ML20198K686
| ML20198K686 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/10/1997 |
| From: | Teator J NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198K582 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-97-365 NUDOCS 9801150069 | |
| Download: ML20198K686 (24) | |
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. 1 j mmwem TApril 10,.1997 h ~
.To: File 1 96 005 l ?From:.Jeffrey A.>Teator, Special- Agent 01:RI. -
Subject:
Conversation with Harold EICENHOLZ L EICENHOLZ was the Senior Resident Ins _pector at Vermont YAleCEE Nuclear Power T - Plant (VY) from January 1990 June 1995. From 1973 until 1979 he worked for-
- VY and worked with Jim MASSEY in the Electrical Engineering Department, h
- EICHEWOLZ recalls that in May 1995 VY Enqineering Director, Bernie BUTEAU, VY.
Project Ernineering Supervisor, Pat CORBt i, and VY Vice President, Don REID
- came into uhe resident office to give him a " heads " on a personal performance issue dealing with MASSEY. and that VY anned on taking n disciplinary action against MASSEY. EICHENHnLZ sai that the group told him
;that they were being sensitive to the issue because it had the potential to-J : escalate outside of the company in that MASSEY had threatened to get an 4 attorney to represent him. EICENHOLZ said that he asked the group one ,
cuestion, "Were there any safety issues being raised at' the plant that VY was ' c coaling with in terms of the performance problem?" and was told, absolutely i not, but, that MASSEY was not performing up to job standards. The_grou
- .EICHENHOLZ that they were going to >ut together 6 grou) including REID,p Russ told F CLARK, and one other to look into tle disagreement by 1ASSEY over his yearly job performance review.- ;
EICENHOLZ. stated that during a VY reorganization MASSEY was moved from the '( : construction side of the plant to the nuclear engineering department. t EICENHOLZ said that at that' time he prophesied that would cause some of the . ' effected employees a "hard time" meeting the new management expectations which would be placed on them. EICENHOLZ commented that a constructioil engineer, L like MASSEY, does not translate into being able to successfully perform the L job function of.a design e ineer because MASSEY was not a design engineer. EICHENHOLZ opines that and CORBETT were out to get rid of MASSEY because he wasn't performing.like a design engineer. i L EICENHOLZ is aware that VY Vice President Jay THAYER tried to come to a settlement with MASSEY, but that NASSEY wouldn't accept it, because EICHENHOLZ believes that MASSEY wants " vindication" of his views on th6 Advanced Off Gas L System. , b l O' i l j l B p i ? vc j - 1 E 9901150069 971231 KE 365 PDR j
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EXHIBIT /5
. MEND. 11 - 9 G 2 0 0 5" pAaE
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c I- . i f c EXHIBIT 18 (:
~ Case No. 1 96 005 Exhibit 18
p 3 a.s y - : 9 CONFIDENTIAL .
- TO: J P Pelletier June 21,1995-1 4 \, eV 1 FROM: EJM i MMITTEE 7
4 1 As you requested in your May 9,1995 Memo, D.A. Reid, G.A. Maret, F. Baxter, 3 - and!W.L. Wittmer have completed-our review of Mr. Massey's last performance 1 - appraisal, in the course of this effort, we have reviewed various documentation and -
' discussed the relevant issues with Messrs. Massey, Corbett, Buteau, Casey, Routhier,
- and McKenny.zWe are satisfled that the following conclusions and observations are ,
- 'sufficiently supported by the facts. Further, there was little controversy over the facts . .
and the events, just the perspective. >
- Although we believe that Mr. Massey in the past, was a hardworking, dedicated, ,
and generally capable engineer, our conclusion is that the employee performancs : , _ review of E. James Massey dated 2/27/95 generally and fairly depicts his performance - over the review period. The reasoning behind that conclusion is: p - Mr. Massey failed in his project management / senior kngineering role by not , communicating appropriately with management. Communications needed to be'in clear and definitive terms.as required by the procedure and needed to E .-Indicate.that thijob could not be completed as management envisioned, Further, the communications to management should have identified the risks ih - with proceeding. In view of his conflicting. viewpoint, Mr. Massey should have asked to be relieved of the AOG Design Change assignment, ' - Mr. Massey fallep to provide management with definitive and timely input on his - perception of the capability of the assigned YNSD design engineer. For example, Mr. Massey stated that he believed that the _YNSD cognizant engineer was incapable of performing his duties. Aiso, Mr. Massey stated that he "did > not want to hurt anybody" resulting in his attempt to personally take on the burden of assuring a successful project completion.
