ML20198F402

Rev 27 to USEC-02, Application for Us NRC Certification, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

ML20198F402
Person / Time
Site:	Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date:	12/11/1998
From:	UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198F348	List: ML20198F345 ML20198F402
References
NUDOCS 9812280112
Download: ML20198F402 (9)

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GDP 98-0275 USEC-02 Application for United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Certification Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Revision 27 t.

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l APPLICATION FOR UNITED STATES g,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CERTIFICATION.

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PORTSMOUTil GASFOUS DIFFUSION PLANT USEC-02 REMOVEhNSERT INSTRUCTIONS 3

Revision 27 Remove Pages Insert Pages PIIYSICAL SECURITY PLAN Page1 Pagei Page 2 Page 2 Page 11 Page 11 Page 12 Page 12 Page 21 Page 21 Page.51 Page 51 Page 55 Page 55 Page 68 Page 68 A()

CLASSIFIED MATTER SECURITY PLAN Page 2 Page ?

Page 17 Page 17 Page 47 Page 47 Page 49 Page 49 Page 53 Page 53 Page 80 Page 80 Page 82 Page 82 Page 126 Page 126 Page 127 Page 127

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APPLICATION FOR UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CERTIFICATION _

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USEC-02 REMOVE / INSERT INSTRUCTIONS Revision 27 Remove Pages Insert Pages VOLUME 3 EMERGENCY PLAN List of Effective Pages, pages i / ii List of Effective Pages, pages i / il 1-3 / l-4 1-3/l-4 5-5 / 5-6 5-5 / 5-6 6-3/6-4 6-3 / 6-4 FUNDAMENTAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS CONTROL PLAN List of Effective Pages, pages i / ii List of Effective Pages, pages i / ii Table of Contents, pages iii / iv Table of Contents, pages lii / iv Introduction, pages xi / xii Introduction, pages xi / xii 1-1 through 1-6 1-1 through 1-4 2-3 through '?-5 2-3 through 2-6 4-23 / 4-24 4-23 / 4-24 5-9 / 5-10 5-9 / 5-10 5-23 / 5-24 5-23 / 5-24 5-27 / 5-28 5-27 / 5-28 11-1 through Il-4 11-1 through Il-4 12-1 through 12-6 12-1 through 12-6 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY PLAN Page1 Page1 j

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j Emergency Plan'- PORTS

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Emergency Plan - PORTS April 15,1998 g

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a Emergency Plan-PORTS

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- -December 11,1998 Rev. 27 * -

The general location is an area of steep to gently rolling hills, with average elevations of 120 feet above the Scioto River valley. The steep hills characteristically are forested, while the rolling hills provide marginal farmland. With the exception of the Scioto River and its floodplain, the floodplains and valleys are

- narrow and are occupied by small farms.

Here are no unrelated industrial, commercial, institutional, or residential structures within the plant proputy. USEC and DOE lease facilities onsite to the Ohio National Guard. The Ohio National Guard does not store weapons onsite. There are no other military installations located near the site.

Roadways within the fenced !imited access or protected area of the plant consist of several miles of paved surface. Several paved roads branch out from the plant to the Perimeter Road that surrounds the plant site. The west access to the plant extends from U.S. 23 to the Perimeter Road. Shyville Road connects U.S.

l 32 to the north side of the plant, Big Run Road leads to the south side of the plant, and Dutch Run Road enters i

the area from the east side of the ptant.

1 Rail and roadways are used for cylinder movements to the plant. The rail spur enters the site from i

the north and branches to several areas inside the fence. All the process buildings and most of the support facilities have direct rail service. In addition, cylinders are transported around the plant site using a variety i

of devices, including cylinder carriers, stackers, rail cars, forldifts, trucks, and wagons.

Rivers or major streams do not traverse the plant area. However, Big Beaver Creek and Little Beaver Creek cross the ncrthern edge of the PORTS reservation. Runoff water flows from the area through three streams: Little Beaver Creek, Big Run Creek, and a drainage ditch to the Scioto River, The PORTS site consists of 3,708 acres with an 800-acre central developed area surrounded by the Perimeter Road. The resenation land outside the Perimeter Road is used for a variety of purposes, including a water treatment phnt, lagmns for the process waste-water treatment itnt. sanitary and lart landfills, and w:. A rm. 2d M ia n.u.

