at the Walnut Creek, California offices of Impell Corporation during the week of October 7, 1985. The electrical equipment supports were audited at the Norwalk, California, offices of Becntel Power Corporation (BPC) on December 13, 1995 and February 3, 1986. In addition, one BPC calculation (5-A-04/28) was provided for audit at Walnut Creek on February 21, 1986. Specific audit dates are orovided for each calculation in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
The raceway calculation audited was rancomly chosen from tne 13 available for audit. The two subcalculations audited were aisc randomly chosen from the calculation. All support calculations in both subcalculations were fully audited. The three electrical equipment anchorage calculations subjected to the initial full audit were chosen from
- ne 74 availaoie for aucit to ootain a samole tnat includec all tne s:ectral data used anc all ancnorage ty;es.
The initial ancncrage aucits reveaiec several pc entially ncnconservative ascects of a generic nature. They also revealed anchcrage designs that typically exnioited suffigient overstrength to accommocate the
- ncerns. This was verifiec by an extension of the audit scoce: ten acci:icnal, ranccmiy cncsen calcula:icns were accitec. These aucits caused ano:ner calculatten Oc ce inclucec in the aucit. The initial analyses we e cone using estimatec ficer resconse spectra (scec ra) while the calcula:icn of tne required saectra was cone in parallel. A ccmcarison of estimatec
.itn recuirec s ectra snowed that the estimatec spectra for ne acministration/ control buiicing were not conservative. Equipment in :nis building was suosecuently reevaluatec for the required spectra. This was documented in calculation ASEE-RE-01. Three of the audited equipment items are located in the building, and their reevaluation was fully audited. All of these calculations are identified in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
28'
- ~
.The methodology applied to the audits of the raceways and raceway supports consisted of a single pass that included checking for good engineering practice and adherence to acceptable requirements. The initial audits of the electrical equipment anchorages were conducted identically, except that the criteria in Reference 6 were used. Subsequent audits of the electrical equipment anchorages were the same, except that a checklist was included to ensure that all issues raised by the initial audits were considered in the subsequent audits.
4.1 SER Related Findings--Electrical E ui: ment Anchorages, and Raceways, Including Raceway Succorts 4.1.1 Electr' cal Raceway and Su: cort Criteria and Methodology (3.9 and 2.4)
The criteria which were proposed and accepted for the evaluation of electrical raceways and supoorts were based primarily on the 1980 versions of the AISC and AISI specifications. Allowable loads for concrete anchor bolts were based on manufacturer's ratings witn an a:: lied factor of sa#ety of 4, witnaccifonalfac:Orofsafetya:ofdecformasonywall acclications. Allowec metnedologie's inciuced scuiva'ent static, cynamic, similarity, and nonlinear analysis. The raceways were cualifiec ey :ne a: plication of a t-in. d'solacement limit eneck. Eased on the aucits, tne acclication of criteria anc me nodology in the calculations was founc to :e acceptacie. Allowaole stresses were found to :e as s:ecifiec in :ne criteria. The raceway cis:lacements were checksc. T e acplica:t ns of ecuivalent static anc cynamic analysis techniques were acce;;acle.
Similarity arguments were acceptacle. Nonlinear analysis tecnnicues were not used.
a.1.2 E'e::rical Ecuterect an :herage Cri e-ia arc Me:noco!cey (TER Sec:fon 2.5)
The criteria used in evaluating electrical equipment anchorages were based primarily on the 1978 AISC specification and the IEEE 344-1975 i 1
standard. Allowable loads for concrete anchor bolts were based on the manufacturer's ratings with an applied factor of safety of 4 Equivalent 29 L . -- .
static analysis techniques were " sed. Based on the audits, the application of these criteria and methodologies in the calculations was found to be acceptable.
4.2 General Findings--Electrical Ecuiement Anchorages, Raceways, and Raceway Succorts 4.2.1 Use of Full Section .orocerties for Cold-Rolled Beams Stress calculations for cold rolled sections in calculation I-ECRS-7, subcalculation 05, did not include a check to ensure that the section modulus need not be decreased to account for local buckling per the AISI s:ecification recuirements. The ifcensee indicated that this check had typically no been per#0rmed. However, a eneck of the c01c-r lled beam sections used at SCNGS 1, made using the specified allowable stress, showed that all the secticns used were sufficiently compact that no derating cf section m:culus was necessary. The section properties used in calculating cold-roilec beam stresses were found ac,ceptable, a.2.2 Use of Raceway Sut:ce: C nc ete anche- Bol t s ' - Va s o n ry 'da l l s Aucit of the Raceway SO: port P oject Instruction revealed tnat 40
^
pr0videc al':wa:le 'cacs for ::ncrete anchor bolts in 9asOn y walls. "a licensee statec :nat sucn colts were used in Oractice. Since incustry practice is :0 use tnrcugn 001:s, a justif' cation was recues:ec.
Discusst:ns witn :ne licensee ceveic:ec tne foll0 wing scints: (a) tre allowable 1:acs are extremely :ense-vative, since they resu't f-:: a
-ecuction of f actors of 3/4 anc 1/1 (tension and shear) acclisc :: tne usual allowaoles, wnich are alreacy casec on a factor of safety of a (b) tne ancnce colts are installed in greuted walls only (per be 3r ject Instruction) anc (c) tre safety-relatec walls to whic9 such installati0ns are limitec have been reinforcec with cuctile steel, cath horizontally anc vertically, and have been shewn to ce capable of maintaining a high cegree of integrity during and after experiencing an earthquake more severe than 30
the modified Housner Earthquake (Reference 7). Based on these points, the use of raceway support concrete anchor bolts in grouted, reinforced masonry walls is acceptable.
4.2.3 Assurance of Emcedment Evaluation It is a good audit practice to extend the scope of the audit a bit beyond the boundary of the organization under audit. This allows auditing of the interface between organizations. In this case, the boundary occurs between the attachment weld, consicered part of the equipment, and the embedded element to which the equipment is welded, considered part of the building. The calculation evaluating the embedded plates (No. S-E-09) was audited anc 'cunc :: ce :ensistent with :ne eis::rical epuipment su:pcr:
calculations.
