ML20196K358
| ML20196K358 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1988 |
| From: | DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196K321 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8807060581 | |
| Download: ML20196K358 (16) | |
Text
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1 ATTACHMENT A-1 Revise the Beaver Valley Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications as.~follows:
-Remove Pages Insert Pages 3/4 6-19c 3/4 6-19c 3/4 6-19k 3/4 6-19k l.
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l 8807060501 880622 PDR ADOCK 05000334 PNV P
',' a ry i-ATTACHMENT A ' Revise the Beaver Valley Unit No.-2 Technical. Specifications as follows:
Remove Pages Insort Pages 3/4 6-17 3/4.6-17; 3/4 6-18 3/4 6-18 3/4 6-19 3/4 6-19 3/4'6-20 3/4 6-20 3/4 6-z2 3/4 6-22 3/4 6-28 3/4 6-28 3/4 6 3/4 6-30
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-y TABLE 3.6-1 N
CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS
~
- o t'
b MAXIMUM MAXIMUM N
PENT.
IDENTIFICATION /
INSIDE STROKE OUTSIDE STROKE i
NO. AREA DESCRIPTION VALVE TIME *(SEC)
VALVE TIME *(SEC) ey 32-C Deluge System to RHR Area IFP-800 N/A TV-1FP-106 N/A 33-C High Head SI to Hot Legs (2)1SI-8'e N/A (2)MOV-ISI-869B N/A 34-A Spare
.o 35-A Seal Injection Water RCP 1A (10)(2)1CH-181 N/A (2)MOV-1CH-308A N/A l
8m u 36-A Seal Injection Water RCP 1B (10)(2)1CH-182 N/A (2)MOV-1CH-308B N/A l
01 g
37-A Seal Injection Water RCP 1C (10)(2)1CH-183 N/A (2)MOV-1CH-308C N/A l
38-A Containment Sump Pump Discharge (A)TV-1DA-100A 10 (A)TV 'DA-100B 10 h
39-C Steam Generator IA Blowdown Closed System N/A (2)(A)TV IBD-100A 20 3
40-A Steam Generator IB Blowdown Closed System N/A (2)(A)T1-1BD-100B 20 41-B Steam Generator 1C Blowdown Closed System N/A (2)(A)TV-1BD-100C 20 42-C Compressed Air to Fuel Handling ISA-15 N/A-ISA-14 N/A Equipment 43-B Air Activity Monitor-Out (A)TV-1CV-102-1 5
(A)TV-1CV-102 5
44-B Air Activity Monitor-In (A)TV-1CV-101A 5
(A)TV-1CV-101B 5
45-B Primary Grade Water to PRT 1RC-72 N/A (A)TV-1RC-519 12 46-A Charging Fill Header (10)(2)1CH-170 N/A (2)(1)FCV-ICH-160
.N/A l
57-B Instrument Air IIA-91 N/A IIA-90 N/A
_=a
TABLE 3.6-1 g
' CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS x
MAXIMUM MAXIMUM t'
PENT.
IDENTIFICATION /
INSIDE STROKE OUTSIDE STROKE NO. AREA DESCRIPTION VALVE TIME *(SEC)
VALVE TIME *(SEC)
Cz N
Emergency Containment Airlock PH-P-2 s-Equalization Valve (01(7)1VS-172 N/A Equalization Valve (8)(7) 1VS-171 N/A (A) Containment Isolation Phase A (B) Containment Isolation Phase B mx O
$&[
(1)
May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.
tn a E!p (2)
Not subject to Type C leakage tests.
- E e (3)
May be leakage tested with water as the test fluid.
o (4)
Maximum opening time.
o (5)
Applicability:
During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within containment. The provisions of specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. The containment Purge Exhaust and Supply valves will be locked shut during operation in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.
(6)
Not subject to the requirements of specification 3/4.6.3.
Listed in TABLE 3.6-1 for information only.
(7)
Tested under Type "B" testing.
(8)
Temporarily removed and penetration plugged.