- Mr.-Massey demonstrated and maintained an uncooperative and inflexible position throughout the AOG project with his management and YNSD. This appeared to result from a fear or preconceived. notion that he would be responsible for potential startup delays'if the project was not completely _
successful. Notwithstanding our conclusion, we believe that there were failures outside of [ Mr. Massey's control that contributed to his performance review e.nd also hindered , comp'etion of the AOG project. The primary reasons for that observation are: I .1 Management failed to' recognize the importance of team composition, and
; 7 therefore teamwork, in selecting and assigning the design and the lent EXHIBIT /c CASENO. ci - 9 6 - 0 0 5 "- OF._.sb.PAGE(S)
&c-<u' PAGE /
q _ ,v . . . - i- !I'. cognizant engineers. it is apparent that both Mr. Massey and Mr. Casey had very different sty'es and approaches to project completion.
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Management failed to recognize and resolve the issue of lack of compatibility of the cognizant engineers. Neither VY nor YNSD management actively tried 0 to resolve the differences in style and approach, bl ather allowed the situation - to continue uncorrected. Management's focus appeared to be on resolving the technical issues and not the management issues. Management failed to maintain high standards in allowing and encouraging the : AOG. design change to proceed through.the review and approval process knowing that it was missing important information and that Mr. Massey still had significant opposing views.-- . Manayament failed to prvmote face to face com Mnications on an ongoing basis to more quickly resolve ongoing issues. At your convenience, we would be pleased to discuss this conclusion and observation as well as any other information that you may require. c
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4~ s c . e 9 c EXHIBIT 19 4
! 9 Case No. 1 96 005
.g, le f p fj T . .
n " g' .9 4 CONFIDENTIAL REPORT TO TEAM MEMBERS-- -.,,, V ^ As alirected by Don Reed I have gained famManty de ne technical aspects of me AOG desgn
- peakepe and Peve conducted inteMews 4th Lou Casey, Roger Viben Stan Mmer, Jim Massey,
(^ y
. Pat McKenney, and Pat Corbett YNSO kneMeme were hekt on .ime 1,1996, and W hteMews on June 2,1996. My inteMews inofuded a review of pertnent correspondence and 0> swings.
i-
'M addefon,' k order to assist k he seem's overaq abjecdve of rW,g Jm Massey's 1994 Performance Appraisal, I have provided my personal raakg and assessment of om Massey's 1 oepobGry and perftrmance as ne W ongnizant engineer on ne AOG prais:t.
h 1 Background of AOG
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In 1971 W contracted with the Suntac Corp, for engineering, design, startup and testing seMoss for.the AOG modification. l In 1972 W . contracted with Ebasco for construction management services for the AOG modification, in 1993 the AOG was tumed over to W.:
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Drawings for the AOG modification were lesued by Suntac, Suntac contractors, Ebasco, Ebasco i- contractors, and W. With this multipiiuly of sources, formats, styles, and no coordinaticr-i 4 between the various parties issuing drawings, a nightmare was emtsd for the end user. W found no drawings for some systems, r*Fmwi in other systerns, IOG drawings mixed in, ard . overall, a real mecs, F
' Because the AOG was classified as a NNS system, and it had or'ly general tech, spec.
F requirements, it was not regarded as a priority system. As such it received minimal
. mairmenance and engineering effort. The quagmire of drawings did not help engineering or maintenance become familiar with AOG as a system. When AOG components broke down they were )
fixed symptomatically with little understanding of the functioning of the system as a whole. l Around 1990-91 the AOG began to exhbit more serious problems which now threatened I operation. In 1991 a meme was written by Van Bowman alerting W to the fact that corrective - action was in order. One of the issues identilled in this memo was that the drawings were, , inecourate and incompit,te such that maintenance and tro@le shooting could not be performed
- ' with conlldence. Cleaning up the drawings, along with lleid verification, was fet no
- essary.