4.2.4 Toe Mounted Caole Loacs The anchorage evaluation of the Motor Control Cabinet (MCC) No. 2 (calculation No. 5-A-C2/12) cic not incluce consicerati:n of :ne 1: acing ass 0:iatec witn tre ::: mounted ca:'es. 00nversaticas wi tn tne licensee accu: :nis to:ic ceveloced the f llowing points. The asscciated loacing is
'inited by a max' mum allowable unsucocrted-cable scar between cabine and raceway of 3 ft (per Orawing No. 5134139-2, sneet 5, " General Notes arc Legends," Revision 2, 1933). The criteria do ne'; s ecifically recuire c09siceration Of caole 10 ads, cu C0 include a recuiremen; to incluce tre "neign: Of all :ermanent atta:n=ents." Electrical e:ui: ment weignts a a typically increased by a factor of 20% :: :rovice a easure of c:nserva:'s.m in :ne weignt estimate. The MCC c:nsists Of 1; icentical units moun:sc sfce by side to f0rm the cacinet, eaca unit with a ci#feren assortment o#
acui: ment mountec insi:e. ::s : alificatien cens'stec cf a cuali#ica icr Of :ne neavies; of :ne units, as ceterminec Dy :ne analyst. The : articular unit chosen did not nave top mountec cables, so there were no too mountec cable loads in the analysis. The audit established that tne analysis Of the single unit did constitute an adequate qualification of the entire cabinet, including the cable .oads. The unit analyzed contained significantly heavier equipment than all the others except one, which was 31
o sww- w = __. .
e identical to the unit analyzed. Its weight had been increased by 20%. The cabinet's critical aspect ratio, height to depth, was identical to that for the unit analyzed. Although the cabinet's analysis was found acceptable,
. the scope of the audit was extended, primarily because the criteria cid not specifically mention caole loads. Ten additional calculations were audited, six of which had top mounted cables. Three of the six included explicit cable loads. The remaining three (S-A-04/29, S-A-07/42, and S-B-08/63) had reserve capability which could accommodate the cable loads.
The 20% increase in equipment weight was judged to be larger than :ne cable weights. Because of this reserve capability, the calculations have been found acceptable.
c.Z.5 Shor ccmin;s in Natural F-ecuency Calculations The anchorage calculation for the diesel generator control beards includec a natural frequency calculation :nat gave full credit to the cacinet coors for structural rigidity. Because of tolerances in hinges anc latches, cabinet doors do not participate fully in resisting cabinet motion. Tne result of fully creciting cacinet ccor rigidity is a calcula:ec natural frecuency tigner nan :ne actual cre. The l'censee claimed :na :ne natural frequencies calculated for such equipment are suf#icien:ly far in o ne rigid range :na the assum:-f on of rigid resconse is valid cespite One sner:ccmings cf :ne calculation. This was.founc := ce the case for the diesel generator control board calcula:icn. To further succort this claim, the licensee -eviewed all calcula-ions of cacine:s si:n ccces, anc chose tne One with ne least ancncrage margin f:r a cemonstra-ion calculation. The calcula-ion snowed :na- -he na ural frequency of the cacinet was 31 H: with ne assumot!cn of no dcor rigicity. This was consideracly icwer tnan the original calculated natural frecuency (53 P:). Du: s-ill well wi:nin ne rigid range (the :erc :erf::
acceleration frequency was 20 H:). The claim was also evalua:ec curing :ne
. audits of ten additional calculations. Seven of the ten calculations
~
includec natural frequency calculations wnich gave full credit for coor rigidity. Six of the seven had sufficiently high fundamental natural frequencies to accommodate the effect of door flexibility and still demonstrate rigidity. The seventh (S-B-06/49-C) did not have a 32
sufficiently high natural frequency to ensure rigidity, but it did have sufficient anchorage reserve capability to accommodate a seven-fold increase in loading. This compares to a potential increase of loading by a factor of 1.5 to account for cynamic response.
The anchorage calculation for the pressurizer instrument cabinet (calculation No. S-B-02/52) included a natural frequency calculation based solely on the cabinet, with no consideration of its angle iron support structure. This was discussed with the licensee, anc it was concludec that the very hign calculated cabinet frequency (SS2 H:) combined with the stiffness of the support structure (4 angle iron legs, 9 1/2 in. long) demonstrated the cabinet's rigidity. This was verified with a hand calculati:n of ne Ocmcinec cabinet /sup ort natural fre:uency. The result (590 H:) cemenstrated the cacinet's rigicity.
Eight of the thirteen natural frequency calculations audited were cnaliengec by :ne auditor. In seven of the eignt cases, the auditor agreed with the licensee's conclusion that the equipment is rigic. In the remaini g case, the auci:ce foun :na: the rigicity :# the scui: ment was cues:10na le. Out that its anchcrage sas clearly ca:1:le :# ac::mmocating full dynamic res:ense. In eve y case, tne conclusi:r :na: ne equi:mer.:
anchorage was adecuate has been found t: be correct. Based on this, the calculattens are acceptacle.
- .2.6 Base :!at Fl e x ibi l i.:y Aucit of :ne diesel genera:ce : ntrol =carc (calcula-ion
?,c. 5-3-01/21) showed that consiceration of :ne flext:ili ty Of tre :acine-
- ase had not been included in the evaluation of the an:nor 01:s. The ancncrage cesign consisted of an angle section welced : :ne ca:ine; anc coltec : :ne :Op flange of an emceeded C-section. The prying effect of such a cesign nac not been censicered in the analysis of tne colts. Tne licensee resconced to this concern by stating tnat the prying effect was negligible. This was checked by an AISC specification (tne apolicable specification per the criteria) prying calculation. The calculation showed 33 l
l
o a the prying effect to be negligible. Because this configuration and loading are typical of the anchorages which may be subject to prying, the practice of neglecting the prying effect in such anchorages was found acceptable.
4.2.7 Comoleteness of the Calculations The initial audit revealed that the Pressurizer Instrument Cabinet calculation (S-R-02/52) was incomplete in two areas. The calculation called for a field verification of the support configuration. No documentation of the field eneck coulc be found in the calculation. In addition, Sections 1 and 2 of the rack had not been completely evaluated.
