ML20199B193

Amend 114 to License NPF-42,revising TS 4.5.2b & Associated Bases to Eliminate Requirement to Vent Centrifugal Charging Pump Casings

ML20199B193
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	11/03/1997
From:	Thomas K NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199B200	List: ML20199B193 ML20199B208
References
NUDOCS 9711180242
Download: ML20199B193 (7)

Text

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t UNITED STATES -

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I,

2 WASHINGTON, D.C. toseH001 o+.,...../

WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-482 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.114 License No. NPF-42 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment to the Wolf Creek Generating Station (the facility) Facility Operating License No NPF-42 filed by the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (the Corporation), dated October 17, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I:

B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the prov,sions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission:

C.

There is reasonable assurance:

(1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that ~ such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations:

D.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public: and E.

The issuance of this amendment is ii1 accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

9711190242 971103

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PDR ADOCK 05000482 P

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'2.

_Accordingly. the license is amended by changes to-the Technical l

Specifications =as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of facility Operating License No. NPF-42 is hereby amended to read as follows:

2.

Technical ' So?cifications The Technical. Specifications contained'in Appendix A. as revised-through Amendment No.114. and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B. both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated in the license. The Corporation shall operate

- the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.-

3.

The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l W., N N Kristine M. Thomas. Project Manager Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

November 3, 1997

s-ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 114I FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-42 DOCKET NO.-50-482 Replace the following sages-of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages.

Tie revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

-REMOVE-INSERI.

3/4 5-4

.3/4-5-4 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2 1

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-A-EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS-1/4.5.2 - ECCS SUBSYSTEMS ~ T,y,1350*F

. LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two-independent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a.=

One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump, b.

One-OPERABLESafetyInjectionpump, c.

One. OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger, d..

One OPERABLE RHR pump, and 3.

An OPERABLE-flow cath capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a Safety Iniection signal and automatically transferringsuctiontotheconts.Innentsumpduringtherecirculation phase of operation.

. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.*

4 ACTION:

s.

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem

.o OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describ-ing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accymulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

4

• The provisions of Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 for the centrifugal charging pumps and the Safety Injection pumps decir. red inoperable pursuant to Specification 4.5.3.2 provided the centrifugal charging panps and the Safety Injection pumps are re:;tored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or prior to the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs exceeding 375'F, whichever comes'first.

WOLF CREEK - UNIT 1 3/4 5-3 4

I

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVElllANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At-least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated positions with power to the valve operators removed:

Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position BN-HV-8813 Safety injection to Open RWST Isolation Viv EM-HV-8802A(B) 51 Pump Discharge Closed Hot leg Iso Vlvs EM-HV-8835 Safety injection Open Cold Leg Iso Valve EJ-HV-8840 RHR/S1 Hot Leg Closed Recirc Iso Valve EJ-HV 8809A RHR to Accum Inj Open Loops 1 & 2 Iso Viv EJ-HV-8809B RHR to Accum Inj Open Loops 3 & 4 Iso Viv b.

At least once per 31 days by:

1)

Verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water by venting the RHR and $1 pump casings and accessible ECCS discharge piping l

high points, and 2)

Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked. sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

c.

By a visual inspection which verifies that r^ loose debris (rags.

trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the co c inment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the aump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall 3e performed:

1)

For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and 2)

At least once daily of the areas affected within containment by containment entry and during the final entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

d.

At least once per 18 months by:

1)

Verifying automatic interlock action 'f the RHR System from the Reactor Coolant System by ensuring that with a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure signal greater than or equal to 425 psig. the interlocks prevent the valves from being opened.

WOLF CREEK - UNIT 1 3/4 5-4 Amendment No, "O 105.114

5 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.S.1 ACCUMULATORS The OPERABILITY of each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators.

This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be

" operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met.

In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.

If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

3/4.5.2, 3/4.5.3, and 3/4.5.4 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break siras ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe (;ownward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

With the RCS temperature below 350*F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

WOLF CREEK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 l

t EMERGENCY CORE C001ING SYSTfMS BASf5 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continue 1)

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirements to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE charging aump to be inoperable in MODLS 4 and 5 and in MODE 6 with the reactor vessel lead on, provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operat1on of a single PORV or RHR suction relief valve.

In addition, the requirement to verify all Safety injection pumps to be inoperable in MODE 4, in MODE 5 with the water level above the top of the reactor vessel flange, and in MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on and with water level above the top of the reactor vessel flange, 3rovides assurance that the mass addition can be relieved by a single PORV or RHR suction relief valve.

With the water level not above the top of the reactor vessel flange and with the vessel head on Safety injection pumps may be available to mitigate the affects of a loss of decay heat removal during a reduced RCS inventory coadit101 The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERAB!LITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

Surveillance Requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to eacn injection po1nt is necessary to:

(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration (2) provide the progr flow s) lit between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS LOCA analyses.

The Surveillance Requirements for leakage testing of ECCS check valves ensures that a failure of one valve will not cause an intersystem LOCA.

The Surveillance Requirements to vent the RHR and SI aum] casings and accessible 1.e., can be reached without personnel hazard or 1191 radiation dose. ECCS discharge pipina ensures against inoperable pumps caused by gas binding or water hammer in ECC$

piping.

3/4 5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on kWS1 minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that: (1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the enld condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes assuming all the control rods are out of the core.

These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

WOLF CREEK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5 2 Amendment No. 63-36,114