ML20198S984

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Informs That on 981202,NRC Staff Completed Insp Planning Review (Ipr) of South Texas Project NPP & Advises of Planned Insp Effort Resulting from Ipr.Forwards Historical Listing of Plant Issues,Referred to as Plant Issues Matrix
ML20198S984
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 12/29/1998
From: Tapia J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Cottle W
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 9901120069
Download: ML20198S984 (25)


Text

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. - ga neog 0, UNITED STATES

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i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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g 611 RYAN PLAZA DRNE. SUITE 400

,e ARUNGTON. TEXAS 76011 8064

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Miliam T. Coitle, President and

. Chief Executive Officer

- STP Nuclear Operating Company

, P.O. Box 289 -

Wadsworth, Texas 77483

SUBJECT:

' INSPECT!ON PLANNING REVIEW (IPR) - SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

Dear Mr. Cottle:

On December 2,1998, the NRC staff completed a unique Inspection Planning Review (IPR) of

" South Texas Project Nuclear Plant. The staff normally conducts Semiannual Plant

Performance Reviews for_all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance and adjust inspection resources. However, due to the .

. suspension of the Systematic Assessrnent of Licensee Performance process, we implemented

an abbreviated inspection Planning Review for plant issues and to develop inspection plans.

The IPR for South Texas Project Nuclear Plant involved the participation of both Reactor Projects and Reactor Safety divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance information for the period April 23 to October 28,1998. This IPR provided NRC management with,a current summary of licensee performance trends since the last Plant Performance Review.~

Based epon this review, inspection resources have been prioritized and scheduled. No changes have been made to the inspection resources for your facility.

Enclosure 1 contains an historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that was considered during this IPR process to arrive at an integrated view of

= licensee performance trends. The PIM includes only items from inspection reports and other

-_ docketed correspondence between the NRC and STP Nuclear Operating Company. The IPR may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration.

Enclosure 2 is a general description of the PIM table labels. This material will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

o This letter als' o advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the South Texas l Project Nuclear Plant IPR. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector

' arrival onsite. Enclosure 3 details our inspection plan for South Texas Project Nuclear Plant

over the next 8 months. The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas.

' Also included in Enclosure 3 are noninspection activities related to licensed operator 9901120069 981229 PDR ADOCK 05000498 G PDR

- 1

~ . - . - - . . ~ . . - . . - - - _ . - - . . - - . . . . . - . - .. . . . -.. - . . .. - - -

STP Nuclear Operating Company -

!- examinations. Resident inspections are not listed because of their ongoing and continuous l nature. We will inform you of any changes to the inspection plan.

. If you have any _ questions, please contact me at (817) 860-8243.

Sincere ,

a J ph . Tapia P ect Branch ivision of Reactor Projects 1 Docket Nos. 50-498 -

50-499 License Nos. NPF-76 NPF-80

Enclosures:

1. Plant issues Matrix 2.' General Description of PIM Table Labels j

'3 Inspection Plan .  ;

- cc w/ enclosures:

~ Lawrence E. Martin, Vice President I Nuclear Assurance & Licensing STP Nuclear Operating Company P.O. Box 289

Wadsworth, Texas 77483

- A. Ramirez/C. M. Canady

- City of Austin -

Electric Utility Department

. 721 Barton Springs Road Austin, Texas 78704 Mr. M. T. Hardt/Mr. W. C. Gunst City Public Service Board

-P.O. Box 1771 -

San Antonio, Texas 78296

-D. G. Tees /R. L. Balcom

Houston Lighting & Power Company P.O. Box 1700 l- . Houston, Texas 77251' I

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- STP Nuclear Operating Company l Jori C. Wood Matthews & Branscomb

One Alamo Center 1106 S. St. Mary's Street, Suite 700 l San Antonio, Texas 78205-3692 ,

Jack. R. Newman, Esq. .;

~ Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M. Street, N.W. .

. Washington, D.C. 20036-5869 1

  1. .j Mr. G. E. Vaughn/Mr. C. A. Johnson l Central Power & Light Company P.O. Box 289 Mail Code: N5012 l

- Wadsworth, Texas 77483 - l lNPO-

. Records Center

- .700 Galleria Parkway .

Atlanta, Georgia 30339-5957 )

Bureau of Radiation Control )

State of Texas  !

' 1100 West 49th Stre' c '

l Austin, Texas 78756 Mr. Jim Calloway

-Texas Public Utility Commission

- William B. Travis Building .

L1701 North Congress Avenue P.O. Box 13326

. Austin, Texas 78701-3326 .;

' John Howard, Director Environmental and Natural Resources Policy Office'of the Governor'-  !

P.O. Box 12428. ,

Austin, Texas 78711

-' Judge, Matagorda County Matagorda County Courthouse

-1700 Seventh Street-Bay City, Texas 77414 l.

l if .

l STP Nuclear Operating Company ~ 2 b '"-

l E-Mail report to T. Frye (TJF)

E Mail report to D. Lange (DJL) l E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)

E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)

E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)

E-Mail report to Frank Talbot (FXT)

, ,; bec to DCD (IE01)' -

bec distrib. by RIV:

Regional Administrator Resident inspector -

DRP Director DRS-PSB l Branch Chief (DRP/A) . MIS System i Project Engineer (DRP/A) RIV File - i

! Branch Chief (DRP/TSS) R. Bachmann, OGC (MS: 15-B-18)

The Chairman (MS: 16-G-15) Records Center, INPO l Deputy Regional Administrator Carol Gordon '

. Commissioner Dieus B. Henderson, PAO Commissioner Diaz C. A. Hackney Commissioner McGaffigan SRis ai all RIV sites  ;

Commissioner Merrifield - B. Murray, DRS/PSB i

' W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 17-G-21)

Associate Dir, for Projects, NRR

- Associate Dir. for insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR SALP Program Manager, NRR/lLPB (2 copies).

