ML20197B365

Forwards Responses to NRC 860407 & 28 Requests for Addl Info Re Instrumentation & Control Design SER Open & Confirmatory Issues.Fsar Rev Provided in Attachments Will Be Incorporated Into Future Sser

ML20197B365
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	05/10/1986
From:	Devincentis J PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
To:	Noonan V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
SBN-1042, NUDOCS 8605130007
Download: ML20197B365 (58)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:~ 1 i 9 j o SEABROOK STATION i Engineering Office il May 10, 1936 Pub 8c SeMee W New Hampette SBN-1042 T.F. B7.1.2 New Hompshire Yonkee Divlelen United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Mr. Vincent S. Noonan, Project Director PWR Project Directorate No. 5

References:

(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 (b) USNRC Letter, dated April 7, 1986, "Scabrook - Requests for Additional Information Related to Instrumentation and Control Open and Confirmatory Issues," V. Nerses to R.J. Harrison (c) USNRC Letter, dated April 28, 1986, "Seabrook - Requests for Additional Information Related to Instrumentation and Control Design," V. Nerses to R.J. Harrison

Subject:

Request for Additional Information; ICSB

Dear Sir:

Enclosed please find responses to requests for additional information addressed in the above referenced letters. Attachment 1 provides our response to Reference (b), and Attachment 2 to Reference (c). The FSAR revision provided in these attachments will be incorporated into the FSAR via a future auendment. We trust that the enclosed is acceptable and request that the resolution of the associated open and confirmatory items be reflected in the next supplement to Seabrook's SER. Very truly yours, 8605130 7 pjhh43 PDR AD PDR John DeVincentis E Director of Engineering Enclosures cc: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List ,os..,oo. ~.m osm.w n n e, '( ^

SBN-1042 ATTNilMENT 1 l l 4 L

SER 7.2.2.4 (RAI 420.66) Turbine Trip on Reactor Trip Details should be provided to verify that the latest turbine trip on reactor trip (TT-0-RT) design complies with the Westinghouse rollability requirements related to IEEE 279 (Sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.5, 4.6, and 4.10 specifically). If not, then justification should be provided for any deviations from the required design criteria. This information should confirm that the latest TT-O-RT design for Seabrook has been satisfactorily resolved with Westinghouse (i.e., approved by Westinghouse). Information is needed to describe the isolation devices utilized for the TT-0-RT circuitry. This should include the cross-trip circuits provided from the redundant trains to trip the turbine emergency trip system. This information should be provided consistent with the staff's position related to the required qualification of isolation devices. Information is required to describe any differences that exist between Seabrook's TT-0-RT circuitry and that to be implemented on Vogtle.

Response

Compliance of the nonsafety Seabrook TT-0-RT circuit with portions of IEEE 279-1971 is: 4.2 Single Failure - Complies, see SBN-945 for details. 4.3 Quality of Components and Modules - Complies. The reactor trip input is Class IE, the turbine controls are not Class 1E, but are manufactured with high quality components that have proven to be reliable. 4.5 Channel Integrity - Complies except that the turbine controls are not designed to be functional during or af ter a seismic event; the entire Turbine Building is considered nonseismic. A seismic event that damages the mechanical trip solenoid circuit such that it cannot be energized would probably also result in de-energization of electrical trip solenoid that will trip the turbine. 4.6 Channel Independence - The reactor trip inputs comply. The turbine trip circuits are independent but are not separated, see SBN-945 for details. 4.10 capability for Test and Calibration - The mechanical and electrical trip solenoid valves are designed for on-line testing) none of the components require calibration. The isolation relay used in the B Train reactor trip input is provided by Consolidated Controls Corporation. Detailed information is being provided as part of the response to requests for additional information on the Seabrook separation criteria. The entire turbine control system is considered A associated, therefore, there is no isolation required between the 24 V and 125 V trip circuits. The cross-trip relays are similar to relays used in other applications in the turbine controls. The Seabrook TT-O-RT circuitry is essentially similar to the Vogtle circuit, including the essential turbine controls and reactor trip breakers. The following differences exist: 1. Seabrook uses associated circuits instead of the separate nonvital routing used at Vogtle. 2. Seabrook routes portior.s of the circuit in tray, while conduit is used at Vogtle. 3. Seabrook provides an isolation relay to change the B Train reactor trip input from B associated to A associated for input to the turbino controls. Vogtle runs both circuits as nonvital. The Vogtle TT-O-RT circuits were closely studied during the January 1986 ICSB Site Audit. This circuit was not mentioned as an open item et the exit meeting. SER 7.3.2.4 (RAI 420.73) Instrumentation for Safety Functions a) The applicant should confirm that the responses to 420.73, Items e) and h) are still valid (i.e., all safety functions can be periodically tested without interfering with normal plant operation tb,use of jury rigs a or lifted leads). If not, then provide information detailing the nonconformance with the required periodic testing design feature including justification. b) For RWST, low-low level recirculation actuation, explain what is meant by the phrase, " Increased surveillance will be employed to ensure operability...." as related to the Technical Specification periodic surveillance requirements.

Response

a) Information concerning lifted leads, etc., has been presented in our letter, SBN-992, dated April 7, 1986, which is in answer to a request for additional information related to RAI 420.17. A revised response to RAI 420.73 was included. b) " Increased surveillance will be employed to ensure operability" means that in addition to the Technical Specification testing, a test will be performed on these transmitters which will consist of decreasing the differential pressure on the transmitter to determine that, with a simulated low-low water signal, the instrument will function properly. This test will be accomplished on six-month intervals and will involve one recirculation initiation transmitter at eact interval. o SER 7.4.2.1 (RAI 420.48) Station Service Water System ) Need to address the correlation between heat treatment for service water tunnels and diesel generator full load testing as related to worst-case temperature conditions. Need to address possible reopening of service water isolation valves subsequent to loss of off-site power.

Response

The limiting condition for operation of the cooling tower during normal plant operation is maintenance of the basin temperature below 67.3 F. Since the o design wet bulb temperature is 75 F, it is necessary to preplan cooling tower operation to ensure that the heat load will not result in the 67.3 F limit being exceeded during high wet bulb temperature conditions. Part of the planning will include reducing the heat load as much as possible to minimize the basin heatup and reduce the tower losses. The procedures for cooling tower operation during normal power operation will include restrictions on operation of the diesel generators during high wet bulb conditions when the Technical Specification basin temperature could be exceeded. This procedure will be available prior to core load. Interlocks are provided to prevent opening of the service water isolation valves until off-site power is restored, see Drawing M-503917. t i t i-I i j f

SER 7.4.2.4 (P.AA. 420.38. 420.39) Remote Shutdown a) Need to confirm that disabling of SSPS will not affect cooling tower actuation signal. b) Need to provide a list to identify each piece of equipment affected by disabling of the SSPS. This should include identification of whether the equipment will have manual control capability from outside the control Room once SSPS is disabled. If no manual control capability exists, then justification infocmation must be provided for each case as related to the staff's position on remote safe shutdown. c) Need information on the time allowed for manual actions required should the cooling tower be actuated automatically and to verify that such manual actions are included in the remote shutdown procedures. Should include a discussion on how the operator is alerted from outside the Control Room that the cooling tower has actuated automatically. d) Should provide information to address the effect of nonseismic service water system pipe failures not large enough to give an automatic cooling tower actuation signal, e) Information is required to address actuation of cooling tower from outside Control Room assuming automatic signal not present. Should discuss correlation between automatic trip signal (TA) and transfer of control to the remote shutdown station. f) Should revise FSAR Section 7.4.6 to add information deleted in Amendment 56 related to events of Chapter 15 that produce the most severe consequences that are pertinent to safe plant shutdown. g) Verify that power for indication required for safe plant shutdown remote from the Control Room is Class lE. i

