ML20197H616

Proposed Tech Specs Re Safety Injection Tank Level

ML20197H616
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	11/09/1990
From:	CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18057A580	List: ML20197H616 ML20197H623
References
TAC-76806, NUDOCS 9011200005
Download: ML20197H616 (12)

Text

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ATTACHMENT'.1 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50 255 i

r l

1 SAFETY INJECTION TANK LEVEL (TAC N0 76806) REVISION 1 l

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGE CHANGES November 9, 1990 i

3 Pages 90t1200005 901109 PDR ADOUI': 05000235 P

PDC

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. 3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM Applicability Applies to the operating status of the emergency core cooling system.

Objective To assure operability of equipment required to remove decay heat from the core in either emergency or normal shutdown situations, m

Specifications

. Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling Systems 3. 3. 11 Tha reactor shall not be made critical, except for low-temperature 4

physics tests, unless all of the'following conditions are met:

a.

The SIRW tank contains not less than 250,000 gallons of water with l

a boron concentration of at least 1720 ppm but not more than 2000 ppm at a temperature not less than 40'F.

b'.

All. four Safety Injection tanks -are operable and pressurized to at least 200 psig with a tank liquid level of at least 174 inches

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(52%): and a maximum level of 198 inches (59%) with a boron

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p concentration of at least 1720 ppm but not more than 2000 ppe.

i c.

One~ low-pressure Safety Injection pump is operable on each bus.

NE d.

One high-pressure 9afety Injection pump is operable on each bus.

i.

Both shutdown heat exchangers and both component cooling heat e.

exchangers are operable.

f.

Piping and valves shall be operable to provide two flow paths from the SIRW tank to the primary cooling system.

g.

All valves, piping and interlocks associated with the above components and required to function during accident conditions'are operable.-

h.

The~Los-Pressure Safety Injection Flow Control Valve CV-3006 shall be opened and disabled (by isolating the air supply) to prevent-1 l

spurious closure.

p 1.

The. Safety. Injection bottle motor-operated isolation valves shall be opened with the electric power supply to the valve motor discennected.

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j. The Safety Injection miniflow valves CV-3027 and 3056 shall be opened with HS-3027 and 3056 poaitions to maintain them open.

3-29 Amendment No. 74, 191.

TSP 0690-0360-NLO4

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3.3 DdERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (Continued)

If Specification a. and b. cannot be met,'an orderly shutdown c.

shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in hot shutdown condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and cold shutdown within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Basis The normal procedure for starting the reactor is, first, to heat the primary coolant to near operating temperature by running the primary coolant pumps.

The reactor is then made critical by withdrawing-control rods and. diluting boron in the primary coolant.II)

With this mode of start-up.. the energy stored in the primary coolant L

during the approach to criticality is substantially. equal to that during power operation and, therefore, all engineered safety features'and auxiliary cooling systems are required co be fully operable._ During low-temperature physics tests, there is a-h

. negligible amount of stored energy in the primary coolant;

?

-therefore, an accident comparable in severity to the design basis accident is not possible and the engineered safeguards' systems are not required.

The SIRW tank contains a minimum of 250,000 gallons of water containing 1720 ppm boron. This is sufficient boron concentration

~

to' provide a 5% shutdown margin with all control rods withdrawn an?

a new core at a temperature of 60*F.

Heating steam 11s provided to maintain the tank above 40'F to prevent freezing. The 1% boron (1720 ppa) solution will not precipitate out i

_above-32*F.

The source of steam during normal plant operation is extraction steam line in the turbine cycle.-

The 11mits for the safety injection tank pressure and volume assure.

the required amount of water injection during an accident and are L

based on values used for the accident analyses.

The minimum 174-inch level corresponds to a volume of 1040 ft3 and the maximum

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198-inch level corresponds to a volume of 1166 f t.

Prior to the time the reactor is brought critical, the valving of the. safety injection system must be checked for correct alignment j

i and appropriate valves locked.

Since the system is used for shutdown cooling, the valving will be changed and must be properly aligned prior to start-up of the reactor.

L The operable status of the various systems and components is to be demonstrated by periodic tests. A large' fraction of these tests will be. performed while the reactor'is operating in the power range.

