ML20198Q836
| ML20198Q836 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1997 |
| From: | Barron H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 50-369-97-16, 50-370-97-16, NUDOCS 9711130061 | |
| Download: ML20198Q836 (6) | |
Text
.
.;~X Duke Power Competty l
l A la Ewy Compey
'WI McGuirr Nwk,tr Station
=
' M 8-r'
- MG0lVP.
12700 llagers Ferry Rd.
Ilunictiville, NC 28078 9340 H. B. Berren -
Vice besident. McGuire VOD 875-4800 omct Nwhar Generation Department PO4) 875-4809 m November 6, 1997
- U. S. Nuclear-Regulatory Commission ATTN
- Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos.-50-369 and 50-370 NRC Inspection Report No. 50-369, 370/97-16
. Violation 50-370/97-16-01 Reply to a Notice of Violation (NOV)
Pursuant to the provir > ions of 10 CFR 2.201, attached is Duke Energy Corporation's response to a Notice of Violation dated October 8, 1997 regarding failure to comply with Technical Specification requirements for the operability of Unit 2 ice condenser inlet doors.
This violation was identified during inspections conducted between July 12 and August 27, 1997.
Duke Energy Corporation acknowledges this occurrence to be a violation of the requirements of Technical Specification 3 /4. 6. 5. 3..
If there are any questions concerning this response, please contact Randy Cross at (704) 875-4179.
Very Truly Yours,
'NW w
~H.
B. Barron
,ny
-Attachment lj
/
l 120104 pglig Fg,
{
@ $54%Ill
_ _._.. _- _._ ~ _..
i
- .g
~
Q
.{
-f t
s i
Uk S.--Nuclear-: Regulatory Commissioni
- J.Novemberf-6,-;1997
=i
?
J xc
-(w/ attachment)
{
. Mr. Luis - A'. _- Reyes -
Regional Administrator,-Region'II--
U./-S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission i
Atlanta Federal Center i61-Forsyth St.,
SW, Suite 23T85; I
-Atlanta,' Georgia _30323 M r'.--- V i c t o r N e r s e s U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office-'of Nuclear. Reactor Regulation One' White Flint-North, Mail.Stop 9H3 Washington, D. C. 20555' Mr. Scott-Shaeffer J
Senior-Resident-Inspector:-
'McGuire Nuclear Station t
i n
F t
[
-r
?
i l
'l rt-y-
.,g y-7-
yy-,
".-eyg,.y
-.,.g'
,--rw-.,
y,e g
y y
v m-<
n-g,
,y-
,-- - - 9
n_.
-.. -... - -.-. -.. ~ _
l s.
McGuiro Muslear StOtion:
Reply to a Notice of Violation Restatement of Violation 50-370/97-16-01, Technical Specification 3/4.6.5.3 requires, in part, that the-ice condenser inlet doors be-operable when in Modes-1, 2, 3, and 4 and that the torque required to initially open each door be less than or equal to 675 inch-pounds.
Contrary co the above, as of July 17, 1997, 10 of the 48 ice r
condenser inlet doors <xt Unit 2 required an initial opening torque in excess of the 675 inch-pound operability limit.
This condition resulted in the ice condenser system being in a degraded condition that could have existed for an extended period of t.ime hetween May 1996 (completion of the end-of-cycle 10 refueling outage) and July 11, 1997 (low reactor coolant system floei trip), with Unit 2 operating in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
Reply to Violation 50-370/97-16-01 1.
Reason'for the violation:
The reason for the violation is equipment failure caused by unanticipated environmental interaction.
Water r
intrusion into the Unit 2 ice condenser floor wear slab coupled with freeze / thaw cycles resulted in floor wear slab upheaval movement.
Upward movement of the floor I
wear slab caused interaction with the flashing below the i
ice condenser lower inlet doors which interfered with the ability of some ice condenser lower inlet doors to meet Technical Specification requirements for door opening force.
2.
Corrective steps-that have been taken and the results achieved:
Operations personnel immediately initiated a work request to perform an inspection to determine the need for a' retest of the Unit 2 lower inlet doors.
A determination was made to perform the retest and functional verification as a result of the inspection.
1 4 ~, -
s.
e
~-,
-a
~
d 4
e' NcGuiro Nu31 ear StStion Reply to a Notice.of ViolOtion c
The Unit 2' ice condenser lower inlet-doors were immediately-logged as inoperable-in the Technical Specification Action Item Log _(TSAIL).
A modification was performed on Unit 2 to remove a portion of the door frame flashing-that was interacting with_the floor wear slab.
The remaining flashing which was contacting the doors was restored to the original fit.
All Unit 2 ice condenser lower inlet doors were retested with satisfactory results.
Inspections were performed and measurements taken of the exact position of the floor wear slab for the ice-condenser on Unit 2 as well as the gap distance between
-the floor and remaining flashing.
A video inspection was performed of the lower ice condenser on both units.
The floor cooling system instrumentation was checked, repaired and tuned as required to ensure proper operation for both units.
Inspection of the floor cooling system and remote visual inspection of the lower ice condenser in Unit 1 indicated that no abnormally severe floor temperature fluctuations have occurred since the last Unic 1 outage.
A work order for performance of PT/0/A/4200/32, Periodic Inspection Of Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Doors, was added as a Trip List item for Unit-1.
A work order was also initiated to perform measurements of the position of the floor wear slab for the ice condenser on Unit 1 during the next available outage.
No similar events have occurred since implementation of these corrective. actions.
- 3. Corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations:
These actions are regulatory commitments.
Ice Condenser Floor Cooling System Corrective Actions Ice condenser floor cooling parameters will be monitored-on a weekly basis to establish base line performance criteria.
2
McGuiro NutlCOr StOtion a.
Reply to a Notice'of Violation McGuire will evaluate the need for changes in floor cooling system design, controls and monitoring equipment.
In addition, McGuire will evaluate preventative maintenance of controls and monitoring equipment.
Ice condenser Outace Corrective Actions A process will be established to measure and trend ice condenser floor wear slab elevations during refueling outages to assure no binding of the ice condenser lower inlet doors occurs during the subsequent operating cycles.
Ice condenser refueling outage maintenance practices will be evaluated and revised as necessary to ensure minimization of water intrusion into the ice condenser floor wear slab.
A program will be established to require inspection of the gap between the ice condenser. floor wear slab and lower inlet door flashing for each unit prior to return to service from any cold shutdown and during power operations.
Potential Water Intrusion Event If water intrusion into the ice condenser floor wear slab occurs, the following corrective actions will be taken:
a) McGuire will estimate the amount of ice melt in the l
ice condenser, b) McGuire will examine floor elevations and floor wear slab to lower inlet door gap data.
c) Any viable methods to de-water the floor wear slab will be evaluated for the elimination of trapped water.
i An' evaluation of alternative ice condenser lower inlet door flashing insulation designs will be performed to ensure adequate insulation but not cause interaction between the floor wear-slab to door flashing.
An evaluation-of. ice condenser floor foam concrete de-watering and scaling options will be performed to L
3
,e McGuire Nu]lsar Lect &rc Reply to a Notice of vic.idtion determine if any viable options are effective for implementation.
4.
Date when full compliance will be achieved:
McGuire Nuclear Station is now in full compliance with Technical Specification 3/4.6.5.3.
l l
1 4