Response

a) Disabling the SSPS will not affect the cooling tower actuation signal. The TA signal is generated in the balance of plant instrumentation and control equipment racks which are independent of the SSPS equipment. b) Appendix A provides a listing of equipuent affected by disabling the SSPS and addresses the manual control capability frou outside the Control Roou. Remote Safe Shutdown (RSS) in the event of Main Control Room evacuation will be handled utilizing Procedure 0S1200.02, " Safe Shutdown and Cooldown from the Remote Safe Shutdown Facilities." This procedure primarily applies to RSS in the event of a fire, but is also applicable to safe shutdown using safety grade equipment (reference response to RAI 420.38). As in the case for fire, the Main Control Room evacuation scenario assumes the possibility for a loss of off-site power and no accident event. The operators will disable the SSPS to prevent inadvertent safety injection as follows: Prior to evacuation of the Main Control Room, the test switches on the SSPS test cabinets will be placed with the " Test" position on both Train A and Train B. This blocks the output signals from actuating ESF equipment. The RSS locations have limited instrumentation and are designed to allow safe shutdown of the plant. They are not designed for accident mitigation; therefore, disabling the SSPS is consistent with this philosophy. The prime objective of disabling SSPS is to block SI prior to depressurization. Disabling the SSPS, as stated above, is the most feasibic method for accomplishing this task, considering the limitaticns on personnel availability and the need for expediency. Also, doing this absolutely eliminates the possibility of an unwanted' actuation of a safeguards system. Revisions to FSAR Section 7.4 to reflect the above changes, will be I contained in the next amendment. !c d. Section 7.4 of.the FSAR " Systems Required for Safe Shutdown," addresses e) safe shutdown utilizing safety grade equipment from the Main Control Room and from remote shutdown locations should it be necessary to evacuate the Main Control Room. Section 7.4 does not address safe shutdown in the event of fire or an accident. Therefore, it is expected that plant . shutdown will always be conducted from the Main Control Room except in the event that evacuation is necessary for some yet unidentified rearon. Because the Main Control Room is designed to be available at all times and because it is manned continuously, it should be stressed that the evacuation occurrence is very unlikely. Safety grade shutdown has been analyzed, in detail, in Section 7.4. The postulation of an earthquake coincident with a Main Control Room shutdown is reasonable because it is expected that the plant will be operable from that location most of the plant life. Furthermore, an earthquake of sufficient magnitude may be the root cause of the shutdown. Therefore, redundancy and seismic qualification of equipment required for this shutdown would be essential to justify such capability. It should be nevertheless recognized that no plant condition can occur that would lead the Control Room operators into a procedure limiting them to the use of safety grade equipment. Therefore, no specific safety grade shutdown procedure has been leveloped. Instead, the plant has instituted safe shutdown procedures for the Main Control Room shutdown and the remote shutdown primarily aimed at the fire scenario, but which can also be utilized for the safety grade shutdown. This simply means that these procedures, aside from conforming to the guidance of Appendix R, also assure that every essential function for shutdown can be accomplished with redundant safety grade equipment. i L

Since an earthquake is postulated to occur in the Main Control Room o shutdown, loss of normal service water with subsequent switch over to the cooling towers has been anticipated. This has been done to be in compliance with the present regulatory position on cooling water tunnel integrity following a seismic event. The Control Moom operators will be aware of cooling tower actuation from alarms in the Main Control Room. Automatic tower actuation will initiate all equipment functions necessary to accomplish service water transfer to the cooling towers. At some time into the shutdown, the Control Room operator will reposition the cooling tower recirculation valves to switch to the spray mode. These manual actions will be accomplished from the Main Control Room. Additionally, the operators will check for, and respond to, equipment malfunctions that could compromise cooling tower operation, utilizing the Abnormal Instructions as guidance. As previously stated, Main Control Room evacuation is a very unlikely occurrence. It is, therefore, unreasonable to expect an earthquake occurring coincident with Main Control Room evacuation. Furthermore, an earthquake cannot, by design, be the root cause for evacuation. Therefore, it is not necessary to postulate the loss of normal service water (i.e., tunnels) nor the transfer to cooling tower operation. Essentially, the cooling towers are not required for remote safe shutdown. A review of the applicable criteria for remote safe shutdown, as defined in FSAR Section 7.1, supports this position. Based on the preceding discussion, the following summary is offered as additional clarification to SER 7.4.2.4 (RAIs 420.38, 420.39), Remote Shutdown: 1. Cooling tower actuation is not postulated for remote safe shutdown. Therefore, time allowances for manual actions related to cooling tower operation have not been developed, nor does the remote shutdown procedure include steps for establishing cooling tower operation. l l l l ; t

7_- 1 2. Since automatic cooling tower actuation will not occur when L an evacuation occurrence has taken place, tower. actuation f indicating alarms outside the Main Control Room are not I required. l In regards to the question pertaining to the effects of nonseismic service water system pipe failures not large enough to give an automatic cooling tower actuation signal, a detailed analysis of this condition has already. j-been provided by letter (SBN-945, dated February 14, 1986) in response to RAI 420.48. I i 'f) The FSAR Section 7.4.6 will be amended to include that information-presented to'the NRC in Letter SBN-917, dated December 31, 1985, specifically, Insert C of the letter. In addition, FSAR Section 7.4.6 will be revised to add information related to Chapter 15 events. The revised FSAR excerpt is provided hereinafter. g) The power for indication of parameters required for safe plant shutdown remote from the Control Room is Class lE. I l _9 i i

SER 7.5.2.2 (RAI 420.16) Radiation Data Management System Need information to verify ability of Class 1E RDMS monitors to perform the required safety function during application of the fault tests.

Response

Exhibit 420.12-1 (Sheet 5 of 8), in FSAR Amendment 49 (May 1983), indicates that there were no errors in the communication port during the isolation test, indicating that the Class 1E monitor will perform its intended function during the application of a fault. In response to our letter asking for clarification of the test results, C. A. Technologies stated in the letter dated January 13, 1984 and a telephone conversatior on April 18, 1986, that during the time of the fault application, the IE portion of the radiation monitoring system will function properly. !

SER 7.6.7.6 (RAI 420.54) Transfer of Injection 4 'J ", ~ Need information to verify that lights will be verified as part of ~ Technical Specification surveillance requirements for the safety injection instrumentation trip channels.

Response

r a 4 There are two lights on the main control board that are part of the safety injection instrumentation trip channels: one is in Train A; the other, Train B. These lights are downstream of the safety injection latching relays end are illuminated whenever a safety injection signal is present. These lights are verified as part of the Technical Specification surveillance requirements. (

• • a i

4 s f._

RAI 420.75 (7.3) (9.3.4) (6.3) The plant procedures concerning operator response to low water levels in the volume control tank have been reviewed to ensure that operators are properly alerted and will take appropriate actions.

Response

These procedures will be available for review by the NRC during the ICSB Audit in May 1986. . J

.. _ = ATTACHMENT 1 SB 1 & 2 Amendment 58 FSAR April 1986 1 The indication of bypass of systems required for safe shutdown is discussed in Subsection 7.1.2.6. st, Instrumentation at the RSS locations is independent of the main control room instrumentation. It is activated continuously so that its availability can, bs monitored. Provisions have been made for testing instrumentation 4 channels during power operation. The RSS instrumentation will be available following all natural phenomena. The RSS controls can be tested during plant shutdowns. 54 Psrtions of the instrument air system may be used for the RHR air-operated valves necessary for safe shutdown. Normal operation of the RHR System utilizes instrument air for the control of the RHR heat exchanger outlet and bypass valves. Should the instrument air system be unavailable, the RNR l h:st exchanger bypass valve will fail to the closed position and the RHR 52 h st exchanger outlet valve will fail to the full-open position. This failure mode provides full RER flow through the RER heat exchanger. Analysis of system startup and operation under these conditions has shown that an acceptable cooldown rate of less than 500F/hr will result. Therefore, plant operation at hot standby and cooldown to cold shutdown can be accomplished without the use of the instrument air system. 49 Scfety grade backup air supplies have been provided to components which must remain operable for safe shutdown. Refer to FSAR Section 9.3 for further l discussion. The station service water system is explained in Subsection 9.2.1. The scfety evaluation is presented in Subsection 9.2.1.3. The primary component cooling water system is explained in Subsection 9.2.2 and the safety evaluation is presented in Subsection 9.2.2.3, in detail. s1 The selection of instrumentation and controls for safe shutdown has included censideration of the event consequences that might jeopardize safe shutdown canditions. The event consequences that are germane are those that would tcad to degrade the capabilities for boration, adequate supply for emergency i fcedwater, and residu31 heat removal. l 7 Add WINK 8 h Sq 'The results of the analysis which determined the applicability of the NRC General Design Criteria, IEEE Standard 279-1971, applicable NRC Regulatory Guides, and other industry standards, to the equipment required for safe shutdown, are presented in Table 7.1-1. 51 7.4.7 Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown The equipment required to accomplish safe shutdown functions is listed in Tchle 7.4-1. M Moic, tvijek % h Abbed ) -P WA SG C - h'7 I 7.4-7