(9)
Auto open on Safety Injection recirculation signal.
(10)
Not subject to the surveillance requirenents of specification-3/4.6.3. Valves tested per specification 4.0.5.
TABLE 3.6-1 CONTAIMENT PENETRATIONS m
yi MAXIMM MAXIORM p
PENT.
INSIDE STROKE OUTSIGZ STROKE Q
NO.-AREA IDENTIFICATION / DESCRIPTION VALVE TIME (SEC)
VALVE TIE (SEC) c 1
Camp Cool from Res (1)(B) 2CCP-MOV157-2 < 60 (1)(B) 2CCP-MOV157-1
< 60 g
Heat Exch 2CCP-RV105 N/A 2
Camp Cool to Res (1)(B) 2CCP-MOV150-2 < 60 (1)(B) 2CCP-MOV150-1
< 60 Heat Exch 2CCP-RVIO2 N/A
?
4 Comp Cool to Res (1)(B) 2CCP-MOV151-2 < 60 (1)(B) 2CCP-MOV151-1
< 60 4
Heat Exch 2CCP-RV103 N/A C
f 5
Comp Cool from Res (1)(B) 2CCP-MV156-2 < 60 (1)(B) 2CCP-MDV156-1
< 60 n-Heat Exch 2CCP-RV104 N/A g*
6 SPARE
't-
.O 7
High Head
- 2) 2515-83 N/A (3)(2) 2 SIS-MV869A N/A Safety Injection (13) 9 SPARE 11 Instrument Air (A) 2IAC-MV133
< 60 (A) 2IAC-M V134
< 60 13 SPARE 14 Chill & Service Wtr (B) 25WS-MOV'153-2 < 60 (B) 25WS-fp!153-1
< 60 to Cont. Air Recirc 25WS-RV153 N/A Cooling coils 15 CHARGING 3 2) 2CHS-31 N/A (3)(2) 2CHS-MOV289
< 10, 16 SPARE I
i i
i s
TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont) in h
CONTAll0ENT PENETRATIONS
]
9 s
MAXIIRM MAXIltM i
P PENT.
INSIDE STROKE OUTSIDE STR0KE j
O NO.-AREA IDENTIFICATION /CESCRIPTION VALVE TIME (SEC)
VALVE TIME (SEC) 1 e
1 17 High Head
- 2) 2 SIS-84 N/A (3)(2) 2 SIS-MOV8698 N/A e
}
Safety Injection (t3
" 19 Seal Water from (A) 2CHS-MOV378
< 00 (A) 2CHS-MDV381
< 60 Reactor Coelant Pump 2CHS--473 N/A M
20 Safety Injection 2515-42 N/A (1) 25I5-41 N/A i
2 Accumulator Makeup 2 SIS-RV130 N/A 21 Chill & Service Wtr (8) 25WS-MOV155-2 < 60 (8) 25WS-DOV155-1
< 60 a.-
from Cont. Air 25WS-RV155 N/A R
Recirc Cooling Coils F
1 i' 22 SPARE i
3' s
u 23 SPARE j
i 24 Residual Heat Removal 2RHS-107 N/A 2RHS-15 N/A to Refueling Water Tank 2RHS-RV100 N/A
~25 Chill & Service Wtr (8) 25WS-MOV154-2 < 60 (8) 25WS-fmV154-1
< 60 from Cont. Air Recirc 25WS-RV154 N/A Cooling Coils l
27 Chill & Service Wtr (8) 25WS-MOV152-2 < 60 (B) 25WS-MDV152-1
< 60 to Cont. Air Recirc 25WS-RV152 N/A Cooling Coils 28 Reactor Coolant Letdown (A) 2CHS-A0V200A 10 (A) 2CHS-ADV204
< 66 (A) 2CHS-ADV2008 10 (A) 2CHS-A0V200C 10 (1) 2CHS-HCV142 N/A 2CHS-RV203 N/A 1
TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont) l g
j g
CONTAlletENT PENETRATIONS
- =
i s
MAXIfEM MAXIDEM l PENT.
