ML20199G915
| ML20199G915 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1997 |
| From: | Barron H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 50-369-97-15, 50-370-97-15, NUDOCS 9711250334 | |
| Download: ML20199G915 (5) | |
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. Nwlear Generation ikpremens G M)6734809 W November-19, 1997 U.
S._ Nuclear Regulatory Commission
. ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.'20555
Subject:
McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 NRC Inspection Report No. 50-369, 370/97-15 Violation 50-370/97-15-01 Reply to a Nocice of Violation (NOV)
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, attached is Duke Energy Corporation's response to a Notice of. Violation dated October 20, 1997 regarding failures.in the steam generator inspection process.
This violation was identified during inspections conducted between August 10, 1997 and September 20, 1997.
Duke Energy Corporation acknowledges this occurrence to be a violation of the requirements of Technical Specification
.6.8.1.
If there are any questions concerning this response, please contact Randy Cross at (704) 875-4179.
b Very Truly Yours,
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i H. B. Barron
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U. S._ Nuclear Regulatory Commiss' ion-Novtad>er-19, 1997 t
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Mr. Luis A. Reyes Regional Adminiscrator, Region II U.
S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St.,
SW, Suite 23 TBS Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. Victor Nerses U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear. Reactor Regulation One White Flint North, Mail Stop 9H3 Washington',
D. C.
20555 Mr. Scott Shaeffer Senior Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station
- I 4
McGuiro NualcCr StOtiin Reply to a Notice of Violution
's on the appropriate steps to take in dealing with re-run calls that do not have disagreements or discrepancies.
In addition, the limitations associated with using a single landmark for probe position verification under certain conditions were not recognized.
Also, unclear expectations were provided for the dispositioning team on the extent of review required for No Defect Found (NDF) calls on MRPC inspection.
- 2. Corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved:
Unit 2 was shutdown and the leaking 2A steam generator tube (R7C60] was identified by secondary side pressure testing.
R7C60 was the only leaking steam generator t"be.
The other three steam generators had no identified primary to secondary side leakage at the time of shutdown nor was any leakage ident.fied during Eddy Current inspection.
Tube R7C60 in steam generator 2A was repaired by plugging.
During the Unit 2 shutdown, Eddy Current testing data from the previous refueling outage was reviewed and any tubes with bobbin indications that didn't have a corresponding MRPC were re-inspected.
Out of a total of 377 tubes re-inspected, 5 tubes had indications that met the plugging criteria.
The indications did not meet the plugging criteria during the previous refueling outuge.
These 5 tubes were plugged during the Unit 2 shutdown.
An additional 19 tubes were plugged in lieu of performing additional Eddy Current testing.
There were no additional mis-characterized tubes identified during the re-inspection.
The process for establishing probe location was reviewed and modified to provide assurance of an adequate range of coverage for flaw indication.
Departmental Programs have been provided for resolution analysts to either accept matching re-run calls or involve a designated third party (Level III certified analyst).
This requires concurrence prior to changing the call.
2
McGuira Nu31COr StOtitn Reply to a Notice of Violation Expectations were clarified for the dispositioning team on the extent of the review required when the MRPC inspection result is No Defect Found (NDF).
No similar events have occurred since implementation of these corrective actions.
- 3. Corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations:
Departmental Programs for resolution analysts will be incorporated into McGuire specific guidelines prior to the next refueling outage.
The training and testing for resolution analysts will be reviewed prior to each outage to determine if adequate emphasis is placed on reviewing the extent of the eddy current exam to insure guidelines are met and to determine if additional training or testing is appropriate.
The guidelines for establishing the physical location boundaries of MRPC exams will be reviewed prior to each outage to determine if the current guideline of plus and minus 2 inches is sufficient in all cases.
The review will verify that adequate margins are established to insure that the full extent of the indications are inspected under every case including those that might lead to vertical positioning indication errors.
4.
Date when full compliance will be achieved:
McGuire Nuclear Station is now in full compliance with Technical Specification 6.8.1.
3
o McGuiro NualCOr StOticn Reply to a Notice of Violation Restatement of Violation 50-370/97-15-01 Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained for activities recommended in Apcendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program requirements, Revision 2, February 1978.
Procedures for inspection of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary are included in Appendix A.
The McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 2 Eddy Current (ET)
Analysis Guidelines, dated March 27, 1996, is a procedure for inspecting the steam generator (SG) tubes, a reactor coolant system pressure boundary.
Appendix C of the ET Guidelines requires that SG tube indications of interest found with a bobbin coil ET be examined with a rotating pancake coil within plus or minus 2 inches. Also Appendix E of the ET Guidelines requires that a resolution analyst resolve discrepancies between primary and secondary analysts.
Contrary to the above, on April 20, 1996, the ET Guidelines, Appendices C and E, were not implemented as evidenced by the following:
- 1. A SC Tube, R7C60, indication in SG 2A was not examined to the prescribed tolerance of plus or minus 2 inches as reqaired by Appendix C of the ET Guidelines, following identification of the indication by a bobbin coil ET.
- 2. A resolution analyst revised and overruled a re-examination request for SG 2A Tube R7C60, even though there was no discrepancy between the primary and secondary analysts recommendations for an indication re-examination.
As a result, Unit 2 experienced a leak in SG 2A Tube R7C60, which resulted in an unplanned outage on June 14, 1997, in order to effect repairs.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I).
Reply to Violation 50-370/97-15-01
- 1. Reason for the violation:
Inadequate guidance was provided for resolution analyst I