The calculation was terminated after loads had been computed, and no stresses were calculated. These snce:ccmings were identified :: :ne licensee, wne correctec tree. The revisec cocument was subsequently audited and found to be in order. No field mcdifications were required as a "esult of the revision. During the aucit of ten additional calculations, a check was made for completeness. All were found complete. This has :een classified as an isolated incident which nas been satisfactorily corrected.
c.2.3 Oversiph: c' Su:::r: L:ac Audit of ne ancnorage calculation for battery cnargers A anc 3 (calculation No. S-A-Cc/28) reveaisc :nat :ne evaluatien of :ne ancnce ocits lacKec consiceration of a significant leacing. The cesign of :ne ancncrage was sucn :nat :ne bcits wouic :s sc:jectec to a :encing lea:
.nicn was no c:nsicered. Ice licensee revise: the ca'.culaticn. Awci: :#
the revisi:n revealed the # llowing: One : lts are :recicted :: yielc, cut oc: to fcrm lastic hinges. Cielc ins:ection icenti#ied :ne belts as A3C7, and verifiec a sufficient clearance around tne cabine; anc slac( in :ne attached caciing to allcw for tce limitec slicing wnicn coulc cccur, No mcdificat'cns are :lanrec. The -'nimum mccification wnien wcule :*ing 09e design into ncminal conformance witn ne design crite-ia would be to replace the A307 bolts with high strength bolts. Unfortunately, nts modification would reduce the ultimate capacity of the anchorage. Sucn bolts are brittle, and the anchorage would tend to fail as a result of the
. 34
. e r
bolts breaking. On the other hand, the A307 bolts would bend, allowing the development of tensile load bearing capacity to limit sliding and providing a ductile response to absorb the earthquake energy. Based on this, the revised calculation has been found acceptable.
i l
l I
't 35
- 5. CASE-BY-CASE REVIEWS The September,1985 SER has required that every application of certain criteria and methods be reviewed. The results of these reviews, called case-by-case reviews, are reported in the following sections. The title of each section identifies the topic under review, with the appropriate section of the SER identified in parentheses. Since the scope and nature of the review is strongly dependent on the topic, these details differ from section to section, and are cescriced in each section. Several of tne criteria and methods requiring case-by-case review were not applied in practice. This was verified by the audit activity reported in Sections 2 through 4 of this recort. These criteria and methods are:
- 1. Similarity analysis for icing (3.11.4).
- 2. Nonlinear time nistory piping analysis (3.11.5).
- 3. SRSS load combination for gang pice supports (3.12).
In acciti:n 0 One case-:y-case reviews, tnere were areas of the cri;eria acclication that were icentifiec as needing : articular attentien
'n Section 5.0 of tne See:emcer, 1955 SER. Audits of cri eria nc: included in :ne scoce of ne case-cy-case reviews wnich fell into :nese areas were re:or ec in the body of this ae: Ort. Such areas are listec celow, alcng wi th tre secti0n of this recort wnere Oney are discussec.
- 1. Di:e su:ccr: ancnce ooit factor of safety ( 05) ce: ween 2 an: 4 (2.1.5.2).
- 2. Catalog si:e su::or c:::enen s wi n ~05 near 2 (2.1.5.3).
- 3. Pipe wele material strengtn (2.1.6.4).
1
- 4. Multiple level response spectra analysis (2.1.8).
l l
l 36
o .- -
- 5. Energy balance method (one of the nonlinear analysis techniques
.. discussed in 2.1.9).~
- 6. Penetration analysis (3.1.3).
- 7. Secant stiffness method (one of the nonlinear analysis techniques discussed in 2.1.9).
- o. Nonlinear time history analysis (one of the nonlinear analysis techniques discussed in 2.1.9).
- 9. Similarity method (2.1.9).
- 10. Gang (multiple) cipe su:00r: analysis (2.1.10).
5.1 Picin
Strain Ort'e-ia t Acelications Over 1% (3.1.1.1 and 2.1)
Section 3.1.1.1 of the Septemoer, 1985 SER requires case-by-case eviews 'cr all a:cl':ati:ns of the of:ing strain : ':e ia to strains cetneen 1% an: 2%. Three such cases were identifie: (calculation No. 51-5'.. A:-02, anc RC-102/CV *00.'CV-101). All n-se calcula icns we-e eviewec using the fc11: wing methecclegy. The first steo was to icentify
- ne criti:al egien. This consisted of all of the piping wi:nin two supoorts of :ne location of strain criteria application in all thre'e ortnogenai cire::icns. Piping isometric drawings were reviewec to ensure
- na: :ne crit ical recion aas acecuately cefined. The regi:n was ::nsice-e ade uate if 9: : lla:se mechanism was cerceived under the assum: fon .na the loca:fon of strain criteria ao:lication ::uld provide no :encing
-esistance. Su: ports, flanges and valves witnin tne critical region were
- nen evaluatec to ensure tha: :ney nac sufficient excess leac caca:ity to satisfy the re:uirements c's:usse in Attachment 2 of :ne TER. The excess ca:acity was definec linearly, from a value of 1.0 a: 15 strain to 2.7 at 2% strain. Capacity was cefined in terms of the allowable stresses witn no increase in yield strength, and no use of ductility criterion. These requirements were applied to all supports, flanges and valves in the 37
~
o e critical region, including anchorages for equipment that provided anchor points in the critical region. The 11 calculations included in the review are listed in Table 5.1.1. Table 5.1.2 lists the components which did not have sufficient excess margin to meet the requirements. These were identified to the licensee, who made a commitment to reevaluate them under the increased loadings. This was done, with the support reevaluation results documented in calculation NRC-SUPT. The reevaluation for the remaining components was documented by revision to existing calculations.
These are listed on Table 5 '.1. With the exception of components on the RC-102/CV-100/CV-101 system, there was sufficient conservatisms in the calculations to accommodate the increased loading. For the RC-102/CV-100/CV-101 system, the RTS spectra used were shown to be sufficiently conservative ccmpared to the ap'plicable LTS spectra to accommodate the margin requirement. This was verified by audit of the pertinent calculations.