ATTAC!! MENT 1 INSERT "A" (Insert onto FSAR Page 7.4-7 The results of the analyses are presented in Chapter 15. Of these, the following events will produce the most severe consequences that are pertinent: 1. Uncontrolled boron dilution (see Subsection 15.4.6). 2. Loss of normal feedwater (see Subsection 15.2.7). 3. Loss of external electrical load and/or turbine trip (see Subsections 15.2.2 and 15.2.3). 4. Loss of nonemergency ac power to the station auxiliaries (Loss of Off-Site Power) (see Subsection 15.2.6). It is shown by these analyses, that safety is not adversely affected by these events, assuming the equipment indicated in Subsection 7.4.7 is available in the Main Control Room to control and/or monitor shutdown. These available systems will allow maintenance of hot standby and cooldown to cold shutdown even during the events listed above which would tend toward a return to criticality or a loss of heat sink. In the unlikely event that the Main Control Room is uninhabitable, alternate control provisions are provided at the RSS locations. Safety is not adversely affected by Event 1., uncontrolled boron dilution (see Section 15.4.6). Events 2., 3., and 4. do not have an adverso offect since the remoto safe shutdown equipment can be powered by emergency power, and a plant trip initiated by Main Control Room evacuation will put the plant in a safe condition.

.~ 9 a I ATTACHMENT 1 1 APPENDIX A P 4 4 4 e i e-- +e-a a-~---- --n. ,---e--

Page 1 of 9 Manual Control From Outside Trains A and B the Component No. Component Description Control Room Conunent RH-P-8A RHR Pump Yes RH-P-8B RHR Pump Yes Bus-1-E5 DC-1A Breaker Yes Bus-1-E6 DG-1B Breaker Yes CS-V-142 Charging Pump to E2 Isolation Valve Yes CS-V-143 Charging Pump to E2 Isolation Valve Yes CS-LCV-112B CS-TK-1 Outlet Isolation Valve Yes CS-LCV-112C CS-TK-1 Outlet Isolation Valve Yes i CS-LCV-112D RWST to Charging Pump Isolation Valve Yes CS-LCV-112E RWST to Charging Pump Isolation Valve Yes SI-V-138 Baron Injection Tank Isolation Valve Yes SI-V-139 Boron Injection Tank Isolation Valve Yes SI-V-3 SI-TK-9A Outlet Isolation Valve Yes SI-V-17 SI-TK-9B Outlet Isolation Valve Yes CS-V-196 Charging Pump Mini-Flow Isolation Valve No Note 4 CS-V-197 Charging Pump Mini-Flow Isolation Valve No Note 4 SW-V-4 SCCW Isolation Valve Yes SW-V-5 SCCW Isolation Valve Yes SI-V-32 SI-TK-9C Outlet Isolation Valve Yes SI-V-47 SI-TK-9D Outlet Isolation Valve Yes SW-V-74 Loop A Discharge to Cooling Tower No Wote 2 SW-V-76 Loop B Discharge to Cooling Tower No Note 2 CBA-FN-16A Emergency Clean-Up Filter Fan No Note 3 CBA-FN-16B Emergency Clean-Up Filter Fan No Note 3 SI-P-6A Safety Injection Pump Yes SI-P-6B Safety Injection Pump Yes

Pag 3 2 cf O Manu21 Control From Out0ida Trains A and B the Component No. Component Description-Control Room Conument DG-CP-79 Sequencer - Train A No Note 3 DG-CP-80 Sequencer - Train B No Note 3 CAH-FN-1A Containment Structure Cooling Fan No Note 3' CAH-FN-1B Containment Structure Cooling Fan No Note 3 CAH-FN-1C Containment Structure Cooling Fan No Note 3 CAH-FN-1D ~ Containment Structure Cooling Fan No Note 3 CAH-FN-1E Containment Structure Cooling Fan No Note 3 CAH-FN-1F Containment Structure Cooling Fan No Note 3 CBS-V-2 RWST to CBS Pump Isolation Valve Yes CBS-V-S RWST to CBS Pump Isolation Valve Yes FW-P-37B Emergency Feedwater Pump Yes MS-V-127 Steam Supply to Feed Pump 37A Yes MS-V-128 Steam Supply to Feed Pump 37A Yes IRTW Station Computer No Note 3 CS-P-2A Charging Pump A Yes CS-P-2B Charging Pump B Yes CAP-V-1 Containment Air Outboard Isolation Valve No Note 3 CAP-V-2 Containment Air Inboard Isolation Valve No Note 3 CAP-V-3 Containment Air Inboard Isolation Valve No Note 3 CAP-V-4 Containment Air Outboard Isolation Valve No Note 3 CAP-FN-9 Pre-Entry Purge Fan No Note 3 COP-V-1 Containment Purge Isolation Valve No Note 3 COP-V-2 Containment Purge Isolation Valve No Note 3 COP-V-3 Containment Purge Inboard Exhaust Valve No Note 3 COP-V-4 Containment Purge Outboard Exhaust Valve No Note 3 l l

a Paga 3 cf 9 Hanusl Contr21 From Outsid3 Trains A and B the C_omponent No. Component Description Control Room Conunent COP-FN-34 Jefueling Purge Supply Fan No Note 3 COP-FN-73 Containment Purge Fan No Note 3 CC-V-447 Loop B Supply Isolation Valve No kote 3 CC-V-448 Loop B Supply Isolation Valve No Note 3 CC-V-427 Loop A Return Isolation Valve No Note 3 RMW-V-30 Makeup Water Isolation Valve No Note 3 SI-V-157 Accumulator Fill Line Isolation Valve No Note 3 CC-V-341 PCCW Outlet Isolation Valve No Note 3 CC-V-32 Loop A Supply Valve No Note 3 CC-V-445 Loop B Supply Valve No Note 3 MM-WA-50 Annunciator-No Note 3 RH-V-27 E-9B Header Test Valve No Note 3 RH-V-28 E-9A Header Test Valve No Note 3 NG-V-13 N2 Supply to Accumulator Isolation Valve No Note 3 NG-V-14 N2 Supply to Accumulator Isolation Valve No Note 3 SI-V-160 Safety Injection Pump Isolation Valve No Note 3 i WLD-V-81 Waste Processing Liquid Drains Containment Isolation Valve No Note 3 WLD-V-82 Waste Processing Liquid Drains Containment Isolation Valve No Note 3 WLD-V-8331 Waste Processing Liquid Drains Containment Isolation Valve No Note 3 WLD-V-8332 Waste Processing Liquid Drains Containment Isolation Valve No Note 3 CC-V-426 Loop A Supply Isolation Valve No Note 3 CC-V-272 E-9B PCCW Outlet Isolation Valve Yes CS-V-149 Letdown Line IRC Isolation Valve No Note 3 CS-V-150 Letdown Line ORC Isolation Valve No Note 3