J. Hannon, NRR Project Director (MS: 13-H-1) i T. Alexion, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13-H-3)

I I

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRPDIR\lPR\STP To receive copy of document, Indicate inbox: "C" = Copy without enclosures *E" = Copy with enclosures *N" = No copy RIV:C:DRP/A[A A:DRA DD:DRP l/11:DRP J

! JITapia;df M orjb ATHalve'll KEBrock,msn TPGwynn i f 12//f./98 fYh 12/ % 98 12/ / 98 12d/98 V

'i OFFICl4L RECORD COPY '

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STP Nuclear Operating Company DEC 2 91998 E-Mail report to T. Frye (TJF) )

E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)

- E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)

E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)

E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)

E-Mail report to Frank Talbot (FXT)

, bec to DCD (IE01) bec distrib. by RIV:

Regional Administrator Resident inspector  ;

DRP Director DRS-PSB j Branch Chief (DRP/A) MIS System  !

Project Engineer (DRP/A) RIV File j

Branch Chief (DRP/TSS) R. Bachmann, OGC (MS
15-B-18)

The Chairman (MS: 16-G-15) Records Center, INPO Deputy Regional Administrator ' Carol Gordon  !

Commissioner Dicus B. Henderson, PAO Commissioner Diaz C. A. Hackney Commissioner McGaffigan SRis at all RIV site.s l Commissioner Merrifield B. Murray, DRS/PSB W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 17-G-21)

Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR SALP Program Manager, NRR/lLPB (2 copies)

J. Hannon, NRR Project Director (MS: 13-H-1)

T. Alexion, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13-H-3)

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRPDIR\lPR\STP To receive copy of document, Indicate In box: "C" = Copy without enclosures "E" =_ copy with enclosures 'N" = No copy RIV:C:DRP/C A:DRn DD:DRP /nDRP J l

JITapia;df M .att ATHalve'll KEBrocipran TPGwynn i f

12/26/98 [Y h 12/ % 98 12/,/f98 12/ #/98 V '1 OFFICl4L RECORD COPY '

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ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 07/25/98 POS 1R 98-07 NRC OPS 1A 1C 2A Operators exhibited good teamwork during Unit 2 control rod testing and startup actmties.

Operators responded well to several minor equipment problems and remained focused on plant safety. The schedule for this brief-duration outage was detailed and realistic, resulting in an improvement in material condition of the plant and confirmation that all rod control cluster assemblies were functioning as expected.

06/13/98 NEG IR 98-06 NRC OPS 1A 3B A worker left a safety-related ventilation boundary door from the mechanical auxiliary building to t"e atmosphere open and unattended. The inspector observed the occurrence and remained cognizant of the oversight until he could access the area and close the door, preventing a violation of operating procedures. The shift supervisor took positive action to prevent recurrence.

03/13/98 STR 1R 98-06 NRC OPS 1A 3A 3B During routine daily observations, the professional demeanor of licensed operators in the main control room, the use of self-verification techniques, the use of closed-loop communications techniques, and operator knowledge were considered strengths.

06/13/98 POS IR 98-06 NRC OPS 2A in general, equipment availability and material condition were excellent and plant housekeeping was good. The Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System Train A, inspected on May 12, was in excellent material condition, was properly aligned for standby conditions, and was considered to be operable. However, minor deficiencies were identified.

06/04/38 POS IR 98-301 NRC OPS 3A 3B Five of the six applicants for senior operator licenses passed their examinations (one failed the written exam). Applicants demonstrated effective oversight and good communication techniques during the dynamic scenarios. A common applicant performance weakness involving clearance order review was ident#ied in that the majority of the apphcants failed to or were slow in identifying that component cochng water had not been designated for isolation for overhaul of a residual heat removel pump.

06/04/98 POS 1R 98-301 NRC OPS 3B The licensee submitted a proposed examination that was adequate for administration, which represented an improvement when compared to the previous submittal for the prior license l

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05/02/98 POS IR 98-05 NRC OPS 1A Corzc room operator performance was strong. Effective communication and self- l verification techniques were utilized. Shift tumovers were thorough.

04/17/98 NEG 1R 98-05 NRC OPS 1C 3A 3B Incomplete procedural guidance combined with a failure cf operatoes to fully understand system alignment resulted in a trip of Steam Generator Feedwater Pump 12 while aligning the balance of plant diesel generator for testing.

October 28,1998 1 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 04/17/98 POS IR 98-05 NRC OPS 1B 2A Operator and plant equipment response to the Steam Generator Feed Pump 12 trip was excellent. Use -af abnormal procedures and communication in the control room and by radio with plant operators was excellent throughout the recovery effort.

03/27/98 POS IR 98-01 NRC OPS 38 Senior reactor operators demonstrated a strong knowledge of their responsibility for recording equipment functional and nonfunctional time for risk profile eva!uations and unavailability tracking .

03/21/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC OPS 2A Emergency core cooling system observable material condition was very good. Equipment rooms were well lit and housekeeping was excellent. System components were property aligned and free of visible leaks.

03/21/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC OPS 1A Control room operator performance was characterized by strong control board awareness, good communications, and professionalism.

02/14/98 VIO IR 98-03 LIC OPS 28 A fire protection header in Unit 1 containment was isolated for 2 months. Resulted from SL IV inadequate release of an equipment clearance order. The closed isolation valve provided an alarm in the fire protection computer system. Licensee program did nnt require verification of historical alarms in fire protection system. Violation of License Condition 2.E

  • Fire Protection".

02/14/98 POS IR 98-03 NRC OPS 1A Licensed operator performance in both units was very good. Continuous awareness of plant conditions resulted from superior attention to control panel indications. Annunciator response was performed in accordance with in-hand response procedures. Radio communications with plant operators were good.

01/24/98 POS IR 98-03 NRC OPS 1A 3C Online implementation of the Unit 1 control room modification was good. Coordination of work activities was excellent. Application of lessons learned from the Unit 2 modification reduced the impact to Unit operations. Compensatory measures for interim states were verified. The shift supervisor stepped work during risk significant activities.

01/03/98 POS IR 97-08 NRC OPS 3A 3B Licensed operators in the main control room perfomled in a professional manner.

Continuous awareness of plant conditions resulted from superior attention to control panel indications. Response to a steam generator feedwater pump trip was very good.

October 28,1998 2 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE __

12/29/97 POS 1R 97-08 NRC OPS 38 3C The overall response to a main transformer oil leak was excellent. Plant response to the rapid power reduction was very good. Corrective actions were well designed and properly validated the condition of the main transtormer.

