ML20198C093
| ML20198C093 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/1985 |
| From: | Cybulskis P, Denning R, Gieseke J Battelle Memorial Institute, COLUMBUS LABORATORIES |
| To: | NRC |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8511110294 | |
| Download: ML20198C093 (125) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. e u [ [ FINAL REPORT [ on { [ FISSION PRODUCT TRANSPORT FOR { THE LIMERICK PLANT to BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY [ and U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [ September 23, 1985 by [ J.A. Gieseke, P. Cybulskis, R.S. Denning, M.R. Kuhlman and K.W. Lee [ [ [ BATTELLE Columbus Laboratories [ 505 King Avenue Columbus, Ohio 43201 ( 8511110294 85092332 j ( ADOCK 0 gDR
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) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION ........................... 1
.................. 2 ACCIDENT SEQUENCE DESCRIPTIONS FISSION PRODUCT FLOW PATHS .................... 3 RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Accident Thermal Hydraulics ................. 5 Sequence TC (Transient with Failure to Scram) . . . . . . 5 Sequence TPE (Transient, Stuck-0 pen, Safety Valve, Fail u re o f ECC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Sequence TQUV (Transient with Failure of Coolant Makeup) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Code Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Fission Product Inventory .................. 21 Rel ease from Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Release During Core-Concrete Interaction ........ 22
[ Fission Product Transport in the RCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 RCS Transport and Deposition for the TC3 Sequence . . . . 22 { RCS Transport and Deposition for the TC4 Sequence . . . . 34 RCS Transport and Deposition for the TPE Sequence . . . . 34 RCS Transport and Deposition for the TQUV Sequence ... 38 Transport of Fission Products Through Containment ...... 42 i TC4 Sequence ...................... 46 TQUV Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 ( 1 ii (
f FISSION PRODUCT TRANSPORT FOR THE LIMERICK PLANT by J.A. Gieseke, P. Cybulskis, R.S. Denning, M.R. Kuhlman and K.W. Lee September 23, 1985 INTRODUCTION Four accident sequences were analyzed for the Limerick Mark II BWR. The sequences considered were TPE, TQUV, and two variations of TC. These sequences were selected in discussions among the U.S. NRC, Brookhaven National Laboratory, and Battelle-Columbus. Each of these sequences and the assumptions used for their analysis will be described below. The analysis of the overall accident thermal hydraulics for each of the individual accident sequences was performed with the MARCH 2 code. The MARCH input related to the physical description of the Limerick plant was pro-vided by Brookhaven National Laboratory. Battelle-Columbus converted the original input for use with the later version of the code as well as updating the modeling option choices to conform to the options used in the BMI-2104 analyses. Some of the input initially provided was revised after review by Battelle-Columbus and discussion with BNL. In the MARCH description of some of the reactor vessel internals, as well as in the subsequent MERGE analyses, information previously provided by General Electric for the Peach Bottom plant was utilized. It is' understood that in this respect the Limerick and Peach Bottom reactors are identical. The Mark II pressure suppression containment,' illustrated in Figure 1*, i was modeled as a two-compartment system in the MARCH analyses. For these analy- [- ses, a containment failure pressure of 145 psia was. assumed and failure was assumed to take place in the drywell compartment. BNL representatives have [ . indicated that containment failure could take place either in the drywell or
- Figures are placed at end of report.
[ [
2 the wetwell spaces though failure in the drywell has been indicated to be more litely. The in-vessel release of fission products was analyzed using the CORSOR code, using the MARCH calculated core node temperatures as input. Addi-tionally, the nodal extent of Zircaloy oxidation was passed to CORSOR for use in determining the extent of tellurium release as a function of time in the TQUV and TC4 sequences. The TPE and TC3 analyses do not include tracking of the Te release from fuel. The releases of the other fission product groups = and their behavior in the RCS, however, are presented in this report. The transport and deposition of fission products within the primary coolant system was analyzed with the TRAP-MELT code. The thermal hydraulic input required by TRAP-MELT was provided by the MERGE code. The MERGE code takes the output from MARCH and does additional analysis of heat transfer within the primary system, using a finer breakdown of the volumes and structures in the fission product flow path than used by MARCH. Analyses of fission product and aerosol release during the molten core / concrete interaction were performed by Brookhaven National Laboratories using the VANESA code which was developed by Sandia National Laboratories. Retention of aerosols in the suppression pool was predicted with Battelle-Northwest's SPARC code, and the behavior of aerosols in the containment was predicted using the NAVA4 code developed by KfK, Karlsruhe, Germany. ACCIDENT SEQUENCE DESCRIPTIONS The TPE sequence consists of a transient followed by the sticking open of a safety / relief valve and the complete failure of emergency core cool-ing injection. Such a sequence is sometimes described as a transient-induced loss-of-coolant accident. In the MARCH analyses for this sequence it was assumed that the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) was actuated following I core uncovery. The TQUV sequence consists of a transient followed by reactor shut-down and the loss of both the high pressure as well as the low pressure coolant makeup systems. In the MARCH analyses it was assumed that the system was - maintained at high pressure and the primary coolant boiled off through the safety / relief valves until the low-water level in the vessel was reached; at s 5
3 that point the ADS was assumed to be actuated manually. This is believed to be consistent with current emergency operating procedures for boiling water reactors. The TC sequence is a transient with failure of the reactor shutdown system. In the absence of control rod insertion and standby liquid control system operation, the reactor power would be expected to stabilize at a power
, level below normal operating level, but well above decay heat level. The power
( would tend to equilibrate with the rate of coolant makeup being provided to the system. In the Limerick analyses an equilibrium power level of 30 percent ( of normal was assumed for the fully covered core; the power was assumed to decrease as the core uncovered, reaching decay heat level when the water level was at the 3 foot level. Since the power 'evel is well above the capacity of the residual heat removal system, heatup of the suppression pool would result from the continued discharge of the primary coolant. In one of the variations of the TC sequence, designated TC3, the emergency cooling pumps supplying makeup to the reactor vessel were assumed to fail when the suppression pool reached a temperature of 212 F. In the other variation of this sequence,
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designated TC4, the emergency coolant pumps were assumed to operate until the containment failed, and fail by cavitation following containment failure. In ( the TC3 scenario the initial core melting takes place with the containment intact; in TC4 the core melts in a failed containment. ( It is recognized that the equilibrium power level in the event of failure to scram could vary from the nominal value assumed here; in particular, the core power history would depend on the specific actions taken by the opera-tor in the event of such a transient. Changes in the equilibrium power level from the nominal value assumed would have the effect of shifting the time of predicted containment and/or emergency core cooling pump failure, but would ( have no effect on subsequent core heatup and melting. FISSION PRODUCT FLOW PATHS The flow paths for the transport of fission products are very similar for all of the Limerick accident sequences considered. As the core heats and ( melts, fission products released from the core flow with the steam and/or hydrogen through the steam separators; the flow then splits, with the major ( [ e
4 portion (85 percent) going through the steam dryers and the balance (15 percent) bypassing the dryers through the outer annulus. The split flows merge at the steam line and pass through the relief lines to the suppression pool. Figure 2 is a schematic illustration of the fission product flow paths in the primary system; the control volume breakdown used in the MERGE analyses is shown in Figure 3. Prior to the failure of the reactor vessel and with the containment intact, fission products leaving the suppression pool could enter the drywell through the vacuum breakers. Following failure of the reactor vessel, fission products would be released to the drywell; from there they would be transported to the suppression pool through the vent lines. Failure of the containment, assumed to take place in the drywell in the present analyses, would allow sus-pended activity in the drywell to be released to the environment. After pene-tration of the concrete diaphragm separating the drywell from the suppression pool, the core debris would drop to the bottom of the pool. If the debris was effectively cooled, further release from the fuel would stop at this point. In the analyses described here, the debris was assumed to continue attack of the concrete after falling to the bottom of the pool, i.e., implying that the debris is not quenched by the water. The latter assumption was necessitated because the control logic in the MARCH code does not permit return to the HOTDRP subroutine for describing debris interaction with water once control has passed to the INTER subroutine which treats corium-concrete interactions. The analysis can, of course, be stopped at the time of diaphragm penetration if desired. Figure 4 gives a schematic illustration of possible fission product flow paths in the containment; normal leakage paths out of the contain-ment are not shown in these schematics. Not all the flow paths illustrated would necessarily apply to a single accident sequence. RESULTS The results for each of the accident sequences considered are discussed below. The overall accident progression and thermal hydraulic results are discussed first; these are followed by the results of the fission product release and transport calculations.