As noted in Section 2.1.1 of this report, the application of strain criteria was audited as a part of the case-by-case review process. All three piping calculations (AF-02, RC-102/CV-100/CV-101, and 51-51) were audited. The criteria found in the TER and Reference 9 were used. The strain calculations were found to be in orcer. The two additional checks for local buckling ano low-cycle fatigue were incluced. Since tne interference check involved plant walkdowns, it was recorded in a single document, LTS-STRAIN. This document was audited and found to meet i acceptable requirements.
Applications of the strain criteria were found to ce acceptable.
5.2 Pipino Succort Concrete Ancnor Bolt Factor of Safety Eetween 2 and 4 (3.3.2 anc 2.7)
Section 3.3.2 of the September, 1985 SER requires case-by-case reviews for all applications of a pipe support concrete anchor bolt factor of safety (FOS) between 2 and 4. A FOS less than 2 was not allowed. Four 38
e ..
such cases (AC-23, CV-11, MW-02, and SI-52) were identified. All four were reviewed using the following methodology. The first step was to assess the effect of potential anchor bolt degradation on the performance of the su: port at which the reduced FOS was applied. All directions in which support performance could be degraded as a result of degradation of ancher bolt performance were classified as critical. For example, with cantilevered supports, this was all directions except the one associated with axial compression. A critical region was then defined, the boundaries of which consisted of su: ports which would experience increased loading as a result of degradation of tne ancnor belt failure. Piping isemetric drawings were then reviewed to determine if the critical region was adequately defined. Within the critical region, piping and critical su::cr: cal:ulations were revisoed :: determine the excess ca:a:ity available to a:::=medate Icac redistribution anc tuning of system res: nse resulting from anchor ooit degradation. Table 5.2.1 identifies the calculations reviewed. Table 5.2.2 provides the results of the review.
Three of the four piping systems were jucged to have sufficient excess cacacity to accommocate load redistribution and tuning of system response
- ' ncut furtre- ce;racation. The f0urth system, SI-52. ay ex:erience sc.9e ca age to the su:: Ort witn tre 0.92 rati: Of preciete: lea :0 sue: Ort ca:acity. 40 wever, One-e is a tri-c su: ort, with a -2010 of 1:ac :o 02:acit.y Of 7.66 for tne same leading cirection, and One direction of Icacing is such :na: :ne s;:per: with :ne recutec an:nce bolt FOS coulc provice su port for half of eacn fully reversec cycle of motion. The Oi:ing nas a large excess ca:acity to ac::=mcca:e icac redistributi n, anc consists of an all welced cressure bouncary with nc aives or flanges in
- ne critical region. The su::ce: with tne reduced FC5 fs installed :n a wail a: roximately 2 't frem an scge abutting a cont';ucus cer:endicular nall. This :osition, remete from :ne center and ecge effects of the sia:,
would be unlikely to ex:erience severe cracking as a result of an i ear:ncuane. Eased en a f :nese fact:rs, :ne su:p:r: system fer 5:-52 '
l has also been judged acecuate with the reduced FCS. None of the fcur piping systems require modification to ac: mmodate tne apolication of anchor bolt criteria.
39
,-m e .
o .. -
As noted in Section 2.1.6.2 of this report, audits of the application of anchor bolt criteria were performed in conjunction with the case-by-case review. This involved the audit of calculation LTS-A50LT, which documented the application of the revised criteria. All four piping systems were evaluated and audited. All base plates had at least four bolts, and only two bolts were ever subjected to simultaneous tensile loading. Loads beyond those associated with FOS = 4 were redistributed to adjacent supports, which were shown to be adequate under the increased loading with a minimum FOS of four for anchor bolts. The base plates had been inspected in the field and found to be satisfactorily installed, including proper embedment. This was properly documented in the calculations. The application of anchor bolt criteria, as found in the calculations, is acceptable.
J 40
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5
- 6. PLANT INSPECTION
.m Inspections were conducted at SONGS 1 on August 20-25, 1985, and April 14, 1986. The first involved observation of the collection of as-built data to be uscd in piping analysis by the licensee. The second involved cbservation of the as-modified condition to assure conformance with the calculation assumptions.
6.1 Insoection Scoce
- The scope of the first inspection included all in-containment portions of the safety injection lines (SI-150, SI-155, and SI-158). These lines a
were chosen so that the inspector could observe SI-158 in connection with the confirmatory analysis of that piping in addition, to observing the collection of as-built data. The remaining lines were part of the group of lines including SI-158 to be inspected by the licensee's inspection team under observation by the inspector.
The scope of the seconc insoection included piping, electrical raceways, and electrical equipment. Two piping systems were cnosen (SI-52 and AF-02). SI-52 was chosen because of the application of a pipe support ancnor bolt factor of safety (FOS) less than 4 to one of its sucports (see Section 5.2 of this report). AF-02 was chosen because of an application of the large bore piping strain criteria to one of its com;:enents (see Section 5.1 of this report). Three areas of electrical raceways were inspected, all found in the south extension of the turoine builcing. Tne areas were chosen cecause they contained raceways that had been identified as needing additional supports in the original SEP seismic upgrade effort, but were later shown to not need additional support by the LTS evaluation.
The former evaluation used a minimum support spacing criteria, the latter, a more detailed calculation (discussed in Section 4.1.1 of this report). l These areas were inspected, in part, as a check on the new criteria. The )
specific areas involved are near support Nos.138,15, and 49 of sheet 176 of OCP No. 82-162-20C. The electrical equipment and anchorages inspected are located in the D. C. Switchgear Room and the Battery Room. The initial intent was to inspect the Battery Chargers A and B in relation to the equipment anchorage issue discussed in Section 4.2.8 of this report. Other 41 l l
. s m equipment in the area'was inspected as a matter of convenience. This included the Inverter Cabinet nearest the Battery Charger, the Battery Racks, and a safety shower located in the Battery Room.
6.2 Insoection Findings In general, the inspection findings were positive. Some additional confirmation was requested in some cases, as discussed below.
6.2.1 Inscection Fincines for Picinc anc Succorts As a result of the first inspection, the conclusion was drawn that the pr;;edure used for gathering piping cata ensured its accuracy. All dimensional data was measured by the first inspector and confircec by the second before recording. Photographs were taken of all valves and pipe sup: orts. This conclusion was verified during the second audit. No discrepancies were found between the data used in analysis and the field configuration. In the areas of application of alternate criteria (anchor
- ! :OS less tnan a fo- SI-52, anc strain criteria f:r AF-02), no features ae-e founc in :ne field wnicn were not ac:0unted for in the analyses, nor as-e any found wnich negatec the ;ositive c:nclusicns of : nose analyses.
