ML20196H211
| ML20196H211 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/30/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-0940, NUREG-0940-P02, NUREG-0940-V17-N1-P2, NUREG-940, NUREG-940-P2, NUREG-940-V17-N1-P2, NUDOCS 9812090015 | |
| Download: ML20196H211 (275) | |
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AVAILABILITY NOTICE
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NUREG-0940 Vol.17, No.1, Part 2 Reactor Licensees Enforcement Actions: Significant Actions Resolved l Reactor Licensees Semiannual Progress Report January - June 1998 Manuscript Completed: November 1998 Date Published: November 1998 Office of Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 l l kmRao, ) %,.....
ABSTRACT j This compilation summarizes significant enforcement actions that have been resolved during ! the period (January - June 1998) and includes copies of letters, Notices, and Orders sent by the : Nuclear Regulatory Commission to reactor licensees with respect to these ento,rcement actions. It is anticipated that the information in this publication will be widely disseminated to managers j and employees engaged in activities licensed by the NRC,~so that actions can be taken to . improve safety by avoiding future violations similar to those described in this publication. j i r I l l l l I l l l 2 1 I l NUREG-0940, PART 2 iii
I i i CONTENTS Page < l , A B ST R AC T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii i INTRODUCTION .........................................................1 I e S U M MA R I E S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 i REACTOR LICENSEES A. CIVIL PENALTIES AND ORDERS , Boston Edison Company, Plymouth, Massachusetts (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), EAs 97-482, 97-525, 98-052 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1 Boston Edison Company, Plymouth, Massachusetts (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), EA 98-191 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-19 Carolina Power & Light Company, Hartsville, South Carolina (H. B. Robinson, Unit 2), EA 97-490 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-26 Carolina Power & Light Company, New Hill, North Carolina : (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), EA 98-020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-33 Centerior Service Company, Perry, Ohio (Perry Nuclear Power Plant), EA 96-253 ................................ A-43 Centerior Service Company, Perry, Ohio (Perry Nuclear Power Plant), Eas 96-482,96-542, G7-047, and 97-430 . . . . . . . . . A-49 Commonwealth Edison Company, Zion, Illinois (Zion Generating Station), EA 97-249 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-74 Commonwealth Edison Company, Downers Grove, Illinois (Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station), EA 97-466 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-82 Commonwealth Edison Company, Downers Grove, Illinois (Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station), EA 97-591 .......................... A-92 Consumers Power Company, Covert, Michigan (Palisades Nuclear Power Plant), Eas 97-567 and 97-569 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-102 Duquesne Light Company, Shippingport, Pennsylvania (Beaver Valley Power Station), EA 97-517 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A 110 Entergy Operations, Inc., St. Francisville, Louisiana (River Bend Station), EA 97-497 .....................................A-117 Florida Power & Light Company, Juno Beach, Florida NUREG-0940, PART 2 y
l (St. Lucle), EA 98-009 .............................................A-125 Indiana and Michigan Power Company, Columbus, Ohio (D. C. Cook), Supplement Vil, EA 93-059 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A- 1 3 4 Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Oswego, New York (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station), EA 97-530. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-143 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Waterford, Connecticut (Millstone, Units 1,2, and 3), EAs 96-034,96-067,96-086,96-106,96-145,96-183 96-197,96-198,96-331,96-332,96-333,96-350,96-351,96-352,97-141 . . . . . A-151 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Waterford, Connecticut (Millstone, Unit 3), EA 97-562 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-185 Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, Allentown, Pennsylvania (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station), EA 97-472 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A- 1 9 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey (Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station), EAs, 97-144, 97-563 . . . . . . . . . . . . A- 199 Tennessee Valley Authority, Chattanooga, Tennessee (Sequoyah and Watts Bar), EA 95-252 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-210 Tennersee Valley Authorh, Chattanooga, Tennessee (SeqJoyah), EA 97-409 ............................................A-219 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation, Brattleboro, Vermont (Ve rmont Yankee), EA 97-531. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-231 B. SEVERITY LEVEL 1. II. AND lil VIOLATIONS. NO CIVll PENALTY American Electric Power Company, Buchanan, Michigan (D.C. Cook), EA 98-113 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1 Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Lusby, Maryland (Calvert Cliffs), EA 98-106 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-6 Carolina Power and Light Company, Hartsville, South Carolina (Robinson Steam Electric), EA 98-043 and 98-050 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B- 1 1 Duke Energy Corporation, York, South Carolina (Catawba Nuclear Station), EA 98-208 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-21 Entergy Operations, Inc., Killona, Louisiana (Wate rford-3), EA 97-589 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-30 Florida Power & Light Company, Juno Beach, Florida (St. Lucie), EA 98-064 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-39 NUREG-0940, PART 2 vi
l l 1 ( GPU Nuclear Corporation, Middletown, Pennsylvania (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station), EA 97-533 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-45 GPU Nuclear Incorporated, Forked River, New Jersey (Oyster Creek), EA 97-617 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-53 North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation, Seabrook, New Hampshire ,
- (Seabrook),' EA 98-073 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-60 4
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Waterford, Connecticut I (Millstone, Unit 3), EA 98-179 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-67 i Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey
- (Salem / Hope Creek), EA 97-351 and 97-422 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-74 >
l Souhh California Edison Company, San Clemente, California (San Onof re), EA 97-585 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-80 Washington Public Power Supply System, Richland, Washington (W N P-2), EA 97-573 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-88 ; C. Non-licensed Vendor (Part 21) Construction Products Research, Inc., (Five Star Products, Inc.), Fairfield, Connecticut EA 97-471 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C- 1 ; i NUREG-0940, PART 2 vii
1 i 3 i ! ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS RESOLVED
- REACTOR LICENSEES 4
JANUARY - JUNE 1998 j INTRODUCTION i i l This issue and Part of NUREG-0940 is being published to inform Nuclear Regulatory i Commission (NRC) reactor licensees about significant enforcement actions and their resolution for the first half of 1998. Enforcement actions are issued in accordance with the NRC's f Enforcement Policy, published as NUREG-1600," General Statement of Policy and Procedure j for NRC Enforcement Actions." Enforcement actions are issued by the Deputy Executive j Director for Regulatory Effectiveness (DEDE), and the Regional Administrators. The Director, j Office of Enforcement, may act for the DEDE in the absence of the DEDE or as directed. The j NRC defines significant enforcement actions or escalated enforcement actions as civil ! penalties, orders, and Notices of Violation for violations categorized at Severity Level I, ll, and j lli (where violations are categorized on a scale of I to IV, with I being the most significant). l The purpose of the NRC Enforcement Program is to support the agency's safety mission in protecting the public and the environment. Consistent with that purpose, the NRC makes this ! NUREG available to all reactor licensees in the interest of avoiding similar significant noncompliance issues. Therefore, it is anticipated that the information in this publication will be widely disseminated to managers and employees engaged in activities licensed by NRC. A brief summary of each significant enforcement action that has been resolved in the first half l of 1998 can be found in the section of this report entitled " Summaries." Each summary j provides the enforcement action (EA) number to identify the case for reference purposes. The
- supplement number refers to the activity area in which the violations are classified in i accordance with the Enforcement Policy.
l Supplement 1 - Reactor Operations Supplement 11 - Facility Construction Supplement lli - Safeguards Supplement IV - Health Physics Supplement V - Transportation Supplement VI - Fuel Cycle and Materials Operations Supplement Vil - Miscellaneous Matters Supplement Vill - Emergency Preparedness Section A of this report consists of copies of completed civil penalty or Order actions involving reactor licensees, arranged alphabetically. Section B includes copies of Notices of Violation that were issued to reactor licensees for a Severity Level 1,11, or ill violation, but for which no civil penalties were assessed. The NRC publishes significant enforcement actions taken against individuals and involving materials licensees as Parts I and lll of NUREG-0940, respectively. I NUREG-0940, PART 2 1
r ( i ) j SUMMARIES
! A. CIVIL PENALTIES AND ORDERS l
Boston Edison Company, Plymouth, Massachusetts (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), Supplement I, EAs 97-482,97-525,98-052,98-255 A Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $165,000 l i was issued on April 27,1998. The action was based on two Severity Level lll violations and one Severity Level ill problem involving seven violations of failure to identify and/or take prompt and comprehensive corrective action for conditions adverse to quality associated with the design of safety-related cooling water systems, the emergency core cooling systems, the emergency diesel generators, and other electrical equipment important to safety. The violations involved deficiencies in the licensee's design control and safety evaluation. A base civil penalty was proposed in this case because: (1) this was not the first escalated action in 2 years, (2) credit was not warranted for identification, and (3) credit was warranted for corrective action. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on May 27,1998. Boston Edison Company, Plymouth, Massachusetts (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), Supplement 111, EA 98-191 A Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $55,000 was issued May 19,1998. The action was based on one violation involving apparent failures associated with assessment aids at the facility. The violation was classified at Severity Level 111. A base civil penalty was proposed in this case because: (1) this was
; not the first escalated action in 2 years, (2) credit was not warranted for identification, 4
and (3) credit was warranted for corrective action. The licensee responded and paid the j civil penalty on June 18,1998. Carolina Power and Light Company, Hartsville, South Carolina (H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant), Supplement I, EA 97-490 A Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $55,000 was issued December 12,1997. The action was based on one Severity Level lll problem consisting of two violations including: (1) the failure to identify promptly and correct a mispositioned EDG output breaker control switch; and (2) the failure to take adequate corrective action to preclude repetition of position control errors affecting the EDG local control panels. A base civil penalty was proposed in this case because: (1) this was not the first escalated action in 2 years, (2) credit was warranted for identification, and (3) credit was not warranted for corrective action. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on January 9,1998. Carolina Power and Light Company, New Hill, North Carolina
- (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), Suppement lit, EA 98-020 A Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $55,000 '
was issued on March 26,1998. The action involved a Severity Level Ill violation for two NUREG-0940, PART 2 3 j i
I I examples in which individuals were inappropriately granted unescorted access to the l protected and vital areas of the plant. A base civil penalty was proposed in this case l because: (1) this was not the first escalated action in two years and credit was ! warranted for identification and corrective action. Although, a civil penalty would not normally be considered for a Severity Level lli violation when the licensee had been given credit for identification and corrective action, based on the similarity of previous violations, the staff determined that the exercise of discretion was appropriate and proposed the base civil penalty. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on April 23,1998. Centerior Service Company, Perry Ohio (Perry Nuclear Power Plant), Supplement Vil, EA 96-253 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $160,000 was issued October 9,1996. The action was based on a Severity Level ll problem involving two violations of 10 CFR 50.7. As determined in the DOL Administrative Law Judge's Recommended Decision and Order, dated June 11,1996, the licensee instructed its contractor to terminate one insulator from his employment and banned him and five additional insulators from working at any licensee's facility in rotaliation for the insulators filing a civil complaint under the Atomic Energy Act. Th violation is categorized at Severity Level 11 because it appeared from the ALJ s decision that management above first line supervision was involved in the discrimination. A base civil . penalty for the Severity Level ll was $80,000 and the licensee was not given credit for ) identification nor corrective actions, which resulted in a civil penalty twice the base amount. The licensee responded on November 5,1996 and requested deferring the full l response and payment until the final decision by the DOL Administrative Board. The DOL final decision approving Settlement and Dismissing Complaint was dated December 16,1997. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on January 15, : 1998. f Centerior Service Company, Perry, Ohio (Perry Nuclear Power Plant), Supplement I, EAs 96-482,96-542,9'7-047, and 97-430 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $100,000 was issued on November 18,1997. The first violation (EA 97-047) involved an inadvertent reactivity addition that was not prevented by corrective actions for a similar prior event associated with flow control valves for the reactor recirculating water system. The second violation (EA 97-430) involved a violation of 10 CFR 50.59 for changes to procedures involving the component cooling. A base civil penalty was proposed because: (1) this was not the first escalated action in last two years, (2) credit for identification was not warranted, and (3) credit for corrective action was warranted. A third Severity Level 111 (EA 97-542) violation was cited for a miswired circuit breaker causing control room emergency ventilation components to be inoperable on several occasions. A civil penalty was not proposed for this violation because credit was warranted for identification and corrective actions. A fourth issue (EA 96-482) was considered for escalated enforcement but due to the licensee's perfortnance in identifying and correcting an old design issue, enforcement discretion was exercised. The licensee responded on December 18,1998, and paid the civil penalty for EA 97-047, but asked for remission of the associated civil penalty for EA 97-430. After NUREG-0940, PART 2 4
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t
considsation of the response, the staff imposed the civil penalty for EA 97-430 on April 9,1998. The licensee paid the penalty on June 8,1998. Commonwealth Edison Company, Zion, lilinois (Zion, Units 1 and 2), Supplement Vll, EA 97-249 A Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $110,000 was issued on January 15,1998. The action was based on a Severity Level 111 problem involving the implementation of the Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program at Zion. Two supervisors noticed alcohol on the breath of employees and then failed to send the employees for FFD testing. The FFD procedures for recalling employees to the station . were not implemented on two occasions. Twice the base civil penalty was proposed l because: (1) this was not the first escalated enforcement action within the last two years, (2) credit for identification was not warranted because the individual issues were l identified through allegations and the NRC identified the programmatic problems with , the FFD program, and (3) credit for corrective action was not warranted because the licensee's corrective actions failed to address the programmatic aspects of the problem. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on February 4,1998. Commonwealth Edison Company, Downers Grove, Illinois (Quad Cities), Supplement I, EA 97-466 i~ A Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $55,000 was issued on March 3,1998. This action was based on a Severity Level 111 problem consisting of multiple violations involving the failure to adequately implement 10 CFR 50.65, " Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants" (the Maintenance Rule). While the actual safety consequence of each violation was low, they had high regulatory significance in that they represented a lack of effective oversi.ght and a programmatic breakdown in the implementation of the , Maintenance Rule. A base civil penalty was proposed because: (1) this was not the first escalated enforcement action within the past 2 years, (2) credit was not warranted for identification, and (3) credit was warranted for corrective action. The licensee responded i and paid the civil penalty on April 2,1998. Commonwealth Edison Company, Downers Grove, Illinois (Quad Cities), Supplement I, EA 97-591 A Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $330,000 was issued March 12,1998. The action was based on two Severity Level 111 problems consisting of violations involving performing reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage testing at 12% power, in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G. In one violation a double base civil penalty was warranted because: (1) this was not the first escalated enforcement action within 2 years, (2) credit was not warranted for identification, and (3) credit was not warranted for corrective action. With regard to the other violation, a base civil penalty was warranted because: (1) this was not the first escalated enforcement action within 2 years, (2) credit was not warranted for identification, and (3) credit was not warranted for corrective action. The staff determined that discretion was warranted for both violations to double the civil penalty due to the particularly poor performance as NUREG-0940, PART 2 5
manifested in the poor management oversight of these plant activities. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on April 13,1998. Consumers Power Company, Covert, Michigan (Palisades Nuclear Power Generating Plant), Supplement I, EAS 97-567 and 97-569 A Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $55,000 was issued on April 2,1998. The action was based on six violations that represent a Severity Level lli problem. The violations refer to both conduct of operations errors made by a shift operating crew and failures to follow maintenance-related procedures by maintenance personnel when power was removed from all of the control rod drives during power operation to facilitate the repair of a single control rod drive. A base civil penalty was proposed in this case because: (1) this was not the first escalated enforcement action within 2 years, (2) credit was not warranted for identification, and (3) credit was given for corrective action. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on April 27,1998. Duquesne Light Company, Shippingport, Pennsylvania (Beaver Valley Power Station), Supplement 1, EA 97-517 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $55,000 was issued on January 6,1998. The action was based on a violation involving the failure to take adequate action to correct a significant condition adverse to quality involving the high head safety injection (HHSI) pumps at L,oth units. The specific adverse condition involving voiding in the HHSI pumps suction lines which could lead to gas binding of the pumps and consequent failure to operate. The violation was classified at Severity Level 111. A base civil penalty was proposed in this case because: (1) this was not the first escalated enforcement action within the past two years, (2) credit was not warranted for identification, and (3) credit was warranted for corrective action. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on February 5,1998. Entergy Operations incorporated, St. Francisville, Louisiana (River Bend Station), Supplement I, EA 97-497 A Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $55,000 was issued on December 23,1997. This action was based on a Severity Level lli problem involving several violations related to two separate events where the licensee failed to ensure shutdown cooling systems were adequately maintained. The first violation involved a failure to meet technical specification requirements when, in one event, the licensee inadvertently transitioned from Reactor mode 4 to mode 3 for about 30 minutes and experienced some boiling in the core. The remaining three violations involved failures to establish adequate procedures for operation of shutdown cooling. A base civil penalty was proposed in this case because: (1) this was not the first escalated ! enforcement action within 2 years,(2) credit was not warranted for identification and (3) credit was warrt.nted for corrective actions. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on January 21,1998. l NUREG-0940, PART 2 6 l l l
Florida Power and Light Company, Juno Beach, Florida (St. Lucie ), Supplement 1, EA 98-009 A Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $88,000 was issued on March 25,1998. The action involved two violations which togethr; represented a Severity Level ll problem, associated with the !.icensee's failure to properly calibrate the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) level bistables. This condition resulted in a Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS) bistable setpoint below the required Technical Specifications (TSsi raquirements. This incorrect setpoint would cause ECCS pump air entrainment resultin3 in the licensee not having reasonable assurance that the ECCS systems would remain operable under all postulated accident scenarios. The licensee was given credit for identification and corrective action. However, the staff exercised enforcement discretion, in accordance with Section Vil.A.1 of the Enforcement Policy. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on April 23,1998. Indiana and Michigan Power Company, Columbus, Ohio (D. C. Cook), Supplement Vil, EA 93-059 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Impcsition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $25,000 was issued August 5,1993. The action was based on a Severity Level ill violation, occasioned by a DOL Administrative Law Judge finding that an employee of a contractor of the licensee had been terminated as the result of engaging in protectad activities. The base civil penalty was rr.itigated by 50% based on the licensee's overall past performance. The licensee responded on September 1,1993 and asked ' hat payment of the civil penalty be postponed until the appeal had been settled by DOL. On December 1,1994, the Secretary of Labor adopting the ALJ's decision . Th~e contractor appealed the SOL's decision and by Order dated January 29,1998 the U.S. Cour1 of Appeals reversed the Decision by the SOL. DOL petitioned for a rehearing and was denied by the court on April 3,1998. In light of that decision, the NRC withdrew the Notice of Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty on May 12,1998, and closed the enforcement action. L Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Oswego, New York (Nine Mile Point), Supplement V, EA 97-530 A Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $55,000 was issued on January 22,1998. This action was based on a Severity Level lli problem involving four violations of transportation requirements during four different shipments of radioactive material. While the actual safety consequence of the violations was low in each case, the violations indicate a lack of adequate oversight of the radioactive materials handling and transportation program. In addition, the violations demonstrate a clear potential for greater safety consequences, as evidenced by the fact that three of those shipments occurred during a two-month period in 1997. A base civil penalty was proposed in this case because: (1) this was not the first escalated enforcement action within the past 2 years, (2) credit was not warranted for identification, and (3) credit was warranted for corrective action. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on February 23,1998. NUREG-0940, PART 2 7
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Waterford, Connecticut (Millstone, Units 1,2, & 3), Supplement I, EAS 96-034,96-067,96-086,96-106,96-145 96-183,96-197,96-198,96-331, 96-332,96-333,96-350,96-351, 96-352,97-141 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of
$2,100,000 was issued on December 10,1997. The action was based on three Severity Level ll and one Severity Level lli problems consisting of multiple individual violations.
Many of the violations were categorized within two related programmatic areas, namely longstanding deficiencies in engineering programs and practices, some of which led to safety equipment being inoperable or degraded for extended periods; and the failure to have effective corrective action programs and practices, which resulted, in many cases, in deficiencies previously identified by the licensee not being corrected . In addition to these two programmatic areas, a number of violations of technical specifications (TS) were also identified. Additional violations included the recurring problems of inadequate procedures, and failures to follow procedures. In assessing the penalty in this case, consideration was given to the varying degrees of significance and duration of the violations as well as the number of examples of the violations. This penalty was comprised of $500,000 for the violations related to inadequate engineering; $1,000,000 for the violations related to inadequate corrective actions; $500,000 for the violations related to violations of technical specifications; and $100,000 for the violations of quality assurance. In arriving at the cumulative amount of the civil penalties, the staff exercised enforcement discretion in accordance with section Vll.A.1 of the Enforcement Policy. The licensee paid the civil penalty on December 19,1997, and responded to the civil penalty on March 2,1998. Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Waterford, Connecticut (Millstone, Unit 3), Supplement I, EA 97-562 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $55,000 was issued on March 9,1998. The action was based on one Severity Level ill violation regarding failure to take adequate corrective actions with respect to the potential for air in certain portions of the recirculation spray system to be swept into the suction of the charging and safety injection pumps during the recirculation phase of a loss-of-coolant accident. The action also contained on.e Severity Level lll violation regarding the potential for valve leakage from systems containing highly radioactive water to leak outside containment to the refueling water storage tank following a postulated accident for which the staff exercised enforcement discretion in accordance with Section Vll.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy and not issue a civil penalty or a violation.(See Appendix E). A base civil penalty was proposed in this case because: (1) this was not the first escalated enforcement action within 2 years, (2) credit was not warranted for identification because the NRC identified the problem, and (3) credit was warranted for corrective action. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on April 8,1998. l Pennsylvania Power & Light company, Allentown, Pennsylvania (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station), Supplement I, EA 97-472 A Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $55,000 was issued on January 9,1998. This action was based on a Severity Level 111 violation involving the failure to establish adequate controls for activities affecting the quality and NUREG-0940, PART 2 8 I
I operability of the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). Specifically, PP&L failed to adequately control the position of the EDG Woodward governor controls and, as a result, one of the required EDGs was inoperable for an indeterminate period of tirue. A base civil penalty was proposed for this case because:(1) this was not the first escalated enforcement action within the past 2 years,(2) credit was not warranted for identification, i and (3) credit was warranted for corrective action. The licensee responded and paid the I civil penalty on February 2,1998. Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 1 (Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station), Supplement I, EAS 97-144 & 97-563 I A Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $55,000 for a Severity Level ill violation and a Severity Level ill problem was issued on March 20,1998. The civil penalty was based on a violation involving the failure by an operating , crew to fol!ow procedures and act conservatively during a test, while the reactor was i shutdown, to demonstrate core shutdown margin. A base civil penalty was proposed in this case because: (1) this was not the first escalated enforcement action within the past 2 years, (2) credit was not warranted for identification, and (3) credit was warranted i for corrective action. The Severity Level lli problem involved to two violations: (1) the i failure to include certain systems, components and functions within the scope of the ' maintenance rule; and (2) the failure to adequately demonstrate that the performance or condition of a number of systems, components and functions is being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance. A civil penalty was not proposed because:(1) credit was warranted for identification and, (2) credit was warranted for corrective actions. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on April 20,1998. Tennessee Valley Authority, Chattanooga, Tennessee l (Watts Bar and Sequoyah), Supplement Vil, EA 95-252 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $80,000 was issued February 20,1996. The action was based on a Secretary of the Labor decision finding that TVA discriminated against an employee in not selecting him for l several positions due to his reporting safety concerns. In a letter dated April 4,1996, the NRC deferred issuance of an order until a decision was issued on the appeal. TVA appealed the decision and the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the Secretary of Labor's findings and vacated the orders of the Administrative Review Board. A final mandate was issued on March 10,1998. The NRC withdrew the Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in a letter dated April 16,1998. Tennessee Valley Authority, Chattanooga, Tennessee (Sequoyah), Supplement I, EA 97-409 A Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $55,000 was issued on December 8,1997. The action was based on one Severity Level 111 problem consisting of three violations related to a failure to maintain a direct current vital battery channel energized and operable. A base civil penalty was proposed in this case because: (1) this was not the first escalated enforcement action within 2 years, (2) credit was determined to be warranted for corrective action, and (3) credit was not warranted NUREG-0940 PART 2 9
A
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l for identification because prior opportunities to identify the violations existed. However, the licensee responded to the Notice admitting the violation but requesting that the NRC reconsider the determination that credit was not warranted for identification. After careful consideration of the licensee's response, the Staff concluded that despite prior opportunities to identify the violations, credit for identification was appropriate. As a result, the civil penalty was withhdrawn on February 6,1998. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation, Brattleboro, Vermont (Vermont Yankee), Supplement I, EA 97-531 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $55,000 for a Severity Level lli problem was issued on April 14,1998. This action was based on violations involving the Technical Specification (TS) limit for maximum torus operating temperature being inconsistent with the plant design basis. The licensee failed to ensure that the design basis was correctly translated into specifications when the TS i amendment request was submitted in 1982, failed to promptly evaluate and correct the discrepancy between the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and the TS when it was identified in 1994, and failed to report operation of the plant in a condition outside of the design basis. A base civil penalty was proposed in this vase because (1) this was not i the first escalated enforcement action within the past two years, (2) credit was not warranted for identification, and (3) credit was warranted for corrective actions. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on May 14,1998. B. SEVERITY LEVEL 1. II. AND III VIOLATIONS. NO CIVIL PENALTY i l American Electric Power Company, Buchanan, Michigan (D.C. Cook, Units 1 and 2), Supplement V, EA 98-113 i A Notice of Violation was issued April 21,1998. The violations involved failure to provide shipping papers and emergency response instructions for a shipment of contaminated objects. The violations resulted from poor communications between radiation protection personnel and the truck driver. A civil penalty was not proposed ; because even though the facility had been the subject of escalated enforcement action i within the last two years, credit was warranted for identification and corrective action: ! identification because the violations were identified by the licensee's staff and corrective actions because the staff's actions were prompt and comprehensive. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Lusby, Maryland (Calvert Cliffs), Supplement IV, EA 98-106 A Notice of Violation for a Severity Level 111 problem was issued on March 20,1998. The action was based on two violations related to the licensee's failure to establish radiological controls for work in the reactor cavity during cleaning of the reactor flange. Specifically, (1) the licensee did not make necessary and reasonable surveys to comply with the requirements and (2) the licensee did not post an airborne radioactivity area when required. Although a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000 would have been considered under the normal assessment process, the staff exercised discretion in accordance with Section Vll.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy to not propose a civil penalty in this case. The decision to exercise discretion was made because the violations NUREG-0940, PART 2 10 .
i related to the cavity event which occurred approximately one month after the diving event in April 1997, and appeared to be the result of the same fundamental j performance deficiencies. i Carolina Power & Light Company, Hartsville, South Carolina , (H. B. Robinson, Unit 2), Supplement 1, EA 98-043 and EA 98-050 ; t I
- A Notice of Violation for a Severity Level 111 violation was issued on March 4,1998. The i
- action was based on the licensee's failure to verify the adequacy of a design change to j the safety injectir>n (SI) system. The design change, disabled the automatic start a feature for one of the three SI pumps resulting in the SI system design failing to meet !
i the operability requirements of Technical Specification. Although this was not the first i escalated action in two years the civil penalty was fully mitigated because: (1) credit was j warranted for identification and (2) credit was warranted for the factor of corrective action. - i Duke Energy Corporation, York, South Carolina (Catawba Nuclear Station), Supplement I, EA 98-208 1 A Notice of Violation for a Severity Level lil violation was issued June 11,1998. The j action was based violations involving (1) failure to implement the 7-day restoration i actions of TS 3.7.7 following a failure to satisfy TS surveillance requirements, (2) failure j to take prompt corrective action associated with a low flow condition on the Unit 2 "A" j train VA system, (3) failure to follow procedures for system operability determinations
, following surveillance testing of the Unit 2 A-train VA system, (4) failure to verify that all j activities described by Minor Modification CNCE-7901 had been implemented in the field before closing the modification, and (5) failure to ensure that adequate prerequisites for
- surveillance testing of the VA system were established as required by 10 CFR 50, j Appendix B, Criterion XI. A civil penalty was not proposed because the facility had not j been the subject of an escalated enforcement action for the past two years and credit i was warranted for the prompt and comprehensive corrective action that the licensee i took.
l Entergy Operations, Inc., Killona, Louisiana (Waterford-3), Supplement I, EA 97-589 i A Notice of Violation for a Severity Level lil problem was issued on February 5,1998. This action was based on six violations related to a failure to retum a valve controller to l automatic operation folicwing use which went unrecognized for 15 hours, rendering
- Train A of the auxiliary component cooling water system inoperable. Operators j compounded this error by removing Train B of the auxiliary component cooling water
, system from service for routine maintenance without first physically verifying the j operability of Train A. Both trains of this system remained inoperable for approximately { 7.5 hours. Although this was not the first escalated action in two years the civil penalty j was fully mitigated because: (1) credit was warranted for identification and (2) credit was
- warranted for corrective action.
i i
; NUREG-0940, PART 2 11
Florida Power & Light Company, Juno Beach, Florida (St. Lucie), Supplement lil, EA 98-064 A Notice of Violation for a Severity Level 111 violation was issued on April 3,1998. This action was based on a violation that involved two examples of the failure to comply with the Physical Security Plan. Specifically, a plant security officer failed to inactivate the keycards and hand geometry for two terminated employees after being notified that the two individuals had been terminated, and access authorization was to be withdrawn. As a result, one contract employee entered the protected area for approximately eight minutes, and between December 31,1997, and January 2,1998, could have gained access to protected and vital areas of the plant. The second employee whose access was not properly inactivated, returned his keycard at the time of his termination and did not and could not have gained access to protected or vital areas. Although this was not the first escalated action in two years the civil penalty was fully mitigated because:(1) credit was warranted for identification and (2) credit was warranted for corrective action. GPU Nuclear Corporation, Middletown, Pennsylvania (Three Mile Island, Unit 1), Supplement I, EA 97-533 A Notice of Violation for a Severity Level til violation was issued on January 27,1998. This action was based on the pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) being returned to service without performing an IST to verify proper valve operation after the PORV was replaced. As a result, a wiring error, that prevented the PORV from opening in response to an automatic or manual signal, was not detected. Consequently, the PORV was inoperable for the operating cycle from October,1995, until September, 1997. Although this was not the first escalated action in two years the civil penalty was fully mitigated because:(1) credit was warranted for identification and (2) credit was warranted for corrective action. GPU Nuclear incorporated, Forked River, New Jersey (Oyster Creek), Supplement I, EA 97-617 A Notice of Violation for a Severity Level ill problem was issued on February 8,1998. This action was tsased on three violations involving failures to perform safety evaluations prior to downgrading the quality classifications of plant components and systems that were described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). These violations were identified at Oyster Creek after programmatic vieaknesses in the equipment downgrading process, which was common to both Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island, were identified at Three Mile Island. Although this was not the first escalated action in two years the civil penalty was fully mitigated because:(1) credit was warranted for identification and (2) credit was warranted for corrective action. North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation, Seabrook, New Hampshire (Seabrook), Supplement I, EA 98-073 A Notice of Violation for a Severity Level 111 problem was issued on April 1,1998. This action was based on three violations involving the failure to promptly identify and/or correct conditions adverse to quality at the facility. Specifically, (1) the licensee identified potentialleakage from stainless steel piping in the vicinity of the "B" Residual 12 I NUREG-0940, PART 2 i
I Heat Removal pump suction relief valve but did not promptly correct the condition, (2) the control building air conditioning (CBA) compressors were degraded resulting in j multiple compressor failures since 1993, with no action taken until December 1997, and I (3) a caution tag on the control switch for the Positive Displacement Charging Pump indicated that the pump could trip after starting due to an oil leak from the pump's sensing line, however, a modification was canceled without resolving the condition. The civil penalty was fully mitigated because: (1) this was the first escalated issue in the last 2 years, and (2) credit was warranted for corrective action. Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Watedord, Connecticut (Millstone, Unit 3), Supplement I, EA 98-179 A Notice of Violation for a Severity Level 111 problem was issued May 6,1998. The , violation involved failure to maintain an adequate PASS program that ensured the capability to obtain and analyze samples under post accident conditions. A civil penalty l was not proposed and the NRC exercised discretion pursuant to Section Vll.B.2 of the , Enforcement Policy. This decision was made because the licensee's facility has been in l an extended shutdown, and significant enforcement action was taken for the j pedormance issues that led to the shutdown. The violation was based on the licensee's 1 practices prior to the shutdown, not classified higher than Severity Level 11, and not willful. Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey l (Salem / Hope Creek), Supplement Vil, EA 97-422 A Notice of Violation for a Severity Level 111 violation was issued on April 24,1998. This . action was based on a violation that involved inaccurate security records created by two Wackenhut security personnel indicating that compensatory measures were in place ; within the required time (10 minutes) following the failure of the security computer, i Although this was not the first escalated action in two years the civil penalty was fully l mitigated because:(1) credit was warranted for identification and (2) credit was warranted for corrective action. Southern California Edison Company, San Clemente, California (San Onofre), Supplement 111 EA 97-585 A Notice of Violation for a Severity Level ill violation was issued on February 18,1998. This action was based on a violation involving the discovery that a copy of the composite safeguards contingency plan was lost, and not under the control of an authorized individual or locked in a locked security storage container. The plan was missing from the safeguards storage container in the security operations office, located outside the protected area. The civil penalty was fully mitigated because: (1) this was the first escalated issue in the last 2 years, and (2) credit was warranted for corrective action. NUREG-0940, PART 2 13
l Washington Public Power Supply System, Richland, Washington (WNP-2), Supplement I, EA 97-573 , 9 A Notice of Violation for a Severity Level lli violation was issued June 1,1998. The ; violations involved failure to (1) perform an adequate safety evaluation in accordance , with 10 CFR 50.59 when the RCIC System was downgraded from a safety-related ; system to a nonsafety-related system without NRC approval, and (2) maintain the i acceptance criteria for the opening stroke-time testing of six RCIC System valves and the failure to maintain inservice testing of Valve RCIC-V-45 as required by 10 CFR ! 50.55a(f). Enforcement discretion was exercised in accordance with Vll.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy because (1) the NRC's determination that the reason for the violations was similar to the reasons for violations in another enforcement action, (2) corrective actions for the other action encompass the corrective actions for this issue, and (3) the fact that the licensee continued to meet the TS surveillance requirements ! even after the RCIC was downgraded. C. Non-licensed Vendor (Part 21) Construction Products Research, Inc., (Five Star Products, Inc.), Fairfield, Connecticut Supplement Vil, EA 97-471 A Notice of Violation for a Severity Level I violation was issued on January 16,1998. The action was based on of 10 CFR 50.7, which prohibits discrimination against employees for engaging in protected activities. Specifically the discrimination of the i employee included: (1) placing him on an involuntary leave status; (2) instructing other employees not to discuss the ongoing NRC investigation of CPR and Five Star with him; (3) denying him access to his office and other facilities in the companies; and (4) terminating him from employment. ! l l NUREG-0940, PART 2 14 9 i
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O A- CIVIL PENALTIES AND ORDERS NUREG-0940, PART 2
_ _ . _ _ - - _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ . _ . . - _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ - . . ~ m - . , _ . . . l 4%g* , g UNITED STATES l . 8 o - NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION * ! $ b- REGION I i 4 - 475 ALLENDALE ROAD j KING oF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 1940lL1415 f April 27,1998 l ! EAs 97-482; 97-525; 98-052 *
.Mr. Leon J. Olivier Vice President - Nuclear !
. Boston Edison Company 1 i Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
[ ' 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360-5599 ]. i
- l. .
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY ; l - $165,000; AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION ; i (NRC inspection Report Nos. 50-293/97 05,97-12 snd 97-13) ! I Dear Mr. Olivier. This letter refers to the three subject NRC inspections conducted between May 14,1997, and January 6,1998, at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, Massachusetts, the ; findings of which were discussed with Mr. H. V. Oheim and members of your staff during t several exit meetings, the last of which was held on January 30,1998. The first of these t inspections examined the cvii.ctive actions ===<v4=ted with the findmes from a January 1995 self-assessmer.t of the Pilgrim safety-related cooling water systems and other related issues. The second inspection reviewed various engineering activities, including the replacement and subsequent modification of two 480/120 volt safeguard control transformers. The third inspection was a routine integrated inspection which, in part, reviewed an issue related to the reliability of the salt service water (SSW) pump operation. The inspection reports were sent to you previously on October 21,1997, December 17,1997, and February 6,1998. On November 21,1997, a predecisional enforcement conference (conference) was conducted with you and m_ embers of your staff, to discuss the violations related to the first two inspections, their causes, and your corrective actions. The apparent violations identified in NRC Inspection Report 97-12, issued on December 17,1997, related to the 480/120 voit , transformers, were discussed at the conference, even though the inspection report had not ! been issued at the time of that conference. On December 16,1997, Mr. Oheim of your staff ; informed Mr. Wiggins of my staff that another conference was not needed to further discuss those issues. Based on the findings of the inspections and information provided during the conference, two I Seventy Level til violations and one Severity Level lit problem (consisting of multiple violations) are being cited and are described in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice).-These violations involved a r. umber of failures to either promptly identify conditions adverse to quality and/or failures to promptly and effectively correct the u conditions once they were identified, contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, P as well as violations of design control requirements, and 10 CFR 50.59. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-1
__-- ~ Boston Edison Company 2 from a modification involving insulation eon recirculatio esulting drywell performed in 1984. The design change involved a USQ in that c onthe probability of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps (i.e., residual heat core spray) was increased due to the potentially higher line pressure losses collection of insulation debris on the pump suction strainers. To allevia change took credit for post-accident containment overpressure to assur p with the plant licensing basis as described in the Up (UFSAR). However, you failed to recognize that crediting containment ove rpressure increased the probability of a malfunction of the ECCS pumps, and the safety evaluati on performed to Consequently, the change was made without appropriately addressed until January , was not NRC appro approval for including containment pressure as a component of licensing basis) even though there were prior opportunities to identify and corr problem, namely: (1) the 1995 service water system operational performance inspectio containment overpressure in the NPSH calculations; ( completed on March 25,1996 modification did not involve s. USQ: and (3) the report n of an inde containment overpressure issue performed by Yankee Atomic Electric Com concluded that containment overpressure was not credited ina the Pilgrim lice . The second Severity Level 111 violation involves a design deficiency which int roduced an unintended trip function in the microprocessors that control y the transform 120 Vac power to safety-related instrument busses. Following ,1997 in an event on A which the unintended trip function caused a common mode malfunction of the safety evaluation performed to support replacementprocessors recognize the existence of a USQ. of the micro failed to The Severity Level 111 problem consisting of seven violations reo involved co service water (SSW) system inlet temperatures highe a vulnerability in the SSW system design; (3) failure to translate, esign into procedures requirement to isolate non-essential reactor building closed cooling water ( loads during accident conditions; (4) failure to adequately translate into procedu es, residual in emergency diesel generator (EDG) eloading c encies on of the calculat EDGs at ambient temperatures higher than the design limit; n the and (7) inaccura L environmental to safety. qualification (EO) drywell temperature predile for electric eq Several of these adverse conditions resulted from failure ases to properly trans of the plant into specifications, procedures, and instructions. em For examp design flow rate of 5100 gpm used in design basis containment heat t ransfer and NUREG-0940, PART 2 pressure / temperature calculations was e ownot properly trans A-2
Boston Edison Company 3 rates specified in the system operating procedure were not supported by calculations that , considered the effects of instrument accuracy. Specifically, the RHR operating procedure specified a flow range of 4800 to 5100 gpm for containment cooling during accident conditions. There was no analysis to confirm that adequate heat removal would be provided at the lower flow rate specified in the operating procedure, including the effects of instrument error. Similarly, there was no analysis to demonstrate that flows greater than 5100 gpm (which, after considering the effects of instrument error, could occur) would not exceed the design limitations of the RHR heat exchangers. , in some cases, you identified the design deficiency, but failed to take prompt action to correct the deficiency once it was identified. For example, during the service water system operational performance inspection (SWSOPI) self-assessment in 1995, you identified that no procedural guidance existed to isolate the non-essential RBCCW system heat loads during an accident, an action assumed in the licensing bases for the plant. However, at the time of the NRC inspection in 1997, no action had been taken to address the identified deficiency. The NRC is concerned that, although you identified inconsistencies between the safety analyses and plant specifications and procedures, you apparently failed to recognize the significance of the conditions in that prompt action was not taken to correct the discrepancies. You also failed to recognize that some of these conditions resulted in the plant being operated outside of the design basis as evidenced by the fact that the conditions were not reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. Additionally, in some cases, your corrective actions to address the deficiencies after they were identified, were inadequate because you either failed to perform required safety evaluations, I or performed safety evaluations that failed to identify unreviewed safety questions (USQs). In a number of cases, you limited your formal evaluations to operability determinations and often relied upon engineering judgement rather than formal analyses to support your actions. For example, although you identified as early as July 1994, that a design basis change was needed to support operation of the plant with SSW inlet temperatures above the design limit of 65'F specified in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), a safety ovaluation to support a change to the licensing basis was not performed until March 1996 even though you operated the plant during the interim with SSW temperatures in excess of 65'F. In the interim, you relied on an operability determination that concluded that the RBCCW system was operable with elevated SSW temperatures, and you used engineering judgement to support the use of " rolling averages" to justify operation of the plant with SSW temperatures above 65'F. When a formal safety evaluation was performed, the evaluation was inadequate because post-accident containment overpressure was inappropriately credited in ECCS pump NPSH margin calculations contrary to the plant's licensing basis. The NRC is concerned that the plant was operated outside of the NRC approved licensing bases because of an apparent fundamental misunderstanding of what constitutes a change to the design and licensing bases. .While there were no resultant adverse safety consequences in any of these cases, the potential existed that, had a design basis accident occurred, safety-related equipment and systems were not assured of accomplishing their design functions. Additionally, the failure to identify and/or correct these conditions adverse to quality is of , significant regulatory concern because the NRC relies upon licensees to operate the plant I within the approved licensing basis and to correctly assess changes to the plant or its operations to assure that unreviewed safety questions do not exist. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-3
Boston Edison Company 4 The violations represent a failure to take corrective actions to resolve' programmatic weaknesses in your design control and safety evaluation processes. The violations associated with inappropriately crediting containment overpressure in calculations of ECCS pump NPSH margin, and a design deficiency in the microprocessors that control the transformers which supply 120 Vac power to safety-related instrument busses, are each categorized as separate Severity Level til violations in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG 1600,in that each involved the creation of a USQ. The remainder of the violations are classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level lli problem because they represent a failure to implement corrective actions in a number of different areas. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000is considered for each Severity Level 111 violation or problem. Since Pilgrim has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two years,' the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for /dentification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy for each. Severity Level 111 violation and the Severity Levelill problem. While you identified some of the technical issues, no credit is warranted for identification because the NRC identified the USQs and you-failure to promptly identify and resolve these conditions adverse to quality. Your corrective actions, once you were put on notice by th' NRC, included: 1) procedure revisions; 2) performance of the necessary safety evaluations; 3) broad scope UFSAR and licensing basis documentation reviews; 4) rcvision of the guidance for evaluating conditions for reportability; and 5) increased management attention to the corrective action process. Since these corrective actions appear comprehensive, credit is warranted for corrective actions. Therefore, to emphasize the importance of timely identification and comprehensive correction of problems and in recognition of your previous escalated enforcement actions, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $165,000. This is comprised of a base civil penalty of $55,000 for each Severity Level ill violation and for the Severity Level 111 problem in Section I of the Notice. Four separate Severity Lovel IV violations for failure to make timely notifications and reports l to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 for some of the situations l described in Section I of the Notice are described in Section ll. l Additiortally, during your follow-up review of EDG loading, conducted as a result of the violations identified during the NRC SWSOPl follow-up inspection, you identified a design l deficiency associated with the thermal overload relay trip settings for the SSW pumps that I could have resulted in an inadvertent trip of the pumps and a loss of all SSW cooling. This issue was identified as an epparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion til in NRC Inspection Report 97-13. The NRC has determined that the failure to assure that the SSW design bases were correctly translated into the overload trip settings constituted a 8 e.g., A Notice of Violation without a civil penalty was issued on October 21,1996 for a Severity level III pmblem involving a violation of contamment integrity Technical Specification requirements and failure to correct deficiencies in electrical penetrations (EA 96-271). NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-4
1 Boston Edison Company 5 i violation of NRC requirements which could be considered for escalated enforcement and subject to civil penalties. {
- However, after consultation with the Director, Office of -1 3 Enforcement, I have been authorized to not issue a Notice of Violation and not propose a civil t
] penalty for this issue in accordance with the provisions provided in Section Vll.B.4 of the '
- Enforcement Policy. This decision was made after consideration thai: (1) the violation was i identified by your staff as part of corrective action for violations that were subject to escalated i enforcement action; (2) the violation has a similar root cause as the other design deficiencies for which escalated action is being issued; (3) it does not substantially change the safety l significance or the character of the regulatory concern arising from the initial violations; (4)
! immediate corrective action was taken to reset the trip setpoints; and (5) ycu have planned j long term corrective actions to address the root cause of the violation. The exercise of { discretion acknowledges your effort to perform comprehensive actions to identify and correct l similar violations to those for which escalated enforcement action was issued. i i You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the i enclosed Notice when preparing your response. Due to the prograrnmatic nature of these j violations, the NRC expects that your response will address not only the specific violations l cited, but will also include the results of any extent of condition reviews that you have } performed in the areas of design control, safety evaluations, and reportability. The NRC will j use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to l ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. I In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRO's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its l l enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). l Sincerely, i ) H ert J. Miller
- Regional Administrator 5
i Docket No. 50-293 l License No. DPR-35 l 1 ]
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of j Civil Penalty l 1 i
] NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-5 i , . -
Boston Edison Company 6 cc w/ encl: R. Ledgett, Executive Vice' President - Operations. C. Goddard, Plant Department Manager N. Desmond, Regulatory Relations D. Tarantino, Nuclear information Manager R, Hallissy, Department of Public Health, Commonwealth of Massachusetts The Honorable Therese Murray The Honorable Joseph Gallitano , B. Abbanat, Department of Public Utilities Chairman, Plymouth Board of Selectmen i Chairman, Duxbury Board of Selectmen Chairman, Nuclear Matters Committee Plymouth Civil Defensc Director ; P. Gromer, Massachusntts Secretary of Energy Resources ! J. Miller, Senior issue & iAanager J. Fleming A. Nogee, MASSPIRG l Office of the Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality ! Engineering Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts T. Rapone, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Chairman, Citizens Urging Responsible Energy Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SLO Designee i
?
i l I r i NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-6 i
ENCLOSURE NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY , Boston Edison Company Docket No. 50-293 ! Pilgrim Station License No. DPR-35 EAs 97-482; 97-525 During NRC inspections conducted between May 14,1997, and October 10,1997, for which exit meetings were held on July 18,1997, August 28,1997, October 10,1997, and l November 19,1997, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the l " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the j NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and ; associated civil penalty are set forth below: I
- 1. VIOLATIONS ASSESSED CIVIL PENALTIES l
A. VIOLATION ASSOCIATED WITH CONTAINMENT OVERPRESSURE 10 CFR Pert 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Actions," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditums adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action : l is taken to preclude repetition. ' l 10 CFR 50.59, " Changes, tests and experiments," permits the licensee, in part, to make changes to the facility as described in the safety analysis report without prior Commission approval provided the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question (USQ). The licensee shall maintain records of changes in the facility and these records must include a written safety l evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change does not involve a USQ. A proposed change shall be deemed to involve a USQ (i) l if the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety l analysis report may be increased; or (ii) if a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created; or (iii) if the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is reduced. Appendix B to 10 CFR 50, " Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants", Criterion ill, " Design Control," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory j requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, j drawings, procedures, and instructions. i ! NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-7
- -~--~ - - - --- - _ 2 Enclosud 10 CFR 50.71(e) requires, in part, that the final safety analysis report (FSAR) be updated periodically to assure that the information included in the FSAR contains the latest material developed. Revisions to the FSAR shall be sut,mitted annually or six months after each refueling outage provided the interval between submittals does not exceed 24 months. The revisions must reflect all changes up to a marimum of 6 months prior to the date of filing. 20,1997, the Contrary to the above, between January 1995 and January licensee failed to take prompt and effective corrective action for a significant condition adverse to quality, failed to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions, and failed to perform an adequate written sabty evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that The deficiency involved ECCS net a design change did not involve a USQ. positive suction head (NPSH) calculations performed to support safety evaluations for a design change to the dryweltpiping insulation. Specifically, the calculations were changed to credit containment overpressure as a result of modification of insulation on recirculation loop piping located in the drywell in 1984. BECo Safety Evaluation (SE) No.1638, approved on August 31, The design change 1984, was performed to support the design change. involved a USO in that the probability of a malfunction of the ECCS pumps (i.e., residual heat r3moval (RHR) and core spray) was increased due to the potentially higher line pressure losses caused by the collection of insulation debris on the pump suction strainers. The design change took credit for post-accident containment overpressure to assure adequate ECCS pump NPSH. Crediting of containment overpressure was inconsistent with the plant design basis as described in Section 14.5 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). However, the licensee failed to recognize that crediting containment overpressure increased the probability of a malfunction of the ECCS pumps, and SE-1638 incorrectly concluded that the change did not involve a USQ. Consequently, the change was made without NRC approval. This condition 20,1997, adverse to quality was not appropriately addressed until January when BECo requested NRC review and approval for including containment pressure as a component of NPSH margin in the Pilgrim licensing basis, despite prior opportunities to do so, namely: 1. In 1995, the service water system operational performance inspection (SWSOPI) self-assessment identified that the 1984 safety evaluation may have improperly credited containment overpressure in the NPSH calculations.
- 2. On March 25,1996, the licensee completed a new safety evaluation (SE-2971) which supported the previous replacement of all piping thermal insulation in the drywell and superseded SE-1638. SE-2971 also incorrectly concluded that the 1984 plant modification did not involve a USQ.
- 3. The report of an independent review of the containment overpressure issue performed by Yankee Atomic Electric Company, dated June 5, 1996, concluded that containment overpressure was not credited in the
)
NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-8 1
l Enclosure 3 ' Pilgrim licensing basis; however, prompt action was not taken to correct i l the deficiency. i l In addition, between 1984 and June 1996, the licensee did not update Section i 14.5 of the FSAR to reflect the design brsas and methods for calculating the , NPSH for the ECCS pumps as impacted by the modification to the ECCS pump strainers in 1984. Specifically, to support the modification, containment overpressure was credited in calculation of ECCS pump NPSH margin. FSAR l i Figure 14.5-10, "NPSH Availability for RHR and Core Spray System", was not ! revised to reflect the design bases and methods for calculating NPSH until June 1996. (01013) i l This is a Severity Level 111 violation (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty $55,000. j B. VIOLATION ASSOCIATED WITH 480/120 VOLT TRANSFORMER ! I REP 1.ACEMENT L 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Actions," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action is taken to preclude repetition. 10 CFR 50.59, " Changes, tests and experiments," permits the licensee, in part, to make changes to the facility as described in the safety analysis report without prior Commission approval provided the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question (USQ). The licensee shall maintain records of changes in the facility and these records must include a written safety l evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change does not involve a USQ. A proposed change shall be deemed to involve a USQ (i) ; if the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or i malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety l analysis report may be increased; or (ii) if a possibility for an accident or l malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created; or (iii) if the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is reduced. ' l The Pilgrim Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), section 8.8.3, Safety Design l Basis for the 120 Vac safeguard control subsystem describes that the 120 Vac safeguard control subsystem was' designed and installed in accordance with i lEEE-279 Standard. IEEE-279 Standard section 4.6, Channel Independent.e, l required that the signals from both channels to be independent to accomplish L decoupling of the effects of electric transients. Section 8.8.3.3 of the FSAR I stated that the 120 Vac safeguard control subsystem was arranged so that no ( single component failure would prevent the system from providing power to the l hydrogen / oxygen analyzer subsystem. l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-9 l I
Enclosure 4 Contrary to the above, between April 1,1997 and October 10,1997, the licensee f ailed to take adequate corrective cutions to preclude the recurrence of a significant condition adverse to quality, and failed to perform an adequate ( written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that l a design change did not involve a USO. The deficiency involved an unintended
- trip functon of the microprocessors associated with two transformers (X55 and X56), which provide the 120 Vac power to the safeguard control subsystem.
} The unintended trip function caused a common-mode malfunction (power loss) of both transformers due to a voltage transient on April 1,1997. Specifically, I following the event on April 1,1997, the safety evaluation (SE 3091, dated April 10,1997) and engineering performed to support replacement of the microprocessors to eliminate the unintended trip function were inadequate in that the hardware and software of the microprocessors were not sufficiently evaluated to determine that the modification did not involve a USQ. For example, voltage transients such as harmonic distortion or noise were not addressed, and the evaluation did not consider , vendor configuration management, coding standards, or life cycle issues, all of which could have created a malfunction of a different type and, therefore, involved a USQ.
' Consequently, the modification of the transformers in April 1997, a change that involved a USQ, was made without prior NRC approval. (02013) This is a Severity Level ill violation (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty $55,000. C. ADDITIONAL VIOLATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH INADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR KNOWN TECHNICAL ISSUES 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Actions," requires, in ! part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures j shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action I is taken to preclude repetition. 10 CFR 50.59, " Changes, tests and' experiments," permits the licensee, in part, to make changes to the facility as described in the safety analysis report without prior Commission approval provided the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question (USO). The licensee shall maintain records of changes in the facility and these records must include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change does not involve a USQ. A proposed change shall be deemed to involve a USQ (i) if the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased; or (ii) if a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created; or (iii) if the margin of safety as defined in the basis for :,ny technical specification is reduced. NUREG-0940, PART 'E A-10 1
- . - -_ _ - - . . - - . . - - - _ _ - - - . - . . - . . . - - - . . - - . _ ~ . - . _ - . . -
i
- Enclosure 5 4
Appendix 8 to 10 CFR Part 50, " Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power j Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants", Criterion 111, " Design Control," requires, i in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, < drawings, procedures, and instructions. I
- 1. VIOLATION ASSOCIATED WITH SSW DESIGN INLET TEMPERATURE
)
l Contrary to the above, between July 1994 and August 28,1997, the I , licenses failed to prow &Gy identify and correct discrepancies associated l with operation of the plant with salt service water (SSW) system inlet j temperatures higher than the design temperature specified in the UFSAR, ; i a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, in July 1994 and August - 1 1995, SSW system inlet temperature exceeded the design temperature 1 1 of 65'F, as used in the accident analysis and as described in UFSAR l' Section 14.5.3. Additionally, plant procedures were not consistent with ) the UFSAR with respect to the SSW design inlet temperature. Procedure : ! 2.2.32, " Salt Service Water System," contained no guidance rege ding j j the tamperature limit and procedure 2.2.30, " Reactor Building Closed ' i Cooling Water System," specified a design inlet SSW temperature of ) ' 75*F, representing a failure to properly translate the SSW design
- temperature limit into procedures. This condition adverse to quality was j not promptly identified and corrected, despite prior opportunities to do l so, namely
- a. In July 1994, the licensee recognized that the elevated SSW j temperature was a nonconforming condition and erformed evaluations that concluded that the reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) system was operable with SSW inlet i temperatures up to 75'F. However, the beensee failed to identify
! that operation of the plant with SSW system inlet temperature
- above 65*F was a condition outside of the design basis of the
- f. plant.
1 1 b. Although the licensee had identified that a design basis change i
! was needed to change the SSW inlet temperature from 65'F to l 75'F in July 1994 and again during the SWSOPl in 1995, they ,
i did not take prompt effective corrective actions to revise the l j design basis. A written safety evaluation to support a change to l 1 the design basis was not performed until March 1996. However, the safety evaluation that was performed in March 1996, was inadequate in that it inappropriately credited post-accident containment overpressure in the analysis. Use of containment overpressure was inconsistent with the plant licensing basis.
- c. The licensee did not identify the procedural discrepancies until the SWSOPI was performed in 1995 despite prior opportunity in 1994. Procedure 2.2.32 was revised on February 23,1995, to include an administrative limit stating that the RBCCW system NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-11
1 Enclosure 6 ! remained operable with a SSW inlet temperature up to 75'F. { ' However, the design discrepancy was not corrected because the 75'F limit had not been incorporated into the licensee's current i UFSAR analysis of record for design basis events and the l performance of emergency core cooling equipment. These j analyses used an ultimate heat sink temperature of 65'F. l Additionally, no written safety evaluation was performed to : determine that the procedure change did not involve a USQ. l t
- d. Interim corrective actions taken by the licensee to incorporate the !
use of SSW temperature " rolling averages" into plant instructions l were also ineffective because tho'needed design analysis to ! support this method of determining inlet temperature was not _ performed. Specifically, in August and September 1995, the , licensee approved the use of " rolling averages" to justify SSW 4 temperature excursions above the 65'F design limit. However, [ no formal detailed analysis was performed to verify that [ temperatures above 65'F for limited periods of time were ' bounded by the analyses for design basis events and ECCS ; performance. (03013) ;
- 2. VIOLATION ASSOCIATED WITH SALT SERVICE WATER SYSTEM ;
l SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY Contrary to the above, between January 1995, and July 18,1997, the ! licensee failed to identify a design deficiency in the salt service water ! system that rendered the system vulnerable to a single failure, a condition adverse to quality, despite prior opportunity to identify the ; deficiency. The single failure vulnerability involved a loss of DC power i dunng a design basis event at specific tidal conditions and Cape Cod Bay water temperatures. Under certain conditions, only one SSW pump ; would remain operating with the SSW headers cross-connected and insufficient NPSH; therefore, the single DC power failure could prevent the SSW system from performing its safety function. Although the licensee completed a single failure analysis on April 27,1997, in response to identification of single failure vulnerabilities in the SSW and . RBCCW systems during the SWSOPI in 1995, the licensee failed to [ identify the vulnerability. (03023)
- 3. VIOLATION ASSOCIATED WITH ISOLATION OF NONESSENTIAL RBCCW LOADS ;
i Contrary to the above, between February 1995, and August 28,1997, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a deficiency associated with isolation of nonessential RBCCW loads during design f basis conditions. Specifically, the design basis was not correctly ! translated into procedures in that there was no guidance in procedure ; 2.2.19.5, "RHR Modes of Operation for Transients," for isolating ! nonessential RBCCW system heat loads during a design basis accident , as described in Section 10.5.5.3 of the UFSAR and other design f NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-12 i, I i
a 1 i 1 Enclosure 7 i- analyses. This condition adverse to quality was not promptly identified and corrected, despite prior opportunities to do so, namely: l
- a. Although the licensee identified that there was no procedural i guidance to isolate the nonessential loads during the SWSOPl in l
j 1995, they failed to recognize that the condition caused the plant i j to be outside the design basis of the plant. i L b. Although procedure 2.2.19.5 was revised on July 18,1997, to . l Isolate non-essential RBCCW system heat loads if suppression l ? pool temperature exceeded 130*F, this corrective action was ! j not eff6ctive because no design-basis analysis was performed for l i the 130*F limit to demonstrate that the core spray pump bearing ! cooler would receive adequate flow during all design basis j conditions. Additionally, no written safety evaluation was i l performed to determine that the restriction on isolation of the nonessential loads did not involve a USQ. A 50.59 safety j l evaluation was required because the description in the UFSAR did i not restrict isolation of the nonessential loads based on j suppression pool temperature. (03033) ( ' i 4. VIOLATION ASSOCIATED WITH RHR SYSTEM DESIGN FLOW RATES [ Contrary to the above, prior to August 28,1997, the licensee failed to
- promptly identify and correct a design deficier.cy associated with
- translation of the RHR design flow rate into plant procedures. The RHR i design flow rate of 5100 gpm used in design basis containment heat l transfer and pressure / temperature response calculations was not i adequately translated into procedures. The RHR flow range of 4800 to j 5100 gpm specified in Operating Procedure (OP) 2.2.19.6,"RHR Modes i of Operation for Transients", was not supported by calculations that
! considered the effects of instrument accuracy on post-accident containment response or RHR heat exchanger integrity. After the j deficiency was identified by the NRC in July 1997, the licensee failed to identify the significance of the deficiency and failed to take effective corrective actions to resolve the problem. Specifically, Operating Procedure 2.2.19.5 was revised on July 18,1997, to throttle RHR flow not to exceed 5600 gpm; however, this corrective action was not effective because the specification of the higher RHR flow rate was not adequately supported with the required calculations and analyses and ; was not representative of the design basis. Additionally, no written ! safety evaluation was performed to determine that the higher system flow rate did not involve a USO. - Specifically, no evaluation was performed to ensure that a flow rate of 5600 gpm would not have an adverse effect on the RHR heat exchangers. (03043) NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-13
I Enc!osure 9
- 5. VIOLATION ASSOCIATED WITH EDG LOADING CALCULATIONS Contrary to the above, betwee i January 1995 and August 28,1997, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct design deficiencies associated with emergency diesel generator (EDG) loading calculations l
and procedures. Specifically, calculation PS-79, " Diesel Generator Loading", did not include the power drawn during current limit operation i for the 250 vDC battery charger and did,not address the effect on i generator load by motor driven pump frequency variation. The limit : specified in the precautions of procedure 2.2.8, " Standby AC Power System", for EDG 2000-hour rating did not account for accuracy of the idlowatt meter. Additionally, the diesel ponerator loads documented in design basis calculation PS-79 were not properly translated into the diesel generator loading information specified in procedure 2.2.8. Although diesel generator loading was assessed during the SWSOPI in ; 1995, the licensee did not identify the deficiencies in calculation PS-79 i and procedure 2.2.8. The licensee had identified the inconsistencies < between design-basis information contained in calculation PS-79, and diesel generator loading information in procedure 2.2.8 prior to the , SWSOPl in 1995 and had initiated a tracking item to revise procedura l 2.2.8 during the SWSOPl. However, the licensee failed to take prompt ; corrective action to resolve the discrepancies. Although both calculation PS-79 and procedure 2.2.8 had been revised since the SWSOPI, as of l August 28, 1997, the calculation and the procedure were still inconsistent. (03053)
- 6. VIOLATION ASSOCIATED WITH EDG AMBIENT TEMPERATURE DESIGN klffl Contrary to the above, between January 1995, and August 28,1997, the licensee failed to promptly identify and effectively correct a design discrepancy associated with the EDG design maximum outdoor ambient temperature limit of 88'F specified in UFSAR Section 10.9.3.9 and Table
< 10.9-2. During certain summer periods since initial plant startup, ambient temperatures exceeded 88'F; however, the licensee failed to , ensure that the design basis limitation for operation of the EDGs was i translated into specifications. The licensee failed to promptly identify
- and correct this condition adverse to quality, despite prior opportunities to do so, namely:
- a. During the SWSOPl in 1995, the licensee identified that the f maximum ambient temperature for operation of the EDGs had ,
been exceeded in the past. However, they failed to recognize . that the condition caused the plant to be outside the design basis
- of the plant.
l
- b. No limits were placed on EDG loading when operating above ambient temperatures of 88 'F until June 20,1997.
NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-14
+
._ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - . _ _ . . _ . . . . _ . _ _ _ . . _ . . ~ . _ . _ _ _ . . - _ _ _ _ _
i Enclosure 9 l t i i c. The safety evaluations performed to support the change to a ' i 100% water mixture in June 1997 (SE-3102) and the change
- back to a 50/50 glycol mixture in August (SE-3114) were not
- comprehensive and were based on preliminary input that was not i
properly validated. The safety evaluations did not address the effects of higher air temperature on key engine performance characteristics such as fuel consumption rate or the overall
- impact on accelerated engine wear and possible engine power de-
- rating. Although the testing performed to validate the analysis upon which these evaluations was based did not achieve the expected results, the EDGs were. still considered operable. ;
- ,(03063)
- 7. VIOLATION ASSOCIATED WITH ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION
- RELATED TO DRYWELL TEMPERATURE PROFILE l i !
{ 10 CFR 50.49 (e) requires, in part, that the electric equipment ! ! environmental qualification program must include and be based on the , { tune-dependent temperature and pressure at the location of the electric equipment important to safety. The time-dependent temperature and { pressure must be established for the most severe design basis accident l j during or following which this' equipment is required to. remain functional. ? Contrary to the above, between January 1996, and August 28,1997, i the licensee failed to take corrective action to preclude recurrence of a l deficiency associated with the environmental qualification (EQ) accident , i temperature profile for electrical equipment in the drywell, a significant i condition adverse to quality. The condition involv3d a computer modeling error for certain small break sizes and an incorrect assumption i that resulted in higher average drywell temperature than the analysis of ; ' record for the containment temperature profile used for EQ of electrical ; . equipment in the drywell. The modeling error caused the analysis of ) record since 1987 to be nonconservative due to differences in the s predicted peak temperature and drywell temperatures from one hour to i approximately 220 hours after the event. In January 1996, the licensee identified and corrected the errors in the
- drywell temperature profile; however, they failed to take action to l preclude recurrence of the deficiency. Specifically, the licensee determined that the cause of the error was failure to review the input i values and assumptions used by the vendor in their analysis; however,
[ as of August 28,1997, no change had been made to engineering procedures to preclude repetition of the condition. From 1987 to January 1996, a condition existed in which design basis drywell accident temperature profiles would have exceeded equipment j environmental qualification temperature limits during postulated main steam line break accidents, placing the plant outside its design basis. t Although the licensee identified the condition in January 1996, they j NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-15 i i
-- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0 failed to recognize that the condition caused the plant to be outside the design basis of the plant. (03073)
These violations (l.C.1 - 7) represent a Severity Level 111 problem (Supplemant 1). Civil Penalty - $ 55,000.
- 11. ylOLATIONS NOT ASSESSED A civil PENALTY 10 CFR 50.72, "Immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear power reactors," requires, in part, that the licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within one hour of any event or condition during operation that results in the nuclear power plant being in a condition that is outside the design basis of the plant.
10 CFR 50.73, "Ucensee event report system," requires, in part, that the licensee shall submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) within 30 days after the discovery of any event or condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant. Centrary to the above, notifications and reports were not made within the required times as evidenced by the following examples, each of which represents a separate violation: A. As of August 28,1997, BECo had not reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 that in July 1994 and August 1995, SSW system inlet temperature exceeded the design temperature of 65*F, as used in the accident analysis and as described in UFSAR Section 14.5.3., representing a condition outside the design basis of the plant. (04014) This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1). B. On June 6,1997, a design d.eficiency was identified in the SSW system that rendered the system vulnerable to a single failure in the event of a loss of DC power during a design basis event at specific tidal conditions and Cape Cod Bay water temperatures. UFSAR Section 10.7.2 indicates that no single active failure can prevent the system from achieving its safety objective. This condition was not reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 until July 18,1997. (05014) This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1). C. As of August 28,1997, BECo had not reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 that in the past, as identified during the SWSOPI in 1995, the ambient temperature for operation of the EDGs had exceeded the maximum of 88'F as specified in UFSAR Section 10.9.3.9 and Table 10.9-2 representing a condition outside the design basis of the plant. (06014) This is a Severity Level IV violatic,n (Supplement 1). NUREG-0940, PART 2 A.16
- Enclosure 11 1
D. As of August 28,1997, BECo had not reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 ' j and 10 CFR 50.73 the identification of errors that resulted in higher average drywell temperature than the analysis for the containment temperature profile used for EQ of electrical equipment in the drywell as specified in the General ' Electric analysis of record, SUDDS/RF 87-917, "Drywell Temperature Analysis," j dated September 2,1987, representing a condition outside the design basis of ' l the plant. (07014) i l This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Boston Edison Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a
" Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission !
or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the re0 sons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in I this Notice, an Order or a Demand for Information may be issued as why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation (s) listed in , this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in i this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to l protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-17
Enclosure 12 ; l J Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in i accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, l and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 . Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738,with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. . Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the l facility that is the subject of this Notice. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent , possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so l that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifes the information that should be protected and a redacted 1 copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you E921 specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the , disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide : the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). if safeguards information is necessary to provide an ; acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. j P R s Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 27th day of April 1998 r NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-18
?
- _ . . . _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . - _ _ . - . _ . _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . . _ . _ ~ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
- UNITED STATES 1
[ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2 5 REGION I I 475 ALLENDALE ROAD
- KING oF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415
- 'May 19, 1998 EA 98-191 i
F Mr. Leon J. Olivier i Vice President - Nuclear Operations / Station Manager ! Boston Edison Company Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station j 800 Rocky Hill Road ,
- Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360-5599 1
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY j - $55,000 l (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-293/98-03) i ,
Dear Mr. Olivier:
This letter refers to the NRC inspection conducted on March 2-5 and 11-12,1998, at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station to assess your security force's capability to protect the facility J against radiological sabotage and to determine whether your security program met 1- requirements. During the inspection, an apparent violation of NRC requirements was
- identified, as noted in the inspection report sent to you on April 3,1998. On April 27,1998,
, a predecisional enforcement conference was conducted with you and members of your staff to discuss the apparent violation, its causes, and your corrective actions. l Based on our review of. the inspection findings, and information provided during the ! i conference, one violation is being cited and is described in the enclosed Notice of Violation j and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). The violation involves multiple examples ! of equipment failures associated with the protected area assessment system used by your !- secunty personnel to continuously monitor and assess the security status at the facility. The l details of this violation, which contain Safeguards information, are described in the enclosed . Notice. l The NRC is concerned that deficiencies related to your protected area assessment aids had
- been identified during audits conducted by your Quality Assurance staff in 1996 and 1997,
! as well as during NRC inspections between 1995-1997,and adequate action was not taken i to correct the deficiencies. As a result of the failure to address the identified deficiencies, the ! assessment sids further degraded, result'ng in the violation. At the enforcement conference,
- you ir.dicated that there was inadequate management oversight regarding the quality of the assessment aids, and there was insufficient senior management support to properly maintain j the capability of the assessment aids. You further stated that it was not until after the NRC inspection that senior management determined that there were known problems with the j' assessment aida that had been previously documented. Those problems had been i documented on work lists rather than problem reports, and although maintenance requests had l been issued, they were reissued under new numbers when deadlines were not met, which
- prolonged the period that the assessment aids were degraded.
NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-19 { i L j. l 4
Boston Edison Company 2 This violation represents a rignificant lack of attention, by security staff, supervision, and management, to an important aspect of the security program at Pilgrim. The failure to ensure these aids were maintained operable resulted in a degradation of your overall system for protecting the facility from security threats. These aids are needed to provide a capability to , observe the rotected area barrier and isolation zone to limit exposdre of responding personnel to possible attacks. Therefore, the violation has been categorized at Severity Level lli in ! accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement l Actions," (Enforcement Policy), NUREG 1600. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000is ' considered for a Severity Level lli violation. Since your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years', the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for /dentif/ cation and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit is not warranted for r
/ den #ficadon because the violation was identified by the NRC. The NRC also considered your l corrective actions, as described at the enforcement conference. These actions included, but ;
were not limited to, (1) establishing compensatory measures for the degraded assessment i
' aids; (2) assignment of additional maintenance staff to assist with maintenance of security assessment aids; (3) rdnforcement of expectations by the Vice President and Group Manger; j (4) providing "on-the-job" training to Central Alarm Station and Secondary Alarm Station operators; (5) creation of a checklist to surveill equipment by operators and supervisors; and f (6) replacement of equipment with new, ' state-of-the-art" equipment. Credit is warranted for Corrective Action because these actions, at the time of the enforcement conference, were considered prompt and comprehensive. l Therefore, to emphasize thew' yeitence of maintaining appropriate security at the facility, and [
promptly responding to indications of degrade'd conditions, I have been authorized, after r consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to propose a civil penalty in the amount ; of $55,000 for this Severity Level ill violation. You are required to. respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should also describe i i actions taken or planned, to ensure, appropriate attention is given to resolution of mainten,ance i" requests in a timely manner. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. l lr
' For example, on April 27,1998, a Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $165,000 was issued for several violations of NRC requirements. (
Reference:
EAs 97-482 and 97-525) t NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-20 t
. - - . . . . - - - . . ~ - . - - -- - -_ - . - . - . .. . . - ~ . . - - _ . . _ . Boston Edison Company 3 in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, without safeguards information, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). , Sincerely, ! t r H rt J. Miller
- Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-293 f License No. DPR-35 l
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-21
1 Boston Edison Company 4 cc w/enci(w/o SGI): R. Ledgett, Executive Vice President - Operations C. Goddard, Plant Department Manager i N. Desmond, Regulatory Relations ! D. Tarantino, Nuclear Information Manager R. Hallisey, Department 6f Public Health, Commonwealth of Massachusetts The Honorable Therese Murray The Honorable Joseph Gallitano l B. Abbanat, Department of Public Utilities Chairman, Plymouth Board of Selectmen i Chairman, Duxbury Board of Selectmen Chairman, Nuclear Matters Committee ' Plymouth Civil Defense Director i P. Gromer, Massachusetts Secretary of Energy Resources ; J. Miller, Senior issues Manager
. J. Fleming A. Nogee, MASSPIRG Office of the Commissiorter, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering ,
l Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts i T. Rapone, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety l Chairman, Citizens Urging Responsible Energy j Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SLO Designee 1 l l l j i 4 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-22
ENCLOSURE NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Boston Edison Company Docket No. 50-293 Pilgrim License No. DPR-35 EA 98-191 During an NRC inspection conducted on March 2-5 and 11-12,1998, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act),42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violation and associated civil penalty are set forth below: License Condition 3.g of License No. DPR-35 requires that the licensee fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security plan, including amendments made pursuant to provisions of 10 CFR 73.55. (SGl) THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION ANDIS NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSUREITISINTENil0NALLY LERBLANK. (SGi>
)
(SGI) THis PARAGRAPH CONTAINSSAFEGUARDS i INFORMATION ANDIS NOTFOR PUBLIC i DISCLOSUREliISINTENil0NALLY LER BLANK. (SGI) THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS (SGl) INFORMATION ANDIS NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSUREITISINTENil0NALLY LEFT BLANK. NUREG-094 , PART 2 A-23
i j 2 Enclosure THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFFGUARDS INFORMATION ANDIS NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSUREITISINTENil0NALLY LEFT BLANX. (SGI) (01013) This is a Severity Level 111 Violation (Supplement 111). Civil Penalty - $55,000. Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Boston Edison Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a
" Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reacons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232,this response i shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty, in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Shoud the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed, in addition to protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-24
1 I l Enclosure 3 , In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee ] is dire'cted to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedura for imposing a
- civil penalty.
- Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c.
The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: Director, Office of Enforcement, U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Director, Special Projects Office, NRR, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l Commission, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of l this Notice. I Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent ) possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so l that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary 1 information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed j copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted , copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such j material, you mutil specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the
- disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an l acceptable response, please provide the lovel of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. !
I l Dated at King of Prussia, PA
- this 19th day of May 1998 i
NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-25
UNITED STATES f[AMag% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGloN 11 y 3 4 d ,,, nj ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER 61 FORSYTH STREET SW. sVITE 23T85
% 2 ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30303 3415
% y - /
*** December 12, 1997 EA 97 490 Carolina Power & Light Company ATTN: Mr. J. S. Keenan Vice President H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville. South Carolina 29550
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY -
$55,000 (NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50 261/97-10)
Dear Mr. Keenan:
This refers to the inspection conducted on August 31 October 11, 1997, at H. B. Robinson Unit 2. The purpose of the inspection was to review an August 1997 event during which the "B" emergency diesel generator (EDG) output breaker control switch was identified by the NRC resident inspector to be in the partial ~ pull-out" position rather than the neutral" position. An exit interview was conducted on October 24, 1997, and the results of the inspection were sent to you by letter dated November 7.1997. An open, predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region II office on November 25, 1997, with you and members of your staff, to discuss the violations, the root causes, and your corrective actions to preclude recurrence. A list of conference attendees and copies of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) and Carolina Power & Light Company's (CP&L) presentation materials are enclosed. A videotape which CP&L used during its presentation is available for viewing at NRC's Region II office. - Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that was provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. Two violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. Violation A involved the failure to promptly identify and correct a mispositioned EDG output breaker control switch. The mispositioned switch caused the "B" EDG to be inoperable for an indeterminate period. Although auxiliary operator tours included local verification of portions of the EDG panels housing the switch, the tour procedure did not specifically require verification of the switch position. The violation appears to have been caused by the lack of effective physical and/or administrative configuration control measures to prevent the switch mispositioning or alert personnel earlier to the mispositioning. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-26
= =. . . - - - . _ _ _ . . - - - - -- -
CP&L 2 I Violation B involved the failure to take adequate corrective action to preclude repetition of configuration control errors affecting the EDG local control panels. In November 1993, an event similar to the August 1997 EDG switch mispositioning event occurred. A Severity Level III problem (Enforcement Action (EA) 93 298) was issued on March 14. 1994, identifying two violations. One of these violations was cited against 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B', Criterion II, for the failure to provide controls over activities affecting the EDGs to an extent consistent with their importance to safety. Specifically, the violation cited a failure to assure control of the position of the automatic voltage regulator adjustment potentiometers for the "A" and "B" EDGs. Violation B cited in the enclosed Notice, was originally proposed in our letter of November 7,1997, as an apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. Criterion II. The violation has been recharacterized as a failure to take adequate corrective action to preclude repetition of the previous 1994 Criterion II violation. Although the mispositioning event had no actual safety consequences, the potential safety consequences of the event were high. With tne switch mis)ositioned, an undervoltage condition on the E-2 Emergency Bus concurrent wit 1 an EDG start would have caused the EDG output breaker to close and immediately reopen. As a result, the "B" EDG would have been incapable of automatically energizing the E 2 Emergency Bus for a significant period of time. The regulatory significance is also high because the 1993 event should have alerted you to the need to place more comprehensive configuration controls on components that are not alarmed when they are out of the safeguards position. Moreover, the importance of these controls should have been recognized given the absence of automatic alarms to alert operators to situations which could remain undetected until the EDG was called on to mitigate an accident. CP&L's April 13, 1994 response to EA 93 298, stated that other equipment with no automatic indication of equipment misalignment had been added to Operator logs for routine checks. However, this critical switch was not included in the operators' periodic logs and no other positive administrative controls, such as those afforded by specific operator status checks or physical barriers to switch movement were provided. Therefore, the violations have been categorized in the aggregate in accordance with the
" General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy). NUREG 1600, as a Severity Level III problem.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil pencity in the amount of $55.000 is considered for a Severity Level III problem. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two years,' the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification l and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process l described in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NRC determined that credit was not warranted for Identification because, as discussed above, 2 A Severity Level III violation was issuect on May 16. 1996. for failure to control safeguards information properly (EA 96120). NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-27
i CP&L 3 l the mispositioned switch was identified by the NRC and prior opportunities to identify the violations existed. Your corrective actions included: (1) the placement of temporary caution tags on both switches: (2) the installation of protective covers on both EDG generator control panels: (3) revision of i operating lineup, operator rounds, and testing procedures to include . verifications of proper equipment )ositions, both periodically and after j manipulation during the quarterly EDG test; and (4) verification of the i positions of other switches and evaluation of the need for protective covers l' and/or similar configuration controls for other switches. Based on the above, the NRC determined that credit was warranted for the factor of Corrective j Action. Therefore, to emphasize the importance of prompt identification of conditions ! adverse to quality and the need for configuration control of equipment ; important to stfety, and in recognition of your previous escalated enforcement actions, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice in the base amour.t of $55,000 for , the Severity Level III problem. j You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your ! I response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence of the violations. After reviewing j your response,to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and : the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC l enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory i requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of j this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. I f Sincerely, , A0n Luis A. Reyes ! Regional Administrator L l Docket Nos. 50 261 . I License Nos..DPR-23 ;
Enclosures:
- 1. Notice of Violation and Proposed !
Imposition of Civil Penalty i
+
- 2. NRC Presentation Materials l 3. CP&L Presentation Materials ,
l 4. List of Attendees L l cc w/encls: See page 4 l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-28 I I Y
l CP&L 4 l cc w/encls Dale E. Young Director l Director, Site Operations Division of Radiation Protection i Carolina Fower & Light Company N. C. Department of Enviror. ment, i H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Health & Natural Resources 3581 West Entrance Road 3825 Barrett Drive . Hartsville, SC 29550 Raleigh, NC 27609-7721 ! J. W. Moyer W. D. Johnson Vice President Plant General Manager and Senior Counsel Carolina Power & Light Company Carolina Power & Light Co. : H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant P. O. Box 1551 3581 West Entrance Road Raleigh, NC 27602 Hartsville, SC 29550 1 Assistant Attorney General l D. B. Alexander._ Manager State of North Carolina Performance Evaluation and P. O. Box 629 Regulatory Affairs OHS 7 Raleigh, NC 27602 Carolina Power & Light Company 412 S. Wilmington Street Executive Director : Raleigh, NC 27601 Public Staff NCUC ! P. O. Box 29520 : H. K. Chernoff, Supervisor Raleigh, NC 27626 0520
. Licensing / Regulatory Programs Carolina Power & Light Company Public Service Commission H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant State of South Carolina ,
3581 West Entrance Road P. O. Box 11649 Hartsville, SC 29550 Columbia, SC 29211 T. M. Wilkerson, Manager Hartsville Memorial Library Regulatory Affairs 147 W. College Avenue - Carolina Power & Light Company Hartsville. SC 29550 H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant 3581 West Entrance Road , Hartsville, SC 29550 Chief , Bureau of Radiological Health Dept. of Health and Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, SC 29201 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-29
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Carolina Power & Light Company Docket Nos. 50-261 Robinson Unit 2 License Nos. DPR-23 EA 97-490 During an NRC inspection conducted from August 31 through October 11, 1997, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the
" General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions "
NUREG 1600, the NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty aursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 J.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below: 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to cuality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is cetermined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. A. Contrary to the above, as of August 20, 1997, the licensee failed to ; establish measures to assure that conditions adverse to quality were promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify that the B" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) output breaker control switch was mispositioned; and, therefore, failed to correct the switch position error resulting in the inoperability of the EDG. (01013) B. Contrary to the above, as of August 20, 1997, the licensee failed to take adequate corrective action to preclude repetition of a Severity Level III violation issued in March 14, 1994 (EA 93-298) involving position control errors affecting the EDG local control panels. Specifically, the licensee did not take comprehensive corrective 1 action in that they failed to include the EDG output breaker control f switches in Auxiliary Operator logs to be checked on rounds or take other measures to control activities affecting the EDG local control panels. (01023) These violations represent a Severity Level III problem (Supplement I).
- Civil Penalty $55,000.
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Carolina Power & Light Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-30
Notice of Violation and Proposed 2 Imposition of Civil Penalty violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved. (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the ; time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or - why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the resoonse time for good cause shown. Under the ; -authority of Section 182 of tie Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be t submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under ; 10 CFR 2,201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to ; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or may ; protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written l answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear I Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time l specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the i Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting i I the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly maiked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violations listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to - 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific . reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The l attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205. regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General., and the penalty, unless . l compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282c. I The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: Mr. James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcemer.t. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the Robinson facility. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-31
Netice of Violation and Proposed 3 Imposition of Civil Penalty Because your res)onse will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possi ale, it should not include any personal privacy, aroprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR wit 1out ' redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that ioentifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must s)ecifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withield and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this 12th day of December 1997 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-32 l
i UNITED STATES
#pa a849'o g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 61 FORSYT SR 23T85 g"***/ MMTA. GEORGIA 30303-3415 March 26, 1998 l
EA 98-020 Carolina Power and Light Company ATIN: Mr. W. R. Robinson Vice President - Harris Plant Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. 0. . Box 165. Hail Code: Zone 1 New Hill, NC 27562-0165
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY -
$55.000 AND EXERCISE OF DISCRETION (NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-400/98-02) s
Dear Mr. Robinson:
This refers to the inspection conducted on December 8-12, 1997, at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. The inspection included a review of the access authorization program at the Harris plant. The results of the inspection were discussed with members of your staff at the exit conducted on January 21. . 1998, and formally transmitted to you by letter dated January 23. 1998. An open, predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region II office on February 26. 1998, with you and members of your staff to discuss the apparent violations. the root causes, and corrective actions to preclude I recurrence. A list of conference attendees, copies of the Nuclear Regulatory 1 Commission's (NRC's-) slides, and Carolina Power and Light Company's (CP&L) presentation materials are enclosed. Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information you provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of V'olation, and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. Violation I involves two examples where individuals were ina>propriately granted unescorted access to the protected and vital areas of tie plant because pertinent information was not properly reviewed and evaluated in accordarce with 10 CFR 73.56(b)(3). License i Condition Amendment Nd. 75 and plant procedures. Specifically the first example involves your lack of adequate review and evaluation of pertinent , information on a Personnel History Questionnaire (PHQ) related to illegal use l or possession of a controlled substance, which allowed an individual to be inappropriately granted unescorted access to the protected and vital areas from April 5 to May 15. 1997. Had a thorough review of the PHQ been conducted. the individual would not have been granted unescorted access because your procedures delineate that information related to illegal use or possession of a controlled substance is sufficient to disqualify an 1.ndividual for unescorted access. This example was identified on June 24, 1997. well after the individual was favorably terminated, when you received the results of a Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal background history check. The second example involves the inappropriate granting of unescorted access to three contractors after a psychological assessment determined that unescorted NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-33
Carolins Power and Light Company 2 access for these individuals should be held in abeyance pending further evaluation. You subsequently determined that one of these three individuals, who was granted unescorted access to the 3rotected and vital areas from April 8 to May 13, 1997, should not have 3een granted unescorted access. The two other individuals were later determined to satisfy criteria for granting unescorted access to protected and vital areas. This second example also was- l identified well after the individuals were favorably terminated, through a routine review of access authorization files. At the conference, you : identified the root causes of the violation to be personnel errors and inattention to detail. A contributing cause was a failure to establish and utilize adequate performance indicators to assess organizational performance following previous access authorization events in 1996. As discussed at the predecisional enforcement conference the NRC also considers a contributing cause of these access authorization issues to be a lack of effective management of changes in the security access program. Although your subsequent review of plant access, security records, and work history of the individuals involved did not find adverse consequences, this violation represents a significant regulatory concern. Your inability to control access authorization through established systems or procedures could i compromise overall plant security. Had your staff conducted a thorough review and evaluation of pertinent information. individuals would not have been granted unescorted access to protected and vital areas, or additional evaluation would have been warranted prior to granting unescorted access. The , manner in which your access authorization arogram was implemented is contrary to the objectives and requirements in 10 C R 73.56 of providing high assurance that unescorted access be granted only to individuals who are reliable and trustworthy. Therefore, this violation has been classified in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level III violation. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55.000 is considered for a Severity Level III violation. Because your facility pas been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two years . the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NRC determined that credit was warranted for Identification because you identified the first access authorization example through a procedurally required criminal history record check by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Independent of this issue, you identified the second example regarding the psychological evaluations through your normal review process of access authorization records. Your corrective actions were both prompt and comprehensive, and included: (1) suspension of ' the subject individuals' eligibility for future access: (2) an immediate : second review of background files and review of psychological and PHO data for - temporary clearances: (3) enhancements of the psychologists' review form and the PHQ form: (4) a procedurally required second review of access I A severity Level III problem was issued on April 24. 1997, associated with multiple failures to implement various aspects of the Access Authorization and Fitness for Duty programs (EA 97-056. 97-057 97-058). NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-34
Carolina Power and Light Company 3 i authorization files prior to granting access: (5) strengthening the performance of the individuals in the access authorization program; (6) discussions of lessons learned with the security staff; and (7) development of a means to monitor personnel performance. Thus, based on the above, the NRC has concluded that credit is warranted for Identification and Corrective Action. Normally, a civil penalty would not be considered for a violation categorized i at Severity Level III when the licensee has been given credit for ! Identification and Corrective Action. However, this violation is similar to l earlier violations identified in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-325.324/97-01. 50-400/97-02. and 50-261/97-02, and dispositioned as escalated enforcement (EA 97-056, 97-057, 97-058, issued April 24. 1997). The previous enforcement actions were associated with multiple failures to im)lement various aspects of your corporate access authorization programs at the iarris and Brunswick plants. As you reiterated at the aredecisional enforcement conference, the access authorization program for tie Harris. Brunswick, and Robinson facilities is a corporate managed and implemented program. Violations A.1 and A.4 of EA 97-056. 97-057, 97-058 were issued because your corporate access authorization program did not adequately review and evaluate all pertinent information developed as part of the decision to grant deny. revoke, or : continue an unescorted access authorization in accordance with 10 CFR l 73.56(b)(3). These violations also resulted in individuals being I ! inaparopriately granted unescorted access to protected and vital areas. Based on tie similarity of the issues documented in Inspection Report No, l 50-400/98-02 and discussed at the predecisional enforcement conference with ! those violations issued as part of EA 97-056, 97-057. 97-058, the NRC has ; determined that the exercise of discretion is appropriate in accordance with Section VII. A.1 of the Enforcement Policy. Therefore, to emphasize the ) importance of precluding similar violations associated with the access ; authorization program. I have been authorized after consultation with the ! Director. Office of Enforcement, and the Deputy Executive Director for Regulatory Effectiveness, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and . Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the base amount of 555.000 for the l Severity Level III violation. ' An additional issue discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-400/98-02 as EEI 50-400/98-02-01, and at the predecisional enforcement conference, concerns the granting of unescorted access to 14 individuals prior to the review / adjudication of all pertinent information listed on the PHQ. Your i review determined that the file containing various access authorization material for these individuals was missing certain information. This missing information was required to be reviewed prior to granting unescorted access in accordance with your procedures. Nonetheless, the 14 individuals were inappropriately granted unescorted access; however, your subsequent reviews determined that the missing information would not have precluded the granting of unescorted access to protected and vital areas. For this reason. the NRC has determined that this violation of plant procedures is less significant. Although you identified and corrected this issue, the NRC has determined that this violation should be clas-ified at Severity Level IV. because it also is similar to Violation A.1 and A.4 of EA 97-056, 97-057, and 97-058. NUREG-0940. PART 2 A-35 l '
Carolina Power and Light Company 4 You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions j specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will i use your response. in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice." a co)y of this letter. its enclosures, and your response will be placed in the NRC
.Public Document Room (PDR).
Sincerely. > bTMd. 6b
% Luis A. Reyes Regional Administrator ,
Docket Nos. 50-400 , License Nos. DPR-63
Enclosures:
- 1. Notice of Violation
- 2. List of Attendees i
- 3. NRC Slides
- 4. Licensee Material i
l l i NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-36 ,
- ' Carolina Power and Light Company 5 cc w/encls
D. B. Alexander. Manager Performance Evaluation and l Regulatory Affairs OHS 7 l Carolina Power & Light Company , 412 S. Wilmington Street ! Raleigh. NC 27601 l J. W. Donahue ! Director of Site Operations i Carolina Power & Light Company l Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant ' P. O. Box 165. MC: Zone 1 i New Hill NC 27562-0165 l Bo Clark Plant General Manager - Harris Plant . Carolina Power & Light Company l Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. O. Box 165 New Hill. NC 27562-0165 i Chris A. VanDenburgh Manager
. Regulatory Affairs Carolina Power & Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. O. Box 165. Mail Zone 1
' New Hill, NC 27562-0165 Johnny H. eJs. Supervisor ! Licensing / Regulatory Programs : Carolina Power & Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. O. Box 165. Mail Zone 1 New Hill NC 27562-0165 W. D.-Johnson. Vice President and Senior Counsel Carolina Power & Light Company P. O. Box 1551 l- Raleigh. NC 27602 l l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-37 I l l
l
~
Carolina Power and Light Company- 6 1 I cc w/ encl:-(Con't) . i Mel Fry. Acting Director Division of Radiation Protection- , N. C. Department of Environment. l l
. Health & Natural Resources- i 3825 Barrett Drive Raleigh, NC- 27609-7721 Karen E. Long i Assistant Attorney General !'
State of North Carolina P. O. Box 629 Raleigh. NC 27602 Public Service Commission State of South Carolina : P. D. Box 11649 Columb1a. SC 29211 Chairman of the North Carolina Utilities Commission !
.P. O.-Box 29510 Raleigh. NC 27626-0510 ,
Robert P. Gruber l u- Executive Director i Public Staff NCUC- ! P.-0. Box 29520 l Raleigh. NC 27626 : 1 i
- Stewart Adcock. Chairman Board of County Commissioners. !
< of Wake County-
-P. O. Box 550 i Raleigh NC 27602 i
Margaret Bryant Pollard Chairman i Board of County Commissioners of Chatham County l
.P. O. Box 87 ,
Pittsboro. NC 27312 l i NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-38
i NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY l Carolina Power & Ligt.t Company Docket No. 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant License No. DPR-63 EA 98-020 During an NRC inspection conducted on December 8-12_ 1997, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with tne " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions.' NUREG-1600, the NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act). 42 U.S.C 2282. and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below:
- 1. Violation Assessed a Civil Penalty 10 CFR 73.56(b) requires the licensee to establish and maintain an l
Access Authorization Program granting individuals unescorted access to protected and vital areas with the objective of providing high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable. l and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of l the public including a potential to commit radiological sabotage. l 10 CFR 73.56(b)(3) requires that the licensee base its decision to I grant deny. revoke, or continue an unescorted access authorization on I review and evaluation of all pertinent information developed. License Condition Amendment No. 75. requires the licensee to fully l implement and maintain in effect' all provisions of the Commission-approved Physical Security Plan. Nuclear Worker Screening Program for Unescorted Access. SEC-NGGC-2101. ' Paragraph 9.8. Revision 6. dated February 28, 1997, implements part of i the security plan for access authorization. It states. "When l considering unescorted access, the Company shall examine information obtained as a result of the background investigation and psychological evaluation process." The following conditions are sufficient to disqualify the individual from unescorted access: Illegal use or possession of a controlled substance A psychological evaluation which indicates that the person is a risk in terms of trustworthiness or reliability Contrary to the above, the licensee did not follow procedure SEC-NGGC . 2101 in the two examples below: 1 On March 31, 1997, disqualifying information associated with a. illegal use or possession of a controlled substance on a Personnel History Questionnaire was not properly reviewed and evaluated. As
- a result.~3n indivi~ dual was inappropriately granted unescorted
- access to the protected and vital areas from April 5 through May 15. 1997.
j NUREG-0940. PART 2 A-39 i _ - -
Notice of Violation 2
' b. On March 31. 1997, results of a psychological evaluation determined that unescorted access for three individuals should be held in abeyance, pending further review. However, one individual, not able to satisfy the psychological criteria. was
. granted unescorted access to the protected and vital areas from April 8 through May 13, 1997. The other two individuals, subsequently determined to satisfy psychological criteria. also were granted unescorted access prior to additional psychological evaluation. (01013)
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement III). Civil Penalty - $55.000. II. Violation Not Assessed a Civil Penalty 10 CFR 73.56(b) requires the licensee to establish and maintain an Access Authorization Program granting individuals unescorted access to protected ar.d vital areas with the objective of providing high assurance that' individuals granted. unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public including a potential to commit radiological sabotage. . 10 CFR 73.56(b)(3) requires that.the licensee base its decision to grant, deny, revoke, or continue an unescorted access authorization on review and evaluation of all pertinent information developed. License Condition Amendment No. 75 requires the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-
. approved Physical Security Plan.
Nuclear Worker Screening Program for Unescorted Access. SEC-NGGC-2101. Paragraph 9.8.1 Revision 6. dated February 28. 1997, recuires the licensee to review pertinent background investigation anc psychological information prior to granting unescorted access. Contrary to the above. on during March and April 1997, the licensee failed to follow procedure SEC-NGGC-2101 in that 14 individuals were granted unescorted access )rior to review / adjudication of all pertinent information listed on the >HQ. (02014) This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement III). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201. Carolina Power and Light Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted and if denied. the reasons why. (3) the corrective i steps that have been taken and the results achieved. (4) the corrective steps NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-40 s
l l Notice of Violation 3 that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2232. this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201. the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with i a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is 3roposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part.
)y a written answer addressed to the Director. Office of Enforcement.
! U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within i the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part. such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation listed in this Notice, in whole or in part. (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances. (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201. but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g.. citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205.
- regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty.
Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General. and the penalty. unless compromised. remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil Jenalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: James _ieberman. Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l Commission. One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike. Rockville. MD 20852- j 2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l Commission. Region II. l Because your res)onse will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). to the extent possi)le. it should not include any personal privacy. 3roprietary. 1 or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR wit 1out redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-41
l 1 Notice of Violation 4 l
)
provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your 1 response that identifies the information that should be protected and a l redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If ycu request l withholding of such material, you mg1 s)ecifically identify the portions of . , your response that you seek to have withield and provide in detail the bases i for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information ! will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the j information required by 10.CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding j confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information ; is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of ; protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. l Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this 26th day of March 1998 i l I l i i t i l l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-42 l l
-- .. . - - , . .-- ., . . - - - - . - - ~ . _ - . ~ ~ - - - - . - - - - - . - -
l l l f** "' % UNITED STATES ! f k NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l ! i 1; nEcioN m l 5 ! 801 WARRENVILLE ROAD ( ""** jf USLE. GNOIS 60632-4351 October 9, 1996 l EA 96-253 Mr. John P. Stetz Senior Vice President - Nuclear i Centerior Service Company Post Office Box 97, A200. Perry, Ohio 44081 l
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY - 5160,000 s (U.S. DEPARTMENT Of LABOR (DOL) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE (ALJ) RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER (CASE NO. 96-ERA-6))
Dear Mr. Stetz:
On October 26, 1995, the DOL Wage and Hour Division in Cleveland, Ohio, received a complaint by six insulators who claimed that they were denied access'at Centerior Energy facilities because they were involved in litigation , against Centerior regarding an exposure to radioactive materials while working , at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The denial of access by Centerior j resulted in Fischbach Power Services, Inc., a Centerior contractor at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, terminating one insulator and not hiring the other ] five. In response t'o the complaint, the Wage and Hour Division conducted an investigation, and in a letter dated January 9, 1996, the District Director of the Wage and Hour Division found that the evidence obtained during the Division's investigation indicated that the six insulators were protected employees engaging in a protected activity within the scope of the Energy Reorganization Act and that discrimination as defined and prohibited by the statute was a factor in the actions which comprise their complaint. Centerior filed an appeal with the 00L ALJ on January 16, 1996. In a Recommended Decision and Order dated June 11, 1996, the ALJ determined that the complainants had shown by the clear preponderance of evidence that Centerior's actions, which resulted in the termination of one complainant and the banning I of the other five complainants, were in deliberate retaliation for their filing the civil complaint under the Atomic Energy Act. Based on NRC review of the ALJ's Recommended Decision and Order, two ! violations of the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR 50.7, " Employee , Protection," have occurred. Under 10 CFR 50.7, discrimination by a Commission licensee against an employee or contractor employee for engaging in protected activities is prohibited. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) and the , circumstances surrounding the violation are described in detail in the ALJ's Recommended Decision and Order. Before the NRC made its enforcement decision, we provided you an opportunity to respond to the apparent violation in a ! letter dated July 18, 1996. In your response dated August 16, 1996, you I disputed the apparent violation because~you believe that a "public liability action" (i.e., a radiation injury lawsuit) is not conduct protected by the
- NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-43 i
I
i l l October 9, 1996 J. P. Stetz 2 l Energy Reorganization Act, and because you believe you had a legitimate basis i for declining to hire individuals who profess to be suffering severe and l debilitating emotional distress However, the D0L ALJ disagreed with your ; legal argument and determined that Centerior's proffered reasons for terminating one of the insulators and banning the other five insulators, l including your emotional distress argument, were pretextual. We do not , disagree with the ALJ that filing a civil action against you under the Atomic Energy Act in this case is a protected activity. l Since the discrimination involved actions by the then-Director of the Perry . Nuclear Services Department, essentially arising out of a single protected ! activity, the violations have been categorized as a Severity Level Il problem in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcen)ent Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. Such violations are ' very significant because they could have a chilling effect on other licensee ; or contractor personnel and deter them from identifying and/or raising safety l concerns. < In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $80,000 is considered for a Severity Level 11 problem. The NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and for Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. ' Credit was not warranted for identification because the violation was not self-identified. Credit was not warranted for your f corrective actions. You notified your employees of your decision to pursue an appeal of the ALJ's decision and emphasized that none of your employees misinterpret the appeal as any indication of unreceptiveness to safety concerns. Additionally, you re-emphasized that all employees should understand that it is their duty to identify conditions adverse to quality or safety and they may do so, publicly or confidentially, without any fear of ; retaliation. However, as you have informed us, you have neither provided a remedy to the parties involved in the D0L proceeding against you nor do you plan any further corrective action, unless the ALJ's decision is not overturned on administrative appeal or judicial review. Therefore, to emphasize the importance of continuously assuring a work environment that is free of any harassment, intimidation, or discrimination against those who are engaged in protected activities, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, and the Deputy , Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and ; Research, to issue the enclosed Notice in the total (twice the base) amount of i $160,000 for the Severity Level Il problem. i You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. Since the NRC enforcement action in this case is being proposed prior to the final decision of the U.S. Department of Labor Administrative Review Board on this matter, ' you may delay payment of the proposed civil penalty, as well as certain portions of the response, as described in the enclosed Notice, until 30 days l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-44 e r l
l l J. P. Stetz 3 October 9, 1996 after the final dec!sion of the U.S. Department of Labor Administrative Review Board. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further i enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of :
- this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public l Document Room (PDR).
Sincerely, t A. ill Beat Regional Administrator g Docket No. 50-440 License No. NPF-58
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty , cc w/ encl: L. W. Myers, Vice President, Nuclear
- L. W. Worley, Director, Nuclear Services Department J. D. Kloosterman, Manager, Regulatory Affairs W. R. Kanda, Director, Perry Nuclear Assurance Department N. L. Bonner, Director, Perry Nuclear Engineering Dept.
H. Ray Caldwell, General Superintendent Nuclear Operations R. D. Brandt, General Manager Operations Terry J. Lodge, Esq. State Liaison Officer, State of Ohio Robert E. Owen, Ohio Department of Health C. A. Glazer, State of Ohio, Public Utilities Commission j I l. ! NUREGG40, PART 2 A-45 l
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF civil PENALTY Centerior Service Company Docket No. 50-440 Perry Nuclear Power Plant License No. NPF-58 EA 96-253 Based on the Recommended Decision and Order by a U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) Administrative Law Judge dated June 11, 1996 (DOL Case No. 96-ERA-6), violations of NRC requirements were identified. in accordance with the
" General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
NUREG-1600, the NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below: 10 CFR 50.7(a), in part, prohibits discrimination by a Commission licensee against an employee for engaging in certain protected activities. Discrimination includes discharge and other actions that relate to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
. employment. Protected activities are described in Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and in general are related to the administration or enforcement of a requirement imposed under the Atomic Energy Act or Energy Reorganization Act, and include, but are not limited to, an employee providing the Commission or his or her employer information about alleged violations of either the Atomic Energy Act or the Energy Reorganization Act.
- 1. Contrary to the above, as determined by the D0L Administrative Law Judge's Recommended Decision and Order in Case No. 96-ERA-6 dated June 11, 1996, Centerior Energy Company discriminated against six insulators, Messrs. Owen McCafferty, Dennis Maloney, Sean Kilbane, Terry McLaughlin, Sean McCafferty, and Robert Prohaska, for engaging in protected activities in that on October 13, 1995, Centerior banned all six insulators from working at any Centerior facility in retaliation for the insulators filing a civil complaint under the Atomic Energy Act.
(01012)
- 2. Contrary to the above, as determined by the DOL Administrative Law Judge's Recommended Decision and Order in Case No. 96-ERA-6 dated June 11, 1996, Centerior Energy Company discriminated against Mr. Dennis Maloney on October 16, 1995, when it instructed its ccntractor to terminate Mr. Maloney from his employment at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant in retaliation for the insulators filing a civil complaint under the Atomic Energy Act. (01022)
This is a Severity Level II Problem (Supplement VII). Civil Penalty - $160,000. Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Centerior Service Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-46
i Notice of Violation 3 l compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant i to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory } Commission, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-l ; - 2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the 4 facility that is the subject of this Notice. i Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, 1 or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request l withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of l your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases ) for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b)-to support a request for withholding 3
- confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of
- protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
4 1 Dated at Lisle, Illinois j this 9th day of October 1996 t NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-48
~ .. ----- _
2 Notice of Violation of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. At your election, responses to Items (1) and (2) may be deferred until 30 days after Yourtheresponse decisionmay of reference the U.S. or Department include of Labor Administrative Review Board. previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as 'may be Consideration may be given to extending the proper should not be taken. Under the authority of Section 182 of the response time for good cause shown. Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within 30 days of the final decision of the U.S. Department of Labor Administrative Review Board in this case, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or Should may the protest imposition of the Licensee fail to Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should (1) deny the be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: violation listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstantes, (3) show error .in this Notice, or (4) show otherIn addition reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed Any writtenin Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g.,The attention of the citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. Licensee is d procedure for imposing a civil penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-47 1
/ "' % y UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY OOMMISSION ; ,e( '% REGloN m E'
hj 801 WARRENVILLE ROAD
- e. . , , f USLE. ILLINols 60532-4351 November 18, 1997 EAs 96-482,96-542,97-047, and 97-430 Mr. Lew W. Myers Vice President - Nuclear Centerior Service Company P.O. Box 97, A200 Perry, OH 44081
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF civil PENALTY-
$100,000 (Reports 50-440/96016 (DRS), 50-440/96017 (DRP), 50-440/96018 (DRP), and 50-440/97008(DRS)) and EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Dear Mr. Myers:
This refers to three routine safety inspections conducted from December 28,1996 through February 3,1997, and a special inspection conducted from July 21 through August 27,1997, at the Centerior Service Company's (Centerior) Perry 1 Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP). Among the more significant findings from the three routine safety inspections were failures to: (1) take effective corrective action following an earlier event to prevent repetition;.(2) protect cables and equipment in the same fire control zone outside of primary containment from hot shorts; and (3) restore operability of a motor control center (MCC) within the time specified in the Perry Plant Technical Specifications (TS). The reports documenting these inspections and transmitting the apparent violations were sent to Centerior by letters dated January 23,1997, February 4,1997, and March 19,1997. An open predecisional enforcement conference (PEC) was held in the NRC Region 111 office on April 18,1997, at which time the violations, root causes and corrective actions were discussed. A follow-up conference was held on October 7, 1997, to discuss the corrective actions. ) j The purpose of the special inspection (Inspection Report No. 50-440/97008(DRS)) was to follow up on issues identified during the NRC Design inspection conducted at PNPP from I February 17 through March 27,1997 (Inspection Report No 50-440/97201). An apparent violation involving a change to the emergency closed cooling (ECC) system was identified during this inspection. This issue also appeared to represent an unreviewed safety question (USQ). The exit meeting for the specialinspection was conducted on August 27,1997. The inspection report for the special inspection was mailed to Centerior by letter, dated September 23,1997. On October 7,1997, an open PEC was held in the NRC Region 111 office to discuss the apparent violation, and the report of the PEC was sent to Centerior by letter, l dated October 16,1997. l Based on the information developed during the inspections and the information provided by ! representatives of Centerior at the conferences, the NRC has determined that several significant violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed I NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-49
L Myers Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection reports. Violation A (EA 97-047) of the enclosed Notice pertains to a November 9,1996 event. This violation is considered significant because it concems a failure to take lasting corrective actions following a similar event in 1994. The November 9,1996 event occurred as operators were retuming a hydraulic power unit (HPU) for the reactor recirculation system 'A' Flow Control Valve to service. The operators were required to confirm that output power was available from the HPU programmable logic controller prior to restarting the HPU. A technician reported that a l fuse was blown, indicating an operate / isolate solenoid valve had no power. The shift supervisor consulted with one of the responsible system engineers and decided the HPU could be restarted with the blown fuse in place. The reactor operator then proceeded to restart the HPU. However, the operator was notifying plant personnel of the HPU restart and he was not attentive to critical reactor parameters. Approximately 12 seconds after the HPU was started, the shift supervisor recognized that the flow control valve was opening and reactor power was increasing. He then took action to stop the reactivity addition. Nevertheless, reactor power increased from 98 percent to 100.2 percent during the transient. The significance of this event is that, even though several people were involved in developing the plan to retum the flow control valve to service, the actions taken did not take into consideration lessons learned from a prior similar event. Operator training following the 1994 event apparently failed to adequately inform the operators of the potential consequences of an HPU subloop operate / isolate solenoid failure and the impact on reactivity. Violation A represents a breakdown in the implementation of corrective actions following an incident on July 27,1994, as corrective actions from that event were insufficient to prevent recurrence of a similar event on November 9,1996. The violation also represents a potentially significant lack of attention toward reactivity control. Therefore, Violation A is categorized in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," (Enforcement Policy) NUREG 1600 as a Severity Level lil violation. In addition t,o the violation, we are concemed that the shift supervisor became overly focused on restarting the flow control valve HPU instead of maintaining a broad perspective of operational conditions. In acco'rdance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level 111 violation (Violation A) occurring prior to No" ember 12,1996. Since the Perry Plant has beer' the subject of an escalated enforcement action within the last two years', the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit was not warranted for Identification because the event was se:f-identifying and a similar event in 1994 provided prior opportunity to identify that starting the HPU with a blown fuse could result in reactivity excursions. Also, several workers from diffvi%
' A Notice of Violation without civil penalty was issued for EA 96-367. The issue was categorized as a Severity Levellit problem for the failure to consider ECC or ECC loops inoperable under conditions specified in PNPP Technical Specification 3.7.1.2.
NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-50
L. Myers disciplines were involved in developing the plan to return the flow control valve to service. This provided plant personnel with additional opportunities to identify anticipated problems prior to actually restarting the HPU. Credit for Corrective Action was warranted for Violation A. The NRC recognizes that high level management attention was given to the November 9,1996 event and an investigation into the event was completed. it was also recognized that Centerior took corrective actions to address operational performance weaknesses associated with the event. Other corrective actions include, but are not limited to: remedial action for the crew that caused the event; training on the event for the other crews; and modifications to improve HPU reliability. To emphasize the importance of reactivity controls and the need for effective corrective actions in response to events, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of
$50,000.
Violation B (EA 96-542) pertains to a miswired electrical breaker installed in an MCC which supplies safety related loads for various systems, including the Control Room Emergency Recirculation (CRER) system. Violation B represents a significant failure to comply with an Action Statement for a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (TS LCO) where the appropriate action was not taken within the required time on at least four occasions from March 10 to September 17,1996. Therefore, Violation B is categorized in accordance with the Enforcement Policy as a Severity Level lli violation. Since the Perry Plant was the subject of the previously described escalated enforcement action, within the last two years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for ldentification and Corrective Action for violation B in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit was warranted for Identification because the event was self-identifying, but without reasonable prior opportunities to discover the miswired breaker. Also, Centerior proactively identified other similar breakers purchased and installed at the same time and performed appropriate inspections. Credit was also warranted for Corrective Actions because, even though the vendor considered this event an isolated case, Centerior performed an additional comprehensive evaluation of the susceptibility of other breakers from this vendor to miswiring and developed a method to test the polarity of the signals to the solid state trip device. Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations, I have been authorized after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty for Violation B. Violation C (EA 97-430) involves the failure to identify a USQ for the ECC surge tanks. The ECC surge tanks were designed to ensure adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) was provided to the ECC pumps. Further, the design of the surge tanks provided a 7-day supply of water with normal system leakage,0.5 gallons per hour (gph), before makeup water was needed. As part of the corrective actions for an earlier event involving ECC leakage, the PNPP staff established allowable system leakage limits of 3.0 gallons per minute (gpm) for ECC Loop A NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-51 1
L. Myers and 3.5 gpm for Loop B. The increased allowable leakage reduced the 7-day supply of water to a 30 minute supply and introduced the need for local operator action at the 30 minute point to ensure adequate NPSH to the ECC cooling pumps. The PNPP staff also changed the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and applicable drawings and procedures to support the new allowable leakage. However, the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation performed by the l PNPP staff incorrectly concluded the changes did not constitute a USQ, and prior NRC l approval was not required. The change to the USAR was later incorporated in a periodic update of the USAR and it was not submitted to the NRC for review. l At the October 7,1997 PEC, the Centerior representatives agreed that this change constituted a USO and a violation of 10 CFR 50.59, but disagreed with the NRC's basis for coming to that conclusion. The NRC determined that this was a USQ because the change in allowable system leakage increased the consequences of an accident, and it increased the probability of failure of safety related equipment due to the potential failure of time-critical required actions by operators in a high radiation area. However, your staff concluded that this change was a USO because it reduced the margin to safety as described in the licensing basis for the PNPP. The change to increase allowable leakage rates was initiated because the ECC was leaking in excess of 0.5 gph. Therefore, the PNPP staff considered the ECC as degraded. However, this leakage was in the reverse direction from accident conditions. Following the Design inspection Team's questioning of the test methodology used on the system, the PNPP staff disassembled portions of the system (i.e., piping and valves) and tested the system in the proper direction. The resultant total system leakage was less than 0.5 gph, and that equated to a 10 day supply of water in the surge tank. Following that testing, the PNPP staff rescinded the proposed change to the USAR. However, while it is fortuitous that the potential safety consequences were low, the regulatory significance is high. The NRC depends on a licensee performing adequate safety analyses to determine whether or not a USQ exists. A licensee's safety analysis for the existence of a USQ is fundamental to ensuring the bases on which the plant was licensed are maintained. In this case, multiple levels of the PNPP staff and management reviewed the changes, but did not identify the safety implications. The violation described in the Notice concems a significant failure to meet the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, including a failure such that a required license amendment was not sought. Therefore, this violation has been categori2ed in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600 at Severity Level 111. 1 ( In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is l considered for a Severity Level 111 violation occurring prior to November 12,1996. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for /dentification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process described in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Identification credit was not warranted because the NRC identified the violation. l The NRC evaluated whether credit for Con'ective Action was also warranted. Your corrective l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-52 1
L. Myers actions were comprehensive, and included, but were not limited to: training, both , current and future refresher, emphasizing the importance of effective safety reviews; reviewing a number of past safety evaluations to determine if they failed to identify any USQs; and revising your procedure for reviewing changes to consider any change that results in any reduction in the margin to safety, as described in the licensing basis, as a USO. Your definition of reduction in margin is more conservative than the NRC definition of reduction in margin as defined in the basis for a technical specification. While your corrective actions did not directly address part of the root cause of the violation (i.e., poor understanding of the 10 CFR 50.59 criteria regarding increased consequences and increased equipment failure probability) the j NRC concluded that your conservative definition of reduction in margin would likely prevent recurrence of this violation in the vast majority of cases. In addition, we are aware that the , nuclear industry's formal position on USQs is based on the nme principles you applied in reviewing the potential for increased consequences and probability of equipment failure. Therefore, we have determined that on balance, credit is wanc.nted for corrective action. Nonetheless, in your response to this letter, you should describe additional corrective actions i that you have taken, or plan to take, to ensure that your review criteria appropriately identify changes that would result in increased consequences of an accident or increased probability of failure of safety related equipment. i Therefore, to emphasize the importance of promptly identifying violations and to ensure that safety reviews related to 10 CFR 50.59 are broad and suff ciently detailed, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the base amount of $50,000 for the Severity Level lil violation. EA 96-482 concerns a period of approximately two years (August 1994 to July 1996) when a means had not been established to protect cables and equipment of at least one redundant train of safe shutdown equipment from hot shorts during a postulated fire in the control room. This design issue is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R and represents a system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being able to perform its intended safety function (l.e., er" ,t a redundant train remained free from fire damage and available to maintt ' un of the unit). This issue was considered for escalated enforcement and pcs .. penalty. However, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, I have been authorized to neither issue a Notice of Violation nor propose a civil penalty in this case, in accordance with Section Vll.B.3 of the Enforcement Policy. This decision was made after considering that the issue was discovered by the PNPP staff. In addition, the initial evaluation by plant staff of NRC Information Notice (IN) No. 92-18,
- Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During a Control Room Fire," dated March 28,1992, was adequate based on the available information. While there was an opportunity to identify this issue during the 1994 refueling outage, the PNPP staff was focused at that time on providing sufficient margins to assure MOV actuation and not on hot short concems. The hot short weakness in post-safe shutdown capability was later identified through the engineering design change process. The NRC also considered that Centerior's corrective actions following identification of additionalinformation in 1996 were adequate. Modifications have been made to all affected equipment, and Centerior imoroved the process for multi-disciplined design NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-53
_~ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _. - _ ._ _ _ _._____ 1 4 , L. Myers ! change reviews. Further, the NRC considered that this issue is not reasonably linked to current i performance. The exercise of discretion acknowledges your good efforts to identify and correct significant design problems. ! You are required to respond to this letter, with the exceptions noted in the following paragraph, ; } and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response for the issues cited in Violations A and C. The NRC will use your responses, in part, j to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with j j regulatory requirements. j r 4 The NRC has concluded that the information regarding Violation B, the corrective actions taken 1 and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance l
- l. was achieved are already adequately addressed on the docket in License Event Report (LER) ,
! No. 96-008, dated November 4,1996. Therefore, you are not required to respond to Violation ! ! B unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the j instructions specified in the enclosed Notice. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's i
- Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the j
- NRC Public Document Room (PDR). ;
1 ) Sincerely, l us ac , A. Bill Beach : Regional Administrator l l t . J Docket No. 50-440 l l License No. NPF-58 l l ~
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty l cc w/ encl: H. L Hegrat, Manager, Regulatory Affairs , T. S. Rausch, Director, Quality and l Personnel Development l R. Schreader, Director, ! Nuclear Engineering Department ! W. R. Kanda, General Manager, Nuclear Power Plant Department , H. W. Bergendahl, Director Nuclear Services Department t Terry J. Lodge, Esq. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-54
. - . . _ . . - - - - _ - . . - - . - _ ~ . . - . - - . . , _ . . . . . ~ - . . . - - . _ . . . . . - . - . . ~ _ _ . . - . . . - -
, i l i . l j L. Myers -7 j l l l State Liaison Officer, State of Ohio I l
- Robert E. Owen, Ohio ,
l Department of Health ! l C. A. Glazer, State of Ohio l Public Utilities Commission B I f t- , t i l t l i i t . l ! t 1 t l I t l L ; l i 4 l f i ! l i
- 1 l 1 i
')
i l i-a ' NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-55 i i i ! l I I i l l
I l NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Centerior Service Company Docket No. 50-440 Perry Nuclear Power Plant License No. NPF-58 EAs 96-482,96-542,97-047,97-430 During NRC inspections conducted from December 28,1996 to February 3,1997, and from July 21 through August 27,1997, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act),42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below: A. Violation Assessed a Civil Penalty Associated with Reactor Recirculation System Flow Control 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI," Corrective Actions," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective materials and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. Contrary to the above, as of November 9,1996, the licensee failed to take adequate measures.to determine the causes of a significant condition adverse to quality and failed to take corrective action to preclude repetition. Specifically, on July 27,1994, an uncontrolled reactivity change, a significant condition adverse to quality, occurred during unintended movement of a reactor recirculation flow control valve. As of November 9, 1996, when a similar event occurred, the licensee had not determined the causes of the July 24,1994 event, and the licensee had not implemented adequate corrective actions to preclude repetition of an uncontrolled reactivity change caused by movement of a reactor recirculation flow control valve. Further, (1) Operator training following the July 27,1994 event failed to adequately inform the operators of the potential consequences of a hydraulic power unit (HPU) subloop operate / isolate solenoid valve
' failure, and (2) on November 9,1996, when a blown fuse was found in an HPU while the reactor recirculation 'A' flow control valve (FCV) was being retumed to service, the shift supervisor authorized the HPU to be retumed to service with a blown fuse based on a misunderstanding that a mispositioned solenoid valve would have no impact on the FCV even though the July 27,1994 event demonstrated that a mispositioned solenoid valve could cause a positive reactivity addition by allowing the reactor recirculation FCV to open further. (01013)
This is a Severity Level ill violation (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty - $50,000. i NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-56 1
Proposed Notice of Violation and Imposition of Civil Penalty ! . B. Violation Associated with the Control Room Emeroency Recirculation System Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.2', Action A., requires with the unit in operational conditions (Modes) 1, 2, or 3, with one Control i Room Emergency Recirculation (CRER) subsystem inoperable, the inoperable ) l subsystem must be restored to operable status within 7 days or be in hot shut down
- (Mode 3) within the next 12 hours and in coid shutdown (Mode 4) within the following ,
- 24 hours.
TS LCO 3.7.3, Action D requires when two CRER subsystems are inoperable with the : . unit in Modes 1,2, or 3, TS LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.8 Once entered, ! TS LCO 3.0.3 requires action to be initiated within 1 hour to place the unit in Mode 4 l within 37 hours. , j >
- TS LCO 3.0.4 prohibits entry into an operating mode when an LCO is not met and the I i
associated action statements do not permit continued operation in that operating mode. Contrary to the above, the listed TS LCOs were not met for varying periods of time due to a miswired breaker causing motor control center (MCC) No. EF-1-D-09, which , supplies CRER Train B, to be inoperable.
- 1. Between March 10 and September 17,1996, with the unit in Mode 1, an incorrectly wired power supply breaker for MCC EF-1-D-09, which supplies l power to CRER Train B subsystem, caused the CRER subsystem to be inoperable. The CRER subsystem was not restored to operable status within the allowed outage time specified in the applicable TS LCO (3.7.2 or 3.7.3) action statement and the unit was not taken to the appropriate Mode, Mode 4, as required.
- 2. For about 41 hours from August 5 to 6,1996, two CRER subsystems were inoperable (CRER Train A due to maintenance and CRER Train B due to the inoperable MCC), and TS 3.0.3 action to place the unit in Mode 4 was not initiated.
- 3. On June 10 and 11,1996, contrary to TS LCO 3.0.4, the unit entered operating i Modes 2 and 1, respectively, with the CRER Train B subsystem inoperable,
' On July 14,1996, the licensee replaced TS 3.7.2 with improved TS 3.7.3. Improved TS LCO 3.7.3., Action A.1. requires that an inoperable Control Room Emergency Recirculation (CRER) subsystem be restored to operable within 7 days. TS Actions B.1. and B.2. further require the Unit be placed in Mode 3 within the next 12 hours and in Mode 4 within the next 36 hours if the CRER subsystem is not restored to operable status.
- The licensee implemented improved TS LCO 3.0.3 on July 14,1996.
NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-57
Proposed Notice of Violation and Imposition of Civil Penalty when TS LCO 3.7.2 was not met and the associated action statements did not permit continued operation in Operating Modes 1 and 2. (02013) This is a Severity Level lli problem (Supplement 1). C. Violation Assessed a Civil Penalty Associated With Emeraency Closed Coolina Systems Surae Tanks 10 CFR 50.59, permits the licensee, in part, to make changes to the facility and procedures as described in the safety analysis report without prior Commission approval provided the changes do not involve an unreviewed safety question. Records of these changes must include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the changes do not involve an unreviewed safety question. 10 CFR 50.59 (a)(2)(i) states, in part, that a proposed change shall be deemed to involve an unreviewed safety question if, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased. Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 9.2.2.3
- Emergency Closed Cooling System - Safety evaluation" states, the emergency closed cooling surge tanks are designed to maintain a 7-day supply of water with normal system leakage without the need to provide makeup water.