Other potentia! areas of concem were also identitled. In 1992' YNSO was leaued a work order to investigate and recommend AOG Imorovements to -
- improve the reliability'and maintainebaty of AOG. Based on rear'uaniari and agreement with W Operations _ and leC, a liet of recommendesions were estabilshed by Lou Casey . The buk of problems. appeared to be in the electrical centrol and instrumentation area, in 1993 a joint W/YNSD study teere formed h scope out a design change. The W contingent included Jim Masssy (Cogninrri), Van Bowman, Terry Watson, George Wright,- Dave Phillips, 1
EXHIBIT tmWo. l 1 - 9 6 - 0 0_5 " - PAGE / OF S PAGE(S) LU _ _. - = i_._ - _ _ j
Mike Ball, and Bill Wittmer. The study team outlined a course of direction; June 30,1994 was established ' as YNSD's due date for the EDCR. It should be roted tnat the existence of drawing g errors were recognized as a serious problem, and corrective action was made part and parcel of this design change, l Based on the direction given, Lou Casey proceeded with the EDCR CWT,ent. He was unable to > get Jim Massey's to participate, and, as Jim himself put it, it was because he was either out sick or attendMg to other higher priority tasks. Lou Casey sought the help of other W personnel including Tony Diaz and Frank tJpinski of l&C who came to Bolton to help. Sutwequently the reissued drawings were sut to Jim Massey for review and field vertfir:ation; however, when no comments were forthcoming Lou infonned Roger Vibert and Pat Corbett of the situation which now threatened the EDCR comple' ion date of June 30,1994 At this late stage Jim made it known that the drawing problem was more significant than originally believed, and that the design change must be put off until the drawings were first et,rrected, in April '94 Pat Corbett acknowledged Jim's concem but concluded that the drawing improvements could be performed in parallel with the rest of the design change. He adjusted EE&C work load so as to make Jim Massey availablJ full time, and in addition, provided additional resources to Jim to help in the effort, instead of complying with the direction provided by his manager, Jim put all his efforts into his crusade to hatt the doelpn change. Pat now became concemed that perhaps he had overlooked something, and perhaps ..n may be right, so, to get an independent opinion he commissioned two senior engineers who waru uninvolved with AOG to provide an independent assessment of the situation. The independent team consisting of George Hengerie(YNSD) and Pat McKenney(VY) published their repon on early June '94 after an exhaustive review of drawings and interviews with the personnel involved. While they acknowledged that significant wiring problems existed within AOG, they concluded that the EDCR could be safely and successfully implemented. They also pointed out that awau would renuire clone conneratinn and egggnatic,n between EE&C and WSQ.(As Pat later reflected, this never did occur, and was the ;.itmary cause for fai'ure). Jim was not about to give up; two days aftor the independent team k. sued it's report, Jim !ssued his own memo stating that the only way to proceed was hit way. In my damadons with Jim he claimed that Pat Corbett, Pat McKenney, and George Hengerie were lin,cirpetent because they did not perform their reviews thoroughly (ie., as Jim e ;;1ained, in accordance witi- h]1 rules). The rest is history, in spite of the total lack of cooperation from Jim Massey, the EDCR was issued knd approved. However, his opposition had taken a toll and PORC canceled the design chcnge and. allocated some reso sces to perform fleid verification of the wiring. Nonetheless this didn't satisfy Jim and his grandstanding and theatrics continued. In early January '95 he issued a memo to the "world" wit;1 his opWon on the subject. He now offered to personally " pull it off' if he was given adequate resources. He wanted $225,000 to resolve all wiring and drawing problems.(it is interesting to note that Fishbach provided an estimate of $38,000 for this same task, which actually took them oniv $30,000 to' comp %(e because no significant errors were uncovered). EXHIIT PAGE OFdPAGE(S) m - -. ___ _-= . -
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Jim Mammav An inzicht
- 4 l l have worked closely with Jim Massey over a period of one year on the main transformer 4
replacement job, and our working relationship was always cordial, and guided by mutual i I
= respect and professionalism. However i seldom saw this courtesy extended to other individuals who interfaced with Jim.