Pig 3 4 cf 9 Manu21 Contral From Outsida Trains A and B the Component No. Component Description Control Room Comment RC-FV-2840 Pressurizer ORC Sample Valve No Note 3 RC-FV-2830 Pressurizer IRC Sample Valve No Note 3 RC-FV-2832 Loop 1 IRC Sample Valve No Note 3 RC-FV-2874 Loop 1 ORC Sample Valve No Note 3 RC-FV-2833 Loop 3 Isolation Valve Yes CC-V-145 E-9A PCCW ORC Isolation Valve Yes RC-FV-2831 Pressurizer Inboard Sample Valve No Note 3 SI-V-131 Safety Injection Cold Leg Test Line Isolation Valve No Note 3 RH-V-16 RH-HX-9A to Safe Shutdown System Isolation Valve No Note 3 RH-V-17 RH-HX-9B to Safe Shutdown System Isolation Valve No Note 3 RH-V-49 RH-E-9A Injection Line Test Valve No Note 3 SI-V-158 Charging Pump Isolation Valve No Note 3 SI-V-62 Accumulator to Tank 66 Isolation Valve No Note 3 SI-V-70 Accumulator to HL Isolation Valve No Note 3 RC-FV-2936 PRT Tank Sample Valve No Note 3 RC-FV-2837 PRT Tank Sample Valve No Note 3 NG-FV-1609 RC-TK-11 Isolation Valve No Note 3 NG-FV-1610 RC-TK-11 Isolation Valve No Note,3 SC-T-ALARM Station Computer No Note T RC-FV-2876 Loop ORC Sample Valve No Note 3 SS-FV-2857 Recirculation Sump Sample Valve No Note 3 SS-FV-2868 A Recirculation Sump Sample Valve No Note 3 jf SS-FV-2869 B Recirculation Sump Sample Valve No Note 3 ~

Pega 5 cf 9< Manust Contr31 From Outcid3 Trains ~A and'B. the Component No. Component Description Control Room Comument - SI-V-1 Safety Injection Hot Leg Test Line Isolation Valve No Note 3 SI-V-4 Safety Injection Hot Les Test Line Isolation Valve No Note 3 SB-V-9A Steam Generator Blowdown' Valve No Note 3 SB-V-9B Steam Generator Blowdown Valve No Note 3 SB-V-10A Steam Generator Blowdown Valve No Note 3 SB-V-10B Steam Generator Blowdown Valve No Note 3 SB-V-11A Steam Generator Blowdown Valve No Note 3 I SB-V-11B Steam Generator Blowdown Valve No Note 3 SB-V-12A Steam Generator Blowdown Valve No Note 3 SB-V-12B Steam Generator Blowdown Valve No Note 3 DF-P112A Penetration Area Sump Pump A No Note 3 DF-P112B Penetration Area Sump Pump B No Note 3 CS-V-167 RCP Seal Water Isolation Valve No Note 3 CS-V-168 RCP Seal Water Isolation Valve No Note 3 1 CGC-V-28 Containment Purge Isolation Valve No Note 3 CGC-V-14 Containment Purge Isolation Valve No Note 3 PAH-DP-35A Containment Enclosure Isolation Damper No Note 3 PAH-DP-36A Containment Enclosure Isolation Damper No Note 3 EAH-DP-30A Emergency Exhaust Filter Fan Damper No Note 3 EAH-DP-30B Emergency Exhaust Filter Fan Damper No Note 3 EAH-FN-4A Emergency Exhaust Filter Fan No Note 3 EAH-FN-4B Emergency Exhaust Filter Fan No Note 3 SIC /A Safeguards Test Cabinet No Note 3 STC/B Safeguards Test Cabinet No Note 3 4

~ -w 1 P g') 6 cf 9 Manual Control From Outside l Trains A and B the j Component No. Component Description Control Room Comument CAH-FV-6572 Radiation Monitor Isolation Valve No Note 3 CAH-FV-6573 Radiation Monitor Isolation Valve No ' Note 3 CAH-FV-6547 Radiation Monitor Isolation Valve No Note 3 i 4 i CAH-FN-2A CRDM Cooling Fan No Note 3 CAH-FN-2B CRDM Cooling Fan No Note 3 j CAH-FN-2C CRDM Cooling Fan No Note 3 i CAH-FN-2D CRDM Cooling Fan No Note 3 I CAH-FN-3A Containment Structure Recirculation Filter Fan No Note 3 CAH-FN-3B Containment Structure Recirculation Filter Fan No Nota 3 l } CAH-DP-34A Solenoid Valve - Recirculation Fan 3A No Note 3 4 CAH-DP-34B Solenoid Valve - Recirculation Fan 3B No Note 3 CAH-DP-34C Solenoid Valve - Recirculation Fan 3A No Note 3 l CAH-DP-34D Solenoid Valve - Hecirculation Fan 3B No Note 3 l ) CC-V-175 PCCW Loop B Containment Supply Valve No Note 3 i CC-V-256 PCCW Loop B Containment Return Valve No Note 3 CC-V-257 PCCW Loop B Containment Return Valve No Note 3 CC-V-121 PCCW Loop A Containment Return Valve No Note 3 CC-V-122 PCCW Loop A Containment Return Valve No Note 3 CC-V-168 PCCW Loop A Containment Supply Valve No Note 3 CC-V-57 PCCW Loop A Containment Supply Valve No Note 3 l CC-V-176 PCCW Loop B Containment Supply Valve No Note 3 CC-V-137 E-16A PCCW Outlet Valve No Note 3 ) CC-V-266 E-16B PCCW Outlet Valve No Note 3 i ) MS-V-204 MSIV Loop 1 Bypass Valve No Note 3 MS-V-205 MSIV Loop 2 Bypass Valve No Note 3 1 MS-V-206 MSIV Loop 3 Bypass Valve No Note 3 MS-V-207 MSIV Loop 4 Bypass Valve No Note 3 i i MS-V-86 MSIV Loop 1 Yes i MS-V-83 MSIV Loop 2 Yes { MS-V-90 MSIV Loop 3 Yes MS-V-92 MSIV Loop 4 Yes e i 4

Paga 7 cf 1 Manu21 Control From Outcid3 Trains A and B the Component No. Component Description Control Room Conunent CBS-V-ll Containment Spray Valve No Note 3 CBS-V-17 Containment Spray Valve No Note 3 CBS-V-38 Spray Additive Discharge Valve No Note 3 CBS-V-43 Spray Additive Discharge Valve No Note 3 CBS-V-31 Test Recirculation Valve No Note 3 CBS-V-32 Test Recirculation Valve No Note 3 CBS-V-33 Test Recirculation Valve No Note 3 MM-UA-50-13 Annunciator No Note 3 CBS-P-9A Containment Spray Pump No Note 3 CBS-P-9B Containment Spray Pump No Note 3 SI-V-3 SI-TK-9A Isolation Valve Yes SI-V-17 SI-TK-9B Isolation Valve Yes SI-V-32 SI-TK-9C Isolation Valve Yes SI-V-47 SI-TK-9D Isolation Valve Yes EHC System Turbine Backup Trip No Note 3 EHC System Turbine Primary Trip and Test No Note 3 FW-P-32A SGFP Trip, Reset, Test No Note 3 FW-P-16 Prelube Auxiliary Pump No Note 3 RC-P-1A Reactor Coolant Pump Yes RC-P-1B Reactor Coolant Pump Yes RC-P-lc Reactor Coolant Pump Yes RC-P-lD Reactor Coolant Pump Yes MSD-V-44 Main Steam Line Drain Valve No Note 3 MSD-V-45 Main Steam Line Drain Valve No Note 3 MSD-V-46 Main Steam Line Drain Valve No Note 3 MSD-V-47 Main Steam Line Drain Valve No Note 3

Pz g') 8 cf 9 Manuti Control From Outaid2 Trains A and B the Component No. Component Description Control Room Cotunent FW-FCV-510 Feedwater Control Valve No Note 3 FW-FCV-520 Feedwater Control Valve No Note 3 FW-FCV-530 Feedwater Control Valve No Note 3 FW-FCV-540 Feedwater Control Valve No Note 3 FW-LV-4230 Feedwater Control Bypass Valve No Note 3 FW-LV-4240 Feedwater Control Bypass Valve No Note 3 FW-V-30 Feedwater Isolation Valve No Note 1 FW-V-39 Feedwater Isolation Valve No Note 1 FW-V-48 Feedwater Isolation Valve No Note 1 FW-V-57 Feedwater Isolation Valve No Note 1 FW-LV-4210 Feedwater Control Bypass Valves No Note 3 FW-LV-4220 Feedwater Control Bypass Valves No Note 3 MS-PY-3011A Steam Dump Inhibit Solenoid Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3011B Steam Dump Inhibit Solenoid Valve No Note 3 KS-PY-3015A Steam Dump Inhibit Solenoid Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3015B Steam Dump Inhibit Solenoid Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3019A Steam Dump Inhibit Solenoid Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3019B Steam Dump Inhibit Solenoid Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3012A Steam Dump Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3012B Steam Dump Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3009A Steam Dump Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3009B Steam Dump Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3010A Steam Dump Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3010B Steam Dump Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3016A Steam Dump Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3016B Steam Dump Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3013A Steam Dump Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3013B Steam Dump Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3014A Steam Dump Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3014B Steam Dump Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3020A Steam Dump Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3020B Steam Dump Valve No Note 3