Contrary to the above, Safety Evaluation No. 96-128 prepared by the licensee on ! October 10,1996, and approved on October 21,1996, evaluated a change in the design i basis for the emergency closed cooling system surge tanks. The licensee changed the sizing basis of the surge tanks from a 7-day supply as stated in USAR Section 9.2.2.3 to a 30-minute supply, and the licensee's analysis failed to identify that the change was an unreviewed safety question. Specifically, the safety evaluation did not adequately assess the increased probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety
-associated with an increased potential for operator error as operators replenished the surge tanks on a 30-minute post accident basis instead of the previously evaluated period of 7 days. The safety evaluation also failed to recognize the increased consequences of a design basis loss of coolant accident associated with an increased projected dose to the operators as they refilled the surge tanks on an increased frequency. (03013)
This is a Severity Level lll violation (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty - 550,000. The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reasons for Violation B, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in Licensee Event NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-58
Proposed Notice of Violation and Imposition of Civil Penalty l l Report (LER) No. 96-008, dated November 4,1996. However, you are required to submit a
- written statement or explanation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, if the description there does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, if you choose to respond, clearly mark your response as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation," and send it to the
, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region Ill, Suite 255,801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, IL 60532-4351, with a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation. Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Centerior Service Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation for Violations A and C to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged i violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the ) Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued / Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an
" Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violations listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answers may request remission or mitigation of the penalty.
In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-59
Proposed Notice of Violation and i imposition of Civil Penalty l directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil i penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due whi::h subsequently has been determined in ; accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attomey General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region lil, 801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, IL 60532-4351, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you muit ' specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by ; 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at Lisle, Illinois this 18th day of November 1997 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-60 l
,y patsruq\ UNITED STATES g ; NUC,'. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o & WASHINGTON, D.C. 20066-4001 s., /
April 9, 1998 EA 97-430 Mr. Low W. Myers Vice President - Nuclear Centerior Service Company P.O. Box 97, A200 Perry, OH 44081
SUBJECT:
ORDER IMPOSING civil MONETARY PENALT(- $50,000 PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1
Dear Mr. Myers:
This refers to a letter dated December 18,1997, on the letterhead of First Energy and on behalf of the Cleveland Electric illuminating Company, in response to the Notice of Violation and Propcsed imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) sent to Centerior Service Company by our letter dated November 18,1997. The NRC notes that Centerior holds NRC License No. NPF-58 which authorizes the operation of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. Therefore, this letter is sent to Centerior (licensee). Our letter and Notice described three violations identified during several NRC inspections conducted from November 2,1996, to August 27,1997.
- To emphasize the importance of reactivity controls and the need for effective corrective actions following an event, a $50,000 civil penalty (Violation A of the Notice, EA 97-047) was proposed on November 18,1997, for failure to take adequate measures to det0rmice the cause and corrective actions following an uncontrolled reactivity change, a sigrJficant condition adverse to quality. A second civil penalty was also proposed to emphasize the iniportance of promptly identifying noncompliances and to ensure that safety reviews related to 10 CFR 50.59 are broad and sufficiently detailed. Specifically, a civil penalty of $50,000 was proposed on November 18,1997, for a change to the facility design regarding the use of Emergency Closed Cooling System surge tanks. This violation (Violation C, EA 97-430) represented an unreviewed safety question (USQ). The total civil penalties proposed for these Severity Level lil violations was $100,000.
Violation A was admitted in the response dated December 18,1997, and $50,000 of the proposed $100,000 civil penalties was paid. In that same response, Violation C was denied and remission of the associated $50,000 civil penalty was requested. A civil penalty was not proposed for Violation B (EA 96-542) conceming the Control Room Emergency Recirculation System. Corrective actions for EA 96-542 were already described on the docket; therefore, a response to Violation B was not required. After consideration of the December 18,1997 response, we have concluded, for the reasons given in the Appendix attached to the enclosed Order imposing Civil Monetary Penalty, that sufficient information was not provided to either withdraw the violation for EA 97 430 or remit the NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-61 l
Centerior Service Company ; civil penalty. Accordingly, we hereby serve the enclosed Ordu on Centerior imposing a civil , monetary penalty in the amount of $50,00n Ae prwWd in Section IV of the enclosed Order,
- payment should be made within 30 days of the date of this Order, by check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer, payable to the Treasurer of the United States and mailed to Mr. James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, !
One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738. We will review the ; effectiveness of your corrective actions during a subsequent inspection, r l The NRC accepted the explanation that the change of the description of the ECCS surge tanks f l did not involve a potentialincrease of the consequence of a design basis dose to the public. i ) Therefore, the violation is amended by removing the reference to the consequences of a design , basis dose. However, that modification did not affect the validity or severity of the violation or l the amount of the civil penalty. In addition, the NRC recognizes your intent for the change to the , description was to provide clearer direction to the operators when system leakage would ' necessitate a plant shutdown; however, the method you adopted caused an unrecognized, unreviewed safety question. t in your December 18,1997 letter, you requested to meet with the NRC staff prior to the ultimate resolution of this enforcement action. During a telephone conversation with Mr. James L. Caldwell, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region lil, on April 2,1998, you indicated you believed you had expressed your views sufficiently during earlier conversations and consequently a j meeting prior to issesnce of the Order was no longer necesscry. However. you also indicated
- you reserved the right to request a meeting following receipt of this Order. if you desire such a meeting, the NRC will, as provided in the NRC Enforcement Manual, arrange a transcribed i public meeting with you. In which case, please telephone me at (301) 415-2741 to arrange such !
a meeting,. ; in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and the enclosures will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room. ' Sincerely, M ames Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement Docket No. 50-440 License No. NPF-58 i
Enclosures:
As stated V NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-62
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l l 1 l Centerior Service Company ! cc w/encis:: i H. L. Hegrat, Manager, Regulatory Affairs T. S. Rausch, Director, Quality and i l Personnel Development R. Schrauder, Director, l l Nuclear Engineering Department i W. R. Kanda, General Manager, l Nuclear Power Plant Department ' l H. W. Bergendahl, Director Nuclear Services Department Terry J. Lodge, Esq. l State Liaison Omcor, State of Ohio : Robert E. Owen, Ohio l Department of Health ; C. A. Glazer, State of Ohio Public Utilities Commission i l l I l L l. l ! NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-63 I-l l l
l l l
. 2 First Energy on behalf of Cleveland Electric illuminating Company responded to the Notice on December 18,1997. The NRC notes that Centerior Service Company (Centerior) holds NRC License No. NPF-58 which authorizes the operation of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. .
Therefore, this action is directed to Centerior (Licensee). In its December 18,1997 response, the Licensee admitted Violation A (EA 97-047) discussed in the Notice and paid the $50,000 civil penalty. Violation B (EA 96-542) did not require a response. In that same letter, the Licensee l denied Violation C, EA 97-430, and requested remission of the proposed $50,000 civil penalty l i for that violation. i 111 ! After consideration of the Licensee's response and the statements of fact, explanation, and i argument for remission contained therein, the NRC staff has detenained, as set forth in the Appendix to this Order, that the violation occurred as modified below and that the penalty proposed for Violation C designated in the Notice should be imposed. The NRC accepts the licensee's explanation that the change of the description of the ECCS surge tanks did not involve a potentialincrease of the consequence of a design basis dose to the public. The violation was accordingly modified by removing the sentence concerning potentialincrease of l the consequences of a design basis dose to the public. However, the modification of the violation does not affect the validity of the violation or the amount of the civil penalty. L f . NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-65 l
--9 N
i l Centerior Service Company cc w/encis:: H. L. Hegrat, Manager, , Regulatory Affairs i T. S. Rausch, Director, Quality and j Personnel Development j R. Schrauder, Director, l Nuclear Engineering Department W. R. Kanda, General Manager, Nuclear Power Plant Department H. W. Bergendahl, Director , Nuclear Services Department l Terry J. Lodge, Esq. l State Liaison Officer, State of Ohio Robert E. Owen, Ohio Department of Health C. A. Glazer, State of Ohio ! Public Utilities Commission i i i l i
?
l l l ,
)
l l l t ) . NUREG-0940, PART 2. A-63 1 l
I s l UNITED STATES , NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l l I I r in the Matter of ) [
) Docket No. 50-440 i Centerior Service Company ) License No. NPF-58 i Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 ) EA 97 430 i ORDER IMPOSING civil MONETARY PENALTY !
I i r Centerior Service Company (Licensee) is the holder of Operating i.icense No. NPF-58, issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) on November 13,1986. The , 3 l license authorizes the Licensee to operate the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, in accordance i with the conditions specified therein. ! l ; ll l l l Three inspections of the Licensee's activities were conducted from December 28,1996, to , i August 27,1997. The results of the inspections indicated that the Licensee had not conducted f its activities in full compliance with NRC requirements. A written Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) was served upon the Licensee by letter dated i [ November 18,1997. The Notice states the nature of the violations, the provisions of the NRC's j requirements that the Licensee had violated, and the amount of the civil penalties proposed for ! t the violations. { l- NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-64 I
l
=2-First Energy on behalf of Cleveland Electric illuminating Company responded to the Notice on December 18,1997. The NRC notes that Centerior Service Company (Centerior) holds NRC License No. NPF-58 which authorizes the operation of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1.
Therefore, this action is directed to Centerior (Licensee). In its December 18,1997 response, the Licensee admitted Violation A (EA 97-047) discussed in the Notice and paid the $50,000 civil l penalty, Violation B (EA 96-542) did not require a response. In that same letter, the Licensee denied Violation C, EA 97-430, and requested remission of the proposed $50,000 civil penalty ) I for that violation. l Ill I l After consideration of the Licensee's response and the statements of fact, explanation, and argument for remission contained therein, the NRC staff by.s determined, as set forth in the Appendix to this Order, that the violation occurred as modified below and that the penalty proposed for Violation C designated in the Notice should be imposed. The NRC accepts the i l licensee's explanation that the change of the description of the ECCS surge tanks did not involve a potentialincrease of the consequence of a design basis dose to the public. The 1 violation was accordingly modified by removing the sentence concerning potentialincrease of the consequences of a design basis dose to the public. However, the modification of the violation does not affect the validity of the violation or the amount of the civil penalty. t NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-65
l IV , In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as ! amended (Act),42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: ! The Licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 within 30 days of the date of this ! Order, by check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer, payable to the Treasurer of the f United States and mailed to Mr. James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear , Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. v l The Licensee may request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order. Where good i cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, and include a statement of good cause for the extension. A request for a hearing should be clearly marked as a " Request for an I Enforcement Hearing," and shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Commission's l Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555. Copies also shall be sent to the Assistant ! General Counse' for Hearings and Enforcement at the same address and to the Regional I Administrator, NRC Region lil,801 Warrenville Road, Suite 255, Lisle, IL 60532-4351. I t if a hearing is requested, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place of NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-66
l 4 the hearing. If the Licensee fails to request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order, or if written approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing has not been granted, , the provisions of this Order shall be effective without further' proceedings. If payment has not l been made by that time, the matter may be referred to the Attomey General for collection. In the event the Licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the issues to be considered at such hearing shall be: (a) whether the Licensee was in violation of the Commission's requirements as set forth in the Notice referenced in Section ll above, as amended in the Appendix to this Order, and (b) whether, on the basis of such violation, this Order should be sustained. FOR THE NUCLEAR Pr.GULATORY COMMISSION 1 i W James Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement i Dated t Rockville, Maryland 1 this G May of April 1998 i j NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-67
APPENDIX EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION On November 18,1997, a Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) was issued for violations identified during several NRC inspections at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. First Energy on behalf of Cleveland Electric illuminating Company responded to the Notice on December 18,1997. The NRC notes that Centerior Services Company (Centerior) holds NRC License No. NPF-58 which authorizes the operation of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. Therefore, this action is directed to Centerior (licensee). In the December 18,1997 response, the licensee admitted Violation A (EA 97-047) discussed in the Notice and paid the $50,000 civil penalty. Violation B (EA 96-542) did not require a response. In that same letter, the licensee denied Violation C, EA 97-430, and requested remission of the proposed
$50,000 civil penalty for that violation.
Restatement of Violation C (EA 97-430) 10 CFR 50.59 permits the licensee, in part, to make changes to the facility and procedures as described in the safety analysis report without prior Commission approval provided the changes do not involve an unreviewed safety question. Records of these changes must include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the changes do not involve an unreviewed safety question. 10 CFR 50.59 (a)(2)(1) states, in part, that a proposed change shall be deemed to involve an unreviewed safety question if the probability of occur.ance or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased. Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 9.2.2.3," Emergency Closed Cooling System - Safety Evaluation" states that the emergency closed system cooling surge tanks are designed to maintain a seven day supply of water with normal system leakage without the need to provide makeup water. Contrary to the above, Safety Evaluation No. 96-128 prepared by the licensee on October 10, 1996, and approved on October 21,1996, evaluated a change in the design basis for the emergency closed cooling system surge tanks. The licensee changed the sizing basis of the surge tanks from a seven day supply as stated in USAR Section 9.2.2.3 to a 30-minute supply, and the licensee's analysis failed to identify that the change was an unreviewed safety question. Specifically, the safety evaluation did not adequately assess the increased probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety associated with an increased potential for operator error as operators replenished the surge tanks on a 30-minute post accident basis instead of the previously evaluated period of seven days. The safety evaluation also failed to recognize the increased consequences of a design basis loss of coolant accident associated with an increased projected dose to the operators as they refilled the surge tanks on an increased frequency. This is a Severity Level 111 violation (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty - $50,000 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-68
Appendix 2-Summary of Licensee's Resoonse to Violation C (EA 97-430) The licensee denied this violation as written. The licensee provided three reasons to support the denial of the violation: Summarv of Licensee's Reason 1 The design of the plant, and the corresponding design bases for the emergency closed cooling (ECC) system, were not changed by the safety evaluation. The plant condition was identified as a non-conforming condition, and activities were planned to restore the system condition to the originallicensing basis. A determination of operability for the ECC system with increased leakage concluded that it was acceptable to allow system leakage of 3.0 gallons per minute (gpm) for ECC Loop A and 3.5 gpm for Loop B. In this degraded condition, the increased leakage would reduce the seven day supply of water to a 30 minute supply and introduce the need for local operator action to ensure sustained adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) to the ECC pumps. The licensee indicated that it may have been inappropriate to include the operability evaluation in the Updated Final Safety Analysis (.USAR); however, it was done to preclude the need for preparing additional degraded condition operability determinations in the future. The licensee concluded that the revision to the USAR preserved the original design considerations of a 7 day supply, and distinctly identifies leakage in excess of 0.5 gallons per hour (gph) as a degraded condition. The licensee indicated that its intention was to correct the deficiency during
- refueling outage six* which began on September 12,1997.
NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Reason 1 As originally stated in the USAR, the system was designed to maintain a seven day supply with normal system leakage. This fact was considered and reiterated in the NRC safety evaluation report. The USAR change removed the " design aspect
- of the seven day supply and simply provided the mathematics for the 0.5 gph leak rate. This was a change in the design criteria.
Additionally, the USAR now stated that under condition of degraded system leakage, it would be acceptable to have leakage such that there would only be a 30 minute inventory available. This also represents a change to the design basis of the facility. Although the intention of the licensee was to repair the system, the USAR change represented a continued acceptance of a degraded condition. Summarv of Licensee's Renon 2 The change to the description of the ECC system surge tanks in the USAR did not involve an
- unreviewed safety question (USQ) under 10 CFR 50.59 criteria because it did not involve a potentialincrease in the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.
The licensee indicated thst an increase in the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-69
l Appendix l equipment important to safety was not concluded on the basis that manual actions employed were such that failure of an action would be equivalent to that of a single active failure. When compared to the original evaluated design, the failure of the operator action would result in the loss of one train of the ECC system; a loss of no greater consequence than was previously evaluated in the USAR. I The licensee also indicated that significant efforts put forth to compensate for the additional actions and reduce the potential for error formed the basis to conclude that no increase in probability of equipment malfunction was introduced. The licensee referenced Part 9900 of the NRC inspection manual guidance for 10 CFR 50.59, which states in part that the NRC has found compensating effects, such as administrative controls, acceptable in offsetting uncertainties and increases in probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated or , I reductions in margin of safety, provided the negative impact is negligible, and is clearly outweighed by the compensatory actions. The licensee stated "if these compensating factors < can not be considered in determining that there is no increase in probability, no additional operator actions, for any normal or off-normal operating condition, could be permitted without also concluding an increase in the probability of a malfunction." NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Reason 2 Under the circumstances required to manually accomplish the ECC surge tank refill, the NRC does not agree that the consequences of operator error would be limited to a single active l failure. The licensee did take actions to mitigate potential operator errors; however, in this case the NRC does not consider any mitigating actions to clearly outweigh the increased probability of losing NPSH to the ECC pumps. The increases in probabilities are described below: 1 . The reliance on an operator to refill the emergency closed cooling surge tanks beginning at 30 minutes (with completion occurring within the next 20 minutes) into a design basis accident (DBA) introduced a common-mode failure mechanism at a critical time in the accident sequence. While the USAR did rely on operators to refill the tanks seven days after a DBA, the seven days provided a period of time during which no operator action was required. After seven days, the plant would be stabilized and a failure on the part of an operator to properly refill the ECC surge tanks would still allow some margin for recovery. At 30 minutes into a DBA, the plant is significantly less stable and an ; interruption in operation or loss of this system increases the potential for core damage. When operator response time to perform a task is significantly decreased, the probability - of an error is also increased. . . Due to the limited time into the accident sequence when operator actions would be required to refill the ECC surge tanks, there was also concern that personnel would not be available to perform the activity. Although the actual number of operators on site during routine activities might support the refill activity, during an accident, these i operators would be diverted into addressing the more immediate action of responding to the accident and might not be availabie to compensate for a system that was designed to operate without operator action until the plant was stabilized. Therefore, the potential lack of available personnel early in the accident sequence to perform the ECC surge tank 1 1 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-70
i Appendix refillincreased the probability of not filling the ECC surge tanks within the limited time i frame.
- Based on the licensee's dose estimates for single entries into the ECC surge tank area of 4.4 rom, no single operator would be able to accomplish the repetitive refill activity sufficient to reduce the potential for error. It would appear that a minimum of three i operators would be required within the first 2.5 hours (due to the dose) which increased l the potential for errors.
. The actual and potential physical conditions of the area adjacent to the ECC system l surge tanks (e.g., no emergency lighting, overfilling the surge tanks could cause slippery i floor conditions) could result in the operator being unable to refill the tanks within the !
reduced response time. ; l In this case, the substitution of manual actions to replace the design intention of the tanks, i including significantly reducing operator response time constitutes an unreviewed safety ; question (USQ). This change should have been submitted to and approved by the NRC before ! implementation. , Summary of Licensee's Reason 3 l . ! l The change to the description of the ECC system surge tanks in the USAR did not involve a USQ under 10 CFR 50.5g criteria because it did not involve a potential increase of the , consequences of a design basis accident associated with increased projected dose to the public ; due to operator refilling the surge tanks on an increased frequency. l The licensee performed time and motion studies of the activities needed to refill the ECC surge tanks and determined that for a single entry, the maximum dose was estimated to be 4.4 rom.
- This dose was bounded by the NUREG-0737 defined limit of 5 rom. The expected dose l projection was within the guidelines of USAR section 12.6.1.a. for post accident dose rates in ,
areas designated as " infrequent occupancy," and the activity could be performed at any time throughout the accident without exceeding the 5 rem whole body exposure limit. An increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the USAR was not concluded since doses to the public were not increased above the current licensing limit and doses to onsite personnel were not in excess of the limits as specified in NUREG-0737 or the USAR. The consequences as referenced in 10 CFR 50.59 pertain to the health and safety of the public. Therefore, the proposed operator action from the perspective of receiving the esti' mated dose, does not cause a change in the consequences. NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Reason 3 The NRC determined that an increase in dose consequences, as used in 10 CFR 50.59, refers to the consequences of a design basis accident, and not to increased radiation dose to plant staff from in-plant recovery actions. NRC agrees that the change in operator actions did not l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-71
Appandix involve a potentialincrease in consequences of a des'ign basis accident. The violation is revised as follows: 10 CFR 50.59 permits the licensee, in part, to make changes to the facility and l procedures as described in the safety analysis report without prior Commission approval provided the changes do not involve an unreviewed safety question. Records of these changes must include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the changes do not involve an unreviewed safety question. 10 CFR 50.59 (a)(2)(1) states, in part, that a proposed change shall be deemed to involve an unreviewed safety question if the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an , accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the ; safety analysis report may be increased. j Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 9.2.2.3
- Emergency Closed Cooling i System - Safety evaluation
- states that the emergency closed cooling system surge l
tanks are designed to maintain a seven day supply of water with normal system leakage ! without the need to provide makeup water. i l Contrary to the above, Safety Evaluation No. 96-128 prepared by the licensee on : October 10,1996, and approved on October 21,1996, evaluated a change in the design L basis for the emergency closed cooling system surge tanks. The licensee changed the l sizing basis of the surge tanks from a seven day supply as stated in USAR Section ! 9.2.2.3 to a 30-minute supply, and the licensee's analysis failed to identify that the l change was an unreviewed safety question. Specifically, the safety evaluation did not ! adequately assess the increased probability of a malfunction of equipment important to i safety associated with an increased potential for operator error as operators replenished !' the surge tanks on a 30-minute post accident basis instead of the previously evaluated period of seven days. Summarv of Licensee's Reauest for Remission of the Civil Penaltv i The licensee requested full remission of the $50,000 civil penalty. NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Reauest for Remission of the Civil Panattv The licensee did not provide a separate justification (i.e., a discussion of the civil penalty adjustment factors) to justify remission of the civil penalty. Rather, the licensee's reasons for ! denying the violation apparently are the licensee's justification for requesting remission of the civil penalty. NRC Conclusion The licensee interpreted the NRC position conceming the violation to be that the increases in ; both the consequences and probability of an accident were the direct result of the increased presence in the plant of operators who are fully trained and qualified for the activities under consideration. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-72 9
k l Appendix 6-The NRC did not intend to suggest that the increased presence of personnel in the plant would cause an increase in the consequences and probability of an accident. Rather, the NRC was concemed with the increased potential of failing to refill the ECC surge tanks within an extremely a limited time constraint, which was much shorter than originally described to and accepted by the NRC. In summary, the NRC's concem was that during the performance of the additional operator actions to refill the ECC surge tanks, the potential for errors was increased and could 2 lead to the loss of the safety related ECC system. Loss of the ECC system could result in losing other safety related systems relied upon to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
- Thereto.e. the manual operator action proposed to compensate for the reduced ECC surge tank
'l water supply constituted a USQ. The NRC has concluded that this violation occurred as modified above, and that an adequate ) basis for withdrawing the violation, reducing the severity level of the violation, or remitting the I ! civil penalty was not provided by the licensee. Consequently, the proposed civil penalty in the ' amount of $50,000 should be imposed. I e 1 i I i 4 e i j 5 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-73
janroo UNITED STATES l j g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g S REGloN ll1 3 j 801 WARRENVILLE ROAD % UsLE. ILUNoIS 60532-4351
***** January 15, 1998 EA 97-249 Mr. J. Brons lite Vice President Zion Station Commonwealth Edison Company 101 Shiloh Boulevard Zion,IL 60099
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES
- $110,000 (NRC Special Inspection Report 50-295(304)/97017))
Dear Mr. Brons:
This refers to the specialinspection conducted between June 19 and September 22,1997,3t the Zion Station Nuclear Facility. The inspection reviewed the circumstances surrounding reports that Zion station personnel failed to implement the fitness-for-duty (FFD) program and , conduct for-cause testing when the odor of alcohol was detected on personnel working within the protected area. Due to the seriousness of these issues, a predecisional enforcement I conference was held in the Region lli office on December 1,1997. Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information provided during the predecisional enforcement conference, the NRC has determined that four violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty. The circumstances surrounding each violation are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The four violations contained in the Notice reflect a lack of management commitment to implement the Zion station FFD policy and procedures. The first violation occurred because two supervisors failed to require for-cause testing when they detected the odor of alcohol on a third supervisor in the protected area. Instead, they permitted the individual to leave the site without an adequate evaluation and for-cause test. The next two violations occurred because ; two supervisors both failed to implement the FFD program when one was called back to work outside of normal working hours. The calling supervisor failed to ask if the subordinate supervisor had consumed alcohol during the abstinence period. The subordinate supervisor i I failed to inform the caller that alcohol had, in fact, been consumed during the abstinence period. The last violation occurred because a member of the technical staff failed to notify supervisors when the odor of alcohol was detected on co-workers, so that an adequate evaluation and for-cause testing could be implemented. The violations are significant because they involved NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-74
I Mr. J. Brons ; multiple failures of fully trained and qualified supervisors and technical staff to implement FFD procedures, that are intended to assure a substance-free work environment. Collectively, the four violations represent a programmatic breakdown in the implementation of the FFD program. Therefore, these violations are classified in the aggregate in accordance with the NUREG-1600,
" General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions"(Enforcement Policy), as a Severity Level lli problem. ,
One of the root causes of the violations was poor judgement by individuals, which included both supervisors and members of the technical staff. This appeared to be aggravated because the Zion station management team failed to reinforce expectations regarding FFD program implementation and ensure effective implementation of the FFD program by all personnel working at the Zion station. The violations are significant because the Zion station FFD program must provide reasonable assurance that nuclear power plant personnel will perform their tasks in a reliable and trustworthy manner, free from the influence of a substance which may affect their ability to safely and competently perform their duties. Fortuitously, the safety and risk significance of these specific violations was low because the individuals had not or were not performing safety related activities at the time the smell of alcohol was detected. However, the regulatory and potential safety significance.was high because failure to implement FFD procedures allowed individuals who may have been unfit for duty to enter and remain in the protected area without an adequate evaluation and without mandatory for-cause testing being accomplished. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000 is considered for a Severity Level 111 problem. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2-years', the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for identification and Conective Action ir :ccordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Identification credit was not warranted because these issues were identified as the result of an allegation and the programmatic nature of this problem was identified by the NRC. In addition, the Zion staff failed to resolve repeated (April 1996, January 1997, and February 1997) precursors to these i violations that were identified through the audit process. That audit effort clearly identified that ! the requirements for unscheduled worker call outs were not met. Corrective Action credit was i not warranted because the corrective actions discussed at the enforcement conference were inadequate to address the programmatic breakdown of the FFD program. The majority of the corrective actions addressed only the failures of individuals and included initial access suspension, re-training of specific individuals, some disciplinary action, and counseling of the involved individuals. These actions were necessary to correct the proximate and identified problems only. We do acknowledge that other, more general actions involving non-m ndatory measures (such as newsletters, routine FFD commercials on the in plant communicati n network, and tailgate sessions) were taken. However, the corrective actions failed to address the findings of Zion station's self-assessments and the clear indications that the multiple individual FFD violations demonstrated. In fact, one of those self-assessments documented in EA 97 222 issued a Severity Level ill Problem with a $330,000 civil penalty to emphasize the importance of effective management oversight of plant operations and the importance of timely, effective and lasting corrective actions for known plant and industry problems. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-75
Mr. J. Brons March 1997, that: (1) people were not sensitized to the gravity of the FFD program, (2) most people interviewed found the FFD program awkward and unpleasant, (3) apathy was perceived to be the prevailing sentiment toward the FFD program, and (4) there was a lack of overall commitment and resultant inconsistent implementation of the FFD program. The investigation l report stated that the ". . . importance, implementation, adherence to, and enforcement of the ) FFD Program has not been successfully instilled in Station personnel, because management has not been aggressive enough in its oversight of this program other than what is being communicated during NGET and the Random Testing being performed through Security, not much more is being done to ensure that people are complying with the requirements. . ." It is clear that significant programmatic weaknesses exist, and corrective actions presented at the enforcement conference were not sufficiently comprehensive to address them. Since the NRC has determined that identification and Corrective Action credit was not warranted, the base civil penalty has been escalated by 100% (for a total of $110,000) in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. , Therefore, to emphasize the importance of management's commitment for effective FFD program implementation at the Zion station, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) in the amount of $110,000 (a base civil penalty escalated by 100%). You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. Even though we expressed the escalated nature of this issue and the need for a predecisional enforcement conference during multiple exit meetings, numerous calls to several Commonwealth Edison managers, and in our letter transmitting the subject inspection report, the predecisional enforcement conference was unnecessarily delayed when we experienced significant difficulty and conflicting responses when attempting to schedule this conference. Because of the lack of appreciation for the significance of this issue, the NRC expects that the Commonwealth Edison Company will ensure that the lessons learned from this enforcement action will be communicated to and acted upon (as necessary) by the other Commonwealth Edison nuclear power stations and corporate office staff. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-76
Mr J. Brons ! i ( In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its ] L enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). l l Sincerely, , fD \ Ma
. Bill Beach l
Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 )
. License Nos. DPR-39; DPR-48 l
i
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed l imposition of Civil Penalty I cc w/ encl: L O. Kingsley, Nuclear Generation Group i
' President and Chief Nuclear Officer
'M. Wallace, Senior Vice ,
President, Corporate Services ; L H. G. Stanley, Vice President PWR Operat'ons Liaison Officer, NOC-BOD { D. A. Sager, Vice President,' .
- Generation Support - !
D. Farrar, Nuclear Regulatory : Services Manager l
- - 1. Johnson, Licensing j Operations Manager ;
Document Control Desk-Licensing ~, j R. Starkey, Plant General Manager R. Godley, Regulatory Assurance-Supervisor , Richard Hubbard i Nathan Schloss, Economist l Office of the Attomey General
- Mayor, City of Zion State Liaison Officer State Liaison Officer, Wisconsin Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission L NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-77 1
l NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Commonwealth Edison Company Docket Numbers 50-295; 50-304 , Zion Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 License Numbers DPR-39; DPR-48 EA 97-249 During an NRC inspection conducted between June 19 and September 22,1997, four violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the NUREG-1600," General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," the NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act),42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below: A. 10 CFR 26.24(a)(3), " Chemical and alcohol testing," requires, in part, testing for-cause as soon as possible following any observed behavior indicating possible substance abuse. Zion Administrative Procedure 1130-00 (Revision 3 dated April 17,1995),
" Commonwealth Edison Fitness for Duty Program," at paragraph G.3 requires, in part, that for-cause urinalysis and breath alcohol testing may be required for Commonwealth Edison or contractor employees, following any observed behavior indicating possible substance abuse, including detection of the odor of alcohol per CNSG 207, " Testing For Cause."
Corporate Nuclear Guideline No. 200 (Revision 6 dated June 1996), " Comed Fitness-For-Duty Program," at Paragraph 5.7.6 requires, in part, testing for cause after the odor of alcohol has been detected on an individual and confirmed by a management employee trained in Fitness-For-Duty Supervisor responsibilities. Corporate Nuclear Security Guideline No. 207 (Revision 9 dated November 1996),
" Testing For Cause*," at Paragraph 5.1.6 requires, in part, a for-cause test be conducted when the odor of alcohol has been detected on an individual and a supervisor has confirmed the odor of alcohol.
Contrary to the above, on February 1,1997, between 9:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., three - FFD-trained supervisors failed to require a for-cause test for an employee with the smell of alcoholin the protected area. (01013) B. 10 CFR 26.20(e),
- Written policy and procedures," requires, in part, that each licensee subject to this part shall establish and implement written policies and procedures designed to meet the general performance objectives and specific requirements of this part. Written policies must address Fitness-For-Duty through a procedure that will ensure that the person called in to perform an unscheduled working tour is fit to perform the task assigned. This procedure must (1) require a statement to be made by a called-in person as to whether he or she has consumed alcohol within the length of time stated in the pre-duty abstinence policy, and (2)if alcohol has been consumed within this period, require a determination of fitness for duty by breath analysis or other means.
NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-78
a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty i 1. Corporate Nuclear Guideline No. 200, a procedure that implements 10 CFR 26.20(e), at paragraph 5.8 specifies, in part, that supervisors and others performing call-outs will ask if the employee has consumed alcohol within the five (5) hour abstinence period. Contrary to the above, on February 1,1997, at approximately 9:00 p.m., the supervisor performing the call-outs failed to ask an employee if she had
- consumed alcohol within the five-hour abstinence period prior to directing her to
- report to the plant. (01023)
- 2. Corporate Nuclear Guideline No. 200, at paragraph 5.6.1 states, in part, when d
contacted at home, each individual is responsible for alerting the caller if he or t she is uncomfortable about responding to a work related matter due to l consumption of alcohol. a l Corporate Nuclear Security Guideline No. 206 (Revision 6 dated February 1996),
' Call-Outs for Unscheduled Work," a procedure that implements 10 CFR 26.20(e), at paragraph 5.1.5 specifies if you are called to work unscheduled overtime, inform the person calling if you have consumed alcohol within the five (5) hours period prior to reporting to work.
Contrary to the above, on February 1,1997, at approximately 9:00 p.m., an employee directed to come into the plant on unscheduled overtime did not inform the caller that she had consumed alcohol within the five-hour abstinence period. (01033) Corporate Nuclear Guideline No. 200, at paragraph 5.6.1 requires, in part, that 3. individuals report to their supervisor instances of violation of the Fitness-For-Duty policy and/or procedures which might adversely impact safe operation and maintenance of the station. Contrary to the above, the following instances constitute failures by an individual to notify his supervisor of violations of the Fitness-For-Duty policy which might adversely impact safe operation and maintenance of the station. (01043) 1 e An employee stated that in the September /Docember 1996 time frame, he detected the odor of alcohol on a co-worker but did not notify his supervisor.
- On March 11,1997, an employee failed to notify his supervisor that he detected the odor of alcohol on a co-worker.
- On June 12,1997, an employee detected the odor of alcohol on a j contract employee but failed to notify his supervisor. l I
These violations represent a Severity Level ill problem (Supplement Vil) - $110,000 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-79
Notice of Violation and Proposed l Imposition of Civil Penalty l Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Commonwealth Edison (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as why the license should not be modified, suspanded, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper thould not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail ; to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answers should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation," and may: (1) deny the violations listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answers may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-80
. i ? i Notice of Violation and Proposed j Imposition of Civil Penalty , i The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and
. Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: OE, Director, Office of Enforcement, j U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, L j MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory r j Commission, Region Ill, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not ;
! include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in ! j the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to j: provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that ; j identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that ] deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you mus1 specifically 4 identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the - bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by ; 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please : provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at Lisle,IL ! this 15th day of January 1998 t i l l
\
l 1 i NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-81
4 1 i' ""4 9 UselTE3 STATES
\" NUCLEAR REGtX.ATORY COMMISSION REG ON M I
- 301 W/.RRENVILLE ROAD USLE,ILUNOIS 80532-4361 March 3, 1998 ;
i r l l ,. ' EA 97-466
. Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley l l
President, Nuclear Generation Group ! [ Commonwealth Edison Company , ATTN: Regulatory Services . Executive Towers West 111 ! 1400 Opus Place, Suite 500 ! Downers Grove,IL 60515 ; r l
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF civil PENALTY - ! j $55,000 (NRC Inspection Reports No. 50-254(265)/97017)
Dear Mr. Kingsley:
}
This refers to the inspection conducted August 21 through September 12,1997, at the i Commonwealth Edison Company's (Comed) Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (Quad Cities). The purpose of the inspection was to review Comed's implementation of i 10 CFR 50.65, " Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power . Plants" (the Maintenance Rule) at Quad Cities. The exit meetmg for this inspection was ; conducted on September 12,1997. Five apparent violations involving the failure to implement an ! adequate Maintenance Rule program were identsfied during this inspection The inspection , report was mailed to Quad Cities by letter dated October 24,1997. On November 26,1997, a ! predecisenal enforcement conference was held in the NRC Region ill office to discuss the ! apparent violatens. i Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information provided by Comed representatives during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of N3C requirements occurred. These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and i Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Nobce), and the circumstances surrounding them are ! described in detail in the subject inspection report. ! The violations in the Notice are directly related to the failure to meet the requirements of the i Maintenance Rule. Violation A involves three examples of failure to establish goals and . monitoring for structures, systems, and components (88Cs) as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1). ! Violation B includes seven examples of failures to demonstrate that the performance or condition i l of SSCs within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65 had been effectively controlled through the l performance of appropriate preventive maintenance such that they would remain capable of ! performing their intended function. Velation C includes three examples of not monitoring the ! performance or condition of SSCs agamst established goals pursuant to the requirements of 10 l CFR 50.C5(e)(1), even though it was not demonstrated that the performance or condition of - these SSCs was being effectively controlled through the posformance of appropriate preventive i maintenance as evidenced by maintenance preventable functional failures. Violation D includes t two examples of incorrectly permittmg SSCs to remain under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) following maintenance preventable functional failures. Violation E involves the failure to include functions , of the high pressure coolant iriection, manual rod control, and intra plant communications ! systems within the scope of the station's Maintenance Rule program. !
- NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-82 1
O. Kingsley 1 These violations, collectively, represent a programmatic breakdown in the development and ,
- mplementation of Comed's program to ensure compliance with the regulatory requirements of the Maintenance Rule. Escalated enforcement is warranted due to the significant regulatory concem with the common underlying causes of the violations. The root causes included
- (1) lack of understanding of the intent of performance criteria and goals; (2) inadequate system engineer training; (3) lack of aggressive response to self-assessment findings and other forms of Maintenance Rule information such as inspection reports; (4) lack of site management oversight; and (5) lack of corporate involvement and oversight. The NRC concludes that actions taken to implement the Maintenance Rule had not been fully integrated into the appropriate programs at Quad Cities.
The NRC is concemed that Quad Cities did not have adequate measures in place to monitor the , results of maintenance to assure plant SSCs remain capable of performing theirintended l functions. Appropriate performance trending and effective maintenance preventable functional failure determinations were not property incorporated into maintenance monitoring activities to reasonably assure that plant equipment degradation or problems are identified and corrected before they result in significant failures. Therefore, the failure to implement key aspects of the Maintenance Rule are classified in the aggregate in accordance with NUREG-1600, " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"(Enforcement Policy) as a Severity Level lli problem. ! In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000 is l considered for a Severity Level 111 problem. Because the Quad Cities facility has been the i subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years , the NRC considered whether I credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty I assessment in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NRC has determined that /dentification Credit was not warranted. Although a corporate assessment did identify many of the issues in a June 1997 effort, the Quad Cities staff failed to take appropriate action to understand the full extent of the issues and address them. It was only after NRC inspectors identified the extensiveness of the deficiencies, that aggressive, substantive actions were implemented. The NRC has determined that Corrective Action Creditwas warranted. Corrective actions for the Maintenance Rule violations., when finally taken, were judged to be prompt and l comprehensive. Several corrective actions implemented or proposed at the enforcement ; conference included: (1) contracting with an industry expert; (2) reviewing scoping standards and performance criteria standards with an expert panel; (3) rescoping systems and revising i performance criteria; (4) training of system engineers; (5) performing a program independent assessment; and (6) resetting goals of low and high safety significant systems. In addition, after the Maintenance Rule program issues were identified in September 1997, Comed implemented a program to re-examine, revalidate, and revise, as necessary, the Maintenance Rule program for the Braidwood, LaSalle, and Zion facilities.
- 1. EA 96-114 issued a Severity Level ill violation with a $50,000 cMI penatty on June 13,1996, for falling to retum design margins to the low pressure injection comer rooms. EA 96-530 and EA 96431 issued a Severtty Leveill! violation vnth a $50,000 cMI penalty on June 24,1997, for an inadequate engineering analysis regarding damaged extemal panels for the secondary containment.
NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-83
O. Kingsley Therefore, to emphasize the importance of full compliance with 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice in the ; base amount of $55,000 for the Severity Level 111 problem. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). ; t Sincerely, 11
. wJ A. Bill Beach Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30 1
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed . Imposition of Civil Penalty cc w/ encl: M. Wallace, Senior Vice President D. Helwig, Senior Vice President ; G. Stanley, PWR Vice President J. Perry, BWR Vice President D. Farrar, Regulatory Services Manager I. Johnson, Licensing Director ' DCD - Licensing _ E. Kraft, Jr., Site Vice President D. Cook, Quad Cities Station Manager . C. C. Peterson, Regulatory Affairs Manager Richard Hubbard Nathan Schloss, Economist
- Office of the Attomey General State Liaison Officer Chairman, Illinois Commerce !
Commission W. D. Leech, Manager of Nuclear MidAmerican Energy Company NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-84 ; r
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY , l l Commonwealth Edison Company Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 ) Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30 j 1 EA 97-466 1 l During an NRC inspection conducted Augu st 21 through September 12,1997, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordar.te wi'.h NUREG 1600, " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actias'. '.he NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act),42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below: A. 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) requires, in part, the holders of an operating license shall monitor the performance or condition of structures, systems or components (SSC3) within the scope of the monitoring program, as defined in 10 CFR 50.65(b), against licensee-established l goals, in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such SSCs are j capable of fulfilling theirintended functions. Such goals shall be established commensurate with safety and, where practical, take into account industry-wide operating experience. When the performance or condition of an SSC does not meet established goals, appropriate corrective action shall be taken. l 1
- 1. Contrary to the above, between April 10,1997, through August 7,1997, the i licensee failed to perform any monitoring and failed to establish any goals for the containment atmospheric monitoring system although the system was classified as an SSC within the scope of the monitoring program on April 10,1997. The containment atmospheric monitoring system is used in the Emergency Operating Procedures. (01013)
- 2. Contrary to the above, as of September 12,1997, the licensee had failed to establish goals commensurate with safety for the station blackout diesel generators, a system within the scope of the monitoring program. Specifically, a technically inadequate performance goal of 90 percent reliability was established.
The performance goal was inadequate because the licensee did not take into account industry-wide operating experience, which was practical due to the known industry standard diesel generator program reliability of 95 percent. (01023)
; 3. Contrary to the above, between July 10,1996, and August 20,1997, the licensee failed to perform any monitoring and failed to establish any goals for the residual heat removal / residual heat removal service water systems although the systems were classified as within the scope of the monitoring program on July 10,1996.
The residual heat removal / residual heat removal service water systems are required to mitigate the consequences of an accident or transient. (01033) B. 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) requires, in part, the holders of an operating license shall monitor the performance or condition of SSCs within the scope of the monitoring program, as defined in 10 CFR 50.65(b), against licensee-established goals in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such SSCs are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. Such goals shall be established commensurate with safety. When the performance or condition of an SSC does not meet established goals, appropriate corrective action shall be taken. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-85
Notice of Violation and Proposed 2 l Imposition of Civil Penalty l 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) requires, in part, that monitoring as specified in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) is not required where it has been demonstrated that the performance or condition of an SSC is being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance, such that the SSC remains capable of performing its intended function. Contrary to 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), as of July 10,1996, the time that the licensee elected to not monitor the performance or condition of certain SSCs against established goals pursuant to the requirements of Section (a)(1), the licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance or condition of SSCs within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65 had been effectively controlled by performing appropriate preventive maintenance, as evidenced by the following examples, each of which constitutes a separate violation:
- 1. The licensee failed to adequately demonstrate that the performance or condition of the pressure boundary function of the nuclear boiler instrumentation, source range monitor drive control, recirculation, standby liquid control, reactor core isolation cooling, and high pressure coolant injection systems had been effectively controlled by performing appropriate preventive maintenance in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2). Specifically, the measures used in the demonstration for these system functions included an inappropriate reliability measure that allowed repetitive maintenance preventable functional failures in the form of pressure boundary leakage. Such a reliability measure is unacceptable because it validates preventive maintenance despite through-wallleakage. The licensee also failed to include an unavailability measure and employed a condition monitoring measure of no through-wallleakage. Such a conditioning monitoring >
measure is unacceptable because it cannot prevent a failure. As a result, it was not demonstrated that effective preventive maintenance ensured that the pressure boundary function remained capable of performing as required. (01043)
- 2. The licensee failed to adequately demonstrate that the performance or condition of functions of the 4160 volt switchgear crosstie,480 volt transformer,480 volt switchgear, and the 250 volt DC system had been effectively controlled by performing appropriate preventive maintenance in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2). Specifically, the measures established for these functions in the demonstration allowed multiple failures before the licensee concluded that the performance or condition had not been effectively controlled.
Such a reliability measure is unacceptable because it validates preventive maintenance despite multiple failures. As a result, it was not demonstrated that effective preventive maintenance ensured that these functions remained espable of performing as required. (01053)
- 3. The licensee failed to adequately demonstrate that the performance or condition of functions of the rod positioning, process computer, and 120 volt AC computer uninterruptable power supply systems had been effectively controlled by performing appropriate preventive maintenance in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2). Specifically, the licensee's basis for placing these SSC functions under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(2) was l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-86 l
Notice of Violation and Proposed 3 , imposition of Civil Penalty l inadequate because plant level measures were used in assessing preventive maintenance. Failures of these SSCs would not necessarily result in unp!anned scrams, safety system actuations, or an unplanned capability loss factor. These plant level measures were thus inadequate to determine whether there were maintenance preventable functional failures of these functions. (01063)
- 4. The licensee failed to adequately demonstrate that the performance or condition of functions of the nitrogen system ha'd been effectively controlled by performing appropriate preventive maintenance in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2). Specifically, the licensee failed to determine in the demonstration if the nitrogen system functions were maintained. (01073)
- 5. The licensee failed to adequately demonstrate that the performance or condition of functions of the intemal flood protection, automatic depressurization, and standby gas treatment systems had been effectively controlled by performing appropriate preventive maintenance in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(2). Specifically, the licensee used inadequate measures in the demonstration to evaluate the effectiveness of preventive maintenance on these functions in that only unplanned limiting condition for operation time was specified as an unavailability performance measure for these functions. As such, planned unavailability was not considered even though system functions during these I times were unable to perform as required. (01083)
- 6. The licensee failed to adequately demonstrate the performance or condition of functions of the 480 volt transformers and switchgear, reactor building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning, fire protection attemate water supply to a reactor pressure vessel,4160 volt switchgear, and 345kV switchylid had been effectivety controlled by performing appropriate preventive maintenance in accordance with I the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2). Specifically, the licensee used a reliability measure, but no availability measure in the demonstration. Reliability and availability measures are both necessary to demonstrate that preventive maintenance had been effective to ensure that system functions will perform as required. (01093)
- 7. The licensee failed to adequately demonstrate that the performance or condition I of functions of the 125 Volt DC, and 250 Volt DC systems had been effectively l controlled by performing appropriate preventive maintenanue in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2). Specifically, the licensees basis for placing the 125 V and 250 V DC electrical systems under the requirements of section (a)(2) was an unavailability performance measure that effectively allowed battery chargers to be out of service and unable to perform their intended functions for sixty six percent of the time. Therefore, the licensee's basis for placing these functions under the requirements of section (a)(2) was inadequate because it allowed an excessive unavailability during which time these SSCs were unable to perform their intended functions. (01103)
NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-87
- .m . _ - - _ . ._. _ . __ . ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ Notice of Violation and Proposed 4 Imposition of Civil Penalty
'C. 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) requires, in part, the holders of an operating license shall monitor the performance or condition of SSCs within the scope of the monitoring program as defined in 10 CFR 50.65(b) against licensee-established goals, in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such SSCs are capable of fulfilling their intended functions.
Such goals shall be established commensurate with safety. When the performance or condition of an SSC does not meet established goals, appropriate corrective action shall be taken. l 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) requires, in part, that monitoring as specified in 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) ; is not required where it has been demonstrated that the performance or condition of an i SSC is being effectively controlled by performing appropriate preventive maintenance, such that the SSC remains capable of performing its intended function. Contrary to the above, the licensee elected not to monitor the performance or condition of j certain SSCs within the scope of the Maintenance Rule in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) when preventive maintenance failed to assure that these SSCs remained capable of performing their intended function, as evidenced by the following examples, each of which constitutes a separate violation:
- 1. Between July 10,1996 and April 10,1997, the licensee elected not to monitor the ,
performance or condition of functions of the emergency diesel generators against established goals pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1). However, the licensee failed to adequately demonstrate that the pe formance or condition of these functions was being effectively controlled by performing appropriate , preventive maintenance. Specifically, the licensee's demonstration of effective preventive maintenance failed to consider maintenance preventable functional i failures which occurred prior to July 10,1996. (01113)
- 2. Between July 10,1996 and August 22,1997, the licensee elected not to monitor ;
the performance or condition of certain functions of the control rod drive hydraulic ; control unit accumulator No.115 check valves, shutdown cooling permissive , pressures switches, and the 480 volt AC breaker for motor operated valve 1-1001-26B against established goals pursuant to the requirements of Section (a)(1). However, the licensee failed to adequately demonstrate that the performance or condition of these functions was being effectively controlled by performing appropriate preventive maintenance. Specifically, the licensee's demonstration of effective preventive maintenance failed to consider maintenance preventable functional failures which occurred prior to July 10,1996. (01123) ,
- 3. Between July 10,1996 and September 12,1997, the licensee elected not to monitor the performance or condition of the functions of source range, ,
intermediate range, local power range, and average power range neutron , monitoring systems against established goals pursuant to the requirements of . Section (a)(1). However, the licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance ! or condition of these functions was being effectively controlled by performing l appropriate preventive maintenance. Specifically, the licensee's demonstration of effective preventive maintenance failed to consider the maintenance preventable functional failures of electronic cards required for the performance of these functions that occurred prior to July 10,1996. (01133) NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-88 , E
Notice of Violation and Proposed 5 Imposition of Civil Penalty l D. 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) requires, in part, the holders of an operating license shall monitor the performance or condition of SSCs within the scope of the monitoring program as defined in 10 CFR 50.65(b) against licensee-established goals, in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such SSCs are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. Such goals shall be established commensurate with safety. When the performance or condition of an SSC does not meet established goals, appropriate corrective action shall be taken. 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) requires, in part, that monitoring as specified in 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) is not required where it has been demonstrated that the performance or condition of an SSC is being effectively controlled by performing appropriate preventive maintenance, such that the SSC remains capable of performing its intended function. Contrary to the above, the licensee permitted certain SSCs within the scope of the Maintenance Rule to remain under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) when preventive maintenance failed to assure that these SSCs remained capable of performing their intended function, as evidenced by the following examples, each of which constitutes a separate violation:
- 1. On July 10,1996, the licensee elected to place the containment atmospheric monitoring system under Section 50.65(a)(2). Following a maintenance preventable functional failure, which occurred on November 22,1996, the licensee incorrectly allowed this system to remain under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2). The maintenance preventable functional failure demonstrated that the preventive maintenance being performed on this system was not appropriate in that it failed to assure that the system remained capable of performing its intended function.
The system should have been placed under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) following the failure. (01143)
- 2. On July 10,1996, the licensee elected to place the scram discharge volume transmitter under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2). Following a maintenance preventable functional failure, which occurred on April 14,1997, the licensee incorrectly allowed this transmitter to remain under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2). The maintenance preventable functional failure demonstrated that the preventive maintenance being performed on this transmitter was not appropriate in that it failed to assure that the transmitter remained capable of performing its intended function. The transmitter should have been placed under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) following the failure. (01153)
E. 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) requires, in part, that the holders of an operating license shall monitor ! the performance or condition of SSCs within the scope of the rule as defined by 10 CFR l 50.65(b) against licensee-established goals, in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such SSCs are capable of fulfilling theirintended functions. Such goals shall be established commensurate with safety. When the performance or condition of an j SSC does not meet established goals, appropriate corrective action shall be taken. 1 O NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-89
Notice of Violation and Proposed 6 Imposition of Civil Penalty I 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) requires, in part, that the holders of an operating license shallinclude within the scope of the monitoring program specified in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), safety-related structures, systems, or components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in poter,tial offsite exposure comparable to the 10 CFR, Part 100 guidelines. The scope shall also include non-safety related structures, systems, or components that are relied upon to mitigate accidents or transients, or are used in the plant emergency operating procedures, or whose failure could prevent safety-related structures, systems, and components from fulfilling their safety-related function, or whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system.
- 1. Contrary to the above, as of September 12,1997, the licensee had failed to identify and include the automatic trip functions of the safety-related high pressure coolant injection pump turbine in the scope of the Maintenance Rule program.
(01163)
- 2. Contrary to the above, as of August 21,1997, the licensee failed to include the rod block function of the reactor manual control system, a nonsafety system intended to mitigate the consequences of an accident or transient, in the scope of the Maintenance Rule program. (01173)
- 3. Contrary to the above, prior to August 15,1997, the licensee had failed to include the nonsafety related intra plant communications systems, relied upon to mitigate the consequences of accidents or transients, in the scope of the Maintenance Rule program. (01183)
These violations represent a Severity Level 111 problem (Supp!ement 1). Civil Penalty- $55,000 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Commonwealth Edison Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be cleariy marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation," and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-90
t Notice of Violation and Proposed 7 Imposition of Civil Penalty Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Ucensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States, in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Ucensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Ucensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in pari, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation (s) listcd in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole orin part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should he set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The sttention of the Ucensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attomey General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region lil, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial hformation), if safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please gvide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at Usle, lilinois, this 3rd day of March 1998 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-91
p e*44 UNITED STATES 9lo,, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [ c. REGION lli lf y 801 WARRENVILLE RoAo
% $ lisle. ILLINOIS 60532-4351
%,,,,,! March 12, 1998 EA 97-591 Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley President, Nuclear Generation Group Commonwealth Edison Company 1
ATTN: Regulatory Services Executive Towers West til 1400 Opus Place, Suite 500 Downers Grove,IL 60515 , l
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF civil PENALTIES - $330,000 (NRC Special inspection Report Nos. 50-254(265)-97027)
Dear Mr. Kingsley:
This refers to the special inspection conducted November 3 through 7,1997 at the . Commonwealth Edison Company's (ComEo) Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (Quad Cities). l The inspection identified several apparent violations associated with Comed's performance of an American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 1 pressure test while Unit 2 ' was at power on June 22,1997 and ASME Code Class 1 and 2 pressure testing activities of both units during previous outages. The NRC discussed these apparent violations with members of the Quad Cities staff at an exit interview on December 4,1997. The inspection report was issued on December 23,1997. On January 9,1998, a predecisional enforcement conference was held in the NRC Region lli office to discuss the apparent violations. Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information provided by Comed representatives during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. l Section A of the Notice addresses the ASME Code leakage test for Unit 2 that was performed after the reactor was made critical. Although in previous outages Quad Cities appropriately performed this test prior to the reactor being made critical, recent changes to the reactor vessel pressure-temperature (P-T) limits triggered the Quad Cities staff's decision to perform this test at power. Although Quad Cities staff recognized that the changes to the P-T limits were going to cause significant operational challenges during the 1997 leakage test, timely proactive steps to address the challenges were not taken. The Quad Cities staff's decisions centered on identifying any regulation that prohibited conducting the leakage test after making the reactor critical and failed to consider the basic reason for conducting this leakage test. The NRC finds ! this decision process inadequate because the Quad Cities staff's efforts failed to identify the applicable regulation (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G," Fracture Toughness Requirements") that l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-92
O. Kingsley prohibited this action. Further, Comed's investigation into this issue revealed that the Comed organization, as a whole, apparently had no formal process to ensure that changes in regulations are distributed to staff members that must comply with them. In order to perform the leakage test at power, the Quad Cities staff developed, reviewed, and approved a new procedure. During this process, the Quad Cities staff failed to identify that the procedure was a test not described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) that involved an unreviewed safety question as described in 10 CFR 50.59, " Changes, Tests, and l Experiments" because the probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident may l have been increased. The lack of thoroughness in this review and approval process resulted in l the failure to identify pertinent portions of the Quad Cities UFSAR that specifically discussed conducting leakage tests in accordance with the ASME Code. Consequently, only an abbreviated screening review of the procedure was performed. Had the pertinent portions of the UFSAR been identified, a full 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation of this issue should have i concluded that performing the test at power involved an unreviewed safety question, because the reactor coolant system pressure boundary had not been tested prior to power operations. More problematic was the fact that the Quad Cities staff reviewing the leakage test were aware of other applicable ASME Code requirements, which stated the " system leakage test shall be conducted prior to plant startup." The Quad Cities staff elected to intercret the term " plant startup" to involve startup of the turbine, rather than startup of the reactor. Based on this i interpretation, the test was accomplished at power. Thus, the NRC is concemed that a ful! Quad Cities station 10 CFR 50.59 process review in this case would not have been effective at preventing the performance of this test at power. l The performance of the Unit 2 reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage test with the reactor l at power demonstrated a significant lack of safety focus and a lack of knowledge and l understanding of the bases for the ASME Code test and the applicable regulatory requirements. l The Quad Cities staff's decision to allow an *at power" leakage test demonstrated a lack of l effective management oversight; a significant failure to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, l Appendix G; and the failure of the 10 CFR 50.59 process to conclude that an unreviewed safety l question was involved. It was also of significant concern that Comed was ineffective in l communicating known changes in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G requirements to its nuclear
- facilities and that fully trained and qualified Comed inspectors, who were part of the Quad Cities insp?ction crew and who are responsible for performing similar visual examinations at the other 1
Comed nuclear facilities and in the past did not conduct these tests at power, and did not question why the testing was performed at power. Accordingly, the violations are classified in the aggregate, in accordance with NUREG-1600, " General Statement of Policy and Procedure l for NRC Enforcement Actions (Enforcement Policy)," as a Severity Level til problem. Section B of the Notice addresses the failure to perform adequate ASME Code leakage tests following Unit 1 and Unit 2 refueling outages. The NRC is concemed that trained, qualified and certified VT-2 inspection staff and supervisory personnel performed and accepted the extremely abbreviated June 22,1997, VT-2 examinations as meeting Code requirements. The causes identified by Comed for these inadequate tests included personnel judgment errors and NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-93 l 1 l
O. Kingsley ineffective self assessment. However, the NRC considers these causes incomplete, as they do not address the underlying cause for accepting the 1997 Code VT-2 examination performed in one third of the time taken to complete past Code VT-2 examinations. The Comed staff explanation that environmental conditions (drywell ambient temperature) unduly influenced VT-2 inspection staff judgement, does not justify the failure to properly complete the Code required inspections. Further, this issue was first identified by the NRC in the subject inspection report on November 7,1997, and the issue was not adequately addressed at the January 9, 1998, enforcement conference. Comed's completed corrective actions included retraining of VT-2 inspection personnelin accordance with existing procedures and processes without understanding the reasons for these process failures during the 1997 VT-2 examination. Other examples of failure to meet Code requirements included inadequate inspection of the reactor vessel flange and reactor vessel head area, and a missed Code Class 2 pressure test. These additional Code violations indicated a potentially broad lack of understanding on the part of the Quad Cities staff for the importance of adhering to Code requirements essential to the safe operation of Quad Cities Station. Accordingly, the violations are classified in the aggregate, in accordance with NUREG-1600, " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions (Enforcement Policy)," as a Severity Level ill problem. The performance and acceptance of the abbreviated inspections for the Code leakage test at power indicates that certified VT-2 inspection staff did not understand the bases of leakage testing requirements which are essential for ensuring that the probability of a loss of coolant accident remains extremely low. Several administrative and managerial control systems failed to ensure that these significant performance deficiencies were identified early such that they could be corrected in a timely manner. The subsequent performance of the leakage test at 12% power without a fully tested pressure boundary was significant because of the corrosion history at Quad Cities and the fact that the recovery from 12% power would be complicated should a loss of coolant accident occur. In precluding the use of nuclear heat to perform the ASME Code test the Commission said in the Statement of Considerations 60 FR 65456 (December 19,1995) for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G that "the use of nuclear heat before the completion of such tests is not consistent with basic defense-in-depth nuclear safety principles for several reasons, including the hindrance of finding leaks with the vessel at such a high temperature and the potential for exacerbating the consequences of a vessel rupture (in the extremely unlikely event that it should occur) by having the core critical." The NRC does acknowledge that the Quad Cities staff performed a pressure test at 900 psig without nuclear heat. However, this test did not satisfy ASME Code requirements and, as acknowledged by the Comed representatives at the predecisional enforcement conference, contributed to acceptance of the abbreviated ASME code test that was performed at power. Subsequently, the hydrostatic test performed on Quad Cities Unit 1 in February 1998 revealed a weld leak on the vessel bottom head drain line and leakage in the reactor vessel head seal area as indicated by an alarm condition on the leakage detection system. Because of the inadequate inspection methods revealed during the Unit 2 test, the potential exists that these areas may not have been adequately inspected on either unit during past pressure tests. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-94
O. Kingsley 1 l , in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000 is considered for each Severity Level ill problem. Because the Quad Cities facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years' the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Identification credit was not warranted for either problem because, although Comed did identify the Appendix G violation 4 they failed to identify the underlying 10 CFR 50.59 violation that should have prevented the Appendix G violation, and also failed to identify the majority of the violations that constitute the regulatory concem in this case. Corrective Action credit was warranted for the violations in i Section A of the Notice. These corrective actions included revisions to the method by which new regulations are reviewed by the site staff, enhancements to the review process for new procedures, and training for safety evaluation reviewers. Since no identification credit was l i i warranted and Corrective Action was warranted, the civil penalty assessment for the violations in Section A would be $55,000. Corrective Action credit was not warranted for the violations in Section B of the Notice. The corrective actions failed to timely identify and address the training deficiencies of the individuals performing the inadequate tests and supervisors responsible for oversight and review of these tests. Since credit was not warranted for Identification and Corrective Action, the civil penalty assessment for the violations in Section B would be
$110,000. The combined civil penalty assessment for Sections A and B would be $165,000. ! The NRC considered whether discretion was warranted to escalate the enforcement sanction in i
accordance with Section Vll.A of the Enforcement Policy. After reviewing the merits of this enforcement action, the NRC has determined that discretion is warranted to double the civil penalty due to particularly poor performance as manifested in the poor management oversight of these plant activities. Therefore, to emphasize the importance of effective management oversight of plant activities and the significant failure to comply with regulations, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, and the Deputy Executive Director for Regulatory Effectiveness, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice)in the amount of $330,000. Comed is required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In developing your response, you should address actions planned or taken,if any: (1) to emphasize a questioning attitude for worl ers, especially those that work at different Comed sites such that unusual or different conditions or practices are questioned, (2) to determine the adequacy of the ASME code leakage tests at other Comed facilities, and (3) to assure that such testing is properly performed in accordance with Appendix G requirements. The NRC will use the Comed response, in part, to determine EA 96114 issued a Severity Level til violation with a $50,000 civil penalty on June 13,1996, for failing to retum design margins to the low pressure injection corner roorns. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-95
O. Kingsley , whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of
' this letter, its enclosure, and Comed response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).-
Sincerely, C (A J w . June V A. Bill Beach Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-254; 265 License Nos. DPR-29; DPR
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties
- cc w/ encl: M. Wallace, Nuclear Services Senior Vice President G. Stanley, PWR Vice President J. Perry, BWR Vice President D. Farrar, Regulatory Services Manager .