5 Accident Thermal Hydraulics Sequence TC (Transient with Failure to Scram) As was noted above, two variations of the TC sequence were analyzed as part of this effort. The first, designated TC3, assumed that the emergency core cooling pumps providing makeup to the reactor vessel failed due to high suppression pool temperature, brought about by the imbalance in the heat input I and removal to the suppression pool. At the time of pump failure the core was covered with water and the reactor containment was intact. The core becomes uncovered shortly after the makeup pumps fail, with overheating and melting following thereafter. Table 1 gives the accident event times as predicted by MARCH. In the analysis of this sequence it was assumed that the primary system was maintained at an elevated pressure and that boiloff of the coolant inventory took place through the safety / relief valves. It is recognized that an alternate l possibility would be the depressurization of the primary system by the actuation of the Automatic Depressurization System (ADO . After the molten core slumps { into the bottom of the reactor vessel, it is partially quenched by the large amount of water in the bottom head as well as by the structures there. Thus { there is an appreciable period of time between core slumping and the predicted { failure of the vessel bottom head. Table 2 gives the core and primary system conditions at key times during the accident sequence. Figures 5a and 5b illus-trate the temperature histories of selected core nodes as predicted by MARCH. { The gas and structure temperatures calculated by MERGE for each of the primary system control volumes are presented in Figures 6a-h. Failure cf the vessel [ bottom head is followed by the attack of the concrete diaphragm by the core debris. In the analysis for the TC3 sequence failure of the containment was { predicted to take place prior to the penetration of the concrete diaphragm. Table 3 sumarizes the containment conditions at key times during the accident sequence; Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the containment pressure and temperat m histories for this sequence. Referring to Figure 7, it is seen that the containment pressure rises fairly rapidly at the start of the accident as the result of loss of primary coolant inventory; as the core uncovers and starts to melt, the containment pressure levels off at about 29 psia. The next abrupt change in the containment pressure occurs when the core is predicted to [
6 collapse onto the support structures in the bottom head of the reactor vessel; the release of steam and hydrogen from the reactor vessel from the time of core slumping to the time of bottom head dryout are seen to raise the contain-ment pressure to about 57 psia. The release of the contained high pressure steam and hydrogen following vessel failure, together with the evaporation by the core debris of the water in the reactor cavity, lead to the transport of a large fraction of the noncondensible gases to the wetwell gas space and to the increase in containment pressure to about 129 psia. The ensuing attack of the concrete by the core debris raises the pressure to the assumed failure level in about an hour after vessel failure. The penetration of the concrete diaphragm separating the drywell from the suppression pool is predicted about 3 hours after containment failure for this sequence. In the second variation of the TC sequence, designated TC4, the pumps supplying makeup water are assumed to continue operation until containment failure; the boiling of the heated water in the suppression pool following containment is assumed to lead to the failure of these pumps due to cavitation. Thus containment failure precedes core degradation in this variation of the TC sequence. Core uncovery and melting start shortly after containment failure and termination of coolant makeup. Table 1 gives the accident event times as predicted by MARCH. As in the previous case, the primary system was assumed to remain at high pressure in the analysis, with the coolant inventory being boiled off through the safety / relief lines. Core and primary system conditions at key times during the accident sequence are given in Table 2. Figures 9a and 9b illustrate the temperature histories of selected core nodes for this sequence. The gas and structure temperatures in the various control volumes of the primary system as calculated by the MERGE code are illustrated in Figures 10a-h. The in-vessel phase of the accident in this case is quite similar to the previous case. The containment pressure and temperature responses for the TC4 sequence are shown in Figures 11 and 12. Due to the imbalance between the heat input and removal rates in the suppression pool, the pool temperature and the containment pressure rise quite rapidly to the assumed failure level. The depressurization of the failed containment is prolonged in time due to the flashing of the heated water in the suppression pool. The perturbations in the containment pressure after depressurization correspond to large steam inputs ( (
L 7 TABLE 1. ACCIDENT EVENT TIMES Event Time, minutes Limerick TC3 ECC Fails 15.0 [ Core Uncover 17.1 Start Melt 34.5 Start Slump 66.5 Core Collapse 68.0 Bottom Head Dry 102.5 Bottom Head Fail 106.5 Start Concrete Attack 106.6 Reactor Cavity Dry 1 51.4 Containment Fail 162.8 Cavity Penetration 353.8 ( End Calculation 705.9 - l [ Limerick TC4 , Containment Fail 39.9 [ ECC Fails 40.1 Core Uncover 40.2 k Start Melt 64.0 Start Slump 103.3 Core Collapse 105.9 Bottom Head Dry 114.6 Bottom Head Fail 146.8 Start Concrete Attack 146.8 Reactor Cavity Dry 180.9 Cavity Penetration 466.7 ( End Calculation 623.4 ( ( (
8 TABLE 1. (Continued) Event Time, minutes Limerick TPE Core Uncover 37.3 ADS On 47.6 Start Melt 74.1 Start Slump 106.3 Core Collapse 113.2 Bottom Head Dry 130.2 Bottom Head Fail 237.9 Start Concrete Attack 238.0 Cavity Penetration 399.8 Containment Fails 399.8 End Calculation 838.0 i Limerick TQUV Core Uncover 57.0 ADS On 82.5 Start Melt 131.2 ) Start Slump 164.5 Core Collapse 168.3 Bottom Head Dry 180.8 Bottom Head Fail 242.8 Start Concrete Attack 242.8 Civity Penetration 398.5 Containment Fails 398.5 End Calculation 842.6 J
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v: .r . v v m v m m v v 7 TABLE 2. CORE AND PRIMARY SYSTEM RESPONSE Primary l Primary System I System Water Average Core Peak Core Fraction Fraction Accident Time, Pressure. Inventory, Temperature, Temperature, Core Zircaloy Event minutes psia lbm F F Melted Reacted Limerick TC-3 Core Uncover 17.1 1164 2.100E5 730 848 0.0 0.0 Start Melt 34.5 1164 1.763E5 1949 4130 0.0 0.03 Start Slump 66.5 1166 1.671E5 3556 4137 0.54 0.17 Core Collapse 68.0 1177 1.432E5 4285 --- 0.81 0.32 Bottom Head Dry 102.5 1185 0. 3269 --- --- 0.33 Bottom Head Fall 106.5 1185 0. 3369 --- --- 0.33 u3 Limerick TC4 Containment Fail 39.9 1280 1.959E5 708 795 0.0 0.0 Core Uncover 40.2 1293 1.950E5 712 749 0.0 0.0 Start Melt 64.0 1170 1.704E5 2109 4130 0.0 0.03 Start Slump 103.3 1150 1.666E5 3575 4132 0.44 0.00 Core Collapse 105.9 1156 1.288E5 4137 --- 0.79 0.28 Bottom Head Dry 114.6 1154 0. 2612 --- --- 0.29 Bottom Head Fail 146.8 1150 0. 3364 --- --- 0.29
TABLE 2. (Continued) Primary I Primary System System Water Average Core Peak Core Fraction Fractfon Accident Time, Pressure, Inventory. Temperature, Temperature. Core Zircaloy Event minutes psia Ibm F F Melted Reacted Limerick TPE Core Uncover 37.3 463 2.615ES 472 480 0.0 0.0 ADS On 47.6 313 2.160E5 641 880 0.0 0.0 Start Melt 74.1 48 1.689E5 1964 4130 0.0 0.03 Start Slump 106.3 33 1.605ES 3548 4135 0.47 0.16 Core Collapse 113.2 183 1.452E5 4130 --- 0.78 0.30 Bottom Head Dry 1 30.2 300 0. 1943 --- --- 0.31 ; Bottom Head Fail 237.9 42 0. 3774 --- --- 0.31 Limerick TQUV Core Uncover 57.0 1152 2.426ES 572 578 0.0 0.0 ADS On 82.5 1153 1.752E5 1012 1549 0.0 0.001 Start Melt 131.2 75 1.064E5 2849 4130 0.0 0.04 Start Slump 164.5 76 1.534E5 3653 4139 0.41 0.07 Core Collapse 168.3 177 9.211E4 4130 --- 0.78 0.22 Bottom Head Dry 180.8 234 0. 3852 --- --- 0.23 Bottom Head Fail 242.8 90 0. 3776 --- --- 0.23
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- v. r v . rm . r .rm r _r - w r e TABLE 3. CONTAINMENT RESPONSE I Containment Compartment Suppression Pool Reactor Cavity Steam-Pressure, Temperature, Water Water Cond.
CST Time, D518 Water Mass, Mass, Temp., Mass, Temp., on Walls Accident Event minutes 1 2 lbm Ibn F lbm F lbm/ min Limerick TC4 Containment Fail 39.9 145.0 337 354 9.528E5 7.858E6 356 2.718E4 100 1176/578 ECC Fails 40.1 158.4 347 361 9.528E5 7.847E6 355 2.738E4 100 3016/1057 Core Uncover 40.2 149.0 343 356 9.528E5 7.847E6 355 2.738E4 100 0/0 Stcrt Melt 64.0 33.9 257 257 9.528E5 7.080E6 261 3.289E4 100 0/5 Start Slump 103.3 15.3 262 213 9.528E5 6.742E6 215 3.290E4 100 0/19 Ccre Collapse 105.9 21.0 247 225 9.528E5 --- 221 --- --- 0/0 3 Bottom Head Dry 114.6 19.0 237 225 9.528E5 --- 227 -- --- 0/125 Bottom Head Fall 146.8 16.8 218 216 9.528E5 6.791E6 226 3.293E4 100 137/0 Ccvity Dryout 180.9 15.6 294 215 9.528E5 6.707E6 215 0. --- 0/20 Cavity Penetration 466.7 15.3 573 223 9.528E5 6.638E6 214 0. --- 0/0 End Calculation 623.4 15.1 304 212 9.528E5 7.702E6 213 0. --- 0/7
TABLE 3. CONTAINMENT RESPONSE Containment Compartment Suppression Pool Reactor Cavity Steam Pressure. Temperature. CST Water Water Cond. psia F Water Mass, Rass, Temp., Mass, Temp., on Walls Accident Time, lbm Ibm F ibm F 1bm/ min Event minutes 1 2 Limerick TC3 15.0 24.2 187 211 9.528E5 7.829E6 214 0. -- 0/526 ECC Fails 17.1 28.8 176 232 9.528E5 7.993E6 234 1.588E2 100 665/699 Cora Uncover 29.1 237 9.528E5 8.027E6 238 2.887E3 100 39/199 Start Melt 34.5 172 Start Slump 66.5 30.8 178 237 9.528E5 8.035E6 238 4.235E3 100 110/128 Ccro Collapse 68.0 45.1 211 280 9.528E5 --- 242 --- --- 0/0 57.1 212 256 9.528E5 --- 257 --- --- 70/123 _., Bottom Head Dry 102.5 " 106.5 116.2 322 367 9.528E5 8.195E6 260 1.286E4 100 12670/0 Bottom Head Fail R actor Cavity Dry 151.4 139.0 384 266 9.528E5 8.305E6 267 0. --- 0/102 Containment Fall 162.8 145.0 459 268 9.528E5 8.239E6 268 0. --- 0/99 Cavity Penetration 353.8 15.3 520 214 9.528E5 7.720E6 214 0. -- 0/29 705.9 16.5 260 216 9.528E5 7.701E6 213 0. --- 0/175 End Calculation e- _ _1 +__ m a u m