12/29/97 NEG IR 97-08 NRC OPS 3A 30 SC A licensed operator attempted to trip a steam generator feedwater pump without first completing operating procedure prerequisites. Plant design requirect that the startup feedwater pump be disabled prior to tripping a main feedwater pump. Peer checking prevented a procedural violation. However, a condition report was not written until requested by the inspectors.

12/05/97 NEG IR 97-301 NRC OPS 3B The licensee initially failed to submit an acceptable examination for administration to operator licente applicants for of the control room systems and facility walkthrough portion of the examination. Several revisions by the licensee were required to produce a product which satisfied examination standards. This resulted in delaying administration of the operating test portion of the examination 12/05/97 F'OS IR 97-301 NRC OPS 3B All six applicants for reactor operator hcenses and all eight applicants for senior operator licenses displayed the requisite knowledge and skills to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55 and were issued the appropriate licenses.

12/05/97 VIO IR 97-301 NRC OPS 3B A violation involving the granting of examination exemptions to two individuals contrary to the SLIV regulations was identified by the NRC. Because the licensee had completed its assessment ,

and revised its procedure to prohibit exemptions and ensure that all licensed operators meet i the requirements, no response was requested. This was caused by an inappropriate revision ,

to the administrative procedure which occurred in late 1994 or early 1995. Violation of 10 CFR 55.59 (c)(4).

12/0';/97 POS IR 97-301 NRC OPS 3B Overall, the operator license applicants demonstrated good crew dynamics and communications. Individual self-verification was consistently good during control panel and equipment manipulations.

11/21/97 POS IR 97-08 NRC OPS 1B 3B Plant equipment and licensed operators provided an exceilent response to a failed closed LER LER 2 97-007 main feedwater regulating valve. Emergency operating procedures were followed. Plant equipment responded as designed to the manual reactor trip. Control room supervision added value during the event response.

October 28,1998 3 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX

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l DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 11/15/97 NEG IR 97-07 NRC OPS 3A Position indication was poor for several remote-manually operated valves. These valves had j

previously been mispositioned resulting in a loss of volume control tank level and, in another l instance, spent fuel poollevel 11/15/97 POS IR 97-07 NRC OPS 3C 3A SA The implementation of the Unit 2 control room human interface modification was well I coordinated with plant operators and well controlled. Contingency plans and compensatory actions were well developed and in place. However, one fire loading issue was identified and

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resolved.

11/15/97 POS IR 97-07 NRC OPS 1C An action plan to reseat two leaking moisture separator reheater relief vafves property included personnel safety controls, plant impact assessment, and appropriate contingency plans. Shutting down the turbine-generator to repair the valves was a conservative action.

11/10/97 NEG IR 97-07 NRC OPS 3B 3C An inadvertent auxiliary feedwater actuation resulted from the failure to balance instrument signals prior to transferring the steam dump mode of control during plant stabilizaton following a Unrt 1 reactor trip.

10/06/97 POS IR 97-07 NRC OPS 3B 3A 4A Licensed operator response to a failure of a moisture separator reheater relief valve was LER 197-013 excellent. The shift supervisor exhibited superior command and control in directing the rapid shutdown of the unit.

10/04/97 POS IR 97-06 NRC OPS 3A 3C Licensed operators were continuously aware of plant conditions and fully understood control panelindications. Annunciator response was considered excellent.

10/04/97 VIO IR 97-06 NRC OPS 4C 39 Operators failed to verify certain containment penetration isciation valve positions once per SLIV IR 97-05 31 days as required by Technical Specifications 4.6.1.1.a. Licensee interpretation of Technical Specifications indicated that valves in the isolation scheme of 10 containment penetrations were exempt from Technical Specification verification requirements. The violation was withdrawn based on enforcement discretion in accordance with Section Vll.B.6 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and unresolved item 9705-02 was closed.

10/04/97 POS IR 97-06 NRC OPS 4C SC Refueling and Equipment Outage 1REO7 was well run and controlled with a proper perspective on nuclear safety and shutdown risk. Schedule setbacks were aggressively addressed while ensuring that workers performed <:autiously. Shift supervisors maintained cognizance of safety system status.

October 28,1998 4 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT I

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 09/05/98 POS IR 98-08 NRC MAINT 2A 28 3A The extended Standby Diesel Generator 23 outage to perform 18-month inspections and preventive maintenance was well planned, detailed, and completed without problems. The configuration risk management program was property implemented to ensure conformity to plant risk analyses during this extended outage. Work activities were closely coordinated, adequately supervised, and were fully supported by system engineering and vendor personnel.

09/05/98 NEG IR 98-08 NRC MAINT 3A The inspectors identified examples of poor documentation of work activities performed following initial failure of postmaintenance testing in two safety-related systems. These included the identification of corrosion on an auxiliary feedwater pump govemor velve and troubleshooting and rework on a control room filtration unit. In each case the problems were added to existing condition reports, minimizing the effectiveness of problem reporting.

08/27/98 ED NOEDs LIC MAINT 2B 4C The licensee identified that inservice tests were missed for 21 check valves required to eel 98-6-016 perform a containment isolation function as required by the ASME Boiler and Pressure 98-4-008 Vessel Code. The NRC exercised enforcement discretion in accordance with the NRC EA 98-451 Enforcement Policy (NUREG 1600 Revision 1) on August 28,1998, to permit additional time IR 98-08 to test the affected valves in order to avoid an unnecessary plant shutdown. An eel was opened to review the licensee's corrective actions when docketed.

07/25/98 NEG 1R 98-07 LIC MAINT 2B 2A 3A Following governor stem work on the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump turbine, maintenance workers experienced difficulty aligning the governor linkages due to uriclear work instructions. In the process of troubleshooting, the governor was damaged and required replacement, which resulted in an increased outage time. Operations and system engineering and design engineering personnel provided close support during troubleshooting and repair efforts.

06/13/98 POS IR 98-06 NRC MAINT 3A In general, technician performance during maintenance activities observed was very good.

Survei!!ance testing observed was well conducted in accordance with approved procedures and properly implemented the Technical Specification surveillance requirements.