- l. Johnson, Licensing Director DCD - Licensing E. Kraft, Jr., Site Vice President D. Cook, Quad Cities Station Manager C. C. Peterson, Regulatory Affairs Manager Richard Hubbard Nathan Schloss, Economist Office of the Attomey General State Liaison Officer Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission W. D. Leech, Manager of Nuclear MidAmerican Energy Company NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-96 J
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PRCPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES Commonwealth Edison Company Docket Nos. 50-254; 265 Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2 1.icense Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30 EA 97-591 During an NRC inspection completed on December 4,1997 violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the NUREG-1600, " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," the NRC proposes to impose civil penalties pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act),42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violation (s) and associated civil penalties are set forth below: A. Inadequate Test Conditions
- 1. 10 CFR 50.60, " Acceptance criteria for fracture prevention measures to light water nuclear power reactors for normal operation," requires, in part, that all light-water reactor plants must meet the fracture toughness requirements for the reactor coolant pressure boundary as set forth in Appendix G, " Fracture Toughness Requirements."
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, IV.2(d)," Pressure-Temperature Limits and Minimum Temperature Requirements," requires, in part, that pressure tests and leak tests of the reactor vessel that are required by Section XI, " Rules for inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components," of the American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code must be completed before the core is critical. ASME Code Section XI (1989 Edition, no Addenda), Table IWB-2500-1,
" Examination Category B-P, All Pressure Retaining Components," at item B15.10 requires a system leakage test (IWB-5221) and visual VT-2 examination of the pressure retaining boundary of the reactor vessel each refueling outage.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to perform the required ASME Code Section XI leakage test and visual examination of the Unit 2 pressure retaining boundary of reactor vessel during the Unit 2 refueling outage and prior to core criticality on June 22,1997. (01013)
- 2. 10 CFR 50.59 (a)(1)," Changes, tests, and experiments" states, in part, that a licensee may conduct tests not described in tne safety analysis report, without prior Commission approval, unless the test involves an unreviewed safety question.
10 CFR 50.59 (a)(2) states, in part, that a test shall be deemed to involve an unreviewed safety question if the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-97 l
Notice of Violation . 10 CFR 50.59 (b)(1) requires, in part, that the licensee shall maintain records of 1 tests pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section. These records must include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the test does not involve an unreviewed safety question. Contrary to the above, the licensee performed a system leakage test of the Unit 2 reactor vessel pressure boundary on June 22,1997 at power operations, a test not described in the UFSAR. The safety evaluation for the system leakage < test was inadequate because it failed to identify that IWB-5000, the testing methodology described in the UFSAR, Section 5.2.4.7, requires that the system leakage test of the reactor vessel pressure boundary be performed prior to plant startup. The licensee implemented lWB 5000 through Procedure QCOS 0201-10, Reactor Vessel and Class One Piping Leak Test at Power Operation." Revision 1 (dated June 6,1997 to QCOS 0201-10) allowed system leakage test ; of the reactor vessel pressure boundary to be performed after plant startup contrary to the UFSAR. The performance of the test at power constituted an unreviewed safety question since the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident (loss of coolant accident) had been increased because the licensee allowed the reactor to be in an operational condition prior to successful completion of tests that are intended to ensure that the reactor vessel meets leakage and pressure requirements. (01023) These violations represent a Severity Level ill Problem (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty -
$110,000.
B. Inadequate Tests Quad Cities Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specification 4.0.E, " Surveillance Requirements'" requires, in part, implementation of ASME Code Section XI inservice inspection and testirg requirements for Code Class 1 and 2 components.
- 1. ASME Code Section XI (1989 Edition, no Addenda), IWB-5210(b), " System Test Requirements - Test," states, in part, that system pressure tests and visual examinations shall be conducted in accordance with IWA-5000
- System Pressure Tests."
- a. lWA-5242(a), " Insulated Components," states, in part, visual examination VT-2 may be conducted without the removal of insulation by examining the accessible and exposed surfaces and joints of the insulation.
Essentially vert.,al surfaces of insulation need only be examined at the lowest elevation where leakage may be detectable. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-98
l l Notice of Violation l IWA-5242(b) states, in part, that when examining insulated components, the examination of surrounding area (including floor areas or equipment surfaces located undemeath the components) for evidence of leakage, or other areas to which such leakage may be channeied, shall be required.
- l. Contrary to the above,'on June 22,1997 the licensee failed to l perform an adequate VT-2 Inspection of the reactor vessel head i area during the ASME Code Section XI pressure test of the Code l Class 1 systems for Unit 2. Specifically, the VT-2 examination l failed to include the floor areas of the refueling cavity at radial locations along the lower edge of the vertical insulation wall i
surrounding the reactor vesse! head. Further, the licensee failed l to utilize an inspection port in this vertical head insulation to perform direct VT-2 inspections of the vessel head. (02013) l 11. Contrary to the above, on June 22,1997 the licensee failed to L perform an adequate VT-2 Inspection of portions of the Code Class 1 system boundary within the drywell during the ASME ! Code Section XI leakage test. Specifically, the licensee concluded (after a January 3,1998 re-enactment of the June 22, 1997 VT-2 inspection) that Class 1 system boundary leakage (if present) for portions of the system boundary located within the drywell would not have been detected.- (02023)
- b. lWA-5243, " Components With Leakage Collection Systems," states that where leakages from components are normally expected and collected (such as valve stems, pump seals, or vessel flange gaskets) the visual l
examination VT-2 shall be conducted by verifying that the leakage , collection system is operative. l l
- 1. Contrary to the above, on June 22,1997 the licensee failed to perform an adequate VT-2 examination of the reactor vessel head flange joint leakage collection system during the Unit 2 ASME Code Section XI Class 1 system leakage test. Specifically, the VT-2 examination failed to verify that this system was operative.
(02033)
- 11. Contrary to the above, on May 3,1996 the licensee failed to perform an adequate VT-2 examination of the reactor vessel head flange joint leakage collection system during the Unit 1 ASME
! Code Section XI Class 1 systerr 'eakage test. Specifically, the VT-2 examination failed to verify tV this system was operative. l l l (02043) l l ! NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-99 1 e-a__m _ m m --W. . 4,,, , -. ,7 ,,. g . -7., ,_mpa
Notice of Violation .
- 2. ASME Code Section XI (1989 Edition, no Addenda), IWC-5210(a), " System Test Requirements - Test," states, in part, that system pressure tests will be as there specified and visual examinations will be in accordance with the method specified in Table IWC-2500-1,
- Examination Category C-H."
Table IWC-2500-1, requires a pressure test (lWC-5221) and VT-2 examination of pressure retaining boundaries of Code Class 2 systems during each inspection period. The Unit 1 inspection period was February 18,1993 to February 18,1996. The Unit 2 inspection period was March 10,1993 to March 10,1996.
- a. Contrary to the above, as of February 18,1996 the end of the Unit 1 inspection period, the licensee failed to perform a VT-2 examination of the Unit i reactor pressure vessel head flange seal leak detection system, a Code Class 2 system, within the required code inspection period. (02053)
- b. Contrary to the above, as of March 10,1996 the end of the Unit 2 inspection period, the licensee failed to perform a VT-2 examination of the Unit 2 reactor pressure vessel head flange seal leak detection system, a Code Class 2 system, required within the required code inspection period. (02063)
These violations represent a Severity Level til Problem (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty -
$220,000.
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Commonwealth Edison Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. The Licensee may pay the civil penalties by letter addressed to the Director, Office of l Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-100
Notice of Violation i penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalties in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalties will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 4 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation (s) listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not be imposed. In addition to , protesting the civil penalties in whole or in part, such answers may request remission or mitigation of the penalties. In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalties, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing civil penalties. Upon failure to pay any civil penalties due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attomey General, and the penalties, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalties, ; and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: Director, Office of Enforcement, i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region 111 and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction if personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information), if safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at Lisle, Illinois this 12th day of March 1998 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-101
UNITED STATES [/"8%k*
,, S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGloh lil 5 801 WARRENVILLE ROAD USLE. ILUNOIS 60632-4361
***** April 2, 1998 i
EA 97-567 EA 97-569 i Mr. T. Palmisano i Site Vice President and General Manager Palisades Nuclear Power Generating Plant j 27780 Blue Star Memonal Highway , Covert, MI 49043-9630
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CML PENALTIES ;
$55,000 (NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 50-255/97014(DRS)) ,
Dear Mr. Palmisano:
j This refers to the special inspection conducted on October 28 through November 19,1997, at ; the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant. The purpose of this inspection was to review the t circumstances surrounding the removal of all control rods from service to conduct maintenance l
- i during power operation. These issues and the need for effective corrective schons were I
discussed during a public exit meeting on November 19,1997. The report documenting our l ' inspection activities was issued December 12,1997. Due to the significance of these issues a predecisional enforcement conference was conducted on December 19,1997. Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information provided during . the predecisional enforcement conference, the NRC has determined that six violations of NRC ! requirements occurred. These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) ! and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties. The circumstances surrounding each violation are ! described in detail in the subject inspection report. - The violations refer to both conduct of operations errors made by a shift operating crew and , failures to follow maintenance-related procedures by maintenance personnel when power was removed from all of the control rod drives during power operation to facilitate the repair of a single control rod drive. These errors reflected significant weaknesses in pre-evolutionary preparations, communications, and supervision that resulted in the breakdown of oversight and , control of operations and maintenance activities. Specifically, during the preplanning of this activity, the operating crew failed to implement a plant , procedure mandating that a safety assessment be conducted to ensure the system configuration was acceptable for the current plant status. The crew incorrectly removed power from all of the : control rod drives without communicating that system configuration to the shift supervisor. Five !'
~of the on shift licensed operators did not realize that removing power to all of the control rod drives, during power operation, was a system configuration that the Technical Specifications only permitted for a limited time. Before removing power from all of the control rods, the operating crew erroneously referenced a previous tag out that had removed power from all of the control ;
rod drives during shutdown conditions. Before starting the repair, maintenance personnel incorrectly documented that power to only one control rod drive motor was removed; the system , i NUREG-0940, PART 2 ' A-102 i F
) I l 3 T. Palmisano ! j configuration required by the maintenance procedure prerequisites. If maintenance personnel j had complied with the procedure requirements and correctly verified the prerequisite, this work request could either have been deferred until the specified system configuration was established l or changed to accommodate the expanded work scope. During the repair, maintenance personnel inadvertently expanded the scope of the authorized work when they removed and
- reinstalled relays for three additional control rod drive motors. This was accomplished without i documenting the additional work activity. The shift management team failed to exercise its
! oversight responsibilities by failing to stop the maintenance activity or expand the scope of the ! post maintenance test after observing a mechanic exceed the scope of the maintenance activity
- by removing and reinstalling the additional relays. As a result, an inadequate post maintenance
! test was performed because the change in scope was not adequately communicated to l maintenance or operations personnel. When the expanded maintenance scope was discussed i with the operations manager, the post maintenance test was still not revised to include the
- expanded maintenance scope. Inherent in the failure of your staff to recognize the increased i maintenance work scope and the need for additional post maintenance testing was your staff's l incorrect interpretation that removing and inspecting the relays did not constitute maintenance that could adversely affect system operation.
l f While the NRC acknowledges that the control rods remained trippable, both manually and
- automatically, which ensured that the reactor protection functions provided by the control rods were available and that the control room crew had discussed contingencies needed to respond to i an operational transient, the failures present in this case represent a significant lack of attention i to licensed responsibilities and, therefore, a significant regulatory concem. The procedural i violations evidenced by both maintenance and operations personnel, in light of their root causes discussed above, could in different circumstances present actual or potential safety ,
consequences. Accordingly, the violations in the Notice are classified in the aggregate, in l accordance with NUREG-1600, " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC ; Enforcement Actions (Enforcement Policy)," as a Severity Level 111 problem. l l In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000 is l considered for each Severity Level til problem. Because the Palisades facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years,' the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identi# cation and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NRC recognizes that the i Palisades site management team identified many of the violations. However, the site management team did not identify the inadequate pre-evolutionary preparations, ineffective communications, and lack of supervision; that collectively these violations represented. As a result, the NRC interceded to focus the attention of plant management on the broader programmatic nature of the problem. Therefore identi# cation credit was not warranted. Conective Action credit was evaluated and determined to be warranted. Conective Actions consisted of, but were not limited to: (1) removing licensed operators from shift duties and conducting remedial training for the operations personnel on duty at the time of the event;
' A Severtty Level 111 violation and a $50.000 cMI penalty were issued on August 13.1996. for v6olabons of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R (EA 96-131).
NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-103
- - .. . ._ - - _. -- . . = - _. _ .
T. Palmisano (2) meeting with all shift operating crew members to discuss crew communications, emergent work planning, and adherence to Technical Specifications; (3) briefing maintenance workers about the event and the lessons leamed from the incident; and (4) improving the mechanisms for managing emergent work and error likely situations. Therefore, to emphasize the importance of implementing work controls for systems that are vital to plant safety, the importance of procedural compliance, and emphasize the breakdown in the conduct of operations activities, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties in the base amount of $55,000. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response, in developing your corrective actions, you should address actions planned or taken, if any, to address the adequacy of your corrective actions in response to previous procedural violations involving work control and control room activities. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. Sincerely, A. Bill Beach Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-255
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties r cc w/ encl: Robert A. Fenech, Senior Vice l President, Nuclear, Fossil i and Hydro Operations l Thomas C. Bordine, Manager i Licensing Department l Richard Whale, Michigan 1 1 Public Service Commission Michigan Department of Environmental Quality Department of Attomey General (MI) NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-104 l l
MOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES Consumers Power Company Docket No. 50-255 Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant License No. DPR-20 EA 97 567 & EA 97-569 During an NRC inspection conducted from October 28 to November 19,1997, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG 1600, the NRC proposes to impose civil penalties pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), l 42 U.S.C. 2282 and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalties are i set forth below: Palisades Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specification 6.4.1.a (Amendment 174), " Procedures," requires, in part, that written procedures shall be implemented covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, " Typical ; Procedures for Pressurized Water Reactors and Boiling Water Reactors," February 1978. l RG 1.33, Revision '2, Appendix A, states, in part, that the following are typical safety-related activities that should be covered by written procedures: authorities and responsibilities for safe operation (Section 1.b); equipment control (Section 1.c); maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment (Section 9.a); and control of maintenance (Section 9.e). l
- 1. Administrative Procedure 4.00 (Revision 20 - 7/18/97), " Operations Organization, Responsibilities and Conduct," a procedure required by Section 1.b of RG 1.33, at Step 4.2.3.b.6, required that the Control Room Supervisor shall keep the Shift Supervisor informed of plant and equipment status.
Contrary to the above, on October 17,1997, the Control Room Supervisor failed to property implement Administrative Procedure 4.00 in that the Shift Supervisor was not kept informed that power would be removed from all of the control rod drive motors in order to facilitate maintenance on control rod 38. (01013)
- 2. Administrative Procedure 4.10 (Revision 6 - 4/30/97), " Personnel Protective Tagging," a procedure required by Section 1.c of RG 1.33, at Step 7.2.2 required that the Shift Supervisor shall ensure that equipment may be removed from service by ensuring that the Technical Specification requirements, including the Limiting Conditions for Operations and Action Statements, are met.
Palisades Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specification 3.10.4.b, Amendment 169, states, in part, that a control rod is considered inoperable if it cannot be moved by its operator and if more than one control rod becomes inoperable then the reactor shall be placed in hot shutdown within 12 hours. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-105
Notice of Violation Contrary to the above, on October 17,1997, the Shift Supervisor (and the Control Room Supervisor, Shift Engineer (all licensed senior reactor operators)) failed to ensure that equipment could be removed from service by failing to ensure that Technical Specification requirements, including the Limiting Condition for Operation and Action Statements, were met prior to removing all the control rods from service. Specifically, power was removed from all the rods and the licensed operator failed to realize that removing power from more than one control rod required entry into a 12 hour action to shut down the plant. (01023)
- 3. Administrative Procedure 4.02 (Revision 15 - 6/27/97) " Control of Equipment," a procedure requirey _ Section 1.c of RG 1.33, at the NOTE before step 1 of Attachment 8, " Safety Assessment for Removal of Plant Equipment (SSCs) From Service," required that Attachment 8, or an equivalent risk-based assessment, be completed for maintenance activities that met all of the following conditions:
a) entry into unplarned maintenance outages b) involved high safety significant systems identified in Attachment 10 c) would render the system incapable of performing its Maintenance Rule function d) did not occur with the equipment positioned in its designed safety position prior to removing its power source. Contrary to the above, on October 17,1997, the licensee failed to complete Administrative Procedure 4.02, Attachment 8, or perform an equivalent risk-based assessment for the maintenance on control rod 38. Specifically, this maintenance activity- (1) was an unplanned r maintenance outage because the corrective maintenance on control rod 38 was emergent work; (2) involved the control rod drive system which was a high safety significant system identified in Attachment 10; (3) rendered the control rod drive system incapable of performing its maintenance rule function of manual operation; and (4) did not occur with control rod 38 positioned in its designed safety position of fully inserted prior to removing its power source. (01033)
- 4. Maintenance Procedure CRD-E-32 (Revision 7 - 2/21/95), "CRDM [ Control Rod Drive Motor)
Control Relays Cleaning and inspection," a procedure required by Section 9.a of RG 1.33, at Step 3.4.2.e. required during plant operation with rods withdrawn and the clutch power supply energized that only one relay set and its related fuses be removed from service at a time. Contrary to the above, on October 17,1997, during implementation of work order 24714120, maintenance on control rod 38, licensee personnel failed to proper 1y implement Maintenance Procedure CRD-E-32 in that more than one control rod relay set and its related fuses were simultaneously removed from service and inspected. (01043) NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-106 1
l l Notice of Violation 5. Administrative Procedure 5.01 (Revision 21 - 5/12/97), " Processing Work Requests / Work l Orders," a procedure required by Section 9.e of RG 1.33, Attachment 2," Work Order ' Scheduling, Performance, and Completion," at Step 2.3.c, required the Assigned Supervisor to review scheduled work orders to determine the work could be performed as scheduled, and if not notify the Shift Supervisor (" scheduled" includes both the time of occurrence and manner of conduct). Step 6.1 of Attachment 2, required the work order to be replanned, per i the requirements of this procedure, if the Assigned Supervisor determined that the work l required to correct the problem was not adequately described in the work orderjob plan. , Step 5.11.b required the repairperson to document the "as found" conditions and the , repairs / adjustments made. l Contrary to the above, on October 17,1997, during implementation of work order 24714120, l maintenance on control rod 38, licensee personnel failed to proper 1y implement Administrative Procedure 5.01 in that three additional control rod drive relay contactors for control rods 3,40, and an unidentified Group Ill control rod were removed, inspected, and reinstalled. This represented a condition not allowed by the work procedure and was an unplanned and undocumented expansion of the approved work scope without the required notification to the Shift Supervisor. (01053)
- 6. Administrative Procedure 5.19 (Revision 6 - 4/15/97), " Post Maintenance Testing," a procedure required by Section 9.e of RG 1.33, at Step 5.2.e, required the Operations Marmer to ensure that Post Maintenance Testing was properiy performed prior to declaring the ewipment operable. Step 5.4.c required the Maintenance Supervisor to ensure that the specified post maintenance testing was revised, as necessary, if the scope of maintenance performed was changed after initial planning.
Administrative Procedure 4.02 (Revision 15 - 6/27/97), " Control of Equipment," a procedure required by Section 1.c of RG 1.33, at Step 9.3.b, required operability testing to be performed on safety-related equipment following any maintenance activity which had the potential to affect the equipment's operability. Contrary to the above, following implementation of work order 24714120, maintenance on control rod 38, on October 17,1997, licensee personnel failed to property implement Administrative Procedures 5.19 and 4.02. Specifically, more than one control rod relay set and its related fuses were removed from service and inspected which represented a change in the scope of maintenance after initial planning. However, the specified post maintenance testing was not revised as necessary. Consequently, appropriate Post Maintenance Testing was not identified or performed. (01063) These violations represent a Severity Level ill problem (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty $55,000. Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Consumers Power Company (Ucensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-107
f i Notice of Violation 1 i - i imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice). This reply should be cleariy marked as a " Reply to a Notice of l Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged l violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the I l corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be
- taken to evoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an i adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for
! Information may be issued as why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why i such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending . the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,
- 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
, Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the ! Licensee may pay the civil penalties by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. l Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to
- the Treasurer of the United States in the cumulative amount of the civil penalties or may protest
{ imposition of the civil penalties in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, l Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer
- within the time specified, an order imporing the civil penalties will be issued. Should the Licensee i elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in 1 j part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may
(1) deny the violations listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating ! circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not j be imposed. In addition ' to protesting the civil penalties in whole or in part, such answer may request l
- remission or mitigation of the penalties. l In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalties, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the l Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and
{ paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other
- provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing civil penalties.
Upon failure to pay any civil penalties due which subsequently has been determined in accordance i with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attomey General, i and the penalties, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c. j The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalties, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region 111 and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the Palisades Plant. i ! Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room, to the extent possible, it j should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it I l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-108 l i e i _ _ ._ __ -
t Notice of Violation 1 ) can be placed in the Public Document Room without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary 1 information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you reek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the in ormation required by , 2 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confiantial commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please
- provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
- L
, Dated at Lisle, Illinois this 2nd day of April 1998 l 1
- ,n NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-109
panrg UNITED STATES
*$ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[ REGION i
$ j
- 475 ALLENDALE ROAD KING oF PRUSSIA, PENNSYl.VANIA 19406-1415 January 6, 1990 EA 97-517 Mr. J. E. Cross, President Generation Group Duquesne Light Company (DLC)
Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY
- $55,000 (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-334/97-07;50-412/97-07 & 50-334/97-08; 50-412/97-08)
Dear Mr. Cross:
This letter refers to the NRC inspection conducted between August 31,1997, and October 4,1997, at the Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2, the findings of which were discussed with you and members of your staff during an exit meeting on October 14,1997. During the inspection, an apparent. violation of NRC requirements was identified involving the f ailure to take adequate action to correct a significant condition adverse to quality at the facility. The specific adverse condition involved voiding in the high head safety injection (HHSI) suction lines which could lead to gas binding of the HHSI pumps and consequent failure to operate. The related NRC inspection report was sent to you on November 7,1997. I This also refers to an NRC inspection conducted between October 5,1997, and November 15,1997, the findings of which were discussed with you and members of your staff during an exit meeting on November 21,1997. During that inspection, the NRC documented a related unresolved item with respect to whether the venting of the HHSI pumps immediately prior to its surveillance test invalidated the test causing a violation of NRC requirements. On December 10, 1997, a Predecisional Enforcement Conference was conducted with you and members of your staff to discuss the apparent violation, its causes, and your corrective actions, as well as the related unresolved item. Based on the information developed during the inspections, and the information provided during the conference, one violation is being cited and is described in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). The violation involves your failure to take adequate action to correct this significant condition adverse to quality regarding gas binding of the HHSI pumps. This condition was identified at Unit 2 on September 12,1997 when operators observed that the differential pressure for one of the Unit 2 HHSI pumps was below its Technical Specification limit. Previously, your staff had encountered repeated instances of gas binding of this specific HHSI pump. However, on each occasion, adequate corrective actions were not taken, as more fully described herein. These repeated instances
- of gas binding of the pump likely caused the degradation of the pump below Technical Specification differential pressure limits.
NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-Il0
Duquesne Light Company 2 This finding is significant because the gas binding of the pump created the potential for interruption of HHSI flow to the reactor during design basis accident conditions. The violation is particularly risk significant because the issue affected both units over a long duration and affected the only safety related high pressure source of injection to the reactor vessel for several accident scenarios. At the conference, you recognized the seriousness of this problem, noting that in not taking adequate corrective actions sooner, you operated outside the design basis for the facility. You also indicated that the failure of your staff to display a l more questioning attitude on this matter was one of the root causes of the problem. This was l evident during testing of the pump in August 1997 when indications of degraded pump I performance were not fully evaluated following surveillance testing on August 20 and after ) extensive venting on August 28, or prior to returning the pump to operability following the August 28 gas binding event. This finding is also significant because the prior indications of gas binding of this pump provided clear opportunities to correct this condition sooner. In March 1988, your staff 1 discovered excessive gas accumulation on a Unit 2 HHSI pump. This gas accumulation was l large enough to prohibit the pump from operating. Your investigation in 1997 has shown that the corrective actions taken from 1988 to 1997 for Unit 1 and Unit 2 were ineffective to ) prevent possible gas binding events due to inadequate engineering evaluations and a failure to evaluate the effectiveness of the corrective actions. For example, you attributed the gas binding of a Unit 2 HHSI pump (the same pump that failed in September 1997)in June 1993 to the accumulation of excessive gas because of inadequate manual venting of the charging ; lines to the volume control tank (VCT). Although corrective actions were planned to install l a continuous venting design, this action was never implemented and the item was closed in 1 your tracking system, in addition, in November 1996, that same pump again experienced gas binding. While the planned corrective action at that time was to modify the vent path to l improve the manual venting of the system, this action was not scheduled for completion until January 15,1998, and there were no interim actions taken to prevent recurrence of gas binding. Further, in August 1997, the pump again experienced gas binding even after the lines had been vented for over three hours, which was much longer than the normal venting period of less than 10 minutes. This type of violation is similar to the failure to correct a condition adverse to quality at Unit 1 involving the operation of the reactor with two of the three pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) block valves shut for an extended period of time (from 1981 until 1996). As you know, on March 10,1997, the NRC issued to Duquesne Light Company a Notice of j Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $160,000 for, in part, the failure to correct that adverse condition related to the PORV block valves. In that case, your staff also missed several opportunities to identify and correct the incorrect valve lineup. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-111
-- ~_ _
Duquesne Light Company 3 Given the risk significance of the failure to correct the HHSI gas binding phenomena, despite the prior opportunities to do so, the violation has been classified at Severity Level lil in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Action, (NUREG-1600) (Enforcement Policy). In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, the base civil penalty amount for this Severity Level lli violation is $55,000. Your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two years, as already noted herein; therefore, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for /dentification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit is not warranted for identification since the violation was identified as a result of an event, and it should have been identified sooner given the prior opportunities. Credit is warranted for corrective action because your corrective actions, which were described during the conference, were considered prompt and comprehensive after the September 12,1997 event. Those actions included, but were not limited to: (1) initiation of a multi-discipline team to review events leading to the pump's failure to meet the technical specification; (2) plans to install six 22-stage recirculation line orifices in order to eliminate the vast majority of the generation of hydrogen gas; (3) plans to perform more frequent ultrasonic measurements to determine gas accumulation; (4) detailed engineering evaluations and establishment of gas accumulation limits for Unit 1 and Unit 2; (5) conduct of safety culture training to focus on improving questioning attitude; and (6) plans to establish a Critique Process to promote earlier identification and resolution to deviant conditions. Therefore, to emphasize (1) the importance of a questioning attitude to ensure prompt and comprehensive identification and correction of conditions adverse to quality when they exist, and (2) aggressively looking for and pursuing anomalous conditions at the facility, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to propose a $55,000 civil penalty in this case. Given the high risk significance of this condition, as well as the period of time it existed, I considered exercising discretion to increase the civil penalty. However, I have decided not to do so in view of the overall comprehensiveness of your corrective actions. With respect to the unresolved item discussed during the second inspection, the NRC is still evaluating this matter and resolution will be handled by separate correspondence at a later date. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-112
Duquesne Light Company 4 {_ i: In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and . Its enclosure, and your response, will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). 1 !: Sincerely, i
- Hubert J. Miller
[ Regional Administr or M Docket Nos. 50-334;50-412 License Nos. DPR-66; NPF-73
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty cc w/ encl: S. Jain, Vice President, Nuclear Services R. LeGrand, Division Vice President, Nuclear Operations Group & Plant Manager W. Kline, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department B. Tuite, General Manager, Nuclear Operations Unit M. Pergar, Acting Manager, Quality Services 'Jnit
; J. Arias, Director, Safety & Licensing Department J. MacDonald, Manage, System and Performance Engineering M.' Clancy, Mayor -
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State of Ohio
-State of West Virginia NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-113
ENCLOSURE NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Duquesne Light Company (DLC)- Docket Nos. 50-334;50-412 Beaver Valley Power Station License Nos. DPR-66; NPF-73 EA 97-517 During an NRC inspection conducted between August 31,1997, and October 4,1997, for which an exit meeting was held on October 14,1997, a violation of NRC requirements was l identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC l Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act),42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violation and associated civil penalty are set forth below: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected, in the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures. shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action is taken to preclude repetition. Contrary to the above, between 1988 and September 12,1997, a condition adverse to quality existed at Unit 1 and Unit 2, when excessive gas accumulation in the HHSI pumps suction lines resulted in the potential operation of both units outside the design basis. The excessive gas accumulation resulted in repeated gas binding of the Unit 2 high head safety injection (HHSI) pump 2CHS-P21C. During that time, measures were not established to ensure that the condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected until after September 12,1997, when the differential pressure for the pump was observed to be at 2341 psid which was below the limit of 2437 listed in Technical Specifications 4.1.2.4.1 and 4.5.2.b.1. Specifically,
- 1. In March 1988, the licensee discovered excessive gas accumulation on the HHSI Pump 2CHS-P21 A. This gas accumulation was large enough to prohibit the pump from operating. The licensee identified that Unit 1 also experienced gas accumulation in the HHSI system. Corrective actions taken in 1988 to 1990 to install manual venting systems and establish venting frequencies were inadequate _ to prevent possible gas binding events due to inadequate engineering evaluations and failure to evaluate the effectiveness of the corrective actions.
1 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-114
Enclosure 2
- 2. In June 1993, HHSI Pump 2CHS-P21C experienced gas binding which the licensee attributed to an accumulation of excessive gas due to inadequate venting of the charging lines to the volume control tank. While the corrective actions stated in response to this event were to install the design for confnuous venting, this action had not been implemented as of September 12,1997 even though the itern had been closed m the licensee's tracking system.
- 3. In November 1996, HHSI Pump 2CHS-P21C again experienced gas binding which was again attributed to inadequate venting of the charging lines to the VCT. While the corrective action stated in response to that event was to modify the vent path to improve the manual venting of the system, this action was not scheduled for completion before January 15,1998, and there were no interim actions taken to prevent recurrence of gas binding.
- 4. In August 1997, HHSI Pump 2CHS-P21C again experienced gas binding due to inadequate venting of the charging lines. However, corrective actions taken prior to the pump start and following that event were deficient in that indications of degraded pump performance were not fully evaluated following surveillance testing on August 20 and after the extensive venting on August 28, or prior to declaring the pump operable following the August 28 gas binding event. (01013)
This violation is classified at Severity Level 111 (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty - $55,000. Pursuant to provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Duquesne Light Company (DLC) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty, in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-115
l Enclosure 3 ) penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation (s) listed in this I Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this ! Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or l mitigation of the penalty. r in requesting mitigation'of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of , the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to ( 10 CFR 2,201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference ,
-(e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee :
is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing civil l penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due that subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by r civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c. l The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: James Lieberman, Director, r Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 ! Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738,with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region 1, and a copy to the NRC Senior Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent t possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR. If redactions are required, a proprietary version containing . brackets placed around the proprietary, privacy, and/or safeguards information should be l submstted. In addition a non-proprietary version with the information in the brackets redacted l should be submitted to be placed in the PDR. ; I Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 6th day of January 1998 f NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-I l6 - , l
. ~ . . .. .- . . - . . . . - . . . . - . ... .
s# " Coq UNITE D STATES ' , I k NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R EGION IV 4
%,,V 4, /
f 611 RY AN PLAZA DRIVE. SulTE 400 AR LINGTON, TE XAS 760118064 4 December 23. 1997 EA 97-497 i l John R. McGaha. Vice President - Operations 4 River Bend Station Entergy Operations, Inc. P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF civil PENALTY - .
$55,000 !
(NRC Inspection Report No. 50-458/97-15) i
Dear Mr. McGaha:
This refers to the predecisional enforcement conference conducted in the NRC's Region IV , office in Arlington, Texas on December 2,1997. The conference was held to discuss the results of an NRC inspection conducted September 22 through October 17,1997, at the River Bend j Station (RBS). The inspection reviewed the circumstances surrounding two instances where shutdown cooling was not appropriately maintained. The first event, described in Licensee Event Report (LER) 97-006, occurred on September 13,1997, and resulted in an unplanned mode change. The second event occurred on October 4,1997, and involved the inadvertent l closing of a shutdown cooling suction isolation valve. Our inspection identified two apparent ' , violations, and these were discussed with you and your staff during an exit briefing on October 17,1997. l Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that you provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that two violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty and the circumstances surrounding them were described in detail in the subject inspection report. The first violation involves a failure to meet technical specification 4 requirements that prohibit mode changes except when associated limiting conditions for operation are met. Specifically, RBS inadvertently transitioned from Mode 4 to Mode 3 when the average reactor coolant temperature increased to greater than 200'F. This vidation occurred on September 13 when RBS was performing post-modification testing on a new system, the alternate decay heat removal (ADHR) system. In developing the test plan and procedures, RBS personnel failed to determine how long shutdown cooling systems could remain offline (a situation with no forced cooling in the core) before boiling would occur. As a result, after two hours, unexpected boiling occurred. When RBS personnel unbolted the reactor core isolation cooling flange connection to the reactor head, steam was released on the refuel floor. This steaming set off alarms and caused an evacuation of the refuel floor until airborne activity could be determined. A review of the circumstances surrounding thls event indicated that RBS staff and management relied on a requirement in the test procedure to terminate the test and to restore shutdown NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-117
Entergy Operations, Inc. cooling if indicated reactor coolant temperature reached 160*F. This was intended to give RBS personnel sufficient time to restore shutdown cooling before the temperature reached 200*F. However, with shutdown cooling secured and no forced circulation, the temperature indication l was not representative of average reactor coolant temperature because of temperature j stratification (coolant temperature near the core was much higher than coolant temperature at RWCU inlet). As a consequence, the unit changed Technical Specification operating modes in I an uncontrolled manner. The second violation involves three examples of inadequate procedures for operation of shutdown cooling. The first two examples were identified after reviewing the circumstances of the September 13 event. The third example was identified after reviewing the circumstances of the inadvertent isolation of shutdown cooling on October 4. The October 4 event occurred when operators closed an electrical breaker and unintentionally shut the shutdown cooling suction valve. The plant was without shutdown cooling for approximately 17 minutes while operators worked to restore the appropriate systems. During this time, average coolant temperature increased from 97* to 100*F. These issues are of regulatory significance. In the first event, RBS staff did not recognize a fundamentalissue (time-to-boil) during its review process. Although average coolant temperature exceeded 200*F for about 30 minutes, with a maximum average coolant temperature calculated at about 205 *F, the lack of sensitivity to time-to-boil considerations created the potential for safety consequences, especially in light of the fact that both primary and secondary containment were open, establishing an unfiltered release path to the environment. In the second event, shutdown cooling was not effectively protected from other plant activities. Therefore, based on the importance of plant staff being sensitive to the need to maintain and protect shutdown cooling, these violations are classified in the aggregate in accordance with the
" General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions"(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level ill problem.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a civil penalty with a base value of $55,000 is considered for a Severity Level lil problem. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years', the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NRC has determined that no credit is warranted for identification, because the violations were revealed by events and because there was industry experience and other information available to RBS staff (specifically . time-to-boil curves in the RBS Shutdown Operations Protection Plan) that should reasonably ! have caused actions that would have prevented the violation. This information was not considered by the engineers developing the test procedure nor by the operations department reviewing the procedure, and of concern to the NRC, was not questioned by the Facility Review Committee (FRC). However, the NRC has determined that Entergy is deserving of credit for Corrective Action based on its prompt and comprehensive corrective actions. These actions
' On November 7,1996, a Severity Level 111 Notice of Violation (EA 96-329) was issued for many licensee-identified examples of a failure to meet the surveillance test program.
NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-ll8 i l
Entergy Operations, Inc. included taking immediate actions to restore shutdown cooling after each event, immediately forming a Significant Event Response Team, chartering a Quality Action Team to improve the modification process, enhancing management oversight of complex processes, stressing leadership of the Operations department, performing additional training on fundamental knowledge and outage risk awareness, raising the standards and expectations of the FRC, developing a
- bus coordinator" assignment for entire cycle, and formalizing shutdown cooling procedure to greater degrees of detail.
Therefore, to emphasize the importance of protecting shutdown cooling from other plant activities and in recognition of your previous escalated enforcement action, I have been authorized to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) in the base amount of $55,000 for the Severity Level lli problem. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's
- Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Sincerely.
.f ;
l Ellis W. Mers Regional Admi strator i Docket No. 50-458 License No. NPF-47
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty i NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-119
Entergy Operations, Inc. 'cc (w/ encl): Executive Vice President and l Chief Operating Officer , Entergy Operations, Inc. P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi . 39286-1995 ; Vice President Operations Support , Entergy Operations, Inc. , P.O. Box 31995 , Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 f i General Manager. '; Plant Operations ' River Bend Station Entergy Operations, Inc. l P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 ' Director- Nuclear Safety f River Bend Station Entergy Operations, Inc. P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 i Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway P.O. Box 651 Jackson, Mississippi 39?05 t Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esq. Winston & Strawn , 1401 L Street, N.W. ! Washington, D.C. 20005-3502 l Manager- Licensing , River Bend Station Entergy Operations, Inc. 1 P.O. Box 220 i St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 l t The Honorable Richard P. leyoub !- Attorney General , P.O. Box 94095 l Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9095 l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-120 I L i [
1 Entergy Operations, Inc. ! H. Anne Plettinger l 3456 Villa Rose Drive , Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70806 l President of West Feliciana Police Jury l P.O. Box 1921 i
. St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 1 Joint Ownership Manager !
Cajun Electric Power Coop. Inc. ; P.O. Box 15540 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70895 ) i William H. Spell, Administrator ' . Louisiana Radiation Protection Division I P.O. Box 82135 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70884-2135 l l I i l l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-121
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1 4 NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF civil PENALTY t Entergy Operations, Inc. Docket No. 50-458 River Bend Station License No. NPF-47 EA 97-497 4 During an NRC inspection conducted on September 22 through October 17,1997, violations of
- NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and 3
Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission j proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act),42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below: ; A. Technical Specification 3.0.4 states, in part, that when a limiting condition for operation is not met, entry into a MODE shall not be made except when the associated actions to be l'
- entered permit continued operation in the MODE for an unlimited period of time.
r Contrary to the above, on September 13,1997, without meeting limiting conditions for
- operation associated with primary containment, secondary containment, drywell,
! emergency diesel generators I and Ill, and containment unit cooler A, the reactor ; transitioned from MODE 4 (Cold Shutdown) to MODE 3 (Hot Shutdown), and the i l associated actions to be entered did not permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the applicability for an unlimited time. (01013) i B. Technical Specification 5.4.1.a states, in part, that written procedures shall be [ maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33," Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation)," Revision 2, February 1978. Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33. Revision 2, Section 4, recommends procedures , for operation of the nuclear steam supply system and shutdown cooling. !
- 1. Contrary to the above, on September 13,1997, adequate procedures covering operation of shutdown cooling were not maintained. Specifically, Post- i Modification Test Procedure MR-95-0010-PMT-04, " Alternate Decay Heat ,
Removal System initial Operation," Revision 01, was inadequate, in that the procedure neither listed precautions related to performance of the test shortly after reactor shutdown when decay heat rates were high, nor did it contain the time to boil data available to the operators. (02013)
- 2. Contrary to the above, on September 13,1997, adequate procedures covering operation of shutdown cooling were not maintained. Specifically, Operation Section Procedure OSP-0037, " Shutdown Operations Protection Plan,"
Revision 5, shutdown cooling guidelines and contingency actions were shown to NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-122
l l l Entergy Operations, Inc. be inadequate to ensure there was sufficient time between securing or inadvertently losing normal shutdown cooling, and establishing suitable attemate shutdown cooling to prevent iost of reactor coolant temperature control, or inadvertently, entering a mode change when the applicable LCOs were not met. (02023)
- 3. Contrary to the above, on October 4,1997, adequate procedures covering operation of shutdown cooling were not maintained. Specifically, Operation Section Procedure OSP-0019, " Electrical Bus Outages," Revision 5, was inadequate, in that the procedure failed to recommend verifying that isolation signals were reset during restoration of Breaker 4A which controls an inboard suction valve for normal shutdown cooling. Additionally, the enclosure contained incomplete breaker designations. (02033)
These violations represent a Severity Level 111 problem. (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty - $55,000. 1 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Entergy Operations, Inc. is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation (s) listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-123 (
Entergy Operations, Inc. In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the l Attomey General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected 1 by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c. l The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV,611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you_must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withho! ding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at Arlington, Texas, this 23rd day of December 1997 l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-124
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UNITED STATES
/p "849'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8 o REGION il 5 y ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER l t: 61 FORSYTH STREET. SW. SUITE 23T85 ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30303 3415 March 25. 1998 l
EA 98-009 Florida Power & Light Company , ATTN: Mr. T. F. Plunkett , President - Nuclear Division P. O. Box 14000 : Juno Beach. Florida 33408-0420
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY - 588.000 (NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT N05. 50-335/97-16, 50-389/97-16)
Dear Mr. Plunkett:
This refers to the inspection conducted on November 3.1997, through January ~9. 1998, at the St. Lucie facility. The results of the inspection were formally transmitted to you by letter dated January 23. 1998. An open. predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region Il office on February ~13; 1998. with you and members of your staff to discuss the apparent violations. the root causes. and corrective actions to preclude recurrence. A list of conference attendees copies of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) slides. and Florida and Power Light Company's (FP&L) presentation. materials are enclosed. In addition. a video presented by FP&L at the predecisional enforcement conference is available in the NRC Region II office. Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that you provided during the conference the NRC has determined that two violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the
-enclosed Notice of Violation, and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. Violation A involves the failure to ensure that the design basis was correctly translated into specifications drawings. procedures and instructions. Specifically, in 1993. you revised the Unit 1 Refueling Water Tank (RWT) instrument loop and bistable calculation to establish a new setpoint for the RWT level instruments and bistables. This new setpoint was not correctly translated into instrument calibration procedures. This resulted in a Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS) bistable setpoint of 36 inches indicated level. instead of 48 inches indicated level as required by Technical Specifications (TSs). Violation B. a
' direct result of the incorrect RWT setpoint. is associated with the failure to comply with two TSs. .TS 3.3.2,1 requires that the trip setpoint for the Containment Sump Recirculation actuation signal be set at 48 inches above the RWT bottom. Because the trip setpoint for the RAS was set at 36 inches instead of 48 inches above the RWT bottom you failed to comply with this TS for the period of April 1993 until December 1997. TS 3.5.2 requires that two independent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems be operable with NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-125
FP&L 2 each comprised cf an independent operable flow path capable of taking suction from the RWT on a safety injection signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on an RAS. The incorrect setpoint would cause ECCS pump air entrainment mder certain design basis accident scenarios. Given the air entrainment into the ECCS pumps. you die not have reasonable assurance that the ECCS systems would remain operable under all postulated accident scenarios. Therefore, the NRC considers that the ECCS systems were inoperable, and thus you failed to comply with TS 3.5.2. The analysis performed by your staff and that of your contractor, as referenced in Licensee j Event Report 50-335/97-011.. supports this conclusion. The root cause of the ! violations was a failure to follow setpoint program and Engineering Quality ! Instructions which resulted in a failure to properly revise the RWT level ! bistable calibration procedure. }I Although there was not an actual safety consequence of the incorrect RWT set)oint as safety systems were not called upon to function. this issue is risc significant and has potential safety consequences. The design basis of ! your facility requires that during certain loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs). ! ECCS subsystems must be capable of automatically transferring suction to the containment sump upon receipt of an RAS. Because of the incorrect trip setpoint of the RWT level instrument bistables. automatic transfer of the ECCS ; pumps' suction source from the RWT to the containment sump under certain . conditions would cause an open channel flow condition. This condition could ! cause damage.to the ECCS pumps because of air entrainment. absent operator : intervention to manually initiate transfer to the containment sump prior to i the open channel condition. Systems affected by this condition include the ; high pressure safety injection system. the low pressure safety injection ! system. and the containment spray system, which are designed to prevent or ! mitigate serious safety events. Damage to these systems because of air l entrainment would prevent them from performing their intended safety function. [ The NRC recognizes that your Emergency Operating Procedures require monitoring ; of the RWT level., and direct operators to manually transfer the ECCS pump ! suction source from the RWT to the containment sump. if necessary. However. l the design basis of the plant calls for automatic transfer of the ECCS suction ! source. In such a case, your analysis as described in Licensee Event Report ! 50-335/97-011 and as presented during the enforcement conference concluded i that there was a substantial increase in the core damage frequency (i.e., ! based on your calculations, you estimated the core damage frequency increased i by a factor of two to 5.5E-5) This further confirms the significance of l these violations. For these reasons, these violations represent a very i significant regulatory concern. Therefore. Violations A and B have been classified in the aggregate in accordance with the " General Statement of i Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy). ! NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level II problem. l In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount , of $88. 000 is considered for a Severity Level 11 problem. Because your ; facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-126 I 1
FP&L 3 l two yearsi , the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. This issue was identified because of critical. questioning attitudes by operations and engineering personnel. During replacement of the RWT level circuitry bistable cards in October 1997. a main control room operator initially questioned a difference in the safeguards cabinet RWT level meter reading when compared to the meter reading prior to replacement. After notifying engineering personnel, the system engineer reviewed this anomaly and, in addition, conducted a thorough review of the RWT level circuitry which led to the identification of the l incorrect RAS set)oint. In addition your corrective actions were comprehensive. 51 ort-term corrective actions included verification that the issue was limited to only the Unit 1 RWT level RAS setpoint. formation of an event response team which identified the root cause and contributing causes, revision of Engineering Quality Instructions to clarify requirements regarding transmittal of design information to the plant and use of engineering hold points for critical design aspects, revision and cross-referencing of bistable calibration procedures, and re-emphasis of management expectations ~on design transmittal requirements. You also conducted an unannounced simulator ' exercise with a minimum control room staff to gain a high level of confidence that operators would manually initiate a transfer of the ECCS pump suction I source to the containment sump prior to pump damage, given a failure of an automati,c transfer to the sump. Finally, you initiated a comprehensive i engineering program implementation review to verify that the root and contributing causes which led to this setpoint error were not translated into other engineering programs. As of the date of the predecisional enforcement conference, reviews for many programs have been completed. with other program reviews in progress and planned. Thus based on the above. the NRC has concluded that credit is warranted for Identification and Corrective Action. Notwithstanding credit for Identification and Corrective Action. the NRC considers the exercise of discretion to propose a civil penalty for problems categorized at Severity Level I or II. in accordance with Section VII. A.1 of the Enforcement Policy. In this case. the violations resulted in a significant increase in risk over the more than four year period in which the conditions existed. In addition, the violations are not associated with old design issues in that they were caused by engineering performance deficiencies in the 1990's. Moreover. better quality assurance of engineering activities at the time of the setpoint change could have prevented the violation altogether. Therefore, after consultation with the Director. Office of Enforcement. and the Deputy Executive Director for Regulatory Effectiveness. I have been authorized to exercise discretion to propose a base civil penalty of I A Severity Level III problem was issued on December 11. 1997 associated with the failure to maintain two trains of containment cooling operable as required by Technical Specifications (EA 97 501). A Notice of Violation (NOV) and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $100.000 was issued on January 10. 1997 for violations of the plant security access control program, the emergency preparedness program, and requirements for nuclear instrumentation (EAs 96-458. 464, and -457). A severity Level Ill violation was issued on September 19. 1996. associated with the failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.59 (EA 96 326). An NOV and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $50.000 was issued on March 2a.1996. for multiple violations associated with a dilution event (EA 96-040). NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-127
FP&L 4 588.000 in this case. This penalty is intended to emphasize the importance of l effective engineering activities and associated quality assurance commensurate with the core damage risk. If not for the questioning attitudes displayed by your staff and, in particular the aforementioned licensed operator and system engineer, which led to the identification of the setpoint error, a more substantial civil penalty would have been proposed. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The'NRC will 1 use your response.-in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. i in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice." a copy of i' this letter. its enclosures, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). ; Sincerely. , Luis A. Reye Regional Admi. strator [ t Docket Nos. 50-335. 50-389 License Nos. DPR-67. NPF-16 i
Enclosures:
- 1. Notice of Violation !'
- 2. List of Attendees
- 3. NRC Slides
- 4. Licensee Material ,
P i NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-128 1 i
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FP&L 5 cc w/entis: J. A. Stall Site Vice President St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach. FL 34957 H. N. Paduano. Manager Licensing and Special Programs Florida Power and Light Company P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach. FL 33408-0420 J. Scarola Plant General Manager
-St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach. FL 34957 E. J. Weinkam
. Licensing Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach. FL 34957 M. S. Ross. Attorney Florida Power & Light P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach. FL 33408-0420 l John T. Butler. Esq. l Steel. Hector and Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center Miami. FL 33131-2398 Bill Passetti Office of Radiation Control Department of Health and ! Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee. FL 32399-0700 i NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-129
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I i FP&L 6 cc.w/encls: i Director Division'of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100
' County Administrator St. Lucie County -
,. 2300 Virginia Avenue Ft. Pierce. FL 34982 r h' i i L ! !. I ! l l t 3 1
- l. !
l t t i l l f i-l i i l i t I i I 1.. : l f t i I t 4
+
i i NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-130 ' ! l r
! i NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND } PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY j
- Florida Power & Light Docket No. 50-335 !'
- " St. Lucie License No. DPR-67 EA 98-009 During an NRC inspection conducted on November 3.1997 through January 9. !
1998, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the i
" General Statement of Policy.and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions." }
NUREG-1600, the NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty ]ursuant to Section 234 i of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act). 42 J.S.C. 2282. and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalties are set forth : below: . 4 P A. 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix B. Criterion III. " Design Control" requires in j part. that measures shall be established to ensure that the design basis ' is correctly translated into specifications. drawings. procedures. and j instructions. Contrary to the above, on January 22, 1993. Calculation PSL-1FJI-92-011. ; Revision 0. was issued identifying a new setpoint for the Refueling l Water Tank level instruments and bistables for Unit 1. The licensee i failed to correctly translate this design change into procedures in that i as of December 2. 1997 instructions had not been provided to change Calibration Procedure 1-1400052. Engineered Safety Features Actuation , System - Channel Functional Test. to reflect the revised setpoint j information. (01012) j B. . Technical Specification 3.3.2.1 states that the Engineered Safety l Features Actuation System instrumentation channels and bypasses shown in t Table 3.3-3 shall be operable with their trip setpoints consistent with : the values shown in Table 3.3-4. Table 3.3-4. item 5.b identifies a , trip setpoint for the Containment Sump Recirculation (RAS) as ,48 inches above the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) bottom. TS 3.5.-2 states that two independent Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) subsystems shall be operable with each subsystem comprised of an I independent operable flow path capable of taking suction from the RWT on 1 a Safety Injection signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal. Contrary to the above. from April 19. 1993. until December 2. 1997, the Unit 1 trip setpoint for the Containment Sump Recirculation (RAS) was set at 36 inches from the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) bottom. With the trip setpoint for the Containment Sump Recirculation set at 36 inches, air entrainment would occur under certain design basis accident scenarios and consequently, there was not reasonable assurance that the i NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-131 Enclosure 1 l
NOV 2 ECCS systems could fulfill their intended safety functions in all accident scenarios and therefore, were inoperable. (01022) These violations represent a Severity Level II problem (Supplement I). Civil Penalty - 588.000 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201. Florida Power and Light is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. within 30 days of the date of this Notice of. Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). i This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and l should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the , alleged violation. (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied. the reasons why. (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the ; results achieved. (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further , violations. and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an ; adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an ; order or a Demand for Information may be issued as why the license should not i be modified, suspended. or revoked or why such other action as may be proper i should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act. ! 42 U.S.C. 2232. this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. 4 i Within the same time as provided for the response required above under l 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to i the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. with ! a check. draft money order, or electronic transfer payable to the , Treasurer ! I of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is i proposed. or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part. 1 by a written answer addressed to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should ; the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 t protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part. such answer should be ! clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the i violations listed in this Notice. in whole or in part. (2) demonstrate ; extenuating circumstances. (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other i reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the ' civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or ! mitigation of the penalty. i In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty. the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written i answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the ! statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201. but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g.. j citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the ! Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. ! NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-132 l i
l ; I NOV 3 Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been ! determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205. this ! matter may be referred to the Attorney General. and the penalty, unless ; compromised. remitted, or mitigated. may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation. letter with payment of civil penalty. and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: i James Lieberman. Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike. Rockville. MD 20852- ! 2738. with a copy to the Regional Administrator. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory , Commission. Region II and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the - St. Lucie facility. Because your res)onse will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). to the extent possi)le it should not include any personal privacy. 3roprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR witlout i redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response. then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material you must s)ecifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withield and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding , confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information ' is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of , protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
]
Dated at Atlanta. Georgia this 25th day of March 1998 l l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-133
uenino STATES -
/p ue<,9'og NUCLEAR MOULATORYCOMMISSION ! g Raamm us
- ! e rue ROOSEVELT ROAD
% GL.EN ELLYN, KilNOIS 80137-5027
/
I
*% * * * * * / August 5, 1993 i'
Dockets No. 50-315; 50-316 Licenses No. DPR-58; DPR-74 EA 93-059 Indiana and Michigan Power Company ATTN: Mr, E. E. Fitzpatrick Vice President Nuclear Operations Division One Riverside Plaza Columbus, Ohio 43216
Dear Mr. Fitzpatrick:
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY AND DEMAND FOR INFORMATION (U.S. Department of Labor Case No. 92-ERA-37) This refers to the results of a hearing conducted by a U. S. ; Department of Labor (DOL) Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) into a complaint filed on April 20, 1992, by an individual formerly employed by American Nuclear Resources, Inc. ( ANR) , a subcon-tractor at the D. C. Cook plant. In his complaint (DOL Case No. 92-ERA-37), the former tool accountability technician alleged that ANR improperly terminated his employment on March 20, 1992, after he contacted the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at the D. C.
- Cook plant on the same day. In a May 19, 1992 letter, the DOL Area Director decided that the decision to terminate the technician's employment was not discriminatory because ANR made the decision to terminate him prior to the technician's contact with the NRC inspector. That decision was appealed by the technician and, following a hearing, the DOL ALJ concluded that discrimination occurred. Specifically, the ALJ found that, although the decision to terminate the technician was made before his contact with the NRC Resident Inspector, the ANR decision to terminate the technician was motivated, in part, by his ques- '
tioning of radiation protection personnel regarding his exposure to radiation and his request to ANR on March 20, 1992 for a copy of the report concerning his whole body radiation exposure. l An enforcement conference was held on May 13, 1993 in the Region III office to discuss the corrective actions taken by the licensee as a result of the findings by the DOL ALJ in this case. The NRC has determined that ANR's termination of the tool accountability technician is a violation of 10 CFR 50.7, '
" Employee Protection." This violation is described in the CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-134 l
. _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . ~ . _ . _ _ _ ; 1 Indiana and Michigan t Power Company
{ i enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). Specifically, under 10 CFR 50.7, discrimination by a Commission licensee, or its ! contractor or subcontractor, against an employee for engaging in ! protected activities is prohibited. Activities that fall within L the protection of 10 CFR 50.7 include, but are not limited to, requesting information from a licensee or a subcontractor of a , licensee about an employee's exposure to radiation. ' To emphasize the importance of maintaining an environment in !' i which employees are free to engage in protected activities l without. fear of retaliation, the violation has been categorized i as Severity Level III in accordance with the " General Statement ! l of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," { i (Enforcement Policy) 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C. A Severity Level . { III categorization in this case is appropriate because the l employee's first-line supervisor made the decision to terminate him. l An environment which could discourage individuals from ' , raising safety issues is a significant concern and cannot be ! l tolerated if licensees are to fulfill their responsibility.to ' protect the public health and safety. Thus, the managers of a licensee and its contractors must avoid actions that discriminate ) against individuals for raising safety concerns, and must t
- promptly and effectively remedy actions that constitute l
{ . discrimination. l ! After consultation with the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear ' l Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research and the ;
; Director of the Office of Enforcement, I have been authorized to !
i issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of ! Civil Penalty in the amount of $25,000 for the severity Level III ) violation. The base civil penalty for a Severity Level III j violation is $50,000. The civil penalty adjustment factors in i the Enforcement Policy were considered in deciding the amount of {. the civil penalty in this case. I Indiana and Michigan Power Company's past performance in the
- specific area of discrimination appears to be good, including the j fact that this appears to be the first complaint of discrimination filed against it. However, the licensee's past
. performance overall has been average; therefore, the base penalty will be mitigated only 50% for this factor. As to corrective action, the NRC acknowledges the steps already taken by the , licensee to correct the chilling effect. However, mitigation is not warranted for corrective action because your actions did not include efforts to reinstate the individual. The remaining civil penalty adjustment factors were considered and no further adjustments were warranted.
You are required to-respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-135 I l 1
~
Indiana and Michigan Power Company response. Since the NRC enforcement action in this case is based on the Recommended Decision and Order of the DOL ALJ, which is , still being reviewed by the Secretary of Labor, you may delay payment of the civil penalty and that portion of the response which refers to the specific circumstances of this case until 30 days after the final decision of the Secretary of Labor. However, notwithstanding the corrective actions you described at the enforcement conference, please respond within 30 days of your ; receipt of this letter describing those actions and any
~
additional actions you have taken or plan to take to minimize any potential chilling effect arising from this incident. Included in that written response, you should describe: (1) the steps you I have taken to ensure that your employees and site contractors, including but not limited to American Nuclear Resources, and the employees of your contractors, understand their responsibilities with respect to the right of individuals to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation or discrimination, (2) the actions you have taken to assess the extent to which workers at the D. C. Cook plant may fear retribution for raising safety concerns, an6 (3) the actions you have taken or plan to take to eliminate or minimize any such fears. In addition, the tool accountability supervisor and the contractor's site supervisor, the individuals who made the decision to terminate the employee, remain in the employ of ANR at the D.C. Cook plant. In order to determine whether your licenses should be modified or other enforcement action taken, you are hereby required, pursuant to sections 161c, 161o, 182 and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.204 and 10 CFR 50.54 (f), to provide the following information within 30 days of the date of this letter, in writing and under oath or affirmation: (1) a written description of the duties and activities currently performed by the tool accountability supervisor and the site supervisor for American Nuclear Resources; and (2) your basis for concluding that the tool accountability supervisor, the contractor's site supervisor, and the managers of American Nuclear Resources fully understand their responsibilities under your NRC license and their obligation to fulfill NRC regulations and license requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your responses will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-136 i
l l i Indiana and Michigan i Power Company : The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act . of 1980, Public Law No. 96-511. ! Sincerely, John B. Martin Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
i Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty ~ cc/ enclosure: l DCD/DCB (RIDS) l A. A. Blind, Plant Manager ; James R. Padgett, Michigan Public Service Commission : Michigan Department of Public Health EIS Coordinator, USEPA 'l Region 5 Office Resident Inspector, RIII . D. C. Cook, LPM, NRR l l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-137
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Indiana and Michigan Power Dockets No. 50-315; 50-316 Company Licenses No. DPR-58; DPR-74 D. C. Cook Nuclear Station EA 93-059 Based on a Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge's Recommended Decision and Order in DOL Case 92-ERA-037, dated February 25, 1993, the NRC has determined that a violation of its regulations occurred. In accordance with the " Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, the violation is listed below: 10.CFR 50.7 prohibits discrimination by a Commission licensee, permittee, an applicant for a Commission license or permit, or a contractor or subcontractor of a Commission licensee, permittee, or applicant against an employee for engaging in certr.in protected activities. Discrimination includes discharge or other actions relating to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. The protected activities were established in Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, (now Section 211) and include, but are not limited to, requesting information from a licensee or a subcontractor of a licensee about an employee's exposure to radiation. Contrary to the above, Gregory A. Sprague, an employee of American Nuclear Resources, Inc., a subcontractor of the Indiana and Michigan Power Company and a tool accountability technician at the D. C. Cook Nuclear Station, was discharged on March 20, 1992, by American Nuclear Resources, Inc. A U.S. Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge issued a Recommended Decision and Order (DOL Case 92-ERA-037) on February 25, 1993, which found that Mr. Sprague's discharge was an act of retaliation for engaging in protected activities. The protected activities were Mr. Sprague's questioning of radiation protection personnel regarding his exposure to radiation and his request to American Nuclear Resources, Inc., for a report of his whole body count conducted on March 20, 1992. This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement VII). Civil Penalty - $25,000 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Indiana and Michigan Power Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement of explanation to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region III, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the final decision of the Secretary of Labor in this case. This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-138 1
Notice of Violation for each violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted or, if denied, the basis for disputing the violation. (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such l answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation listed in this Notice, i I in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty which has subsequently been imposed in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-139
~ _ _ _ _ _. __ ._.. ________ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Notice of Violation !