w w -r m ru, - ~. v v r .. m _. r r .. n n_ r ---.7 TABLE 3. CONTAINMENT RESPONSE Containment Compartment Suppression Pool Reactor Cavity Steam Pressure, Temperature, Water Water Cond. CST psia F Accident Time, Water Mass, ~ Mass, Temp., Mass, Temp., on Walls Event minutes 1 2 lbm Ibm F lbm F lbm/ min Limerick TPE Cere Uncovers 37.3 17.3 155 146 1.126E6 7.806E6 147 0. --- 0/88 ADS On 47.6 17.7 154 153 1.126E6 7.859E6 154 0. --- 0/85 Start Melt 74.1 19.4 159 162 1.126E6 7.918E6 163 0. --- 0/66 Start Slump 106.3 27.2 171 169 1.126E6 7.919E6 164 0. --- 0/0 Core Collapse 113.2 37.1 211 204 1.126E6 7.943E6 165 0. --- 0/0 Bottom Head Dry 130.2 39.0 187 180 1.126E6 8.031E6 184 0. --- 0/104 Bottom Head fail 237.9 46.1 205 215 1.126E6 8.078E6 193 0. --- 1414/0 Cavity Penetration 399.8 144.0 381 301 1.126E6 8.106E6 203 0. --- 0/0 g Containment Fails 399.8 146.0 390 301 1.126E6 7.700E6 203 0. --- 0/0 End Calculation 838.0 15.1 221 211 1.126E6 7.956E6 213 0. --- 0/8 L_imerick TQUV Core Uncovers 57.0 17.3 154 144 1.126E6 7.801E6 145 0. --- 0/78 ADS On 82.5 17.6 152 152 1.126E6 7.953E6 153 0. --- 0/56 Start Melt 131.2 20.0 155 172 1.126E6 7.986E6 173 0. --- 0/57 Start Slump 164.5 21.5 157 172 1.126E6 7.986E6 173 0. --- 0/0 Core Collapse 168.3 31.9 218 220 1.126E6 173 0.919El 100 0/0 Bottom Head Dry 180.8 34.0 160 183 1.126E6 8.065E6 186 4.401El 100 0/199 Bottom Head Fails 242.8 44,y 215 233 1.126E6 8.085E6 191 7.838E1 100 2865/0 Cavity Penetration 398.5 132.0 406 267 1.126E6 8.118E6 202 0. --- 0/0 Containment Fails 398.5 145.0 410 288 1.126E6 7.674E6 202 0. --- 0/0 End Calculation 842.6 16.2 227 214 1.126E6 7.976E6 213 0. --- 0/57
14 associated with core collapse and failure of the vessel bottom head. For this sequence the penetration of the concrete diaphragm between the drywell and the wetwell is predicted in about 5 hours after vessel failure. The containment conditions at key times during the accident sequence are sumarized in Table 3. Sequence TPE (Transient, Stuck-Open Safety Valve, Failure of ECC) The TPE sequence consists of a transient leading to reactor shutdown, the sticking open of a safety / relief valve, and the complete failure of the emergency core cooling injection system. Such a sequence is frequently ) described as a transient-induced loss-of-coolant accident. In such a squence the primary coolant inventory would be lost through the failed safety / relief valve with core uncovery and melting following. In the analyses of this sequence it has been further assumed that the ADS would be actuated following core uncovery. The actuation of the ADS is intended to facilitate emergency core coolant injection, but in this sequence the latter is failed. Table 1 gives the accident event times for this sequence as calcu-lated by MARCH. Table 2 sumarizes the core and primary system conditions at key times during the accident sequence. The primary system is predicted to be substantially depressurized during the time of core melting, with temporary ) repressurization caused by the falling of the core into the bottom head. The quenching of the core debris by the water in the bottom head together with the ) low primary system pressure lead to a rather long time to head failure. The temperatures of selected core nodes during the TPE sequence are presented in ) Figures 13a and 13b. The gas and structure temperatures within the primary system control volumes as calculated by MERGE are illustrated in Figures 14a-h. The containment conditions at key times during the accident sequence are summarized in Table 3; containment pressure and temperature responses are illustrated in Figures 15 and 16. Containment pressure is seen to rise rela-tively gradually up until the time of predicted core slumping. The rapid release of steam and hydrogen to the containment during core slumping raise the containment pressure to about 40 psia; the containment pressure stays at about this level until the time of vessel head failure. The attack of the concrete by the core debris following vessel failure leads to the rapid I [
5 15 pressurization of the containment, with the assumed failure level being reached [ in ab'out 2-1/2 hours after head failure. For this sequence the predicted times of containment failure and penetration of the diaphragm between the drywell [ and the wetwell are essentially the same. ('1 Sequence TQUV fTransient with Failure of Coolant Makeup) ( The TQUV sequence consists of a transient with reactor shutdown, [ accompanied by the complete failure of the low pressure and high pressure coc'- ant makeup to the primary system. The primary coolant would be boiled off through the safety / relief valves to the suppression pool. When the water level { in the core reached the 2-ft level, the ADS was assumed to be actuated by the operator. The level swell resulting from primary system depressurization leads { t to a temporary arrest of core heatup, but complete core uncovery and melting follow. Table 1 gives the accident event times as calculated by MARCH. { Table 2 summarizes core and primary system conditions at key times during the sequence. The temperatures of selected core nodes are illustrated in Figures 17a and 17b. In this sequence the primary system is again substantially depressurized during core melting, but the pressure is somewhat higher than in [' the preceding sequence. The time between core collapse and the time of head ! failure in this sequence is somewhat shorter than in the preceding case. The [ gas and structure temperatures in the several control volumes of the primary system as calculated by MERGE are illustrated in Figures 18a-h. { The containment conditions at key times during the accident sequence are suonarized in Table 3; pressure and temperature responses are illustrated { in Figures 19 and 20. The containment pressure response for the TQUV sequence is' quite similar to that of the TPE sequence. The pressure is predicted to be relatively modest during the core uncovery and melting, but rises rapidly following vessel failure to the assumed failure level. The suppression pool remains subcooled up to the time of predicted containment failure, with the { major cause of overpressurization being the buildup of noncondensible' gases. The penetration of the diaphragm separating the wetwell from the drywell is again predicted to coincide with the time of containment failure. { (- C
16 Code Interfaces As was noted previously, the MARCH code results provide the framework as well as much of the input required for the subsequent analyses of fission ] product release and transport. Typically the MARCH results cover a longer time scale and with smaller time increments than are convenient for the fission product transport codes. Thus some processing of the MARCH results is generally desirable. The fission product analyses are generally initiated at the time of core melting rather than at the start of the accident, since the releases up to that time, if any, are small. The CORSOR analyses of in-vessel fission product release read directly the MARCH generated file of core node tempera-tures and of Zircaloy oxidation extent. The analysis of fission product trans-port within the reactor primary system utilizes the TRAP-MELT code, with thermal hydraulic input from MERGE and source terms from CORSOR. Fission product behavior in the containment is described by the NAUA code, again using MARCH generated accident thermal hydraulics. Fission product removal by the suppres-sion pool is evaluated by the SPARC code, which takes its input from MARCH regarding the nature of the flows entering the pool as well as the condition of the pool. The SPARC and NAUA codes are run sequentially as required by the details'of the accident sequence. Table 4 summarizes the containment leakage flows and related conditions derived from the MARCH analyses for use in the evaluation of fission product transport in the containment.
)
)
]
]
1
n r w_ r . r __ w m n 2 - r _r TABLE 4.
SUMMARY
OF CONTAINMENT LEAK RATES Leakage in Compartment I Leakate in Compartment 2 "I "" Pressure Temp. Int al. R e Ra e (b) Subseca.x e min v/hr Wa psia *F *C v/hr MPa psia *F *C Remarks Limerick TC-4 39.9 0./ 1.00 145 337 170 14.7 1.00 145 354 179 Containment fails. 4.2E-5 39.9-40.2 0/ 1. 0') 145 338 170 104.6 1.00 145 354 179 Initial heatin9 55.9 40.2 OJ 1.03 149 343 173 34.1 1.03 149 356 180 Core uncovers 56.7 40.2-64.0 0./ 0.48 70 297 147 78.2 0.48 70 297 147 Core heats 57.4 64.0-103.3 0./ 0.14 20 251 121 57.4 0.14 21 228 109 Core melts 55.1 103.3-105.9 Of 0.13 19 269 132 76.1 0.13 19 232 111 Core slumps and collapses G 47.3 105.9-146.8 0. /23.8 0.11 16 242 116 34.1 0.11 16 217 103 Reactor vessel heats 146.8 505.5/36.9 0.12 17 218 103 0. 0.12 17 216 102 Reactor vessel fails 146.8-146.9 37.3/54.1 0.14 20 226 108 66.6 0.14 20 244 118 Bolloff of H O 2 146.9-150.6 0/ 0.13 19 222 106 49.1 0.13 19 223 106 initial concrete attack 49.9 150.6-180.6 5.0/18.4 0.11 16 283 117 18.7 0.11 16 217 103 Concrete decomposition 3.1 0.10 15 213 101 Concrete decomposition 180.6-466.7 0.5/4.2 0.10 15 499 259 466.7 19.5/37.2 0.12 17 516 269 0. 0.12 17 244 118 Cavity penetrated 466.7-623.4 3.3/14.2 0.11 16 335 168 4.8 0.11 16 214 101 Concrete decoN osition a) Normalized to a compartment free volume of 2.487 X 10 5 ft , leakages are respectively from compartment I to compartment 2 and 3 compartment I to the environment. Units are volume fractions per hour. b) Nomalized to a compartment free volume of 1.550 X 10 5 ft , leakage is from compartment 2 to compartment 1. 3 Units are volume fractions per hour.