5.2.2 Insce:: ion Findines for Electrical Raceways and Succor:s No discreaancies were found ce: ween the fielc Ocnfiguration and ne crawings. Tne araas inspectec, all of whicn includec locations of suc:Or:s
- sficec for SEP anc celetec during LTS, a::earec :: be uniformly anc wei succortec. This confirms the valicity of :ne criteria used.
1 5.2.3 Insee :fon :indings for Electrical 50ui: men; and Arc 9eraces
- nspection of the equipment revealed no poorly supportec ccmconents Or wiring, and no inadequate support elements. For the Battery Chargers A and B ancnorage, no features were found in the field which were not accounted for in the analysis, nor were any found which negated the positive conclusions of the analysis. Two areas were found that required confirmation from the licensee.
42
b e -
, , 2 An OSHA type safety shower was observed in the Battery Room. Failure of the shower could adversely impact functionality of the batteries. The licensde was requested to provide assurance that either the shower has been seismically qualified, or that such qualification is not necessary. In Reference 9, the seismic qualification of tne shower was shown to be unnecessary. There are drains in the floor capable of preventing flooding of the battery room if the shower were to fail. Not seismically qualifying the shower is acceptable.
Observation of the battery racks indicated that they were a recent acdition relative to the age of,the plant. A summary report of the measures taken to ensure seismic qualification of the racks was recuested f-Om :ne licensee. This was *0vided in Reference 10.
The battery racks have been seismically qualified to current recuirements in :ne standard fashion celineatec in Section 3.10 of NUREG-CSCO (Reference 5). A cynamic analyses was performed witn the resulting stresses shown to be less than 9C% of minimum specified yield streng:rs. Tre cuali#ication is acce::acle.
6.2.* : sce: f on Fincir;s for Ce; acati:n of Pic'n; and E ui:rer: Su:: -:s
! Significant degracation of of:e anc ecui: ment su::cris due :
corrosion was ,1centified as an issue in a walkcown cerformed orior o :ne RTS : cgram (Re#erence 13). ~he licersee commit:ac :: inspecting anc evaluating :nese su;; r:s anc ma<ing any necessary e: airs (Refererce *.1).
A1:ncugn no s:ecific inscec:t:ns were concuctec :: c -fien tne esciutier Of :nis issue, tre Conclusion is mace tna tne licensee nas adecuately accressec it cased on the following. No cases of cegracation were ecservec in four recent inscections (one related to :ne RTS or: gram repor:ec in Reference 15, one rela:ec :: small-ec-e ; icing analysis recor:ed in I 1
Reference 16, anc tne two ciscussec in :nis report). These ins:ections l covered piping and equicment in the yard (outsice), in the turbine building, and inside containment. In acdition, 195 pnotographs of 43
- .-. ~ - - -.- - - - ,
equipment and pipe supports (including equipment supporting piping), taken during the plant inspections, were reviewed for degradation with none observed.
e e
a 44
iWL+ _ .. ' '_ ~ -
- 7. CONCLUSIONS Some 46 calculations were fully audited. Specific features of 48 more were audited. Case-by-case reviews involved 34 calculations. Based on this audit activity, the majority of LTS criteria and methods were found to be correctly applied. In the remainder of the cases, revisions were made which brought the calculations into conformance. Revisions were verified by additional auditing. In some cases methods were found which had not been delineated in the criteria and methodology review. These methods were either reviewed anc founc acceptable, or they were replaced y acceotable methodologies. This was also verified by additional auditing of soecifications. Based on the audits, the coculation of calculations ecresantec by tre audited ca?culaticos has been found to be in con #cemance with tne recui-ements. :urtner, cased on the plant inspections, the calculations accurately reflect olant conditions.
l 45
4 ,
.. #m.s ,-
- - .. _. a s
- 13. Letter, D. G. Eisenhut (NRC) to K. P. Baskin (SCE), dated November 21, 1984, transmitting Contingent Recision of Suspension and Supporting Safety Evaluation Report.
- 14. Letter, H. Thompson (NRC) to K. P. Baskin (SCE), dated September 19, 1985,
Subject:
Long Term Service (LTS) Seismic Criteria and Methodology - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1.
l 1
4
)I l
I 25126 4
47
6 ,
TABLE 1.1. AUDIT PARTICIPANTS ,
Name Affiliation S. Atalik Bechtel Power Corporation (SPC)
Walter Bak Impell Dick Blaschke Southern California Edison (SCE)
T. Cheng USNRC
- 0. Day BPC W. Drummond BPC John Eidenger Impell R. P. Ellis SPC Ira Farnough Impell W. D. Gallo Impell Robert Grubb. , . _ .
Impell Gcrc:n Hau Impell Kim H0ang Impell Ward Ingles Impell E. M. Kimoto SCE 4
R. Kundalken BPC i
Bill LaFramooise Impell Henry Lin Imcell Bruce Myatt Imcell Lycia Myatt Impell R. Ceneias SCE Chiren ancya Imoeil L. Papescu Im: ell J. Rainsberry SCE Mark Russell EG&G Idaho Mark Sc tt Imoell George S:1onic:y SCE M. Swatta I=pell
'. Wang EPC
- Tres Wnite Im:eli Can Woloveke Impell Torrey Yee SEC H. T. Ying Imcell 1
I 48
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TABLE 1.3. LIST OF ACRONYMS ABS Absolute summation method AC Auxiliary cooling system AF Auxiliary feedwater system AISC American Institute of Steel Construction AISI American Iron and Steel Institute ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM American Society of Testing Materials '
BPC Bechtel Power Corporation CA Containment air system CL Class CQC Complete acadratic combination CV Chemical and volume control system FCR Field change request FCS Factor of Safety Fu Ultimate strength FW Feedwater system Fy Yield streng n IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers LTS Long term service MCC , Motor control center MFE vedified Housner ea-th:.ske MLRS Multiple level resconse s:ectra MS Main steam system vW Miscellaneous water sys em NCR <Nenconformance report NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission CEE Coerating basis eartncuate .
