ML20198G000
| ML20198G000 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Washington Public Power Supply System |
| Issue date: | 09/06/1974 |
| From: | Harold Denton US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Deyoung R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| CON-WNP-0995, CON-WNP-995 NUDOCS 8605290175 | |
| Download: ML20198G000 (6) | |
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R. C. DeYoung, Assistant Director (or Light Water A.eactors, Group 1, L WASullCf03 PUBLIC POWER SLTfLY ST31Mt - WP?SS WJS.1 & 4, Q-2 QUESTI0 tis & POSITIONS BY THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS D12Lil PLANT NAWJ WPPSS Nos. 1 & 4
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D-M ' % 513 RESPONSIBLE BJAUCH: LUR l-3, T. Cox, LFM dEQJCSTED COMPLETIC.1 DATE: August 26, 1974 ALVIEW STATUS: AAd Q-2 and Positions Complete Enclosud are Round 2 questions and positions on tho relocated
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Washington Public Power Supply Systems buclear Pro.jects 1 and 4 (WPPSS No.1 and No 4) fro:a the Accident Aaalyals Stanch.
Tnese questions were compiled by L. Soffer.
i We have included our positions on the fuel oil storaiso tank, one cite storage of propana, and the need for pre-operational testing of the spray additive system.
i It anould also be noted that one of our uecond accesptance review questions regarding toxic gaseous releases liaa not aa yet breil answerud. -
Orighai Signed by II. R. Dantes Harold R. Denton, Assistpat Director j
for Site Safety Directorate of Licenalng Enclosure Q-2 Questions & Positions cc: See noxt page
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31-1 31.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS BRANCH 31.1 Using Regulatory Guide 1.78, " Assumptions for Evaluating the (2.2.2)
Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Chemical Release," as a guide, assess the impact of any hazardous chemicals shipped or stored in the site vicinity upon control room habitability.
31.2 Indicate whether explosives are transported past the plant (2.2.2) site on the Ha'nford railroad system, and if so, provide the maximum quantity transported at one time. Assuming accidental detonation of this quantity, provide an analysis of the consequences to plant safety related features.
31.3 Discuss the 'bethods used to ' resupply the fuel oil tank.
(2.2.3)
Indicate frequencies and quantities of shipment and the method of transport. Indicate the closest approach of the fuel oil carriers to the safety-related structures of the plant.
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31.4 Discuss the consequences of a common mode failure, sucu as a (2.2.3) seismic event, causing a rupture of both the fuel oil atorage tank and the dike intended to confine any oil spillage. It is our position that either the fuel oil storage tank or the dike are to be designated as Seismic Category I structurcs, or that the ambient grading in the vicinity of the tar.k should be designed to permit spilled oil to flow, under gravity, away from any safety-related featores o.f the plant.
In this rescrd, indicate what action you plan to take.
31.5 The response to question 2.47 is unacceptable. Our analysis (2.2.3) indicates that a release 'of the complete inventory of the propane stored adjacent to the turbine generator building followed by a detonation could produce peak reflected over-pressures at the centainment greater than thosa caused by the i
design basis tornado.
'It is our position that either the maximum propane inventory must he reduced to no more than
.five gallons at the present location, er the propane storage shed must be relocated to be no closer than 850 feet from the nearest safety-related structure of the plant, or that electric arc ignition of the auxiliary boiler be substituted for propane.
In this regard, indicate what action you plan to tako.
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0 31-2 31.6 Given a turbine failure, provide an analysis which evaluates (3.5) the overall probability of a high trajectory turbine missile (from LP stage) strike with respect to the plant vital systems. Evaluate the probabilities using 130% and 180%
overspeed energies. The analysis should include all projected turbines which may be "within reach" of each candidate target during the nuclear facility lifetimes. Fossil as well as nuclear unit turbines should be included. Vital system targets should include all plant structures and equipment whose damage could lead to significant radiological consequences.
This should include direct effects (e.g., damage to containment, spent fuel, etc.) and indirect ef fects (e.g., control room).
List all redundant vital systems whica are excluded from potential turbine missile targets on the basia of spatial separation.
31.7 Section 6.2.2.3 lists the spray solution pH as 12.05 for the (6.2.2) case of maximum ECCS and minimum spray flow. It is our position that a spray solution pH in excess of 11.0 is un-acceptable.
Indicate the revision to be made to the system to comply with this position.
31.8 List the regions below the operating floor, and any other (6.2.2) volumes which aru not directly covered by the spray, and have restricted commynication with the main sprayed region.
31.9 Indicate whether the spray patterns shown in Figures 6.2-64 (6.2. 2) and 65 are for atcospheric or the post-accident containment conditions. Note that the spray trajectories shrink significantly in the post-accidt,t environment, and that an unsprayed annulus adjacent to the containment walla is highly undesirable.
31.10 We note that no pre-operational testing of the spray additive (6.2.2) function of the system is proposed. It is our position that the capability of the system to deliver the proper mixture of borated water and sodium hydroxide must be verified by a pre-operational proof test. No iodine removal credit for the spray system will be given without such verification of the spray additive function of the system. It should be noted that, without iodine removal credit for the spray system, the thyroid doses as a result of a postula:ed LOCA are well in excess of 10 CFR Part 100 guideline values.
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t 31-3 31.11 The response to Question 9.16(b) does not clarify how the (9.4) 400 cubic feet of incoming contaminated outside air is prevented from going directly to the air handling units without passing through the emergency filters. According to Figure 9.4-1 of Amendment 9, the outside air coming in through the normal intake can pass directly through the air handling unit prior to closure of the damper marked HCL-DAO-6 in Figure 9.4-1 of Amendment 9. Please clarify.
31.12 The response to Question 9.16(a) is incomplete since the (9.4) 400 cubic feet of contaminated outside air is based only on the 2.5 second closure time of the isolation damper.
Discuss briefly the response times associated with detector actuation and signal initiation, closure time for the damper used to divert air flow from the air handling units to the emergency filters, and any other tire constants associated with switching from the normal to the emergeacy ventilation mode.
31.13 Provide a response to yuestion '15.7 which has not been (15.1.35) answered.
31.14 Assume that in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident, the (15.1.13) equipment is leaking at a maximum operational leakage rate (i.e., postulate a damaged seal, or packing, or some other leakage path in which leakage would be at a maximum but not great enough to,cause the pump or equipment to be inoperable).
Calculate the radioactive release to the environment and resulting doses from the KilR, containment spray systems, etc., over the 30-day period cf operation.
State all of the assumptions that were used in your analysis and verify that they are conservativa.
Include the following parameters in your analysis:
a.
Concentration (uc/cc) of iodine and noble gas activity in the primary containment sump water following a LOCA.
b.
Temperature curve vs time for water being circulated through pumps following a LOCA.
Expected maximum leak rate through pump seals, flanges, c.
valves, etc.
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31.15 (Cont'd.)
d.
Partition factor for iodine.
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Adsorption and filtration efficiencies of the filter train used on the exhaust system for the engineered safety features area and whether these systems meet t
the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.52.
Provide an estimate of the total amount of leakage that could occur prior to isolation of failed equipment such as a pump seal failure.
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