Pag 3 9 cf 9 c Manual Control From Outside Trains A'and B the Component No. Component Description Control Room Comment I MS-PY-3017A Steam Dump Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3017B Steam Dump Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3018A Steam Dump Valve No Note 3 MS-PY-3018B Steam Dump Valve No Note 3. RC-V-22 Letdown Isolation Valve Yes RC-V-23 Letdown Isolation Valve Yes RC-V-87 Letdown Isolation Valve Yes RC-V-88 Letdown Isolation Valve Yes MM-CR-470 Block Automatic Rod Withdrawal No Note 3 CBS-V-8 Containment Sump Isolation Valve No Note 3 CBS-V-14 Containment Sump Isolation Valve No Note 3 NOTES: 1. This function will have been performed prior to the operators manning the remote shutdown stations. 2. In the event of failure of the automatic function, this device will be operated locally should manual reposition be necessary. 3. This device would not be operated in a nonaccident scenario for remote shutdown purposes. 4. Disabling the SSPS does not prevent this device from performing its safety function under nonaccident conditions.

SBN-1042 9 ATTACHMENT 2 I I

[L 1. Information on the technical specification requirements to be implemented for the safety-related portion of the design (include a discussion on the provisions provided for surveillance testing of the ADVs and associated safety-related manual controls including the design features used for isolation from the nonsafety-related portion of the system).

RESPONSE

Ue coauited to safety related controls during our FSAR review in anticipation of regulatory requirements. These regulatory requireuents have never been promulgated. Also the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG 0452) does not include ASDV's. Thus we have not added any portion of the ASDV controls to the Seabrook Technical Specifications. 2. Information on the failure modes and effects associated with the Train A and Train B solenoid operated valves utilized to control operation of the ADVs. This should show as a minimuu: - that the capability of the subject valves to perform the required safety functions (open/close as required for safe plant shutdown) cannot be degraded below an acceptable level as a result of all possible circumstances (i.e., overvoltage, undervoltage, etc. ) associated with the power supply to these valves. The main concern is with solenoid valves that are continuously energized during normal plant operation. - that the atmospheric dump valves fail to the closed position on loss of pouer, - that at least two (2) ADVs will be available for safe plant shutdoun after assuming a single failure, and - That the nonsafety-related positioner will be isolated when required.

1 4

RESPONSE

a) The solenoid valves used to control the ASDV's are Asco NP-1"s. These valves are environmentally and seismically qualified. They have a normal operating range of 90 to 140 volts dc (continuously energized). The valves can be operated at 15% below and 10% above this range. At Seabrook the minimum DC voltage is 105 and the maximum is 140. All solenoids that are required to be normally energized during plant operation have been designed and purchased for such service. b) Failure Mode - refer to Loop Drawing M-506585. Upon loss of power PY3001-1 and PY 3001-2 close. This prevents the opening or closing of the ASDV valve by the positioner. Valves PY3001-4 and PY3001-6 open on loss of power providing a safety grade vent path so that the ASDV valve will close. c) Each ASDV is supplied with redundant solenoid valves for controlling the vent path (PY3001-4 and 6) and gas supply (PY3001-3 and 5). These valves are fed from redundant power trains. The only single failures that could prevent an ASDV from opening are 1) failure of the ASDV actuator, 2) failure to isolate the non-safety grade positioner, 3) failure of the gas supply. Since all of these are single failures they will only affect one ASDV, there will always be at least two ASDV's available for safe shutdown. d) The non-safety related controls are isolated by PY3001-1 and PY3001-2 when the operator selects the safety-grade control mode. 3. A complete set of drawings (electrical schematics, logics, switch development tables, etc.) which show the latest design implementation associated with the ADVs.

RESPONSE

A couplete set of drawings for one ASDV is provided in Appendix A.

4. Information on the design criteria associated with the mechanical aspects of the backup air supply systou (bottles, tubing, valves, etc.). Include details on the control room indications available for the operator to verify operability of the backup air supply system.

RESPONSE

a) The gas bottles are seismically supported and meet the requireuents of DOT 3AA. (see FSAR Table 3.2-2). b) A seismically mounted pressure indicating transmitter is provided for each set of gas bottles. this transmitter provides control room indication on demand and a VAS alarm. c) Each set of bottles is supplied uith a seismically qualified regulator and safety valve (see FSAR Tabic 3.2-2). d) All tubing and valves are installed as ANSI B31.1 Seismic Category 1 (see FSAR Table 3.2-2). 5. Information detailing the actuator design associated with the ADVs.

RESPONSE

Details of the actuator design are provided in Appendix B.

6. Information on the safety-rclated backup air system as related to the following concern. FSAR Section 7.3.2 implies that the safety-related backup air system may not have sufficient capacity to ensure that the necessary equipment is maintained in service to allow operation at hot standby for at least four hours and the additional time required for cooldown to conditions permitting operation o:'.'

the RllR sys tem. It is stated that the plant air system (nonsafety-related) can be manually loaded onto the diesel generator bus, or that local manual E control will be established. Information is required to detail how this planned operation complies with the requirements of Brench Technical Position RSB 5-1, items of the ADVs for safe plant shutdown should be provided including identification of all deviations from the subject BTP requirements. Justification information for each identified deviation should be provided.

RESPONSE

The safety related air systeu has sufficient capacity to operate the AEDV's for 10 hours. This will provide adequate time to cooldown from hot standby to RHR system operation. Provided herewith is FSAR page 9.3.2 marked up to reflect this capability.

w ATTACHMENT 2 SB 1 & 2 Amendment 58 FSAR April 1986 O The following devices are supplied with back up high pressure gas bottles. Device Capacity of Supply /0 Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine 4 Complete Cycles in / hours Steam Supply /0 Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves 10 Complete Cycles in J/ hours Primary Component Cooling 10 Complete Cycles in hours Temperature Control Valves 53 The following devices are supplied with back up air supply. Component Device Fail Position Atmospheric relief valves Closed PCCW Temperature Control Valves Fail Open PCCW Temperature Control Bypass Valve Fail Closed O* Both the plant and containment air systems are non-Seismic Category I. Since the compressed air system operates at approximately 100 psig and at ambient temperature, it is not considered a high energy system. Therefore, protection against pipe whip is not necessary. However, the piping is supported in accordance with Seismic Category I criteria in all areas where failure could render safety class systems or components inoperable, or compromise safe plant shutdown. A line supplying service air from the plant air system is provided to the l containment for post-accident combustible gas control. However, this line 6' would only be used should both safety related hydrogen recombiners fail. Containment isolation valves and the associated piping are Safety Class 2, ceismic Category I. The combustible gas control system is explained fully in Section 6.2.5. O 9.3-2