OSHA Occucational Safety and Health Act PVRC Pressure Vessel Researen Commi tee RC Reactor cociant sys em RG Regulatory Guide RS Reactor samoling sys em RTS Re urn to service RW Radioac fve waste system SAM Seismic ancnor motien 50
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TABLE 1.3. (continued) ,
SCE Southern California Edison-Co.
SEP Systematic Evaluation Program SER Safety evaluation report SI Safety injection system; seismic inertia (load)
SCNGS 1 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 SRSS Square root of the sum of the squares method SSE Safe shutdown earthquake SW Salt water system TER Technical evaluation recort i
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51
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4 TABLE 2.1. LIST OF AUDITED LARGE-BORE PIPING CALCULATIONS Calculation Audit Number Revision Date Date Remarks AC-06 0 08/28-35 09/19/85 Full audit AC-13 1 10/07/85 10/08/85 Audited Eqn 10 correction AC-131 1 11/29/85 12/12/85 Audited Eqn 10 correction CA-55 0 08/26/85 09/20/S5 Full audit l CA-56 1 11/29/85 12/12/85 Audited Eqn 10 correction FW-05 1 10/C8/5F 10/CS/85 Audited E:n 1C ::rrecticn 2 12/20/55 Aucitec res ;ution Of e regional plasticity ::ncerr MW-02 0 10/11/85 12/12/35 Audited Eqn 10 correction 02/17/86 Audited MLRS - PVRC da=:ing application SI-11 1 11/29/86 02/27/86 Audited MLRS + PVRC camping acclication 5!-52 2 *1/29/36
. 02.'27'56 Auc':ec MLRS - :VRC cam:ia; a:;11 cation SW-02 0 08/28/95 09/20/85 Full aucit Con fi rma- 0 04/08/30 04/16/36 This calcula icn verifies t0ry the suita ility of acolying Snalysis ne smal'-: Ore ecuiva'er-static calculatten me-h:c to large 50re icing.
LIS-REVIEW 3 -- --
This calcua-icn cocumer:s wert genera ec by ne aucit. The work was audited as it was finisnec.
RTS-REVIEW 0 C2/11/36 C2/22/86 This :alcu;a-icn cc:u erts LTS review of RTS calcula-tions; reviews of calcula-tien Nos. AF-02, FW-124, anc RC-102 were audited.
- a. This calculation had not been formally reviewed and signed off at the ,
time of the audit. I 52
TABLE 2.1. (continued)
Calculation Audit Number Revision Date Date Remarks LTS-STRAIN O 03/31/86 04/08/86 Occuments field interference check and associated calculations.
O f
1 i
53 ,
f I
i . . _ . - -. - . . - _-- . -. -
e ..
8 :
TABLE 2.2. LIST OF AUDITED SMALL-BORE PIPING CALCULATIONS Calculation Audit Number Revision Date Date Remarks AF-03 0 10/24/85 01/08/85 Full audit
- Audited application of CV-151 1 01/08/85 strain criteria, performed confirmatory analysis of strain criteria application MS-358 1 01/09/86 Audited application of strain criteria MW-02 0 10/10/55 12/12/85 Full audit SI-51 0 09/23/85 12/10/85 Full auci RC-102/ 3 09/14/84 02/17/86 Audited MLRS + PVRC camping CV-100/ application CV/101 RC-120 1 01/07/86 Full audit; performed con-firmatory analysis of strain criteria ao:li:at'On RS-54 0 C9/20/35 01/07/56 : ui: aucit RW-352 0 10/02/S5 12/12/35 :
.uli aucit 5?AN-1 1 09/20/55 01/08/86 Full aucit; c:ntains ca -
culations of most alicwaole span lengths likely to ce neecec in 55 calculations
- a. These calculations nac not been f0-mally reviewec anc signed Off a; :ne
-ime of the acci .
54
-- , , -w. y +- - . - + r m m. + -+ #. - - - - -
C.
lAliLL 2.3 LISI lit Alltelltle Pil't '.th'PIMI CAttlit Alltars'.
Awe n. i .it ed P spang .
C alculet time C.a it islat eini stinis t Nuudier is.sl .a P I Nevtssun li sl e ti.il e Lil/5tl kende k s SIN 8- AC-Ots-O l ,u/ --
O --d trJ//tif.ib Lil full audst ul all support celtulations StN'-AC-314-01,u/ JS u i l/u l/al's 0 1/ l / /156 Sl1 lull audit ut I support cele:ulatiost SIN'-AF-U/-O/ --
J ll// l/il4 n/// l/11b Lil Auditeil in suppurt of WLLo-HVW dudit i
StM'-CA-SS-u l ,u/ -- 0 09/ l'J/itS 09//l/11$ Lli full oudet ul all suptiort celtulations i StN'-CV-lbl-UI,u/ -- u 1// l//IPs til/ lu/alS Sil f ull endet ut calculatiosis f or support 4
No. SI-ul-/uli-IlutN' StN8-MW-u/-u/ /bb u 09/ tut /tes 01/u//16 Ll1 Audited stand rd csuntumient capacity c a ku lat isme SlH*-HW-3S/-01,u/ Su o ll/09/tra u l/a rJ/itt, Sti inil .nntil ul I support celt.ulation SIN *-S t 0/ 1/ *.s / O//14/ab n// l:l/ilt. Lli Audited inntet scil standard canalmanent
(.ipacity a ale salat sosis J/S l l//09/its 01/0//.b Lli Audited st andard camaponent capacity '
t/S / n//14/!!a. 0//l!l/db Lil Audited sonist led stand.ard timmponent capacity calculation SLA*-SI-OS-u l 43 1 1//uS/ith ul/1//ish Lis Audsted supinert stiffsistss (alculation StN'-S t -S t -01 490 1 --
u l/ l//1:t. Lil Audited a.upinn't stillness a alculation 5th'-Sl-b l-u/ ll$ it uti/ l//IIS til/u//ilb Lil Audited steuel..rd canuponent tapacity calculat tois l ite 1 --
ti///l/lb til Aud eleil ment al led standard tamnpunent t .q.a.. s a > . a li.u l.it soes l/S I --
O/// l/ith til Audite d inintil seil standard t'imalamient cap.ac tly e.414.ulat ion SIN *-SW-0/-01,u/ -- 0 09/ul/itS u 8// l/ItS Lil f ull .sudit ut all support a.mitulations StA*-Gil-Pl N 9// u ll//u/ilS 1// l// tis --
Full audit ul I grouted penetration frosi piping talt alat son AC-06 s,.,
- . _ . _ . . _ . __ __ _~ _ _ . . . _ _ _ -,_. .__
a IAllLL /.3 (cont esun il)
A %uttels:d l' I l#llis)
Ca lcu lat sini I..a la u t al sine Audit 16ausdier li.s t.a 1* l Ne v s .sant ihal e. . lsal e L H/*,11 ___
lhedrk s Ulla t-I S -- u -- u// lit /Itt, -- t ull suellt ut Il-l><ilt igualif icet tant r e lcu l .it io nie . Iseis triciendest a check of the ontdifical s akul.st ion for support MW-U?/le/h's WLLD-RVid -- u --
u///l/m --
1:6.ecked LIS review of 6 HIS weld calcialatious f or piping systie Af-02 data posuts 12/, I?te, 114, 311, b?), and 656 1