INSIDE STR0KE OUTSIDE STR0KE
':! NO.-AREA IDENTIFICATION / DESCRIPTION VALVE TIME (SEC)
VALVE TIME (SEC) i g 29 Pri Dr. Trans Pump Disch (A) 2DGS-A0V108A
< 60 (A) 20GS-ADV1088
< 60
)
2DGS-RV115 N/A
" 30 SPARE 31 SPARE j
32 SPARE i
33 SPARE R 34 High Head Injection Line 3 2) 2515-94 N/A (3)(2) 2 SIS-MDV836 N/A i
(i (3)(2) 2 SIS-MDV840 N/A i
l f
G 35 Inj Seal Wtr to Reactor 3 2) 2CHS-474 N/A (2)(3) 2CHS-MDV308A N/A
{
Coolant Pump (t3 l
l h
36 Inj Seal Wtr to Reactor
) 2CHS-476 N/A (2)(3) 2CHS-MDV3088 N/A Coolant Pump
- l 37 Inj Seal Wtr to Reactor
- 2) 2CHS-475 N/A (2)(3) 2CHS-fGV308C N/A Coolant Pump (13 I
38 Sump Pump Discharge (A) 20AS-A0V100A
< 60
( A',
< 60 20AS-RV110 N/A i
39 St Gen Blowdown Closed Systes M/A (2) 280G-A0V100A-1
< 60 40 St Gen Blowdown Closed System N/A (2) 280G-A0V1008-1
< 60' 41 St 'en Slowdown Closed System M/A (2) 280G-ADV1000-1
< 60 1
TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont) a, 9
g CONTAllMENT PENETRATIONS h
NAXINUM MAXIftM g PENT.
INSIDE STROKE OUTSIDE STROKE
-< NO.-AREA IDENTIFICATION / DESCRIPTION VALVE TIME (SEC)
VALVE TIE (SEC) 1 e
c: 42 Service Air 2SAS-15 N/A 2SAS-14 N/A
[43 Air Monitor Sample 2CVS-93 N/A (A) 2CVS-50V102 60 44 Air Monitor Sample (1)(A) 2CVS-50V1538
< 60 (1)(A) 2CVS-50V153A
< 60 l
-d 45 Primary Grade Water 2RCS-72 N/A (A) 2RCS-A0V519
< 60 2
2RCS-RV100 N/A m
l E
46 Loop Fill
(19j i
w 47 SPARE E
1 l
1 p 48 Primary Vent Header (A) 2VRS-A0V109A-2 < 60 (A) 2VRS-A0V1094-1 < 60 49 Nitrogen Supply Manifold 2RCS-68 N/A (A) 2RCS-A0V101
< 60 50 SPARE s
l, 51 SPARE 52 SPARE 53 Nitrogen Manifold (A) 2GIIS-A0V101-2 < 10 (A) 2GNS-ADV101-1 < 60 S
l l
l
i j
TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont)
.9 CONTAlf0ENT PENETRATIONS n
mxinuM mx1 mum
- PENT.
INSIDE STROKE OUTSIDE STR0KE
-< ND. -AREA IDENTIFICATION / DESCRIPTION VALVE TIME (SEC)
VALVE TIME (SEC) l g 60 Low Head Safety Injection 3 2) 2S15-132 N/A (3)(2) 2 SIS-MDV88888 N/A q
Discharge 13
" 61 Low Head Safety Injection
- 2) 2515-130 N/A (3)(2) 2 SIS-MDV8889 N/A l
Discharge 13) l y
62 Low Head Safety Injection
- 2) 25I5-133 N/A (3)(2) 2 SIS-MDV8888A N/A 7
Discharge (13')
1
-o; 63 Quench Puup Discharge 2QSS.-4 N/A (8) 2QSS-MDV101A < 60 (4)
[,
2QSS-RV101A N/A l
64 Quench Purp Discharge 2QSS-3 N/A (8) 2QSS-lev 1018 < 60 (4)
Y?