)
be collected by civil action pursuant to section 234c of the Act, 42, U.S.C. 2282c. l The response noted above (Reply to a Notice of Violation, letter ' with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice. Dated at Glen Ellyn, Illinois , this 5th day of August 1993 l f 1 NUREG-0940, PART 2 I A-140
I ney g 4 UNITED STATES s* NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 30006 0001 r
*...+ May 12, 1998 EA 93-059 Mr. E. E. Fikes- t,ick Executive Vice President Nuclear Generation Group i I
Amencen Electric Power Company 500 Circle Drive i Buchanan,MI 49107-1395 l
SUBJECT:
WITHDRAWAL OF NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF i civil PENALTY - $25,000 - (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR CASE NO. 92-ERA-37) I
)
Dear Mr. Fitzpatrick This letter is in response to a letter from the American Electric Power Company's (AEP) Indiana Michigan Power Company, dated February 12,1998, and subsequent correspondence, i' requesting the NRC withdraw a Notice of Violation (NOV) and Proposed Civil Penalty - $25,000 (Notice) issued to Indiana Michigan Power Company on August 5,1993. AEP's request for withdrawing the Notice was based upon a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversing a holding by the Secretary of Labor that discrimination had occurred in the above ~ referenced case. The NOV was based on a Recommended Decision and Order issued on September 15,1992, by a DOL Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who found that American Nuclear Resources, Inc. (ANR), a contractor at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, had i discriminated against Gregory Sprague, a tool accountability technician, for engaging in protected activity. i On December 1,1994, the Sec oiary of Labor (SOL) issued a Decision and Order adopting the ALJ's Recommended Decision and Order. ANR subsequently appealed the SOL's Decision and Order to the Sixth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals. By Order dated January 29,1998, the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the Decision and Order by the SOL. On March 12,1998, DOL petitioned for a rehearing, which was denied by the court on April 3,1998. i In light of the court's decision, the NRC has withdrawn the Notice of Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty, and closed this enforcement action without further action. However, we read the court's holding as confined narrowly to the particular circumstances of this case, and emphasize that the NRC will examine each situation on a case-by- case basis in order to determine whether descrimination occurred regardless of whether the alleged protected activity consisted of a single act or a continuing course of conduct. A single incident of raising a safety concem can constitute protected activity under Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act and Employee i I Protection regulations. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-141
j E.E. Fitzpatrick 2 4 in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and any response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). Sincerely, ' l i James Lieberman, Director i Office of Enforcement $ Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316 i
- License Nos. DPR-58; DPR-74 I I cc: John Sampson, Site Vice President A. A. Blind, Vice President Nuclear Engineering Douglas Cooper, Plant Manager i Richard Whale, Michigan Public ;
Service Commission ;
- Michigan Department of Environmental Quality Emergency Management <
Division, MI Department i of State Police i Gregory A. Sprague l l I i NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-142
z
** 4g l
i g k UNITED STATES l , NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E REGION 1 j % 475 ALLENDALE ROAD KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 ! EA 97-530 January 22,1998 i ! Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia Executive Vice President l and Chief Nuclear Officer 1 l Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation l I Nuclear Learning Center i T 450 Lake Road ! Oswe9o, NY.13126 l i l
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY ; i - $55,000 !' (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-220/97-07,50-410/97-07) ! Dear Mr. Sylvia-s 1 This refers to the NRC inspection conducted between August 10 and October 4,1997, at the ;
- Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, the findings of which were discussed during an exit meeting ;
! on October 17,1997. During the inspection, the NRC reviewed the circumstances associated l with several apparent violations of transportation and radweste program requirements which j occurred at your f 'cilities. The inspection report was sent to you on November 28,1997. . i ' On December 19,1997, a predecisional enforcement conference was held with you and i members of your staff to discues the violations, their causes, and your corrective actions. Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that you provided during the conference, four violations of NRC requirements are being cited and are ; l
- . . described in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty. The ;
circumstances surrounding the violations are described in detail in the subject inspection '
- report. The violations involve four shipments of radioactive materialin a manner contrary to ;
- i. NRC, requirements. In the first case, the radiation levels (within en ocapied portion of the l j transport vehicle) were in excess of limits upon arrival of the shipment at its destination. In i the second case, the wrong material was shipped such that the radiation levels upon receipt i were four times higher than expected. In the other two cases, material was shipped to
{ locations different than intended or authorized. Numerous instances of your staff being 1 inattentive to details, and not adequately independently verifying information, contributed to 2 the three failures within a two month period. With respect to the first violation, on July 24,1997, a package containing two metal samples from the Unit 1 core shroud, was sent to BWX Technologies, Inc., Lynchburg, Virginia, and upon receipt of the package at BWX, the dose rate in the normally occupied section of the vehicle was 2.8 mrem /hr, which is in excess of the regulatory limit of 2 mrom/hr. As you
! noted at the conference, adequate radiological surveys were not conducted prior to the
- . shipment, in that the technician only surveyed that forward portion of the sleeper cab and did
- not survey the rear portion of the cab which was closest to the source.
_ NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-143 I e 4 }.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corpwnon 2 With respect to the second violation, on September 3,1997, a cask was shipped from Unit 2 to Molten Metal Technology, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, containing a liner that was different than the liner that was intended for shipment, contrary to the shipping manifest. The violation was identified when, during unloading of the cask, Molten Metal Technology recognized that the radiation levels in the area of the liner were approximately four times higher than expected. Subsequent investigation revealed that one of your radwaste operators inadvertently loaded the wrong liner into the shipping cask prior to transport. Although each liner had a unique identification number, the radwaste operator did not check the number on the liner with the number on the shipment schedule. Rather, he used only the storage location number which was in error, in addition, although a Unit 1 radiation protection (RP) technician conducted a radiation survey of the cask and sent the results to the Unit 2 RP technician prior to the shipment, the Unit 2 RP technician signed the associated shipping manifest authorizing the shipment without reviewing the radiation survey. Such eview may have disclosed the higher than expected radiation levels. With respect to the third violation, on September 25,1997, a package containing a metal sample removed from a tube sheet in the Unit 1 emergency cooling (EC) condenser, was shipped to a BWX contracts officer in an administrative office complex in Lynchburg, Virginia, rather than to the intended BWX laboratory. The office complex was not listed on the material License Certificate for receipt of radioactive shipments. A similar error, which constitutes the fourth violation, had occurred in May 1995, w ben a source range detector was shipped to the General Electric (GE) facility in San Jose, CaSfornia, rather than to the intended GE facility in Twinsburg, Ohio. The San Jose facility sirailarly did not have a license to receive radioactive material. Although the manifests had been properly prepared in each case, your warehouse personnel nonetheless sent the package to the wrong address. On both occasions, inattention to detail and inadequate verification contributed to these violations. The NRC recognizes that the actual safety consequence of these violations was low in each case. However, these violations indicate a lack' of adequate oversight of the radioactive materials handling and transportation program to ensure appropriate attention to detail by staff in implementing the program. In addition, the fact that three of the violations occurred during a two-month period, between July 24,1997 and September 25,1997, indicates a potential for greater safety significance. Therefore, the violations are of a significant regulatory concern and are being classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level lli problem in accordance with the
" General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.
NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-144 i
! Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 3 i I in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amourtt of $55,000 is i considered for a Severity Level ill problem. Because your facility has been the subject of l escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years,' the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for / dant /f/cetion and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty l assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. No credit was warranted l for identification of the problem because the events were identified in Lach case by the i 1 recipients of the packages, and in each case, you had an opportunity to identify these l j deficiencies sooner. For example, in the case of the shipment in which dose rates in the
- occupied portions of the vehicle were found to have exceeded regulatory limits, an adequate j survey prior to shipment may have identified the condition. In the case of the wrong liner of .
j resins being dispatched from the site, review of the survey results by the Unit 2 RP technician ! j would have identified the condition. Credit is warranted for your corrective actions which I l were considered prompt and comprehensive. Your immediate actions included disciplinary - ' j actions against responsible personnel, ceasing warehouse personnel responsibilities pertaining l to shipment of radioactive materials by transferring those responsibilities to RP, and j modifications of radiation survey protocols with respect to transport vehicles. Your long-term corrective actions included planned focus on improving human performance and leadership of ! the radioactive materials handling and transportation program. > Therefore, to emphasize the importance of appropriate attention to detail in the implementation ! and oversight of the radioactive transportation program, the need for identifying violations, and i in recognition of your previous escalated enforcement action, I have been authorized, after i consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation , and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) in the base amount of $55,000 for the Severity Level 111 problem. , Three other apparent violations set forth in the inspection report, are not being cited, i consistent with Section IV of the Policy, because they are of minor significance. Those apparent violation involve (1) improperly maintained process control plans involving such issues as references to outdated Title 49 requirements and training procedures; (2) the failure to identify and correct the out of date references in the Process Control Program with respect to the Title 49 requirements; and (3) although your QA department identified during an audit the deficiency in the process control plan with respect to the references to outdated training procedures, this audit finding was closed prior to the deficiency being corrected. With respect to the two remaining apparent violations described in the inspection report, the violations involved (1) transporting radioactive materialin shipping containers owned by SEG, Inc., without complying with all quality assurcnce requirements as defined by 10 CFR 71, Subpart H; and (2) failure to verify that any vendors you etilized to process waste had a quality assurance program that met NRC requirements per the Unit 1 Process Control Program. At the conference, you disagreed with both of these apparent violations. With respect to the 1 For example, on November 5,1997, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $50.000 was issued for violations of the maintenance rule (
Reference:
EA 97-007). In addition. on April 19,1997, a Notia of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $200,000 was issued for several violations (
Reference:
EAs 96-474; %475; %494; 96 541). NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-145 l l 1
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 4 first issue, you contended that the QA requirements only applied to the shipper who was separately licensed. After further review of this matter and consultation of this matter with the Office of Spent Fuel Projects, the NRC maintains that you are responsible for adhering to the QA requirements, unless certain exemptions contained in 10 CFR 71.10 are met. The Statements of Consideration for this rule provide clarification on the rule's intent: "While information may be submitted by any interested person to the Commission in support of an application for package approval, it is the licensee who delivers a package of radioactive material to a carrier who must assure himself and the Commission that the quality assurance ; program, on which approval of the package design is based, has been followed." (42 FR i 39364, published 8/4/77). However, in this case, a stated exemption in 10 CFR 71.10 (b)(2) l was met in that the dose rates from the unshielded packages did not exceed 1 rem /hr at 3 ' meters. Therefore, the apparent violation is withdrawn With respect to the second issue, ! you contended at the enforcement conference that th.r. Unit 1 Process Control Program requirement had only been intended for vendors providing processing services on the promises i of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station. The NRC is still reviewing this item and resolution will ' be handled by separate correspondence at a later date. f You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the i enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to ! dete'rmine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with ! regulatory requirements. ' in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). , i Sincerely, ! l Hu rt . Miller -/v Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-220 and 50-410 License Nos. DPR-63 and NPF-69 !
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition > of Civil Penalty ;
}
i l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-146
. . - - __ -. . = = -
l l Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 5 l cc w/ encl-R. Abbott, Vice President & General Manager - Nuclear C. Terry, Vice President- Safety Assessment and Support J. Conway, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering K. Dahlberg, Vice President - Nuclear Operations ' D. Wolniak, Manager, Licensing J. Warden, New York Consumer Protection Branch G. Wilson, Senior Attorney M. Wetterhahn, Winston and Strewn i J. Rettberg, New York State Electric and Gas Corporation .P. Eddy, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York , C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law J. Vinquist, MATS, Inc. ' F. Valentino, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority i l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-147
ENCLOSURE NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF civil PENALTY Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Docket No. 50-220, 50-410' Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station License No. DPR-63, NPF-89 Units 1 and 2 EA 97-530 During an NRC inspection conducted between August 10 and October 4,1997, for which an ) exit meeting was held on October 17,1997, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act),42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below. ; A. 10 CFR 71.5 requires that each licensee who transports radioactive material comply with the applicable DOT regulations contained in 49 CFR Parts 170-189. 49 CFR i 173.441 requires that radiation levels in any normally occupied space of the vehicle not exceed 0.02 milliSieverts per hour (2 mrom/hr). Contrary to the above, on July 24, 1997, the licensee transported a package containing two metal samples from the Unit 1 core shroud, to BWX Technologies, Inc., Lynchburg, Virginia, and upon receipt of the package at BWX, the dose rate in the ; normally occupied section of the vehicle was 2.8 mrem /hr. (01C13) B. 10 CFR 71.5 requires, in part, that each licensee who delivers licensed material to a i carrier for transport, comply with the applicable requirements stated in 49 CFR Parts 170-189. Title 49 CFR 172.203(d)(4) requires that the activity contained in each package of the shipment in terms of the appropriate Si units or in terms of the appropriate SI units i followed by the customary units shall be included on the shipping papers. ' Title 49 CFR 172.204(a) requires, in part, that each person who offers a hazardous material for transportation shall certify that the materialis offered for transportation in accordance with this subchapter (manually or mechanically) in the shipping paper containing the required shipping description the certification contained in paragraph ! (a)(1) of this section or the certification (declaration) containing the language contained in paragraph (a)(2) of this section. F Contrary to the above, on September 3,1997, the licensee shipped a cask from Unit ! 2 to Molten Metal Technology, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and 1 1
- 1. the cask contained a liner of spent resins that was different than the liner that I was intended for shipment as noted on the shipment papers. As a result, the activity recorded on the shipping papers was not reflective of that contained in the liner as required by 49 CFR 172.203(d)(4); and NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-148
Enclosure 2
- 2. licensee personnel failed to carry out procedurally required steps to certify that the shipment was proper in accordance with 49 CFR 172.204(a). (01023)
C. 10 CFR 71.O(b) states that "the packaging and transport of licensed material are also subject to other parts of this chapter (e.g., Parts 20,21,30,39,40,70, and 73) and to the regulations of other agencies (e.g., the US Department of Transportation and the US Postal Service) having jurisdiction over means of transport. The requirements of 4 this part are in addition to, and not in substitution for other requirements." Title 10 CFR 30.41 requires that before transferring byproduct material to a specific licensee of the Commission or an Agreement State or to a general licensee who is required to register with the Commission or with an Agreement State prior to receipt i of the byproduct material, the licensee transferring the material shall verify that the transferee's license authorizes the receipt of type, form and quantity of byproduct material to be transferred." , 1. Contrary to the above, on September 25,1997, the licensee sent a package , containing a metalsample removed from a Unit 1 emergency cooling condenser tube sheet, to a BWX Contracts Officer in an administrative office complex in Lynchburg, Virginia, and that office complex was not listed on the material License Certificate for receipt of radioactive shipments. (01033)
- 2. Contrary to the above, on May 24,1995, the licensee sent a source range detector to the General Electric (GE) facility in San Jose, California, and that facility did not have a license to receive radioactive material. (01034)
This is a Severity Level ill Problem (Supplement V). Civil Penalty - $55,000 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results 4 achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for Information may be issued as why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oatn or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-149
Enclosure 3 above, or th4 ~r.s'ative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordence with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation (s) licted in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to cupport a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 22nd day of January 1998 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-150
orerg g % UNITED STATES i g j t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. soseH001
\*****/ December 10, 1997 EA Nos. 96-034; 96-067; 96-086; 96-106; 96-145; 96-183; 96-197; 96-198; 96-331; 96-332; 96-333; 96-350; 96-351; 96-352; 97-141 Mr. B. D. Kenyon, President & CEO Nuclear Group Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Post Office Box 128 Waterford, Connecticut 06385
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES - $2,100,000 [NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-245/50-336/50-423: 95-44; 95-82; 96-01; 96-03; 96-04; 96-05; 96-06; 96-08; 96-09; 96-201]
Dear Mr. Kenyon:
From October 24,1995 through December 31,1996, the NRC conducted numerous inspections at your Millstone facilities in Waterford, Connecticut. While several facets of plant performance were reviewed during these inspections at all three units, a principal focus of the ) inspections was the handling of engineering issues, as well as your corrective action j programs and practices. These inspections included a special team inspection by NRC l headquarters staff focused on these areas, as well as numerous inspections conducted by i resident and Region I based inspectors. All of the related inspection reports were sent to you l previously. Similar to findings made at your Haddam Neck nuclear facility between November 1995 and November 1996, for which cumulative civil penalties in the amount of $650,000 were issued ; on May 12,1997, numerous violations and significant regulatory concems were identified l during the inspections involving the three Millstone units. One violation (namely, the significant degradation over time of the liquid radwaste system at Unit 1) was discussed at a predecisional enforcement conference in the NRC Region I office on March 11,1996. Most of the other violations were discussed at a predecisional enforcement conference at the Millstone facility in Waterford, Connecticut on December 5,1996. While the conference, which was open to the public, was held to discuss the violations, their causes and your corrective actions, the December 5th conference for Millstone, like the December 4th conference for Haddam Neck, focused on the broader programmatic deficiencies underlying the violations which contributed to the problems at the Millstone Station. Certain additional violations identified subsequent to the December 5,1996 conference (reference inspection Report No. 96-09) are also included in this proposal, although they were not covered by the December 5th conference. Mr. R. T. Laudenat of your staff informed Mr. Jacque Durr of the NRC Special Projects Office on February 18,1997, that you agreed another enforcement conference was not needed to discuss those issues. ! NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-151 l
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- Northeast Nuclear 2 j Energy Company The specific violations are described in the enclosed Notice of Violation (NOV) and Proposed
! Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice). Many of the violations are categorized within two ;
- related programmatic areas, namely (1) longstanding deficiencies in engineering programs
- and practices, some of which led to safety equipment being inoperable or degraded for extended periods (these violations are desenbod in Section I of the Notice); and (2) the
- failure to have effective corrective action programs and practices, which resulted, in many cases, in deficiencies previously identified by your staff not being corrected (these violations l are described in Section ll of the Notice). In addition to these two programmatic areas, a r l number of violations of your technical specifications (TS) were also identified, some of which j were caused by inadequate engineering or inadequate corrective actions. Violations of the ; TS are described in Section lli of the 60ce. Additional violations assessed civil penalties i are described in Septions IV of the Notice, of which several are of particular concem, ! including the recurring problems of inadequate procedures, and failures to follow procedures,
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3 at the Millstone facilities. ! With respect to engineering issues, the violations included several examples of failing to l assure that the plant was maintained in the configuration as designed and specified in the l j licensing basis; making design changes to the facility without performing adequate safety ! evaluations to assess the consequences (at times the evaluations were narrowly focused); and not updating the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as required when ! modifications were completed, which represented a programmatic weakness in the process , for maintaining the accuracy and consistency of the UFSAR. As a result of these engineering ( i failures, margins of safety for certain safety related equipment were reduced, at times for extended periods, and TS were at times violated. f With respect to the corrective action issues which are described in Section 11 of the enclosed Notice, management deficiencies in your program and practices for identifying and correcting problems adversely affected the operation of the Millstone units. For example, the NRC ! special inspection report dated September 20,1996, noted numerous problems with j corrective action processes, including instances where degraded and nonconforming conditions were not promptly corrected, as well as instances where line management did not respond to findings of your own quality assurance (QA) department and did not address the . I
. root causes of issues in a timely manner. The team also found several cases where your staff identified design bases issues that were inappropriately dispositioned through the use of administrative controls or temporary modifications, rather than by restoring the affected :
systems to their original configurations in a timely manner. Furthermore, while the team l found that QA audits and third party reviews were generally effective in identifying ; programmatic weaknesses, management's responses to the findings were often slow and incomplete. For example, one of the violations in the attached Notice relates to the fact that while your own audits identified that your Nonconformance Report procedure was inadequate i because there were no procedural controls to ensure timely resolution of nonconforming i conditions, this matter went uncorrected for an extended period. Also, one of your Adverse i Condition Reports (ACR), issued in May 1996,' identified a programmatic breakdown in the ACR program implementation. Although the violations described in the enclosed Notice did not result in any actual consequences to public health and safety, many of these violations and undertying causet were long-standing and indicative of a deficient safety culture, fostered by plant and corporate management, which neither set high standards or actively encouraged woters to NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-152
Northeast Nuclear 3 i . Energy Company identify and report safety issues or act upon issues once they were reported. Those deficiencies, which existed at all three units to varying degrees, have contributed to the units ! remaining in an extended shutdown. Also, the Millstone site has been designated as a ; Category 3 facility on the NRC ' Watch List" as a result of the numerous problems identifed I by both the NRC and your staff.' As such, the units will remain shut down until adequate i programs have been established and demonstrated to the NRC to be effective. To ensure '
- such improvement, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to Northeast Nuclear Energy
1 Company (NU) on August 14,1996, requiring independent third party oversight of corrective { actions for design and plant configuration. f 4 ! At the December 5,1996 predecisional enforcement conference, you admitted all the j violations that formed the basis for that conference, described your assessment of the root :
. causes, and presented your corrective actions to address these issues. You acknowledged l
- your failures to property implement an effective design process, adequately maintain design i basis documents, and conduct adequate safety evaluations. You noted that there was a ;
focus on justifying deficiencies, rather than correcting problems, and you recognized that e there were significant deficiencies at Millstone that must be fully addressed before y9u could )- contemplate restart of the units. I
- You also acknowledged that many of the issues identified during the inspections had their j roots in the ineffective leadership provided by your management, who failed to establish and
. communicate adequate performance standards. It is clear that senior management did not ! foster an environment and culture where managers and supervisors were aggressive in ; correcting problems or sensitive to employees who brought forward such concems. In the ; past year, the NRC performed a special review of the handling of employee concems and ' 4 allegations at the Millstone facility since 1985. The September 1996 report by the NRC independent Review Group indicated that an unhealthy work environment, which did not l l tolerate dissenting views or welcome or promote questioning attitudes, has existed at
- Millstone for at least several years. That report also indicated that many of the cultural l ' issues which lie at the root of the company's problems had been recognized by licensee
- management as early as August 1991.
i For example, three of your intemal reports issued since that time indicated a lack of respect and trust between employees and management, insufficient management sensitivity to , employee concems, persistent attitudes impeding effective problem identification and resolution, and an arrogant management style that had eroded employee trust and j confidence and contributed to repeated failures to correct clearly identified problems. Also, some employees who brought forward concems, including design issues, were discriminated ' against, as noted in three civil penalties issued by the NRC to you since 1993 for such instances. In essence, these findings reflect the lack of effective leadership at Millstone. I l Consequently, on October 24,1996, another Order was issued to you requiring that, prior to )
- restart, you develop and submit to the NRC a comprehensive plan for reviewing and ;
{ dispositioning safety concems raised by your employe3s and ensuring that employees who l
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- For example,17 civil penalties have been issued since 1990 for violations at Millstone, some of which included failures of your corrective action programs to prevent recurrence of problems.
I NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-153 1
Nodheast Nuckar 4 Energy Company raise safety concems can do so without fear of retaliation. That Order also required that you retain an independent third party to oversee implementation of the comprehensive plan, which you have done, as noted in your January 14,1997 letter to the NRC. It is crucial that this oversight be effective. As you indicated at the December 5,1996 enforcement conference, in order to correct Millstone's problems and establish the necessary safety culture and safety conscious environment, it is important that line management perform effective self assessments, champion and support the oversight organizations (including staffing them with some of Millstone's best employees), lower the threshold for identifying iss: es, support the employee concems program, and effectively resolve employee concems. l The violations in the enclosed Notice have been categorized in accordance with the NRC i Enforcement Policy (NUREG 1600) as follows: } The violations in Part I related to inadequate engineering are categorized at Severity Level 11. This Severity Levelis warranted for the substantial and longstanding failures
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to meet design control requirements and to maintain the licensing bases. This has resulted in a very significant regulatory concem, as indicated by a broad breakdown in the control of licensed activities. l The violations in Part il associated with corrective actions are categorized at Severity - i Level 11. This Severity Level is warranted to reflect the longstanding unsatisfactory performance in identification and correction of significant conditions adverse to quality. . The violations of Technical Specifications in Part til involving inoperable equipment , and degraded conditions are categorized at Severity Level 11. The eight identified violations, a number of which could individually be categorized at Severity Level lli, represent an overall lack of attention to detail regarding compliance with Technical i Specifications. ! i The violations in Part IV related to failures in implementing various aspects of the , quality assurance program are categorized at Severity Levellli. This Severity Level ! is warranted to reflect the significant concems with regard to quality assurance programs at the Millstone site. Therefore, in consideration of (1) the degree of noncompliance with NRC requirements, (2) ! the high regulatory significance that the NRC attaches to the significant conditions adverse to , quality that existed at Millstone, and the importance of effective management and oversight to ! i onsure compliance with NRC requirements and achievement of a safety conscious I environment that encourages employees to bring forth and resolve concems, (3) the need to l ensure that similar management oversight is maintained at Seabrook, and (4) the importance of sending a similar message to the nuclear industry regarding the importance of such oversight, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Commission, to issue the . enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties in the cumulative l amount of $2,100,000 for the violations discussed above. In arriving at the cumulative l l l amount of the civil penalties, the staff proposes to exercise discretion, pursuant to Section ! Vll.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, and increase the amounts consistent with the i regulatory concem present in this case. I note that but for the extended shutdown of all three units, the civil penalties may have been higher. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-154 l l __ .- -
d i Northeast Nuclear 5 Energy Company { i in assessing the penalty in this case, consideration was given to the varying degrees of ; significance and duration of the violations described in the four parts of the Notice as well as , the number of examples of the violations. This penalty is comprised of $500,000 for the violations in Part I of the Notice; $1,000,000 for the violations in Part 11; $500,000 for the violations in Part lil; and $100,000 for the violations in Part IV. l I Finally, the violations described in the Notice are not the sum total of all apparent violations present or identified during the var;0us inspections, but serve to represent the systemic a nature of the significant regulatory problems existing at the Millstone facility. Other apparent , violations described in the inspection reports referenced in the Notice are not being addressed in this enforcement action. Nevertheless, they need to be considered as part of your corrective actions. \ You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to , determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with l regulatory requirements. , in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its 1 enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR). To t.he extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. Should you have any questions conceming this letter, please contact Mr. James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, at (301) 415-2741. Sincerely, l L. sep Cat an , Executive Director for Operations ;
- Docket Nos. 50-245; 50-336; 50-423 License Nos. DPR-21; DPR-65; NPF-49 i
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition
- of Civil Penalties l cc w/ encl
- (See next page) 4
) 4 d I i l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-155 l
Northeast Nuclear 6 Energy Company M. H. Brothers, Vice President -Millstone, Unit 3 J. McElwain, Unit 1 Recovery Officer M. Bowling, Jr., Unit 2 Recovery Officer D. M. Goebel, Vice President, Nuclear Oversight D. Amerine, Vice President for Engineering and Support Services P. D. Hinnenkamp, Director, Unit Operations F. C. Rothen, Vice President, Work Services J. Stankiewicz, Training Recovery Manager R. Johannes, Director -Nuclear Training S. J. Sherman, Audits and Evaluation L. M. Cuoco, Esquire J. R. Egan, Esquire V. Juliano, Waterford Library J. Buckingham, Department of Public Utility Control S. B. Comley, We The People State of Connecticut SLO Designee D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN) R. Bassilakis, CAN J. M. Block, Attomey, CAN S. P. Luxton, Citizens Regulatory Commission (CRC) Representative T. Concannon E. Woollacott, Co-Chairman, NEAC l-1 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-156
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Docket Nos. 50-245, 336,423 Millstone Station Units 1,2, and 3 License Nos. DPR-21, DPR-65, NPF-49 EA Nos. 96-034; 96-067; 96-086; 96-106; 96-145; 96-183; 96-197; 96-198; 96-331; 96-332; 96 333; 96-350; 96-351; 96-352; 97-141 During NRC inspections conducted between October 24,1995, and December 31,1996, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose civil penalties pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act),42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalties are set forth below:
- 1. VIOLATIONS RELATED TO INADEQUATE ENGINEERING A. ERRORS IN DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTS 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion lil, " Design Control," states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. These measures shall include provisions to assure that appropriate quality standards are specified and included in design documents and that deviations from such standards are cont,olled. Additionally, design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of attemate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.
t Contrary to the above, the licensee did not translate design features into work instructions, did not verify the adequacy of designs, and did not adequately establish design measures, as evidenced by the following examples, each of which constitutes a separate violation. 1.*' in 1978 and 1988, spent fuel pool (SFP) rerack modifications were made at Unit 1; however, the licensee did not translate the 0.5 inch diameter siphon break hole design feature into proper work instructions for incorporation into the modified SFP retum piping. As a result, the licensee operated the SFP cooling system without the siphon break holes until the situation was identified by the licensee in August 1995, and corrected in November 1995. (01012)
' Violations annotated with an asterisk (*) are violations occurring beyond the five year statute of limitations period for assessing civil penalties or are violations for which definitive dates to establish their occurrence are unavailable to determine the statute of limitations' applicability. In either case, these violations were not considered for purposes of determining any civil penalties.
NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-157
Notice of Violation 2
- 2. In January and February 1994, the licensee did not property translate a design requirement into adequate instructions for the reactor building component cooling water (RBCCW) system at Unit 1. Specifically, various design information, such as values of RBCCW flow and temperature, was provided by the licensee to one of its vendors (Hollec) to perform analyses to define acceptable hold times prior to fuel movement during refueling cutage (RFO) No.14. These hold times were then incorporated into Special Procedure (SP) 94-1-7 which was used to perform a Unit 1 full core offload during RFO 14. Although the licensee instructed Holtec to use a normal (expected) RBCCW flow of 1250 GPM in their analyses, there were no specific instructions in SP 94-1-7 for the operators to control RBCCW flow to 1250 GPM. (01022)
- 3.
- As of March 14,1996, the licensee did not identify design inputs potentially impacting the Unit 1 SFP cooling system flow model which had been developed by its vendor (Holtec) to technically support a ,
license amendment request describing the use of a shutdown cooling ) (SDC)/SFP cooling system cross-connect modification. Specifically, the ' temporary TriNuclear filter assembly located and used in the SFP was not evaluated for its impact on the thermal and hydraulic design work performed in 1995 in support of the license amendment. Also, the SFP . cooling system flow model had not been updated to reflect recent ! piping changes that installed a thermal expansion loop. In addition, the i licensee did not implement adequate design verification activities I regarding the Unit 1 SFP cooling system flow model developed by its vendor in that the SFP cooling system flow model was not formally j verified against actual plant data. (01032) l l
- 4. As of March 11,1996, design control measures associated with a l temporary modification (bypass jumper 2-95-045, dated April 14, 1995) t to the Unit 2 reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) surge tank, were inadequate to assure seismic capability. Specifically, Calculation 95-ENG-1198 M2, Revisions 1 and 2, dated April 14,1995, and April 3, 1996, respectively, used to support the modification, contained numerous errors in assumptions and calculations, including inaccurate bolt dimensions, omitted seismic loads and nonconservative response I spectra. Also, the installed design was not in accordance with the j approved temporary modification design package, in that the installation included the use of ropes and hoists (rigging). (01042) l
- 5. Design control measures were inadequate to assure that the design basis requirements for the Unit 2 post accident hydrogen monitoring system and post accident sampling system were maintained. ;
Specifically, in October 1995, the licensee identified that these systems did not meet the single failure criterion because a loss of one vital , 125-vDC bus would render the system inoperable because a flow path could not be established in that both trains of containment monitoring are isolated; however, instead of correcting the deficiency, the licensee l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-158 l
i Notice of Violation 3 implemented a procedure change and a bypass jumper as a ! compensatory measure on January 12,1996, and that compensatory { measure did not preserve the design basis. (01052)
- 6. Design control measures were not adequately established for the steam j generator replacement modification (ABB-CE Calculation 006-AS92-C- l 010 " Millstone Unit 2 LOCA Containment Pressure / Temperature !
Analysis for Steam Generator Replacement," dated October 15,1992), as evidenced by the following examples:
- a. NUREG 0737 (committed to by the licensee and confirmed by Order, dated July 10,1981), item II.F.1.6, " Containment Hydrogen Monitor," stated that if an indication is not available at all times, continuous indication and recording must be functioning within 30 minutes of the initiation of safety injection.
On March 14,1983, NRC issued an Order confirming the licensee's commitments on post-TMl related issues that indicated that item ll.F.1.6 was completed. In a letter dated March 27,1984, the licensee stated that it was unable to satisfy the 30 minute requirement of NUREG 0737, item II.F.1.6, because the hydroger monitors must remain isolated until containment pressure is between 0 and 10 psig. The letter stated that containment pressure for the design basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) will be less than 10 psig in approximately three hours after the initiation of the event. However, due to the resulting higher peak containment pressure from the modification, the hydrogen monitors could not be placed in service for 24 hours.
- b. NUREG 0737, 'TMl Action Plan Requirements," item II.B.3,
" Post Accident Sampling Capability," requires the capability to promptly obtain reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples. The combined time allotted for sampling and analysis should be three hours or less from the time a decision is made to take a sample. In a letter to the NRC, dated November 1, 1982, the licensee stated that the entire sampling operation, including preparation, sample recirculation, sample isolation, purge of the system piping, sample retrieval, transport to the chemistry laboratory, and analysis, for both reactor coolant and containment air samples, can be completed within 3 hours. In a safety evaluation report (SER) dated June 14,1984, the NRC stated that based on a review of the licensee's letters dated January 12 and April 19,1984, the provisions of NUREG 0737, item li.B.3 were satisfied. The SER stated that the licensee has provided the capability to promptly sample and analyze containment atmosphere samples within three hours from the time the decision is made to take the sample. However, due to the resulting higher peak containment pressure resulting from the modification, the licensing basis requirement to promptly NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-159
- Notice of Violation 4
- sample and analyze containment atmosphere samples within .
I L three hours could not be met because the containment atmosphere post-accident sampling system could not be placed
- in service for 24 hours. (01062) r
! 7. Design control measures were inadequate to assure that the Design l Basis Documentation Packages (DBDPs) at Units 2 and 3 were adequate source documents for design applications. Nuclear , . Generation Procedure (NGP) 5.28, " Development, Review, Update and ; ! Use of Design Basis Documentation Packages (DBDPs)," Revision 1, j
- dated August 2,1994, states that DBDPs are quality related design i
[ documents and are acceptable for use during safety-related design !
- applications. The NU Design Control Manual states that design input !
" source documents include DBDPs. However, as of March 20,1996, l 4 programmatic inadequacies were identified in the development, revision, and control of DBDPs, in that DBDPs were developed using l information spot checks with little field verification, were not being i updated through the design change notice (DCN) process, and were r not being maintained as quality records. (01072) .
8? Design control measures associated with Engineering & Design I Coordination Report T-P-06677, dated August 1,1985, were , inadequate. Specifically, T-P-06677 introduced two 0.375-inch ! restricting odfices, RO-153A and B, into the Unit 3 service water (SW) ; system without assuring that the system would still adequately mitigate water hammer effects (a previous calculation, Stone and Webster i Engineering Corporation (SWEC) P(T)-1070, dated January 26,1985, t found that a 0.5 inch orifice was acceptable). (01082) !
- 9. Design control measures associated with temporary modifications at I Unit 3, namely, housekeeping filters taped on battery room fire dampers i 3HVC*DMPF33, 38,40, and 43, were inadequate to assure operability ,
of the fire dampers. Specifically, filters were installed in 1984 without l' any measures to ensure that the ventilation systems would provide adequate ventilation or that the dampers would be able to close in the event of a fire. The condition existed until April 1995 when Calculation 95-ENG-1109 MS evaluated the filter impact on air flow to the battery rooms and concluded that the ventilation systems in the battery rooms l could adequately ventilate the rooms with clean filters installed. However, as of May 20,1996, the lack of acceptance criteria for the . cleanliness requirements for the air filters, and the impact on the [ operation of the fire dampers, had not been evaluated. (01092) -
- 10. Design control measures were inadequate to assure operability of the l Unit 3 tuit>ine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump following a ;
loss of all electrical power. Specifically, Calculation 91-074-324M3, ' dated March 1,1993, assumed an incorrect and nonconservative steam
- exhaust pressure, which had the potential to adversely impact the {
effectiveness of operator actions contained in Emergency Operating ; k NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-160 I
l j- Notice of Violation 5 ! l 1- Procedure EOP 35 ECA-0.0, Revision 11, dated October 3,1995, to ; assure TDAFW pump operability in that the higher turt>ine exhaust l
- pressure may have limited turbine horsepower to less than required.
j (01102) 11? ' Design control measures were inadequate to assure that the Unit 3 TDAFW pump containment isolation valves (3FWA*HV36A, B, C, and i D) were capable of isolating the containment under design basis accident conditions, as required by Unit 3 TS 3.6.3, " Containment i i isolation Valves." Specifically, bench testing conducted on March 30, i 1996, demonstrated that since initial installation the valves were only j capable of remaining closed when exposed to a differential back l l pressure of up to 8 psid, rather than the design-basis peak containment
- accident pressure of 38.6 psig specified in Millstone 3 FSAR Section i L 6.2," Containment Systems." This resulted in these containment l
! isolation valves being declared inoperable and requiring the Unit 3 L shutdown on March 30,1996. (01112) h
- 12. Design control measures were inadequate to assure that the design basis was correctly translated into drawings and that the selection of j material and parts was reviewed for the suitability of application to the j safety-related function of the affected component. Specifically, the -
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 FSAR in Table 3.2-1 lists the letdown heat exchanger as an ASME 111, Class 2 component on its tube j side. ' The _ASME Code, Section lli (1983 edition, summer 1983 l addenda) specifies in subsection NC-2123 the requirements for the ! design allowable stress values for ASME 111, Class 2 material. i However, as of November 1993, a plant design change request (PDCR) MP3-90-243, Revision 1, did not correctly translate the Unit 3 design basis into the revised drawings for the letdown heat exchanger. 4 Specifically, flange studs were replaced with new studs and credit was i taken for a minimum yield strength that was greater than the design l 1 allowable stress values for ASME 111, Class 2 material. Furthermore, l I the design change control measures applied to PDCR MP-3-90-243 did ; i not assure adequate review of the modification detailin that the j replacement of a certain number of the originalletdown heat exchanger i studs with the specified material was not controlled with regard to the ! ! suitable application of structural integrity to the safety-related Class 2 . pressure boundary. (01122) l 13? Provisions to assure that appropriate quality standards are specified i and included in design documents and that deviations from such j standards are controlled were inadequate. Specifically, filter regulators ! originally installed upstream of 48 ASCO safety related solenoid-4 operated valves (SOVs) to limit the differential pressure on the SOVs in i accordance with SWEC design specification No. 2472.110-185,
" Electro-Hydraulic and Air-Operated Control Valves,"were procured as ; non safety-related components. This resulted in the installation c7 48 SOVs in Unit 3, procured in accordance with SWEC design specification J
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- NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-161
] k I
Notice of Violation 6 No. 2472.110-185, that could be subject to air pressure (e.g. 80 psig) in excess of the component designed maximum operating pressure differential (e.g. 60 psid) if there was a failure of the non safety-related air regulator located upstream of each SOV.' (01132) ; 14.* At some unknown time subsequent to initial licensing, an inadequate ; modification to the Unit 2 service water system common strainer ; backwash line was made that added a horizontal piping section to the ; existing vertical section. This resulted in minor leakage past the ; strainer backwash valves forming an ice plug when it contacted the , horizontal leg of piping that was exposed to a long period of sub- i freezing temperatures. There were no records of a formal engineering i review of this modification. This inadequate modification permitted the formation of an ice plug which rendered the service water system l inoperable on January 8,1995. (01142) ; B. INADEQUATE. OR LACK OF SAFETY EVALUATIONS AND FAILURES TO I UPDATE THE FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT ; 10 CFR 50.59, " Changes, tests and experiments," in part permits the hcensee [ to make changes to its facility and procedures as described in the safety ! analysis report and conduct tests or experiments not described in the safety analysis report without prior Commission approval provided the change does ! not involve a change in the technical specifications or an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ). The licensee shall maintain records of changes in the facility and these records must include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change does not involve a USQ. l 10 CFR 50.71(e) requires, in part, a licensee to update the FSAR originally ! submitted as part of the application for the operating license to assure that the ; information included in the FSAR contains the latest material developed. The updated FSAR shall be revised to include the effects of, in part, all safety evaluations performed by the licensee in support of conclusions that changes ' did not involve a USQ. 10 CFR 50.9(a) requires, in part, that information provided to the NRC by a I licensee or information required to be maintained by a licensee shall be [ complete and accurate in all material respects. {
- 1. Unit 3 TS 3.7.1.2, " Auxiliary Feedwater System," requires that in operating Modes 1,2, and 3 at least three independent AFW pumps l
and associated flow paths are required to be operable. , Contrary to the above, on May 10,1994, the licensee made a procedural change to shut the TDAFW pump discharge isolation valve , during startup and shutdown operations, rendering the TDAFW pump ; inoperable, when the motor-driven AFW (MDAFW) pumps were being I used for steam generator water level control. The licensee's safety ; evaluation to support this change was inadequate in that the need to ' f NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-162
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I Notice of Violation 7 revise the TS was not recognized. In addition, the updated FSAR was not complete and accurate in all material respects in that it did not reflect this change. (01152) I
- 2. Unit 2 UFSAR, Chapter 7, states that the engineered safety features ;
actuation system is designed to meet the provisions of institute of ! Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 279-1971, "Cnteria for l Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." lEEE 279 i specifies, in part, that the system be designed to meet the single failure i criterion. 1 l Contrary to the above, on January 12,1996, the licensee approved Revision 18 to operating procedure (OP) 2313C, " Containment Post-
- incident Hydrogen Control," to address the fact that the as-built containment gas and particulate radiation monitors, the post accident sampling system, and the hydrogen monitors did not meet the single failure criterion (the licensee had identified that the loss of one vital DC bus would render these systems inoperable). This revision was made without an adequate safety evaluation to ensure that it did not involve a USQ, in that the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated was not appropriately considered and evaluated.
The safety evaluation was also inadequate in that the design bases were not appropriately considered. (01162)
- 3. Unit 1 UFSAR, Section 11.2, " Liquid Waste Management Systems,"
(LWMS), states, in part, that the LWMS are designed to be operated and maintained to collect, store, process, and dispose of, or recycle, safely, all radioactive or potentially radioactive liquid waste generated by plant operation. The Radwaste Building and equipment arrangement provide assurance that the Radwaste Building will form a radioactive waste boundary and prevent excessive radioactive material release. Contrary to the above, the licensee changed the LWMS and as of February 9,1996, did not perform an evaluation to ensure that the change did not involve a USQ. Specifically, the radwaste facility would not perform the function for which it was designed due to long standing leakage of radioactive waste, deterioration of numerous pipe flanges I and valve bodies, significant cracking and deterioration of the sludge tank boundary, and overfill of the spent resin tank resulting in an uncontrolled release and dispersal of highly radioactive material in that room, and deterioration of transfer piping, pipe supports and restraints. As a result, not all radioactive liquid waste was stored or processed by ' the LWMS as described in the UFSAR. The licensee, by its inaction over years to correct the degradation of the LWMS, made a decision to maintain the LWMS in a manner different from that described in the UFSAR. Therefore, the facility was changed but no evaluation existed NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-163
Notice of Violation 8 to determine that the conditions did not constitute a USQ. In addition, the updated FSAR was not complete and accurate in all material respects in that it did not reflect the differing use of the LWMS from that described in the UFSAR. (01172)
- 4. Unit 1 UFSAR, Section 9.1.3.3, states that water circulates to the heat exchangers, filter domineralizer, and back through diffusers at the bottom of the SFP.
Contrary to the above, from 1988 until November 1995, the facility was not as described in the FSAR in that a Unit 1 spent fuel pool cooling (SFPC) system modification, PDCR 1-24-88, SFP Rerack, existed that removed the SFPC diffusers without an adequate safety evaluation. The safety evaluation for the PDCR performed prior to the change was inadequate in that the removal of the SFPC diffusers was not j addressed. An adequate safety evaluation that addressed the removal . of the SFPC diffusers was not conducted until November 1995. In ! addition, the updated FSAR was not complete and accurate in all i material respects in that it did not reflect this change. (01182) i
- 5. Unit 1 UFSAR, Section 8.3.1.1.5.1, " Diesel Generator System," states, in part, that the starting air system consists of one AC motor-driven :
compressor capable of recharging the empty dual air receivers in 30 . minutes. This compressor is backed up by a DC air compressor. The two air receivers are each capable of a minimum of three independent f cold diesel engine starts without recharging when the starting air . pressure is 250 psig. The air starting system automatically maintains j the necessary inventory of compressed air. The two air compressors ; are started if the pressure in the reservoirs falls to 225 psig and are ! stopped when the pressure reaches 250 psig. Contrary to the above: I
- a. From at least February 14,1991, to 1996 the facility was not as !
described in the UFSAR in that the diesel starting air receiver j discharge check valve intemals were removed, which defeated : the capability for each air receiver to provide three independent cold diesel engine starts. No evaluation existed to determine that this change did not constitute a USQ. In addition, the , updated FSAR was not complete and accurate in all material , respects in that it did not reflect this change. j
- b. Prior to December 31,1996, the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) starting air system was configured in a manner different i
than described in the UFSAR in that (1) while the ability to start ! the diesel engine three times at 250 psig without recharging the , receivers was successfully demonstrated in the preoperational , test, no supporting documentation was found that provided reasonable assurance that the receivers would contain sufficient j i NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-164
i Notice of Violation 9 inventory for three starts when the air receiver pressure is as low as 220 psig; (2) both compressors do not simultaneously 1 receive a start signal; and (3) while the AC compressor starts at 225 psig, the DC compressor starts at 220 psig. No evaluation existed to determine that the change did not constitute a USQ. In addition, the updated FSAR was not complete and accurate in all material respects in that it did not reflect this change. ; (01192)
- 6. Unit 1 UFSAR, Section 8.3.2.2, states that the Class 1E 125 vDC power i sources and the DC distribution system have sufficient independence, '
redundancy, and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a
- single failure. The Class 1E 125 vDC power system consists of two
, redundant and independent DC systems.
Contrary to the above, since initial construction, an electrical separation deficiency existed which constituted a change to the facility as described in the UFSAR. Specifically, on April 11,1995, the licensee i identified an electrical separation deficiency associated with a feedwater regulating valve (FRV) interlock, due to its dependency on both 125 vDC logic trains. No evaluation existed to determine that the change did not constitute a USQ. Further, this change to the facility as j described in the UFSAR remained until November 4,1995 without a i written safety evaluation in that the licensee : hose to resolve the issue
- using an analytical basis without a supporting safety evaluation rather than restore the configuration as described in the UFSAR. In addition, I the updated FSAR was not complete and accurate in all material l
- respects in that it did not reflect this change. (01202)
- 7. Unit 2 UFSAR, Section 9.2.3.3, states that (1) the operator does not i insert the shutdown group of control element assemblies (CEAs) until the cooldown is completed; and (2) the boron concentration is increased to the cold shutdown value prior to the cooldown of the plant.
Contrary to the above, from initial licensing until July 7,1996, Unit 2 OP
- 2206, " Reactor Shutdown," and OP 2207, ** Plant Cooldown," required
, operators to insert all shutdown group CEAs prior to starting a plant a cooldown, and allowed a plant cooldown to proceed prior to the boron concentration being increased to the cold shutdown value. This constituted a change in procedures described in the FSAR. No evaluation existed to determine that the change did not constitute a USQ. In addition, the updated FSAR was not complete and accurate in all material respects in that it did not reflect this change. (01212) l'
- 8. Unit 3 UFSAR, Section 8.3.1.1.7, "Altemate AC Design Criteria and
. Complisnee," describes the licensee's response to 10 CFR 50.63 and states that (1) 4160-V power cables are protected from adverse weather by running the cables almost entirely in buried ductbanks, except for a small transition area where the power cables are supported NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-165 4
Notice of Violation 10 by rigidly mounted cable trays, (2) a start and full load test of the Station Blackout (SBO) EDG is performed every refueling outage, and (3) the surveillance and maintenance procedures for SBO equipment are designed and maintained with due consideration for vendor recommendations, the history of past maintenance practices, and engineering judgement. Contrary to the above, as of March 11,1996; (1) two approximately four foot sections of 4160-V cable were not protected from adverse weather in that they were not in buried ductbanks or supported by rigidly mounted cable trays; (2) the credited tests of the SBO EDG did not test the EDG start times and did not reach the expected accident loads; and (3) no maintenance or surveillance had been performed on the electrical support equipment for the SBO EDG despite recommendations in the related vendor manuals. This as-built configuration of the plant and accompanying maintenance and surveillance practices constituted a change in the facility from the description in the FSAR. No evaluation existed to determine that the inaccuracy did not constitute a USQ. In addition, the updated FSAR was not complete and accurate in all material respects in that it did not reflect this change. (01222) ;
- 9. Unit 3 UFSAR, Section 9.2.1, " Service Water System," describes the !
SW system and includes a description of the motor control center ] (MCC) and rod control area booster pumps and the design features that ; provide the automatic valve actuation and pump start. Contrary to the above, on May 3,1990, the licensee changed the { facility as described in the FSAR by installing a temporary rnodification j in the Unit 3 SW system which added jumpers to the booster pump ; initiation circuit in order to address a fire protection concem regarding l both trains of SW being in the same fire area. This temporary l modification, which was still in effect in May 1996, defeated portions of the automatic initiation and alignment of the booster pumps, and added i steps to alarm response procedures to prompt the operator to manually align and start the booster pumps when needed. While a safety evaluation was performed, it was inadequate in that it did not address ; (1) the substitution of a manual operator action for an automatic feature i and (2) the removal of an automatic pump actuation. Further, the added compensatory alarm response steps were deleted in a subsequent revision to the alarm response procedure without a written ' safety evaluation being performed. In addition, the updated FSAR was - not complete and accurate in all material respects in that it did not i reflect this change. (01232) i
- 10. Unit 3 UFSAR, Section 10.4.9.2, "AFW System-System Description,"
describes the automatic starts of the TDAFW pump to be either of two signals: low level in two of four steam generators or a sensed loss-of-power event. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-166 4
6 Notice of Violation 11 I Contrary to the above, in the as-built condition prior to 1995, only the i SG low-level signal would automatically start the TDAFW pump, , i constituting a change in the facility from the description in the FSAR. : No evalaation existed to determine that the change did not constitute a ! USQ. Following recognition of the discrepancy, FSAR Change Request 95-MP3-12 deleted the description in the UFSAR of the TDAFW ! autostart on loss of offsite power so as to match the as-built ! configuration, without performing a written safety evaluation to assure i that the as-found condition did not involve a USQ. In addition, the ; updated FSAR was not complete and accurate in all material respects in that it did not reflect this change. (01242) : I . 11. Unit 2 UFSAR, Section 6.6.3.1, states that the hydrogen monitoring system is manually initiated within 12 hours following an accident. 4 Contrary to the above, the licensee's letter to the NRC, dated March 27, i 1984, in response to NUREG 0737 (committed to by the licensee and confirmed by Order, dated July 10,1981), item II.F.1.6, " Containment ;
- Hydrogen Monitor," states that the system is initiated within 3 hours. t Following installation of steam generator replacement modification -
(which included ABB-CE Calculation 006-AS92-C-010. " Millstone Unit 2 LOCA Containment Pressure / Temperature Analysis for Steam , i Generator Replacement," dated October 15,1992), the actual time for : containment pressure to fall below 10 psig, at which point the hydrogen l
- monitors can be placed in service, was determined to be 24 hours. l
- These conditions constituted changes in the facility as described in the FSAR. An inadequate evaluation existed to determine that the changes !
, did not constitute a USQ in that the licensee failed to identify that the ; , time needed to place the hydrogen monitors in service could no longer ' . be met. In addition, the updated FSAR was not complete and accurate j in all material respects in that it did not reflect theses changes. (01252) 4
- 12. Unit 3 UFSAR, Section 8.3.1.2.4," Cables and Routing Analysis," and i Table 8.3-2, " Cable in Trays," specified the allowable electrical fill for safety-related cable trays.
Contrary to the above, since initial construction, several trays were filled above the limits which constituted a change to the facility as described
- in the UFSAR. Specifically, as of May 22,1996, five safety-related L-service cable trays had electrical fill greater than the allowable 100-percent (i.e., Tray 3TL1070 at 105-percent fill Tray 3TL2040 at 132-percent fill, Tray 3TL204P at 108-percent fill, Tray 3TL2060 at 132-i percent fill, and Tray 3TL210P at 108-percent fill) and four safety-related C-service cable trays had electrical fill greater than the
! allowable 157 percent (i.e., Tray 3TC402P at 159-percent fill, Tray i i i NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-167 l l l 4
j-i i Notice of Violation 12 3TC442P at 158-percent fill, Tray 3TC4430 at 173- percent fill, and Tray 3TC4620 at 172-percent fill). An inadequate evaluation existed to determine that the change did not constitute a USQ. In addition, the updated FSAR was not complete and accurate in all material respects in that it did not reflect this change.' (01262)
- 13. Unit 3 UFSAR, Section 9.4.8.1, " Circulating and Service Water Pumphouse Ventilation System," indicated that total exhaust air flow from the circulating and GW pumphouse during the summer and winter ,
months is 8200 cfm and 3100 cfm, respectively. t Contrary to the above, as of May 22,1996, the calculated total fan flow was 16,500 cfm and 15,500 cfm, respectively, which constitutes a change in the facility as described in the FSAR. No evaluation existed to determine that the change did not constitute a USQ. In addition, the ; updated FSAR was not complete and accurate in all material respects - ; in that it did not reflect this change. (01272) l
- 14. Unit 3 UFSAR, Section 10.4.9.2, "AFW System - System Description,"
, specified the recirculation flow minimum acceptance criteria of 45 gpm ;
- for the MDAFW pumps and 90 gpm for the TDAFW pump. l l ?
l Contrary to the above, as of May 22,1996, surveillance procedures i (SPs) 3622.1 and 3622.2,"MDAFW Pump 3FWA*P1A&B Operational i l Readiness Tests," and SP 3622.3, 'TDAFW Pump SFWA*P2 . Operational Readiness Tests," specified minimum acceptance criteria of ! 43.2 to 52.8 gpm and 87.3 to 106.7 gpm, respectively, which constitute a change in procedures as described in the FSAR. No evaluation existed to determme that the change did not constitute a USQ. In i addition, the updated FSAR was not complete and accurate in all i material respects in that it did not reflect this change. (01282) i
- 15. Unit 3 UFSAR, Section 8.3.1.1.4.2.e " Electrical System Protection - l l Motor Feeder, Emergency Switchgear," for the 4.16-kV safety-related !
l motors stated that an overload condition alarm is set for 125 percent of l motor full load current and that the instantaneous overcurrent trip is set i at 175 percent of motor locked-rotor current. ! Contrary to the above, as of May 22,1996, the values used in licensee Specification SP-EE-321, Revision 0, "NUSCO Control of Electrical Setpoint Data Base," for the 4.16-kV safety-related motors overioad condition alarm and the instantaneous overcunent trip are 115 and 200 ; percent, respectively, and the values used in the Stone & Webster , document which provided design criteria for protective relay settings, ; NERM-46, "4.16kV and 6.9kV Station Service Protechon Philosophy," ! are 115 and 190 percent, respectively, which constitutes a change in I the facility as described in the FSAR in that the actual settings were ! based on these documents. No evaluation existed to determine that the change did not constitute a USQ. In addition, the updated FSAR NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-168 l l { f f
Notice of Violation 13 , was not complete and accurate in all material respects in that it did not reflect this change. (01292)
- 16. Unit 3 UFSAR, Table 6.2-65, " Containment Penetration," identified the AFW flow control valves as containment isolation valves and indicates that they are motor operated and fail"as is." UFSAR Section 6.2.4,
" Containment isolation System," states that "all air and solenoid-operated containment isolation valves fali in the closed position."
Contrary to the above, as of May 22,1996, the AFW flow control valves as originally installed are solenoid-operated and fail"open," : which constitutes a change in the facility as described in the FSAR. No l evaluation existed to determine that the change did not constitute a l
USQ. In addition, the updated FSAR was not complete and accurate in l a!! material respects in that it did not reflect this change. (01302) j
- 17. Unit 3 UFSAR, Section 8.3.1.1.6,"Aftemate AC System Description,"
states that the attemate attemating current (AAC) system switchgear enclosure contains a battery with a 125 ampere hour rating. Contrary to the above, as of May 22,1996, the FSAR was not accurate in all material respects in that the installed battery in the enclosure had a 80 ampere hour rating. The AAC system was installed and tested in l August 1993 with the 80 ampere hour rated battery. However, when ! the UFSAR was updated by the licensee to include the AAC system description, the information provided did not reflect the correct as-installed battery configuration. (01312) These violations in Sections 1.A and I.B represent a Severity Level ll problem (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty - $500,000 ll. VIOLATIONS RELATED TO INADEQUATE OR LACK OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS A. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI," Corrective Action," requires in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. Contrary to the above, the licensee did not assure that conditions adverse to quality were promptly identified and corrected. Moreover, the causes of significant conditions adverse to quality were not determined, nor were corrective actions taken to preclude repetition, as evidenced by the following examples, each of which constitutes an individual violation: NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-169
-.- - -. - - - -. -- . ~
l Notice of Violation 14
, 1. On March 30,1995, the licensee identified that incorrect stud material
!. existed in Unit 1 Reactor Water Cleanup valve 1 CU-3; however, as of ! April 27,199ti, adequate measures were not established to correct this , condition adverse to quality in that the licensee did not perform short ' { term reviews or inspections following the identification of the incorrect
- stud material to determine if the incorrect botting material was used in
' other applications. In Juae 1995, incorrect studs were identified in
- other safety-related valves, namely, low pressure coolant injection
{ valves 1-LP-10A&B,1-LP-29A, and 1-LPA, B & D. (02012) i 2. On June 7,1996, the licensee completed an Event Review Team (ERT) ! report that assessed the findings of a QA Services audit of the adverse ' l condition report (ACR) process. The ERT report indicated a continued ! l inadequate implementation of the corrective action program at Unit 1, ; and the licensee did not establish measures to assure that the cause of i the condition was determined and corrective actions taken to preclude ! i repetition, Specifically, the ERT root cause report, causal factors, and ; j' corrective action plan took credit for a draft Operating Experience : Manual which was part of the Nuclear Excellence Plan. This plan was , ! not implemented and, therefore, no corrective actions were taken. ; (02022) l 3. On November 17,1995, the licensee identifed a significant condition adverse to quality at Unit 2. Specifically, a 1992 containment j j temperature profile analysis was performed using an incorrect RBCCW
- system flow rate through the shutdown heat exchangers. Upon l l discovery of the error in November 1995, the licensee issued ACR 8344 !
