ML20198S544
| ML20198S544 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/22/1986 |
| From: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8606100481 | |
| Download: ML20198S544 (12) | |
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY CONSERVATION AND POWER STATEMENT OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PRESENTED BY NUNZIO J. PALLADINO, CHAIRMAN U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION MAY 22, 1986 1
MR. CHAIRMAN, AT YOUR REQUEST, THE COMMISSION APPEARS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE TODAY TO DISCUSS THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE SOVIET i
ACCIDENT AT CHERNOBYL ON THE LEVEL OF SAFETY OF THE U.S.
COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY AND THE ADEQUACY OF THE NRC 1
PROGRAMS TO ASSURE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY.
WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN i
PROVIDED WITH INFORMATION RELATED TO THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.
HOWEVER, MEASUREMENTS OF RADI0 ACTIVITY OUTSIDE OF THE S0VIET UNION i
HAVE BEEN USED TO ESTIMATE THE SEVERITY OF THE ACCIDENT.
WE HOPE THAT THE S0VIET UNION WILL PROVIDE DETAILS ON THE CAUSE AND l
l CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENT DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.
AS YOU KNOW, DETAILS REGARDING THE ACCIDENT ARE SKETCHY.
- HOWEVER, THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THE ACCIDENT WAS INDEED SERIOUS.
MY FELLOW COMMISSIONERS AND I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS OUR "e8"8824 088""
CORRESPONDENCE PDR
' i CONDOLENCES TO THOSE S0vlET CITIZENS, AND OTHERS, WHO HAVE BEEN OR 7
MIGHT BE IMPACTED BECAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AT CHERNOBYL.
IT IS OBVIOUSLY A MATTER OF DEEP CONCERN TO US ALL WHEN TRAGEDIES OCCUR.
l THE WHITE HOUSE ESTABLISHED AN INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE TO MONITOR THE HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHERNOBYL
't ACCIDENT ON THE UNITED STATES.
THE TASK FORCE WAS CHAIRED BY LEE THOMAS, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY.
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MEMBERS REPRESENTED VARIOUS FEDERAL AGENCIES, INCLUDING THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC).
THE NRC REPRESENTATIVE WAS MR. HAROLD DENTON, DIRECTOR, 0FFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION.
I I REGRET THAT MR. DENTON COULD NOT BE WITH US TODAY.
HE IS PARTICIPATING IN AN IAEA MEETING IN VIENNA RELATED TO CHERN0BYL.
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AN NRC INCIDENT TRACKING TEAM WAS ESTABLISHED ON MAY l',
1986 TO 4
COLLECT INFORMATION AND REVIEW THE EFFECTS OF THE CHERNOBYL INCIDENT IN SUPPORT OF EPA.
THE PURPOSE OF THE EFFORT WAS TO OBTAIN AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE REACTOR ACCIDENT AND THE RADIOLOGICAL SOURCE TERM IN ORDER TO ASSIST EPA IN ASSESSING ITS IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES.
AS YOU ARE AWARE, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE HAD A SERIOUS ACCIDENT IN THE UNITED STATES AT THE THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 FACILITY.
OUR STUDY OF THAT ACCIDENT IDENTIFIED EXTENSIVE CHANGES THAT THE COMMISSION CONCLUDED WERE NECESSARY TO IMPROVE THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR PLANTS j
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I IN THE UNITED STATES.
BECAUSE OF THE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR PLANTS IN OPERATION IN THE UNITED 4
STATES AND THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR FACILITY IN THE SOVIET UNION, IT IS DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY AT THIS TIME ANY SPECIFIC LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THIS ACCIDENT THAT MIGHT BE APPLICABLE TO THE PLANTS WE REGULATE.
WE, OF COURSE, WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO LEARN WHAT WE CAN FROM THE S0VIETS, BUT UNTIL WE HAVE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION, IT IS PREMATURE TO SPECULATE WHETHER ANY CHANGES IN UNITED STATES' COMMERCIAL PLANTS ARE WARRANTED.
I HAVE ASKED THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR UPERATIONS (ED0) TO APPOINT A GROUP OF OUR SENIOR SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS TO CONTINUE THE STUDY OF THE ACCIDENT AND 1
RECOMMEND TO THE COMMISSION ANY ACTION THAT MIGHT BE NEEDED FOR t
THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY PROGRAM.
t WE WOULD NOW LIKE TO COMMENT ON THE ITEMS YOU SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT OUR TESTIMONY ADDRESS.