24SS-RV1018 M/A 2_ %
3' 65 Fuel Transfer Tube (7)
Flange N/A i
u 66 Recirc Spray Pump Suction (8)(2) 2RSS-MDV155A < 60 (4) 67 Recirc Spray Pump Suction (8)(2) 2RSS-lev 155C < 60 (4) 68 Recirc Spray Pump Suction (8)(2) 2RSS-lev 1550 < 60 (4) 69 Recirc Spray Pump Suction (8)(2) 2RSS-lev 1558 < 60 (4) 70 Recirculation Pump (2 (13) 2RSS-29 N/A (8)(2) 2RSS-MDV156A < 60 (4) l Discharge (6) 2RSS-RV156A N/A 71 Recirculation Pump (2)
I 2RSS-31 N/A (10)(8)(2) 2RSS-BWV156C < 60'(4)
Discharge (6) 2RSS-RV156C N/A
TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont)
CONTAlfetENT PENETRATIONS
=
i si MAXIMUM MAXIDRM F PENT.
INSIDE STROKE OUTSIDE STROKE O NO.-AREA IDENTIFICATION / DESCRIPTION VALVE TIME (SEC)
VALVE TIME (SEC) h 105 Leak Detection (2) 2LMS-50V951
< 60 (4) l Leak Detection 2LMS-51 N/A 2LMS-52 N/A Hydrogen Analyzer (1) 2HCS-SOV133A N/A (1) 2HCS-50V134A N/A o
Post Accident Sampling (A)(1) 2 PAS-50V105A-1 < 60 (A)(1) 2 PAS-50V105A-2 < 60 2
l 1
106 Safety Inj. Test Line (A) 2 SIS-MOVG42
< 60 (A) 2 SIS-A0V889
< 60 i
e 2 SIS-RV175 N/A
[u t
- 108 SPARE E
T
[ g 110 SPARE 113 Safety Injection
) 2 SIS-95 N/A (3)(2) 2 SIS-fmV867C < 10 (4)
(3)(2) 2 SIS-lWV8670 < 10 (4) 114 Recirculation Pump (2
2RSS-32 N/A (10)(8)(2) 2RSS-MDV1560 < 60 (4)
Discharge (6) 2RSS-RV1560 N/A 115 Recirculation Pump (2
RSS-30 N/A (8)(2) 2RSS-MDV1568 < 60 (4)
Discharge (6) 2RSS-RV1568 N/A 116 Fire Protection HVR 2FPW-398 N/A (A) 2FPW-ADV221
< 60 Firter 8 l
117 Fire Protection HVR 2FPW-382 N/A (A) 2FPW-A0V204
< 6d Filter A
3 TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont)
$ NOTES:
i E (A) Containment Isolation Phase A.
g (B) Containment Isolation Phase B.
(1) May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.
i (2) Not subject to Type C leakage tests.
l z
i l
Z (3) May be leakage tested with water as tha test fluid.
~
(4) Maxi m opening time.. ;
q m
4 (5) Applicability: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within containment. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. The containment Purge Exhaust and Supply valves o
l will be locked shut during operation 'n modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
E (6) Not subject to the requirements of Specification 3/4.6.3.
Listed in Table 3.6-1 for information only.
E w
l g
2 (7) Tested under Type "B" testing.
i A
m j
F lo (8) Temporarily removed and penetration plugged.
40 i
(9) Auto open on Safety Injection recirculation signtl.
(10) Auto close on Safety Injection recirculation signal.
(11) Auto open on QSS switchover signal.
(12) Isolation is p n vided by bellows operated hydraulic isolators.
1 G3) At satjed to &. sucvcibce repue.dnfs of se ecincat.n v4. (. 3.
Wives fcgt Q yer 5peciF icdion 4.0.