06/08/98 NEG IR 98-06 NRC MAINT 2B 3A When a replacement circuit board failed to calibrate, technicians attempted to perform work on this solid state protection system component when the work instructions were known to be insufficient to provide adequate guidance. The inspector questioned the appropriateness of this action, and the work was suspended, prior to any actions resulting in a procedural violation. Maintenance management stated that this isolated case did not meet mat.agement's expectations.

October 28,1998 5 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 05/02/98 POS IR 98-05 NRC MAINT 2B 3A Technician performance during maintenance and surveillance activities observed were very good. Work packages and instructions provided appropriate detail and vendor information was property incorporated. Surveillance testing observed was well conducted in accordance with approved procedures and property implemented the Technical Specification surveillance requirements.

05/02/98 POS IR 98-05 NRC MAINT 2A Equipment material condition was excellent. Feedwater pump turbine control systems and startup feedwater pump automatic functions performed as designed in response to a feedwater pump 21 trip.

05/01/98 ED LETTER LIC MAINT 4A 4C The licensee's request for a notice of enforcement discretion to permit repairs of the Fuel 05/05/98 Handling Building Exhaust Booster Fan 118 satisfied the NRC's policy for enforcement IR 98-06 discretion. Certain information related to previous booster fan failures was not provided to the NRC. However, after a thorough review, the information was not considered material to the final NRC decision.

03/27/98 STR 1R 98-01 NRC MAINT SA SC The reviewed self assessments were thorough, comprehensive, detailed, and addressed areas of Maintenance Rule implementation. The licensee's corrective actions were appropriate for the problems identified with one exception for corrective actions for the licensee-identified failure to establish on unavailability measure for the solid state protection system.

03/27/98 STR 1R 98-01 NRC MAINT 4C SA SC The procedures for performing periodic evaluations met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65.

The monthly assessments and a su nmary report were comprehensive and were useful tools for evaluating structures, systems, and components performance.

03/27/98 STR 1R 98-01 NRC MAINT 3A 4C A programmatic strength was identified with: (1) the practice of updating the nsk assessment calculator software program to reflect results from the most current probabilistic risk assessment mode, (2) the process for assessing plant risk resulting from equipment out of service, and (3) the process for evaluating plant risk during various modes.

03/27/98 URI 1R 98-01 NRC MAINT 4C The failure to establish measures to evaluate the unavailability of the solid state protection EA 98-322 system was a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2). STP does not believe a violation occurred.

The violation was reclassified as unresolved item 9801-03 until NRC reviews (1) how STP meets NUMARC 93-01, section 12.2.4 and (2) related unavailability sensitivity study.

03/27/98 WK IR 98-01 NRC MAINT 4C The failure to include the responsible system engineers in the review determinations of nonfunctional failures was a minor program weakness.

October 28,1998 6 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 03'27/98 WK IR 98-01 NRC MAINT 4C The failures to appropriately identrfy Maintenance Rule functonal failures associated with the essential cooling water, efectrical auxiliary building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning, and instrument air systems were a weakness in the licensee's implementaton of the Maintenance Rule program.

03/27/98 VIO IR 98-01 NRC MAINT 3A 4C 5A The licensee's program scoping was conservative and thorough, with some exceptions. The SLIV LIC failure to include in the scope of the Maintenance Rule program the digrial rod position NCV indication system and the function of the electrical auxiliary building heating, ventilating. and air conditioning system to automatically and manually transfer control room envelope ventilation to the recirculation operating mode was a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b). A noncited violation consistent with Section Vil.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy related to the licensee's identification of not including tne instrumentation air compressors, containment building cranes, fuel handling building cranes, and the 138/13.8kV emergency transformers in the scope of the Maintenance Rule program.

03/21/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC MAINT 2B 3B 4B The licensee demonstrated good planning, coordination, and risk evaluation in the performance of surveiltances, preventive and corrective maintenance. On one occasion, engineers and craft failed to consider the effect of installed test instruments on system performance. This condition complicated troubleshooting and delayed restoration of Standby Diesel Generator 13 to operable status.

02/14/98 NCV IR 98-03 NRC MAINT SA A condition report was not written to address an identified work order discrepancy until 6 months after identification. Work contro!!er identified an open work package that could have implemented a contingency design change package that required further review. The issue was the subject of severalintemal documents and discussions before a condition report was written. Conditon report program requires a condition report upon identification of discrepancies. This violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 is an NCV consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

02/14/98 POS 1R 98-03 NRC MAINT 28 Maintenance and surveillance activities observed were very good and supported continued plant operations. Technician performance during corrective and preventive maintenance activities was very good. Work instructions incorporated vendor supplied information.

Survei!!ance testing implemented the Technical Specification requirements.

October 28,1998 7 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

ENCLOSUREl_1, PLANT ISSUES MATRIX-DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 02/14/98 STR 1R 98-03 NRC MAINT 28 A generic review of the licensee's preventive maintenance program was performed and the inspectors concluded that the program was very good. A review of several completed PM packages encompassing all activities associated with the program requirements was performed with no concerns identified. Scope / intent, work instruction, vendor requirements and recommendation, and post PM review were good.

02/11/98 NEG IR 98-03 NRC MAINT 5A A condition report was not written to address an identified employee concems program failure to address an individuars concern. Concern was brought to the ECP more than once.

ECP personnel acknowledged the concern but did not enter their process to address the problem.

01/03/98 POS 1R 97-08 NRC MAINT 28 Maintenance and survei!!ance activities observed were very good and supported continued plant operations. Technician performance during corrective and preventive maintenance activities was very good. Work instructions incorporated vendor supplied information.

10/29/97 POS IR 97-07 NRC MAINT SC The replacement of an air actuator diaphragm on 3 containment isolation valve was good implementation of corrective actions to conditions identified by the licensee's review for the applicability of NRC Information Notice 96-68. i 10/04/97 POS IR 97-06 NRC MAINT 2B 3C Containment inspections conducted in accordance with Technical Specification requirements were well implemented and provided additional assurance of containment sump operability.

Licensee hutory in this area included repeat violations. Corrective actions were in place and appeared to be ef;ective.  !