4 Ihis calcialatiane 141 siisi leci en tise nia. ally e e v lerw : 1.st ti.e t inie ut the audit.
. _ . - _ . _ . . . . _ i I
A 4
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4
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I Allt.L ?.4 ' l'.il ut AlllelILis 4*ll't ',Ol'I'uHl Huull it.Al14:4 i Al Lilt AllufC*
A:.sut. i.ata si P spiuq 4: l:ulat seus al4ulatBolt ^
Niusdier Auile&
Ninider Data Putut ih vissun le.s t e pate lh mark s DC-19uS t W tu, /u u wj//4/uS 10/ i l/ ass full audet LIC-19ph Iw-use tillA o 09//4/8S 1u/11/115 Audited asu: luer lault Cupacity calculatiott UC-l90/ I W-ut, uJlA d
u 09//l/u's lu/ II/ilS f ull auallt (IC- 19tt? SI-01 t.0 1 1//09/llS 1//ll/h5 Audited celtaalat ion of allowable sts'ess DC- 1911/ S t -4 4 tsu i 1 / / 0 9 /115 1//11/liS AuditeJ omicistaliaen est allowdhle stress 410-1983 St-04 lla o i
10/ua/185 lu/ l l/liS Full madit 17/10/215 1//14/itS Audite1 resoluti.wi of overstress problem IIC- 1991 Mb 15 L /lu u 10/08/115 I//14/11S Auditeil raitislat sose ist allowable stress DC-20/0 AC-t r., 28/ 0 10/ l$/115 2186 0 10/ l//:tb 12/ 14/11S Audited calculatitus ist allowdhle stress 17 / l4 /115 Auditeil raltulatsins of allowable stress DC-?o24 SI-b/ 110 0 lu/ ttilin$
l .itt u lu/ l//iLS 17/ l4/t15 Audited calculat eurs ut allowatste stress 2t15 o lu/ ttt/ttS l// li/ tis Audite:D calculat ions ut allowatale stress .
I?/ ll/llS Audited calcislat eurs saf alluwatale stre >s 4.
liiere are two sway .ta uts at stata point it:tA; e as.le is analyzed .rparately.
S/
__ _ . . _ . .. . - _ . . . . . m. _ . . _ . _ . . . . ... _. _ . _ .
' . e e
lAllLL J.1 LISI til AtilillLis Hl'.I Lll Afd till'. (t)til4>lt 141 ANil V Al V8 1.na t. tit AlltWe's C.s le.u l.at luu _ _ _ ,
1 Number Heev ia. iini li.it er bu sj us ut Aasiis t 414te H eim. ark s til- 14 / -* LCW liitat L at ti.aii.it - til/ lis/d's full audit
[l)- 19 l U // JO/It's Safe t y lie.ja?t t luu l'eaup til/O'l/tt's full audit lil-28 11 -- flysle at tuta l asak lil/ lO/tt'2 full audit ll8/Olb H --
4 in. H.H. eldi v .s i v t* lH/t)')/H'a full audit l18/0/ u -- 6 iii unit lu su. H.81. yate valvt* 10/W1/115 Itall 4 sdit ll11/06 0 --
3/4 sei. x 1- 1// lu. .lates volvia lil/025/tt's f ull audit 131/01 O O')/O*./4LS l-l// in.1s.uial v.sivi- 10 /13'8/115 Faill audit i
- d. LdCk ul d sl.e tt' i liti l t" .s l t**n llu.* i dittalatitHG llat$ OHet lat*0"It l't*W it*674'40 Jflt$ s iljilt tl 4 ll .
- b. Itais sluusid lu? a ntad as s' ale islet some No. 1815. .ulu .altialat lieu flu. 0 4.
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r.als ulas eine __ _
Nuudier liev is isua H.. t e- Aisd e l D..l e Iteinark s L IS-PL N-01 0 --* 1 / / 1 1 / 11 S l'ai t ial audild LIS-PLN-Ul-IL u -- 1// l l/lf, Pastial audit L IS-PtN-O l-Sil 0 --
l l/ml/atS tuli audit 1// i l/HS Part ial audit U///l/lth Audited nundifications tu include canisideratiuse ut inside and outside piping souttle lesads L IS-PL N-0/-ML l 0 --
l// l l/IIS Partial audit u// lH/ith Aiutated nuidif scat suis tu inclu.a.: a.iuesiderationi ut inside .I outside piping nutile loads LIS-PLN-U/-Su O --
1//ll/HS Parti nl audit 0//ld/Hi. Audeled uusdif iCatlost tu iset.luile a eussiderat stus est inside .nid outside piping siuttle loads L I S-l'L N-03 0 --
11/011/H5 tuli audit I//ll/HS Partial audit 01//9/!!6 Audite d u.udificalinn tu int lude e he t k of a
unreeufurced sphere shell L I S-PL N-03-ML l 0 --
l// l l/115 Partial autfit 0 --
O//lH/Hb Audited uindet iCallon to include consideratines of inside and outside piping nuttle loads LIS-PLN-04 0 --
l?/ll/Hu Partial audit L IS-PLN-US H --
1//II/HS l'artial audit L IS-PL N-illHA 0 ul/ul/Hb 01/OJ/H6 tull audet L IS-l'E N-lildu u --
1.3/ l I/HS Parila1 .iudit 4 L ack ut a date inditate, the a altulat ion had inet been rev leard and signed ull . i la . t he par t i a l aud i t i nc luded c hed s s ur :
(a) 10% f re elucracy t hes.6 willa esse of Sl(SS ut siottle 1.sads (b) evaluat ion ut inu cinius e r.1 sphere shell for penet rat tun nutile loads (L) cenisideral luu est ensede ..ud outside piping sauttle luals.