L 0
9en 1
I
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ATTACHMENT B
Safety Analysis Proposed Technical Specification Change Unit No. 1 - Change No. 1A-150 Unit No. 2 - Change No. 2A-5 Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would exclude all containment isolation weight and spring loaded check valves not subject to containment type C leakage testing from the surveillance requirements for LCO 3.6.3.1 on both Beaver Valley Unit 1
and Unit 2.
The current surveillance testing requirements applicable to these valves are items 4.6.3.1.1.a.2 and 4.6.3.1.2.e.
These surveillance requirements cycles each of these check valves and verifies that the valves remain closed with < 1.2 psid differential pressure across the valve and opens with the differential pressure >
1.2 psid but less than 6.0 psid.
The proposed amendment would add a footnote to Table 3.6-1 excluding the check valves from these surveillance requirements and references the ASME Section XI testing requirements of 4.0.5.
Safety Analysis Unit 1 The basis for surveillance requirement 4.6.3.1.1.a.2 and 4.6.3.1.2.e is to ensure that applicable containment isolation check valves will remain closed preventing the loss of subatmospheric pressure in the containment following a
DBA.
The Unit 1 FSAR discusses the der.ign basis of these valves in section 5.3.3.
It states that these check valves are designed to require, in order to
- open, a
differential pressure across the valve in the normal flow direction exceeding the expected post DBA differential pressure between atmosphere and containment (about 1.2 psi).
As a result, leakage into the containment through incoming lines with check valves inside the containment caused by passive failures of such lines l
between the containment penetration and the outside isolation valve is prevented.
Amendment No.
6" to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications deleted I
the containment type C leakage testing requirement for 38 containment isolation valves including the following check valves:
1CH-170 1CH-181 1CH-182 1CH-183 Approval of this change was based on the conclusion that the lines associated with these valves do not represent a potential containment atmospheric leakage path and therefore are not subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 50 Appendix J,
Section IIIC.
This conclusion was based on the fact that these lines are expected to be operating after a
DBA and will be pressurized to well in excess of the peak containment
- pressure, even in the event of any single failure.
It was also demonstrated that these lines would remain filled for the 30-day period following the accident.
l-
.Attcchmsnt B Paga 2 The Unit 1 FSAR, Appendix B, Table B.1-1, Structures and Systems Requiring Design for Seismic
- Loading, states all containment isolation valves and associated piping are seismic qualified.
- Also, per FSAR Section 5.3.1 the containment isolation system components (piping,
- valves, penetration, etc) are protected from internally or externally generated missiles and water jets.
Since Technical Specification Amendment No. 65 has demonstrated that these lines are not a potential containment atmosphere leakage path following a DBA and the lines are seismic qualified and missile protected the basis for surveillance requirement 4.6.3.1.la and 4.6.3 1.2.a are not applicable to the above four valves.
Full stroke tests and valve leakage tests with water would continue to be performed where required by ASME Section XI Inservice Testing Program to demonstrate valve operability.
This change will therefore not affect the isolation of the containment nor increase the potential for any release of the containment atmosphere following any postulated accidents and is therefore considered safe.
Unit 2 The Unit 2
FSAR discusses containment isolation weight loaded check valves in Section 6.2.4.1 The design basis stated for these valves is to ensure that the valves remain closed when the inside containment atmcaphere returns to subatmospheric conditions following a DBA.
As with Unit 1,
Unit 2 has excluded certain valves from Type C leakage testing.
Unit 2 containment isolation valves not subject to type C
leakage testing are listed in Table 6.2-60 of the FSAR.
Unit 1
Technical Specification knendment No. 65 was used as the basis for justifying the exclusion of these valves.
This is discussed in the Unit 2
SER dated October 1985, Page 6-18.
These valves are excluded from type C
leakage testing since they do not present a potential containment atmospheric leakage path.
This conclusion is based on the fact that the lines associated with these penetrations are pressurized well in excess of the containment pressure following a DBA and will be filled with water for at least 30 days following the accident.
Table 1 provides a list of all weight loaded containment isolation valves not subject to type C leakage testing along with a discussion of the status of these containment panetrations following a DBA.