- to document the issue; however, the ACR was closed without
- identifying the cause of the error and did not document actions to l
[ ensure that the other assumed values in the analyses were correct. ( (02032) ! 4. Conditions adverse to quality identifed in 1992, related to the adequacy l of the environmental qualification (EQ) of the Unit 2 MCC enclosures ! which surround MCCs B51 and B61, were not corrected. Specifically, j in 1993 and 1994, similar additional concems were identifed by the licensee related to assumptions in the EQ analysis, as well as with e ! regard to the operator actions needed following an accident, and the cooling capability of the MCC enclosures. However, when excessive ' door seal gaps were identified in the Unit 2 MCC enclosures in March l 1996, degrading the capability of the MCCs to mitigate the effects of a i harsh environment, it was determined that the licensee had not taken or
- planned corrective actions to address those conditions adverse to quality identifed in 1992,1993, and 1994. (02042)
- 5. On September 29,1995, the licensee identifed that Unit 2 seismically-qualified, vital switchgear room cooler X-182 would not be available '
following a seismic event. As a result of modification PDCR 2-064-94,
" Vital Switchgear Ventilation System-Service Water Isolation,"
NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-170 '
i Notice of Violation 15 ! , completed June 22,1995, cooler X-182 would be isolated in the event of any leakage in the vital switchgear room, including leakage from the i.' non-seismically-qualified fire protection piping above. Although the licensee issued DCN DM2-S-1246-95, " Modification to Fire Protection ! Piping Cable Spreading Area Turbine Building," on February 27,1996, i to address potential leakage from Victaulic couplings, this corrective l action was inadequate because the fire protection system's 2-over-1
- seismic design critsria were less conservative than the criteria for the j safety-related cooler and switchgear below the piping. As a result, as
- of May 22,1996, the licensee had not taken adequate corrective action i to assure the availability of cooler X-182 following a seismic event.
l (02052) ! 6. In 1993, the licensee identified deficiencies in the maintenance and j testing of dual-function containment isolation valves at Unit 2 which resulted in certain of those valves being unable to fulfill their safety
- function, a significant condition adverse to quality. The licensee's valve j maintenance and test program had failed to specify the proper bench-
- settings or retest requirements for certain pneumatic valves. As a j result, certain containment isolation valves would not be able to close
! against full system pressure in performing their line-break isolation ! function. The NRC issued an NOV for this issue on February 2,1994 } (NRC Inspection Report 50-245/93-27; 50-335/93-20; and 50-423/93-i 23). Also, the licensee identified on June 8,1995, that corrective ! actions specified to address this significant condition adverse to qdality ; i had not been taken. However, as of March 20,1996, the licensee had ) not implemented corrective actions for this deficiency. (02062) i
- 7. Procedure NGP 2.40, *lssues Management and Action Tracking,' states i
that Level A and B Adverse Condition Reports (ACRs) represent significant conditions adverse to quality, and specifies that Level A 1 ACRs be resolved within 30 days and Level B ACRs be resolved within ) 45 days. NGP 2.40 states that Level A ACRs represent events or , j issues of such importance they deserve the immediate, undivided i attention of whatever resources are required to mitigate the
)
1
- consequences, determine the causes, and implement at least sufficient i
interim corrective measures to prevent recurrence. However, as of May 22,1996, numerous Unit 2 Level A and B ACRs had not been promptly l resolved within the time periods specified by NGP 2.40. Specifically, i nine Level A and B ACRs were identified that remained open for over 90 days, with several that had been unresolved for over 9 months. l (02072) ! 8. The environmental qualification required by 10 CFR 50.49 of certain l Unit 2 valves subject to a harsh environment was discussed in NRC 3 Inspection Report No. 50-336/88-20, issued on October 14,1988, and i in a related Enforcement Conference conducted on July 20,1988. At j that time, the licensee determined that only one of the 10 valves, an I i [ NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-171 i I
Notice of Violation 16 atmospheric dump valve, had terminations that required environmental qualification because this was the only valve that required energization to perform its safety function (i.e., valve opening). The other nine valves, all feedwater or containment isolation valves, were said to reposition to their safe (i.e., closed) positions when their coils are doenergized. The licensee failed to identify, however, that four containment isolation valves also had a safety-related function to open. As a result, in part, until March 26,1996, seven of those safety significant solenoid valves (listed in Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-336/96-19) that are required to function in a harsh environment were electrically connected using devices for which no record of qualification existed for that environment. Thus, equipment required to perform post-accident functions, including containment air radiation and hydrogen monitoring, sampling, reactor coolant charging, pressurizer auxiliary spray, and containment hydrogen purge were not demonstrated to be environmentally qualified. (02082)
- 9. A third-party audit entitled " Station Blackout Assessment," Report 24-00116, Revision 0, dated October 1994, had identified deficiencies in the licensee's implementation of the NRC's SBO requirements in 10 CFR 50.63 at Units 2 and 3. The deficiencies included potentially inadequate loading calculations, voltage drop calculations, and battery sizing calculations. In addition, the licensee's failure to address the i issues was identified in a QA surveillance of October 1995 and a Nuclear Safety Engineering Group report of February 1996. However, as of May 22,1996, the licensee had not taken corrective action to address the deficiencies identified in the third-party audit of SBO ;
equipment. (02092)
- 10. Licensee Audit Reports Nos. A25092, A21065, A22065 and A23065, ,
entitled "Nonconformance Reports," dated July 14,1994, identified that NGP 3.05, "Nonconformance Reports," was inadequate in that there . were no procedural controls associated with the timeliness of resolving nonconforming conditions, a significant condition adverse to quality. . However, as of March 11,1996, the licensee had not taken measures l to correct this condition adverse to quality to assure the timely ; resolution of identified nonconformances, as evidenced by several > uncorrected MP3 nonconformance reports (NCRs), which dated back to 1988-1989, associated with damaged air-operated valves in the Unit 3 ; Volume Control System, deficiencies associated with 480V load < centers, and nonconforming conditions in the containment recirculation spray system (RSS). (02102)
- 11. Between May 1990 and March 1996, a Unit 3 temporary modification resulted in the deletion of the SW booster pump autostart interlock .
described in Unit 3 UFSAR Section 9.2.1. A specialinstruction to [ manually restart the booster pumps was subsequently deleted from an alarm response procedure. This constituted a condition adverse to quality because the SW supply to the motor control center / rod control , NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-172 , 9
t ) i Notice of Violation 17 area (MCC/RCA) air handling units would not automatically initiate on i high temperature in the retum duct. This condition adverse to quality , was not previously identified, despite numerous opportunities to do so following installation of this temporary modification, including approximately 70 required monthly audits of temporary modifications by the Operations Department, four reviews by the Plant Operations i Review Committee, and the August 1994 reviews associated with the Design Basis Documentation Package program. (02112) l ' 12. On May 20,1996, Unit 3 safety-related SW booster pump 3SWP'3B l was found to be significantly degraded in that its concrete support i pedestal had been damaged for an extended but indeterminate period such that there was no longer assurance that the pump would meet i applicable seismic requirements; however, this condition had not been previously identified and evaluated by the licensee. (02122) j l 13. In May 1992, the licensee determined that there was no assurance that I there existed an adequate combin6tlinventory of the Unit 3 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) and the Domineralized Water Storage Tank !
- (DWST). Specifically, existing proccdures required a minimum l combined CST and DWST inventory of 334,000 gallons, even though a minimum of 364,000 gallons was required to meet design basis requirements, because 30,000 gallons of water in the CST were unusable due to the tank configuration. Although a proposed TS l change was submitted to the NRC in May 1995 to correct the TS, the !
proposed change was withdrawn in June 1995 because of other ; unrelated issues. A!so, as of March 11,1996, the licensee had not revised the applicable procedures or taken interim measures to correct ! this condition adverse to quality by assuring adequate CST and DWST l
- inventory. (02132)
- 14. NRC Inspection Report 50-423/95-07, dated April 28 1995, included a violation for inadequate control of scaffolding that did not prevent safety-related components frem being potentially impacted. The licensee response to the NOV, dated June 12,1995, stated the actions taken to resolve the identified problems including actions to prevent recurrence. However, additional examples of inadequate control of scaffolding with the potential to impact safety-related equipment were identified at Unit 3 on March 12,1996. (02142)
- 15. DCN DM3-S 0677 93, dated August 12,1993, documented that the Unit 3 protective relay criteria documents for safety-related motor design had .
previously not been adequately controlled. However, as of March 12, 1996, the licensee had not taken adequate corrective measures to control those documents in that Stone & Webster design spwicidions NERM-45 and NERM 46, which were used as design criteria for protective relay settings, were uncontrolled and inconsistent with the UFSAR and NUSCO specification SP'EE-321. As result, a quench spray pump motor overcurrent relay needed to be reset. (02152) NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-173
i Notice of Violation 18
- 16. On March 12,1996, unauthorized temporary l-beams were identified above 3 of 4 Unit 3 RSS heat exchangers. This constituted a significant condition adverse to quality because during a seismic event, the resulting damage from the falling beams could have rendered multiple trains of RSS inoperable. The licensee had no instructions or technicaljustification for the installation; however, this condition had not been previously identified and corrected by the licensee. (02162)
- 17. In March 1996, tre licensee identified that the No. 9 upper main bearing for the "B" 3DG at Unit 2 was significantly degraded, a significant condition adverse to quality, in that excessive bearing-to-shaft clearance was detected. However, the cause of tha condition was not determined and corrective actions were not taken to preclude repetition in that on April 17,1996, the *B" EDG engine experienced severe damage to the upper crankshaft main and connecting rod i bearings during surveillance testing from causes related to the earlier j No. 9 upper main bearing degradation. (02172) !
B. 10 CFR 50.9(a), " Completeness and Accuracy of Infom1ation," requires, in part. that the information provided to the Commitsion by a licensee be complete and accurate in all material res; t. Contrary to the above, the licensee submitted Letter B154600, dated December 13,1995, to the Commission conceming the Radwaste Facilities at Millstone Unit 1, which was not accurate in certain material respects. Specifically, the letter stated that "Upon determining the degree to which the material conditions had deteriorated, an ACR was initiated to document the findings. The ACR was assigned a significance Level"B", thus requiring a root cause analysis." The letter also discussed the results of a root cause investigation. However, the only Level"B" ACR on this issue was ACR 2372, dated January 18,1996, and the root cause evaluation associated with ACR 2372 was completed on March 8,1996. Both of these occurred after the December 13,1995, letter was issued. (02182) These violations in Section ll.A and 11.B represent a Severity Level 11 problem (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty - 51,000,000 til VIOLATIONS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS A. Unit 1 TS 3.7.B.1," Containment Systems, Standby Gas Treatment System," requires that both trains of the SGTS and their associated power sources required for operation of such circuits shall be operable at all times when containment integrity is required. Contrary to the above, between July 5,1995 and November 19,1995 when containment integrity was required, whenever the outside temperature was less than 45'F, the B train of the SGTS was inoperable, and whenever the outside temperature was less than 30*F, the A train of the SGTS was inoperable. On NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-174
- - -- -. .- . - - - ~ - - . - -.- . - -_ - - - . - . - . - ._ - . _ - - -
F i E l 1 Notice of Violation 19 , several occasions during this period the ambient temperature dropped below j 45'F, with a low of 26'F, rendering one or both trains inoperable. Specifically, j i if actuation of the SGTS had occurred during the time period that the j temperature was less than the values stated herein, coincident with a loss of ;
- normal power and a single failure in one train, the required negative pressure !
may not have been maintained throughout the secondary containment, thereby ; resulting in a reduction of the system's ability to perform its intended safety + + function.- (03012) B. Unit 1 TS 3.9.B.4, " Auxiliary Electrical System," requires, in part, that when !
- either emergency power source is made or found inoperable for any reason, j reactor operation is permissible according to specification 3.5.F/4.5.F. ;
4 ; Unit 1 TS 3.5.F. " Minimum Core and Containment Cooling System Availability," , items 3.5.F.2 and 3.5.F.3 respectively require, in part, that from and after the - date that the EDG is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, continued ! , reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days i
- provided that the gas turbine generator is operable; and from and after the i date that the gas turbine generator is made or found to be inoperable for any .
reason, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding l four days provided that the EDG is operable. l Contrary to the above, t 1. On multiple occasions since May 18,1994, and continuously from l 1 July 14,1995, until January 1996, the gas turbine generator was l inoperable because one of its two fuel forwarding pumps was inoperable and unable to transfer fuel from the fuel storage tank to the I' gas turt>ine, and during those times, reactor operation was continued in excess of the succeeding four days;
- 2. On multiple occasions between May 18,1994 and January 1996, the EDG was inoperable (taken out of service) at times when the gas turbine was also inoperable because one of its two fuel forwarding pumps was inoperable and unable to transfer fuel from the fuel tank to the gas turbine, and during those times, reactor operation continued.
(03022) C. Unit 1 TS 3.5.B.1, " Containment Cooling Subsystems," requires, in part, that both containment cooling subsystems shall be operable whenever irradiated fuelis in the reactor vessel. A subsystem includes two emergency SW pumps and associated valves. Unit 1 TS 3.5.F.1, '1Ainimum Core and Containment Cooling System , Availability," requires, in part, that both emergency power sources shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor. TS 3.5.F.2 states that from and after the date that the EDG is made or found to be inoperable, for any reason, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days provided that the feedwater coolant injection (FWCl) system subsystem shall NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-175
e Notice of Violation 20 be operable. The SW system is a support system for the EDG and the FWCl subsystem. Contrary to the above, from initial plant operation until 1996, neither containment cooling subsystems, the EDG nor the FWCl subsystem were operable, including periods with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel. Specifically, these systems were inoperable because the operability for the emergency SW pump motors could not be demonstrated during several postulated loss of intake structure ventilation scenarios, and with the emergency SW pump motors inoperable, there would be insufficient cooling of the containment cooling subsystems, the EDG and the FWCl subsystem. (03032) D. Unit 1 TS 3.6.F. " Structural integrity," states that the structural integrity of the primary boundary shall be maintained as specified in TS 3.13. Unit 1 TS 3.13,
" Inservice inspection," states that the structural integrity of ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 equivalent components shall be maintained at an acceptable level in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g). l 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) requires, in part, that components (including supports) which are classified as ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components meet the requirements set forth in ASME Code, Section XI. ASME Code, Section XI, requires that unacceptable flaws be evaluated per Paragraph IWB-3640.
Contrary to the above, between 1984 and 1995, the licensee did not evaluate unacceptable flaws in six ASME Class 1 reactor coolant components (RCAJ-2, RCBJ-1A, RRJJ-4, RREJ-4, RRCJ 4 and CUBJ 18) as required by ASME Section XI,1986 Edition, Paragraph IWB-3640. The components were placed back into service without flaw analyses with an unacceptable structural integrity and a high probability of abnormal leakage. (03042) E. Unit 2 TS 3.5.2 and 3.5.3, " Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCSs)," s requires ECCSs to be maintained operable during plant operations in Modes
- 14. Unit 2 TS 3.6.2, " Containment Spray System," requires two separate and ;
independent containment spray systems to be maintained operable during plant operations in Modes 1-3. Contrary to the above, prior to February 1996, the ECCS systems and the Containment Spray Systems were inoperable in that several deficiencies with the containment sump strainer existed. Specifically, debris much larger than the screen mesh size could pass through the strainer because (1) two end ; panels and a center partition of the strainer were constructed of wire mesh greater than the 0.187 square inch designed openings; and (2) there were ten i locations where openings as large as 0.25 inches by 2 feet were identified. l (03052) ' F. Unit 2 TS 3.6.4.1 requires that two independent hydrogen monitors be , operable in modes 1 and 2. Unit 2 UFSAR Section 6.6.2.1 states that two full { capacity hydrogen concentration monitoring systems are provided outside the NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-176 l . l
Notice of Violation 21 containment for periodic or continuous analysis of hydrogen concentration of the containment atmosphere and that uniform mixing of the containment post-accident atmosphere is provided by the post-accident recirculation system. Contrary to the above, since original installation, during operation in modes 1 and 2: 1
- 1. Two full capacity hydrogen monitors were not operable or available for !
periodic or continuous analysis because vacuum regulating valves PCV- l 7852 and PCV-7856 would have prevented air flow through the monitor l cell when containment pressure was low, thereby rendering both trains ; of hydrogen monitors inoperable. j
".The hydrogen monitors could not provide continuous analysis of h 2.
hydrogen concentration of a uniformly mixed post accident containment : atmosphere because the hydroger. ~ nonitor suction lines were tied into suction ductwork of the non vital containment auxiliary circulating fans . rather than the vital post-incident recirculation fans. This condition [ would have resulted in a non-representative containment sample, ! thereby rendering both trains of hydrogen monitors inoperable (this condition also rendered both trains of the containment atmosphere ! post-accident sampling system inoperable since the system was installed in 1983). (03062) G. Unit 2 TS 1.6, " Operable - Operability," defines, in part, that a system, , subsystem, train, component or device shall be operable or have operability l when it is capable of performing its specified function (s) and when all other auxiliary equipment that is required for the system, subsystem, train, , component or device to perform its function (s) is also capable of performing its l related support function (s). ! Unit 2 TS 3.7.4, " Service Water System," requires that two independent service j water loops be operable while in modes 1,2,3 and 4. The associated action ; statement states that with one service water loop inoperable, restore the j inoperable loop to operable status within 48 hours or be in cold shutdown < within the next 36 hours. l Unit 2 TS 3.0.3 states that when a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met, _ except as provided in tne associated action requirements, within one hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in a mode in which the specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in:
- 1. At least hot standby within the next 6 hours,
- 2. At least hot shutdown within the following 6 hours, and
- 3. At least cold shutdown within the subsequent 24 hours.
Contrary to the above, at approximately 1:00 a.m. on January 8,1996 both independent service water loops were identified as being in a condition such that the service water system and auxiliary equipment, the service water NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-177
Notice of Violation 22 strainers, would not perform their functions, thus requiring entry into TS 3.0.3, and the service water system was not declared inoperable and no action was initiated within one hour to place the unit in a mode in which the specification did not apply. Specifically, at approximately 12:10 a.m. an operator identified that no service water strainer backwash flow existed despite high differential pressure across the service water strainers, a condition for which strainer backwash flow was required. At approximately 1:00 a.m., licensee personnel concluded that an ice plug had formed in a common horizontal backwash line for the service water strainers, which resulted in the inability to backwash the strainers, thus rendering the service water system inoperable but did not I declare the service water system inoperable. . (03072) j H. Unit 3 TS 3.7.1.2, " Auxiliary Feedwater System," requires that at least three independent steam generator AFW pumps and associated flow paths be i operable in Modes 1,2, and 3. The associated action statement requires that ! with one AFW pump inoperable, the required pump be restored to operable status within 72 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and ! in hot shutdown within the following 6 hours. Unit 3 TS 3.0.4 states that entry into an operational mode shall not be made when the conditions for the LCO i are not met and the associated action requires a shutdown if they are not met. Contrary to the above, on at least five occasions (June 1,1995 (entry into Mode 3), June 3,1995 (entry into Mode 2), June 4,1995 (entry into Mode 1), and December 15,1995 (entries into Mode 2 and Mode 1)), Unit 3 entered an operational mode with an inoperable TDAFW pump in that the pump discharge ! t isolation valves were closed. (03082) These violations in Section ill represent a Severity Level ll problem (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty - $500,000 IV. OTHER VIOLATIONS OF NRC QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS 6SSESSED A CIVIL PENALTY , A. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion ll, " Quality Assurance Program," states in part that the licensee shall identify the structures, systems, and components ; to be covered by the QA program. The QA program shall provide control over . activities affecting the quality of the identified structures, systems, and ! components, to the extent consistent with their importance to safety. ! Contrary to the above, as of March 14,1996, the licensee's QA program did [ not provide control over activities affecting the quality of the Unit 1 SFPC system in that the system was modified and operated in advance of the full : knowledge of the quality standards of the SDC system which was part of the ; modification. Specifically, the licensee installed a cross connect between the SDC system and the SFPC system and declared the systems operable after ' completing the modification work; however, the licensee did not determine if ! the SDC system components fully met the QA Category I classification similar j to the SFPC system. (04013) j NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-178 , I i
, I 1 Notice of Violation 23 , l l B. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and , j Drawings," requires in part that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed j . by documented instructions and accomplished in accordance with these
- instructions.
f i 1. Vendor manuals for the Unit 3 motor driven AFW pumps (Bingham Willamette 01M041-001C and -002C) direct that the pumps be 5 lubricated every 30 days if they are normally in standby service, in 1987, that interval was extended to 40 days with the concurrence of the l
- vendor. Surveillance Test Procedures SP 3622.1 and 3622.2 directed '
2 the operator to manually prelubricate the pump bearings if the pump - had not been operated during the previous 40 days. ; Contrary to the above, as of March 20,1996, the licensee failed to ; ' ensure that the 40 day lubrication requirement was met or appropriately j changed after the AFW pump surveillance test interval was changed in
- . January 1995 to 90 days. (04023)
' 2. Unit 3 OP 3208, " Plant Cooldown," Revision 16, Steps 4.3.10 and 3 4.3.11, requires the operator to monitor reactor plant closed cooling water (RPCCW) system retum temperatures from the outlet of the A and B residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchangers to ensure the design maximum RPCCW temperature of 115'F is not exceeded. The ~ procedure also requires that operators initiate an ACR and notify . system engineering personnelif this temperature is exceeded. i ! Contrary to the above, during a shutdown on December 1,1995, Unit 3 l operators failed to maintain RPCCW below 115'F and failed to initiate ; an ACR to document and notify system engineering that the temperature had been exceeded, as required by OP 3208. Specifically, I
- the RPCCW temperature at the outlet of RHR heat exchanger A l i exceeded the 115 'F limit and reached a maximum temperature of 120 1 *F. Subsequent to the identification of this occurrence, the licensee i identified that during Unit 3 shutdowns on September 9,1994, and April 15,1995, the RPCCW temperature limit of 115 "F had also been i
exceeded (04033)
- 3. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV," Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to control materials, parts, or components which do not conform to requirements in order to prevent their inadvertent use or
- i installation.
NGP 6.01, " Material, Equipment, and Parts Lists (MEPL) for Inservice I Nuclear Generation Facilities," implements the licensee's QA program and procedural controls associated with the classification of safety-related equipment. 4 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-179
Notice of Velation 24
- s. Contrary to the above, neither NGP 6.01 nor NGP 3.05, "Nonconformance Reports," provided adequate guidance regarding the evaluation of the adequacy of non-QA material identified in safety-related applications. As a result, between 1993 and 1996, approximately 25 MEPL deficiencies that had been identified by the licensee at Units 2 & 3 were not ,
corrected, and the justification for not doing so was inadequate. l (04043) ;
- b. Contrary to the above, as of May 22,1996, several instances t were identified in which the requirements of NGP 6.01 were not followed for Unit 2, resulting in the inappropriate reclassification i of safety-related equipment as non-safety. Specifically, the i technical review requirements of NGP 6.01, section 6.1.2.4, !
were not property executed such that required discipline reviews were not completed; the requirements of section 6.1.2.6 were not met in that the specified review verifications were signed prior to reviews; and the requirements of section 6.1.2.2 were ! not complied with in that revisions of completed individual MEPL ; determinations were issued which superseded portions of ; existing MEPL determinations. (04053) ; C. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, " Test Control," requires in part that ! a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate ; that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service j is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures that t incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable ! design documents. i I
- 1. Contrary to the above, on several occasions between September 30, 1994, and January 2,1995, written test procedures were not property 7
~
performed at Unit 2. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow PI-13,
" Evaluation of Dynamic Test Results," which stated that negative load !
sensitive behavior could not be used to increase motor-actuator I capability at the control switch trip for Valve MS-202 (No. 2 steam i generator to Terry Turbine steam supply valve), and that thrust calculations were to be updated with dynamic test results prior to the i next static test. Consequently, the licensee used an incorrect ' acceptance criterion and on three occasions erroneously evaluated the ! design-basis capability of valve MS-202. (04063) i l
- 2. Contrary to the above, testing required to demonstrate that components I will perform satisfactorily in service was not properly performed in that as of May 21,1996, test data taken in December 1995 following the l
l May 1995 replacement of safety-related cooling coils for the Unit 3 SW MCC/RCA room coolers, accomplished as part of PDCR MP3 94-122, i l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-180 l l -.
? 1 i
- . Notice of Violation 25
! , *3HVR*ACU1 A/B Service Water Cooling Coil Replacement," had not been evaluated to assure that the design change had been adequately ; } implemented. ~ Specifically, upon review, the test results differed j significantly from the purchase specification, necessitating additional ; analysis. (04073) [ j ! 3.
- 10 CFR 50.55a(f) and (g) require that !icensees comply with ASME l Code, Section XI requirements associated with inservice testing and l inservice inspection. Paragraph IWC 5222(a) of ASME Code (1986),
Section XI, requires that hydrostatic testing of systems be conoucted at a pressure of at least 1.25 times the corresponding relief valve setting if l the system design temperature exceeds 200*F.
- 'I ontrary C to the above, on September 26,1993, per Engineering Form ;
31063-1, " Hydrostatic Pressure Test," the licensee accepted hydrostatic !
- test results on the Unit 3 high pressure safety injection (SlH) system, an i
- ASME Code system with a design temperature greater than 200'F, at ;
i pressures less than 1.25 times the settings of relief valves 3SlH*RV-l 8851,-8853A, and 48538. (04083) l 4.* 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3) requires that altematives to the ASME Code ,
- inservice testing and inservice inspection requirements must be l authorized by the NRC.
l Contrary to the above, as part of PDCR MP3-91075, dated April 11, ! 1 1991, the licensee deferred conducting the ASME Code required l hydrostatic testing of the Unit 3 SlH system without approval of the ! 3 NRC. (04093) l ! D. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV, " Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or ; j Components," requires in part that measures shall be established to control i materials, parts, or components which do not conform to requirements in order ; to prevent their inadvertent use or installation. l 4 NGP 3.05, "Nonconformance Reports," Section 6.1.1, written to comply with 10 i
^
. CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XV and XVI, states that in the field, the NCR , is not used to identify deficiencies but to provide engineering direction when a !
- condition adverse to quality cannot be made to conform to requirements or ,
i- when an organization requires engineering direction concoming an identified , deficiency. In the field, deficiencies in installed plant equipment are identified ! by trouble reports, automated work orders, ACRs, surveillances, inspechons,
- and audits which require a prompt assessment of operability for degraded or
- nonconforming conditions.
Contrary to the above, on April 8,1996, the licensee used NCR 1-96-248 (rather than a trouble report, automated work order, ACR, surveillance,
' inspechon, or audit), to identify a degraded concrete base beneath a SW pipe j support. As a result, a prompt assessment of operability for this degraded condition on installed plant equipment was not conducted. (04103) 1 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-181 4
1
Notice of Violation 26 E. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVil," Quality Assurance Records," requires in part that sufficent records be maintained to fumish evidence of activities affecting quality, and that such records be identifiable and retrievable. Contrary to the above, as of March 11,1996, two technical evaluations, entitled "MP3 Service Water Operability Under a Loss of Offsite Power Given a 77'F Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature" and "MP3 Service Water Operability During a Steam Generator Tube Rupture Event Without a Loss of Offsite Power Given a 77'F Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature," listed as references to support a Unit 3 TS Amendment dated April 28,1995, were neither retrievable nor retained within the licensee's QA records. (04113) These violations in Section IV represent a Severity Level lli problem (Supplement I). Civil Penalty - $100,000 i V. VIOLATIONS OF NRC REQUIREMENTS NOT ASSESSED A CIVIL PENALTY A. 10 CFR 50.59, " Changes, tests and experiments," permits the licensee, in part, ; to make changes to the facility as described in the safety analysis report without prior Commission approval provided the change does not involve a USQ. The licensee shall maintain records of changes in the facility and these records must include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change does not involve a USQ. Unit 3 UFSAR, Section 9.4.6, " Emergency Generator Enclosure Ventilation System," describes the EDG room ventilation system, including the room low i temperature alarm setpoint of 45'F. Contrary to the above, in October 1995, the licensee changed the EDG room low temperature alarm setpoint from 45'F to 52*F without performing a written ' safety evaluation to assure that the change did not involve a USQ. (05014) This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1). l B. 10 CFR 50.73(a), " Reportable Events,' requires that the holder of an operating license for a nuclear power plant (licensee) shall submit an LER for any event ; of the type described in 50.73(a)(2) within 30 days after the discovery of the , event. } Contrary to the above, the licensee did not submit an LER for certain events of ! the type described in 50.73(a)(2) within 30 days after the discovery of the event. Specdically: !
- 1. On November 9,1995, a condition prohibited by the Unit 1 TS was !
identified, involving a loss of secondary containment, because the ' SGTS was inoperable with the reactor mode switch not in the shutdown condition; however, LER 50-245/95031, which describes this event, was not issued until January 25,1996. ,
- 2. On January 9,1996, a condition outside the design basis of Unit 1 was {
identified involving the isolation condenser makeup water being less NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-182 ; I
Notice of Violation 27 , than the design basis limit; however, LER 50-245/96009, which describes this event, was not issued until March 5,1996.
- 3. On March 6,1996, a condition outside the design basis of Unit 1 was {
identified involving movement of new fuel assemblies over the SFP, , however, LER 50-245/96023, which describes this event, was not l issued until April 19,1996. (05024) ' This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice q of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice). This reply should be clearly ! marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if d6nied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalties by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the cumulative amount of the civil penalties proposed above, or may protest imposition of the civil penalties, in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.- Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalties will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violations listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not be imposed in addition to protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such . answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalties. ! In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalties, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR ; 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 l CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specife reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee I is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing civil , penalties. I s NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-183
Notice of Violation 28 Upon failure to pay any civil penalties due which subsequently have been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attomey General, and the penalties, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234(c) of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalties, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: Director, Office of , Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory i Commission, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, if you find it i necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information l that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your i request for withholding the information from the public. Dated at Rockville, Maryland [ this 10th day of December 1997 [ i 5 i r I i I NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-184
t [pano T UNITED STATES
- g j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. SoseHeet o, f March 9,1998
, %, * * ,***g i
EA 97-562
' Mr. Bruce D. Kenyon
' President and Chief Executive Officer Northeast Nuclear Energy Company .
P.O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 !
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY - i
$55,000 and EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION ;
(NRC Inspection Report No. 50-423/97-206)
Dear Mr. Kenyon:
t This letter refers to the NRC inspection conducted between August 18-29 and September 8-19, 1997, at Millstone Unit 3, the findings of which were discussed with your staff during an exit ; meeting on September 24,1997. The inspection included a safety system functional inspection (SSFI) of the emergency core cooling and sealinjection functions of the chemical volume and . . control system to review the capability of the system to perform the safety functions required by its design basis. The inspection also assessed whether the system adhered to its desigre and licensing bases, whether the as built configuration was consistent with the Final Safety Analysis Report, and whethe system operations were in accordance with the plant technical specifications. The inspection report was sent to you on December 5,1997. You have been conducting assessments, principally through the Millstone Unit 3 Configuration Management Plan (CMP), to provide assurance that Unit 3 is in conformance with its design and licensing bases. On August 14,1996, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company requiring that an independent organization conduct a multi-disciplinary review of Millstone Units 1,2, and 3. The review is to provide independent verification that the CMP has identified and resolved existing problems and put into place effective programs and processes for effective configuration management. Sargent and Lundy has been conducting this independent review for Unit 3. The inspection resulting in the findings ' described below was conducted as part of the NRC review of the Millstone Unit 3 restart review process, as described in SECY-97-003 dated January 3,1997. The inspection was one of several planned to verify the effectiveness of your CMP efforts. i During the inspection, several violations of NRC's requirements were identifed and forwarded j to you with the Notice of Violation that was included with the NRC's December 5,1997, letter transmitting the inspection report. In addition, enforcement action for two apparent violations of NRC requirements was held in abeyance pending the conduct of an open Predecisional , Enforcement Conference with you and members of your staff on January 13,1998, to discuss the apparent violations, their causes, and your' corrective actions. Based on the information developed during the inspections, and the information provided during the conference, the NRC has concluded that both of the apparent violations set forth in the , NUREG-0940 PART 2 A-185
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company 2 inspection report constitute violations of NRC requirements. Both violations involve your failure to take adequate action to correct conditions adverse to quality at your facility. However, as described further in this letter, only one of the two violations is being cited and is described in the enclosed Notice of Violation. With respect to the violation being cited, the NRC determined that you failed to identify, despite prior opportunities, the potential for air in certain portions of the recirculation spray system (RSS) to be swept into the suction of the charging and safety injection pumps during the recirculation phage of a loss-of-coolant accident. This required an evaluation to determine whether reduced pump performance or even air binding of the pumps could have resulted. With respect to the second violation, the NRC determined that you did not identify, until June 1997, an inadequacy in your Technical Specification-required program to minimize leakage outside the containment. Specifically, your program did not account for potential valve leakage from systems which could carry highly radioactive water to the refueling water storage tank following a postulated accident. With respect to the first violation, you contended at the enforcement conference that the actual ! l safety significance of the violation was low, noting your determination that the pumps would have performed satisfactorily. This determination was based on your recent assessment which , indicated that the total volume of air was small; the predicted void fractions were also small and ! would occur over a short duration; and the air entrainment would be well below void fraction acceptance criteria. Your assessment included a detailed analytical evaluation, and one- , quarter scale model testing. Based on our assessment of your analysis and testing, the NRC i staff has determined that this issue does not impact the functionality of the system, but does involve a nonconformance with the Unit 3 licensing bases. This violation is of regulatory concem because, as you acknowledged at the conference, you missed prior opportunities, both in the past as well as more recently, to identify this condition. ' On August 22,1985, you initiated Design Deficiency Report (DDR) No. 641. That DDR discussed the potential for air in the recirculation spray system to be injected into the suction of the charging and safety injection pumps. However, due to the limited scope of the DDR, it did ; not result in the identification of the piping of concem. NRC Information Notice (lN) 88-23, " Potential for Gas Binding of High Pressure Safety injection Pumps," and its supplements thoroughly discussed the potential for, and the adverse effect of, gas / air being trapped in safety systems and subsequently entrained, including the suction l piping of emergency core cooling pumps. However, your evaluation of IN 88 23, including Supplements 1 through 4, did not identify that there was air in the RSS pump discharge and ; suction piping of the charging and high-pressure safety injection pumps. Although the IN and its supplements did not specifically address the Unit 3 configuration, a thorough review of the system based on the IN should have identified this issue. , Additionally, your CMP, which was specifically designed to identify such issues, did not do so in this case. At the conference, you recognized the significance of this regulatory concem and indicated that you did not adequately consider, as part of your efforts, the interaction of standby safety systems on normally operating systems. The failure to identify and correct conditions advarse to quality was, in part, the basis for the $2,100,000 civil penalty issued by the NRC to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company on December 10,1997. Given the regulatory significance of your failure to identify this condition, the violation is classified at Severity Level 111 in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-186
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company 3 Action, (NUREG-1600) (Enforcement Policy). This violation could have been classified at Severity Level 11 if it were determined that the pumps would not perform satisfactorily. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, the base civil penalty amount for this Severity Level lli violation is $55,000. Your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two years, as already noted herein; therefore, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for identi# cation and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit is not warranted for identification since the violation was identified by the NRC, and you had opportunities to identify the violation sooner. With respect to your corrective actions, a number of actions have been taken, including (1) performance of an integrated system functional review and revision to appropriate procedures; (2) a review of the system to determine any further possibility of air / filling and venting problems; (3) a detailed engineering analysis of the impact of air entrapment on system operation; and (4) a horizontal review to check that air binding would not adversely affect the operability of other safety systems. In addition, you supplemented the information presented at the conference in your letter dated February 2,'1998, regarding actions to more completely address consideration of industry experience, including NRC ins. Our understanding of the commitment made in that letter is that the screening of ins and actual review of those found noteworthy will be completed before Unit 3 enters mode 2. The above corrective actions, which included reviews to determine if other safety systems could be impacted, have been determined to be effective by the NRC staff. Thus, the promptness and comprehensiveness of these actions preceding entry into mode 2 are appropriate to warrant corrective action credit. Additionally, based on the effective corrective actions taken in response to this NRC finding, the staff has decided not to expand the scope of our ongoing review of Unit 3 licensing and design bases conformance. This determination is consistent with the process being used by the NRC staff as described in my letter to you dated January 30, 1998. Our ongoing reviews of Unit 3 licensing and design bases conformance willinclude continued assessments to determine if any expansion in the scope of our reviews is warranted. Therefore, to emphasize the significance that the NRC attaches to this issue, as well as the importance of ensuring prompt and comprehensive identification and correction of conditions adverse to quality when they exist, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue a civil penalty in the amount of $55,000 for the violation in the enclosed Notice. The NRC did consider whether to exercise discretion and not issue a penalty in this case in view of the NRC issuance of the $2,100,000 civil penalty on December 10,1997, and the fact that you are in a shutdown condition and will not be authorized to restart until the NRC is satisfied with your CMP efforts. Nonetheless, given the regulatory significance of your failure to identify the aforementioned condition through your recent CMP reviews, I have decided that such discretion should not be exercised. With respect to the second violation, since the violation was identified by your staff prior to the NRC inspection, and it involves an old design issue that precedes the shutdown, I have decided, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to exercise discretion in accordance with Section Vll.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy and not issue a Notice of Violation or a civil penalty for that vietation. However, the NRC is concemed that although the NRC also NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-187
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company 4
. identified this concem in September 1997, it took until December for you to recognize that your i
staff had previously identified this problem in June 1997, and had already placed it in the corrective action process to be completed before restart. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. . 1 in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its ! enclosure, and your response, will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). ! l Sincerely, LR/- William D. Travers, Director Special Projects Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l Docket No. 50-423 License No. NPF-49 l
Enclosure:
- 1. ' Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty f
i i i l i l 1 l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-188 {
, .\ $ Northeast Nuclear Energy Company ' 5 I cc w/ encl: P. Loftus, Director- Regulatory Affairs M. Brothers, Vice President - Operations l J. McElwain, Acting Vice President - Millstone Unit 3 J. Streeter, Vice President, Nuclear Oversight . G. Hicks, Unit Director - Millstone Unit 3 M. Ross, Manager - Nuclear Training Assessment Group l D. Amerine, Vice President for Engineering and Support Services , 1 F. Rothen, Vice President, Work Serv *mes : J. Stankiewicz, Training Recovery Manager ! R. Johannes, Dirsctor - Nuclear Training ,
- S. Sherman, Audits and Evaluation i L Cuoco, Esquire
{ J. Egan, Esquire V. Juliano, Waterford Library J. Buckingham, Department of Public Utility Control S. B. Comley, We The People State of Connecticut SLO Designee D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN) l R. Bassilakis, CAN J. Block, Attorney, CAN S. Luxton, Citizens Regulatory Commission (CRC) Representative T. Concannon E. Woollacott, Co-Chairman, NEAC NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-189
ENCLOSURE I NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Docket No. 50-245 Millstone, Unit 3 License No. DPR-21 EA 97-562 During an'NRC inspection conducted on August 18-29 and September 8-19,1997, for which an exit meeting was held on September 24,1997, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act),42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violation and associated civil penalty are set forth below: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, states in part that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, l deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. l Contrary to the above, as of September 1997, a condition adverse to quality existed at l the facility which had not been promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, a possibility existed ofinjecting air into the suction of the safety injection and charging pumps upon initiation of recirculation following a small break loss of coolant accident. No test or analysis had been performed to verify that (1) such air injection would not degrade pump or system performance, and (2) the effects of a potential water hammer, as water is irjected into the dry piping, would not degrade system performance. This violation is classified at Severity Level 111 (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty - $55,000 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-190
)
I ' J j Enclosure 2 ; i l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, i or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may l l protest imposition of the civil penalty, in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the ! Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee l fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. l Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil t penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of i l Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, ; } (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. , i 1 j in request;ng mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the ;
- Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR
- 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10
! CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., l citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil l penalty. l Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in j accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the i Attomey General, and the penalty, unless compomised, remitted, or mitigated, may be l collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234(c) of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c. i The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN
- Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with i a copy to the Director, Special Projects Office, NRR, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and i a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice.
Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent
- possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so ,
j that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information i
- is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your j response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your
- response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you mual i specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in l detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will ,
i create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 !
- CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial j information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please 4 provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
' Dated at Rockville, MD this 9th day of March 1998 ) NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-191 4 e
o nezu g UNITED STATES [ g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5 j REGloN I 4 475 ALLENDALE ROAD KING oF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 1415 EA 97-472- January 9,1998 i Mr. Robert G. Byram Senior Vice President - Nuclear Pennsylvania Power & Light Company 2 North Ninth Street l Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF civil PENALTY - $55,000 (NRC Invection Report Nos. 50-387/97-06 and 50-388/97-06)
Dear Mr. Byram:
This refers to the inspection conducted between July 1,1997, and August 16,1997, at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station in Berwick, Pennsylvania, the findings of which were discussed with members of your staff during exit meetings on August 26,1997, and September 11,1997. During the inspection, apparent violations were identified related to the misalignment of the 'A' emergency diesel generator (EDG), which was discovered by the NRC on July 11,1997. The inspection report addressing these issues was previously forwarded to you on October 27, 1997. On December 16, 1997, a predecisional enforcement conference (conference) was conducted with you and members of your staff, to discuss the violations, their causes, and your enrrective actions. Based on the information developed d Jring the inspection and the information provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation involved yuur failure to establish adequate controls for the alignment of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) woodward governor controls contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion ll, " Quality Assurance." The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report. Specifically, the load limit setting for the 'A' EDG governor was not adequately controlled in that the setting was not maintained in the required 100% load position. The load limit setting was misaligned sometime between June 16,1997, when an operability surveillance test was satisfactorily performed and the setting was left in the 100% load position, and July 11, 1997, when the NRC found the setting at approximately 35% Due to the misalignment, during an accident, the 'A' EDG would not have started within the required time and would not have been able to supply the required load as designed. As a result of the misalignment, the 'A' EDG was inoperable for an indeterminate period of time between June 16,1997 and July 11,1997 while both units were operating. Your subsequent investigation of the misalignment did not determine the proximate cause. However, a work sequence error, inadvertent human interaction, or tampering could not be eliminated as potential proximate Causes. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-192
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company 2 During the time that the 'A' EDG was inoperable, only three EDGs were operable. Technical Specifications require four EDGs to be operable during plant operations. With the 'A' EDG inoperable, the units did not have the capability to withstand a single failure of another EDG following a design basis accident. Additionally, there was the potential that emergency core ; cooling system (ECCS) motors fed from the 'A' EDG operating in this degraded condition could ' have been damaged due to operation of the EDG at low frequency. The failure to adequately control the EDG load limit setting caused important safety-related equipment to be inoperable ; for an indeterminate period, thus degrading the plant's capability to respond to design basis events. Therefore, this violation has been categorized in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, at Severity Level lli. Further, the NRC is concerned that you f ailed to implement effective controls for the alignment of the Woodward governor controls despite the fact that multiple events involving the functioning of Woodward governors have been identified in the industry between 1985 and the present, including three at SSES. Also, the NRC is concerned that your investigation of this event could not preclude tampering as a cause and that the investigations revealed at least two other recent instances of unexplained misalignment of out-of-service EDGs similar j to the misalignment of the 'A' EDG. It appears that personnel performance issues persist at SSES and there is an adverse trend in equipment status control events. i in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000 is considered for a Severity Levellil violation. Because your facility has been the subject of l escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years,' the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for /dentification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty , assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy." Credit was not warranted for identification because the violation was identified by the NRC. Additionally, you had prior opportunities to identify the need for additional controls on Woodward governors. Credit was - warranted for corrective actions because your corrective actions were considered prompt and comprehensive. Those actions, as described at the conference, included: 1) restoration of the 'A' EDG governor to the correct alignment and verification that the other EDGs and other safety related equipment were properly aligned; 2) installation of protective covers on the EDG Woodward governor controls; 3) review and curtailment of access to vital areas; 4) , assessment of EDG maintenance work practices; 5) enhancements to security and operations l procedures for responding to status contrcl events; and 6) communications with employees concerning this event and ongoing activities to improve industrial relations. , e.g., A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $210,000 was issued to PP&L on June 20,1997, in part, for a Severity 1.evel 11 problem involving the misalignment of an EDG breaker and the documentation of activities that had not actually been performed (EA 96-270). NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-193
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company 3 Therefore, to emphasize the importance of controlling the status of safety related equipment and of prompt identification of violations, and in recognition of your previous escalated enforcement actions, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) in the base amount of $55,000 for the Severity Level ill violation. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). Sincerely,
/
Hu aert J. Miller W Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-387; 50-388 License Nos. NPF-14; NPF-22
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty t i i l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-194
l i d Pennsylvania Power & Light Company 4 : , cc w/ encl: G. Jones, Vice President - Nuclear Operations l G. Kuczynski, General Manager ! i J. Kenny, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing G. Miller, General Manager - Nuclear Engineering ;
' R. Wehry, Nuclear Licensing M. Urioste, Nuclear Services Manager, General Electric l 3
C. Lopes, Manager, Nuclear Security :
- A. Male, Manager, Nuclear Assessment Services i H. Woodeshick, Special Office of the President J. Tilton, lil, Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ! I i d t = l i I 7 i 1 l
. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-195
ENCLOSURE NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND - PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Pennsylvania Power and Light Company (PP&L) Docket Nos. 50-387, 50-388 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) License Nos. NPF-14, NPF-22 Unit 1 and Unit 2 During an NRC inspection conducted from July 1 to August 16,1997, for which exit meetings were held on August 28,1997, and September 11,1997, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to i Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act),42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violation and associated civil penalty are set forth below: ! 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 11, " Quality Assurance Program", requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be performed under suitably controlled conditions ; including special controls needed to attain the required quality. !
' Contrary to the above, as of July 11,1997, the licensee failed to establish adequate -
controls for activities affecting the quality of the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). ! Specifically, the licensee failed to establish adequate controls for the positioning of the . speed and load controls of the EDG Woodward governors allowing the 'A' EDG load _ i limit control to be misaligned sometime between June 16,1997, when the load limit i setting was left in the required 100% load position, and July 11,1997, when the load l limit setting was found at approximately 35%. Due to the misalignment, during an , accident, the 'A' EDG would not have started within the required time and would not j have been able to supply the required load as designed. As a result of the i misalignment, the 'A' EDG was inoperable for an indeterminate period of time between i June 16,1997 and July 11,1997, while both units were operating, contrary to i Technical Specification 3.8.1. (01013) ! This is a Severity Level lll violation (Supplement 1). l Civil Penalty - $55,000. Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Pennsylvania Power and Light Company l (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, ' Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this ; Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be . clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged l violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if i admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved, if an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for Information may be issued as why ' the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may ; NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-196 l .-_ _ _ . . _ - _ _ . _ _ _ . _,_ , _ _ . - . - . , . _ = ._ . _ _ _ . .
Enclosure 2
- be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
3 Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the i Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer t.1 the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. ! Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be , collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c. ' The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: Mr. James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockviile Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. if personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have l withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-197 l
. . ~ . . .. . . . . - . . . . . . . . - - . - . . - . . . - . . . . . - . . _ _ . -
a t Enclosure 3 1 l disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide i the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential l' commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an
- acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 9th day of January,1998 i l t k E I NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-198 i l
~ .- - . . ~ ~ - . _ __- _ -
- . ~ . - _ ~ . ~ . . _ . . ~ - . - - - . - - . . . . - . . . - . - -
.[ g UNITED STATES.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t j REGION 1 !' 470 ALLENDALE ROAD
,%*****,o KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415
}
EAs- 97-144 March 20,1998 ' l 97-563 ^ I Mr. Harold W. Keiser l Executive Vice President !' Nuclear Business Unit
.Public Service Electric & Gas Company f i
. Post Office Box 236
- Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL , PENALTY - $55,000 !
. (NRC Inspection Reports No. 50-354/97-09;97-80;97-81) i
Dear Mr. Keiser:
i This letter refers to the three NRC inspections conducted on February 24-28, 1997, August 25-29,1997, and October 5,1997 - November 15,1997, at the Hope Creek Nuclear ! Generating Station at Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey, the findings of which were discussed l with members of your staff during exit meetings on February 28,1997, August 29,1997, and November 21,1997. The first two referenced inspections focused on your implementation { of the maintenance rule at Hope Creek. The third inspection was a routine integrated ! inspection. During the inspections, apparent violations of NRC requirements were identified l related to the failure to properly implement the maintenance rule, as well as the failure by { operators to follow procedures governing operation of the control rod drive system. The - inspection reports addressing these issues -were previously forwarded to you on ] April 18,1997, December 1,1997, and December 10,1997. On January 14,1998, two ; predecisional enforcement conferences (conferences) were conducted with Mr. L. Storz and other members of the PSE&G staff, to discuss the violations, their causes, and your corrective , actions. - i l Based on the information developed during the inspections and the information provided during the conferences, the NRC has determined that three violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding the violations are described in detail in
'~ the subject-inspection reports. The first violation, which is set forth in Section I of the enclosed Notice, involves the failure by an operating crew to follow procedures and act conservatively during a test to demonstrate core shutdown margin. During the test, certain control rods stuck while being withdrawn, and elevated hydraulic system drive water
~
pressures were used to free the stuck rods. However, the operating crew did not return control rod drive water pressure to the normal operating range after each stuck control rod , was freed, as is required by your abnormal operating procedures. The two other violations, ) which are related to the maintenance rule and are set forth in Section ll of the enclosed NUREG-0940, PART 2 ' A-199 _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ ___-_.. ._ __ _ _ _ - - . - _ _.l
Public Service Electric and 2 Gas Company Notice, involve (1) the failure to include certain systems, components and functions within the scope of the maintenance rule; and (2) the failure to adequately demonstrate that the performance or condition of a number of systems, components and functions was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance. The first violation occurred in November 1997 during the conduct of the shutdown margin test j while the reactor was in the cold shutdown condition with the vessel head removed. During < that test, which involved the full withdrawal of 20 control rods, operators had invoked a special test exception to permit conduct of this infrequently performed evolution since the test required the mode switch to be placed in the startup position in crder to defeat an interlock that allowed only one rod to be withdrawn in this condition. Since operators experienced difficulty withdrawing several of the designated rods, the control red drive (CRD) hydraulic ; system drive water pressure was increased, in accordance with the stuck control rod abnormal procedure, to free the stuck rods. However, after individual rods were freed, the operators did not immediately restore the drive water pressure to the normal range, as required. Rather, when subsequent rods were withdrawn, the operators inappropriately remained in the stuck rod procedure without first meeting the prerequisite for unsuccessful control rod movement. l I This created the potential for control rod withdrawal at speeds exceeding design limits for reactivity addition. Subsequent review revealed that several rods were, in fact, withdrawn from the core at speeds faster than normal, although not in excess of the design limits. The NRC is particularly concerned that operators did not adhere to the abnormal operating procedures in that (1) drive water pressures were not returned to the normal operating range following successful control rod movement at elevated pressures; (2) drive pressures were not reduced to the normal range before subsequent initial control rod withdrawal attempts; and (3) operators did not follow established standards for reactivity manipulations and move control rods in a cautious manner. Although the operators completed the evolution without i incident, their actions to add positive reactivity to the new reactor core at increased rates had the potential to cause an inadvertent criticality. The risk of inadvertent criticality was greater in this case because several safety barriers were either defeated or degraded at the time. Specifically, the reactor vessel head was removed; the "one-rod-out" interlock feature was l defeated to perform the test; the moderator temperature was below 100'F (increasing core reactivity); and the rod worth minimizer was inoperable. The NRC notes that source range nuclear instrumentation was available to mitigate an inadvertent criticality by actuating an automatic reactor scram from a single source range channel. This event also was of significant regulatory concern because this demonstration was an infrequently performed evolution, and no additional management oversight or control was afforded to the activity. Although NRC inspectors informed personnel in the control room of the departure from the stuck rod procedure, including three licensed operators, a formerly licensed quality assurance inspector, and the reactor engineering supervisor, no action was taken to address the control rod manipulation violation until the inspector discussed the issue with senior plant management. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-200
Public Service Electric and 3 Gas Company The event is of further concern because prior occurrences at Hope Creek and other facilities involving control rod manipulations, provided opportunities to insure appropriate control of reactivity management activities. For example, although your licensed operators had received training regarding an occurrence at the Zion Nuclear Station in 1997 involving a loss of reactivity control, this training was not effective in increasing operators' awareness of the l importance of operations standards prior to and during control rod movements. In addition, on October 23,1996, the NRC issued to you a $150,000 civil penalty, for, in part, a violation at Hope Creek related to control rod withdrawal. Notwithstanding those prior opportunities, it is clear that your staff lacked an appropriate appreciation of the safety significance of reactivity changes based on control rod movement. Therefore, given the regulatory significance of this violation, the violation has been categorized in accordance with the
" General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement ,
Policy), NUREG-1600, at Severity Level 111. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000is considered for a Severity Level lli violation. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years', the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.R.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit was not warranted for identific.ation because the violation was identified by NRC inspectors. In addition, your recognition of the concerns raised by the inspectors was not prompt. Credit was warranted for corrective actions because your root cause assessment and subsequent actions were considered prompt and comprehensive. Those actions, as described in the inspection report l and at the conference, included: (1) initiation of a condition report necessitating completion of a detailed root cause analysis; (2) revision and reinforcement of operating standards and expectations regarding reactivity manipulations; (3) revisions to infrequently performed test procedure controls to enhance management oversight; and (4) personnel changes. Therefore, to emphasize the importanct of your operating staff understanding and adhering to established reactivity management standards, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) in the base amount of $55,000 for the Severity Level 111 violation. With respect to the violations of the mainter'ance rule as set forth in Section 11 of the Notice, l these violations collectively represent a programmatic breakdown in the development and implementation of the Rule. The NRC recognizes that considerable progress was made in the months prior to the initial inspection. Nonetheless, these findings demonstrate that
- management had not applied sufficient resources to assure adequate implementation of the
! program. Therefore, the vioicions have been categorized in the aggregate as a Severity Level lil problem in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," (Enforcement Policy), NUREG 1600. , 1 For exampie, on October 23,1996, a $150,000 civil penalty was issued for several Severity Level lil violations, including violations involving the failure to plan appropriate surveillance testing following completion of maintenance on control rod drives, as well as control rod withdrawal speeds being in excess of the values assumed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Repon (
Reference:
EAs 96-125,96-281). NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-201 l l l l
Public Service Electric and 4 Gas Company The Commission determined that a maintenance rule was necessary to assure licensees monitor the effectiveness of maintenance to minimize the likelihood of failure of safety-significant equipment that could initiate or adversely affect a transient or accident. Even though the final rule was issued in July 1991,it did not become effective until July 1996. During the five year interim period before the rule became effective, the staff and the industry worked in concert to assure licensees had developed useful guidance and clearly understood the manner in which NRC would inspect implementation. This was accomplished through public workshops and a pilot inspection program, the results of which were documented and shared with the industry. Notwithstanding the time allotted to implement this program, as weli as tha guidance provided for establishing a program to meet the Maintenance Rule, your program at Hope Creek was determined to be weak in a number of key aspects. At the conference, you acknowledged the program deficiencies and noted that implementation of the rule program did not meet your expectations. The NRC believes that inadequate management oversight, ineffective integration of industry insights, and insufficient self assessments represent some of the overall causes of the program weaknesses. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000is considered for a Severity Level lil problem. Since Hope Creek has been the subject of , escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years, as already stated herein, the NRC I considered whether credit was warranted for /dentification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy for the Severity Level 111 problem. Credit is warranted for /dentification because the I NRC recognizes that your staff identified, prior to the inspection, similar deficiencies with implementation of the maintenance rule and recognized the need to take appropriate corrective action. Credit is also warranted for Corrective Actions, because your corrective actions, which were inspected in August 1997, were considered prompt and comprehensive. These actions ' were described in NRC Inspection Report No. 97-81. Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations, I l have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to l propose a civil penalty in this case. However, similar violations in the future could result in a civil penalty. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with l regulatory requirements. l l l l 1 l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-202 l l 1
l l l Public Service Electric and 5 i Gas Company i In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its l enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). ! Sincerely, '
.I !
Hu rt J. Miller ! Regional Administrator Docket No. 5-0-354 License No. NPF-54 f
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty . I l l
?
i l l l ! I i l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-203 i r
i Public Service Electric and - 6 Gas Company
. cc w/ encl:
L. Storz, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations E. Simpson, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering E. Salowitz, Director - Nuclear Business Support A. Kirby, Ill, External Operations - Nuclear, Delmarva Power & Light Co. J. Isabella, Manager, Joint Generation Atlantic Electric i M. Bezilla, General Manager - Hope Creek Operations ! J. McMahon, Director - Quality Assurance & Nuclear Safety Review D. Powell, Manager - Licensing and Regulation R. Kankus, Joint Owner Affairs A. Tapert, Program Administrator J. Keenan, Esquire Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate W. Conklin, Public Safety Consultant, Lower Alloways Creek Township l State of New Jersey ! State of Delaware ! i I l 1 i l 1 4 l l. 1 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-204 i
l I ENCLOSURE ] NOTICE OF VIOLATION , AND : PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY , l Public Service Electric and Gas Company Docket No. 50-354 l Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station License No. NPF-57 ! EAs 97-144; 97-563 l I During an NRC inspection conducted on February 24-28,1997, August 25-29,1997, and ! October 5,1997 - November 15,1997, for which exit meetings were held on February 28, 1997, August 29,1997, and November 21,1997, violations of NRC requirements were identified, in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC l Enforcement Actions,"_ NUREG-1600, the NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to l Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act),42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 i CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below: j
- l. VIOLATION RELATED TO CONTROL ROD MANIPULATIONS (
Hope Creek Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, requires that written procedures chall be i established and implemented for applicable activities specified in Appendix A of l Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2. Appendix A of RG 1.33 requires operating l procedures governing the control rod drive system and administrative procedures for i safe plant operation. Hope Creek operations departrnent abnormal operating procedure HC.OP-AB.ZZ-104(Q) Revision 6, " Stuck Control itod," requires, in part, that (1)' the procedure be implemented when control rod position does not change when a withdraw signal is - applied, and (2) drive water pressure be immediately returned to the normal operating j range upon successful control rod movement. PSE&G nuclear department administrative procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0005(O), Revision . 7, " Station Operating Practices," requires, in part, that (1) operators act conservatively j when faced with adverse conditions that could affect safe reactor operation and place : the plant in a safe condition when faced with uncertain conditions, (2) reactivity l manipulation procedures be followed " alertly and cautiously," and control rods always be moved in a deliberate, carefully controlled manner, and (3) additional oversight and controls, such as designation of a special Test Engineer, be established during activities which are infrequently performed, place the plant in an unusual configuration, or lead to a significant reduction in the level of plant safety. Contrary to the above, on November 12,1997, while the reactor was in cold shutdown (operational condition 5) with the reactor vessel head removed, operators, while withdrawing control rods as part of a shutdown margin test,'did not: NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-205
Enclosure 2
- 1. verify that control rod position did not change during a withdrawal attempt at normal operating drive water pressure before entering the stuck control rod procedure,
- 2. immediately restore control rod drive water pressure to the normal operating range following successful control rod movements at elevated pressures,
- 3. act conservatively during reactivity manipulations in that drive water pressures were not returned to the normal operating range before initial control rod withdrawal attempts,
- 4. follow reactivity manipulation procedures alertly or cautiously in that drive water pressures were not returned to the normal operating range following successful control rod movement at elevated pressures, and
- 5. establish additional oversight and controls for the first-time implementation of the shutdown margin demonstration activity. (01013)
This is a Severity Level 111 violation (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty - $55,000. II. VIOLATIONS OF THE MAINTENANCE RULE A. 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) & (2) require that the scope of the monitoring program specified in paragraph (a)(1) include safety-related and non-safety related structures, systems, and components (SSCs). Specifically, the scope of the program shall include safety-related SSCs that are relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure the integrity of the reactor pressure boundary, the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposure comparable to the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines. It shall also include non-safety-related SSCs (1) that are relied upon to mitigate accidents or transients or are used in plant emergency operating procedures (EOPs); (ii) whose failure could prevent safety related SSCs from fulfilling their safety related function; or (iii) whose failure could cause a reactor scram. 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) states that licensees shall monitor the performance or condition of SSCs against licensee established goals, in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such SSCs, as defined in paragraph (b), are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. Contrary to the above, as of February 24,1997, the following SSCs or SSC functions were not included in the scope of the 10 CFR 50.65 monitoring program: NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-206
F Enclosure 3 l t
- 1. nuclear fuel assemblies; and
- 2. bypassed and inoperable r.atus indicating system (BISIS).
- 3. drywell ventilation system; ;
- 4. essential lighting system; l
- 5. communications systems.
- 6. reactor auxiliary cooling (RAC) system function of cooling the ;
control rod drive (CRD) pumps; i
- 7. standby liquid control system function of providing water to maintain reactor level during certain emergency situations; and
- 8. the condensate storage tank (CST) function to support safety- !
related systems. (02013) l i B. 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) requires, in part, that the holders of an operating hcense ! shall monitor the performance or condition of SSCs, as defined by l 10 CFR 50.65(b), against licensee-established goals, in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such structures, systems, and components , are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. When the performance or l condition of a structure, system, or component does not meet established j goals, appropriate corrective action shall be taken. ' 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) requires, in part, that monitoring as specified in 10 CFR 50.65 Section (a)(1) is not required where it has been demonstrated that the performance or condition of a structure, system, or component is being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance, such that the structure, system, or component remains capable of performing its intended function.
- 1. Contrary to 10 CFR 50.65(a)("), as of July 10,1996, (the time that the licensee elected to not monitor the performance or condition of the following SSCs against licensee-established goals pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1)), the licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance or condition of certain system functions, within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65, had been effectively controlled through the ,
performance of appropriate preventive maintenance in accordance with ! the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2). Specifically, the licensee failed , to adequately evaluate the appropriateness of the performance of ; preventive maintenance as evidenced by the following examples, each of which constitutes a separate violation:
- a. The licensee failed to adequately demonstrate the performance or condition of functions of the of the service compressed air system, control complex system, nuclear boiler and reactor l recirculation system, auxiliary building heating ventilation and air conditioning - diesel generator area system, instrument (control) air system, control rod drive system and the reactor protection system in that availability measures were not established.
(02023) NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-207 1 L
- b. The licensee failed to adequately demonstrate the performance or condition of functions for the main steam non-automatic depressurization (r.on-ADS) system in that reliability measures were not established. (02033)
Reliability and availability measures are both necessary to demonstrate that preventive maintenance had been effective to ensure that system functions will perform as required.
- 2. Contrary to 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), as of July 10,1996, (the time that the licensee elected to not monitor the performance or condition of the following SSCs against licensee-established goals pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1)), the licensee failed to adequately demonstrate that the performance or condition of functions of the main turbine control oil (two standby functions), reactor manual control system and remote shutdown systems had been effectively controlled by performing appropriate preventive maintenance in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2). Specifically, the licensee's basis for placing these SSC functions under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(2) was inadequate because plant level measures were used in assessing preventive maintenance. Failures of these functions would not necessarily result in unplanned scrams, safety system actuations, or an unplanned capability loss factor. These plant level measures were thus inadequate to determine whether there were maintenance preventable functional failures of these functions. (02043)
These violations represent a Severity Level 111 problem (Supplement 1). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Public Service Electric and Gas Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for information may be issued as why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-208
l Enclosure 5 proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" end may: (1) deny the violation listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this ; Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. , 1 Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: Mr. James Lieberman, Director, I Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738,with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. 4 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the l facility that is the subject of this Notice. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible,it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such ! material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential l commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an j acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 20th day of March 1998 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-209 l l I
UNITEo STATES
/p*H%% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION is 'i D REGION 11 4 E 101 MARtETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 5 j ATLANTA, GEoRG!A 303230199
% C
\ ,g + February 20, 1996 EA 95-252 Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN: Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.
