ML20197J727

Insp Repts 50-321/86-12 & 50-366/86-12 on 860322-0428. Violation Noted:Operability of Shutdown Cooling,W/Irradiated Fuel in Reactor Vessel at Atmospheric Reactor Pressure Per Tech Spec 3.5.B.1,not Maintained

ML20197J727
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	05/14/1986
From:	Holmesray P, Ignatonis A, Nejfelt G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20197J690	List: ML20197J685 ML20197J691 ML20197J727
References
50-321-86-12, 50-366-86-12, NUDOCS 8605200156
Download: ML20197J727 (6)

See also: IR 05000321/1986012

Text

~

,

'

p Kf 2g UNITED STATES

/j ~

'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,

[

g

n

j"

REGION ll

101 MARIETTA STREET N.W.

• * ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

,o

'+9 . . . .

Rcport Nos.: 50-321/86-12 and 50-366/86-12

Licensee: Georgia Power Company

P. O. Box 4545

Atlanta, GA 30302

Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: March 22 - April 28, 1986

Inspectors: M d . e-[nmaM, S//4/f'r

P. Holmes-Rdf, Seniof Resident Inspector Date Signed

G.n cA La s/!4/n

Date Signed

,

G. M. Nejfelt(/ Residept Inspector

Approved by: M d . c/km ab', 6/// /N /

A. J. Igrfatonis,~Sectica Chief Date Signed

Division'of React'or Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine inspection entailed 134 resident inspector-hours on site in

the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters, an Inspector

, Followup Item, operational safety verification, maintenance observation, plant

l- modification and surveillance observation, reportable occurrences, ope ating .

reactor events, refueling, and . followup of a Regional request.

Results: One violation was identified - Failure to maintain Unit 1 shutdown

[

cooling as required by the Technical, Specifications.

8605200156 86051431

PDR ADOCK O

0

. _ _ _ _ _ _ - _

-. _ ,

,

-

.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

,

Licensee Employees

• J. T. Beckham, Vice President and General Manager, Nuclear Operations

• H. C. Nix, General Manager, Plant Hatch

• L. T. Gucwa, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing

• T. Greene, Deputy General Manager, Plant Hatch

• H. L. Sumner, Operations Manager

• T. Seitz, Maintenance Manager

• T. R. Powers, Engineering Manager

R. W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

P. E. Fornel, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager

C. T. Moore, Training Manager

_

S. B. .Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance

• G. Goode, Superintendent of Plant Engineering, Plant Hatch

• C. R. Goodman, Senior Regulatory Compliance Engineer

'

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,

mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 29, 1986, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify

as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the

inspectors during this inspection. One violation and one unresolved item *

.

were identified. The licensee acknowledged the findings and took no

exception.

(0 pen) Violation 50-321/86-12-01, Failure to maintain shutdown cooling

operational when required by Technical Specifications (paragraph 5).

(0 pen) Unresolved Item 50-321/86-12-02, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump

minimum flow valve tagged shut for shutdown cooling RHR mode (paragraph 5).

*An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to

determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.

,

y - - , , , - _ , , ,

-

- - - - , . , ,- -

.

2

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Violation 50-321/85-34-02, Inadequate Procedure Affecting a Safety

System. Georgia Power Company (GPC) letter of February 17, 1986, for this

violation was reviewed and was determined to be acceptable by the inspector

verifying the licensee's corrective action. No discrepancies were noted, i

4. Inspector Followup (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-366/85-38-02, Procedure Correction

After Signature by the Plant Manager. This IFI was based on an apparent

isolated case of procedure control on issuance of revised procedures. The

administrative procedure for the preparation and control of procedures,

10AC-MGR-003-0S, has been revised by Revision 3 to satisfy this concern.

5. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall

plant status and any significant ssfety matters related to plant operations.

Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the

plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control

-

room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings,

status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment, controls and

! switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for

operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data sheet

entries, control room manning, and access controls. This inspection

L activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their

i

supervisors. Weekly, when on site, selected Engineering Safety Feature

(ESF) systems were confirmed operable. The confirmation was made by

'

verifying the following: accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply

breaker and fuse status, instrumentation, major component leakage, e

lubrication, cooling, and general condition,

t General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions

of the Control Building, Turbine Building, Reactor Building and outside

areas were visited. Observations included safety related tagout verifica-

tions, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant

conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress,

radiation protection controls, physical security, problem identification

systems, and containment isolation.

In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of

the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts

of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities

including: protected and vital access controls; searching of personnel,

packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors;

patrols and compensatory posts. In addition, the inspectors observed

protected area lighting, protected and vital areas barrier integrity and

verified an interface between the security organization and operations or

maintenance. Also, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's security measures

during the Unit 1 outage, and verified the. licensee's

_- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

-

.

3

offsite communication during the loss of normal telephone communications for

several hours which occurred on April 18,'1986.