Most of the site improvements r.re located within tb 500ere fenced core area. The core area is largely devoid of trees, with grass and paved roadways dominating tne open space. Within this area are the three process buildings, each approximately 882 ft by 1781 ft and 80 ft tall.

The three process buildings account for 8 million ft of the total 10 million ft of floor space at 2

2 PORTS, excluding the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP) facilities. The plant also includes a series '

of electrical switchyards, storage areas, cooling towers, a steam plant, water treatment plant, sewage disposal plant, pollution abatement facility, service and maintenance buildings, and facilities for administration, medical, fire, and security. Figure 1-2 shows the plant layout at PORTS.

The process buildings are referred to as the cascade buildings. These cascade buildings, designated X-326, X-330, and X-333, are steel-framed transite-covered two-story buildings that house the enrichment process equipm:nt. Three smaller buildings, X-343, X-342A, and X-344A, are referred to as the feed vaporization and sampling facility, feed vaporization and fluorine generation facility, and toll enrichment facility, respectively. Some of the instruments and controls in these buildings are O

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Emergency Plan-PORTS September 5,1997 Rev.12 dupl:cated in the X-300 Plant Control Facility (PCF). This facility also serves as the alternate Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the headquarters of the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS). A description of the cascade / process buildings, key support buildings, onsite emergency facilities, and airborne effluent controls follows.

The three process buildings, X-326, X-330, and X-333, located near the central portion of plant site, form an "L" configuration. Such a configuration permits easy connection of most overhead and underground piping and service lines required between the process buildings. The purpose of the process buildings is to house the equipment and much of the support systems necessary for the isotopic separation of uranium.

The vaporization facilities, X-342A and X-343, located adjacent to their respective process buildings, are the enny points of the feed material into the cascade. Autoclaves are used to vaporize the feed from the cylinders.

Cascade UF, withdrawals are also performed at various locations. As with feed operations, there are both fixed and portable withdrawal facilities, but some withdrawals involve liquid UF. tra isfers. These UF, liquid phase withdrawals are performed at three fixed facilities: the X-330 tails withdrawal station, the X-333 low assay withdrawal, and the X-326 extended range product station. These withdrawals involve the compression and condensation of UF,.

Assay control for enriched products withdrawn from the cascade is verified by samples taken simultaneously at the withdrawal point. Low-assay (5.0 wt % 2"U) materials are withdrawn into 10-ton heavy wall cylindus at X-326 or X-333.

g The toll enriclunent facility (X-344A) is the central receiving and shipping point for large-cylinder toll enrichmem en:ering and leaving the plant. Small-cylinder shipping and receiving activities are performed at the special nuclear material storage facility (X-345).

l The primary EOC k :ccated in th M020 ~ Sding. The EOC is a Jedicated facility that provides communications, information processing capabilities, and support services with which the Crisis Manager can direct mitigation of an emergency. Upon activation, the EOC is staffed by a preassigned cadre who assists i

the Crisis Manager.

l The alternate EOC is located in the X-300 PCF, which houses the PSSs, power operat;;m nersonnel, the Cascade Controllers, and other cascade operations personnel. The PCF provides commutlications, information processing capabilities, and suppo.

rvices with which the Crisis Manager can direct mitigation of an emergency.

The plant medical facility, located in the X-101 Builaing, is operational during the day shift, Monday through Friday excluding holidays. The medical facility has supplies, equipment, and personnel to treat most l

injuries. Medical personnel assess patient condition, provide emergency care, and determine appropriate supplemental treatment. Medical personnel are capable of treating contaminated individuals.

The plant decontamination facility is located in the X-705 Building, which is designed for the safe disassemoly and decontamination of process and support equipment. Contaminated emergency equipment 1

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Emergency Plan - PORTS December 11, 1998 p)

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Rev.27 The major physical components of the fire protection system consists of water supply system, pumps, sprinkler systems, and fire alarms. Mobile fire equipment is maintained onsite to support fire fighting activities and back up the fixed fire suppression systems. The fire services, using test frequencies established in group procedures, oversees the testing and inspection program for the tire protection system and eo.uipment.