President, TVA Nuclear and Chief Nuclear Officer 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY -
$80,000 (Department of Labor Case Nos. 92-ERA-19 and 92-ERA-34)
Dear Mr. Kingsley:
As a result of events in 1991, the Secretary of Labor issued a Decision and Order of Remand (Decision) on October 23, 1995, in Department of Labor (DOL) Case Nos. 92-ERA-19 and 92-ERA-34, Frady v. Tennessee Valley Authority. The Secretary of Labor concluded that the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) discriminated against Mr. Randolph Frady, a former TVA Nuclear Inspector, when he was not hired for the positions of machinist and steamfitter trainee at the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants and for the position of Nuclear Inspector at the Sequoyah Plant. In his decision, the Secretary of Labor concluded that TVA failed to hire Mr. Frady because of his engaging in protected activities. The protected activities involved a history of expressing nuclear safety concerns to the licensee and the NRC which were also the subject of a June 1991 settlement agreement with TVA. This Decision reversed the DOL Administrative Law Judge's Recommended Decision and Order issued on January 22, 1993, which found that Mr. Fridy failed to establish that the failure of TVA to hire him for the positions at issue was due to his past protected activity. Our letter dated December 8, 1995, transmitted the apparent violation and a copy of the Secretary of Labor's Decision to you and provided you an opportunity to either respond to the apparent violation in writing or request a predecisional enforcement conference. In your January 12, 1996, response, you declined the predecisional enforcement conference, denied the violation, and provided a description of your planned currective actions and actions taken to ensure that there was no chilling effect resulting from the circumstances surrounding this matter that would discourage employees from raising safety issues. Based on the information developed by the DOL and a review of the information provided in your January 12, 1996 letter, the NRC adopts the Secretary of Labor's Decision in this case and finds that the adverse actions taken against Mr. Frady were in retaliation for his engaging in protected activities. Therefore, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This violation involves three NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-210
TVA instances where TVA failed to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.7, Employee Protection, which prohibits discrimination against an employee for engaging in protected activities. , While discrimination'against any person for engaging in protected activities i is cause for concern to the NRC, this was a very significant regulatory l concern because it involved discrimination against an employee by plant ; managers substantially above first-line supervision. The NRC places a high value on the freedom provided to nuclear industry employees to raise potential . safety concerns to their management and to the NRC. Therefore, this violation ' has been categorized in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and l Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, at ! Severity Level II. i In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $80,000 is considered for a Severity Level II violation. In this case, the i NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective
~
Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NRC determined that credit for ' Identification was not appropriate because the violation was identified by a i complaint filed with the DOL and not by the licensee. Your actions in ' response to this matter included: (1) two investigations by the TVA Office of the Inspector General (TVA/0lG) regarding .Mr. Frady's concerns, which ; identified no problems; (2) conduct of ongoing assessments of the effectiveness of the employee concerns resolution program by the TVA/0lG which ! have concluded that employees at Sequoyah and Watts Bar feel free to report . nuclear safety concerns; and (3) initiation of efforts to comply with the i Secretary of Labor's Decision in arranging for a mutually agreeable job assignment for Mr. Frady within TVA and ongoing efforts to compute appropriate backpay and compensation for Mr. Frady's legal expenses. NRC further recognizes that the discriminatory acts against Mr. Frady occurred in 1991 and : that during the period of DOL review and decision, TVA has taken positive i steps to improve the working environment which previously existed at the Watts l Bar and Sequoyah plants. In consideration of these facts, NRC determined that l credit was warranted for the factor of Corrective Action. l Therefore, to emphasize the importance of ensuring that employees who raise real or perceived safety concerns are not subject to discrimination for ' raising those concerns and that every effort is made to provide an environment in which all employees may freely identify safety issues without fear of i retaliation or discrimination, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, and the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the base amount of $80,000 for the Severity Level II violation. , Finally, we note that this is the second civil penalty case involving ; discrimination violations issued within a week to TVA. Both of these cases l involved violations that occurred several years ago at different sites. Nevertheless, these enforcement actions emphasize the importance of TVA . corrective actions being comprehensive and effective across all of its sites. , NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-211 I i i i j
..-_-._ . - - ~-
TVA The NRC has concluded that based on your January 12, 1996 submittal, no ' additional response is required regarding the reasons for the violation, your corrective actions, or the date when full compliance will be achieved, unless the information you have provided does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. However, you are required to respond to the proposed imposition of civil penalty and should do so in accordance with the instructions in the enclosed Notice. , s In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of i this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if submitted, will be placed in ' the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). If you choose to respond, to the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be i placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public. J Your staff has stated that TVA plans to appeal the Secretary of Labor's Decision in this case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth , Circuit. In the event the case is successfully appealed at a later date and i the Secretary of Labor's Decision is reversed, the NRC will reconsider this : enforcement action. ' Sinc rely - I , f& kie
- Stewart D. Ebn '
Regional Admin rator Docket Nos. 50-327, 50-328, 50-390, and 50-391 License Nos. DPR-77, DPR-79, NPF-90, and CPPR-92 !
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed ! Imposition of Civil Penalty i cc w/ encl: !
- 0. J. Zeringue, Senior Vice President i Nuclear Operations Tennessee Valley. Authority 3B Lookout Place 1101 Market Street
- Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 t Mark 0. Medford, Vice President !
Engineering and Technical Services - 38 Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 f i (cc w/ enc 1 cont'd on Page 4) I NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-212 l l 1 __. _ - _ . _ . - - - - , 1
TVA l cc w/enci (cont'd): D. E. Nunn, Vice President Michael H. Mobley, Director New Plant Completion Division of Radiological Health Tennessee Valley Authority 1 i 3rd Floor, L and C Annex ! 3B Lookout Place 401 Church Street ' i 1101 Market Street Nashville, TN 37243-1532 + Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 . County Judge R. J. Adney Hamilton County Courthouse Site Vice President Chattanooga, TN 37402 l l Sequoyah Nuclear Plant l Tennessee Valley Authority B. S. Schofield P. O. Box'2000 Site Licensing Manager Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority J. A. Scalice P. O. Box 2000 Site Vice President Spring City, TN 37381 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority Honorable Robert Aikman Route 2, P. O. Box 2000 County Executive Spring City, TN 37381 Rhea County Courthouse Dayton, TN 37321 General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority Honorable Garland Lanksford ET 11H County Executive 400 West Summit Hill Drive Meigs County Courthouse Knoxville, TN 37902 Decatur, TN 37322 P. P. Carier, Manager Michelle Neal Corporate Licensing Energy Project Tennessee Valley Authority The Foundation for 4G Blue Ridge Global Sustainability l 1101 Market Street P. O. Box 1101 Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Knoxville, TN 37901 Ralph H. Shell Beth Zilbert Site Licensing Manager Energy Campaigner Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Greenpeace P. O. Box 2000 20 -13th Street, NE Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379 Atlanta, GA 30309 TVA Representative James P. Riccio Tennessee Valley Authority Public Citizen Rockville Office 4340 Georgetown Square, #612 ! 11921 Rockville Pike Atlanta, GA 30338 l Suite 402 l Rockville, MD 20852 Ann Harris 305 Pickel Road Ten Mile, TN 37880 NUREG-0940, PART P. A-213 l
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Tennessee Valley Authority Docket Nos. 50-327, -328, -390, and -391 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant License Nos. DPR-77 and 79, NPF-90, CPPR-92 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant EA 95-252 As a result of review of a Secretary of Labor Decision and Order of Remand dated October 23, 1995, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violation and associated civil penalty are set forth below: 10 CFR 50.7 prohibits discrimination by a Commission licensee against an employee for engaging in certain protected activities. Discrimination includes discharge or other actions relating to the compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. The activities which are protected include, but are not limited to, reporting of safety concerns by an employee to his employer or the NRC. Contrary to the above, during the period of July through September 1991, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) discriminated against Mr. Randolph Frady for engaging in protected activities. Specifically, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, TVA failed to hire Mr. Frady for the positions of steamfitter and machinist trainee at the Sequoyah and Watts Bar plants and the position of Nuclear Inspector at the Sequoyah plant for which he had applied because of his history of raising nuclear safety concerns to TVA and the NRC and because Mr. Frady pursued I resolution of his prior complaint filed with D0L. (01012) This is a Severity Level II violation (Supplement VII). Civil Penalty - $80,000. l The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, ! the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent l recurrence and the date when full compliance will be achieved has already been adequately addressed. However, Tennessee Valley Authority (Licensee) is I required to submit a written statement or explanation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 l within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition l of Civil Penalty if the statements made in its January 12, 1996 response l concerning these matters do not accurately reflect your corrective actions or i its position. Within the same time as provided for the response noted above, j the licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, i Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-214
Notice of, Violation 2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206 protesting the civil. penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the ' ' violation (s) listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other ] reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in
!~
Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the 4 procedure for imposing a civil penalty. i 4 i~ Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been ; determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this ! matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless ! compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant ! to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II, and a ! copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this / Notice. 4 Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, a response to this Notice shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. J Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this got day of February 1996 3 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-215
UNITEo STATES
/pa ase NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8 e REGION ll j ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER 7TNTA.GE I 3 0 5 April 16,1998 Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN: Mr. O. J. Zeringue Chief Nuclear Officer and Executive Vice President 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 2801.
SUBJECT:
WITHDRAWAL OF NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (DOL) CASE NOS. 92 ERA 019 and 92 ERA 034 (FRADY)
Dear Mr. Zeringue:
As indicated in your letter of March 23, 1998, the judicial review of , Department of Labor (DOL) Case Nos. 92-ERA 019 and 92 ERA 034 involving ! Mr. Randolph Frady has been completed. Mr. Frady had filed a complaint ; claiming he had been subjected to discrimination when he was not selected for a several positions for which he had applied at the Watts Bar and Sequoyah t Nuclear Plants. The Secretary of Labor issued a decision finding that Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) discriminated against Mr. Frady. and damages were subseg"ently affirmed by the Administrative Review Board. TVA appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued its decision on January 12, 1998. The decision reversed the Secretary of Labor's finding of discrimination in the subject cases and vacated the orders of the Secretary and the Administrative Review Board. A final mandate in the cases was issued on March 10. 1998. Based on the. decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals and the fact that neither Mr. Frady nor the DOL has requested a rehearing, the NRC withdraws the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) issued by NRC
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in a letter dated February 20, 1996 with regard to the subject cases. As you are aware, by letter dated April 4,1996, the NRC deferred issuance of an , order imposing a civil penalty in these cases until a decision was issued on the appeal. Therefore, withdrawal of the Notice completes the action with regard to this case, and the case is considered closed. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice", a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. Sincerely . r Luis A. Regional nistrator Docket Nos. 50 327. 328, 390 and 391 License Nos. DPR 77. 79, NPF 90, and CPPR-92 cc: See page 2 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-216
i I i TVA 2 cc: Mr. Randolph Frady Raul R. Baron, General Manager ) 242 Hightower Road Nuclear Assurance , Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 Tennessee Valley Authority l 4J Blue Ridge - l U. S. De)artment of Labor OSHA 1101 Market Street Atlanta rederal Center Chattanooga, TN 37402 2801 ! 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Room 6T50 , Atlanta, GA 30303-3415 Hark J. Burzynski, Manager Nuclear Licensing Department of Labor Tennessee Valley Authority Associate Solicitor 4J Blue Ridge Division of Fair Labor Standards 1101 Market Street U. S. Department of Labor Chattanooga, TN 37402 2801 i 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20210 Pedro Salas, Manager i Licensing and Industry Affairs U. S. Department of Labor - OSHA Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ; ATTN: Assistant Secretary Tennessee Valley Authority . 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W. P. O. Box 2000 Washington, DC 20210 Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 J.'A. Scalice J. T. Herron. Plant Mana'er g l i Senior Vice President Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ] , Nuclear Operations Tennessee Valley Authority l l Tennessee Valley Authority P. O. Box 2000 i 6A Lookout Place Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 1101 Market Street ! Chattanooga, TN 37402 2801 Michael H. Mobley, Director Division of Radiological Health Jack A Bailey, Vice President 3rd Floor. L and C Annex Engineering and Technical Services 401 Church Street Tennessee Valley Authority Nashville TN 37243 1532 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street County Executive Chattanooga, TN 37402 2801 Hamilton County Courthouse Chattanooga, TN 37402 l l MasoudBajestani ! Site Vice President Richard T. Purcell Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site Vice President ! Tennessee Valley Authority- Watts Bar Nuclear Plant ; P. O. Box 2000 Tennessee Valley Authority ' Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379 P. D. Box 2000 Spring City TN 37381 l General Counsel i
- Tennessee Valley Authority Paul L. Pace, Manager i L ET 10H Licensing
! 400 West Summit Hill Drive Watts Bar Nuclear Plant i Knoxville, TN 37902 Tennessee Valley Authority P. O. Box 2000 cc cont'd: (See page 3) Spring City, TN 37381 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-217
TVA 3 cc cont'd. William R. Lagergren, Plant Manager Watts Bar Nuclear Plant-Tennessee Valley Authority P. O. Box'2000 Spring City, TN-~37381 County Executive Rhea County Courthouse ! Dayton, TN 37321 County Executive j Meigs County Courthouse Decatur, TN 37322 l l i i l l NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-218 i l l
UNITED STATES
- p* 8849'o, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0T TA, GEO 30 5 December 8, 1997 EA 97 409 Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN: Mr. O. J. Zeringue, Chief Nuclear Officer and Executive Vice President 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 2801 i
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED; IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY -
$55.000 (NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50 327/97 13 AND 50 328/97 13)
Dear Mr. Zeringue:
This refers to the special inspection conducted on July 25 through September 4, 1997, at the Sequoyah facility. The purpose of the inspection was to review the misalignment of spare vital battery No. V to vital battery board No. IV on July 24, 1997. The results of the inspection were sent to you by letter dated September 11, 1997. An open, predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region II office on November 19, 1997, with you and members of your staff, to discuss the violations, the root causes, and your corrective actions to preclude recurrence. A list of conference attendees and copies of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) and Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) presentation materials are enclosed. ; Based on the information developed during the ins action and the information ! that was provided during the conference. the NRC 1as determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. On July 24, 1997, a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) failed to realign spare vital battery No. V to vital battery board No. IV properly, after hanging a . clearance on 125 volt direct current (DC) vital battery No. IV. As a result, vital battery board No. IV was inoperable for approximately 30 hours. Based on the additional information that was provided during the conference, the NRC concluded that three violations of regulatory requirements occurred. The violations include: (1) the failure to meet Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.2.3 requirements to maintain four DC vital battery channels energized and operable: (2) the failure to follow procedures associated with realigning the I spare vital battery No. V to a vital battery board: and. (3) the failure to ! follow administrative procedures to ensure that the position of 125 volt DC l distribution system breakers were subject to independent verification. -These violations and a number of other concerns described below indicate serious weaknesses in the performance of the operations staff. In this case, the operations staff demonstrated a lack of inquisitiveness and a lack of strict adherence to procedures in performing the realignment of the ' vital battery. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-219
TVA 2 During this event, the SRO went to the wrong distribution panel to close a i breaker and found a breaker with similar labels already closed. Although the SR0 questioned the unexpected breaker status, he failed to adequatel'y investigate the discrepancy, did not notify the control room of the )otential configuration control issue, and did not note the failure to close t1e breaker as a deviation from the procedure. Several steps later in the procedure, he opened the same breaker yet failed to recognize the incongruity. At the conference, you stated that your procedures and expectations in this situation ' allow the cognizant supervisor, i.e., the SRO, to resolve the discrepancy: yet, the SR0 was closely involved in performing the steps of the procedure which compromised his ability to oversee the work independently. , I Problems with auxiliary unit operator (AU0) rounds practices were also noted. Tests of the batteries indicated that it is likely that the battery voltage was below required surveillance limits at the time AUD rounds were performed; however, the AVO failed to identify reduced voltage at the board. Control : room operators initially performing the battery realignment, and subsequent oncoming crews, did not identify the lack of an expected main control room alarm, and the procedure did not highlight that an alarm was expected. Lastly, an SR0 entered an incorrect Technical Specification action statement during the initial vital board realignment. The root causes of the misalignment event, i.e., the failure to evaluate the unexpected as found condition and/or weaknesses associated with component labeling, were similar to previous events. NRC Inspection Report 50 327.- 328/97 03 documented an event in which an operator found a valve in an unexpected position and did not notify the control room, resulting in the isolation of the spent fuel pool cooling pump for about two hours while the pump was running. Enforcement Action 97 232, issued on July 10, 1997, documented operator errors in investigating discrepant indications of reactor coolant system (RCS) level resulting in an RCS drain down event. Licensee Event Report (LER) 95-08 documented a reactor trip which occurred when an operator opened a wrong breaker on the wrong vital 120 VAC board. The NRC recognizes that the actual safety and risk significance of the inoperable vital battery board was mitigated by the fact that a spare battery charger was aligned to the board and the charger would have provided power to the board in all scenarios except for a loss of offsite power. In addition, the NRC commends the training instructor who recognized that the vital battery board su) ply breaker was not in the correct aosition and took prompt action to notify tie Operations staff. Nonetheless, t1ese violations are of significant regulatory concern to the NRC due to: (1) problems in the performance of the operating staff: (2) the fact that multiple opportunities existed to prevent and detect the inoperability of the vital battery board; and. (3) previous - events involving similar operator errors and problems attributable to component labeling have occurred and corrective action did not preclude NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-220
TVA 3 repetition of the problems. Therefore, the violations have been categorized in the aggregate in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level III problem.' l 1 In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000 is considered for a Severity Level III problem. Because your facility h two years,ps thebeen NRCthe subject whether considered of escalated creditenforcement was warrantedactions within the last for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process described in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. NRC determined that ' i credit was not warranted for Identification because prior opportunities to - identify the violations existed. Your corrective actions included: i (1) revising the operating procedure to require independent verification of breaker position: (2) hanging caution tags on the five No. 107 breakers to l ensure proper identification: (3) plans to relabel all 125, and 250 volt DC - and 120 volt AC boards: (4) developing job performance measures for work on the 125 volt DC batteries: (5) revising the battery procedure to identify the No. V battery in service alarm, including the appropriate TS action statement ! in the battery procedure: (6) reviewing other operations and maintenance procedures to ensure proper independent verifications have been identified: and, (7) taking appropriate personnel actions. Based on the above, the NRC i determined that credit was warranted for the factor of Corrective Action. Therefore, to emphasize the importance of attention to detail and appropriate implementation of TS requirements, and in recognition of your previous escalated enforcement actions, I have been authorized, after consultation with ' 1 the Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and i Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) in the base amount of $55,000 ; , for the Severity Level III problem. The apparent violations identified in NRC Inspection Report No. 50 327, 328/97 13 included a failure to stop the evolution when a procedural step could not be performed and failure to promptly identify an adverse condition (out-of tolerance battery voltage). At the predecisional enforcement conference, you indicated that, although your expectations for operator performance were not met in these areas, you concluded that procedural : requirements had been met. Because these circumstances were factored into our I assessment of prior opportunities to identify the breaker misalignment, these i' apparent violations are withdrawn. In addition, at the conference, you provided information indicating that AVO rounds to assess battery room . temperature and battery voltage on vital battery No. V were appropriate. This
- apparent violation is also withdrawn.
I 2 A severity Level III problem was issued on July 10.1997. (EA 97 232). for violations associated with a reactor coolant system (RCS) inadvertent drain down. Two severity Level III problems and proposed civil penalties of $50,000 each were issued on December 24, 1996. (EA 96-414). for inadequate corrective actions related to maintenance of reactor trip breakers and other equipment. A severity Level III violation and proposed civil penalty of $50,000 was issued on November 19,1996, (EA 95 269). related to fire protection program deficiencies. A severity Level II violation and proposed civil penalty of $80.000 were issued on February 20, 1996. (EA 95 252). related to employee discrimination in Department of Labor Case Nos. 92 ERA.19 and 92-ERA 34. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-221
TVA 4 You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence of the violations. After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. Sincerely, Luis A. Reyes Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50 327, 50 328 License Nos. DPR-77, DPR 79 . l
Enclosures:
- 1. Notice of Violation and Proposed l Im>osition of Civil Penalty 1
- 2. NRC .)resentation Materials
- 3. TVA Presentation Materials .
- 4. List of Attendees I
)
cc w/encls: I Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations Tennessee Valley Authority 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402 2801 l Jack A. Bailey, Vice President Engineering & Technical Services Tennessee Valley Authority 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street , Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 cc w/encls cont'd: See page 5 4 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-222 l 1
-TVA 5 cc w/encls cont'd:
l
'Masoud Bajestani Site:Vice President Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Author'ity P. O. Box 2000 Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 I
General Counsel Tennessee Valley. Authority ET 10H 400 West Summit Hill Drive Knoxville, TN 37902 Raul R. Baron.. General Manager Nuclear Assurance Tennessee Valley Authority 4J Blue Ridge 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402 2801-Mark J. Burzynski, Manager Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 4J Blue Ridge 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402 2801 Pedro Salas, Manager Licensing and Industry Affairs Sequoyah Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 2000 Soddy Daisy,'TN 37379 ' J. T. Herron Plant Manager ! Sequoyah Nuclear: Plant - ! Tennessee Valley Authority ' P. 0.. Box 2000 Soddy Daisy. TN 37379
' Director Division of Radiological Health 3rd Floor L'and C Annex 401 Church Street Nashville TN 37243 1532 County Executive i Hamilton County Courthouse Chattanooga, TN 37402 NUREG-0940, PART 2 - A-223 r
l
4 NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Tennessee Valley Authority Docket Nos. 50 327 and 50 328 Sequoyah Units 1 & 2 License Nos. DPR 77 and DPR 79 EA 97 409
- During an NRC inspection conducted from July 25 through. September 4,1997, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the
. " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG 1600, the NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below: i i A. Technical Specification 3.8.2.3. requires four direct current (DC) vital battery channels to be energized and operable, with each channel consisting of a 125 volt DC board, a 125 volt DC battery bank, and a full capacity charger. Contrary to the above, on July 24, 1997, at approximately 6:13 a.m. , 125 volt DC battery bank No. IV was disconnected from 125 volt DC board No. IV causing the No. IV DC vital battery channel to be inoperable. The channel remained inoperable until 11:32 a.m. on July 25, a period of approximately 30 hours. (01013) B. Technical S)ecification 6.8.1.a requires, in part, that procedures shall be establis1ed, implemented, and maintained covering the activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33. Revision 2. February 1978, " Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation)." Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 3, includes procedures for onsite emergency power sources (DC System). System Operating Instruction (SOI) 0 50 250 1 "125 Volt DC Vital Power , System," Revision 9. Section 8.4, provides instructions for placing ! vital battery V in service for battery boards I, II, III, or IV. Step 8.4.8 of S0I 0 S0 2501 required the operator to " Place Distribution : Panel...B S breaker (107) in ~0N" position to align feed to desired Vital Battery Board." Contrary to the above, on July 24,1997, an SR0 failed to implement step 8.4.8 of SOI 0 S0 250-1, in that, while aligning vital battery V to feed vital battery board No. IV, he did not place distribution aanel B S breaker (107) in the ~0N" position to align feed to vital 3attery board No. IV. (01023) F Enclosure 1 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-224 i
l Notice of Violation and Proposed 2 i Imposition of Civil Penalty . C. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B Criterion V requires, in part, that activities ; affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, ; procedures, or drawings of a type approariate to the circumstances and l shall be accomplished in accordance wit 1 these instructions, procedures, ! or drawings. l l Site Standard Practice SSP 12.6, Equipment Status Verification and l Checking Program, Revision, Section 3.3, Verification Instructions. Step 3.3.1, Independent Verification Requirements, states, " Independent i verification is required for the following situations on breakers, valves, and components in those systems listed in Appendix A...." One ; situation listed stated, "Any activity that, if done improperly, could : remain undetected until that structure, system or component was called r on to mitigate an accident or transient as described in the FSAR,..." i Appendix A List of Systems and Components Requiring Independent
- Verification, includes the "125V Vital DC Distribution System Components [
that supply control power essential for the Shutdown Boards to function ; properly. " l Contrary to the above, on July 24, 1997, the licensee failed to include requirements for independent verification, as specified by SSP 12.6, in , Systems Operating Procedure 0 S0 250 1, 125 Volt DC Vital Power System, l Revision 9, Section 8.4 Placing Vital Battery No. V in Service for Battery Board I, II, III, or IV. Placing vital battery No. V in , l service, if. done improperly, could remain undetected until that ! structure, system or component was called on to mitigate an accident or i transient as described in the FSAR. Vital battery board No. V, while in i service for battery boards I, II, III, or IV, would supply control power ' essential for the shutdown boards to function properly. (01033) These violations represent a Severity Level III problem (Supplement I). I Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201 Tennessee Valley Authority l (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to , the Director Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, i within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation:
! (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved. (4) the corrective steps ,
that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full ' l compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be
. issued as to why the license should ,10t be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such.other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may i be given to extending the res)onse time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of tie Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be 1 submitted under oath or affirmation.
NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-225
Notice of Violation and Proposed 3 Imposition of Civil Penalty Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10.CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violations listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating ! circumstances. (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation i of the penalty. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The , attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions.of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless i compromised, remitted or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant , to Section 234c of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice -of Violation, letter with payment of
- civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: .
Mr. James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory ! Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville. MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. + Because your resaonse will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possi)le, it should not include any personal privacy, 3roprietary, L or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR witlout redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to , provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a : redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request t withholding of such material, you must s)ecifically identify the portions of :
- your response that you seek to have withield and provide in detail the bases
! for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information l will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-226 - i
Notice of Violation and Proposed 4 Imposition of Civil Penalty , information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding
~ confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information i is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of ,
protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this 8th day of December 1997 .) i l
)
l l i 1 , i I l NUREGM, PART 2 A-227
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Mt:g y k UNITED STATES g j t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 4001
****#l February 5, 1998 i
EA 97-409 Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN: Mr. O. J. Zeringue Chief Nuclear Officer and Executive Vice President BA Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801
SUBJECT:
WITHDRAWAL OF PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-327/97-13 AND 50-328/97-13
Dear Mr. Zeringue:
This is in reference to your response of January 7,1998, to our Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) issued on December 8,1997, concerning activities conducted at your Sequoyah facility. We have evaluated your response and found that it meets the requirements of 10 CFR 2.201. We will examine the implementation of your corrective actions during future inspections. In your response, you agreed that the three violations occurred as cited; however, you did not pay the civil penalty. Specifically, you disagreed with the determination that, under the criteria established in the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was not entitled to credit for identifying the problem. You requested that NRC reconsider the determination for the factor of Identification and consider not imposing a civil penalty. The Enforcement Policy, in Part VI.B.2.b, states that when a problem is licensee identified, i.e., identified before the problem has resulted in an event, the NRC should normally give the licensee credit for actions related to identification, regardless of whether prior opportunities existed to identify the problem. Credit for identification was not provided in the NRC Notice. The NRC was concerned that you had not identified the violation earlier despite the multiple missed opportunities to identify the inoperable battery board including operator equipment monitoring rounds, annunciator status monitoring, and during dispositioning of an unexpected as-found condition. In addition, the problem was not identified by on-shift operations personnel or as part of the normal self-assessment program, and was not considered a "self-monitoring" effort as described by the Enforcement Policy and your January 7,1998 letter. As a result of your written response pursuant to 10 CFR 2.205(b), we have reconsidered this proposed e?.forcement action. In reviewing the specific circumstances associated with the missed opportunities, on balance, we conclude that their significance does not warrant a deviation from the normal application of the guidance in Part VI.B.2.b of the Enforcement Policy. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-228
l TVA 2 i Credit for the factor of /dentification is appropriate to recognize the diligence of the TVA training i instructor who discovered the vital battery problem and took prompt action to ensure system ! j operability.' l l Given NRC's determination that credit is warranted for Identification and our prior determination i that credit was warranted for the factor of Corrective Action, a civil penalty is not appropriate in ! this case. Accordingly, the Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty pursuant to 10 CFR 2.205 is ! withdrawn. The Notice of Violation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 remains in effect. Based on your previously provided response to the individual violations, no additional response is required. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter will be i placed in the NRC Public Document Room. We appreciate your cooperation in this matter. ! Sincerely, l
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I James Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement Docket Nos. 50-327,50-328 License Nos. DPR-77, DPR-79 ! cc: Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations T6nnessee Valley Authority l 6A Lookout Place i 1101 Market Street j Chattanooga, TN 37402 2801 ' Ja n A. Seiley, Vice President Eny menng & Technical Services Tenn0sse a Valley Authority 6A Look ~t Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 cc cont'd: See next page 1 The December 8,1997 letter accompanying the Notice had noted the positive action of the training instructor, though credit was not granted for identification. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-229 l l
TVA 3 ce cont'd: Masoud Bajestani Site Vice President Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ! Tennessee Valley Authority P. O. Box 2000 l Soddy-Daisy,TN 37379 General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority ET 10H 400 West Summit Hill Drive Knoxville,TN 37902 Raul R. Baron, General Manager Nuclear Assurance Tennessee Valley Authority 4J Blue Ridge 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Mark J. Burzynski, Manager Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authonty 4J Blue Ridge 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Pedro Salas, Manager Licensing and Industry Affairs Sequoyah Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy,TN 37379 J. T. Herron, Plant Manager Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P. O. Box 2000 Soddy Daisy,TN 37379 Director Division of Radiological Health 3rd Floor, L and C Annex 401 Church Street Nashville, TN 37243-1532 County Executive Hamilton County Courthouse Chattanooga,TN 37402 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-230 _ _ _ _ _ x
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,j UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
i REGION I e: D 475 ALLENDALE ROAD i
- KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415
. l [ April 14, 1998 j EA 97-531 l h <
- i. . Mr. Donald A. 'Reid !
Senior Vice President, Operations . . Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation .I { ' RD 5, Box 169 !- Ferry Road l i Brattleboro, Vermont 05301 l 2
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY !' ! - $55,000 (NRC inspection Report No. 50-271/97-10) - l
Dear Mr. Reid:
}
}
- This letter refers to the subject NRC inspection conducted between September 29 and I 1
November 20,1997, at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Brattleboro, Vermont, the findings of which were discussed with Mr. G. Maret and other members of your staff at
- exit meetings on October 3 and November 20,1997. The purpose of the inspection was to i follow up on the findings of the NRC Architect / Engineer (A/E) team inspection conducted iL between May 5 and June 13,1997. During the follow-up inspection, apparent violations were
- - identified associated with control of the design process, corrective actions for conditions e adverse to quality, and reportability. The inspection reports for the A/E team inspection and I
.the followup inspection were sent to you previously on August 27,1997, and February 5, j 1998, respectively. On March 2,1998, a predecisional enforcement conference (conference) was conducted with Mr. R. Barkhurst, you, and other members of the Vermont Yankee staff, l' to discuss the violations, their causes, and your corrective actions.
i - Based on the findings of the inspection and information provided during the conference, twelve violations are being cited and are described in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). These violations involved a number of failures to: (1) properly translate the design basis of the plant into specifications, procedures, and i instructions, contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion lil; (2) promptly correct design ! i deficiencies once they were identified, contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI; [ and (3) report conditions to the NRC in Licensee Event Reports (LERs), pursuant to 10 CFR l l 50.73. i l
.The three most significant of these violations are set forth in section I of the Notice and relate l
!. to the Technical Specification (TS) limit for maximum normal torus operating temperature. In l 1982, you submitted a TS license amendment request to increase the normal torus water b temperature limit from 90*F to 100*F. The NRC approved the request in 1985; however, the j analyses performed to support the change were inadequate in that they failed to consider the r impact of the change on all of the affected design basis analyses, namely, the emergency core f NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-231 l 1 l 1
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Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 2 cooling system (ECCS) pump net positive suction head (NPSH) margin calculations, loss of coolant accident (LOCA) containment analyses, ECCS piping stress and support load calculations, and equipment qualification. Specifically, no evaluation was performed to demonstrate that these previously performed analyses were still acceptable assuming an initial torus temperature of 100*F. In May 1994, you identified that the TS limit of 100 F for maximum torus normal operating temperature (in place as of June 6,1985, when a TS amendment was issued) was not consistent with assumptions made in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) description of LOCA containment response; however, you did not properly evaluate and correct this condition adverse to quality in a timely manner. Specifically, you did not initiate formal analysos and calculations to support a safety evaluation of this condition until November 1995, and did not comp' ate the safety evaluation and operability determination until April 1996. More importantly, you did not put in place interim administrative controls to limit torus temperature to 90 F, consistent with the design basis, until December 1995. Although you l identified, in March 1996, that yc ,1ight not be able to justify plant operation with a torus i temperature in excess of 90*F, xm later confirmed that you could not operate with torus ; temperature above this limit, you did not initiate the necessary detailed design basis reviews l until 1937, and, as of November 1997, you had not requested a TS amendment to correct the nonconservative torus temperature limit. ; Although you identified, in March 1996, that operation of the plant with torus temperature above 90aF was a condition potentially outside of the design basis, you did not perform a , comprehensive review to determine if torus temperature had actually exceeded 90'F until May 1997, when questioned by the A/E inspection team. At that time, you identified that the plant , had operated with torus temperature above 90 F for greater than 24 hours in two instances between 1985 and 1995; however, you did not report this condition to the NRC in an LER within 30 days, as required. While no actual safety consequences resulted from operation of the plant with torus temperature above 90'F, if a LOCA had occurred, with an initial torus temperature above 4 90 F, there was not high confidence that the emergency core cooling systems and the [ containment would have been able to perform their safety functions. Additionally, the failure ! to take prompt action to evaluate and correct an identified discrepancy between the FSAR and the Technical Specifications is a significant concern because the NRC relies upon licensees to operate the plant within the design basis and to promptly identify and report nonconforming conditions. These violations collectively represent breakdowns in your processes for design control, corrective actions, and reportability; therefore, these violations, set forth in Section I of the enclosed Notice, are classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level ill problem in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. In addition to your failure to ensure that the design basis was maintained when you increased the torus temperature limit, the NRC identified other violations involving design deficiencies and errors in design calculations. These violations are set forth in Section ll.A of the Notice. For example, a nonsafety-related component was used in a subsystem essential to the safety-related function of the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). Specifically, air to the solenoid valves that operated the EDG service water cooling flow control valves (FCVs) was supplied NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-232
-4
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 3 from a nonsafety-related pressure regulator. Failure of the pressure regulator could have resulted in a malfunction that could have prevented operation of the EDGs due to a loss of all service water. In another case, incorrect design inputs were used in the calculation of NPSH margin for the RHR pumps. Nonconservative data was used in lieu of actual test data. The NRC also identified other violations involving your failure to take timely, effective action to correct conditions adverse to quality, and your failure to report a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. These violations are set forth in Sections ll.B and ll.C of the Notice. For example, you failed to properly evaluate end correct a nonconformance between the vendor recommended residual heat removal (RHR) pump minimum flow requirement and the installed minimum flow capacity. Your determination that the installed minimum flow capacity was adequate lacked the technical basis to conclude that the pumps would be able to operate for several hours under minimum flow conditions during postulated accident scenarios because it was not supported by verification from the vendor or test results. Additionally, the precautions added to the RHR operating and surveillance procedures concerning RHR pump minimum flow operation did not adequately reflect the vendor recommendations. The violations cited in Section 11 of the enclosed Notice have been i, ssified individually at Severity Level IV in accordance with the Enforcement Policy. Following the A/E inspection, the NRC was concerned that, at the time of the inspection, it did not appear that your design basis document (DBD) reviews would have identified the ; design issues identified by the A/E team. At the conference, you stated that you had ; committed to perform the DBD reviews and had identified the need for DBD validation prior j to issuance of the NRC's 50.54(f) letter regarding the adequacy and availability of design basis information. However, while the DBD reviews were in progress, the validation effort had not l been fully defined at the time of the A/E inspection. You indicated that the validation effort would have been designed to identify the type of problems identified by the A/E team. Based on the findings of our follow-up inspection and the information provided at the conference, we have no current concern with your DBD validation effort. We will review your DBD program again as part of our followup to your response to the violations described in the Notice. With respect to the violations in Section I of the Notice, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000 is considered for a Severity Level lli l problem. Since Vermont Yankee has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two years,' the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for /dentification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. No credit is warranted for identification because, while you identified the discrepancy between the FSAR and the TS limit for torus temperature, the NRC identified your failure to promptly evaluate and correct the discrepancy and your failure to report the condition outside of the design basis. Credit is warranted for corrective actions because your actions, once the violations were identified, were considered prompt and
' e.g., A Notice of Violation with a proposed $50,000 civil penalty was issued on August 23,1996, for a 2
Severity level III violation involving failure to analyze ECCS equipment to be free from single failures (EA 96-210). NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-233
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 4 comprehensive. Those actions, as described at the conference, include: 1) reconstitution of the containment design basis; 2) development of a more formal document design change process; 3) improvements to your corrective action process, including establishing a single event report process, reduction of the backlog, and development of a trending program; and
- 4) revision of the reportability procedure to implement interim expectations pending further review of your administrative controls and guidelines for considering event complexity.
Therefore, to emphasize the importance of maintaining your facility in accordance with its i design, and promptly correcting conditions that are contrary to the design, and in recognition of your previous escalated enforcement actions, I have been authorized, after consultation ! with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and ! Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the base amount of $55,000. ! 1 l During the inspection, the NRC identified three additional apparent violations involving failure j to take timely corrective actions. With respect to the first of these apparent violations, after further review, the NRC has concluded that the failure to enter TS Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) when performing testing does not constitute a condition adverse to quality in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. Therefore, the failure to take prompt corrective action to address this issue did not constitute a violation of NRC requirements. However, the NRC considers the failure to enter LCOs during testing an administrative weakness. By not tracking LCO entries during surveillance testing, the control room staff loses an opportunity to better control planned maintenance activities and to better respond to emergent system operability concerns. With respect to the remaining two apparent violations, the NRC has concluded that your failure to request revisions to the service water subsystem and battery charger Technical Specifications in a timely manner did not constitute violations, because, in both cases, you had put interim administrative controls in place to compensate for the nonconservative TSs. However, the NRC is concerned that the revision of the nonconservative TSs and corrective action to address entry into LCOs for testing were delayed due to deferral of your improved Technical Specification (ITS) program. As stated in our regulations, TSs are derived from the analyses and evaluation included in the safety analysis report. By maintaining your TSs current, you help maintain our mutual confidence in your safety analysis and your ability to operate the plant in accordance with that analysis. We acknowledge your commitment to submit your application for ITS soon. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine wlather further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-234
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 5 in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). : Sincerely, Hu ert J. Miller
, Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-271 ;
License No. DPR-28 :
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty ' i cc w/ encl: R. McCullough, Operating Experie:.ce Coordinator - Vermont Yankee G. Sen, Licensing Manager, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation D. Rapaport, Director, Vermont Public Interest Research Group, Inc. , D. Tefft, Administrator, Bureau of Radiological Health, State of New Hampshire Chief, Safety Unit, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts f D. Lewis, Esquire G. Bisbee, Esquire J. Block, Esquire T. Rapone, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety State of New Hampshire, SLO Designee State of Vermont, SLO Designee - Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SLO Designee D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN) i I i i NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-235
ENCLOSURE NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVll PENALTY Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation Docket No. 50-271 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station License No. DPR-28 j EA 97-531 During an NRC inspection conducted between September 29,1997, and November 20,1997, for which exits meetings were held on October 3,1997, and November 20,1997, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600,the NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Sec. ion 2.34 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFH 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are ! set forth below: !
- 1. VIOLATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH TORUS TEMPERATURE ,
-A. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion lil, Design Centrol, requires, in part, that ,
- measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements i and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the license , application, for structures, systems, and components, are correctly translated ; into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions and that measures shall be established for the identification and control of design interfaces and for coordination among participating design organizations. ; Contrary to the above, in 1982, the licensee failed to control the design interfaces and failed to assure that the design basis for the maximum torus temperature normal operating limit was correctly translated into specifications. . Specifically, the analyses to support a 1982 Technical Specification (TS) license amendment request (to increase the normal torus water temperature limit from , 90*F to 100*F) did not consider the impact of this change on design basis ' analyses such as the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pump not positive ; suction head (NPSH) margin calculations, loss of coolant accident (LOCA) l containment analyses, ECCS piping stress and support load calculations, and i equipment qualification. An initial torus temperature of 90*F was assumed in ! these analyses. (01013)2 l B. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, h that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies , deviations, defective material and 2This violation occurred beyond the five year statute of limitations period for assessing ; civil penalties; therefore, this violation was not considered for purposes of determining any civil penalty. NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-236
- t Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 2 ,
i equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected, in the j case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that l l the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude ! repetition. The identification of the significant condition adverse to quality, the ! cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken shall be documented and
- reported to appropriate levels of management. l l !
! Contiary to the above, between May 1994, and November 20,1997, the l l licensee failed to properly evaluate and correct, in a timely manner, an identified l
- condition adverse to quality involving the discrepancy between the design basis l and the TS limit for maximum normal torus temperature (described in Section l l 1. A). Specifically, in May 1994, the licensee identified that the TS limit of !
l 100'F for maximum torus normal operating temperature (in place as of June 6, ! 1985, when TS Amendment 88 was issued) was not consistent with ; assumptions made in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) description of : ! LOCA containment response, and did not properly evaluate and correct this j
- condition adverse to quality in a timely manner. Specifically l - The analyses to support a safety evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59
, were not initiated until November 1995. The safety evaluation and
- operability determination were not completed until April 8,1996. ,
i !
- - The nonconformance between the FSAR and the TS was not entered t l into the licensee's corrective action process until November 2,1995.
4 I i
- Administrative controls to limit normal torus temperature to 90*F, I consistent with the design basis, were not established until December j 1,1995.
i
- The residual heat removal (RHR) system operating procedure was not i revised to reflect the 90'F administrative limit until April 1997.
- On March 26,1996, the licensee initiated an internal event report that
- j. questioned the ability to technically justify plant operation with a torus
- temperature in excess of 90*F because of concerns associated with the
, core decay heat model, as well as the need to' consider energy introduction into the containment from continued injection of feedwater. l Within one hour, the licensee reported the condition to the NRC as i potential operation outside of the design basis pursuant to 10 CFR
- 50.72; however, the licensee only reviewed two years of plant operating
- logs to determine if torus temperature had actually exceeded 90'F.
- Since no instances were identified, the licensee incorrectly concluded that the condition was not reportable as a LER, pursuant to 10 CFR
'50.73. A comprehensive review of plant operating logs was not d performed until May 29,1997.
} i - Although the assessment cf the concerns identified in March 1996,
! determined that maximum torus temperature, as a result of a LOCA, was NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-237
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Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 3 l acceptable only if an initial torus temperature of 90'F was assumed, the ! licensee had not requested a TS change as of November 20,1997. i (01023) 3 C. 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) requires, in part, that licensees shall submit a Licensee j
- Event Report (LER) within 30 days after the discovery of the event, for any l 1 event or condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in a condition '
that was outside the design basis of the plant. I ! Contrary to the above, between June 28 and November 20,1997, the licensee l 1 failed to report a condition that resulted in operation outside the design basis i of the plant. Specifically, on May 29,1997, the licensee discovered that the l plant had operated with torus temperature above 90*F for greater than 24 i hours in two instances between 1985 and 1995 (a two-day period in August l 1988, and an eight day period in 1993); however, as of November 20,1997, l the licensee had not reported the condition to the NRC, a period in excess of 30 days. This condition was outside of the design basis of the plant in that an initial torus temperature of 90'F was used in design basis analyses for ECCS pump NPSH margin calculations, LOCA containment response, ECCS piping stress and support load calculations, and equipment qualification. Additionally, when continued feedwater injection was considered in the LOCA containment analysis, the peak torus water temperature was acceptable only if an initial torus temperature of 90'F was assumed. (01033) These violations in the aggregate constitute a Severity Level 111 problem (Supplement I). Civil Penalty - $55,000. II. VIOLATIONS NOT ASSESSED A CIVIL PENALTY A. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 111, Design Control, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for structures, systems, and components, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions and that measures shall be established for the selection and review of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems and components. Criterion 111 also requires that measures shall be established for the identification and control of design interfaces and for coordination among participating design organizations and that design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design.
- 1. Contrary to the above, prior to November 20,1997, the licensee failed to correctly translate the manufacturer's recommendations for RHR motor starting limits into operating instructions considering the expected RHR motor ambient tempeiature. Specifically, the limit for consecutive pump starts (three in five minutes) specified in the RHR operating NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-238
f a c i 4
- r i Vermont Yankee Nucloor Power Corporation 4 ,
i l procedure was based on a maximum ambient room temperature of 86
- F. !
1 However, the maximum normal operating temperature for the RHR corner room is 109'F and the room temperature may reach as high as l . 155'F during accidents. (02014) , i This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1). ) i. l 2. Contrary to the above, prior to May 9,1997, the licensee failed to i correctly select equipment in a subsystem essential to the safety-related : function of the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). Specifically, air to ! 3 the solenoid valves that operated the EDG service water cooling flow :
- control valves (FCVs) was supplied from a nonsafety-related pressure
'( regulator. Failure of the pressure regulator could have resulted in a malfunction of the solenoid valve which could have prevented the FCVs ! l from opening. The failure of the flow control valve could cause a loss I e of all service water to the EDG which would prevent operation of the i 4 EDG. (03014) , This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1). : , 3. Contrary to the above, prior to November 20,1997, the licensee failed i to correctly translate RHR flow specifications into procedures. ! I Specifically, the flow limitations specified in RHR operating procedure for i minimum pump flow requirements did not consider instrument
- uncertainty in the specified limit. The RHR procedure included a i minimum flow precaution of 2700 gpm. However, considering i uncertainty of the flow instrument, an indicated flow rate of 3920 gpm >
j' was required to ensure that the vendor recommended minimum flow of i l 2700 gpm was established. - (04014) I' This is'a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1).
- 4. Contrary to the above, on December 6,1995, the licensee used e incorrect design inputs in the calculation of NPSH margin for the RHR -
i pumps in calculation VYC-808, Rev. 2. Specifically, the licensee used 1 a curve fit of the vendor's pump test data in calculating the required i NPSH values rather than actual test data. Use of the curve fit data
- resulted in a nonconservative NPSH required value. (05014)
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1). 4 i 5. Contrary to the above, prior to November 20,1997, the licensee failed
- to update the heat exchanger fouling assumption used in RHR service
] water (RHRSW) room cooler thermal performance calculations after an inspection of cooler unit coils in April 1995 indicated that the
; assumption was incorrect. Specifically, Calculation VYC-1329 was not y changed to reflect micro-fouling as the likely cause of the fouling, rather
- NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-239 4
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Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 5 than tube plug 0i ag due to silt, after no evidence of silt fouling was found during the inspection. (06014) This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1).
- 6. Engineering Instruction WE-103, " Engineering Calculations and Analyses," Rev.15, dated October 14,1994, section 4.1.4.2, stated that, when information from quality assurance (QA) design records was ,
required, the licensee must ensure that the appropriate (governing) ' documents were used and that such documents were the latest approved revision obtained from the appropriate source. Contrary to the above, in April 1997, the licensee failed to assure correct references and inputs were used in design calculations. Specifically: Calculation VYC-1349, Rev.1, dated April 30,1997, referenced drawing G-191372, Rev. 41; however, engineering had approved Rev. 42 of the drawing G-191372 on December 20,1996, t Calculation VYC-298, Rev.10, dated April 22,1997, referenced > various drawings as listed in Section 3.0.5 (a) through (I), which , were superseded by a later revision before the licensee issued Calculation VYC-298, Rev.10. The latest revisions of the drawings indicated some de load changes. (07014) l l This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I). t B. 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, : such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies , deviations, defective material and ! equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that : the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude : repetition. The identification of the significant condition adverse to quality, the cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken shall be documented and l reported to appropriate levels of management. I f
- 1. Contrary to the above, between November 13,1986, and May 1997, the licensee failed to properly evaluate and correct the nonconformance I between the vendor recommended RHR pump minimum flow ,
requirement of 2700 gpm and the installed minimum flow capacity of 350 ppm. Specifically, in a letter dated November 13,1986, the vendor ; notified the licensee that the minimum flow for the RHR pumps should ' be increased to 2700 gpm Mr continuous operation (more than 2 hours of operation in 24 hours) and to 2075 gpm for intermittent operation. However, the licensee failed to adequately correct this nonconformance, ; despite prior opportunities, namely: NUREG 0940, PART 2 A-240 ) 1
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- The licensee's response, dated May 8,1989, to IE Bulletin 88-1- 04, which requested licensees to determine (and correct)
whether the installed minimum flow capacity was adequate for pump operation, lacked the technical basis to conclude that the existing RHR pump minimum flow would be adequate during i
- postulated accident scenarios during which the pump would '
operate for several hours under minimum flow conditions. The { licensee's response did not provide either verification from the 1 vendor or test results to demonstrate that minimum flow rates { were adequate during the postulated accident scenarios. The i vendor was unable to support the licensee's assertion that a cumulative arithmetic series of minimum flow events'over the life I of the plant (29,200 hours) had the same relationship to pump , degradation as the length of a specific event (4 to 5 hours of i minimum flow operation during an accident). I i The licensee added a precaution to the RHR operating and , surveillance procedures, in 1987, to minimize operation of the , f RHR pumps in the minimum flow mode. These instructions did 2 not adequately reflect the vendor recommendativ.w. provided in j November 1986, to increase the minimum flow to 2700 gpm. ! Although, the RHR operating procedure was revised in May
- 1997, and additional instructions were provided to reflect the vendor recommendations, these instructions did not reflect the recommendation, provided in May 1997, that RHR pump i operation should not be sustained at a flow rate of 350 gpm for more than 30 seconds during surveillance tests. (08014) l i This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1).
- 2. Administrative Procedure (AP) 0009, " Event Reports," a measure established by the licensee to implement the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires, in part, that event reports be initiated for unanalyzed conditions or potential conditions outside the design basis, and that the event be reviewed against the requirements of the Basis for Maintaining Operation (BMO) Guideline to determine if a BMO is required.
The BMO Guideline states, in part, that if a safety-related component or system is degraded relative to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) or other licensing commitment, then a BMO should be prepared. I Contrary to the above, prior to November 20,1997, the licensee failed ) to take appropriate measures to assure that a condition adverse to ; quality involving the service water (SW) and emergency diesel generator I (EDG) support systems was appropriately evaluated and corrected. Specifically, the SW supply line to the circulating water and SW traveling screens, SW piping to the diesel generators outside the diesel generator NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-241 1
I
. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 7 rooms in the turbine building, fuel oil transfer lines routed on the exterior of the pump house, and the diesel exhausts, were not adequately protected from the effects of tornadoes, including tornado missile strikes. This constituted a degraded condition relative to commitments in the Preliminary Design Assessment Report (PDAR); however, no BMO was prepared. (09014)
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1). C. 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) requires, in part, that licensees shall submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) within 30 days after the discovery of the event, for any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to remove residual heat. Contrary to the above, between June 6 and November 20,1997, the licensee failed to report a condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the RHR system, a system needed to remove residual heat. Specifically, on June 6,1997, the NRC identified that instrument uncertainty was not included in the specification of RHR pump minimum flow requirements in system procedures and as of November 20,1997, the licensee had not submitted a LER, a period in excess of 30 days. The failure to provide adequate instructions for RHR pump minimum flow requirements could have resulted in failure of the RHR pumps which would have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of a system required to remove residual heat. (10014) This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and I (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within , the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for information may be issued as why l the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may l be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer l payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed l above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-242
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 8 ! answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory i' Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with ! 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly
- marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may
- (1) deny the violation (s) listed in I this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in 1
' this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed in addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or
- mitigation of the penalty. ! In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of i the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to i 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference , (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee l is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a i civil penalty. I i ! l' Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the j' Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be ; collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c. i The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, , and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: J. Lieberman, Director, Office l j of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockville ;
- Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738,with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that
- is the subject of this Notice.
i Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent 3 i possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary l information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed
] copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted j copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you mgal specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have l withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the
! disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 14th day of April,1998 NUREG-0940, PART 2 A-243
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B- SEVERITY LEVEL I,11, lil VIOLATIONS, NO civil PENALTY 1 NUREG-0940, PART 2 l 1
4 J l om nee UNITED STATES
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# NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- 8. REGION lil
'f 801 WARRENVILLE ROAD LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4351
% ,* April 21,-1998 l
-l EA 98-113 Mr. E. E. Fitzpatrick !
' Executive Vice President Nuclear Generation Group American Electric Power Company l 500 Circle, Drive [
Buchanan, MI 49107-1395 i
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION . . (NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-315/98006(DRS); 50-316/98006(DRS)) !
Dear Mr. Fitzpatrick:
l On February 13,1998, the NRC completed an inspection at D. C. Cook, Units 1 and 2 reactor 7
. facilities. During the inspection, apparent violations of NRC requirements were identified. A )
- copy of the inspection report was sent to you by letter dated March 5,1998. You were given !
' the option of participating in a predecisional enforcement conference or addressing the apparent violations in writing. You chose to submit a written response dated April 15,1998. !
Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information provided in your [ April 15 response to the inspection report, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC ! requirements occurred. The violations involving failure to provide shipping papers and emergency response instructions for a shipment of contaminated objects are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them are described in , detail in the subject inspection report. ' The violations resulteo from poor communications between radiation protection personnel and ; the truck driver. The driver was instructed to wait for the proper paperwork. The driver was ; given a shipping memo documenting the addition of a non-radioactive drum of oil and thought ! that this was the paperwork he needed. The driver then unplacarded the truck and left the
' D. C. Cook facility without receiving the appropriate paperwork. Notwithstanding the fact that j the packages inside the truck were properly labeled and the dose rates on contact were within l 10 CFR Part 20 limits, this failure is of significant concem to the NRC because in the event of ;
an accident, responders could not have ascertained the type and quantity of radioactive > material present without manipulating the packages insida of the truck. Therefore, the ! violations are classified in the aggregate in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy : and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions"(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, as a ; Severity Level til problem. NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-1 l
)
i
l E. Fitzpatrick In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000 is considered for a Severity Level lli problem. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement action within the last two years,' the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit is warranted for identification because the violations were identified by your staff. The NRC acknowledges D. C. Cook's actions in response to this incident and subsequent corrective actions to address the root cause of the violations. Specifically, the corrective actions described in your letter dated April 15,1998 to address the root cause included providing instruction for all personnel handling radioactive material shipments to ensure that they understood what occurred and were aware of the circumstances of this incident, and instituting a policy that requires all drivers picking up radioactive material shipments from locations other than inside the protected area to be escorted at all times in order to provide reasonable assurance that no shipment will leave the site without the appropriate paperwork and placarding. Thus, credit for Corrective Action is warranted because your staff's actions were prompt and comprehensive. Therefore, to encourage identification and comprehensive correctim of violations, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty. The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violations and the corrective actions taken to correct and prevent recurrence of the violations, is already adequately addressed on the docket in Inspection Report 50-315/98006(DRS); 50-316/98006(DRS) and your April 15,1998 response to the apparent violations. Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your positions. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice. In addition, we have reviewed the corrective actions addressed in Attachment 1 of your April 15 letter responding to the Notice of Violation sent to you by letter dated March 5,1998. The actions taken appear to be adequate and we have no further questions at this time.
' A Severity Level lil violation was issued March 11,1996 (EA 96-020), for an inoperable SI pump.
NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-2 l
t E. Fitzpatrick In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if you elect to provide a response, will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. , Sincerely, JL bb Bill Beach Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316 License Nos. DPR-58; DPR-74
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation . l I
\
l NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-3
NOTICE OF VIOLATION Indiana Michigan Power Company Docket Numbers 50-315; 50-316 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant License Numbers DPR-58; DPR-74 EA 98-113 During an NRC inspection conducted from February 9 through 13,1998, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the violations are listed below: 10 CFR 71.5 requires, in part, that each licensee who transports licensed material outside of the site of usage, or where transport is on public highways, or who delivers licensed material to a carrier for transport, shall comply with the applicable Department of Transportation regulations in 49 CFR parts 170 through 189 appropriate to the mode of transport. A. 49 CFR 172.200(a) requires, with exceptions not applicable here, that each person who offers a hazardous material for transportation describe the hazardous material on the shipping paper in the manner required by subpart C of 49 CFR Part 172. Pursuant to 49 CFR 172.101, radioactive materialis classified as hazardous material. Contrary to the above, on January 26,1998, the licensee offered radioactive material consisting of two packages labeled as surface contaminated objects to a carrier for transport and did not include with the shipment a shipping paper describing the material. (01013) B. 49 CFR 172.600 requires, with exceptions not applicable here, that no person may offer for transportation, accept for transportation, transfer, store or otherwise handle during transportation, a hazardous material unless emergency response information conforming to subpart G of 49 CFR Part 172 is immediately available for use at all times l the hazardous material is present. Pursuant to 49 CFR 172.101, radioactive material is
- classified as hazardous material.
l Contrary to the above, on January 26,1998, the licenses offered radioactive material for l transport without the required emergency response information. (01023) l This is a Severity Level lli problem (Supplement V). l l The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for these violations; the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violations, and prevent recurrence; and the date when full compliance will be achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in inspection Report 50-315/98006(DRS); 50-316/98006(DRS) and your April 15,1998 response to the apparent violations. However, you are required to submit a written statement I or explanation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect l your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to respond, clearly mark l your response as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation," and send it to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D. C. 20555 with a copy to the , Regional Administrator, Region Ill, and copy to the D. C. Cook NRC Resident inspector Office, l within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation. NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-4 l
~ i Notice of Violation 1 if you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, ; D.C. 20555-0001. } if you choose to respond, you response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room ! (PDR). Therefore, to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, 4 proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. . i Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted 2 under oath or affirmation. ! ! Dated at Lisle, Illinois this 21st day of April 1998 NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-5
- _ - . - . . _ . .- . . . .. .- - . ~ . _ -. . .
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& UNITED STATES p, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[ REGloN 1 O 'f P g KING oF PRUSslA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 475 ALLENDALE ROAD y . . . . + ,o March 20, 1998 EA 98-106 Mr. Charles H. Cruse Vice President - Nuclear Energy Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, MD 20657-4702
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-317/98-03 and 50-318/98-03 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Dear Mr. Cruse:
This refers to the inspection conducted on January 19-22 and 26-27, onsite, at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Station, and continuing through February 17,1998,in the Region I ' office to review information and documentation provided by your staff subsequent to the onsite inspection. The findings of the onsite inspection effort were discussed with your sta;f on January 27,1998, by Mr. Ronald Nimitz of this office. Mr. John R. White of my staff discussed the findings of the in-office review of radiciogical control performance, during the May 1997, Unit 2 outage, with Mr. Peter Katz, Plant General Manager, on February 20,1998. The principal focus of the inspection was the follow-up and verification of corrective actions, documented in your letter dated September 11,1997, taken in response to violations identified in our letter and Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties, dated August 11,1997, relative to the Unit 2 spent fuel pool diving event on April 3,1997. During the January 1998 inspection, the inspector reviewed planning and preparation for resumption of diving operations, and observed a diving evolution on January 19,1998. The inspector also reviewed previous Unit 2 refueling outage performance in May 1997, planning for the April 1998 Unit 1 outage, and performance relative to improvement of the radiation protection program. Our review indicated that your organization is actively continuing efforts to establish and implement corrective actions to address performance weaknesses in accordance with your September 11,1997, response. We observed that management attention and oversight were very apparent in the planning and preparation of diving activities, and in the efforts to effect overallimprovement of the radiation protection program. While activities and initiatives associated with the Radiation Protection improvement Plan are still in progress, the inspector observed good planning and preparation for radiological work activities scheduled for the April 1998 Unit I outage. NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-6
1 Mr. Charles H. Cruse 2 i However, based on information developed during the inspection, the NRC has determined ! l that violations of NRC requirements occurred related to an airborne contamination event in May 1997 during the Unit 2 refueling outage. These violations are cited in the enclosed l Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the enclosed inspection report. Specifically, your staff failed to establish radiological controls for work in the reactor cavity ) during cleaning of the reactor flange commensurate with the actual conditions indicated by I the area survey. Accordingly, the work planning and process, personnel respiratory protective requirements, and monitoring of personnel for potential exposure to airborne l radioactivity, were not evaluated in view of radiological conditions that were significantly j different than originally anticipated. Further, monitoring of airborne radiological conditions j were ineffective since air sampling was not representative of the workers' breathing zone ' and analysis and determination of the significant concentration of airborne radioactivity, to which workers were exposed, was substantially delayed by 8 to 12 hours. in addition, the l reactor cavity was not properly posted to identify the hazard when elevated airborne l radioactivity concentrations were detected. I These matters were of safety and regulatory' significance in light of the high levels of unevaluated transuranic activity present in the reactor cavity. However, once your staff ~ ; i realized that significant airborne activity existed, they established effective control of the l l areas, and assessed the radiation exposure of the affected personnel. No significant ! l personnel exposures were identified by your staff; and our review ascertained that l personnel exposure in excess of regulatory requirements was not evident, in this case. l
- Our review determined that your organization did not effectively survey and evaluate the
! radiological conditions and revise the radiological protection requirements, accordingly. These performance errors acted to increase the risk of substantial potential internal ! exposure of personnel. Therefore, these violations are classified in the aggregate as a l Severity Level 111 problem in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and ! Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. l In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000 , is considered for a Severity Level lli problem. However, I have been authorized, after l consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to exercise discretion in accordance with Section Vll.B.6 of the Enforcement policy to not propose a civil penalty in this case. The decision to exercise discretion was made because the violations related to the cavity l event occurred approximately one month after the diving event in April 1997, and appear to be the result of the same fundamental performance deficiencies. In the case of the diving event, an escalated enforcement action (involving a $176,000 civil penalty) was issued. Your September 11,1997, letter discussed the diving event and the realization that a comprehensive assessment of the all aspects of the radiation safety program was warranted, including evaluation of site and radiation safety procedures. Our inspection confirmed that broad based corrective actions were underway to improve your radiological j protection program, including review and evaluation of radiation safety procedures, and l previously identified issue reports dealing with radiation safety matters. Additionally, your staff initiated development of a Transuranic Activity Assessment and Programmatic Action Plan to address the performance weaknesses revealed by this event and supplement the broad based corrective actions. NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-7 l
Mr. Charles H. Cruse 3 The circumstances surrounding these violations, the significance of the issues, and the need for lasting and effective corrective action were discussed with members of your staff by Mr. White on February 20,1998. You acknowledged the seriousness of this matter and also noted that the circumstances surrounding this event, and the associated incident reports were included in your broad based reviews currently under way. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures, will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). Sincerely,
/& f Hu ert J. Miller Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 317;50 318
- l. License Nos. DPR-53; DPR-69
Enclosures:
'1. Notice of Violation
- 2. NRC Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50 317/98-03and 50-318/98-03 cc w/encis: !