I HAVE ALREADY ADDRESSED THE ACTIONS WHICH THE NRC HAS TAKEN TO DATE IN RESPONSE TO THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT.
AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, l
THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL DESIGN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMMERCIAL i
REACTORS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE CHERN0BYL REACTOR.
SOME OF t
THESE DIFFERENCES INCLUDE A REACTOR ENCLOSURE PHILOSOPHY THAT i
APPEARS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM THE CONTAINMENT PHILOSOPHY i
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. EMBODIED IN WESTERN-STYLE PLANT DESIGNS AND A CORE DESIGN THAT CONTAINS APPROXIMATELY 1700 TONS OF GRAPHITE COMPARED WITH NONE IN U.S. COMMERCIAL LIGHT WATER REACTORS.
WE HAVE ALSO IDENTIFIED MANY OTHER DESIGN DIFFERENCES THAT THE STAFF IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE FUNDAMENTAL DESIGN DIFFERENCES IS THAT THE NATURE OF ACCIDENT INITIATING EVENTS, AND THE WAY THEY COULD EVOLVE IN A PLANT LIKE CHERNOBYL, AS WELL AS THE NATURE OF THE CONSEQUENCES, ARE VERY DIFFERENT FROM U.S. DESIGNS.
FOR EXAMPLE, RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TO THE ATMOSPHERE AS A RESULT OF A LARGE GRAPHITE FIRE IS NOT AN ACCIDENT THAT NEEDS TO BE CONSIDERED FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS.
IN THE AFTERMATH OF TMI, AND AFTER EXTENSIVE EVALUATIONS AND DELIBERATIONS, THE COMMISSION PROMULGATED ITS SEVERE ACCIDENT POLICY IN 1985.
ON THE BASIS OF CURRENTLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION, THE COMMISSION CONCLUDED THAT EXISTING PLANTS POSE NO UNDUE RISK TO PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY AND SAW NO BASIS FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION ON GENERIC RULEMAKING OR OTHER REGULATORY CHANGES BECAUSE OF SEVERE ACCIDENT RISK.
HOWEVER, SHOULD SIGNIFICANT NEW SAFETY INFORMATION BECOME AVAILABLE, FROM WHATEVER SOURCE, TO QUESTION j
THE CONCLUSION OF "N0 UNDUE RISK," THEN THE TECHNICAL ISSUES THUS IDENTIFIED WOULD BE RESOLVED BY THE NRC UNDER ITS BACKFIT POLICY AND OTHER EXISTING PROCEDURES, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF GENERIC RULEMAKING WHERE THIS IS JUSTIFIABLE.
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. TO IMPLEMENT THIS POLICY, WE WILL BE ASKING THE OWNERS OF REPRESENTATIVE OPERATING NUCLEAR PLANTS IN THE U.S. TO PERFORM A SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION OF THEIR PLANT'S DESIGN TO SEARCH FOR WHAT WE CALL " SEVERE ACCIDENT VULNERABILITIES."
THE INDUSTRY HAS RESPONDED TO THE SEVERE ACCIDENT POLICY AND HAS SET UP AN INDUSTRY-WIDE GROUP, KNOWN AS IDCOR, TO DEVELOP THE METHODOLOGY TO BE USED IN THIS EVALUATION, AND TO PROVIDE OVERALL INDUSTRY COORDINATION.
TO DATE THEY HAVE ANALYZED FOUR REFERENCE PLANTS AND DEVELOPED A METHODOLOGY FOR THE EXAMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL PLANTS.
THIS METHODOLOGY IS CURRENTLY UNDER STAFF REVIEW.
THE NRC STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE IDCOR EFFORT AND UNDERSCORES THE NEED FOR THIS PROGRAM TO GO FORWARD RAPIDLY.
I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THERE IS ONE NRC-LICENSED COMMERCIAL I
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IN THE U.S., THE FORT ST VRAIN PLANT IN COLORADO, THAT HAS A GAS-COOLED, GRAPHITE MODERATED REACTOR.
IN VIEW 0F THE SOVIET REACTOR ACCIDENT AT CHERNOBYL, THE STAFF REEXAMINED THE ORIGINAL LICENSING BASES FOR THE FORT ST. VRAIN FACILITY.
THAT REVIEW REVISITED BOTH THE DESIGN FEATURES OF FORT ST. VRAIN AND THE ACCIDENT ANALYSES DONE AT THE TIME OF LICENSING.
l THE NRC ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE LICENSEE EXAMINE CERTAIN BEYOND-DESIGN BASIS EVENTS, IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH EVENTS.