TABLE 4. SUMARY OF CONTAINNENT LEAK RATES (Continued) Leakage in Compartment i Leakage in Comp _artment 2 (b) Pressure 1emp _., Int al, R e *} '55" --- Ra Wa psia 'F *C v/hr MPa psia *F 'C Remarks Subseqa n e min v/hr Limerick 7,9 0.20 29 232 111 Core uncovers. TC-3 17.1 0./ 0.20 29 176 80 4.2E-5 0.20 79 0.9 0.20 29 237 114 Core heats. 17.1-34.5 0./ 29 174 4.2E-5 0.20 29 174 79 0.4 0.20 29 237 114 Core melts. 34.5-66.5 0./ 4.2E-5 90 22.4 0.25 37 255 124 Core slumps & collapses. 66.5-68.0 0./ 0.25 37 193 4.2E-5 0.39 103 1.3 0.39 57 255 124 Reactor vessel heats. 68.0-106.52 0./ 57 217 4.2E-5 41.5/ 0.79 115 322 161 0. 0.79 115 366 186 Reactor vessel fails. 106.52 ,_, 4.2E-5 106.52-106.54 288.1/ 0.83 120 324 162 259.0 0.83 120 371 188 80iloff of H 2O j 4.2E-5 106.54-106.6 4.2E-5/ 0.89 129 329 165 9.2 0.89 129 389 198 Initiate concrete attack. 4.2E-5 0.8 0.91 132 283 139 Concrete decomposition. 106.6- 162.8 2.0E-2/ 0.91 132 354 179 4.2E-5 162.8 0.4/ 1.00 145 459 237 0. 1.00 145 268 131 Containment fails. 4.2E-5 0.76 110 381 194 0.3 0.76 110 249 121 Concrete decomposition. 162.8-163.5 0./ 59.7 0.21 31 286 141 73.0 0.21 31 246 119 Concrete decomposition. 163.5-182.2 0./ 57.2 320 160 53.1 0.12 18 224 107 Concrete decomposition. 182.2405.2 0 /42.2 0.12 18 0.10 15 463 239 6.8 0.10 15 215 102 Concrete decomposition. 205.2-353.8 p. /7.5 a) Normalized to a compartment free volume of 2.487 X 105 ft ,3 leakages are respectively from compartment I to compartment 2 and compartment I to the environment. Units are volume fractions per hour, Units are volume b) Nonnalized to a compartment free volume of 1.550 X 10 f t 3, leakage is from compartment 2 to compartment 1. 5 fractions per hour, mm m m__
w r _ w w- v m .r _w r . w 7 c r- _ r- w- .m TABLE 4. SUffiARY OF CONTAINMENT LEAK RATES (Continued) Leakage in Compartment I Leakage in Compartment 2 "I - Pressure Temp. p ea, (b) Pressure Temp. In al, Ra e Subsequence sin v/hr pa psia *F *C v/hr MPa psia *F "C Remarks Limerick 353.8 17.3/54.8 0.20 29 425 218 0. 0.20 29 372 189 Cavity penetrated. 353.8-354.9 0./ 0.17 25 294 145 32.1 0.17 25 258 125 Concrete decomposition. o tinued) 57.6 354.9-705.9 2.8/10.8 0.10 15 275 135 4.7 0.10 15 213 101 Cor. crete decomposition. Limerick 37.3 0./ 0.12 17 155 68 0.2 0.12 17 146 63 Core uncovers. TPE 4.2E-5 37.3-74.1 0./ 0.12 18 154 68 0.3 0.12 18 157 69 Core heats. 4.2E-5 74.1-106.3 0/ 0.17 24 169 76 0.9 0.17 24 163 73 Core melts. , 4.2E-5 e 106.3-113.4 0./ 0.22 32 192 89 3.4 0.22 32 188 36 Core slumps and collapses. 4.2E-5 113.44 37.9 0./ 0.28 40 199 93 0.3 0.28 40 190 88 Reactor vessel heats. 4.2E-5 237.9 1.1/ 0.32 47 205 96 0, 0.32 46 215 102 Reactor vessel fails. 4.2E-5 . 237.9438.0 0.6/ 0.32 46 205 96 7.3 0.32 46 216 102 Bolloff of H 0.2 4.2E-5 238.0-399.8 0.4/ 0.66 98 303 150 0.5 0.66 98 259 126 Concrete decomposition. 4.2E-5 399.8 0.6/ 1.01 145 390 199 0. 1.01 146 301 149 Containment fails / cavity 4.2E-5 penetrated, a) Normalized to a compartment free volume of 2.487 X 105 ft 3 leakages are respectively from compartment I to compartment 2 and compartment I to the environment. Units are volume fractions per hour. b) Normalized to a compartment free volume of 1.550 X 105 ft 3 leakage is from compartment 2 to compartment 1. Units are volume fractions per hour.
TABLE 4.
SUMMARY
OF CONTAINMENT LEAK RATES (Continued) Leakaje in Conpartment I _ Leakage in C_ompartment 2 (a) Pressure __ Temp. _ __ p ,* (b) Pressure Temp. g, ay, g min v/hr Wa psia *r *C v/hr MPa psia *r *C Remarks Subsefluence ~ 137 28.0 0.54 78 215 102 Concrete decomposition. Limerick 399.8-402.0 6.3/53.2 0.54 78 279 112 11.2 0.19 93 200 93 Concrete decomposition. 402.0-408.7 1.1/44.4 0.19 27 233 1 ntinued) 0.11 99 Concrete decomposition. 408.7-838.0 5.5/7.4 0.11 16 242 117 3.2 16 211 Limerick 57.0 0./ 0.12 17 154 68 0.1 0.12 17 144 62 Core uncovers. TQUV 4.2E-5 57.0-131.2 0./ 0.13 19 154 68 0.2 0.13 19 163 73 Core heats. 4.2E-5 131.2-164.5 0./ 0.14 21 155 68 0.2 0.14 21 172 78 Core melts. 4.2E-5 0.18 84 7.4 0.18 26 193 89 Core slumps & collapses. '$ 164.5-168.8 0./ 26 184 4.2E-5 168.8 .-048 0./ 0.24 35 176 80 0.4 0.24 35 190 88 Reactor vessel heats. 4.2E-5 2(- 5.0/ 0.30 44 216 102 0. 0.30 44 234 112 Reactor vessel fails.
" 2E-5 242.8442.05 3.0/ 0.31 45 216 102 16.3 0.31 45 237 114 80iloff of H 20.
4.2E-5 0.66 0.4 0.66 96 249 120 Concrete decomposition. 242.85-398.5 0.5/ 96 341 172 4.2E-5 398.5 0.6/ 1.00 145 410 210 n. 1.00 145 288 142 Containment fails / cavity 4.2E-5 penetrated. 398 5-399.1 0./ 0.81 117 354 179 21.3 0.81 117 258 126 Concrete decomposition. I 53.0 399.1-406.7 0.5/50.0 0.26 38 240 116 20.0 0.26 38 198 92 Concrete decomposition. 5.3/7.4 0.11 16 246 119 3.1 0.11 16 210 99 Concrete decomposition. 406.7-842.6 a) Normalized to a compartment free volume of 2.487 X 10 5 ft .3 leakages are respectively from compartment I to compartment 2 and compartment I to the environment. Units are volume fractions per hour. bl Normalized to a compartment free volume of 1.550 X 105 ft ,3 leakage is from compartment 2 to compartment 1. Units are volume fractions per hour, r-- - _ , r n
r' 21 Fission Product Inventory ( The fission product inventory at the start of the accident sequences ( is. presented in Table 5. These values are based on ORIGEN calculations for the Browns Ferry Unit 1 Reactor. These values are based on an actual loading ( .with various types of fuel as described in Volume II of this report. ( Release from Fuel [ The rates of fission product release from fuel during the in-vessel period of melting were calculated using the CORS0R code with the M-Version [ option in effect. The calculations performed in this mode are described in the user's manual for the code and there are slight differences from the ver- [ sion of CORSOR used in analyses of the other plants in this report. There is no significant difference between the two versions in the predicted releases ( of the volatile species (I, Cs, Te, Kr Xe), but there are some differences in the predicted releases of the less volatile materials. This is caused by the ( use of release rate coefficients which differ from those in the default version of CORSOR. The differences result in generally better agreement with available ( experimental data on release of these species, and in predicted aerosol releases which are lower by about a factor of three than the default predictions. ( Table 6 contains the geometric and power peaking factors for the core used in the MARCH and CORSOR analyses. At the time of bottom head failure, the inventory remaining in the molten mass leaves the RCS and becomes the available inventory for releases from the core-concrete interaction modeled by the CORCON and VANESA codes. The fission product inventories predicted by CORSOR at bottom head failure are ( presented in Table 7 for.each of the accident sequences. A key difference between the TC sequences and the others listed in this table is the time which ( elapses between vessel dryout'and bottom head failure. The TC3 and TC4 sequences have only 4 and 30 minutes approximately, while TQl'V and TPE have 62-and 108 minutes during which the core reheats in the vessel. This results in the differences ~in the released amounts of the volatile species seen in the table. If, for example, one compares the remaining Xe inventory at the time of vessel dryout one sees less difference among the sequences. The masses of [- (
22 Xe remaining are: TPE = 31 kg, TQUV = 20 kg, TC3 = 26 kg, and TC4 = 38 kg. Essentially all of this remaining inventory is released in the TPE and TQUV sequences prior to vessel failure, while a portion of the inventory remains with the fuel for the TC sequences. The masses of fuel and structural materials which are a part of the molten mass which leaves the RCS on bottom head failure are predicted by MARCH (based on user-supplied information) and are presented for each sequence in Table 8. Release During Core-Concrete Interaction The VANESA code was used to predict aerosol release rates and composi-tions as a function of time. Composition of the core materials contacting the concrete was determined with the CORSOR code. The total release rates and composition of the releases are given in Tables 9 and 10. It should be noted ) that the aerosol generation rates beyond the time of diaphragm floor failune were not used in the present analyses since the probability of reheating the ) melt to temperatures sufficiently high to generate significant quantities of aerosol following quenching in the pool will be low. Fission Product Transport in the RCS RCS Transport and Deposition for the TC3 Sequence For the TC sequences, the RCS remains at the normal operating pres-sure until the time of bottom head failure. The flow path frun the core to the suppression pool is identical for these sequences and has been presented above. It should be noted here that the gas flow is a,sumed to branch on exit-ing the steam separators, with 85 percent of the gas flow proceeding through the steam dryers and upper outer annulus and the remaining 15 percent bypassing the dryers via the lower outer annulus and then joining the major part of the flow entering the stream lines. Tables 11 and 12 present the TRAP-MELT predictions for RCS retention of CsI, Cs0H, and aerosol for this sequence. Table 11 indicates the cumulative mass of each species released from the core and the total mass retained through-out the RCS. This table indicates that about 90 percent of the inventory of j i