10/04/97 POS IR 97-06 NRC MAINT 4A Independent calculations indicated that component cooling water heat exchanger fouling factor had been appropriately determined. Performance testing of these heat exchangers was being performed in accordance with Generic Letter 89-13.

October 26,1998 8 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

_ _ _ _ . _ . . . . _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _______.___.___-___.,,__.______.___..._______.____________.-_---______________._________________________________m_

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 09/05/98 POS IR 98-08 NRC ENG 4B New fuel receipt inspections and irradiated fuel bowing inspections were well performed.

Supervisica and procedural controls were noteworthy. Bypassing the new fuel dry storage racks resulted in time savings and reduced fuel handling operations.

07/25/98 POS IR 98-07 NRC ENG SB 4B 2B Inspectors identified a potential operability cor'cem during testing of the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Design engineering was able to show through calculations and test data that water observed draining from the turbine exhaust line was condensed in the cool exhaust line due to low flow rate and lack of warming following maintenance. The inspectors we'e satisfied that the water would not be present or affect turbine operabihty during startup from a normal standby condition. Design engineering was responsive and thorough in addressing this issue.

07/23/98 POS IR 98-14 NRC ENG 4B The current effectiveness of licensee review of vendor technical documents was considered good 07/23/98 STR 1R 98-14 NRC ENG 48 The licensee quakty organization has performed comprehensive oversight of Westinghouse and its subvendors during materials manufacture and steam generator vessel fabrication, and has been proactive in the measures taken to assure compliance with the technical and quality requirements of the licensee specification for replacement steam generators 06/13/98 POS IR 98-06 NRC ENG 4A 4C Engineering evaluations related to a temporary reverse osmosis skid were of very good quahty. The engineers' identification of a potential interaction between the temporary system and the charging suction line was excellent.

05/02/98 POS 1R 98-05 NRC ENG 4B The engineering evaluations for the removal of the north switchyard bus from service and the reduction in hot leg injection time were thorough and provided the appropriate level of detait.

03/21/98 NCV IR 98-04 LIC ENG 28 A licensee evaluation determined that temperature switches used for area temperature LER LER 1-97-001 monitoring had incorrect tolerances resulting in a failure to fully meet the requirements of T.S.

4.7.13 for monitored area temperature limits. The temperatures were monitored and logged by plant operators once per shift until the switches were recalibrated with a more rigorous setpoint or replaced.

October 28,1998 9 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

d ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 03/21/98 NCV IR 98-04 LIC ENG 28 A licensee review of the containment spray ESF system actuation logic surveillance LER LER 1-97-008 procedure per NRC GL 96-01 identified that Technical Specification Surveilfance requirement 4.3.2.1 was not being met when the preventive maintenance interval for the implementing procedure was changed. The licensee revised the procedure and perfomied the tests to satisfy the requirements.

03/21/98 VIO IR 98-04 NRC ENG 4A 4C An inadequate unreviewed safety question review resulted in the licensee implementing a SLIV change to the facility as described in the UFSAR without prior NRC review and approval as required by 10 CFR 50.59, which was a violation. Recalcu!ation of the radiological j consequences of a LOCA resulted in an increase in dose to the control room and TSC.

Although within acceptable limits, the increase represents an increase in consequences of an analyzed accident and is an unreviewed safety question. The Licensee denied the violation.

03/21/98 NCV IR 98-04 LIC ENG 2B A licensee review of survei!!ance procedures in accordance with NRC GL 96 01 identified that LER LER 1-97-004 the 4160 volt bus undervoltage logic was not fully tested as required by T.S. 4.3.2.1. The units entered T.S. 3.0.3 and 4.0.3, the procedures were revised, and the logics were tested satisfactority.

02/14/98 POS IR 98-03 NRC ENG 4C Engineering evaluations reviewed were thorough and provided adequate detail to support continued operability of the subject components. Evaluation of generic issue involving thermal binding of Terry turbine govemor valve stems was thorough. Test recommendation was conservative.

01/03/98 POS IR 97-08 NRC ENG 4A Condition report engineering evaluations reviewed were thorough and provided adequate detail to support continued operability of the subject components. Water intrusion into the Standby Diesel Generator 12 local operating panel was property eva!uated. Components in the 125 vde system were considered operable following a system overvoltage condition.

Additional testing was appropriately recommended to support this operability determination.

11/13/97 STR Trip Report NRC ENG 3C 4C Regarding the licensee's corrective action program, their design engineering department's ,

workload is currently less than 1500 actions (1500 actions is their upper limit goat). Only 17 I of these actions are significant conditions adverse to quality or conditions adverse to quality-station level. The 17 actions have an average age of 58 days (120 days is design I engineering department's upper limit goal). '

October 28,1998 10 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 11/13/97 STR Trip Report NRC ENG 4C 3C Regarding the licensee's quality assurance program in the area of engineenng, tt are were no significant conditions adverse to quality found by the licensee in the last 18 months. This does not appear to be commensurate with the number of NRC inspection findings. The licensee did find numerous lesser significant conditions adverse to quality during the same period. In the area of setpoint calculations, the licensee indicated they could have done a better job with regard to impact assessment and interdisciplinary review.

11/13/97 STR Trip Report NRC ENG 3B The licensee appears to have a strong engineering training program. In additon to position specific and general continuing training, approximately 50 engineers have been SRO certified, and the licensee's goal is to have all engineering managers SRO certified.

11/12/97 VIO 1R 97 c' 4 LIC/ ENG 2B 5B The NRC identified surveillance procedures which were not appropriate to the circumstances.

SLIV EA 97-523 NRC Measuring and test equipment accuracy assumptions included in the process instrument uncertainty calculations were not correctly translated into the following process instrument calibration procedures: (1) Surveillance Procedures OPSP05-RC-0417, "RCS Flow Transmitter Calibration

  • Pevision 0, and OPSP05-MS-0514L, " Main Steam Pressure Loop Calibration," Revision 1, both required a voltmeter accuracy of 0.15 percent, when an accuracy of 0.015 percent was assumed in the associated Westinghouse uncertainty calculations.