Jim is a non degreed electrical power engineer, and his basic skills, experience, and strengths ! fall in this gsnerai category. This is not to say that Jim is not skilled or capable in other areas of engineering; basert on my prior work experience with Jim, I believe him to be smart enough and capable of tackling and succeeding in any technical lleid he wehen. However, Jim has some 4 ss.ious handicaps, that if exercised, can impede in ,vd+;ishing a task:
- he is lazy
- he is very stubborn and inflexible, and sees no ones viewpoint but his own he is short tempered, temperamental, and irrational he is unprofessional in his dealings with peers and superiors Thus, if Jim decides not to be involved in a task because he sees it is not really in his area of interest, or, that he knows :t is going to be a pain in the ass type of job (which means lots of work and sweat with nothing much to show), he will exercise one or more of the above options by placing boulders in the path of progress, ano throwing rocks at the individuals attempting to make it succeed. He figures that if he Qan make enougn n0410 his management will call off the job, assNp1 it to someone else, or gw PJn additional nrources, if the first two occur he is off i .
the hook, if he is assigned additional resources, he can now tit back and " manage" the }ob. I should note at this point that I have observed Jim loose more battles than he has won because of ! his irrational behavior, attempted intimidation of others, and his unprofessional attitude, l in a small group like EE&C, every member must be both generalist and specialist and maintain flexibility and versatility, in addition they must be the w *er, the coordinator, and the manager of any task assigned to them. I believe these are the ground rules un$er which the group operates, and being smar, there is no room to accommodate individual whims, preferences, or , luxuries. To function effectively the manager must have total cooperation trom his team, with his senior engineers putting in 150% effort. He also needs his senior engineers to be
- supportive, creative, and innovative in finding solutions when there appear to be none.
( '. My interview with Jim began minutes after i shook his hand and closed his door. I barely got a chance to tell him why I was there when out of the blue he began ranting and raving about the extent and significance of drawing errcrs, and of the incompetence of Lou Casey and others.
=
Everyone was against him, but he was right because he had "pr#, This lins continued to be repeated fot a good half hour. He then began to tel me how I was to conduct my interview, which drawings I flad to review, and the persons I taj to interview, and what I flad to ask them. Upto now I could not have got in a word edgewise even if I had wanted, but this provoestion gave me my first opportunity to speak. I told him I would be conducting this interview to my rules
, e not his, I would be speaking to persons the team directed me to speak to, and I would review the 1 documents that I felt were pertinent to this inves1gation. After that Jim calmed down and for the 3 E BIT PAGE OFdPAGE(S)
I next three hours there ne no more outbursts. Though he appeared to talk rationally Jim had
. certain fixations that no (mourt of persuasion would change. These give me reason to cuestion whether his ludamental skills could laccardize work at nuclear feffities. For example:
I told him that the drawing errors that he claimed were so extensive, were known to exist from at least 1991 when Van Bowman wrote his memo. I remhtd him that the EDCR scope acknowledged this, and that correcting these errors was one of the objectivas of the design change. Therefore, there was Bttle point in harping on this again and again, that had been recognized already. What W needed was someone to correct the p. 21em. I told him that the methodology for correcting the drawirg discrepancies and errors, ie., issuance of new CAD drawings, consolidation of ccher ocawings, addition of fuses, removal of grounds, etc., had already been established by joira W/YNSD teams of which he was stWly a member; therefore, to try to change the approach at a late stage of tne project was not constructive. I reminded him of his non participation in the early l stages of the design because of sickness and higher priority work. He was given an opportunity to influence the design change, yet he choose not to; now he must hold his comments. I told him that his manager as well as the independent team had determined that it was feasible to corvinue both the drawing correction effort and the balance of the EDCR in parallel, he was told to follow this direction, yet he continued to oppose it. I asked him if this did not amount to insubordination? 1 ( l told him there were always multiple ways of approaching and solving problems, his was not the only way. His way had been revl?xed, considered, and rejected; he must now concede to that. I told him that it appeared that his sole objecdve was to find fault v.ith the EDCR instead cf helping and guiding the younger and lesser experienced YNSD enginLf towards the I common goal of completing tha design change on time. He claimed that the YNSD l engineer (Lou Casey) was incompetent and could not even read drawings. I told him that I neither ! , nor others from VY shared that opinion. If he felt Lou Casey was incompetent, he had the authorty to request that the YNSD engineer be removed from the project, yet he did nothing. When I asked Jh11 how often he had visited YNSD offices in Sc! sn, he said never, yet numerous VY engineers made the trip in the interests of helping and expediting the project.