s ( 23 L I TABLE 5. FISSION PRODUCT INVENTORY FOR LIMERICK L. - r Fission Products L Element Mass (kg) [ Kr 25.5 Rb 23.3 ( Sr 63.0 Y 36.2 [ Zr 267 Mo 237 [- Tc 58.9 Ru 172 ( Rh 33.2 Pd 83.3 ( Te 34.8 I 16.7 ( Xe 387 Cs 207 Ba 105 La 98.8 Ce 208 Pr 80.4 ( Nd 271 Sm 53.8 [. Eu 14.1 Pu 743 ( Nb 4.3 Np 41.2 ( Pm 11.5 [ [ [
24 TABLE 6. GE0 METRIC AND POWER PEAKING FACTORS FOR CORE CONFIGURATION OF THE LIMERICK PLANT
)
Radial Power Axial Power '] Peaking Factor Peaking Factor Fraction of Core (Center to Edge) (Bottom to Top) .in Radial Zone 1.18 .47 0.1 1.17 .55 0.1 1.16 .64 0.1 1.15 .74 0.1 ] 1.11 .85 0.1 1.06 .97 0.1 ] 0.98 1.10 0.1 0.88 1.21 0.1 0.69 1.29 0.1 0.62 1.34 0.1 1.38 1.40 1.39 1.36 1.30 1.23 1.15 1.08 1.01 0.93 0.84 0.74 0.60 0.43
/
\
( 25 ( TABLE 7. MELT CONTENT AT TIME OF VESSEL FAILURE FOR SEQUENCES ANALYZED FOR THE LIMERICK PLANT ( ( l [ Species TQUV TPE TC4 TC3 ( Xe 0.0 0.0 24.9 21.9 Kr 0.0 0.0 1.6 1.4 [ I 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.0 Cs 0.0 0.0 13.0 11.5 l Rb 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.3 Te 20.7 -- 24.7 -- Sr 62.9 62.9 63.0 63.0 Ba 103.1 103.0 103.4 103.7 Ru 170.0 170.0 170.0 170.0 Tc 58.4 58.4 58.4 58.4 Rh 33.0 33.0 33.0 33.0 Pd 82.4 82.4 82.4 82.4 Mo 237.0 237.0 237.0 237.0 La 98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8 Nd 271.0 271 . 0 271.0 271.0 Eu 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 Y 36.2 36.2 36.2 36.2 Ce 208.0 208.0 208.0 208.0 Pr 80.4 80.4 80.4 80.4 Pm 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 Sm 53.8 53.8 53.8 53.8 Np 41.2 41.2 41.2 41.2 Pu 743.0 74 3. 0 743.0 743.0 Nb 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 Zr 267.0 267.0 267.0 267.0 ( (i (
TABLE 8. MELT CONTENT AT START OF CONCRETE ATTACK FOR THE LIMERICK ACCIDENT SEQUENCES MASS (kg) Accident Zr Cr Ni Fe0 Fe
. Sequence 002 Zr02 4.21E+04 1.00E+04 5.58E+03 2.88E+04 6.69E+02 6.36E+04 TC3 1.60E+05 4.49E+04 1.00E+04 5.58E+03 2.50E+04 1.38E+02 6.40E+04 TC4 1.60E+05 4.39E+04 1.48E+04 8.23E+03 2.64E+04 8.48E-06 9.45E+04 TPE. 1.60E+05 4.90E+04 1.20E+04 6.69E+03 1.96E+04 6.20E-06 4.90E+04 1.60E+05 TQUV mm .e m h - - o
( 27 ( ( TABLE 9. AEROSOL COMPOSITION AND TOTAL RELEASE RATE FOR LIMERICK TC4 CORE-CONCRETE INTERACTION Time see { Species. 1 3600 4800 6000 7200 8400 9600 0 1200 2400 20.93 10.36 7.50 7.24 18.28 19.67 9.40 1.52 .40 ( Fe0 Cr203 .45E-18 .10E-01 .15E-01 .88E-01 .30 .35E-01 .2SE-01 . 51 E-16 .40E-15 Ni .51E-01 .39 1 . 91 3.40 .26 .19 .14 .13 .78E-01 Mo .53E-12 .27E-06 .44E-05 .11E-04 .10E-06 .57E-07 .30E-07 .16E-07 .12E-11 Ru .46E-07 . 20E-05 .31E-04 .82E-04 .74E-06 .42E-06 .22E-06 .12E-06 .78E-07 ( Sn .33 .81 2.10 3.12 .75 .62 .! * .46 .40 Sb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Te .37 .41 .53 .61 .49 .44 .44 .42 .38 Ag 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Mn 5.45 10.19 7.37 7.12 13.14 10.89 9.54 8.22 7.01 ( Ca0 0 5.46 7.67 7.68 18.62 20.09 24.17 27.37 28.39 i A123 0 0 . 21 E-04 1.22 4.05 .51E-03 .97E-03 .14E-02 .17E-02 .19E-02 l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 { Na2K0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SiO 2 0 21.23 16.15 15.62 39.34 42.32 51.14 58.11 60.38 ( ' 00 2 .14 .55 3.00 5.55 .30 .18 .13 .10 .86E-01 2,0, .i4E 0i .82E-02 .89E-Oi .i9 .i2E-Oi .i E-Oi .i3E-Oi .i4E-Oi .iSE-Oi 54.24 26.45 11.35 .77E-01 0 0 0 0 0 [' Cs 20 Ba0 5.11 4.29 4.09 4.16 4.35 3.02 2.58 2.24 1.74 Sr0 4.06 4.96 6.62 7.31 3.37 2.10 1.60 1.26 1.00 ( t.2 3 0 .50E-03 .28E-03 5.60 n .32 .36E-03 .30E-03 .30E-03 .30E-03 .28E-03 Ce0 2
.19 1.64 8.47 15.33 .76 .40 .23 .14 .94E-01
( Nb 025 .31E-05 .18E-04 .28E-03 .74E-03 .79E-05 .19E-05 .20E-05 .19E-05 .18E-05 Cs! 9.10 13.20 16.25 7.88 0 0 0 0 0 Source Rate (gn/s) 5.84 11.30 34.93 277.4 175.7 149.3 122.6 102.9 94.08 0xide Melt Temp (K) 2082. 2370. 2620. 2713. 2262. 2222. 2171. 2128. 2098. l Aerosol Density (gn/cm3) 4.38 3.69 3.99 4.32 3.32 3.22 2.92 2.71 2.66 ( Aerssol Size (Micron) .77 1.03 1.12 1.11 .88 .87 .85 .83 .83 ( (. [ I (
)
28 TABLE 9. AEROSOL COMPOSITION ANO TOTAL RELEASE RATE FOR LIMERICK TC4. CORE-CONCRETE INTERACTION (Continued)
}
Time, see ) Species % 10800 12000 13200 14400 15600 16800 18000 19194 Fe0 .15 .76E-01 .37E-01 ' .25E-01 .19E-01 .15E-01 .14E-01 .13E-01 Cr 0 23 .62E-15 .77E-15 .95E-15 .12E-14 .13E-14 .14E-14 .17E-14 .20E-14 N1 .61E-01 49E-01 .28E-01 .20E-01 .14E-01 .11 E-01 .10E-01 .10E-01 Mo .75E-12 .48E-12 .14E-12 .19E-14 .95E-15 .61 E-15 .53E-15 .60E-15 Ru .52E-07 .36E-07 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sn .35 .31 .23 .21 .19 .17 .18 .19 Sb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Te .35 .33 .28 .27 .26. .25 .27 .29 Ag 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Mn 6.08 5.35 3.94 3.41 2.97 2.64 2.61 2.71 Ca0 28.98 29.37 30.60 36.36 40.14 42.60 39.06 32.96
' A1 0 23 .20E-02 .21E-02 .22E-02 .26E-02 .2M-02 .31E-02 .35E-02 .40E-02 Na 0 0 0 C 0 0 0 0 0 2
K0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
$10 61.70 62.64 63.58 58.67 55.59 53.66 57.30 63.33 2
UO 2
.73E-01 .64E-01 .54E-01 .55E-01 .55E-01 .55E-01 .59E-01 .65E-01 Zr0 2
.15E-01 .15E-01 .16E-01 .19E-01 .22E-01 .23E-01 .27E-01 .31E-01 Cs 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ) Ba0 1.35 1.06 .70 .52 .39 .29 .24 .19 Sr0 .80 .66 .48 .39 .31 .25 .21 .17
]
La 0 23 .27E-03 .25E-03 .24E-03 .26E-03 .27E-03 .27E-03 .30E-03 .33E-03 Ce0 2
.6 5E-01 .46E-01 .23E-01 .13E-01 .81E-02 .25E-03 .27E-03 .30E-03 Nb 0 25 .17E-05 .16E-05 .15E-05 .17E-05 .17E-05 .17E-05 .19E-05 .21E-05 ]
Cs! 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Source Rate (gn/s) . 88.26 120.4 146.2 112.6 89.56 75.98 61.39 49.71 0xide Melt Temp (K) 2074. 2054. 2003. 1957. 1924. 1900. 1882. 1867. Aerosol Density (gm/cm3) 2.63 2.61 2.51 2.59 2.61 2.61 2.59 2.55 Aerosol Size (Micron) .82 .82 .81 .76 .74 .72 .70 .67
( 29 (- ( TABLE 10. AEROSOL COMPOSITION AND TOTAL RELEASE RATE FOR LIMERICK TQUV. CORE-CONCRETE INTERACTION ( ( Time see Species. % 0 1200 2400 3600 4800 6000 7200 8400 9344 ( Fe0 .84E-09 .33E-01 .71E-01' .20 .55E-01 .43E-01 .34E-01 .28E-01 .24E-01 Cr,03 .77E-16 .27E-15 .48E-14 .21E-15 .94E-16 44E-16 .21E-16 .43E-15 .66E-15 Ni 1.44 2.79 4.57 .43 .28 .17 .10 .76E-01 .60E-01 ( Mo .71E-06 .49E-05 .18E-04 .16E-06 .75E-07 .33E-07 .14E-07 .10E-11 .59E-12 Ru . 52E-05 .35E-04 .13E-03 .12E-05 .56E-06 .24E-06 .11E-06 .62E-07 .41E-07 Sn 2.36 2.44 2.78 .78 .61 .45 .34 .28 .24 Sb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ( Te 1.25 .59 .38 .45 .41 .36 .31 .28 .25 Ag O O O O O O 0 0 0 Mn 45.85 12.00 5.30 18.89 14.90 11.38 8.65 7.09 6.14 Ca0 0 12.47 5.90 21.90 24.75 26.60 27.86 28.64 29.13 A1 0 0 1.85 4.92 . 61 E-03 .12E-02 .16E-02 .18E-02 .20E-02 .21E-02 23 ( Na 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 K0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
$10 0 26.25 11.68 46.13 52.01 56.1 8 59.1 3 60.91 62.02 2
[ 2.09 4.46 8.19 UO 2 .49 .26 .15 .10 .85E-01 .73E-01 Zr0 2
.30E-01 .98E-01 .24 .12E-01 .12E-01 .1 X-01 .1 X-01 .13E-01 .14E-01
( Cs 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8a0 19.44 6.61 3.47 5.34 3.69 2.74 2.16 1.62 1.26 Sr0 21.50. 10.40 6.64 4.14 2.45 1.61 1.13 .87 .70 [ La 0 .13E-02 7.79 15.73 .43E-03 .37E-03 .33E-03 .30E-03 .28E-03 .26E-03 23 Ce0 6.01 12.21 17.26 1.19 .55 .27 .13 .85E-01 .58E-01 2 0,0, .6 x-04 .38E-03 ii.n 0 0 0 0 0 0 Csl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SourceRate(p/s) 5.95 22.27 ( 370.1 158.6 129.9 115.2 101.9 92.19 87.50 0xi d Melt Temp (K) 2342. 2601, 2804. 2295. 2230. 2180. 2129. 2093. 2069. Aerosol Density (p/cm3) 5.54 3.79 4.48 3.04 2.87 2.76 2.69 2.65 2.62 Aerosol Size (Micron) .54 .97 1.21 .86 .85 .84 .83 .82 .82 ( ( ( i c