Further information pertaining to fire protection is provided in Section 5.4 of the SAR.

In the event of an ongoing release of radioactive or hazardous material, the goal is for personnel to escape from the vicinity without personal contact with the release and assist in ensuring that non-response personnel do not enter the vicinity of the release. In some cases, approved engineering controls are used to mitigate the effects of a minor release, i.e., gulpers at the autoclaves and on the cylinder valve change cart.

In other cases, authorized members of the ERO shall take the appropriate actions to reduce and contain the release.

9 5.4 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS During emergencies, the PSS or designee or CM must determine the best possible means to limit exposure of onsite and offsite personnel to potential or actual threats, such as radioactive or toxic materials that may be accidentally released to the environment. Guidelines are provided to limit the exposare of personnel in tiu case of accidental releases to the environme:at. These guidelines are prescribed according to potential health effects and are called PAGs for radioacth e materials and ERPGs for hazardous materials.

p Specific EPIPs have been developed for the protection of emergency workers and other onsite and offsite V

personnel.

Thir

tion descria the protective at - u.

. !imit exposure of plant personnel and the

'% < "c 7 - mer mcy. The rmeetive actiors to ' e imrle.mnted onsite are the responsibility of r

quaiualplam g:-..el. In the e '

' emer, y *S PTS "

Ignee notifies onsite agencies such as the Ohio National Guard and Ohio V./ Electri-

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hne of notification will l

be affect 4.; M.. a of the em;.gency a:M a..

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. -.. urganizations. The appropriate offsite authorities are responsible for providing offsite protecave actions.

5.4.1 Onsite Protective Actions 5.4.1.1 Alerting i

l Wheneve: it is determined that a threat or potential threat to the safety of personnel on the DOE l

reservation exists, the PSS or designee directs that persons on the DOE reservation or within a specified area are alerted, whichever is appropriate. Alerdng is accomplished by use of the PA system, plant radios,

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I telephones, or if required, by runner. Transients on the DOE reservations (i.e. commercial deliveries, school buses, area residents) will be directed to exit the reservation. The alerting time will depend upon the severity and location of the threat to safety.

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Fev.2 5.4.1.2 Personnel Evacuation and Accountability P10tective actions for onsite personnel (including visitors and contractor personnel) include alerting, assembling and accounting for, sheltering in place, evacuating, monitoring, and decontaminating. As previously described, the plant's primary cencern is to minimize the impact on plant personnel and the general public.

1.

Evacuation. When it is determined that a threat to the safety of plant personnel exists, the PSS or designee or CM may order an evacuation of personnel from affected plant areas. Criteria l

that should be considered before ordering an evacuation includes wind direction, wind speed, and kration of the emergency. Evacuation will be implemented immediately in the event of actuation of the radiation and gas release alarm systems. The evacuation alarm and announcement, including any special instructions, is sounded over the PA system, plant radios, or other plant communications systems as appropriate.

At the discretion of the PSS or designee or CM, plant personnel, visitors, r_nd contractors will l

evacuate to a designated assembly point or monitoring station or be sent to reception centers.

Personnel are sent to assembly points during non-radiological events. However, personnel report to a monitoring station if the event involves a radiological release. Refer to Figure 1-2, PORTS Plant Layout, for locations of monitoring stations. If a site-wide evacuation is ordered, personnel report to offsite reception centers.

The PSS or designee will provide directions on the specific evacuation routes. The l

appropriate selection of an assembly area and evacuation route is based upon plant conditions, wind direction, and weather. Evacuation to offsite reception centers is generally by individually owned vehicles.

As discussed in this section, emergencies include natural eve"ts as well as radiological / hazardous materials incidents. The procedures to be followed in these e, cuations are included in the EPIPs, including designation of assembly areas. Provisions are made for consideration of impediments to evacuation caused by weather conditions, traffic, or radiological / hazardous materials release. When sheltering personnel would greatly mitigate the consequences of an emergency, the CM or PSS or designee recommends to shelter-in-place and plant personne!

l are notified over the PA system, plant radios, or other plant communications systene as appropriate.