If a component is found to be inoperable, it will be possible in most cases to effect repairs and restore the system to. full operability within a relatively short time. For a single component to be inoperable does not: negate the ability of the system to perform its function, but it reduces the redundancy provided in the reactor design and thereby limits the 3-31 TSP 0690-0360-KLO4 Amendment No. !!7

-3.3-EMERGENCY CORE COOLTNG SYSTEM i

\\;

i Basis (continued) demonstrate that the maximum fuel clad temperatures that could occur over.the break size spectrum are well below the melring temperature of zirconium (3300'F).

Malfunction of the Low Pressure Safety Injection Flow control valve could defeat the Low Pressure Injection feature of the ECCS; therefore, it is disabled in the 'open' mode (by isolating the air supply) during p'. ant operation.

3 This action assures that it will not block flow during Safety Injection.

The; inadvertent closing of any one of the Safety Injection

.' bottle isolation valves in conjunction with a LOCA has not been analyzed. To provide assurance that this will not occur,

.:hese. valves are electrically locked open by a key switch in the control room.

In addition. prior to critical the valves are. checked open, and then the 480 volt breakers are opened.

Thus, a f ailure of a breaker and a switch are required for any of the valves to close.

Insuring both HPSI pumps are inoperable when the PCS temperature h

is < 260*F or the shutdevn cooling isolation valves are open eliminates PCS mass additions due to inadvertent HPSI pump starts.

Both HPSI pumps starting in conjunction with a charging / letdown

).

l imbalance may.cause 10CFR50 Appendix G limits to be exceeded 1

h when the PCS temperature is < 260'F. When the PCS temperature

]

is > 430*F, the pressurizer safety valves ensure that the PCS i-('

pressure will not exceed-10CFR50 Appendix G.

L

.The7 requirement to have both HPSI trains operable above 325'F b

provides-added assurance that the effects of a LOCA occuring

.under LTOP conditions would be mitigated.

If a LOCA occurs when i

the primary. system temperature is less than or equal to 325'F, the' pressure would drop to the level where: low pressure safety

' injection can prevent core damage.

Therefore, when the PCS temperature is >260*F and'<325'F operation of the HPSI system j

~

would not cause the 10CFR56 Appendix G ' limits to be exceeded

' j nor=is HPSI system operation necessary for core cooling.

HPSI pump testing with the HPSI pump manual discharge valve l

closed'is permitted since the closed valve eliminates the possibility of pump testing being the cause of a mass addition co the PCS.

References (1) FSAR, Section 9.10.3; (2) FSAR, Section 6.1, l

(3) FSAR, Section 14.17

/

l (4) Letter, H. G. Shaw (ANF) to R. J. Gerling (CPeo), "SRP Chapter 15 Disposition of Events Review for Changes to Technical Specification /

D Limits on Palisades Safety Injection Tank Liquid Levels",

/

h April 11, 1990

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3-33 Amendment No. 21, 51, 19Z, 117, 131 TSP 0690-0360-NLO4 m

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4 ATTACHMENT 2 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 it 1

i SAFETY INJECTION TANK LEVEL (TAC N0. 76806) REVISION 1 MARKE0 UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES November 9, 1990

-j.

3 Pages

,4 4

1 3.'3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM b

& bilitF A

y Applies to.the operating status of the energency core cooling system.

L Objective

(~

To assure operability.of equipment required to remove decay heat from the core in either emergency or normal shutdown situations.

o Specifications

(.!

p 3,.

Safety Injection and Shutdown Coolina Systems 3.3.1 The reactor shall not be made critical, except for low-temperature physics tests, unless all of the'following conditions are aest The SIRW cask contains not less than 250.000 gallons of water with a.

a boron concentration of at least 1720 ppe but not more chan 2000 ppe at a temperature not less than 40*F.

~

'wk

$g ^ y g _,.

/74 b.

AllfourSafetyInjectiontaaksareoperableandpress[risedtoat least'200'psis with a tank liquid level of at least h inches f g p ) and a nazimum level of 194 taches (592) with a boros concentration of at least 1720 ppa but not more than 2000 pga.

~

One low-pressure Safety Injection pump is operable on each bus.

c.

d., one high-pressure Sa' fety Injection pump is operabia on each bus.

~

Both shutdown heat exchangers and both component cooling heat e.

exchangers are operable, f.

Piping and valves shall be operable to provide two flow paths from the SIRW tank to the primary cooling system.