(2) Procedure OPSP06-PK-0005, "4.16KV Class 1E Degraded Voltage Relay Channel Calibration /TADOT-Channel 1', Revision 4 directed that the degraded voltage relays be tested using a test set monitor with an accuracy 7;f plus or minus 1.0 percent of reading. An accuracy of plus or minus 0.4 percent was assumed in Calculation EC-5052, " Degraded and Undervolage Protection," Revision 3. This was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. ,

11/12/97 URI 1R 97-24 NRC ENG 4A 4C The team identified two examples where the licensee did not accurately update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The team concluded that the licensee hkely would have identified these examples dttring their reverification process. Both examples involved incorporation of design information related to license am9ndments, which were reviewed and approved by the NRC staff. However, the change notices which initiated these updatea were prepared before the licensee increased their emphasis on Updated Final Safety Analysis accuracy. The licensee committed to a complete reverification of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to confirm its accuracy. The licensee had not yet performed the reverification of the specific Updated Final Safety Analysis Report sections in question.

October 28,1998 11 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

Netosuasi PLANTISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION

, CODE 11/12/97 POS 1R 97-24 NRC ENG 4B 4C The unreviewed safety question evaluations were comprehensive and we!! researched. Of the screenings review, none were found which required a unreviewed safety questson evaluation The team reviewed 9 unreviewed safety question evaluations (USOEs) and 510 CFR Part 50.59 applicability screenings and subsequeZt nuclear safety evaluations for temporary moc5fications, permanent modifications, engineenng change notices, engineering analyses, and procedure changes.

11/12/97 VIO IR 97-24 NRC ENG 4A SA SC Design basis calculations were not a! ways consis%.! with the physical design of the plant.

SL IV EA 97-523 Calculations were not being systematically evaluated or revised when their associated design inputs were changed. During the inspection, the licercee revised their program, which administrative!y controls calculsions, to include an impact review sheet. The licensee planned to use the impact review to identify and document the impact of calculation changes on procedures, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and other calculations. Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion llL 11/12/97 NEG IR 97-24 NPC ENG 3B 4B Loads were being added and subtracted from the vital batteries without evaluating the impact on the battery surveillance service test acceptance criteria. The team reviewed what appeared to be the criticalloading period End determined the acceptance criteria was bounding.

11/12/97 VIO IR 07-24 NRC ENG 2B SC On July 11,1995 Revision 7 of Calculation MC-5037, *DeterminatiorVValidation of RWST SL IV EA 97-523 Level Setpoints," changed the facility as described in the safety analysis report and the safety analysis report was not updated. For example, Calculation MC-5037 specified that the design margin allowed for instrument uncertainty associated with the tank level transmitter was 4.38 percent of instrument span or 23,469 gations. This was less than the 5 percent or 26,550 ga!!ons allowed for tank level instrument uncertainty in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 6.3.2.2,

  • Equipment and Component Descriptions; Refueling Water Storage Tank." This was a violation of 10CFR50.71(e).

October 28,1998 12 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOUTC ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE a

11/12/97 URI 1R b -24 NRC ENG 4B 5A 28 The unresolved item related to the review of the safety impact of the licensee's decision to IR 97-16 defer planned setpoint program improvements was left open for additional followup of specife technicalissues identified by the team. The team identified severalinadequate calculations which the licensee is correcting. For example, the licensee is reperforming: (1) the tank level setpoint uncertainty analyses for the AFST, the VCT and the RWST, (2) the uncertainty analysis for the degraded voltage relay setpoint, and (3) the vortex reserve calculation for the AFST.

The team also determined that the analytical basis for preventing air ingestion into the ECCS pumps from the RWS T, during swapaver to containment sump, was not adequate. The licensee is reperformMg the analysis and revising the UFSAR. After the basis is established, the NRC will rev,ew to determine RG 1.82 test data was appropriately applied.

11/12/97 VIO IR 97-24 NRC ENG SC 5A The NRC identified that from June 30,1997 until September 17,1997, Plant Design SLIV EA 97-523 Calculation ZC7002, " Analysis of uncertainties for the DNB Related Parameter - Tavg*

Revision 0, and a vendor supplied calculation, addressing the same issue for the same parameter, summarized in letter ST-WN-HS-97-0018, dated June 30,1997, were both maintained in an active status. On August 21,1997, the vendor information was used to revise the Surveillance Procedure OPSP03-ZO-0028, " Operator Logs," Revisicn 33, w;thout voiding the site calculation. This was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.

11/12/97 VIO IR 97-24 NRC ENG 4C 48 3C Programmatic calculation deficiencies, first identified in Observatica 92-01-13, from SLIV EA 97-523 Engineering Assurance Assessment 92-01, conducted from January 30 through April 28, 1992 and re-identified in contractor assessments completed in April and June of 1996 were not promptly corrected. This was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI,

" Corrective Actions".

10/22/97 POS IR 97-07 NRC ENG 58 4B An evaluation of a concern related to the localleak rate test of a containment penetration properly bounded the potential problem. The engineering analysis and calculations were thorough and conclusions were well founded.

10/04/97 POS IR 97-06 NRC ENG 4A The analyses and practices related to spent fuel pool cooling and clean-up systems property verified that pool loading would remain within the licensing basis assumptions. The licensee had previously not routinely ensured that peak spent fuel pool temperatures during core offload would remain below the UFSAR design limit.

October 28,1998 13 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE . SOURCE .ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 10/04/97 f>EG IR 97-06 NRC ENG 2B The licensee had not completed intemal inspections of standby diesel generator heat IR 98-03 exchangers since 1993. Preventive rnaintenance task:s had not specifically required intemal heat exchanger inspections. This was contrary to commitments made in response to Generic Letter 89-13. The unresolved item was closed by heat exchanger inspections documented in IR 98-03.

10/04/97 VIO IR 97-06 NRC ENG 4A 4C Engineers failed to document a written safety evaluation of the installation of the advanced SLIV liquid waste processing system in September 1992. This failure also resulted in several deviations from Updated Final Safety Analysis Report commitments not being property addressed. This was a violation of 10CFR50.59. In addition, two examples of Ikensing commitments not being implemented in the plant were noted.