2.

Accountability. In an emergency, one of the most probable protective actions for site personnel is evacuation of a building or area. Provisions for determining and maintaining the accountability of l

perso.mel are established. Search and rescue operations may be initiated if a person is determined to l

be missing.

Monitoring stations are identifed in Figure 1-2.

Personnel permitted unescorted site access are provided training on their assembly / accountability roles and responsibilities. To ensure proticiency, site personnel participate in annual retraining and periodic evacaation and accountability drills.

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Emergency Plan-PORTS December 11,1998 Rev. 27 1

G The CM directs activities at the EOC and is supported by the EOC Coordinator. The EOC Coordinator is responsible for coordination of EOC functions and communications.

EOC personnel are responsible for performing the following functions:

1.

Technical interactions with offsite Federal, State, and local officials, 2.

Generation of emergency information for public information activities, 3.

Ensuring required support to the incident scene, 4.

Coordination of support for onsite response and mitigation and 5.

Timely notification of the USEC EOF.

The plant has planned for and has established alternate EOCs in the unlikely event that the primary EOC, the X-1020 building, becomes uninhabitable due to a radiological / toxic materials release. The requirements, responsibilities, and activities pertaining to the activation of an alternate EOC are described in the EPIPs.

The alternate EOC is located in the X-300 PCF. In die unlikely event that the EOC is evacuated, the key EOC personnel evacuate the area and relocate to the alternate EOC in accordance with the EPIPs and m_j direction from the PSS or designee or the CM. The plant mobile communications vehicle may also be used as an alternate EOC.

6.1.S Central Alarm Station The Central Alarm Station (CAS), located in building X-1020 with back-up in building X-104, e es as a focal point for security activities during an emergency. The CAS is operated on a 24-r.aur basis t.i is, therefore, immediately available to support emergency security operations. The X-104 Communications Room I

supervisor is responsible for coordinatir.;; CAS activi:, and communicauons m icports to the Site and l

Facilities Support advisor. The CAS Operator performs the following furictions:

1.

Dispatches protective force personnel, 2.

Maintains communications with the protective force officer at the emergency scene, 3.

Advises protective force personnel management, and 4.

Advises the EOC staff.

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h'nuary 19,1996 Emergency Plan-PORTS

.x Rev.2 6.1.6 Decontamination Facilities f

Specific facilities, resources, and provisions for the decontamination of personnel, vehicle equipment are provided. These facilities are located, designed, and equipped to handle pote identified in the Emergency Plan.

6.1.7 Joint Public Infor mation Center ne JPIC is the designated location for the dissemination of official information about the emergency to the media and to the public. The JPIC accommodates the following:

Coordination of information with interfacing Federal, State, and local organizations and 1.

spokespersons, 2.

Press releases and media briefings, and Work space for site personnel, interfacing organization personnel, and representatives of the new 3.

media.

The JPIC is located at the Vern Riffe Joint Vocational School. JPIC operations are described in designated EPIPs.

O 6.2 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT This section describes the communications systems in place to support emergency response. The ea:r.unications systems are designed to ensure the 1 eliable. timely flow of information and action direc between all parties having a role to play in the mitigatie rf emergencies. Reliability is provided via redundancy, dedicated communication equipment to preclude delays due to system everload, ad ro and testing of many of the systems, which lowers the probability of undetected system failures. Timeli of information flow is achieved by prompt notification, predefined lines of communications, predefined emergency action levels and predefined levels of authority and responsibility. The communications is formulated around this basic concept and is designed to channel information directly to the key parties hav closely related functions, thus eliminating errors often associa6ed with second-hand information.

The communications links are manned continuously and are periodically tested to ensure availability.

l communic.aions systems in place include the following:

1.

Commercial telephone system, 2.

Facsimile machines, 3.

STU-III secure phone,

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Radio repeater networks for plant groups, h

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