, IN LICENSING FORT ST. VRAIN, THE STAFF EXAMINED A NUMBER OF ACCIDENT SCENARIOS CONSIDERED CREDIBLE FOR THIS TYPE OF REACTOR, INCLUDING EVENTS INVOLVING MULTIPLE FAILURES.
THE STAFF FOUND THEN AND HAS REAFFIRMED THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THESE ACCIDENTS ARE WITHIN THE COMMISSION'S LIMITS SET FORTH IN 10 CFR PART 100.
ADDITIONALLY, THE LICENSEE WAS REQUESTED BY THE STAFF TO EXAMINE THE CONSEQUENCES OF RAPID OXIDATION OF THE GRAPHITE CORE, ALTHOUGH A CREDIBLE MECHANISM FOR SUCH AN EVENT COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED.
THE OFFSITE DOSES RESULTING FROM SUCH A POSTULATED EVENT WERE CALCULATED TO BE WITHIN THE 10 CFR PART 100 LIMITS AT THE LOW POPULATION ZONE BOUNDARY.
BASED UPON ITS EVALUATIONS, THE STAFF HAS DETERMINED THAT NO ADDITIONAL ACTION NEEDS TO BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC IS ADEQUATELY PROTECTED DURING CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE FORT ST. VRAIN REACTOR.
YOU ALSO ASKED WHAT THE MOST SIGNIFICANT UNRESOLVED SAFETY i
PROBLEMS AT U.S. REACTORS ARE.
LET ME PREFACE MY REMARKS BY STATING THAT IT IS Tr:E COMMISSION'S FIRM BELIEF THAT ALL OPERATING REACTORS IN THE U.S. TODAY ARE OPERATING AT A LEVEL OF SAFETY THAT ENSURES THAT THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC IS ADEQUATELY PROTECTED.
THE ISSUES, OR PROBLEMS, BEFORE ThE COMMISSION TODAY HAVE BEEN CATEGORIZED AS I AM SURE YOU ARE AWARE, AS EITHER UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES (USI'S) OR GENERIC SAFETY ISSUES.
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. 0F THE UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES PENDING FINAL RESOLUTION, THE TWO MOST SIGNIFICANT AND HIGHEST PRIORITY ARE:
(1) USI A-44,
" STATION BLACK 0UT", AND (2) USI A-45, " SHUTDOWN DECAY HEAT REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS", A PROPOSED RULE FOR STATION BLACK 0UT HAS BEEN ISSUED FOR COMMENT, AND SHUTDOWN DECAY HEAT REMOVAL HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TECHNICALLY BUT FINAL RESOLUTION PENDS COMMISSION ACTION ON STATION BLACK 0UT.
IN ADDITION TO USI'S, THERE ARE GENERIC SAFETY ISSUES.
THESE ISSUES ARE CATEGORIZED AS EITHER HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW PRIORITY, DEPENDING UPON THEIR SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE.
THERE ARE A NUMBER OF HIGH PRIORITY ISSUES FOR WHICH RESOLUTION HAS NOT BEEN REACHED.
HOWEVER, THE LIST OF SUCH GENERIC SAFETY ISSUES IS A LIVING LIST WITH ISSUES BEING ADDED AND CLOSED OUT ON A CONTINUING BASIS.
BOTH THE UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES, AS WELL AS THE GENERIC SAFETY ISSUES, PRIMARILY ADDRESS TECHNICAL AREAS WHICH THE COMMISSION BELIEVES ARE BEING TREATED ADE3UATELY AND APPROPRIATELY IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS, BUT HAVE A RESIDUAL UNCERTAINTY ASSOCIATED WITH THEM THAT IS LARGER THAN DESIRABLE.
THUS, OUR EFFORTS ON THESE ISSUES ARE EITHER TO REDUCE THESE UNCERTAINTIES TO CONFIRM OUR ORIGINAL JUDGMENTS, OR TO CONSIDER THE IMPOSITION OF COMPEN-SATING FEATURES, FOR EXAMPLE, BACKFITS, TO ACHIEVE THE NECESSARY LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE.
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. YOU ASKED WHAT ARE THE PROBABILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF A SEVERE REACTOR ACCIDENT IN THE UNITED STATES.
IN AN EFFORT TO GIVE YOU A CURRENT ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION IN A TIMELY FASHION, I BELIEVE WE MAY HAVE CREATED AS MUCH CONFUSION AS ENLIGHTENMENT.