. . Farouk D. Baxter, PE June S,1955 i
0 EXH BIT PAGE OFdPAGE(S)
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s.- a- -
.y SOME EX2ffTS PROM M TWO PREVIOUR PEftPOftlAN2 REVEWS
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- " Jim sometimes tends to be narrow minded. When he has reached a conclusion rela 6ve to a -
' subject he sometimes closes his mind to other altematives and refuses to listen to or consider-l}b '}
other opuons.* t
~ he sometimes becomes too involved direc6y in the prok. Instead of managing the -i project overall.'
- "He se somedmes la not as aceve in his support of policies that he fosis ve unnecessary and -
- sometimes places project implementation above safe work practices."-
t t " Jim must still improve his compliance to what appear to him as restrksive plant policies and procedures ' i " Jim's progress in dealing wit:t others, acceptance of restrictive policies,--etc., will l
'x continue to be monitored -
" Tire was one issue with Security during the early phases of thia project which resulted ir. a written warning to Jim." -
i .
' Jim has made some gains, but still needs to work on improving his performance in the non -
7 traditional construction ' areas." i
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Case No. 1 96 005 Exhibit 20A
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CONELDENTIAL ! MEMORANDUM - l YERNONT YANKEE - TERNON y i' To E.J. Massev Vernon Dates 21 Seotember, 1993
'From: D.L. Phillios, Vernon File: -
Subjects M t. ten notification of unerofessional work behavior j This is to inform you that your conduct in the performance of your , dutiss on 30 August, 1993 was unacceptable. Your interactions with the Security Manager, Greg Morgan, while he was attempting to correct an apparent security problem was totally inappropriate. You refused to listen to Mr. Morgian's side of the issue. Instead you attempted to dominate the conversation in a loud, uncooperative and combative manner. With no consideration given to Mr. !! organ's authority in secarity matters or his position on the issue at hand, l
. you became increasingly rude, confrontational nd disrespectful.
The conduct you . exhibited in this situation is a clesr case of , unacceptable work behavior. This type of unprofessio.al demeanor reflects negatively on you as well as the Electrical Engineering , and construction Department. I wish to make it clear, to you that continued behavior of this nature will not be tolerated and could lead to disciplinary action.
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l tL cc: Personnel File BR Buteau ,/j V;ipl4'W o~ G COMIDENTIAL exy,,,7gog CASENO. 1-96-005~ g . PAGE / OF / PAGE(S)
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- Case No. 1 E 005 ti Exhibit 26
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-11/18/91 FRON: EVB ISUi! JECT a i AOG SYSTEN UPGRADE SCOPE y n.
. THE ' AOG SYSTEN WAS - DESIGNED: 30 AS TO HAVE TWO SEPARATE TRAINS.
1 J EACH TRAIN WAS SUPPOSED-TO BE: COMPLETELY-INDEPENDENT OF THE-0THER TO PREVENT x A SINGLE - FAILURE FRON RENDERING- TMB S'J S T E N I N O P . PRESENTLY THE WAY.THE SYSTEM-WAS WIRED THIS IS NOT THE CASE. THE FOLloWING PROBLENS NEED TO BE ADDRESSED IN TNIS DESIGN CHANGZ. ,
- 1. -AOG'S CWD ' S . ARE INACCURATE AND' INCOMPLETE ' SUCH THAT AN1t -
MAINTENANCE OR TROUBLE SHOOTING CANNOT BE PERFORMED WITH ANY DEGREE - e OY CONFIDENC2 THAT THE AS-FOUND W4LL BE ANYTHING LIKE THE PRINT.