10/04/97 NEG IR 97-06 NRC ENG 3B 4C. 3C- Licensed operators failed to maintain the pressurizer backup heaters inoperable while at water solid conditions. Procedural controls did not implement commitments governing administrative controts referred to in Technical Specification 3.4.9.3. Procedural controls goveming other administrative controis required when pressurizer POP.Vs are out of service were limited.

10/02/97 POS IR 97-07 NRC ENG 5B 4C The temporary modification written to repair a leaking high pressure seal at the seal plate was property dewtoped and implemented. An unreviewed safety question determination and work risk assessment were performed and specified conservative controls over the field y ork.

October 28,1998 14 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA "EMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION

,w CODE 09/05/98 WK IR 98-08 NRC PS 5B SC The licensee failed cn two previous occasions to adequately investigate the cause of unexpected power transfers, which led to loss of power to portions of the security system. As a resu!!, the undertying equipment deficiency was not recognized and corrected, and the first event repaated itself. Additionally, a breaker interlock that was not included in operator training or operating procedures contributed to these events. Inadeqcate security response to the precursor alarm also contributed to the loss of power.

08/07/98 POS IR 98-13 NRC PS 1C 3A 3B Overall, performance was good. The control room (CR), technical support center (TSC),

operations support center (OSC), and emergency operations facility (EOF) successfully implemented most essential emergency plan functions inc'uding classification, notification, assembly and accountability, and inplant team protection and control.

08/07/98 NEG IR 98-13 NRC PS IB 3A Electrical power was not restored in a timely manner following the loss of offsite power and the station blackout. CR communication problems contributed to difficufties in classifying events, and three-part communications were not used consistently.

08/07/98 NEG IR 98-13 NRC PS 18 3A 3B Contamination controls and radiological surveys were not always complete or proper. The fire brigade responded well to the simulated emergency situations, but some members did not perform proper pre-use tests, and one member did not have corrective lens inserts for respiratory protection equipment.

08/07/98 NEG IR 98-13 NRC PS 1B 3A At times, field teams were not always effectively controlled: one team was directed to enter the plume twice at the 1-mile point, and there was no coordination with the state to monitor or confirm radiation levels 10 miles downwind.

08/07/98 STR 1R 98-13 NRC PS SA Post-exercise critiques in the TSC, OSO, and EOF were very thorough, cpen, and self-critical. A professional and candid management critique that included offsite agency representatives was conducted. The use of peer evaluators from other sites added <4epth to the critique process.

08/07/98 POS IR 98-13 NRC PS 3A 3B The exercise scenario was challenging and provided an above average vehicle for testing emergency response capabilities.

08/07/98 NEG 1R 98-13 NRC PS SA The post-exercise critique in the CR simulator was superficial and tended to focus on third-party problems.

October 28,1998 15 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 08/07/98 WK IR 98-13 NRC PS 1B 3A 3B An exercise weakness was identified because the EOF and radiological directors failed to recognize that dose projections indicated a need to make protective action recommendations beyond 10 miles.

08/07/98 NEG IR 98-13 NRC PS 3A 3B Some aspects of exercise conduct and control, such as, inappropriate evaluator / observer interactions with participants, controllers allowing participants to perform actions out of sequence, and inconsistent / incomplete data detracted from the training value of the exercise.

07/25/98 POS IR 98-07 NRC PS 3A Security was observed providing good support of various maintenance activities. Guards were determined to be knowledgeable of their responcibilities in regards to the work activities. Central alarm station watchstanders were also observed to be knowledgeable of conditions, with one exception caused by lack of communication, which related to a shift in the protected area boundary during work in a main condenser water box.

07/25/98 POS 1R 98-07 LIC PS SA 5B 2A Chemistry personnel were instrumental in the prompt identification and isolation of a condenser tube leak in Unit 2. Recommendations of actions to minimize the effects on steam generator materials while cleaning up the impurities from chemistry personnel were timely and appropriate. As a result, steam generator chemistry was quickly controlled ar.d a power reduction and plant shutdown were avoided.

06/13/98 VIO IR 98-06 LIC PS 1C 5A SC Two examples of a failure to property implement the fire protection program with respect to SLIV fire brigade training drills were identified by a licensee QA auditor and constituted a violaton ,

of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. 22 individuals participated in a single dri!!, on January 6, 1998, we one evaluator. Corrective actions taken following this improperty conducted drill were not taken with:n a reasonable period of time. Additionally, operations

  • shift supervision was not aware that the qualifications of some fire brigade members were in question.

06/13/98 POS IR 98-06 NRC PS 1C 2A Radiological postings and locked areas were properly contro!!ed. Radiological housekeeping was good. Chemical analysis reports provided evidence of management attention and commitment to maintaining chemistry parameters within appropriate limits. Emergency preparedness facility and meteorological equipment material condition was excellent.

Protected area barriers, security detection and assessment equipment, and temporary compensatory measures were considered excellent. Only mir.or discrepancies were identified in each functional area.

October 28,1998 16 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 04/94/9e VIO IR 98-05 NRC PS 1C 3A in general, plant housekeeping was excellent. The failure to property implement SL IV safety-related procedures for the control of transient fire loads was a violaton of Techn-Specification 6.8.1. Wood scaffold was instaDed and remained in the safety-related 2A isolation Valve Cubicle for 14 months without the required transient fire load storage permit.

In response to this finding, the licensee searched t!.e facility and found several other unevalua'ed transient fire loads.

02/27/98 POS IR 98-12 NRC PS 3A Excellent radio and telephone communications systems were maintained. Testing of access control equipment was excellent 02/27/98 STR 1R 98-12 NRC PS 1C An excellent security training program had been implemented. Documentation of training activities was very good.

02/27/98 STR 1R 98-12 NRC PS 3C Senior management support for the security organization was excellent. Security program management was exceDent.

02/27/98 STR 1R 98-12 NRC PS 1C 3A 3B Implementation of the access authorization program was excellent. This was highitghted by a knowledgeable staff, comprehensive and thorough background investigations, and excenent procedures for behavioral observation. Supervisors were fully knowledgeable of their behavioral observation responsibilities.