TO CLEAR UP THE StTUATION, I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR ME TO DESCRIBE BRIEFLY WHAT WE HAVE DONE, WHAT WE ARE DOING, AND WHAT CONCLUSIONS MIGHT BE DRAWN AT THIS POINT IN TIME.
IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION AT THE APRIL 17, 1985 HEARING BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE, IT WAS REPORTED THAT THE MOST COMPLETE AND RECENT PRA'S AT THAT TIME SUGGESTED CORE MELT FREQUENCIES IN THE RANGE OF 10-3 PER REACTOR YEAR TO 10- PER REACTOR YEAR.
IT WAS STATED THAT A TYPICAL VALUE WAS 3 x 10-4 IT WAS FURTHER STATED THAT IF THIS WERE THE INDUSTRY AVERAGE, THEN A POPULATION OF 100 REACTORS OPERATING OVER A PERIOD OF 20 YEARS WOULD HAVE A CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY FOR SUCH AN ACCIDENT OF 45%.
IN SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PROVIDED FOR THE RECORD OF THE APRIL 17, 1985 HEARING, IT WAS STATED THAT THE STAFF ESTIMATE OF THE AVERAGE CORE MELT FRE0'JENCY OF 3 x 10-4 PER REACTOR YEAR WAS BASED UPON 6 PRA'S COVERING 9 REACTOR UNITS.
THESE STUDIES WERE ORIGINALLY PERFORMED BY THE OWNER-0PERATORS OF THESE PLANTS, IN THREE CASES, THE NRC STAFF REVISED THE OWNER-CALCULATED ACCIDENT FREQUENCY UPWARD, AND THE AVERAGE OF 3 x 10-4 CORE-MELT ACCIDENTS i
PER YEAR REFLECTS THESE NRC REVISIONS.
IN EACH CASE, CHANGES MADE l
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IN PLANT DESIGN AND OPERATION TO REFLECT POST-TMI ORDERS WERE
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CONSIDERED IN THE PRA'S.
THE VALUES USED TO OBTAIN THE MEAN CORE MELT FREQUENCY OF 3 X 10-4 WERE BASED ON PRA'S INVOLVING THE FOLLOWING 9 PLANTS:
INDIAN POINT (2 UNITS), ZION (2 UNITS), LIMERICK (2 UNITS), MILLSTONE-3 (1 UNIT), MIDLAND (1 UNIT), AND SEABROOK (1 UNIT).
IN PREPARATION FOR TODAY'S HEARING, THE EDO SENT THE COMMISSION A MEMORANDUM DATED MAY 19, 1986 WHICH SPEAKS TO MORE RECENT, BUT PRELIMINARY, WORK ON PRA ESTIMATES.
A COPY OF THIS MEMORANDUM IS BEING PROVIDED FOR THE RECORD.
THE ATTACHMENT TO THIS MEMORANDUM DESCRIBES THE RESULTS OF PRA ANALYSES BASED ON WHAT THE STAFF BELIEVES IS A MORE REPRESENTATIVE LIST OF PLANTS.
THIS LIST INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING PLANTS:
SURRY, PEACH BOTTOM, SEQUOYAH, GRAND GULF AND ZION.
THESE LATEST ANALYSES ARE OF PLANTS WHICH HAVE INCORPORATED NOT ONLY POST-TMI MANDATED CHANGES BUT OTHER REFINEMENTS IDENTIFIED IN PRA ANALYSIS TO IMPROVE RELIABILITY.
ON THIS BASIS, THE STAFF OBSERVES THAT THE SEVERE CORE DAMAGE s
FREQUENCY FROM INTERNAL EVENTS IS BETWEEN 1.5 X 10-AND 1 X 10-5 PER REACTOR YEAR FOR THE FIVE REFERENCED PLANTS.
THE STAFF ALSO
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POINTS OUT THAT EVEN IN THESE PLANTS NOT ALL OF THE POTENTIAL RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE.
THE STAFF FURTHER GOES ON TO SAY THAT TO UNDERSTAND THE POTENTIAL INDUSTRY WIDE
4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT PROCESS, WHICH IS STILL GOING ON, ONE MIGHT POSTULATE THAT THESE INTERIM VALUES REPRESENT INDUSTRY AVERAGES FOR REACTORS OF THESE TYPES.
IN THIS CASE THE INDUSTRY AVERAGE SEVERE CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY WOULD BECOME ABOUT 6 X 10-5 PER REACTOR YEAR, AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SEVERE CORE DAMAGE ACCIDENT OCCURRING IN THE NEXT 20 YEARS IN A POPULATION OF 100 PLANTS WOULD BE 0.12, OR ONE CHANCE IN 8.