~ i s s m t E 9 E 4 ATTACHMENT 2 APPENDIX A l +- I t i l

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{ SECTION III MAINTENANCE 3-1. GENERAL for removal instructions. Do not remove the manual override assembly This section provides detailed instru-unless the actuator assembly is to tions.for troubleshooting, complete be disassembled. disassembly, cleaning, inspection, ch a s W to W actu-repair, and assembly. Refer to Sec-ator assembly as shown in figure 3-1. tion V for maintenance instructions for components not included in this section. \\ gyg,ogy f NOTE l , FILTER Notify Control Components 1 nesWLATon Inc. Field Service Engi-newove our 1 neering Dept, (714) 979- $',",sraLL N, ,,,j 6600, of any problems that may be encountered during maintenance procedures. ain unt 3-2. TROUBLESHOOTING l\\ Troubleshooting procedures are limited Lowen cap to general service discrepancies that could occur during the lifetime of the Figure 3-1 control element. These procedures are Attaching Sling to Actuator Assembly limited in scope as the control ele-ment is designed for trouble-free d. Loosen nuts (6, figure 3-2) operation and long life. Table 3-1 until lockwashers (7) are completely lists possible troubles, probable ' relaxed. causes, and suggested remedial action. e. Install a temporary air line Refer to Section V for accessory com-with a manually controlled pressure Ponent troubleshooting procedures as regulator installed in the line, to the applicable. upper cap air port of the actuator assembly (See figure 3-1). 3-3. DISASSEMBLY f. Apply sufficient air pressure to the actuat r assembly t break bon-3-4. Control Element (See figure 3-2) net (5, figure 3-2) loose at body assem-Disconnect all utility lines. bly (9). s. 3 Slowly relieve all air press-b. Remove the manual override ure from the actuator assembly. assembly and other accessory compon-ents as required. Refer to Section V 3-1 l 1

j .i Table 3-1. Troubleshooting i TROUBLE PROBA8LE CAUSE RDEDY Excessive seat leakage Seat surfaces or seals Disassemble and replace damaged or repair damaged par'ts Insufficient air pressure Check air supply j Defective or improperly See Section V adjusted positioner (if installed) ~ Insufficient torque on Tighten to specifications Bonnet leakage bonnet flange nuts Bonnet seal surface damage Rework or rvlace Body or bonnet sealing Disassemble and repair l surface damaged or replace / Stem packing leakage Loose gland flange Tighten nuts t i Damaged plug stem surface Replace plug assembly Insufficient or worn Replace packings packings Plug assembly shaft Plug assembly or disk Disassemble and examine jumping or sticking stack assembly galled Extent of damage. Repair or replace Foreign material in disk Clean stack bore Restricted or. insuffic-Check air supply isnt air supply a Defective positioner See Section V (if installed) l Packings not properly Adjust or replace installed si (, Element does not follow Defective actuator piston Replace piston / positioner input signal Galled plug stem or plug Replace plug assembly Insufficient air supply Check air supply I Balance seal failure Replace balance seal / 8 3-2 Nh gese a. ""Y** T f"1g-**w-me--ir=,_._c,

Table 3-1. Troubleshooting (continued) TROUBLE PROBABLE CAUSE REMEDY Slow descrease in rated Disk stack passages Remove and clean flow through element clogged Hissing sound from actua-Loose actuator stud nuts Tighten ter assembly End cap seal leakage Replace seal Shaft seal leakage Replace seal NOTE l o. Slowly relieve all air pressure from the actuator assembly. Disconnect Steps h through j are applica-the temporary air line and remove the act-ble for FAIL CLOSE control uator assembly to a clean work area for elements only. Steps k and 1 disassembly if required, describe procedures for FAIL OPEN type control elements. p. Install stem clamp (2) onto the Steps m through p are applic-plug assembly to facilitate lifting inter-able for both. nal parts from the body assemoly. h. Disconnect the temporary air 3-5. Body Assembly (See figure 3-3). ine from the actuator assembly upper cap ir port and install in the lower cap a. Remove bonnet flange (10) from air port. body (24). 1. Apply sufficient air pressure NOTE to the actuator assembly to retract the actuator shaft approximately two (2) Step b is applicable only if inches into the cylinder. the metal seal is manufact-ured with a flange on the j. Remove stem chmp (2). upper edge. k. Apply sufficient air press-uro to the actuator assembly upper cap b. Insert a pry bar under the air port to extend the plug assembly flange of metal seal (12). Moving the to within two (2) inches of the closed pry bar around the metal seal, work the Position. metal seal out of the cavity between }' I (*** ~ 1. Remove stem clamp (2). m. Remove gland flange (3) and c. Attach the yoke clamp, stem ) y:ke clamp (4). clamp, and sling to the bonnet as shown in figure 3-5. Lift the plug and bon-n. Lift the actuator assembly net assembly from the body as a unit. from the body assembly. Remove the plug assembly from the bonnet. 3-3 a ,,-.,n ~, -,. ,,.-.7.-.,_,

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17. FACKING l

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18. PACKING SPACER l

19. PLUG ASSEMBLT

..f

20. DISK STACK

21. SEAT RIIIG l

22. SEAT RING SPACER

23. SEAL

• 1 TEN 12 IS AVAILABLE IN TWO CONFIGURATIGES,

24. 900Y l

WITH AND WITHOW A FLANGE ON THE UPPER SDGE. i IF A FLANGED NETAL SIAL 15 USID, ITIN 11 IS i SELETED. '37EN 15 NAT BE AM INTRIGRAL PART OF ITIN 20. l Figure 3-3. Body Assembly 3-5

o O q iji E-y ~ c. d, # ""87 3 N~ smern D 7 12'y' f .jji N.,, 1 s. a e 6 h ~& ' ;- t. ~ - ~" 'A (~~_'& f.1D Figure 3-4. Removing Metal Seal t

J d.

Remove seal spacer (15) and balance seal (14) from the bonnet. NOTE Step e is applicable only if the metal seal is manufact-ured with a flange on the o upper edge. If the metal wooo seal and/or spacer (11) are stocx y/rt stuck to the bonnet by cor-T rosion use a block of wood + , or = u,

• • *
• M * *L and drive toward the top of thebonnet(seefigure3-6).

l,El { p LU' ""* k% 1 Remove spacer (11) and metal e. seal (12) from the bonnet. N s sPActa y 3;l "~ f. Remove packing sleeve (16) from the bonnet. Using a packing pul-l, b, ler, remove packings (17). Remove s ' packing spacer (18) from the bonnet. l g. Lift disk stack (20) from the body. Figure 3-6 Removing Metal Seal and Spacer ) NOTE h. Remove seat ring (21, figure Weight of the disk stack 3-3) from the body. assembly may necessitate use of a sling and hoist to re-1. Remove seals (23) from the move. Attach the sling as seat. Separate seat ring spacer (22) i shown in figure 3-7. from the seat ring, if installed. 3-6 T

N 3 ) $3 &s I I i ll l 3 1 I 'iN N ~, l l l s ' Ain,N N 4 g f ( l. ) ! Q i g,l,' N l ,h ! b !. @b ) jyl g i 5 l ll .A l 7 I I 4N l ,Q l I I i Ain i 1 3 i PonT IS k l I I NY l l g FAIL OP N 'N ,d (spnimo unorn) s I l l i l i l J i:t:::;;;; J: t;* (- ),i i: lC*

1...

!!:t;;:: ^& g ' s i:2;1.n !!:t2, 's i l i5 e* I 'a I FAIL CLOSE (senius oven) Figure 3-8. Actuator Assembly ) l l 3-8

l (4, figure 3-8). l ) l ( sTuo ta) s 7 [i PLAT wasMan 4 k es . u. ~ ~ 3. . '.i Figure 3-7. Removing Disk Stack ' h . d r~l 1 h Locxwa: Man ~

• 3-6.

Actuator Assembly / ' v (See figure 3-8) If a manual override assembly 1 is installed on the upper cap of the cetuator assembly refer to Section V for removal instructions. Figure 3-9. Installing Extension Studs WARNING CAUTION THE ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY IS Nuts on the extension studs SPRING LOADED. USE CARE must be removed evenly by TO FOLLOW NORMAL SAFETY increments to prevent cant-PROCEDURES AND THE FOL-ing the upper cap. LOWING INSTRUCTIONS WHEN REMOVING THE END CAPS. d. Alternately back-off the nuts INJURY TO PERSONNEL OR on the extension studs until all spring DAMAGE TO THE ASSEMBLY tension is relieved. Remove upper cap COULD RESULT FROM IM-(1). PROPER DISASSEMBLY. e. Remove springs (7) (FAIL .. CLOSE type actuators only. a. Remove two directly oppo-site studs (4) from the actuator I f. Tilt cylinder (3) at the cssembly. top to break sealing tension at the b. Replace the two removed lower c8P. Remove the cylinder, studs with two all-thread studs of a

g. Slide actuator shaft (8),

length at least 50% longer than the with piston (9) attached, frcut lower length of cylinder (3). Allow the excess length of the studs to extend cap (2). above the upper cap. Install lock-h. Remove springs (7). (FAIL washers under the studs nuts on the Iower cap end of the studs and flat OPEN type actuators only). washers under the upper cap ends. (See figure 3-9). c. Remove remaining four studs 3-7 )