01/15/98 VIO IR 98-02 NRC PS 3A A violation of Technical Specification 6.11.1 was identified for the failure of the licensee to SLIV follow procedures to survey for radioiodine in the Unit 1 reactor containment building.

01/15/98 VIO IR 98-02 NRC PS 3A A violation of 10 CFR 19.12.(a) with two examples, was identified for the failure to inform SLIV workers of changing radiological conditions.

01/15/98 STR 1R 98-02 NRC PS 1C Overall, a good external exposure control program was in place including locked and posted high radiation areas, 01/15/98 VIO IR 98-02 NRC PS 3A A violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a was identified for the failure of the licensee to SLIV follow procedures and tr 'ost the reactor cavity as an airbome radioactivity area.

01/15/98 STR 1R 98-02 NRC PS 3B Overall, a good internal xposure control program was implemented which included property calibrsted whole body counters, and the performance of internal dose estimates.

01/15/98 NCV IR 98-02 NRC PS 3A Consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 was identified for the failure of workers to follow radiation work permits requirements.

October 28,1998 17 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 01/15/98 STR 1R 98-02 NRC PS 2A Housekeeping within the radiological controlled areas were very good.

11/07/97 VIO IR 97-25 NRC PS 2A A violation of License Condition 2.F was identified involving the failure of the perimeter SLIV intrusion detection system . Oversight by licensee engineering. and security testing personnel.

11/07/97 POS IR 97-25 NRC PS 3A The table-top drill results indicated that the recensee was in compliance with their security contingency plan to protect the plant.

11/07/97 STR 1R 97-25 NRC PS 3A Performance testing verified that zone coverage, overlapping of camera views, picture quatty, video capture call-up and assessment procedures were excellent.

11/07/97 POS IR 97-25 NRC PS 2A Access control equipment functioned properly during performance testing.

11/07/97 STR 1R 97-25 NRC PS 2A The protected area intrusion detection system was functional, effective, and operated as required 7y the licensee's Physical Security Plan.

11/07/97 POS IR 97-25 NRC PS 'A The protected area barrier and isolation zones were effectively maintained.

11/07/97 STR 1R 97-25 NRC PS 5A 5B The annual security program audit was performance based. The overall quality of the audit was excellent.

10/29/97 NEG 1R 97-07 NRC PS 3A 5A SC On one occasion, instrumentation and controls technicians placed tools and parts across a contaminated area boundary adjacent to their work area. The conddion was promptly corrected and no contamination occurred. However, a condition report was not written until questioned by the inspectors.

October 28,1998 18 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

. . . _ . . _ _ _ .____._____._____.____..____________m ____- _ .-__m ,e

ENCLOSURE 2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TA'LE LA~ELS Actual date of an event or significant issue for those items that have a clear date of occurrence, the date the source of the information was Date issued (such as the LER dats), or, for inspection reports, the last date of the inspection period.

Type The categorization of the issue - see the Type item Code table.

SFA SALP Functional Area Codes: OPS for Operations; MAINT for Maintenance; ENG for Engineering; and PS for Plant Support.

Sources The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.

ID Identification of who discovered issue: N for NRC; L for Licensee; or S for Self Identifying (events).

Issue Description Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.

Codes Template Codes - see table. l TEMPLATE CODES TYPE ITEM CODES 1 Operational Performance: A - Normal Operations; B - Operations During Transients; and C -

Enforcement Action Letter with Civil Penalty Programs and Processes EA ED Enforcement Discretion - No Civil Penalty 2 Material Condition: A - Equipment Condition or 8 - Programs and Processes S1R Strength - Overall Strong Licensee Performance 3 Human Performance: A - Work Performance; 8 - Knowledge, Skitts, and Abilities / Training; C -

Work Environment WK Weakness - Overall Weak Licensee Performance 4 Engineering / Design: A - Design; B - Engineering Support; C - Programs and Procesees eel

  • Escalated Enforcement item - Waiting Final NRC Action 5 Problem Identification and Resolution: A -Identification; B - Analysis; and C- Reso!ution VIO Violation Level 1,11, Ill, or IV NOTES:

Eels are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for escalated NCV Non-Cited Violation enforcement action in accordance with the " General statement of Policy and Procedure ter NRC Enforcement Action"(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its DEV Deviation from Licensee Commitment to NRC final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the Eels and the PIM entries may be modified when tw final decisions em made. Befom the NRC rnakes Hs enforcernent decision, the Heenm POS Positive -Individual Good Inspection Finding will be provided with an opportunity to either (t) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a padecisional enforcement confomnce.

NEG Negative -Individual Poor inspection Finding

=

LER Licensee Event Report to the NRC unts are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. However, URI" Unresolved item from inspection Report the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.

Licensing Licensing issue from NRR MISC Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness Finding (EP),

Declared Emergency, Nonconformance issue, etc.

ENCLOSURE 3 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT INSPECTION PLAN IP - Inspection Procedure T1 - Temporary Instruction NI - Non-inspection activity C re inspection - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)

Regional Initiative - Additional inspection resources related to potential problems identified during other inspections INSPECTION TITLE / NUMBER OF DATES TYPE OF PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS INSPECTION / COMMENTS IP 86750 Transportation 1 01/04-08/99 Core inspection IP 37001 10CFR50.59 Safety Eval. Program, 6 01/25-02/12/99 Core inspection IP 92903 Setpoint Followup Regional Reactive Inspection IP 93809 Safety Sys. Eng. Inspection Core inspection IP 84750 Environmental 1 02/22-26/99 Core Inspection IP 81700 Security 1 03/01-05/99 Core inspection IP 50001 S/G Replacement Modification 2 03/01-05/99 Regional Initiative Inspection IP 84750 Radiation Waste 1 03/15-19/99 Core inspection IP 82701 Emergency Operational Status 1 03/22-26/99 Core inspection IP 73753 Inservice inspection 1 03/29-04/02/99 Core inspection IP 83750 Radiation Protection 1 04/05-09/99 Core inspection IP 40500 Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, 2 06/07-11/99 Core Inspection Resolving, and Preventing Problems NI Examination Preparations 2 06/07-11/99 NA NI Initial Examinations 6 07/05-16/99 NA IP 71001 Requalification Inspection 3 08/30-09/03/99 Core inspection