ML20198C810
| ML20198C810 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1985 |
| From: | Hufham J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-85, REF-PT21-85-471-000 PT21-85-471, PT21-85-471-000, NUDOCS 8511120185 | |
| Download: ML20198C810 (3) | |
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II N 00ctbek **1hh BLRD-50-438/82-37
'BLRD-50-439/83-08 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:
Dr. J.-Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
Dear Dr. Grace:
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - FAILURE OF B.I.F. BUTTERFLY VALVE SEATS - BLRD-50-438/82-37 BLED-50-439/83 EIGHTH INTERIM REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-01E Inspector R. V. Celenjak on May 11, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 1819. This was followed by our interim reports dated June 8, and October 29, 1982; February 8 May 25, and. July 28, 1983; September 18.-1984 and April 25, 1985. Related NCRs 2170, 2186, and 2187 were included in our second interim report and NCR 2231 was included in our. fourth interim report.
Enclosed is our eighth interim report. We expect to submit our next report on or about January 3,1986. We consider 10 CFR Part 21 applicable to this deficiency.
The delay in the submittal of this report was discussed with NRC-0IE Region II Inspector A. Ignatonis on September 18, 1985.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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W. Hufham, Manager Licensing and Risk Protection Enclosure Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure) cc:
Office of Inspection and Enforcement i
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Records Center (Rnclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 circle 75 Parkway,-Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 8511120185 851009 PDR ADOCM 05000438 i\\
O PDR An Equal Opportunity Employer gg
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ENCLOSURE BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 FAILURE OF BIF BUTTERFLY VALVE SEATS BLRD-50-438/82-37, BLRD-50-439/83-08 NCRs 1819, 2170, 2186, 2187, 2231 10 CFR 50.55(e)
EIGHTH INTERIM REPORT Description of Deficiency The following butterfly valves, manufactured by BIF, a unit of General Signal Corporation, Ee:st Warwicke, Rhode Island, which are used in the essential air (RJ) system were determined to be leaking in excess of an acceptable rate.
BIF Serial UNID No.
Mark No.
Contract No.
Item No.
No.
1-RJ-VTAC-50B 3BWWO471-00-20 76K30-86163-3 577 N-49445-10 1-RJ-VTAC-44B 3BWWO471-00-15 76K30-86163-3 576 N-49445-7 1-RJ-VTAC-27A 3BWWO471-00-15 76K30-86163-3 576 N-49445-2 Further investigation revealed that the rubber seats had failed due to damage (i.e., the seats were cut and portions were missing).
Subsequent to the identification of the deficient valves cited above in nonconformance report (NCR) 1819, the following essential raw cooling water (ERCW) (KE) system valves also supplied by BIF were determined to be deficient and documented as such in the indicated NCRs.
NCR 2170 The valve seat on 2KE-VTAC-255A had pulled loose from the valve body.
NCR 2186 When valve 1KE-VTAC-252A was removed to inspect for leakage; it was discovered that the valve seat had pulled loose from the valve body.
NCR 2187 When ERCW valve 1KE-VTAC-255A was removed to inspect leakage of 1KC-MHS-006A heat exchanger, it was discovered that the valve seat had pulled loose from the valve body.
NCR 2231 When ERCW valves 1KE-VTAC-113B and 2KE-VTAC-113B were removed to inspect for leakage; it was discovered that the valve seats were cut.
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9 The causes of these deficiencies were:
1.
Valve seats were manufactured or installed improperly on RJ system valves.
2.
In KE and KC system, valve seats deteriorated during storage, or were damaged due to improper storage or damaged during system flushing.
Interim Progress All of the damaged valve seats have been replaced either by TVA or BIF.
TVA is continuing to monitor the performance of BIF butterfly valves to determine if additional corrective action is necessary. We are also in the process of determining the appropriate actions required to prevent recurrence.
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