.SUGGE'STION:. ALL CWD'S NEED TO BE FIELb VERIFIED PRIOR TO ANY OTHER >
DESIGN CHANGES CAN BE CONSIDERED. i
- 2. THERE ARE REALLY ONLY 2 POWER SUPPLIES A AND B. HOWEVER
--NUMEROUS COMPONENTS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR OPERATION OF EITHER TRAIN DO NOT HAVE REDUNDANT POWER SUPPLIES, SUCH AS COMMON VALVES 7.3 i I; SYSTEM TRIPS. ,
l ( SUGGESTIONS: . SEPARATE TRIPS AND PROVIDE REDUNDANT POWER SUPPLIES TO COMMON COMPONENTS. Y 3. RECORDERS-THAT-HAVE INDICATIONS FOR BOTH TRAINS ARE POWERED FROM EIT'.4ER POWER SUPPLY A OR B NOT BOTH
, SUGGESTION: SEPARATE THE POINTS AND REDISTRIBUTE THEN TO TRAIN
- DEDICATED ~ RECORDER!.8
- 4. POWER SUPPLIES AND GROUNDS ARE DAISY CHAINED SUCH THAT REMOVING ONE'COMPoul:NT FOR MAINTENANCE OR BLOWING ONE FUSE WILL INOP ALL OF AOG . -- .
h SUGGESTION: INSTALL BUS WORK WITH FUSES TO INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. L {" :zw ar>hk ws rwe fir feh%'r svkr(b cucL. ; u
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cc t B 4 c EXHIBIT 27 l 1 I l ch. T i t L .. l- Case No. 1. % 005 Exhibit 27 P I [^- - _ - - , - _t s, gygm*pr w . - - r---* * .. nw y r my e = wa'y ___. w. w#.-.4+, ., , l
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-MEMORANDUM i.-
t YANKEE ATOMIC Bot. TON <; :} -
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i ' I L { .: To- 3. R. Millar , Date : Jhruary 11. 1992 ! lj
% $- VYI-04192 {
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@ ADG IMITIAL E71Lt'ATION , I.M.S.# .
Blue # am am*E .1 T.x l 1 REFERENCES t
- 1. Memo, E. Van Bowman to John T. Borron, ADG SYSTEL UPGRADE SCOPE Dated i 11/18/91
!*- RACKGROUND l
. Reference-(1) details a number of problems with the Advanced offgas system (AoG). Consequently, a 1992 lir,e item work request authorised YNSD to
- evaluste the system and make specific recommendations to VY management for '
improves ant. A preliminary evaluation of the system has been completed using drawings and
-p doc.unents on file at YNSD. A meeting took place on 2/3/92 between E. Van
{. (f Bowman of VY Operations, Sam Wender of VY I & C, M. T. Nyama and myself to deterr.ine Vermont Yankee's view regarding A00, system taprove-Snts and the
- - inter.ded scope of the solution. The consensus is detailed on the section
- below.
K DISCUSSION t . The vendor wiring diagrams are qu,*te. difficult to read, and may not l neccesarily reflect the actual instrument wiring =at the plant. As a possible first step, a field verification and possible -redraw 8ng of the Aoc instrumentation wiring would be desirable. To determine the existing system-wiring, a detailed test and verification procedure would. be written which J would be subject to PORC review.
- Any electrical-verification of the system would be done during shutdovn wher
& -the plant is off-line, and the Acc system is accessible. This task could be scheduled during the 1992 outage with the assistance of Vermont Yankee I & C.
,The procedure would include the following steps:
Verify by Test (de-energise circuitry)-to determines a) Which instruments are associated with each particular train (A, B or casunon) .
- ;y .
b-) . Identify instrument power supply configuration and location. EXHIBIT
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L CASENO. 1.L9 g. 0 0 5 - PAGE / Ob PAGE(S) (Mpp
l S. R. Miller February 11, 1992 Page 2 L c) Identify any instruments powered by supplies other than those previously
- identified.