l NOTE l 3-9. Cleaning Methods l If a manual override WARNING assembly is installed on the upper cap nut (10) SOLVENTS MAY BE T0XIC AND/ is deleted and an exten-OR FLAMABLE. REFER T0 sion shaft retains the THE MANUFACTURER's INSTRUC-i piston to the actuator TIONS BEFORE USING. EYE . shaft. PROTECTION IS REQUIRED WHEN SOLVENTS OR COM-1. Secure the actuator shaft PRESSED AIR IS USED. in a vise equipped with soft brass jaws. Remove nut (10), or the exten-a. Immerse parts in solvent. sion shaft, and piston (9). b. Remove stubborn accumula-NOTE tions of dirt from sealing surfaces with a non-metalic brush. Secure the shaft by the milled flats. If the c. Rinse parts with clean sol-shaft does not have flats vent. install the stem clamp onto the shaft and clamp CAUTION the stem clamp in the vise. Do not use abrasives to clean the plug, stem, or 3-7. CLEANING bore of the disk stack. 3-8. Cleaning Materials Required d. Remove scale, rust, and minor The following list of materials pitting from the interior of the body cre used to comply with Control Com-using 200 grit crocus cloth or a wire ponents Inc. recommended cleaning brush. requirements. Materials and methods may be changed to meet local condi-e. Soak the disk stack assembly tions and requirements. in solvent. Crocus cloth, 200 grit f. Direct compressed air Brush, non-metalic W dM pss% h & C n loths reverse direction of flow. I**"* 3 Dry parts with cleaning ath cloths and/or compressed air. - Methyl alcohol, anhydrous purified 3-10. INSPECTION Naptha gas, chloride free a. Visually inspect all thread-

Acetone, ed parts for damaged threads.

technical grade b. Replace the actuator cylin-

• Re-distilled solvents must be der i the interior surface has been equivalent to new solvent.

scored or if fibers have separated 3-9

from the resin. correct tap or die to remove damage. 3 c. Examine finished surfaces b. Polish burrs and corrosion of parts for damage or wear. Note from sealing surfaces using 400 grit defect and repair in accordance with crocus cloth. instructions in this section. NOTE l EXCESS HONING WILL IN-Burrs, nicks, and scratches CREASE THE DISK STACK are defined as material BORE DIAMTER AND ALTER raised above normal sur-CHARACTERISTICS OF THE faces which, if not reoved CONTROL ELEMENT. would prevent complete mat-ing of parts and sealing c. If the disk stack bore is surfaces. Radial scratches galled, hone the bore using an auto-natic honing device only. HONE THE be a e sa ar BORE ONLY UlfrIL THE RAISED PARTICLES with linear defects should ARE REMOVED. be replaced. (see figure -10). d. Replace the plug assembly if pitted, galled, or worn through the - hard surface overlay material. e. Clean all repaired parts ) as described in the CLEANING paragraphs. RAotAL 3-13. Seat Ring Repair j If the seat ring assembly is v constructed with an encapsulated seat, the seat can be replaced as described in the following procedures, s. Remove seals (2) from seat ring (1) (See figure 3-11). gingan b. Remove ring (3) from the bottom of the seat ring. Figure 3-10. Surface Defects c. Pull retainer (4) from the 3-11. REPAIR seat ring and push seat housing (S) from the seat ring. 3-12. General d. Pry seat (6) from the seat Replace all parts that can not ring. Use care not to damage the be repaired by the following proced-machined surfaces. ures. e. Fold a new seat over itself ) a. Chase all threads with as shown in figure 3-12 and install in 3-10

h. Place the plug, with stem down, into a press assembly as shown in figure 3-13. Pntss p J'" A ! d,, E'"' A' @ j. jg""S Q 4. Retainer seat %ptyg 4-5. Seat housing n:No 3-6. Seat 'T Figure 3-13. Installing Seat Housing Figure 3-11. Seat Ring Assembly i. Place the seat ring assembly on the plug as illustrated. SEAT

j. Position metal bars across the seat ring, allowing space to insert a small screwdriver into the seat ring cavity.

SEAT RING k. While pushing on the inside diameter of the retainer with a small screwdriver slowly press the seat ring ~ onto the seat housing until the retain-er enters the groove in the seat hous-ing. Ensure the retainer is complete-ly installed in the groove. 1. Remove the seat ring assem-bly from the press and install ring Figure 3-12. Installing Seat 3, figure 3-11) to hold the retainer the seat ring. f. Insert seat housing (5, 3-14. ASSEMBLY figure 3-11), from the seat side of Procedures described in the of seat ring (1), as far into the seat ring as can be pushed by finger following paragraphs are applicable for both configurations of control pressura. elements. Refer to the drawings ship-3 Slide retainer (4) onto Ped with the,.ontrol element for the seat housing, against the seat torque values and other data applicable ring. to a particular control element. 3-11

3-15. Actuator Assembly (See figure (NOTE l (see figure J-19). I Apply lubricant, such as f 1 ride a. Dow Corning n eber 55, or equivalent, assembly is installed on to all o-rings and install as shown the upper cap, nut (10) in figure 3-14. is deleted and the pis-ton is secured to the l NOTE l actuator shaft by an ex-tension shaft. Apply Loc- . If a manual override tite 242 to the actuator assembly is installed on shaft threads before in-the upper cap refer to stalling the extension Section V for instal-

shaft, lation instructions.

f. Insert the actuator shaft b. Apply a light coat of lub-assembly into the lower cap. ricant such as Dow Corning number 55 or equivalent, to the interior sur-i face of cylinder (3). Install the NOTE I cylinder onto lower cap (2). S h h gpHcMe for FAIL CLOSE type actuators NOTE l only. i Step e is applicable for 8 Install springs (7) into FAIL OPEN type actuator the cylinder. ) assemblies only, h. Install two all-thread studs I c. Install r, rings (7) into of a length at least 50% longer than I the cylinder, the length of the cylinder into the ( lower cap. Allow the excess length of d. Secure actuator shaft (8) the studs to extend from the upper cap in a vise equipped with soft brass end. Install lockwashers under the jaws. nuts on the lower cap end of the studs and flat washers under the nuts on the NOTE l upper cap end.(See figure 3-15). Secure the actuator shaft i. Align the air ports in the by the milled flats. If lower cap and upper cap (1). Slide the shaft does not have the upper cap onto the extension studs. l flats install the stem clamp on the shaft and CAUTION clamp the stem clamp in the vise. TIGHTEN THE NUTS EVENLY ON THE EXTENSION STUDS e. Secure piston (9) to the BY INCREMENTS TO PRE-actuator shaft. VENT CANTING THE UPPER CAP. USE CARE TO PRE-VENT DAMAGE TO 0-RINGS WHILE INSTALLING THE UPPER CAP. 3-12 g-p' w-m se %--i--t--ev

• • -et*s-yww-eger,<--e--eqee ge e+w--w--

-g=-gem-w,w--#== --+---wwmw-w-re- --we-v1 w*

i sN ~ s s s1 ( 'r 1 i .lk i i GP ]Q I s,,,, x ~ c i .c '* f ; l

) !s I

it C l 3; i a s i i s 14 I I i lf'- l Q l l.A 1 ( r$ 7 ~ - u I i i am l N 15 i, ,( Fall OP N 's, s ,g a m =6 ui.oEn> s ,1 ll I, 2 N gl d i:f::::::: J:0;"" i: !!O"" !!: t;;; ( y i i: L.. !!: t;;; - s ^& 's i i:!lC:1 ..n !!:t;W., ,s d 'o ,A FAIL CLOSE (SPRINS OVER ) l Figure 3-14. Actuator Assembly i 3-13

I n. Continue to tighten the ex-uuo m i j tension stud nuts until the end caps are seated against the cylinder. ~ FLa7 WasMER o. Install four studs (4, f,ig-g 4 g ure 3-14) and tighten the nuts. 'n' p. Remove the two extension y studs and replace with the remaining i studs (4).