On April 15,1986, at 1:00 a.m. (EST), with Unit 1 in cold shutdown and

shutdown cooling in operation, the operating RHR pump "B" discharge valve,

IE11-F015B closed during the performance of the logic system functional test

(LSFT) for the Mechanical Vacuum Pump and Gland Seal Exhauster Isolation,

42SV-N62-002-1. Valve closure resulted from two blown fuses when a

technician using the screwdriver to lift a relay contact inadvertently

' caused an arc. This condition was not immediately observed by the

operators, and the fuses were replaced .without notification of the

operations shift supervisor. In the meantime, a Plant Equipment Operator

(PEO) making his rounds noticed that the RHR pump in use for shutdown

cooling did not sound normal and called the control room. In response, the

Reactor Operator checked the RHR instrumentation and discovered that the RHR

pump flow indication was zero and that the discharge valve, IE11-F015B, was

shut. The pump's minimum flow valve was tagged closed and therefore the RHR

pump "B" ran at shutoff head. Shutdown cooling was not available for

operation from the time the fuse was blown until fuse replacement which was

made in about 45 minutes. After fuse replacement, Group 2 was reset with

the switch, and valve 1E11-F015B was reopened at 4:00 a.m. of the same date

to establish shutdown cooling flow. Thus, the "B" RHR pump had been run at

shutoff head for about three hours. TS 3.5.B.1 requires shutdown cooling to

be operable when irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and the reactor

pressure is atmospheric. The above described event constitutes a violation

(321/86-12-01) in that shutdown cooling was not available for operation for

about 45 minutes. No apparent damage to the pump was observed. Shutdown

cooling was also lost for about ten minutes on March 31, 1986, when the

outboard isolation valve went closed due to work being done in the Analog

Transmitter Trip System. In both cases, no increase of reactor temperature

was noted.

The tagging shut of the minimum flow valve during RHR pump operation is an

Unresolved Item (321/86-12-02) pending the inspector's followup of its

safety significance.

6. Maintenance Observation (62703)

During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance

activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for

adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to Technical

Specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the

actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and

adherence to the appropriate quality controls.

On April 18-19,1986, a Unit 1 Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT)

was performed. A regional inspector was on site to witness and review the

-test. The ILRT will be documented in report 50-321/86-13.

-

.

4

7. Plant Modification and Surveillance Testing Observations

(37700 and 61726)

The inspectors observed the performance of n-lected surveillances and plant

modification Design Change Requests (DCRs). The observation included a

review of the procedure and/or DCR for technical adequacy, conformance to

Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument calibration,

observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal from service

and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of

the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

8. ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The inspectors routinely conduct partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve

and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified

both locally and in the control room to verify that the lineups were in

-

accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material

conditions were satisfactory. During the inspection period, particular

emphasis was placed on the testing of the Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation

Cooling (RCIC) System, because the outboard steam supply valve for the RCIC

turbine, 2E51-F008, had a double indication for its position in the control

room.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

9. Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)

The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential

generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective

actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were

also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications

were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost considera-

tion. The following LERs are considered closed:

Unit 1: 85-27*, 85-30*, 85-31, and 85-34

Unit 2: 85-23, 85-26*, 85-27, and 85-29*

• In-depth review performed

10. Refuelin~g (60710)

During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified by observation,

interviews and procedure review that the Unit I refueling was being

conducted in accordance with regulations. Areas inspected included adequacy

of procedures, replacement of the reactor vessel head, Technical Specifica-

tion compliance, and refueling floor housekeeping.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

-

.. .- ,

5

11. Followup of Reg %nal Request (92701)

An anonymous contract worker's sheet metal work safety concerns, reported to

the Regional Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff on March 12,

1986, were investigated. The specific allegations noted by the alleger on

March 11, 1986, in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Turbine Building Water Analysis

Rooms, and near the Unit 1 Reactor Building 130' elevation drywell entrance

were as follows:

sheet metal work was done by unqualified personnel;

unqualified sheet metal was used for the work; and

fire watches were not present while work was being done. ,,

It was found by the inspector that:

No code requirement was established (i.e., ANSI, etc.) for a sheet

metal worker's qualification. However, a sheet metal worker's

qualification is granted by the Sheet Metal Workers' Union, after a

three year apprentice program.

No qualified sheet metal work was performed in the areas at the alleged

time.

Fire protection for the alleged sheet metal work appeared to be

controlled in accordance with Plant Hatch Fire Protection Procedure,

40AC-FPX-001-0, Revision 1. On March 13, 1986, the work in the

vicinity of the drywell was completed; and the Water Analysis Rooms had

posted Hot Work Permits, to perform sheet metal work in these areas.

No actual sheet metal work was observed in progress.

Based upon the findings, these allegations were unsubstantiated.

12. Onsite Followup of Events (93702)

On April 25,1986 at 12:32 a.m., Unit 2 scrmned due to a load rejection.

The load rejection was caused by moisture of the steam escaping from an

18-inch line rupture in a 20" to 16" reducer of the piping section to the

sixth stage feedwater heater, causing a ground in the main generator field

circuitry. The rupture of this low pressure steam reducer was caused by

erosion / corrosion. No release of radioactive isotopes above 10 CFR limits

occurred and no personnel contamination was caused by this event. All

safety systems responded normally. On April 27, 1986, repairs were

'

completed on the replacement of the reducer and two other thin spots were

found during inspection of the extraction steam lines. Both other locations

of thinning were in the line to the sixth stage feedwater heater.

Inspection of suspected areas of thinning in Unit I will be done. On

April 27 at 6:00 p.m. startup of Unit 2 commenced.