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Hevseo Nuudeer leinodies' Date D.a t e H. .ori 's AF-Old S l l//al/tlk 0/////.H. Heturn to Service (HIS) piping calculat eurs Al'-02-LISl8 u ul/ I's/ lit, U/////du t 15 review of His piping calculatiosi
- I SUP-AF-u?-ol S II//l/H4 u/////;u. *ipe suppurt evalis.iteusi Sit'-AF-U/-0/ 3 ll//l/H4 O/////Hu Pipe support capacit y calculatioris HC-lu?/CV-luo/CV-101 3 o'J/14 /114 0 / / 1 9 /i16 kl5 piping c.alculation HC-102/CV-100/CV-lol-Lis u u l/u//aus H//19/Hb L IS review of Hlh peptuq calculatiori SLN*-HC- 107/CV- 100/t:V-lui-til b 1 1 / ? l /184 O//19/lki Pipe support capacit y calculat forts SlN8-NC- lu?/CV- 100/4.V - lu i-u/ l 10/13/114 U//19/lue Pipe support ev.aluatson
$1,$1 1 1// I?/IP. 0/////th'. t iS piping calculdtlini 51-$1-01 1 --' 0/////tWe Pipe support evaluatensi S1-$1-02 1 --
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04/OilfIW thaalliical tuas ut valve LV- 105 1S3 0 Ol/31/sth 04/thi/tus Ilia. alit scallose of valvt At W-4f.)
tlS-PtN-U/ O 04/lts/Hb ?.1-SI Penetration calt ulat isnes LI)-O l 1 --
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- a TABLE 5.1.2 CRITICAL COMPONENTS REEVALUATE 0 AS A RESULT OF THE STRAIN
. CRITERIA APPLICATION REVIEW Support / Anchorage Load ,
Pioine System Identification Factor Remarks AF-02 SI-06-8110-H002 1.27 SI-06-8110-H503 1.27 SI-06-8111-H302 1.27 Pump G-10 1.27 The two pump anchorages were reevaluated with increased AF-02 no::le loadings.
Pump G-105 1.27 RC-102.'CV ' CL'CV '.01
. SI-01-2051-H3C5 1.47 No num:er 1.47 A new su:: ort (guide) near valve CV-305 Regenerative HX 1.47 The heat excnanger ancnorage was reevaluated with increased RC-1C2/
CV-100/CV-101 no::le loads SI-5'. SI-02-6CC5-HCC1 1.19 SI-06-50C5--001 1.19 SI-06-5005--005 1.19 SI-05-6005-H006 1.19 Pene ra-ion 3-1A 1.'9
. The we penetra-ions were recualified ni:n
. outside axial SI-51 no::le loacs increasec.
Penetration 5-1B 1.19
- a. 7he 101: fac Or was multipliac cy exis-ing loads : Ob ain 10 ads use:
for reevalua:10n.
63
.O s
a IAtiLL S./.I l 4:ALLut AllONS l AlllRS Of SAtllYINCLilut lin Ildl N t6114
/ ANil 4litt LASL-Iti e ASL-14t Vit ta Of APPLILAllONS Uf PlPL SilPPtRI ANI.it0H 110L I C41tulottoes Harv I s lini Heview husulerr ibunleer 0.a t e? Hat e a Hem.es k s L IS- Al!OL I O -* 01//11/1Hs AppliCatloss of re v ise 41 aestlu)r 1) ult criterie AC-/3 l ll//9/HS ul//II/atie Piping calculatiori StP- AC-2J-tli O ll/IN!/HS U l/."l/tih Supinsrt evaluat iou
$1P-AC-/j-O/ tl ll/thl/liS Hl//9/ith Support capacity calt'eslatlute l l'j-u/
0 --
Ol//it/Hb Valve evolu st iun (fbe. NV-/Ute)
CV ll u 1//tKt/H 1 01/30/H6 Return to Servate (HIS) paping calculallon 14f 5 HLVitid 0 01/ J0/114, hy tl$ review of Hlh pipiuq e.alculottuse I-SUP-CV-ll-01 / II/US/l!4 Support evaluateou 101:
Ul/30/8t>
b StP-CV-Il-U? I lI/05/d4 If Ol/30/Ub Support capacity cali.ul.at ion m-02 0 10/il/HS 01//11/11b Piping c. Iculet sova St48- N-U/-Ol 0 10/ lS/ti's 0 1 / /11/ 114. Support evaluatiou l
SilP- N.0/-0/ H lu/ lS/ll's 0 1/ /11/156 Support capacity L.sicul.at sune 51-S/ l l//9/it's
/ U//l!!/db P apin'l calculatinu SUP-St-S/-01 I IH/ 31/itS H//lH/ith Support evaluatiens SUP-$1-S/-02 i lu/31/ISS 0// lll/ttu Support cap.sc aly (alcul.st son
~
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4.4
5 -
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TABLE 5.2.2 RESULTS OF THE REVIEW OF AhPLICATIONS OF PIPE SUPPORT AN BOLT FACTORS OF SAFETY BETWEEN 2 AND 4 Ratio of Calculated / Allowable Stress in Critical Recion Piping Anchor Bolt Calculation Factor Piping Number of Safety (een 9) Sucport AC-23 3.4 0.42 0.54 CV-11 2.3 0.25 0.54 MW-02 3.8 0.13 0.36 SI-52 3.0 0.303 0.92 I
i 65 1
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