All valves, piping' and interlocks associated with the above.

~

3 composants and required to function during accident conditions are operable.

h.

The Low-Pressere Safety Injection Flow Control Valve CV-3006 shall be opened and disabled-(by isolating the air supply) to prevent spartaus closure.

1.- The Safety Injection bottle actor-operated isolation valves shall be opened with the electric power supply to the valva motor disconnected.

i j'

l The Safety Injection miniflow valves CV-3027 and 3056 shall be opened with MS-3027 and 3056 positions to maintata them open.

3-29 Amendment No. 74, 101 Tebruary 10, 1987 l

l TSP 1285-0354-NLO4

e 3.3

. EMERGENCY CORE C001.ING SYSTEM (Continued) c.

If Specification a. and b. cannot be met. an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in hot shutdown condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and cold shutdown within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.=

Basis The normal procedure for starting the reactor is, first, to heat the primary coolant to near operating temperature by running the primary coolant pumps.- The ':eactor is then made critical by withdrawing control rods and Auting boron in the primary coolant.

With this mode of sta up, the energy stored in the primary coolant i

during the approach to criticality is substantially equal to that during power operation and, therefore, all engineered safety features and auxiliary cooling systems are required to be fully operable. During low-temperature physics tests, there is.a negligible amount of stored energy in the primary coolant; therefore, an accident comparable in severity to the design basis accident is not possible and the engineered safeguards' systems are not required.

The.SIRW tank contains a minimum of 250.000 gallons of water E

containing 1720 ppa boron. This is sufficient boron concentration' ii to provide a 5% shutdown margin with all control rods withirwn and:

/

a new core at a temperature of 60'F.-

Heating steam is provided to maintain the tank above 40*F-to prevent freezing.. The 1% boron (1720 ppe) sohtien will not precipitate out above 32'F.

The source of steam during normal plant operation is extraction steam line in the turbine cycle.

/090 M~. limits for the safety injec3"n tank presseyynnd volume assure L

L 1 35ar T the. required amount of water injection during,an accident and are g

based on values used for the accident analyses.

The miniaua

g"1

/7f 496-inch level corresponds to a volume of 44M f t and the maximum 8-inch level corresponds to a volume of 1166 fe.

Prior to the. time the reactor is brought critical, the valving of the safety injection' system must be checked for correct alignment and appropriate valves locked.. Since the system is used for shutdown cooling, tho' valving will be changed and must be properly aligned prior to start-up of the reactor.

?

The operable status of the various systems and components is to L

be demonstrated by periodic tests. A large fraction of these

. tests will be performed while the reactor is operating in the power rarge. If a component is found to be inoperable, it will be possible in most cases to effect repairs and restore.che system'to full operability within a relatively short time. For a single component to be inoperable does not negate the ability of the system to perfors.its function, but it reduces the redundancy provided in the reactor design and thereby limits the 3-31 Amendment No. 117 November 14, 1988 TSP 0189-0002-NI.04

'k

3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM C

Basis (continued) demonstrate that the maximum fuel clad temperatures that could occur over tas break size spectrum are well below the melting

~ temperature tf zirconium (3300*F).

4.

Malfunction cf the Low Pressure Safety Injection Flow control

. valve could safeat the Low Pressure Injection f eature of.the ECCS;. thera'. ore, it is disabled in the 'open' mode (by isolating Q

the air rusply) during plant operation. This action assures-that it w'.11 not block flow during Saf ety Injection.

The inadvertent closing of any one of the Safety Injection m4 bottle isolation valves in conjunction with a LOCA has not been analyzed. To provide assurance that this will not occur, these-valves are electrically locked open by a key switch in i

the-control room.

In addition, prior to critical the valves are checked ocen, and then-the 480 volt breakers are opened.

. Thus', a f ailure of a breaker and a switch are required for any y

-of the valves to close.

Insuring.both HPSI pumps are inoperable when the PCS temperature

/

is < 260'F or the shutdown cooling isolation valves are open eliminates PCS mass additions due to inadvertent HPSI pump starts.

/

Both RPSI pumps starting in conjunction with a charging / letdown

/

imbalance may cause 10CFR50 Appendix G limits to be exceeded-

/

when the PCS temperature is < 260'F. When the PCS temperature

/'

-is 1 430*F, the pressurizer safety valves ensure that the PCS

./

pressure will not exceed 10CFR50 Appendix G.