30 TABLE 11. CORS0R PREDICTIONS OF MASSES CF SPECIES RELEASED FROM THE CORE (TOTAL) AND TRAP-MELT PREDICTIONS OF MASSES RETAINED IN THE RCS (RET) DURING THE TC3 SEQUENCE FOR THE LIMERICK PLANT
)
Csl Cs0H Aerosol Time Ret Total Ret Total Ret Total (s) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) 2550 0.8 11.7 6.6 88.2 1.6 20.8 2970 2.2 18.9 17.4 137 31.6 62.0 3390 3.7 23.8 28.3 170 84.6 122 3810 5.5 27.2 42.8 193 154 196 4020 7.8 28.7 70.5 203 194 235 4230 16.2 29.9 128 211 208 251 4650 16.3 31.1 127 219 209 262 5070 16.3 31.5 127 222 210 266 5490 16.3 31.9 127 225 210 266 5910 16.3 32.3 128 227 211 268 6330 16.4 32.7 128 231 212 271
)
)
N
- n. n .n n n m - n n_ . n n_. m , , 1 ~_ r - -
p l TABLE 12. TRAP-MELT PREDICTIONS OF PRIMARY SYSTEM RETENTION FACTORS (RF) AND VOLUME ! SPECIFIC RETENTION FACTORS AS FUNCTIONS OF TIME FOR THE TC3 SEQUENCE FOR THE LIERICK PLANT Csl Cs0H Aerosol Top Steam Top Steam Time Core
-RF Guide Dryers RF Guide Dryers RF (s)
.07 .07 -- .08 .03 2550 .07 .06 --
.01 .13 .12 .01 .51 .45 2970 .12 .11 l
1
.17 .15 .01 .70 .65
! 3390 .16 .14 .01
.01 .22 .20 .01 .79 .74 3810 .20 .19
.11 .35 .13 .09 .83 .72 3 4020 .27 --
.28 .60 .10 .26 .83 .67 4232 .54 --
.26 .58 .10 .24 .80 .64 4650 .52 --
.26 .58 .10 .24 .79 .63 5070 .52 --
.26 .57 .10 .24 .79 .63 i 5490 .51 --
.56 .10 .24 .79 .63 5910 .50 -- .25
.55 .10 .23 .78 .63 6330 .50 -- .25 l
32 the volatiles has been released from the fuel by t = 4230 s. It is also true for the aerosol that 90 percent of the total mass released prior to bottom head failure has been released by this time. This table and Table 12 indicate that some rather dramatic change in the system parameters affecting retention of the Csl and Cs0H occurs at about this time. As indicated in Table 12, the retention factor for the RCS for these species doubles from one time in the table to the next. The explanation for this behavior is that the core begins to slump around t = 3800 s and this results in increased gas flow rates through the system. As the very hot gas in the core region is expelled at the start of this slumping, the condensed Cs! and, to a lesser extent, Cs0H are evaporated from the top guide and transported to cooler portions of the RCS where reconden-sation occurs. The chemical reaction of Cs0H with the surface of the top guide is the reason that not all of the material initially retained is reevolved during core slumping. During this period of high gas flow the suspended material in the core and just above it is brought into contact with the steam dryers and other downstream control volumes and the surface of these structures is about 200 C cooler than the gas for this brief period. Condensation of the volatiles onto the surfaces of the RCS is the result. After core slumping there is almost no further release of these species since their inventory has been exhausted. This is also seen in Figures 21 and 22. The tables presented here and Figure 23 indicate that the emission of aerosol particles by the core is effectively quenched during the core slump-ing, as one would expect. It is interesting that even though the vessel is boiled dry by the slumped core at about t = 5000 s, no further significant aerosol is released during the 1300 s during which the molten core is attacking the bottom head of the reactor vessel. Since essentially all of the aerosol is released from the core during the relatively low flow rate period prior to core slumping, it is not surprising that most of this mass is retained in the core control volume. This retention is principally due to gravitational set-tling which becomes increasingly effective as the particles grow during the course of the melting, reaching mass median diameters in the core F jion as large as 3.8 pm prior to slumping. Table 13 presents the masses retained in the RCS, grouped by WASH 1400 categories. These species are tracked in the containment in a subsequent section of this report. 5
/
\
w ( ( 33 ( TABLE 13. CORSOR PREDICTIONS OF RELEASE FROM CORE AND TRAP-MELT PREDICTIONS OF PiaMARY SYSTEM RETENTION OF f WASH-1400 GROUPS FOR TC3 SEQUENCE L [ Released Retained Group (kg) (kg) [ I .160E+02 .804E+01 Cs .221E+03 .122E+03 Sr .130E+01 .106E+01 ( Ru .677E-04 .387E-04 ( La .531E-05 .303E-05 ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
34 RCS Transport and Deposition for the TC4 Sequence The behavior of the fission products in the RCS during this sequence is, as one would expect, very similar to that observed in the TC3 sequence just discussed. The timing of events in this case is such that the time from ] the start of core melting to bottom head failure is about 1000 s longer than for TC3, with most of this difference appearing after vessel dryout. As before, one can see in Tables 14 and 15 the indications of core slumping occurring at about 6000 s, with the sudden increase in retention of the Cs species seen at this time. Figures 23 and 24 indicate the reevaporation of deposited vapors as before, but with a bit more reevaporation of Cs! in the RCS than seen before. Figure 25 demonstrates the effect of flushing of the core volume into " reactive" portions of the RCS at core slumping, and the effective scaven-ging of the Te by the first available surfaces encountered by the vapor. The aerosol retention is, again, quite effective and dominated by retention in the core control volume via settling under low flow conditions. The absence of significant aerosol generation following core slumping is evident in Figure 26 ] as was seen for TC3. The total masses of WASH 1400 groups released into the RCS and those retained therein are presented in Table 16. RCS Transport and Deposition for the TPE Sequence This sequence involves the same RCS flow path as the TC sequences discussed above, but the system pressure is considerably less than operating pressure, although still well above containment pressure. The flow rates are fairly low for nearly 2000 s after the start of core melting, but then increase significantly after t = 6400 s, and remain high until the supply of coolant in the vessel is nearly exhausted around t = 11000 s. Table 17 indicates that about 90 percent of the inventories of Cs! ) and Cs0H are released by t = 7420 s. At this time, Table 18 indicates that 69 percent of these species are retained in the RCS. The principal mechanism for this retention is condensation on particles which are subsequently retained, but direct vapor condensation and chemical reaction of Cs0H on surfaces account for about 20 percent of the retention. There are no significant changes in
}
s
y -- ( 35 ( ( TABLE 14. CORSOR PREDICTIONS OF MASSES OF SPECIES RELEASED FROM THE CORE (TOTAL) AND TRAP-MELT PREDICTIONS OF MASSES RETAINED IN THE RCS (RET) DURING THE TC4 SEQUENCE FOR THE LIMERICK ( PLANT ( Csl Cs0H Te Aerosol (- Time Ret Total Ret Total Ret Total Ret Total (s) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) I 3950 -- 4.8 0.3 41.1 -- 0.1 -- 2.4 4340 0.5 11.9 4.3 88.8 -- 0.9 2.3 20.1 ( 4820 1.4 18.6 10.9 134 0.2 2.6 36.9 64.0 5300 2.4 23.1 18.7 165 0.3 4.7 96.3 129 [ ! 5790 2.9 26.2 24.6 186 0.5 7.0 174 211 6280 17.8 28.8 143 203 9.1 9.1 270 296 [ 6760 16.3 30.7 132 216 9.6 9.7 277 318 7250 16.3 31.1 132 219 9.7 9.8 278 322 [ 7730 16.3 31.4 131 221 9.7 9.8 280 323 [ 8220 16.4 31.8 1 31 224 9.7 9.9 281 324 8700 16.4 32.4 132 228 9.7 10.0 283 327 ( ( ( ( ( ( ( l-(
TABLE 15. TRAP-MELT PREDICTIONS OF PRIMARY SYSTEM RETENTION FACTORS (RF) AND VOLUME SPECIFIC RETENTION FACTORS AS FUNCTIONS OF TIME FOR THE TC4 SEQUENCE FOR THE LIMERICK PLANT CsI CSOH Te Aerosol Lower Top Steam Outer Steam Top Steam Top Time Core Guide Dryers Annulus Lines RF Guide Dryers RF Guide RF (s) RF
.01 .01 -- -- .01 .01 --
.02 .02 .01 --
3950 --
.04 .04 --
.04 .04 .05 .03 4240 .04 .04 -- -- --
.06 .06 --
.05 .05 .37 .34 4530 .06 .06 -- -- --
.08 .08 --
.06 .06 . 58 .55 4820 .08 .07 -- -- --
.10 .10 -- .07 .07 .70 .67 co 5110 .09 .09 -- -- --
a
.12 .12 --
.08 .08 .77 .74 5400 .11 .10 -- -- --
.13 .13 --
.08 .08 .81 .79 5690 .11 .11 -- --
.09 .14 .13 --
.08 .08 .85 .83 5990 .10 -- -- --
.29 .09 .08 .70 .22 .22 .99 .89 .91 .81 6280 .62 --
.23 .10 .10 .65 .21 .18 .99 .88 .88 .76 6570 .55 --
.21 .10 .10 .61 .21 .14 .99 .88 .87 .75 6860 .53 --
.21 .10 .10 .60 .21 .14 .99 .87 .86 .74 7150 .53 --
.21 .10 .10 .60 .21 .14 .99 .87 .87 .75 7440 .52 --
.21 .10 .10 .59 .21 .14 .99 .87 .87 .75 7730 .52 --
.20 .10 .10 .59 .21 .14 .98 .86 .87 .75 8020 .52 --
.20 .10 .10 .59 .20 .14 .98 .86 .87 .75 8310 .51 --
I
.20 .10 .10 .58 .20 .13 .96 .85 .86 .74 8700 .51 --