Per Table 3.2-1 and section 6.2.4.1 of the FSAR all containment isolation valves and the piping between these valves are seismically qualified.
In addition, section 6.2.4.1 states that all containment isolation fluid system components have been evaluated for the effects of postulated missiles.
"A'$TACHMENT B Pago 3 4
Since the lines associated with the valves listed on Table 1 have been determined -to-not be a potential containment atmosphere leakage path following a DBA and these penetrati.ons have been protected from line failures from a
seismic event a.nd missile
- effects, these penetrations do not present a
potential loss of containment cubatmospheric pressure following a DBA.
Therefore, the lift check tests required by Technical Specification Surveillance items 4.6.3.1.1.a and 4.6.3.1.2.e should not be applied to these valves.
- Again, as in Unit 1, full stroke tests ar.d valve leakage tests with water will continue to be performed where raquired by ASME Section XI Inservice Testing Program to demonstrate valve operability.
This change will'therefore not affect the isolat3on of the containment nor increase the potential for any release of the containment atmosphere following any postulated accidents and is therefore considered safe.
I e
l l
l
TABLE 1
Unit 2 Containment Isolation Weight Loaded Check Valves Penetration Check No.
Valve Description Remarks 7
2 SIS *83 High Head Safety Injection to HL (1) 15 2CHS*31 Charging Header (1) 17 2 SIS *84 High Head Safety Injection to HL (1) 34 2 SIS *94 High Head Safety Injection to CL (1) 35 2CHS*474 Seal Wtr. Injection to RCP (1) 36 2CHS*476 Seal Wtr. Injection to RCP (1) 37 2CHS*475 Seal Wtr. Injection to RCP (1) 46 2CHS*472 Loop Fill Header (1) 60 2 SIS *132 Low Head Safety Injection Disch.
(2) 61 2 SIS *130 Low Head Safety Injection Pisch.
(2) 62 2 SIS *133 Low Head Safety Injection Disch.
(2) 70 2RSS*29 Recirc. Spray Pump Disch.
(3) 71 2RSS*31 Recirc. Spray Pump Disen.
(3) 113 2 SIS *95 High Head Safety Injection to CL (1) 114 2RSS*32 Recirc. Spray Pump Disch.
(3) 115 2RSS*30 Recirc. Spray Pump Disch.
(3)
(1) These containment penetrations are in the various Safety Injection flow paths during injection and recirculation or have High Head Safety Injection Pump discharge pressure of approximately 2500 psig at their outside containment penetration isolation valve.
(2) These containment penetration lines are in the Low Head Safety Injection flow path or have Low Head Safety Injection discharge pressure of approximately 105 psig at the outside containment penetration isolation valve during injection and recirculation mode.
(3) These containment penetration lines are all pressurized with Recirculation Spray Pump discharge pressure of approximately 115 psig during the injection phase.
During the recirculation mode two penetrations continue to see Recirculation Spray Pump discharge flow and the remaining two are pressurized up to the outside containment isolation valve.
____ _-_A
ATTACHMENT C
No Significant Hazard Evaluation Proposed Technical Specification Change Unit No. 1 - Change No. lA-150 Unit No. 2 - Change No. 2A-5 Basis for Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination:
The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a
significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)).
A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed change does not involve a
significant hazards consideration because:
1.
The purpose of the Containment Isolation System is to isolate the piping lines which penetrate the containment and to prevent the release of radioactive material from the containment in thL event of a LOCA.
The capability of the containment Isolation System to perform this function will not be affected by this change.
The capability of maintaining the containment subatmospheric following an accident will also not be affected since the lines associated with this change are not potential containment atmosphere leakage paths.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2.
The proposed change does not reflect any equipment or design change.
Thus no adverse safety considerations are introduced by the change.
Therefore, the probability of an accident or a malfunction of a
different type than previously evaluated would not be created.
3.
This change will not affect the assumptions or consequences of any safety analysis presented in the FSAR.
Therefore, the change will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above considerations, it is proposed to characterize the change as involving no significant hazards consideration.
.