/

The requirement to have both HPSI-trains operable above 325'F

/

l

. rovides added assurance that the effects of a LOCA occuring p

under LTOP. conditions would be aitigated.

If a LOCA occurs when the primary system temperature is less than or equal to 325'F,

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the' pressure would drop to the level where low pressure safety injection.can prevent core damage. Therefore, when the PCS

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temperature is >260*F and <325'F operation of the HPSI system

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i would not cause the 10CFR56 Appendix G limits to be exceeded

/

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nor is HPSI system operation necessary for core cooling.

/

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HPSI pump testing with the HPSI pump annual discharge valve closed is permitted since the closed valve eliminates the possibility of pump testing being the cause of a mass addition to the PCS.

References (1) FSAR, Section 9.10.3; (2) FSAR, Section 6.1, H)

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3G N) 3-33

• hhb(

Amendment No. 21, 5!, !91, !!7, 131 O

April 26, 1990

)

TSP 0889-0101-MD01-MLO4

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9 ATTACHMENT 3-Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 SAFETY INJECTION TANK LEVEL (TAC N0 76806) REVISION 1 A STANDARD REVIEW PLAN CHAPTER 15 DISPOSITION OF EVENTS REVIEW FOR CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LIMITS ON PALISADES SAFETY INJECTION TANK LEVELS November 9, 1990 2 Pages

1

,6 ADMANCED NUCLEARFUELS CORPORATlON u-3 g gn.i.s >: n : - u..e ?.e u n April 11,1990 HGS:117:90

. Mr. R. J. Gerling Consumers Power Company Palisades Nuclear Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043

Subject:

STANDARD REVIEW PLAN CHAPTER 15 DISPOSITION OF EVENTS REVIEW FOR

- CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS ON PAllSADES SAFETY INJECTION TANK LIQUID LEVELS

Reference:

1)

ANF (H. G. Shaw) Proposal ANF-CP 2021-43 to R. J. Gerlinjil (CPCo),

dated March 21,1990.

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2)

CPCo Letter (R. J. Gerling) to ANF (H. G. Shaw), dated March 27,1990.

3)

. ANF 88107, Revision 1, PALISAGES' LARGE BREAK LOCA/ECCS ANALYSIS WITH INCREASED RADIAL PEAKING. February 1990.

An evaluation of the effects of proposed changes to Technical Specification limits on Palisades Safety injection Tank (SIT) levels (174 and 202 inches, respectively, for minimum and maximum allowed SIT levels) has been completed. This work was performed per the Reference 1 proposal, as authorized by Reference 2. The evaluation included a Standard Review Plan Chapter 15

. Disposition of Event:1 Review for those changes. The results of the review demonstrate that no additional analyses are required due to the SIT Iwel limit changes.

The only events which are potentially affected by SIT level changes are Event Classification 15.6:

Decreases in Reactor Coolant Inventory. The large break loss of coolant transient (LBLOCA) is 1

the only Classit; cation 15.6 Event which will completely drain the SITS, so it is the only event which could be affected by the changes in SIT level limits.

The reference LBLOCA/ECCS analysis reported in ANF 88-107 (Ref. 3) indicates that flow from the intact loop Safety injection Tanks, SlT lines, and cold legs keeps the downcomer full for about 30 seconds after the peak cladding temperature (PCT) is reached. Reduction of the minimum sit level to 174 inches does not cause the downcomer level to fall prior to the time that A

Mr. R. J. Gerling HGS:117:90 April 11,1990 Page 2 l

l PCT is reached, so there is no impact on either downcomer head or PCT for the transient.

Increasing the maximum allowed SIT level to 202 inches has no impact on the LBLOCA analysis, because the length of SIT flow time would be extended beyond the time in the limiting analysis.

.gg.

These conclusions apply to all break sizes reported in Reference 3. The PCT of 2114'F reported in Refere.,ce 3 for the limiting break size and axial power shape remains bounding for the l

l; proposed Technical Specification changes to SIT level limits.

Mg Very truly yours, H.G.Shaw

.2 Contract Administrator L

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l ATTACHMENT 4 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 is h

SAFETY INJECTION TANK LEVEL (TAC NO. 76806) REVISION 1 ANF REPORT ANF 88-107, REVISION 1 November 9, 1990 i

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