ML20196J519
| ML20196J519 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Palo Verde, Columbia, Waterford, Midland  |
| Issue date: | 05/12/1999 |
| From: | Gramm R NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Bill Dean NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196J523 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-MA3778, NUDOCS 9907070323 | |
| Download: ML20196J519 (2) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a
WASHINGTON, D.c. 20066 4001
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N y 12, 1999 MEMORANDUM TO: William M. Dean, Chief i
inspection Program Branch
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Division of Inspection Program Management i
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation hw FROM:
Robert M. Gramm, Chief, Section 1 1 Project Directorate IV & Decommissic ing Division of Ucensing PrgNI rg tg00M Office of Nuclear Reacto j aff
SUBJECT:
WATERFORD UNIT 3 LigpNQ OF@ TURBINE-DRIVEND' fJp_fgiN BASES TORNADO MISSILE PROTECT O I
EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP VENT STACK AND STEAM SUPPLY PIPING (TAC NO. MA3778) i The Plant Systems Branch (SPLB) and Project Manager have reviewed the memorandum dated August 28,1998, from Mr. Donald Norkin, Chlof, Operating Reactor inspection Support Branch to Mr. John Hannon, previously Project Directorate IV 1 Director, requesting assistance j
regarding the tornado missile protection for the turbine-driven emergency feedwater (EFW) pump vent stack and steam supply piping at Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 (Waterford 3).
During a design inspection at Waterford 3, which concluded on June 19,1998, the inspection team identified a tornado missile protection issue. The turbine-driven EFW pump vent stack and steam supply piping that are located on the top of the reactor auxiliary building are not protected from tomado missiles. During the Inspection, neither the licenseo por the inspection team could identify any document that exempted these components from being protected from i
The August 28,1998, mcmorandum requested to review three items: (1) determine whether j
the turbine-driven EFW pump vent stack and the steam supply piping are protected adequately from tornido missites consistent with the design and licensing bases; (2) determine whether the licensco's probabilistic risk assessment methods for not protecting safety-related equipment for safe shutdown from tornado missiles are consistent with the design and licensing bases, and (3) determine whether the licenseo should have submitted a license amendment in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90.
Based on SPLB review, we have determined that the turbine driven EFW pump vent stack and the steam supply piping are not adequately protected from tomado misslics consistent with the j
design and licensing basos. Further, we have determined that the licensee's use of the concept of probability without the associated analysis for not protecting safety related equipment for safe shutdown from tomado missiles is not consistent with the design and licensing bases that was domenstrated for the ultimate heat sink. Finally, the licensee allowed a change in tha plant 1
that was not consistent with its design and licensing bases. The staff finds that a 10 CFR 50.59 review would result in an unreviewed safety question. Since the equipment was designed to be N
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I fully protected from tomado missiles and the licensee did not demonstrate that it was adequately protected with the method in its licensing basis, the change increases the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety and is a different malfuncton than previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. Therefore, the licenses should have submitted a license j
i amendment in accordance with 10 CFR 50,90. Further, details are discussed in the attached memorandum dated April 7,1999, froin John Hannon to Stuart Richards.
Docket No. 50 382 -
Attachment; As stated j
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