Verify by Inspection (Walkdown) to determines a) Location of instruments, (t:RP or Field). b) Location and type of Valves and Position Indicetors. c) Instrument information: Manufacturer, Model, etc. This would act as a check against the list contained in OP-53;). d) Location and numbering of Terminal Strips. e) The existsnee of cable numbers (if any). f) Information on any estraneous supplies. This information could then be incorporated &nto the drawings as corrective updates, as needed, and converted to VY format. This task is desirable, as it will ansure that all Aoo wiring diagrams are accurate and easy to understand. There was also discussion of several other issues. These are potential items ( which would possibly lend themselves to future modificati.ons. It is important to nete, however, that the test and verification process outlined above be completed as a necessary first step, prior to any consideration of changes or improvements to the system. After this, the other items, or any which arise as a result of the test procedure, can be dispositioned accordingly. PLECOMMENDATIoM It in recomunended that a procedure be written and implemented to verify the existing instrumentation and control wiring for the Aoo system. When this task has been accomplished, the information gained would provide a cost of f active basis by which to determine the scope of improvements needed to enhance the reliability of the Aoo system. It is also recomunended that this memo be promptly forwarded to Vermont Yankee to obtain the approval necessary for the procedure to be written in order to meet the time constraints imposed by the 1992 outage schedule. EXHIB T PAGE OF2PAGE(S)
~ _._ _ _ _ - _ _ -- - __-- - - - - - -
- s. R. NLiter
-* February 11, 1992 F898 3 !
, me 1.. a. cosey 1 & C Group
( Verssont Project
/. Low, r Ikun N. T. Nyam&
1 & C Group Vermont Project
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R. T. Vibert Lead,1 & C Engineer Vermont Project
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#Engin,r f
g Manager Vermont Project ce: E. Van Sowman (VY)
- 8. A. Wender (VY)
R. L. Smith M. J. $achman Action Taken (if any) Recommendation Accepted _ -Recommendation Denied commentaa
.,J Signed: Md Date: Jfli/93 e
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t EX eAos. 3IT0 , 2 rxeete> L
y .- .: C . a c EXHIBIT 28 A O tj\k Case No. - 1 96 005 Exhibit 28 m_ _ _ _ _ .- - - _ ---_z_._- _
l,;a? MEMORANDUM {; YANKEE ATOMIC BOLTON To D. C. Poner . Dato February 14.1992
,. Groups OPVY 102/92 From R. L. Smith W.O.s 4904 subject PROPOSED INrr1AL ACTION FOR ADO SYSTEM UPORADE
References:
a) Memo, L. J. Casey to S. R., Miller, VYI 04/92 dated February 11,1992 (attached) Discussion: At Vermont Yankee's uest, a task was included in the 1992 NSD budget to evaluate potential improvements in the A system. The attached reference documents our preliminar of the system and discussions with plant personnel regarding theBased scopeon of this tas our efforts to date, we recommend that NSD write a procedure to verify the existing instrumentation and or.ntrol wiring for the AOO system to be implemented during tie upcoming refueling outage with the assistance of the Vermont Yankee I&C Depanment. As discussed in the reference, this effort is a necessary fust step in determining what system impmvements {, should be recommended for further evaluation. Please inform this office regarding your disposition of this recommendation. A timely response is requested to allew this effort to be com have any questions regarding this information,pleted during the upcoming outage. please contact tids office. Sh R. L. Stmth Vermont Yankee Project Engineer c: S R Miller w/o attachment J R !!offman w/o attachment j R T Viben w/o attachment
- i. L J 8asey w/o attachment M J Bachman R D Pagodin Vemon
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i EXHIBIT - 8 CASINO. 1-96-005^ p /OF/ lwl,(+w PAGE PAGE(s)
l 7 l k- . EXHIBIT 29 , 1 Case No.- 1 96 005 Exhibit 29
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MEMORANDUM l
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YANKEE ATOMIC BOLTON i l
%j t j[ TO: E. V. BoMDan DATE: Man:h li 1992 j l PR0ti: H. T. Hvams OROUP # VYI 12192
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SUBJECT:
AOG Instrumentation Verifimtion OlSCUS$40N: i ! l '; Per our discussion on March 6th, this memo is being written to detail the type and ! extent of testing YNSD feels should be performed on the AOG Instrumentation loops in order l
,* to gain assurance regarding the existilig wiring accuracy, The testing proposed by YNSD first j consists of recording initial instrumentation indiations, and then removing the AOG !