c ( I 37 TABLE 16. CORS0R PREDICTIONS OF RELEASE FROM CORE AND TRAP-MELT PREDICTIONS OF PRIMARY SYSTEM RETENTION OF ( WASH-1400 GROUPS FOR TC4 SEQUENCE I ( Released Retained [ Group (kg) (kg) ( I .159E+02 .804E+01 l Cs .218E+03 .125E+03 Te .100E+02 .968E+01 l [ Sr .159E+01 .141E+01 Ru .793E-03 .713E-03 La .665E-03 .595E-03 ( ( ( (' ( ( ( ( ( ( c
)
38 the disposition of these species during the remaining 7000 s of the in-vessel period of fuel melting. This is also illustrated in Figures 27 and 28. The aerosol release from the core is similar to that observed in the TC sequences for t < 11300 s. The time which elapses here between vessel dryout and bottom head failure is sufficient for the melt to reattain temperatures required for significant aerosol mass generation rates. As is seen in Figure ) 29, however, the retention of this mass generated late in the sequence is very nearly complete and occurs principally in the core. The aerosol mass median diameter achieved late in the sequence is 3.6 pm, while for the period early (t < 8000 s) the value reached in the core volume is typically less than 2 pm. Table 19 indicates the RCS retention of the WASH 1400 groups during the period of in-vessel core melting. ) RCS Transport and Deposition ) for the TQUV Sequence
)
This sequence involves the same pathway through the RCS as the three sequences discussed above and the system pressure is,similar to that predicted by MARCH for the TPE sequence. The flow rates, however, are lower for this sequence in general and are quite low for approximately 2000 s following the start of core melting. Tables 20 and 21 present the masses released and retained in the RCS for the principal species of interest. These indicate that nearly 90 percent of the Cs! and Cs0H have been released from the fuel by t = 10080 s. It is interesting to note that none of these materials released after that time is retained in the RCS. The large increase in the masses retained between 9000 and 10000 s, shown in Figures 30 and 31 results from an increased gas flow rate which transports these vapors to parts of the RCS where the temperatures are low enough to permit condensation on particles and surfaces. There is also evidence of a small amount of reevaporation of these species just after ] 10000 s. The Te release from the fuel shown in Table 20 and in Figure 32 repre- ] sents approximately 40 percent of the core inventory. The flushing of the core is seen to some extent in the figure after t = 9000 s and it is clear ] that the vapor reacts with the first RCS surfaces encountered. Following ves-sel dryout at about 11000 s, the Te emitted remains suspended since there is 1 N
( 39 ( ( TABLE 17. CORSOR PREDICTIONS OF MASSES OF SPECIES RELEASED FROM THE CORE (TOTAL) AND TRAP-MELT PREDICTIONS OF MASSES RETAINED IN THE RCS (RET) DURING THE TPE ( SEQUENCE FOR THE LIMERICK PLANT ( Cs! Cs0H Aerosol ( Time Ret Total Ret Total Ret Total (s) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) ( 4980 6.4 13.2 50.0 98.0 4.3 24.5 5470 12.4 21.2 97.0 155 32.8 81.9 ( 6450 20.7 28.7 147 203 16.2 251 7420 21.4 31.2 151 220 170 313 ( 8400 21.7 32.2 153 227 170 317 9380 21.9 32.8 154 231 170 317 ( 10360 21.9 33.1 155 233 170 320 11340 22.2 33.5 157 235 177 331 ( 12310 22.5 34.0 159 238 203 360 13290 22.6 34.2 158 240 271 430 ( 14270 22.6 34.2 158 240 350 509
= ._
( ( ( ( ( (
TABLE 18. TRIP-MELT PREDICTIONS OF PRIMARY SYSTEM RETENTION FACTORS (RF) AND VOLUME SPECIFIC RETENTION FACTORS AS FUNCTIONS OF TIME FOR THE TPE SEQUENCE FOR THE LIMERICK PLANT Csl Cs0H Aerosol Time Shroud Steam Top Steam Steam (s) RF Head Dryers RF Guide Dryers RF Core Dryers 4980 .49 .04 .08 .51 .33 .08 .17 --
.07 5470 .57 .08 .14 .63 .32 .12 .40 --
.14 6450 .72 .17 .31 .72 .14 .23 .65 --
.33 7420 .69 .16 .31 .69 .13 .24 .54 --
.27 8400 .67 .16 .33 .67 .13 .23 .54 --
.27 9380 .67 .15 .30 .67 .13 .23 .54 --
.27 10360 .66 .15 .29 .67 .13 .23 .53 --
.27 11340 .66 .15 .29 .67 .14 .23 .54 .01 .26 12310 .66 .15 .29 .67 .14 .22 .56 .07 .24 13290 .66 .15 .29 .66 .14 .22 .63 .21 .20 14270 .66 .15 .29 .66 .15 .22 .69 .33 .17 I 1 _--I O W W Q W W W W
a ( 41 ( ( TABLE 19. CORSOR PREDICTIONS OF RELEASE FROM CORE AND TRAP-MELT PREDICTIONS OF PRIMARY SYSTEM RETENTION OF WASH-1400 GROUPS FOR TPE SEQUENCE [' ( Released Retained ( Group (kg) (kg) I .167E+02 .111E+02 Cs .230E+03 .152E+03 ( Sr .206E+01 .136E+01 Ru .918E-03 .611E-03 La .683E-03 .454E-03 ( ( - ( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
)
42
)
no flow out of the core and no retention mechanisms for Te are operative in the core control volume. ) The aerosol release from core and RCS retention are shown in Figure 33. The " emitted" curve depicts fairly steady aerosol generation until ] the time of core slumping at which point aerosol generation ceases. Following vessel dryout the melt reheats and generation begins anew with nearly all of ] the material effectively retained in the core region via gravitational settling in the stagnant system. ) Table 22 presents the total masses of various WASH 1400 groups released from the fuel during the in-vessel melting and the masses retained throughout the RCS. These groups are tracked through the containment and their behavior outside of the RCS is presented in the following section of this report. Transport of Fission Products ) Through Containment
]
Results are presented in this section for analyses performed for the transport and retention of various fission products that are released into the
]
containment atmosphere from the reactor coolant system or from the core-concrete interaction. The various compartments of the reactor considered for these
]
analyses include the suppression pool, the u twell, and the drywell. The NAVA code that calculates transport of fission products in partic.ulate form was
]
utilized for the mentioned compartments except that the SPARC code was utilized for calculating the retention of fission products in the suppression pool.
}
In general, the containment codes used here need information on the thermal hydraulic conditions of an accident of interest. The conditions
}
provided by the MARCH computer calculation were used. The typical required thermal hydraulic conditions are time-dependent containment temperature, pres-
]
sure, and wall temperature, and the rates at which steam enters the containment, condenses on the containment structure, and leaks from the containment.
]
Perhaps the most important and critical input that containment codes also need is the fission product source term for particulates. The source rates calculated as release from the primary system (TRAP-MELT code) and the VANESA code calculations for release during the core-concrete interaction were taken for the melt and vaporization releases, respectively. For the NAVA cal-culations six groups of species were distinguished. All the species tracked
]
s
/
c ( 43 ( ( TABLE 20. CORSOR PREDICTIONS OF MASSES OF SPECIES RELEASED FROM THE CORE (TOTAL) AND TRAP-MELT PREDICTIONS OF MASSES RETAINED IN THE RCS (RET) DURING THE TQUV SEQUENCE FOR THE LIMERICK ( PLANT C Csl Cs0H Te Aerosol [ Time Ret Total Ret Total Ret Total Ret Total (s) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) ( 8260 2.8 18.3 25.6 132 0.4 1.6 7.7 35.1 ( 8990 10.2 24.8 89.5 176 2.0 4.6 80.9 124 9710 15.5 28.2 141 199 4.6 7.9 193 246 ( 10080 20.1 30.1 183 212 9.2 9.2 252 302 10800 16.6 33.1 159 233 10.1 10.1 257 334 [ 11530 16.6 33.6 159 236 10.3 10.4 257 339 12260 16.6 33.9 159 238 10.3 10.7 258 344 ( 12990 16.6 34.3 159 240 10.3 11.4 270 360 13720 16.6 34.6 159 242 10.3 12.6 308 404 ( 14450 16.6 34.7 159 243 10.3 14.0 367 464 ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
TABLE 21. TRAP-MELT PREDICTIONS OF PRIMARY SYSTEM RETENTION FACTORS (RF) AND VOLUME SPECIFIC RETENTION FACTORS AS FUNCTIONS OF TIME FOR THE TQUV SEQUENCE FOR THE LIMERICK PLANT Csl Cs0H Te Aerosol Time Shroud Steam Top Shroud Top Top (s) RF Head Dryers RF Guide Head RF Guide RF Core Guide 8260 .15 .01 .01 .19 .18 .01 .25 .25 .22 .11 .10 8990 .41 .04 .07 .51 .41 .03 .43 .43 .66 .49 .13 9710 .55 .07 .13 .71 .53 .06 .59 .59 .79 .61 .13 10080 .68 .18 .33 .86 .48 .13 1.0* .95 .83 .57 .14 10440 .54 .18 .20 .72 .45 .12 1.0* .92 .79 .54 .13 10800 .50 .17 .17 .69 .45 .11 1.0* .91 .77 .53 .12 A 11530 .49 .17 .17 .68 .43 .11 .99 .89 .76 .52 .12 12260 .49 .17 .17 .69 .43 .11 .% .86 .75 . 51 .12 12990 .49 .16 .17 .66 .42 .11 .90 .81 .75 .52 .12 13720 .48 .16 .17 .66 .42 .11 .82 .74 .76 .56 .10 14450 .48 .16 .17 .65 .42 .11 .73 .66 .79 .62 .09
- These values are the result of rounding of: .998, .998 and .997.