t

.q h[tocxwasutR 3-16. Test Assembled Actuator g .T ~ ' Assembly t a a. Connect an air line to the lower cap air port and slowly apply 80 psi air pressure. Check for leak-age at the bottom seal. Check for air Figure 3-15 flow at the upper cap air port, indi-Installing Extension Studs cating piston seal leakage. Vent the air pressure, b. Remove the air line from Steps j through m are the lower cap air port and connect to applicable if the actu-the upper cap air port. Repeat step ator shaft does not a above to test for upper cap leakage. extend through the lower cap when the upper 3-17. Body Assembly (See figure 3-16) cap is installed on the extension studs. Steps a. Apply a lubricant, such as n through p are appli-petroleum jelly, on seals (23) to hold cable for all other actu-in place in seat ring (21). Install ator assemblies, the seals in the grooves in the seat ring. Position the seat ring in body i

j. Raise the cylinder from

.-(24). Ensure the recessed, or soft the lower cap to allow sight of the seal, seal side of the seat ring is i actuator shaft. upward as shown in figure 3-17. Re-tate the seat ring several times to k. Place wood blocks between ensure it is fully seated in the body the lower cap and the cylinder to recess. Install seat ring spacer (22, 1 support the cylinder in the raised figure 3-16) if supplied. position. b. Lower disk stack (20) into 1.. Using an appropriate the body until seated on the seat ring. length of wooden dowel, guide the Ensure the disk stack is seated in the actuator shaft into the lower cap recess of the seat ring. while aIternately tightening the nuts on the extension studs. i m. Remove the blocks as soon ) 1 as the shaft is through the lower cap. 3-14

'~~ T~. ~ =jl0 19 1 i g;jgo 7 4 y 22 l 17 I h 18

3. STEN CLAMP

( e 13 . NUT ~ i ' 1i 8 S. SOLT

6. puf 24 P

7. m acLT I

8. 31UT i

.. J , w a

8. 10CKWAS M l.i

30. SONNET FLANCE o, r

>y ' W'

!!:,*t="Sm i4

V...de

= na = r u. ,eE S. i, it ,,**15. SEAL SPACER 1 i N.

16. PACKING SLEEVE

17. PACKING

..f d.

18. PACKING SPACER

19. PLUG ASSEMBLY l

.P

20. DISK STACK

21. SEAT RING

22. SEAT RING SPACER

23. SEAL

• 1 TEM 12 IS AVAfl.AB12 IN TWO CONFIGURAT2 mis,

24. M WITH AND WITHOUT A FLANGE ON THE UPPER SDGE.

IF A FLANGED METAL SEAL 18 USED, 2 TEN 11 IS DE12TED.

• ITIN 15 MAY SE AN INTREGRAL PART OF ITEN 20.

~ FIGIRE 3-16 SODY ASSEMBLY 3 15

plug and ccrefully lower the W k sormaT plug csstably into the disk stcck sA assembly until bottomed en the s:ct st spactn ring. Remove the stem clamp. }~* y ~ sPinoLE d. Apply Utragraphite Coat, Grade AA lubricant on balance seals (14).

• • ~
• *l"' situ sTaca easutt I e'd If DO NOT USE A POINTED TOOL N

sooy N / TO INSTALL 1HE BALANCE SEALS AS DAMAGE TO THE SEALING CAPACITY OF THE SEALS WILL RESULT. / THE BALANCE SEALS ARE g' /, EASILY BROKEN IF UNEVEN PRESSURE IS APPLIED WHEN INSTALLING. e. Install balance seals in the FIGURE 3-17. SEAT RING INSTALLATION recess of bonnet (13) using a ring with the same o.d. as the seal, to push NOTE the seals into the body cavity. Spacer (11), if available, is a suitable tool to install the balance seals. Weight of the disk stack any require use of a sling f. Place seal spacer (IS) onto and hoist to install. the disk stack. Ensure the seal spa-Attach the sling as shown cer is seated in the recess. in figure 3-18. g. Install yoke clamp (4) and a sling to bonnet (13). Using care to prevent damage to the balance seals, lower the bonnet onto the disk stack. h Remove the yoke clamp. h. Apply a light coat of Ultra-graphite, Grade AA lubricant to both 1 sides of the cavity between the bonnet .i ~ and body. Install metal seal (12) and u p 'g, L spacer (11), or metal seal only as l applicable, into the cavity. = FIGURE 3-18. INSTALLING DISK STACK

i. Position bonnet flange (10) over the bonnet and secure to the body.

c. Apply Ultragraphite Coat Tighten the nuts to the torque speci-Grad AA lubricant, manufactured by fled on the assembly drawings. Tighten Dylon Industires, Cleveland, Ohio, the nuts alternately by 40 foot-pounds on plug assembly (19, figure 3-16). increments, using a cross circular pat-i Install stem clamp (1) on the plug ern as shown in figure 3-19. Ensure essembly. Attach a sling to the i 1 3-16 l

o the plug stem is centered in the bon-k. Slide packing sleeve (16) not packing bore while tightening over the plug stem against the pack-the nuts. ings. ) j. If required, ensure that 1. Assemble yoke clamp (4) to packing spacer (18, figure 3-16) is the bonnet and slide gland flange (2) installed and fully seated in the onto the stem. bonnet. m. Tighten the yoke clamp nuts l equally to 30 to 40 foot-pounds torque. This will apply approximately 1,000 g."j"' 'WI, psi pressure against the packings, compressing them for maximum sealing. g b n. Remove the gland flange and yoke clamp. eI i iG o. Repeat steps i through a above to install remaining quantity of packings. See the assembly draw-ing for the quantity required. Figure 3-19. Torque Sequence P. Install the gland flange and yoke clamp.

i. Apply Ultragraphite Coat, Grade AA lubricant to packings (17).

3-18. Control Element Ultragraphite Coat, Grade AA is the (See figure 3-20) only lubricant recomumended for the Packings. a. C e u a s W u acta t a assembly (1) as shown in figure 3-21. CAUTION DO NOT USE A POINTED TOOL M 80'T uppta car TO INSTALL THE PACKINGS (*fs,png) AS DAMAGE TO THE SEAL-ING CAPACITY OF THE PACK- ,ntren INGS WILL RESULT. nesutaron atmove avr

j. Carefully slide two pack-N'tI' N

l ings, one at a time, over the plug stem and push into the bonnet cavity I using packing sleeve (16) to seat the packings. ain unt i l NOTE l k g Do not seat more than two Lo't" CAP l packings per operation or the packings will not com-Figure 3-21' press as required. Attaching Sling to Actuator Assembly l 3-17 l n .n,__,.n- ,n,,

.mm .m 2 a l \\ ~ rS I-- --- y e s 1. ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY l .'. STEN CLAle F ) ..l 2. GLAND FLANGE II

• . voun Cime E

.5 S. BONNET 3\\ 6. IRTT {r 7. 14Cl3tASHER / 8. PLUG ASSEMBLY g 9. BODY m p ,l r' 3 j Is i i s i ef8,' 8-E% k' 6 7 9, A

b. <' g,

1o v 1 ) i Figure 3-20. Control Element 3-18

r-1 o [ NOTE] f. Slowly relieve all air pres-sure from the actuator assembly, allow-Steps b and c below are ing the actuator shaft to extend into applicable for FAIL CLOSE contact with the plus stem. type actuators only. Steps d and e apply to 3 Install an air line, with a both configurations. u nually controlled regulator installed, to the upper cap air port. b. Connect a temporary air h. Apply sufficient air pressure line,,with a hand controlled press-ure regulator installed, to the low-to exterid the actuator shaft into con-er cap air port. tact with the upper cap air port. i. nstall stem clamp (2) to c. Slowly apply nfficient air

• the P ug stem to the actuator l

pressure to retract the actuator shaft approximately two (2) inches into the actuator cylinder. j. Slowly relieve all air pres-d. Lower the actuator assembly sure from the actuator assembly, allow-onto the body assembly and secure ing the internal parts to seek the relaxed level. the two units with yoke clamp (4, figure 3-20). k. Install accessory assemblies o. Install gland flange (3) in accordance with instructions de-cnd secure with the yoke clamp. scribed in Section V. 1. Remove the temporary air NOTE line and install all permanent utility lines. Step f is applicable for FAIL CLOSE actuators only. m. Check operation of the con-Refer to steps g and h for trol component. procedures that apply to FAIL OPEN configurations. Steps i through n are applicable to both types. 'i l I I 3-19 L _}}