Instrument loop fuses one at a time and documenting the resultant indications, i.e. on scale j; or down scale. Upon completion, the affected fuse will be re installed and the next fuse will [ be removed until all branches have been observed. Additionally, a walkdown of the AOG ! system wiring should be done in order to establish the exact system wiring configuration. The ; l7 walkdow n will not require any equipment to be de-energized, and will be a visual inspection l j only. ! 4 ne electrical testing proposed will be confined to the control room only, and is ! (. i intended to verify the AOG instrumentation loop wiring. De only anticipated effect on any plant equipment outside of the AOG system would be to initiate isolation of Flow Control l Valve 10811 (PCV 11). Our review of the instrumentation dreuitry revealed that this valve : j should go closed when fuse FU 8 88 is removed, which removes power from Radiation Monitor RAn OG 3128. When this monitor is de-energized, the " Fall" contact closes which starts the time delay relays that initiate the isolation of PCV-11. This valve is also isolated by Monitor RAn CG 3127, which b powered through branch fuse FU 8 65. However, this fuse also powers the KV 11 isolation time delay relays. Consequently, when this fuse is removed, i it will de-energize the RAn cresting the " Pail" condition and start the time delay relays. ; However, the auto isolation of PCV 11 will be blocked by the fact that the time delay relays l L are also de-energized. 31s fact has been noted in the attached testing procedure for the ; removal of both fuses PU 888 and 845. The time rec luired to complete these two tasks is estimated to be three days; with one day required for tie AOG Instrument loop testo, and two days for the field walkdown portion. In an effort to minimise the impact on the plant outage, it is possible for the loop tests to be completed _on the back shift, with YNSD presence to record the data. The field walkdown an be completed at any time, and should only require minimal I&C assistance in i opentry terminal / junction boxes as required. In order to establish exactly what I&C assistance ,
.is neec ed during the Aeld walkdown portion, YNSD can begin the walkdown portion independent of the loop testing phase.
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, . CASEND. 1-94.005^ gpg PAGE / OF c$PAGE(S) er ---
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t.- . . . . Your assistance in scheduling the loop toting will be greatly approdated, along with any supat that Operations can provide. I also discussed this with Dave Phillips, who Inh me that he would like Jim Massey to monitor the loop toting, since Jim will be the hat Cognizant Engineer following any AOG modifications that may arise from this testing. ' hve informed aw that Jim will be tied up with the transformer toting for approximately the next three weeks, but should be free afterwards if not during that time. If this consideration can be sectored into the scheduling of the loop testing,it would be approdated. A pretindnary copy of the loop testing outline and data sheets is contained as Attachment A, and is included for your review and comments. Any suggetions yee Joel need to be included or addressed will be incorporated prior to implementation. Concurrent with your review, YNSD is reviewing this procedure to ensure that it will accomplish its intended function with no adverse affects on tJw plant. Feel free to contact me immediately as to proposed scheduling, or any other concerns that you may have. Nng i l] ps- - Harry T Hyams Senior Engineer Vermont Yankee Project ! P: r V1.J ! R. T. Vibert Lead I&C Engineer j , Vermont Yankee Project i 1 E .~. s 6 - J. R. Hoffmari
- _ Engineering ager Vermont Yarcee Project
,- cc R.P.Polack i R.LSmith LJ.Casey , b EX IT PAGE OF M PAGE(S) ~, _ _w._ .- ;= . . _ . , _ .
f e I r I 1 c EXHIBIT 38 ; i I l l 1 I j i l O of Case No. 1. E 005- Exhibit 38 _. . . -_ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .}}