, m - o n m o a m m m m m e m -v o o m o m m
- q. . .
45 ( ( TABLE 22. CORSOR PREDICTIONS OF RELEASE FROM CORE AND TRAP-MELT PREDICTIONS OF PRIMARY SYSTEM RETENTION OF ( WASH-1400 GROUPS FOR TQUV SEQUENCE ( r Released Retained ( Group (kg) (kg) ( I .169E+02 .814E+01 Cs . 233E+03 .150E+03 [ Te .140E+02 .103E+02 ( Sr .19 3E+01 .155E+01 Ru .896E-03 .734E-03 ' ( La . 575E-03 .464E-03 ( ( ( ( ( : ( ( ( [ (- (
46 in the calculation were assumed to be in the particulate form in the contain-ment atmosphere. Although it was assumed in the calculation that individual species are distributed evenly over all sizes of particulates, differential amounts of these species at a given time due to different source timings were ] taken into consideration in the calculations. Two different accident sequences, TC4 and TQUV, were considered in the containment calculations. TC4 Sequence Because of the heat and steam generated in the core that are trcas-mitted to the suppression pool causing the pool temperature and the drywell pressure to rise, in this accident sequence the drywell fails before core melting. As the reactor core starts melting, the fission products released ] from the RCS enter the containment. The flow path is such that the fission products released from the relief valve enter the suppression pool through the ] quenchers and reach the wetwell vapor space and subsequently the drywell before being released to the environment. As the reactor vessel fails, the fission products released from the core-concrete interaction become suspended in the failed drywell. Figure 35 is the aerosol mass suspended in the drywell and the mass released to the environment as a function of time. Sharp increases in the mass concentration at 104 and 147 minutes in Figure 35 correspond with the core slumping time and the bottom head failure time, respectively. Figure 36 is the size distribution of the aerosol particles suspended in the drywell. Figure 37 is the mass of fission products released to the environment. It is interesting to note that due to the presence of the suppression pool, which removes predominantly large particles, the particle size in the containment is ] predominantly in the submicron size range. Table 23 is the calculated distribution of various species or fission ] product groups that are located in the RCS, the suppression pool, the wetwell, and the drywell at the end of the accident. It can be seen from the table ] that about 11 percent of the core inventory for Csl and Cs0H is released to the environment. The balance is found to remain deposited in the reactor cool- ) ant system or remain captured in the suppression pool. It is also seen that a
L 47 L core inventory fraction of 0.46 for Sr is found to reach the environment repre-( senting the highest release fraction among the species considered. The reason is that this group is released primarily during the melt-concrete interaction 1 [ period. Therefore, most of the released Sr is leaked directly out to the environment without passing through the suppression pool. i -TQUV Sequence Three different flow paths were utilized for this sequence depending upon the time compared to various prescribed accident events. Between the time of core melting and the head failure, the fission products enter the sup- ! pression pool via the safety valves and then reach the wetwell vapor space. The fission products entering the wetwell vapor space subsequently are subject to various aerosol behavior mechanisms, such as agglomeration and deposition. As the vessel fails, the fission products from the core-concrete interactions are released to the drywell and enter the suppression pool through the vents before reaching the wetwell space. After the containment fails due to the [ buildup of pressure, the fission products suspended in the wetwell vapor space as well as those still remaining in the drywell may be released to the environ-ment. Figure 38 is the total suspended aerosol mass for the drywell and that released tr
- environa nt. Figure 39 is the size distribution of the suspended particulates in the drywell. Figure 40 is the amount of fission products released to the environment from the drywell. Table 24 summarizes the calculated locational distribution of various fission products at the con-clusion of the accident event. The release fraction of each species shown in the table is considerably lower than that for the TC4 sequence, primarily because the containment fails at a late time.
(
TABLE 23. LOCATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FISSION PRODUCTS AT THE END OF ACCIDENT, TC4 (Unit: Fraction of Core Inventory) Species RCS Pool Wetwell Drywell Melt Environment
-8 -3 0.11 Cs! 0.48 0.41 2.7 x 10 1.2 x 10 0
-3 Cs0H 0.55 0.34 2.3 x 10 -8 1.7 x 10 0 0.11
-II -3 0.24 Te 0.28 1.7 x 10 -II 1.7 x 10 9.4 x 10 0.47
-4 -2 8.4 x 10 -3
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- v r - TABLE 24. LOCATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FISSION PRODUCTS AT THE END OF ACCIDENT, TQUV (Unit: Fraction of Core Inventory) Species RCS Pool Wetwell Drywell Melt Environment
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7000 3000 9000 10000 11000 12000 13000 14000 15000 TIME (sec) FIGURE 33. MASS OF Te EMITTED FROM CORE AND RETAINED IN THE RCS CONTROL VOLUMES AS FUNCTIONS OF TIME FOR THE TQUV SEQUENCE (V0L 2 = TOP GUIDE, V0L 2-9 = ENTIRE RCS EXCEPT CORE) 1 1 x --.m w _
y i 500
*- Legend n NM -
/
cm VOL1 i 6 , (n 300- - ,. -,'
.V.O..L.1.+.2... .
Q VOL1-9 - ,'
/
2 __ _ __._
,'/
9 200-
,........................... .....- / 3 t
/ '7 i,,/p -
\
j/ 100-
/. /
/
O , J/' , , , , , , 7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000 13000 14000 15000 l TIME (sec) FIGURE 34. MASS OF AEROSOL EMITTED FROM CORE AND RETAINED IN THE RCS CONTROL VOLUMES AS FUNCTIONS OF TIME FOR THE TQUV SEQUENCE (VOL. 1 = CORE, VOL. 2 = TOP GUIDE, VOL. 1-9 = ENTIRE RCS).
i 116 l b-y~ AIRBORNE y ' ' '-
- LEAKED y f
b_
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~
. .- /
b_
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)
b_-=
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co - v?'o_ - en c - s: r - a . x s o_ o-s e :
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l o -
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5 5 5 I I I I I l ICf 10' 2*10' TIME, MIN FIGURE 35. AIRBORNE AND LEAKED MASSES AS A FUNCTION OF TIME (TC4) (
117
'o U: 1.9 HR.
[ T 2.5 HR. - - o., 3.1 HR. -- rT r ~i 7. 8 HR . ------------ / - l b,.
~5
[/ .
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( ~! i t i i n- i i [ 'o _ \
-s i
[ 2*10-' 10 10- 10 10 3*10' I RADIUS, MICRONS FIGURE 36. THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF MASS SUSPENDED IN THE DRYWELL (TC4) (
l 118 b - } p! CSI
- CSOH - -
l E TE --
- SR - - - - - - - - - - - -
RU - -- ) y
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l
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]
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a :
]
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<l l
w gi ..**..-
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i
'o 1
s 1Cf 10' 2*10' TIME, MIN FIGURE 37. ACCUMULATED LEAKED MASS BY SPECIES (TC4)
119 b-L RIRBORNE t hi 5 LERKED - - { b (
~?_ .- . . . ._
- r
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/
b., i ( b / l -=
=
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{ E t [ 10' 10' 2*10' TIME, MIN [ FIGURE 38. AIRBORNE AND LEAKED MASSES AS A FUNCTION OF TIME (TQUV) {
= 120
'o
[o '. 2.9 HR. [ T,
- 4.1 HR. -
/ \
b_ 6.9 HR. --
/ T, 3
-= -
i
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=-
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'9 . . .
iii i *
. i iiiiii i i i i....i' i i
)
10- 10~ 10P 10 4*10' RADIUS, MICRONS ; FIGURE 39. THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF MASS SUSPENDED IN THE DRYWELL (TQUV) ,
/
4 1 21 [ b_
-=
i CSI [ : CSOH - - TE -- c b,
-- SR ------------
t 5 RU .......................
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- a i i i i i i i i 10' 10' 2*10'
[ TIME, MIN ( FIGURE 40. ACCUMULATED LEAKED MASS BY SPECIES (TQUV) { c
5 2ng4
~% UNITED STATES 8 i ' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.g ; WASHINGTON, D. C. 20$55
% ,,,,,* . NOV 6 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR: J. McKnight Records Service Branch, TIDC/ADM FROM: C. Ryder Fuel Systems Research Branch, DAE/RES
SUBJECT:
REFERENCES.F0R THE PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOM I would like the document listed below placed in the Public Document Room:
" Fission. Product Transport for the Limerick Plant," Battelle Columbus Laboratories, J. A. Gieseke et al. September 23, 1985.
C.-Ryder Fuel Systems Research Branch Division of Accident Evaluation, rtES
Enclosure:
As stated O l
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.._____._.Em._____._.._____..__.__-..__._____._____m__.__..____._____..m._ ._____..____._-.m.__.__._____._m ._m_ _ _ _ . . __m. ____.-..__._.____..___._.-m__. _ _ _ _ _ ___ ____.____ _ _. _ _ _
)
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l A 9f 4 Ballelle Columbus Laboratories Colu bs h o 4 201 Telephone (614) 424-6424 1 l 1 1
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