ML20198D279
| ML20198D279 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1986 |
| From: | Andrews R OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| References | |
| IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, LIC-86-224, NUDOCS 8605230206 | |
| Download: ML20198D279 (6) | |
Text
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Omaha Public Power District i
1623 Hamey Omaha. Nebraska 68102 l
l 402/536 4000 May 15, 1986 LIC-86-224 Document Control Desk U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Reference:
Docket No. 50-285
Subject:
IE Bulletin 85-03, Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) received the subject bulletin dated November 15, 1985.
This bulletin required several actions of licensees.
The actions required of all holders of operating licenses are detailed in the enclosure to this letter, followed by the written report required in paragraph e.
As requested, the written report is being submitted under oath or affirmation to the Regional Administrator of Region IV, and a copy is attached to this letter.
If you have further questions concerning this matter, please contact us.
Sincerely,
/N sty h R.
L.
Andrews F
Division Manager Nuclear Production RLA/rge cc:
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Ave.,
N.W.
Washington, DC 20036 Robert D.
Martin, NRC Regional Administrator Mr.
D.
E.
Sells, NRC Project Manager Mr.
P.
H.
Harrell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector 8605230206 860515 PDR ADOCK 05000285 PDR s
G 4ssR4 E mployment with Equal Opportunity
%tle Female
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of
)
)
Omaha Public Power District
)
Docket No. 50-285 (Fort Calhoun Station,
)
Unit No. 1)
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AFFIDAVIT W. G. Gates, being duly sworn, hereby deposes and says that he is authorized alternate for the Division Manager - Nuclear Production Division of the Omaha Public Power District; that he is duly authorized to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the attached response to IE Bulletin 85-03 dated May 15, 1985; that he is familiar with the content thereof; and that the matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.
//V. N.
W.
G. Gates - authorized alternate for Division Manager Nuclear Production STATE OF NEBRASKA) m WWHieb elaersta
)
ss L MTWIBCILWWNO COUNTY OF DOUGLAS)
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Nebraska on the
/Kn day of May, 1986.
2 el
[ ' Notary Public
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RESPONSE TG IE BULLETIN 85-03 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE COMMON MODE FAILURES DURING PLANT TRANSIENTS DUE TO IMPROIER SWITCH SETTINGS Actions for All Holders of Operating Licenses or Construction Permits:
For motor-operated valves in the high pressure coolant injection / core spray and emergency feedwater systems (RCIC for BWRs) that are required to be tested for operational readiness in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g), develop and imple-ment a program to ensure that valve operator switches are selected, set and maintained properly.
This should include the following components:
a.
Review and document the design basis for the operation of each valve. This documentation should include the maximum differential pressure expected dur-ing both opening and closing the valve for both normal and abnormal events to the extent that these valve operations and events are included in the existing, approved design basis, (i.e., the design basis documented in pertinent licensee submittals such as FSAR analyses and fully-approved operating and emergency procedures, etc.). When determining the maximum differential pressure, those single equipment failures and inadvertent equipment operations (such as inadvertent valve closures or openings) that are within the plant design basis should be assumed.
b.
Using the results from item a above, establish the correct switch settings.
This shall include a program to review and revise, as necessary, the meth-ods for selecting and setting all switches (i.e., torque, torque bypass, position limit, overload) for each valve operation (opening and closing).
If the licensee determines that a valve is inoperable, the licensee shall also make an appropriate justification for continued operation in accor-dance with the applicable technical specification, c.
Individual valve settings shall be changed, as appropriate, to those estab-lished in item b, above. Whether the valve setting is changed or not, the valve will be demonstrated to be operable by testing the valve at the max-imum differential pressure determined in item a. above with the exception that testing motor-operated valves under conditions simulating a break in the line containing the valve is not required. Otherwise, justification should be provided for any cases where testing with the maximum differen-tial pressure cannot practicably be performed.
This justification should include the alternative to maximum differential pressure testing which will be used to verify the correct settings.
Note: This bulletin is not intended to establish a requirement for valve testing for the condition simulating a break in the line containing the valve. However, to the extent that such valve operation is relied upon in the design basis, a break in the line containing the valve should be con-sidered in the analyses prescribed in items a and b above.
The resulting switch settings for pipe break conditions should be verified, to the extent l
practical, by the same methods that would be used to verify other settings l
(if any) that are not tested at the maximum differential pressure.
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Enclosure (Continued)
Page 2 Each valve shall be stroke tested, to the extent practical, to verify that the settings defined in item b above have been properly implemented even if testing with differential pressure can not be performed.
d.