WHILE THE ANALYSES RELATED TO THESE TWO DIFFERENT POPULATIONS MAY NOT BE DIRECTLY COMPARABLE, THE STAFF STATES THAT FOR SEVERAL PLANTS, IT CAN MAKE COMPARISONS BETWEEN OLD ANALYSES BEFORE IMPROVEMENTS WERE MADE WITH NEW ANALYSES AFTER IMPROVEMENTS WERE MADE.
SUCH COMPARISONS SHOW THAT PLANT IMPROVEMENTS CAN AND D0 REDUCE CALCULATED RISK PROBABILITIES AND THAT PLANTS ARE SAFER THAN BEFORE THE IMPROVEMENTS WERE MADE.
ON THIS BASIS, THE STAFF BELIEVES THAT THE RISKS DUE TO OPERATION OF 100 PLANTS OVER THE i
NEXT 20 YEARS IS SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED.
l HOWEVER, SINCE THESE VARIOUS STUDIES ARE STILL IN PROGRESS, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT TRY TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS ON BOTTOM LINE RISKS AT THIS TIME.
BEFORE DRAWING SUCH CONCLUSIONS, WE SHOULD AWAIT THE COMPLETE RESULTS OF THE STAFF EFFORTS ON THIS MATTER WHICH THE STAFF EXPECTS TO PUBLISH IN SEPTEMBER AS DRAFT NUREG-1150.
THERE IS ONE POINT THAT I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE THAT I BELIEVE i
APPLIES TO BOTH THE APRIL 17, 1985 ANALYSIS AND THE MAY 19, 1986 L
4 ANALYSIS.
THAT POINT IS THAT SEVERE CORE DAMAGE, AS USED IN THESE ANALYSES, IS THE STATE THAT IS QUANTIFIED IN PRA'S, AND IT IS DEFINED AS THE SITUATION WHERE THERE IS INSUFFICIENT CORE COOLING TO MAINTAIN FUEL INTEGRITY.
HOWEVER, SEVERE CORE DAMAGE MIGHT NOT PROCEED TO EXTENSIVE MELTING AND PENETRATION OF THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL, AS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE TMI-2 ACCIDENT.
WE CANNOT AT PRESENT QUANTIFY THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SEVERE CORE DAMAGE AND A " CORE MELT" THAT PENETRATES THE VESSEL.
FURTHERMORE, SEVERE CORE DAMAGE OR " CORE MELT" DOES NOT NECESSARILY INDICATE THAT RADI0 ACTIVITY HAS BEEN RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC.
FOR THAT TO HAPPEN, AN ADDITIONAL SEQUENCE OF UNLIKELY EVENTS WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR THAT WOULD LEAD TO A BREACH OF CONTAINMENT.
THE LOW PROBABILITY OF THIS OCCURRENCE; I.E.,
FAILURE OF THE FINAL BARRIER, PROVIDES ADDITIONAL ASSURANCE OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY.
FINALLY, YOU ASKED TO BE BROUGHT UP TO DATE REGARDING THE RADIO-l LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHERNOBYL MELTDOWN.
AS I AM SURE YOU ARE AWARE, THE SOVIET UNION HAS REPORTED THAT 299 PEOPLE WERE HOSPITALIZED AS A RESULT OF RADIATION RELEASED DURING THE ACCIDENT. THEY HAVE REPORTED 13 PEOPLE HAVE DIED TO DATE.
THE MOST SEVERE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OCCURRED IN THE S0VIET UNION.
ELEVATED LEVELS OF RADIOACTIVITY WERE REPORTED ESSENTIALLY l
WORLD-WIDE.
LEVELS MEASURED AT SOME LOCATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES WERE ELEVATED, WHICH WITH ONE EXCEPTION THE FDA HAS FOUND i
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, TO BE BELOW LEVELS AT WHICH PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES WOULD BE INSTITUTED.
I REGRET THAT WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO PROVIDE WRITTEN RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONS YOU ASKED IN YOUR LETTER OF INVITATION, MR CHAIRMAN.
HOWEVER, WE WILL PROVIDE THOSE RESPONSES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
WE HAVE WITH US TODAY STAFF MEMBERS WHO WORKED ON THE CHERNOBYL INCIDENT TRACKING TEAM, AS WELL AS OTHER STAFF MEMBERS.
THEY ARE PREPARED TO FURTHER DISCUSS THE ACCIDENT AT THIS TIME AND TO HELP RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS.
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