Prepare or revise procedures to ensure that correct switch determined and maintained throughout the life of the plant.gettings are Ensure that applicable industry recommendations are considered in the preparation of these procedures.
Within 180 days of the date of this bulletin, submit a written report to e.
the NRC that: (1) reports the results of item a and (2) contains the program to accomplish items b through d above including a schedule for completion of these items.
- 1. For plants with an OL, the schedule shall ensure that these items are 4
completed as soon as practical and within two years from the date of this bulletin.
- 2. For plants with a CP, this schedule shall ensure that these items are completed before the scheduled date for OL issuance or within two years from the date of this bulletin, whichever is later.
f.
Provide a written report on completion of the above program.
This report should provide (1) a verification of completion of the requested program, (2) a summary of the findings as to valve operability prior to any adjust-ments as a result of this bulletin, and (3) a summary of data in accordance with Table 2, Suggested Data Summary Format. The NRC staff intends to use this data to assist in the resolution of Generic Issue II.E.6.1.
This report shall be submitted to the NRC within 60 days of completion of the program. Table 2 should be expanded, if appropriate, to include a summary of all data required to evaluate the response to this bulletin.
" This item is intended to be completely consistent with action item 3.2,
" Post-Maintenance Testing (All Other Safety-Related Components)," of Generic Letter 83-28, " Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events." These procedures should include provisions to monitor valve perfor-mance to ensure the switch settings are correct.
This is particularly important if the torque or torque bypass switch setting has been significantly raised above that required.
4 o
l Enclosure (Continued)
Page 3 OPPD RESPONSE a.
The valves within the scope of IE Bulletin No. 85-03 for Fort Calhoun Station are as follows: HCV-311, HCV-312, HCV-314, HCV-315, HCV-317, HCV-318, HCV-320, and HCV-321.
Each valve is a two inch globe (throttling plug) valve on the HPSI system and is closed during normal plant operation.
The maximum delta pressure across the valve when operation was required was reviewed. The eight Velan globe valves listed above are of the same design except for inlet inside diameter; HCV-311, HCV-314, HCV-317, and HCV-320 are.Sch. 80, 1.939 inches. HCV-312, HCV-315, HCV-318, and HCV-321 are Sch.
160, 1.689 inches.
Closure / Throttling Design Basis Maximum delta pressure across an open valve occurs when maximum flow oc-curs. At 100% open, flow of 225 GPM, the delta pressure is 270 1 30 psi.
It should be noted that with this type of valve, flow tends to close the valve.
t
-Opening Design Basis SI-2A/B/C pump discharge pressure is 1358 to 1462 psig (ST-SI/CS-1), which includes a full Safety Injection and Refueling Water Tank.
Pump shut off (maximum head) is to be 3100 ft. (1377 psig 9 70*F) per Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Table 6.2.2.
Pump pressure Rise is 1320 to 1448 psi (ST-SI/CS-1).
The maximum inlet pressure to the 8 valves would be 1462 psig minus 44 ft. head change (17 psi 0 350*F) or 1445 psig which corresponds to the maximum delta pressure across the valves.
It should be noted that this maximum delta pressure only occurs during the quarterly surveillance testing of the high pressure safety injection pumps. The system is designed in such a manner that for accident conditions, the valves start to open at -least 3 seconds prior to HPSI pump start, thus yielding a delta pressure across the valves well below design limits. Therefore, the quarterly pump surveillance testing would yield the maximum credible delta pressure across the valves.
During normal plant operations, the eight valves are cycled on a monthly frequency to satisfy requirements of the surveillance test program.
In addition, the valves are tested on a refueling frequency to demonstrate operation under simulated accident conditions.
HCV-312, HCV-315, HCV-318, and HCV-321 can raceive liquid from the charging pumps, CH-1A/B/C, which have a maximum design pressure of 2750 psia. Opera-tion of the charging pumps against closed HCV-312, HCV-315, HCV-318, and HCV-321 is not considered to be an inadvertent equipment operation or sin-gle equipment failure mode. Other credible failure modes are bounded by p
the quarterly surveillance testing discussed above.
Enclosure (Continued)
Page 4 OPPD has a program and procedures in place to utilize M0 VATS equipment for Limitorque valve operator testing. Additionally, procedures are in place to test the valves each refueling cutage for normal valve operation. A procedure will be written and performed prior to the end of the 1987 refueling outage to prove valve operability under the maximum credible delta P of 1445 psi. A report, required by paragraph f will be provided within 60 days of the end of the 1987 refueling outage.
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