T. Pritchett, Director, Nuclear Reguistory Matters (CCNPP) e R. McLean, Administrator, Nuclear Evaluations
-J. Walter, Engineering Division, Public Service Commission of Maryland !
l K. Burger, Esquire, Maryland People's Counsel i R. Ochs, Maryland Safe Energy Coalition * ! State of Maryland (2) : l' l NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-8
ENCLOSURE NOTICE OF V:Ol.ATION 1 Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Docket Nos. 50-317;50-318 Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant License Nos. DPR-53; DPR-69 EA No. 98-106 During an NRC inspection conducted from January 19,1998 - February 17,1998, for which exit meetings were conducted on January 27,1998, and February 20,1998, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG 1600,the violations are listed below: A. 10 CFR 20.1501(a) requires, in part, that each licensee make or cause to be made, surveys that may be necessary to comply with the regulations in this part, and are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the extent of radiation levels, concentrations or quantities of radioactive material, and the potential radiological hazards that may be present. 10 CFR 20.1703(a)(3) requires, in part, that the licensee shall implement and maintain a respiratory protection program that includes air sampling sufficient to identify the potential hazard, permit proper equipment selection, and estimate exposures; and surveys and bioassays as appropriate to evaluate actual exposures. Contrary to the above, on May 5,1997, BG&E did not make necessary and reasonable surveys to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1703 (a)(3) and 20.1501(a)during cleaning of the Unit 2 reactor vessel flange. Specifically: BG&E did not evaluate the high levels of beta, gamma, and alpha contamination present, with regard to respiratory equipment selection to i establish sufficient protection of workers. )
- BG&E's air sampling was not sufficient to identify the potential hazard, in 1 that air sampling was not performed in the workers' breathing zone during decontamination of the reactor flange.
- BG&E did not perform timely surveys (i.e., evaluations) of the air samples collected during decontamination of the reactor vessel flange. The air sample from the reactor flange decontamination was not evaluated for alpha airborne
, radioactivity until about 8 hours after the work activity was completed. When analyzed, the sample indicated approximately 103 DAC alpha, while the respiratory protective equipment selected only offered a protection factor of 50. ,
- The refueling floor air sample (69 foot elevation), collected during the flange cleaning, was not evaluated for alpha airborne radioactivity until about 12 hours after the work activity was completed. When analyzed, the sample indicated approximately 10.6 DAC alpha, and personnel unknowingly worked in the airborne radioactivity area without the use of respiratory protective equipment. (01013)
NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-9
B. 10 CFR 20.1902(d) requires that the licensee post airborne radioactivity areas as defined in 10 CFR 20.1003.10 CFR 20.1003 defines an airborne radioactivity area, in part, as an area in which airborne radioactivity exists in concentrations in excess of the derived airborne concentrations (DACs) specified in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B. Contrary to the above, on May 5,1997, BG&E did not post the 44' elevation of the Unit 2 reactor cavity as an airborne radioactivity area when it was determined that airborne concentrations of Co-60 were about 5 times its DAC specified in Appendix B. (01023) These violations represent a Severity Level ill problem (Supplement IV). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Baltimore Gas and Electric (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a j
" Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the
, corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps j that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time, if you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the i extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you musj specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withhold-ing (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financialinformation), if safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 20th day of March,1998 NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-10
)
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. . _ , . _ -_ __ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ _ . . - _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ , _ . _ _ ..-,m _.mm _ .m m ____
i ~
" #8%g UNITED STATES .
o,, . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION _; i o REGION il '
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l!:
- I-e' ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER 61 FORSYTH STREET. SW, SUITE 23T85 l
t D [ ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 3415
- *se w March 04, 1998 -
c : EA 98 043- ')'
- EA 98 050 i
4 Carolina Power & Light Company l ! ATTN: Mr..J. S. Keenan Vice President
.. . l H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 H
, 3581 West Entrance Road l T Hartsville. South Carolina 29550 ;
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO.-50 261/98 03)
Dear Mr. Keenan:
e This refers to the inspection conducted on January 5 9, 1998, at the Robinson' 1 , Steam Electric Plant. The purpose-of the inspection was to follow up on the t inspection findings resulting from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) - !- Design inspection which was conducted between April 7 and May 23. 1997. The- i F results of the inspection were discussed with your staff in an exit interview on January 30,1998 and were formally transmitted to you by letter dated ,
- February 6. 1998. An open predecisional enforcement conference was conducted !
i in the Region II office on February 19, 1998. to discuss the apparent- 5
.. violations, the root causes, and your corrective actions to preclude ,
i recurrence. A list of conference attendees and copies of the NRC's ! [ presentation material, and materials you presented at the conference are l
- enclosed. ;
~
4 Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information . you provided during the. conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of
- Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding them are described in
- detail in the subject inspection report.
Violation A involves the failure _to verify the adequacy of a design change to
~
- the safety injection (SI) system. The design change. Modification M 951 i which was implemented in March 1988 disabled the automatic start feature for one of the three SI pumps. The calculation that su) ported the design change did not include verification that SI pumps B and C 1ad sufficient net positive e suction head (NPSH) in this configuration for an event involving a large break
- j. loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and-loss of one of the two remaining SI pumps due to a single failure. As a result, the.SI system design failed to meet the
' operability requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.1.1.c (the TS in effect in June 1997 when the violation was discovered).
t The NPSH calculation for Modification M 951 included an incorrect assumption that the piping configuration for SI pump A represented the most limiting
] condition with regard to NPSH. As a result, the NPSH available for pumps B NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-11 1
CP&L 2 and C under the conditions established by the 1988 modification was not reviewed at the time of the modification nor when NPSH issues were raised in subsequent reviews. The potential consequences of the design deficiencies were limited, during the time of occurrence, due to the high, actual availability and reliability of the A SI pump and the limited LOCA break size and pump configurations necessary to create an inadequate NPSH condition. However, given the regulatory significance and duration of this problem and the potential impact on plant safety, Violation A has been categorized in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG 1600, at Severity Level III. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount l of $55,000 is considered for a Severity Level III violation. Because your ! facility pas been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two years , the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification
- Ud Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. With regard to tha factor of Identification, the NRC considered the following: (1) you had prior l opportunities to identify the violation including an April 1988 LOCA 1 reanalysis, a March 1989 safety system functional inspection, a June 1989 review based on NRC questions on SI pump runout concerns and SI flow tests in -
September and November 1990; and (2) NRC Information Notice (IN) 96 55, dated October 22, 1996, alerted licensees to problems with assuring NPSH for similar . system configurations. However you performed an extensive evaluation to I verify NPSH for the SI pumps after receiving requests for calculations related to the SI system from NRC inspectors who were preparing for the Design ' Inspection. As a result of the new calculation, you identified this subtle design error. Absent your decision to conduct a reanalysis, the issue may not have been identified. Therefore, on balance, the NRC determinad that credit should be granted for the factor of Identification. Your corrective actions included: (1) modifications to the refueling water storage tank to increase the tank water level: (2) development of an emergency core cooling system hydraulic model for the SI and residual heat removal systems; and (3) staff training on appropriate methods to ensure the adequacy i of calculations. In addition, you intend to modify the suction piping for the B and C SI system piping and conduct a design verification inspection of the component cooling water system in 1998. Based on these facts, the NRC , determined that credit was warranted for the factor of Corrective Action. Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of i violations, I have been authorized, not to 3ropose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in t1e future could result in a civil penalty. 8 A severity Level III violation was issued on May 16, 1996 for failure to control safeguards information properly (EA 96120). A Severity Level III problem with a $55.000 civil penalty was issued on December 12. 1997 for violations related to a mispositioned EDG output breaker control switch (EA 97 490). NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-12
CP&L 3 NRC Inspection Report No. 50-261/98 03, dated February 6,1998, included an a) parent violation for a number of calculation deficiencies identified during t1e NRC Design Inspection. The deficiencies included: (1) failures to include appropriate design parameters or utilize appropriate design inputs in calculations: (2) failure to translate design requirements into cther design documents such as drawings or procedures: and, (3) failures to perform i adequate design verification. After review of the information provided at the predecisional enforcement conference, the NRC concludes that the deficiencies do not appear to have affected design assumptions to such an extent that safety related equipment was inoperable. In addition, although the NRC believes that the deficiencies indicate weaknesses in your control of design- ! related calculations, the NRC has determined that the violations do not constitute a breakdown in your design control program. Therefore, three violations, each categorized at Severity Level IV, are cited in the enclosed Notice for these design deficiencies. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future I inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and any response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). Sincerely, I rw il . tw
% Luis A. Reyes Regional Administrator Docket No. 50 261 License No. DPR-23
Enclosures:
- 1. Notice of Violation
- 2. List of Attendees
- 3. NRC Slides
- 4. Licensee Material cc w/encls: (See next page)
NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-13
CP&L 4 cc w/encls: Dale E. Young Mel Fry, Acting Director Director, Site Operations Division of Radiation Protection Carolina Power & Light Company N. C. Department of Environment, H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Health and Natural Resources 3581 West Entrance Road 3825 Barrett Drive Hartsville, SC 29550 Raleigh, NC 27609-7721 J. W. Moyer William D. Johnson Plant General Manager Vice President & Senior Counsel Carolina Power & Light Company Carolina Power & Light Company H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant P. O. Box 1551 3581 West Entrance Road Raleigh, NC 27602 Hartsville, SC 29550 Karen E. Long D. B. Alexander, Manager Assistant Attorney General Performance Evaluation and State of North Carolina Regulatory Affairs OHS 7 P. O. Box 629 Carolina Power & Light Company Raleigh, NC 27602 412 S. Wilmington Street Raleigh, NC 27601 Robert P. Gruber Executive Director H. K. Chernoff, Supervisor Public Staff - NCUC Licensing / Regulatory Programs P. O. Box 29520 Carolina Power & Light Company Raleigh, NC 27626 0520 H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant 3581 West Entrance Road Public Service Commission Hartsville SC 29550 State of South Carolina P. O. Box 11649 T. H. Wilkerson, Manager Columbia. SC 29211 Regulatory Affairs Carolina Power & Light Company Hartsville Memorial Library H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant 147 W. College Avenue 3581 W. Entrance Road Hartsville, SC 29550 Hartsville, SC 29550 Max Batavia, Chief Bureau of Radiological Health l Dept. of Health and Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, SC 29201 l l l NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-14
NOTICE OF VIOLATION Carolina Power & Light Company Docket No. 50 261 H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant License No. DPR 23 Unit 2 EAs 98 043 and 98 050 During an NRC inspection conducted on January 5-9, 1998, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions " NUREG 1600, the violations are listed below: A. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, in part, requires that " design control measures shall provide for verifying the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design review, by use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by performance of a suitable testing program." Design changes shall be subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design." Technical Specification 3.3.1.1.c requires two safety injection (SI) pumps to be operable. Section 3.4.3 of CP&L Ccrporate Quality Assurance Manual Revisions 11 through 18, dated January 29, 1988 through September 29, 1995, states that " sufficient design verification shall be performed by one or more methods to substantiate that final design documents meet the ap)ropriate design in)uts." It further states that a design verification s1ould confirm tlat "the design is technically adequate with respect to the design basis." Contrary to the above, between March 24, 1988 and June 27, 1997, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of design to substantiate that final design documents met the appropriate design inputs and were technically adequate for a design change affecting SI pumps B and C. Specifically, the licensee implemented Modification M 951, which disabled the automatic start feature for one of the three SI pumps but failed to verify that SI pumps B and C had sufficient net positive suction head in the event that a large break loss of coolant accident occurred and one of the two remaining SI pumps failed to operate due to a single failure. As a result, the SI system failed to meet the operability requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1.c. the TS in effect in June 1997 when the violation was discovered. (01013) This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I). B. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. Design Control, requires, in part, that " design control measures shall 3rovide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by t1e performance of design review, by use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by performance of a suitable testing program." Enclosure 1 NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-15
i Notice of Violation 2 4 Section 3.4.3 of CP&L Corporate Quality Assurance Manual. Revisions 14 through 18, dated August-1, 1990, through September 29, 1995, states that " sufficient design verification shall be performed by one or more methods to substantiate that final design documents meet the appropriate l design inputs " It further states that a design verification should , I confirm that "the design is technically 6dequate with respect to the design basis." Contrary to the above, as of April 7,1997, the licensee failed to I verify the adequacy of design in certain calculations. Specifically, the licensee failed to consider appropriate design parameters or failed to utilize appropriate design inputs to ensure the design was technically adequate in the calculations listed below:
- 1. Calculation number RNP I/ INST-1023, " Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Indication Accuracies" Revision 0, dated June 28, 1991, did not consider potential vortexing in the Refueling Water Storage Tank above the drain nozzle.
- 2. Calculation number RNP-I/ INST 1109, " Containment E0P Setpoint Parameters". Revision 0, dated November 29, 1994, did not t I
determine the correct containment water level required for post ! accident residual heat removal (RHR) pump recirculation operation (EOP setpoint No. 20),
- 3. Calculation number RNP I/ INST-1058, " Containment Water Level Instrument Uncertainty". Revision 0, April 4,1994, used an !
incorrect value for the containment water level above the ~ containment floor. l
- 4. Calculation number RNP-I/ INST 1040, " Main Steam Flow Accuracy and Scaling Calculation", Revision 0, dated May 16, 1994, and RNP- !
I/ INST-1043, " Main Steam Pressure Channel Accuracy and Scaling ! Calculation" Revision 1. dated April 15, 1994, did not include seismic uncertainty factors specified in Section 10 of Design Guide DG VIII.50, Engineering Instrument Setpoints. i
- 5. Calculation number RNP M/ MECH 1620. " Evaluation of Effects of High !
Energy Pipe Rupture on the CCWS", Revision 0, dated July 18, 1996, ; excluded the design inputs for high enerCy line breaks in Reactor i Coolant System piping and their jet impingement effect on adjacent : component cooling water (CCW) piping and supports. j
- 6. Calculation number RNP-M/ MECH 1362, "SW Screen Wash Piping Flow l l Analysis" Revision 1, dated September 5,1991, did not include l rupture of the non seismic piping that supply the instrument and i
station air compressors. l
- 7. Calculation number RNP E-6.020," Load Profile and Battery Sizing l l Calculation for Battery B", Revision 2 dated November 24, 1993,
) incorrectly referenced a time period of "2 minutes to 59 minutes". NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-16
1
! Notice of Violation 3 l instead of ~1 minute to 59 minutes. The calculation did not ;
consider some of the connected non safety related loads and . referenced an incorrect battery cell type (MCT instead of MCX) in ! Attachment U to the calculation. ; 4
- 8. Calculation number RNP-E 6.23, " Minimum Inverter Voltage Verification" Revision 2 dated December 1,1993, did mt consider the increased inverter current at reduced battery voltage.
- 9. Calculation number RNP E 6.004, "DC Short Circuit Study",
4 Revision 2, dated May 19, 1993, did not consider a small DC motor 1 . that was connected to the system. The battery o)en circuit I , voltage used in the calculation was less than tie voltage ] measured during testing. This calculation along with RNP-E-018,
- "Ampacity Evaluation of Safety Related 125VDC and 120V AC Power Cables", Revision 4. dated March 16, 1994, analyzed cables rated
~ at 75'C, whereas cables rated at 60*C were installed.
- 10. Calculation number RNP E 6.018, "DC Control Circuit Loop Analysis", Revision 0, dated April 19, 1994, used incorrect i solenoid valve power values for design input.
! 11. Calculation number RNP E 8.016. " Emergency Diesel Generator Static and Dynamic Analysis" Revision 5, dated September 19, 1994, used i an incorre-A rcFerence and only modeled SI pump motor B. i
- 12. Calculation number RNP M/ MECH 1460, "NPSH vs. CST Level for SDAFW Pump", Revision 0, dated June 19, 1992, a value for the condensate storage tank (CST) water temperature of 100*F was used, instead of i the 115'F temperature value listed in the Plant Parameter Document
- for Cycle 18.
I' 13. Calculation number RNP M/ MECH 1394, "AFW Pump Recirculation Flowrates for RNP 2", Revision 2, dated August 21, 1995, used an
, incorrect specific gravity for the CST water.
l
- 14. Discrepancies were identified in calculation numbers RNP I/ INST- !
1015, Revision 0. dated December 22, 1990, and 84065 M 06-F,
; Revision 3, dated January 14, 1991, for the condensate storage tank level at which to change the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump suction supply to the service water system. Calculation RNP-I/ INST-1015 shows a 10 percent level, whereas calculation 84065 H-
- 06 F shows a 15 percent level. (02014)
.This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I).
NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-17
Notice of Violation 4 C. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that " design control measures shall 3rovide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by t1e performance of design review, by use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by performance of a suitable testing program." Section 3.4.2 of CP&L Corporate Quality Assurance Manual, Revisions 12 through 18, dated June 1,1989, through September 29, l 1995, states that " Applicable design input requirements shall be i developed and documented. The design inputs shall be specified to a level of detail sufficient to allow translation into other design documents such as specifications, drawings, analyses, procedures, etc," Contrary to the above, as of April 7,1997. the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of design in that design inputs were not correctly translated into other design documents such as drawings or procedures for the examples listed below:
- 1. A design change was implemented in 1990 to provide for isolation of the RHR pumps by closure of valve numbers SW 906, SW 907. CC-927. and CC 928 as discussed in LER 89 008-01. The licensee failed to incorporate the effects of this design change in the ASME Section XI inservice testing (IST) program. These valves were incorrectly classified as passive valves in the IST program when in fact they should have been classified as active valves as a result of the design change.
- 2. The design basis for CCW thermal relief valve numbers CC-747 A and 1 B, CC-774, and CC 791G was incorrectly translated into the ;
installation drawings. Consequently, the valves were installed in i locations which resulted in the 10 psig back pressure values specified in Westinghouse E-spec No. 676257 being exceeded by 5 psig. '
- 3. The design basis for performance of testing on station batteries
, (IEEE Standard 450 1980, Recommended Practice for Maintenance, ! Testing, and Re)lacement of Large Storage Batteries for Generating i i Stations and Su) stations) was incorrectly translated into MST-920, l Station Battery Performance Capacity Test, Revision 6, dated l l September 28, 1995, and MST 921. Station Battery Service Test, t Revision 7, dated April 20, 1995. Step 7.5.10 of procedure MST-l 921 accepted voltages less than the minimum value of 1.0 volt DC j l specified in IEEE Standard 450-1980. The duration of capacity l l testing of station battery B specified in MST-920 was different l l from that used by the battery manufacturer. The minimum i acceptance criteria of 107 volts specified in MST-921 for the station battery load profile test was less than the value of 109.8 volts evaluated in Calculation RNP E 6.018. NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-18 l
Notice of Violation 5
- 4. The design basis for performance of maintenance on station .
batteries was incorrectly translated into procedures PM 410', Installation of Battery Bank and Cell Connections Revision 6 dated November 2, 1995, and PM 411. Disassembly, Cleaning, Assembly, and Testing of A and B Station Battery Cell Connections, Revision 6, dated October 6, 1995. The procedures stated the acceptance criteria was 50 microchms, whereas the vendor calculations specified that the B station battery may not exceed 50 microchms and the A station battery may not exceed 34 microchms. The requirements for installation (torque) of intercell connections and mechanical cable connections and the thickness of the intercell connectors specified in PM 411 conflicted with requirements specified in vendor technical manuals. (03014) This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I),. D, 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that " design control measures shall )rovide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by tie performance of design review, by use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by performance of a suitable testing program." Section 3.4.3.9 of CP&L Corporate Quality Assurance Manual. Revision 18. dated September 29, 1995, states that "A design verification shall be performed to verify an appropriate design verification has been performed for applicable documents contained in the package.." Section 3.4.5 of CP&L Corporate Quality Assurance Manual. Revisions 12 through 16. dated June 1, 1989, through December 17, 1992, states that
" design change documents shall provide for identification of necessary revisions to existing design documents."
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of design in that:
- 1. A calculation in ESR 96-00474 Revision 0, dated August 19, 1996, which evaluated whether failure of a non seismic pipe would affect water supply to the SI pumps, was not design verified.
- 2. Calculation numbers 789M M-02, Revision 0, dated December 15, 1989, 789M M 05, Revision 0, dated December 18, 1989, and RNP E-6.002. Revision 0, dated December 1, 1987, were not identified as voided or superseded when replaced by other design calculations.
(04014) This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Carolina Power and Light Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ATTN: Document Control Desk. Washington, D.C. NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-19
1 Notice of Violation 6 4 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a co)y to the NRC Resident Inspector at the Robinson facility, within 30 days of t1e date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if
- contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved. (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adecuately addresses the required response. If-an adequate reply is not receivec within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or
- why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause i
! is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time. l If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response to the Director, Office of Enforcement. United States Nuclear - Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 0001. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response . shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. ^ Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, 3roprietary, , or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR wit 1out redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you mus_tu s)ecifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withield and provide in detail the bases
- for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information J
will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the 2 information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information j is necessary to provide an acceptable respon.se, please provide the level of 4 protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this 4th day of March 1998 i i NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-20
[a n mac UNITED STATES
'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8 ;f k.
j REGON il
- ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
- 61 FoRSYTH STREET. SW, SUITE 23T85 8 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-3415 o o ...
June 11, 1998 i EA 98 208 l Duke Energy Corporation ATTN: Mr. G. R. Peterson Site Vice President Catawba Nuclear Station 4800 Concord Road
-York, South Carolina 29745 i
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50 413/98 03 AND 50 414/98 03) i l
Dear Mr. Peterson:
i This refers to the inspection conducted on February 22, 1998, through l April 11, 1998, at your Catawba Nuclear Station. The inspection included a ' review of surveillance testing of the Unit 2 auxiliary building filtered exhaust (VA) system. The results of the inspection were discussed with l members of your staff at the exit meeting conducted on April 21, 1998, and !
. formally transmitted to you by letter dated April 30, 1998. An open, I predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region II office'on i May 14, 1998, with you and mmbers of your staff to discuss the apparent l violations, the root causes, and corrective actions to preclude recurrence.
A list of conference attendees, copies of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) slides, and presentation material provided by Duke Energy Corporation (DEC) are enclosed. Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information you provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of regulatory requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violations involve: (1) failure to implement the seven day restoration actions of TS 3.7.7 following a failure to satisfy Technical Specification l l (TS) surveillance requirement 4.7.7.b.3 for the Unit 2 "A" train VA system: l (2) failure to take prompt corrective action in accordance with 10 CFR 50. I Appendix B, Criterion XVI, associated with a low flow condition on the l Unit 2 "A" train VA system: (3) failure to follow procedures for system operability determinations following surveillance testing of the Unit 2 A train VA system: (4) failure to verify, as required by arocedure, that all activities described by Minor Modification CNCE 7901 had aeen implemented.in the field before closing the modification: and (5) failure to ensure that adequate prerequisites for surveillance testing of the VA system were established as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XI. NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-21 l
DEC 2 The violations can be attributed to the following root causes. DEC failed to thoroughly examine potential degradation of the VA system when a low flow condition was identified on the "A" train of the VA system in February 1998. In March 1998, during a required surveillance test of the VA system, the "A" train failed to meet the TS acceptance criteria: however, established procedures for determining TS operability were not followed. When the failure to meet the TS acceptance criteria was identified and discussed with DEC management, DEC management failed to promptly declare the system inoperable. In addition, inadequacies in the surveillance procedure description of the required initial test conditions contributed to engineering decisions which delayed restoration of the system to an operable status. DEC management and staff determined that the system was operable because they believed the initial test conditions were inadequate, but did not promptly identify that appropriate initial test conditions were not specified in the surveillance test. Although the actual safety consequence associated with these violations was minimal. the failure of management to ensure adherence to TS requirements for operability and testing of equipment is a significant regulatory concern. In particular, the NRC is concerned that e nagement decisions with regard to the operability of the VA system were non conservative and resulted in failure to meet the TS restoration requirements. The failure of multiple barriers involving TS adherence, surveillance testing procedures, administrative procedures, and management oversight is a significant regulatory concern. Therefore, these violations have been classified in the aggregate in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy). NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level III problem. i In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount ! of $55,000 is considered for a Severity Level III problem. Because your l facility has not been the subject of escalated enforcement action within the last two years or two inspections, the NRC considered whether credit was i warranted for Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process described in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. l Your corrective actions were prompt and comprehensive and included the return of the VA system to operable status: the establishment of a surveillance test working group: review and revision, as needed, of heating / ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) procedures; clarification of management expectations regarding TS requirements: review of other HVAC modifications for closeout issues and expansion to this review to modifications other than HVAC modifications: and reinforcement of modification requirements with engineering personnel. Based on these actions, the NRC concluded that credit is warranted for Corrective Action. _ i l Therefore, to encourage prompt and comprehensive correction of violations and in recognition of the absence of previous escalated enforcement, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director. Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty. NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-22
- DEC 3
,i In addition, as discussed at the conference, NRC Integrated Inspection Report 50 413.414/98 03 also identified an apparent violation for failure to u)date the Final Safety Analysis Re) ort (FSAR) following 1996 modifications to . t1e VA system. This modification clanged routine operation of the VA system i from the alignment described in the FSAR, i.e., flow bypassing the HEPA and carbon filters, to operation in the filtered mode. As described in the Notice, this violation has been characterized at Severity Level IV. : ! During the predecisional enforcement conference, you indicated that the
- March 23, 1998, date used in the second paragraph on page 14 of Inspection Report 50 413.414/98 03 was in error. You clarified that the correct date when DEC engineering personnel began to question the basis of the conclusion that the VA system was inoperable was March 24, 1998. The NRC accepts this clarification, and this letter serves to correct the record in this regard.
4 You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions i specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future
- inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is j necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice " a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and any response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not include
- any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction.
If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Loren Plisco, j j Director, Division of Reactor Projects, at (404) 562 4501. 1 Sincerely,
- f. ---
hLuisA.Reyes Regional Administrator
-Docket Nos. 50 413, 50 414 License Nos. NPF-35, NPF 52
Enclosures:
- 1. Notice of Violation
- 2. List of Conference Attendees
- 3. NRC Presentation Material
- 4. DEC Presentation Material NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-23 i i
l l
_- . .- -=- _- . _ ._ _. -. DEC 4 cc w/encls: M. S. Kitlan North Carolina Electric Regulatory Compliance Manager Membership Corporation Duke Energy Corporation P. O. Box 27306 4800 Concord Road Raleigh, NC 27611 York, SC 29745 9635 Assistant Attorney General Paul R. Newton N. C. Department of Justice Legal Department (PB05E) P. O. Box 629
' Duke Energy Cor mration Raleigh, NC 27602 422 South Churc1 Street Charlotte, NC 28242 0001 Saluda River Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Executive Director P. O. Box 929 Public Staff - NCUC Laurens, SC 29360 P. O. Box 29520 Raleigh; NC 27626 0520 Peter R. Harden IV Account Sales Manager J. Michael McGarry III. Esq. Energy Systems Sales Winston and Strawn Westinghouse Electric Corporation l 1400 L Street, NW P. O. Box 7288 i Washington, D. C. 20005 Charlotte, NC 28241 7288 North Carolina MPA 1 County Manager of York County Suite 600 York County Courthouse l P. O. Box 29513 York. SC 29745 Raleigh, NC 27626 0513 Piedmont Municipal Power Agency Chief 121 Village Drive Bureau of Radiological Health Greer. SC 29651-1 S. C. Department of Health and Environmental Control G. A. Copp l 2600 Bull Street Licensing EC050 l Columbia, SC 29201 Duke Energy Corporation l P. O. Box 1006 l Assistant Attorney General Charlotte, NC 28201 1006 l S. C. Attorney General's Office
- P. O. Box 11549 '
Columbia, SC 29211 l i Federal Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street. SW. Room 840 Washington, D. C. 20472 l NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-24 l i
NOTICE OF VIOLATION Duke Energy Corporation Docket Nos. 50 413. 50 414 Catawba Nuclear Station License Nos. NPF 35, NPF 52 EA 98 208 During an NRC inspection conducted on February 22, 1998, through April 11, 1998, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG 1600, the violations are listed below: A. Technical Specification 3.7.7, Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust System, requires that two trains of the Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust (VA) system shall be o>erable during Modes 14. With one train of the VA system inoperable, tie inoperable train shall be restored to operable status within 7 days or the reactor shall be placed in at least hot standby within the next 6 nours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours. Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7.b.3 states that each train of the VA system shall be demonstrated operable by verifying a system flow rate of 30,000 cubic feet per minute (cfm) +/- 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510 1980. Contrary to the above, on March 16. 1998, the Unit 2 A train VA system was inoperable in that the system flow rate was 26,129 cfm during surveillance testing in accordance with ANSI N510 1980: however, the licensee failed to implement the seven day restoration actions of Technical Specification 3.7.7 until Merch 25, 1998. As a result. Unit 2 remained in Mode 1 with the A train VA system inoperable for nine days. (01013) B. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, as implemented by Duke Power Company Topical Quality Assurance Program (Duke 1 A), requires, in part, that measures be established to ensure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures and nonconformances, are promptly identified and corrected. Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 4.7.7.b.3, 4.7.7.e. and 4.7.7.f address system testing requirements in accordance with American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard N510 1980. Testing of Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems. ANSI N510 1980, Testing of Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems, states that testing of the air cleaning system is an integral part of the licensee's Quality Assurance Program, and that surveillance tests are used to monitor the condition of associated systems. The ANSI standard also provides that an airflow capacity test acceptance criterion shall be within +/ 10% of system design flow. NUREG-0940 PART 2 B-25 Enclosure 1 l l L-
Notice of Violation 2 Contrary to the above, on February 9, 1998, during surveillance testing of the Unit 2 B train VA system, the licensee identified a low airflow condition associated with the Unit 2 A-train VA system, but failed to aromatly correct the low flow condition. Consequently, on Marc 1 16, 1998, the Unit 2 A train VA system failed to meet an airflow acceptance criterion of 30,000 cubic feet per minute (cfm) +/ 10% during an 18 month surveillance test required by TS 4.7.7. (01023) C. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 Revision 2. As referemed, this includes administrative and surveillance procedures. Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 203, Operability, Revision 10, Appendix A. 203, Operability Policy for Previously Identified Items, defines the licensee *s policy governing failed TS surveillance tests as follows:
"U)on initial discovery of a failed surveillance, the affected system.
I suasystem, train, component or device shall be declared inoperable and the applicable TS action statement entered." Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 203, Operability. Revision 10. Section 203.9.1, General Requirements, states that notification to Operations (Operations Shift Manager) shall be accomplished by completion of Appendix E, Operability Notification Form, as described by this directive. Surveillance procedure PT/0/A/4450/01C, Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Filter Train Performance Test, approved May 5, 1986, l Step 12.2.1.4.2, applies to surveillance tests of the auxiliary building filtered exhaust (VA) system whereby acceptance criteria have not been met and states, " Notify the Shift Supervisor, Performance Engineer and the Licensing Engineer, and have the system (equipment) declared inoperable in accordance with its LC0 in Tech. Specs." Contrary to the above, administrative and surveillance procedures were not implemented as evidenced by the following examples:
- 1. On March 16, 1998, the Unit 2 A train VA system was not declared '
i inoperable following a surveillance test during which system j performance failed to meet TS surveillance acceptance criteria, and l
- 2. On March 16, 1998, a formal, documented operability notification was not provided to the Operations Shift Manager following the March 16, 1998, VA system surveillance test failure. (01033)
NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-26
1 l I l Notice of Violation 3 D. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 Revision 2. As , referenced, this includes general procedures for the control of modification work. 1 Catawba Nuclear Station Modification Manual, Revision 15. Section 5.6.2, l states, that prior to returning the Minor Modification (MM) Work Orders to the Operational Control Group for Return To Service, the Implementation Accountable or MM Originator shall verify that all activities as described by the MM have been implemented in the field or a Variation Notice written to revise the MM's scope accordingly. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to verify that all activities described by Minor Modification CNCE 7901 (Resolution of System VA Filtered Exhaust Low Air Flow Concerns) had been implemented in the i field before closing the modification on December 23, 1996. As a result, three flow straighteners in the Unit 2 A train auxiliary building filtered exhaust (VA) system that should have been removed by ' CNCE-7901 were left installed until removed on March 25, 1998. (01043) E. 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, as implemented by Duke Power Company Topical Quality Assurance Program (Duke 1-A), states that a test program shall be established to ensure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems and components will perform satisfactorily in service. Test procedures shall include provisions for assuring, in part, that all prerequisites for the given test have been met. As referenced in Technical Specification 4.7.7, American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard N510 1980, Section 4.2. Test Procedures, states that test procedures shall identify, among other things, the arrangement or clearances that have to be made prior to the test and the prerequisites that have to be met. Contrary to the above, surveillance test procedure PT/0/A/4450/01C, Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Filter Train Performance Test, approved May 5,1986, did not establish a prerequisite controlling system configuration (pertaining to the status or position of various interfacing systems and components) for performance of the test. As a result, a consistent, repeatable test methodology had not been established to ensure that system performance trends were reliable indicators of flow degradation. (01053) These violations represent a Severity Level III problem (Supplement I). NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-27
~ . _ _ _ __
Notice of Violation 4 F. 10 CFR Part 50.71(e) states that each person licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor shall periodically update the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) to ensure that the information included in the FSAR contains the latest material developed. The updated FSAR shall be revised to include the effects of, in part, all changes made in the facility as described in the FSAR, Contrary to the above, as of April 9, 1998, the licensee failed to ensure that changes made during 1996 modifications CNCE 61117 and CNCE-61118 to the auxiliary building filtered exhaust (VA) system to routinely operate the VA system in the filtered mode were reflected in revisions to the applicable sections (7.6.12.1 and 7.3.1.1.1) of the updated FSAR. (02014) This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201 Duke Energy Corporation (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. I Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at Catawba, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, sus > ended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not >e taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time. l If you contest this enforcement action, you'should also provide a copy of your j response to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear l Regulatory Commission. Washington, DC 20555 0001. < Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. i Because your res>onse will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possi]le, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, ; or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must s)ecifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withield and provide in detail the bases NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-28 P
1 Notice of Violation 5 for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide am acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this lith day of-June 1998 l l 1 i l r NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-29
oq
** p s atc k, UNITED STATES
-g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[ ,8 REGION IV L g 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE. SUITE 400
.g*****g[ ARUNGTON TEXAS 76011 8064
. February 5, 1998 EA 97-589 Charles M. Dugger, Vice President Opershons -Waterford 3 Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOL.ATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-382/97-26) Dear Mr. Dugger. This refers to the predecmonal enforcement conference conducted January 23,19'98, in the NRC's Arlington, Texas office The conference was conducted to discuss several apparent violatons related to a November 1997 incxient involving a mispositioned valve controller in the auxiliary component cooling water system at the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford-3). The apparent violations were identified during an NRC inspection that concluded on December 15,1997, when the inspection findings were conveyed to Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) by telephone, and were documented in the subject inspection rero. on January 5,1998. Based on the information developed during the inspechon, and our consideration of the informaten that you prov ded during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violabon (Nohce) and the circumstances surrounding them were described in detail in the subject inspection report. In brief, the violations are related to a failure to retum the controller for Valve ACC-126A to automatic operation following its use on November 9,1997, an error which went unrecognized for 15 hours despite several control board walkdowns by operators and a shift tumover. The failure to retum this valve to automatic rendered Train A of the auxiliary component cooling water system inoperable. Operators compounded this error by removing Train B of the auxiliary component cooling water system from service for routine maintenance on November 10,1997, without first physically verifying the operability of Train A. Both trains of this system remained inoperable for approximately 7.5 hours. The problem was ultimately corrected on November 10,1997, when a relief operator walked down the control boards and discovered the mispositioned valve. Train A was immediately restored to service. The violations include the procedural error that resulted in the mispositioned valve controller, the failure te verify the operability of Train A before taking Train B out of service, and the failure to discover the mispositioned controller during control board walkdowns and shift tumover. We recognize that the Waterford-3 auxiliary component cooling water system, which supports the component cooling water system, may not have been necessary to support the safety function of the ultimate heat sink, given the meteorological conditions that existed at the time of this incident, and the likelihood that operators could have restored Train A operability after receiving NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-30 l
4 r'* Entergy Operations, Inc. l a high temperature alarm on the component cooling water system. The NRC also recognizes that no audible or visible alarms were triggered as a result of the controller being in the wrong , . position. Nonetheless, these violations are safety significant because a safety system which is designed to remove heat under certain accident conditions, and which was required to be operable at the time, was rendered incapable of operating automatically as designed. In i addition, as discussed at some length during the conference, corrective actions for previous, similar events involving mispositioned switches and valves (NRC inspection report 50-382/96-
- 13) were not effectively impleme'nted in this case, as evidenced by the many missed opportunities to have discovered this error earlier.
[ Accordingly, these violations are classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level lil problem in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" 4 (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a civil penalty with a base value of $55,000 is considered for a Severity Level lli problem. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two years! the
. NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in 3 accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Given that the mispositioned valve controller was discovered by a Waterford-3 operator and not revealed by an event, and that the failures to identify the error earlier also were discovered by Entergy, the NRC concludes that credit for identification is warranted. We also conclude that credit for corrective actions is warranted. Your corrective actions included:
immediate action to restore system operability and walk down all control boards; debrief of all operators on duty when ACC-126A was mispositioned; meetings with all shift personnel to reinforce expectations for walkdowns and shift turnover; procedural revision to eliminate two actions in one step in OP-002-001; implementation of control board assessments by shift technical advisor during shift tumover; enhancement of shift turnover control board walkdown procedure; and plans for a corrective action effectiveness review within six months. Therefore, to encourage identification and comprehensive correction of violations before events occur, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to assess a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations of this nature in the future could result in a civil penalty. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
'For example, a $50.000 civd penalty was issued March 28.1996 (EA 96-025); a $50,000 civd penalty was issued December 26,1996 (EA 96-255); and a $55.000 civil penalty was issued May 9.1997 (EA 97-099).
NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-31
Entergy Operations, Inc. in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). Sincerely, Ellis W. Regional Adm; L tor Docket No.: 50-382 License No.: NPF-38
Enclosure:
Nohce of Violation cc w/
Enclosure:
Executive Vice President and l Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc. P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 Vice President, Operations Support Entergy Operstkms, Inc. P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway P.O. Box 651 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 General Manager, Plant Operations Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc. P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 Manager- Licensing Manager , Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc. P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-32
l i ', Entergy Operations, Inc. I Chairman Louisiana Public Service Commission One American Place, Suite 1830 l Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825-1697 Director, Nuclear Safety & i Regulatory Affairs Waterford 3 SES i Entergy Operations, Inc. l P.O. Box B l Killona, Louisiana 70066 William H. Spell, Administrator Louisiana Radiation Protection Division . P.O. Box 82135 ! Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70884-2135 i Parish President ! St. Charias Parish P.O. Box 302 i Hahnville, Louisiana 70057 l Mr. William A. Cross Bethesda Licensing Office 3 Metro Center Suite 610 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Winston & Strawn 1400 L Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005-3502 NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-33
NOTICE OF VIOLATION Entergy Operations, Inc. Docket No. 50-382 Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 License No. NPF-38 EA 97-589 During an NRC inspection completed December 15,1997, violations of NRC requirements were identified, in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the violations are listed below: 1 A. Technical Specification 3.7.3 states that at least two independent trains of auxiliary component cooling water shall be operable while in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. Contrary to the above, on November 10,1997, two independent trains of auxiliary component cooling water were not maintained operable in Mode 1. Specifically, both trains of the auxiliary component cooling water were inoperable for approximately 7.5 , hours with the plant in Mode 1. (01013) ' B. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, " Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operations)," Revision 2, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, item 1.b requires that administrative procedures be established for safe operation and shutdown of the facility.
- Procedure OP-100-001, " Duties and Responsibilities of Operators on Duty," Revision 12, .
described the responsibilities for the control room supervisor and the nuclear plant ! operstnrs related to personnel conduct and control of operating activities. These responsibilities are described, in part, by the following steps in this procedure: Step 4.4.5: Nuclear plant operators will " Continuously monitor performance of plant control systems and Control Room instrumentation to verify operability." , l Step 5.4.1.1: "On-duty operators shall be attentive to all status indicators and , plant parameters and investigate abnormal conditions or trends." j Step 5.4.1.2: "On-duty Operators must make every effort to keep themselves aware of the status of safety systems and major power generating components." Contrary to the above, on November 9-10,1997, the control room supervisor, primary i nuclear plant operator, and secondary nuclear plant operator failed to continuously j l monitor performance of Control Room instrumentation to verify operability, to remain I attentive to all status indicators, and to keep themselves aware of the status of safety ! systems as stated in Steps 4.4.5,5.4.1.1 and 5.4.1.2, respectively. Specifically, the ; operators failed to recognize that the manual / auto controller for Valve ACC-126A was not j in the required automatic position, rendering Train A of the ACCW system inoperable. l (01023) NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-34
i I i Entergy Operations, Inc. C. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, item 1.b requires that administrative procedures be established j for safe operation and shutdown of the facility. Procedure OP-100-001, Revision 12, Step 4.3.2.4 stated, in part, that the control room supervisor will " Monitor the Nuclear Plant Operators in the performance of their duties." Contrary to the above, on November 9-10,1997, the control room supervisor failed to monitor the activities of the secondary nuclear plant operator who secured Auxiliary ' Component Cooling Water Pump A without placing the manual / auto controller for Valve ACC-126A in automatic. (01033) D. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures l recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. l I Regulatory Guide 1.33, item 1.b requires that administrative procedures be established for safe operation and shutdown of the facility. i Procedure OP-100-001, Revision 12, described the responsibilities of the control room supervisor and the nuclear plant operators related to personnel conduct and control of operating activities. Specifically, these responsibilities are described by the following steps in this procedure: Step 4.3.2.9: The control room supervisor will, in part, " Direct the preparation and installation of Danger tags, verifying that Technical Specification requirements are , observed." Step 5.8.2.1.B: " Redundant subsystems or components shall be verified to be operable, Upon discovery of inoperable components, or prior to initiating maintenance on components required by Technical Specification Limiting Condit on for Operation, their redundant counterparts shall be verified to be operable." Contrary to the above, on November 10,1997, at 3 a.m. (CST) the control room l supervisor failed to direct the preparation of Danger tags, verifying that Technical Specification requirements were observed; and the nuclear plant operators failed to verify redundant subsystems were operable and failed to verify a redundant counterpart to an auxiliary component cooling water train was operable prior to initiating maintenance on the opposite train. Specifically, nuclear plant operators removed Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Train B from service, which included placing Danger tags, for routine maintenance without ensuring operability of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Train A. l (01043) 4
- NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-35 1 .
f ( Entergy Operations, Inc. E. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, item 1.d states requirements will be established for procedure adherence and temporary change methods and item 3.m states requirements for startup, operation, and shutdown of the service water system. Procedure OP-100-001, Revision 12, described the responsibilities of the nuclear plant operators related to use of procedures. Specifically, these responsibilities are described by the following steps in this procedure: Step 4.4.11: Nuclear plant operators will " Operate plant systems in accordance with plant procedures and as directed by the SS/CRS." Step 5.13.8: " Operators shall comply with both the content and intent of approved procedures." Procedure OP-002-001, " Auxiliary Component Cooling Water System," Revision 11, Section 7, Step 6 required operators to set the manual / auto controller setpoint for Valve ACC-126A(B), auxiliary component cooling water system flow control, to s 95'F and to place the controller in automatic. Contrary to the above, on November 9-10,1997, the secondary nuclear plant operator failed to comply with the intent of Procedure OP-002-001 for securing an auxiliary component cooling water train. Specifically, the operator failed to perform Procedure OP-002-001, Section 7, Step 6 that required placing the manual / auto controller for Valve ACC-126A to automatic. (01053) F. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, item 1.g states that requirements be established in administrative procedures for shift relief and turnover. Procedure OP-100-007, " Shift Tumover," Revision 16, described the requirements for control room operators to perform control panel walkdowns during shift turnover and during the shift. Specifically, Step 5.1.7 stated, "Every shift the Shift Superintendent, Control Room Supervisor, Primary Nuclear Plant Operator, and the Secondary Nuclear Plant Operator shall perform two control board walkdowns. One control board wa!kdown per watchstander shall be documented by signing the control board walkdown signature block of the appropriate tumcver sheet." Step 5.1.8 stated,"A complete control board walkdown is performed by thcughtfully observing every light, every indicator, every switch, and every button Feither, Step 5.5.3 stated, "The oncoming and off-going NPOs should walk down the control panels together. Discussions should include, but are not limited to, the following items: Status of safety-related systems; operating equipment and system alignments: NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-36
i Entergy Operations, Inc. -4 l l Contrary to the above, on November 9-10,1997, numerous opportunities existed for the night shift watchstanders to identify the mispositioned indicator when evaluating every indicator and every switch as specified in Procedure OP-100-007, Steps 5.1.7 and 5.1.8. Also, several missed opportunities occurred during shift tumover control panel walkdowns while the nuclear plant operators discussed the status of the safety-related
)
auxiliary component cooling water system and the respective equipment status / alignment. Specifically, from 7:21 p.m. on November 9 until 10:25 a.m. (CST) on , November 10,1997, several operators failed to comply wri Procedure OP-100-007, in that, at least eight opportunities during the night shift and at least three opportunities during shift tumover occurred to identify that the controller for Valve ACC-126A was misaligned. (01063) These violations represent a Severity Level lit problem (Supplement l).
, Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Entergy Operations, Inc., is hereby required to l submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, l ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional
! Administrator, Region IV, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Raply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing
- the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date
, when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where j good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time. If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 4 20555-0001. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you_my.st specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-37
l Entergy Operations, Inc. , 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please ; provide the level of protechon described in 10 CFR 73.21. i Dated at Mington, Texas I 1 this 5th day of February 1998 I i l l l
- NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-38
- - - . . . . ~ . ., . . . - . ~ . - ~ ~ . _ _., . - , _ _ . . .
b !' UNITED STATES l [km nas 'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l 8' n REGION H
! .g j ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER t 61 FORSYTH STREET SW. SUITE 23T85 8 ATLANTA GEORGIA 30303 3415
' April 3, 1998 -
EA 98 064 , Florida Power & Light Company ATTN: Mr. T. F. Plunkett- ; President Nuclear Division P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, Florida 33408 0420 SUBJECTi NOTICE OF VIOLATION . b (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50 335/98 01, 50 389/98-01)
Dear Mr. Plunkett:
This refers to the routine, announced inspection, conducted on January 23, 1998,.to review security access control measures at your St. Lucie facility. The results of the inspection were discussed with your staff during a i telephone conference exit meeting on January 26, 1998, and were formally sent to you by letter dated February 11, 1998. That letter also provided you the opportunity to respond to the apparent violation or request a predecisional 1 enforcement conference. An open, predecisional enforcement conference was conducted at your request in the Region II office on March 31, 1998, with you ; and members of your staff, to discuss the apparent violation, the root causes, and your corrective actions to preclude recurrence. Copies of the Nuclear ! Regulatory Commission's (NRC) and Florida Power & Light Company's (FP&L) presentation materials and a list of conference attendees are enclosed. j i I Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that was provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violation involved two examples of the failure to comply with the Physical Security Plan when a plant security officer failed to inactivate the keycards and hand geometry for two favorably terminated employees after being notified on December 31, 1997, that the two individuals had been terminated, and access authorization was to be withdrawn as of December 31. 1997. As a result, one contract employee-entered the protected area for approximately eight minutes on January 2,1998. In addition, between December 31, 1997, and January 2.1998, this employee could have gained access to protected and vital areas of the plant. As to the second employee whose access was not properly inactivated, this employee's keycard had been retrieved from him at the time of his termination on December 31, 1997. Therefore, this employee did not and could not have gained access to protected or vital areas. The actual safety consequence of the violation was low because both : l individuals _previously had been granted unescorted access to the protected and I' i vital areas and the unauthorized individual who entered the protected area on January 2.1998, was favorably terminated on December 31, 1997, but was
. unaware of this fact due to his absence from work on that date. Although the l ~NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-39 i
FP&L 2 violation was not" programmatic in nature and involved human error, the violation is of significant regulatory concern because the failure to control access of individuals no longer authorized entry into protected and vital areas of the plant could compromise overall plant security. Therefore, the violation has been categorized 11 accordance wP the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Acticas ' (Enforcement Policy), NUREG 1600, as a Severity Level III violation. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000 is considered for a Severity Level III violation. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two years.1 the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil' penalty assessment process described in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. NRC determined that credit was warranted for Identification because your staff identified the violation on January 2, 1998, upon recognizing that a terminated employee had accessed the protected area. With regard to the factor of Corrective Action, FP&L immediately removed the access authorization of the two terminated individuals; implemented interim actions to conduct all badging terminations at the Security Operations Center (which perforned prompt independent verification of such transactions); and, implemented procedural revisions to standardize the badging termination and verification processes. FP&L also hired an outside security contractor to assess the St. Lucie access program, conducted an internal quality assurance audit, and compared the St. Lucie access control program to access control programs of other nuclear facilities. Based on the above, the NRC determined that credit was warranted for the factor of Corrective Action. Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations. I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Pforcement, not 7 ) propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in tne future could result in a civil penalty. On January 10, 1997, a Severity Level III problem with a $50,000 civil penalty was issued for violations which occurred between July and September 1996 related to plant security access control at St. Lucie (EA 96 458). The NRC concluded, after review of the similarities between the current event and the 1996 event, that the root causes for the 1996 problem were programmatic and were not similar to the root cause for this event and that the corrective actions for the 1996 event would not have precluded occurrence of this violation. Therefore, the NRC did not consider the current violation a repetitive violation although the outcomes of both events were similar. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions 8 A Notice of Violation (NOV) and Proposed Imposition of Civil Pr ?lty in the amount of
$88.000 was issued on March 25. 1998 for a Severity Level II proble meiated with an incorrect Refueling Water Tank setpoint (EA 98 009). A Severity Level III problem wat issued on December 11. 1997 related to inoperability of the Unit 2 containment cooler fans (EA 97 501).
An NOV and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $100.000 was issued on January 10, 1997 for violations of the plant security sccess control progran.. the emergency preparedness program. and requirements for nuclear instrumentation (EAs 96 458. 464. and -457). A severity Level III violation was issued on September 19. 1996, assaciated with the failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.59 (EA 96 326). NUREG-0940, PART 2 B 40
FP&L 3 i specified in the' enclosed Notice when preparing your response. _The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. : i In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice." a copy of ; I this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be placed in the NRC
- Public Document Room (PDR).
i Sincerely, t
% Luis A. Reyes l Regional Administrator j Docket Nos. 50 335, 50 389 License Nos. DPR-67, NPF-16 i
Enclosures:
- 1. Notice of Violation
- 2. NRC Presentation Materials
- 3. FP&L Presentation Materials ;
- 4. List of Attendees cc w/encls:
J. A. Stall Vice President . St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 1 63E1 South Ocean Drive l Jensen Beach, FL 34957 H. N. Paduano, Manager Licensing and Special Programs Florida Power and Light Company P. O. Box 14000 ' Juno Beach. Fl 13408 0420 J. Scarola 1 Plant General Manager ! St. Lucie Nuclear Plant ! 6351 South Ocean Drive , Jensen Beach, FL 34957 l cc w/encls cont'd: See page 4 l l NI F5G-0940, PART 2 B-41
FP&L 4 ccw/enclscont'di E. J. Weinkam Licensing Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 6351-South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach,-FL 34957 M. S. Ross. Attorney Florida Power & Light Company l P. 0. Box 14000 ) Juno Beach. FL 33408-0420 !
' John T. Butler, Esq.
Steel. Hector and Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center Miami, FL 33131-2398 Office of Radiation Control Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services-1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399 0700 Director Division of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs 2740.Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399 2100 County Administrator
- St. Lucie County 2300 Virginia Avenue Ft. Pierce. FL 34982 NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-42
i i NOTICE OF VIOLATION Florida Power and. Light Company Docket Nos. 50 335, 59 389 l St. Lucie Nuclear Plant License Nos. DPR 67. NPF-16 Units 1 and 2 EA 98 064 During an NRC inspection conducted on January 23, 1998, a violation of NRC i requirements was identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of ! . Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions " NUREG 1600, the violation is listed below: Facility Operating License Nos. DPR 67 and NPF 16, Amendment 151, dated May 16, 1997, require that the licensee shall . fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved physical security, guard training and cualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments mace pursuant to the provisions of the , Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to l 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). l Section 13.4.4 of the licensee's Physical Security Plan, Revision 50, dated November 24, 1997, states, in part "Upon notification of the voluntary termination or the termination for cause of an individual authorized unescorted access, the Plant Security Supervision shall ; ensure that the keycard and hand geometry access capabilities are I' inactivated." Section 5.3(d) of the licensee's Physical Security Plan, Revision 50, l dated November 24, 1997, states, in part, "Only those individuals with identified need for access and having appropriate authorization, shall l be granted unescorted vital area access." i Contrary to the above, on December 31, 1997, plant security supervision failed to implement Section 13.4.4 of the Physical Security Plan to ensure that a voluntarily terminated individual's keycard and hand geometry access capabilities were inactivated. As a result, one unauthorized individual's unescorted access to vital areas continued in violation of the requirements of Section 5.3(d) of the Physical Security Plan between December 31, 1997, and January 2, 1998, and, in fact, the individual entered the protected area on January 2, 1998. In addition, on December 31, 1997, plant security supervision failed to implement Section 13.4.4 of the Physical Security Plan to ensure that a second favorably terminated individual's keycard and hand geometry were inactivated. (01013) This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement III). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Florida Power & Light Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the St. Lucie facility, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-43 Enclosure 1
~_ .-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _
Notice of Violation 2
~
include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level. (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or inciude previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence , adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not l received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for , Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, i suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration wil1 be given to extending the response time. If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response to the Director Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear , Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 0001. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. ( Because your res)onse will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to , the extent possi)le, it should not include any personal privacy, aroprietary, ' or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR wit 1out i redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must saecifically identify the portions of ' l your response that you seek to have withield and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information l is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of l-protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this 3rd day of April 1998 , 1 NUREG-0940, PART 2 B44 _ - - - ----- ------------- - - - - - - A
4 . _ . - . . -. . . _ . - - - .. _ _ . . . _ _ . - _ ___.___ .- - J
. # o,, UNITED STATES j n_ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
, .1 REGloN f ; a g - 475 ALLENDALE ROAD ; g, KING oF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 e.... :
- January 27, 199.8 EA 97-533
)
Mr. James Langenbach - Vice President and Director, TMI . ! i GPU Nuclear Corporation. l
.Three Mile Island Nuclear Station i
< Post Office Box 480 l Middletown, Pennsylvania - 17057-0191
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
- (NRC Integrated inspection Report No. 50-289/97-09)
Dear Mr. Langenbach:
This refers to the inspection conducted between September 7,1997, and November 1,1997, at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station in Middletown, Pennsylvania, the findings of whicb were discussed with members of your staff during an exit meeting on November 13,1997. Dunng the inspection, apparent violations were identified related to your activities during the 12th refueling outage. The inspection report addressing these issues was previously forwarded to you on December 2,1997. On December 22, 1997, a predecisional enforcement conference (conference) was conducted with you and members of your staff, to discuss the violations, their causes, and your corrective actions. Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that you provided during the conference, three violations of NRC requirements are being cited and are described in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). The circumstances surrounding the , violations are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violations involve: (1) I inadequate post-maintenance testing following replacement of the pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV), in October 1995, that resulted in failure to detect that the PORV actuation circuit was miswired rendering the PORV inoperable; (2) failure to follow procedures when filling the reactor coolant system (RCS) on October 5,1997, that resulted in an uncontrolled spill of_ water from the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) vents; and (3) inadequacies in l the procedure for the control of radioactive (hot) particles that resulted in a worker receiving a significant skin exposure on October 4,1997. The most significant violation involved the inoperable PORV. During rewiring of the PORV actuation solenoid, following replacement of the PORV during the 11R refueling outage in October,1995, the terminal connections on the solenoid were not clearly marked. Nonetheless, neither the technician who landed the leads, nor the technician that independently verified the wiring, stopped and positively determine the correct terminal locations. Instead, both technicians made incorrect assumptions as to the terminal locations. As a result, the PORV was miswired and would not have opened in response to a manual or automatic actuation signal. NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-45
GPU Nuclear Corporation 2 The failure to perform adequate post-maintenance testing following replacement of the pressurizer PORV resulted in this condition not being identified. Specifically, following the incorrect wiring of its actuation solenoid, no test was performed to ensure that the PORV would open in response to an automatic or manual actuation signal. This failure constitutes a violation of the Technical Specification (TS) requirement to perform in-service testing. At the conference, you indicated that the failure to perform the post maintenance test (PMT) was due to procedural and work scheduling inadequacies. Specifically, no PMT checkoff was provided in the PORV replacement and inspection procedures, and there was incomplete guidance in the Job order package to direct the performance of the PMT. The inability to open the PORV would have prevented it from performing its pressure relief function either during power operations or during low temperature conditions during heatup i and cooldown. Even though the pressurizer safety valves (the primary pressure relief system), were available to provide overpressure protection during power operations, and administrative i controls were in place to provide low temperature overpressure protection, the diversity ! provided by the PORV for these functions was not available for the entire operating cycle, a - petd of 23 months. Additionally, the PORV would not have been available to provide a bleed : path for high pressure injection (HPI) cooling or to depressurize the RCS to establish long term i decay heat removal following a steam generator tube rupture. The unavailability of the PORV for pressure relief or HPl cooling had potential consequences in that it resulted, as determined by your own calculations, in a 16% increase in the TMl core damage frequency, if an event ; occurred needing the PORV to be opened. This was preventable if requirements for post- , maintenance testing had been met.' Therefore, the violation has been categorized at Severity ~ i Level 111 in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC' Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000is ! considered for the Severity Level ill violation that occurred prior to November 12,1995. l Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last
- t 2 years,' the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for /dentification and Corrective ,
! Act/on in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the i l Enforcement Policy. Credit was warranted for identification because your staff identified, j during the 12R refueling outage, that the PORV had been miswired and that no PMT had been l pnformed following the 11R refueling outage. Credit was also warranted for corrective , actions because your actions were considered both prompt and comprehensive. Those ! l actions included: (1)- communication of management expectations for self-checking, I l independent verification, and performance of post-maintenance testing; (2) planned revisions : L to the PORV maintenance procedure to clarify the PMT requirements, and to the job order ! program to include the vendor manual wiring diagrams in the job order package; (3) review of other work packages to ensure that all required PMTs had been performed; and (4) plans to perform a process study to identify and correct weaknesses in the PMT program. ; 7 r c.g., A Nouce of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $210,000 was issued ! on October 8,1997 (EAs 97-070, 97-117, 97-127, and 97-256), for numerous violations related to several areas of lant P performance including engineering design controls, classification and environmental qualification of components, corrective actions, and emergency preparedness. NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-46 i i ___o.___________-___
GPU Nuclear Corporation 3 Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result , in a civil penalty. With respect to the overfill of the RCS, the shift supervisor (SS), who was supervising the fill l and vent of the RCS in October,1997, believed that there was not enough water available in i the reactor coolcnt bleed tank (RCBT) to complete the intended evolution. Although the SS l appropriately consulted his supervisor and was told that there was sufficient water available ; in the RCBT, the SS, still believing that there was insufficient water available, used an I inappropriate procedure to fill the RCS from the borated water storage tank (BWST). Other control room operators did not question the SS's decision. Your staff failed to adhere to the limitations provided in the decay heat removal (DHR) system operating procedure (OP) when they used the DHR pumps to provide makeup to the RCS directly from the BWST during the fill and vent of the RCS. Additionally, they failed to fcilow the RCS fill and vent procedure when they failed to terminate the RCS fill at the required point. An a result, borated water spilled onto the reactor vessel head and control rod drive (CRD) components, potentially i degrading those components and creating a radiological condition warranting remediation. ! While this violation is classified at Severity Level IV given the significance of the occurrence, ! it raises concerns regarding the questioning attitude of the staff and management's expectations for adherence to procedures. At the conference, you indicated that the problem was that the SS failed to comply with normal work practices specified in your conduct of I operations administrative procedure (AP), rather than a failure to adhere to the RCS fill and I vent procedure or the DHR system operating procedure. The NRC is concerned that plant management may not be providing a high standard for procedure adherence and may be providing operators with the impression that it is acceptable to use procedures that were not specifically prepared to support an activity. Finally, with respect to the inadequate hot particle control procedure, an emergent hot particle area was discovered during surveys of newly exposed surfaces upon raising the reactor vessel head seal plate following work in the fuel transfer canal in October,1997. Upon discovery of these conditions, the radiation control technician (RCT) assigned to the job elected to proceed without consulting supervision. Although the area was subsequently decontaminated, the surveys that were performed following the decontamination were not adequate to verify the removal of the hot particles. Additionally, a hot particle control area was not formally established. Your radiological protection (RP) procedure RP for hot particle controls was inconsistent with 10 CFR 20.1501 in that it did not provide sufficient direction to assure that adequate surveys were performed and that adequate hot particle controls were established. This constituted a violation of Technical Specification requirements for the radiation protection program which require that procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 20. As a result of the inadequate surveys and lack of sufficient hot particle controls, a worker received a calculated dose of approximately 14 rem to the skin. While the violation is classified at Severity Level IV, the NRC is concerned that, when it was determined that hot particles were present, an evaluation, to determine the quantities and magnitude of the hot particle contamination, was not performed. Consequently, NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-47
GPU Nuclear Corporation 4 an appropriate interval for personnel frisking for hot particles was not established. Without these controls, there was a potential for skin exposures even more significant than the exposure that occurred. With respect to the apparent violation involving the failure to follow procedures for the once-through steam generator (OTSG) locked high radiation area that was discussed at the conference, the NRC concluded that the worker that left the OTSG manway area unattended with the high radiation area door unlocked failed to adhere to the requirements of your locked high radiation area AP. However, based on the information provided at the conference and during subsequent telephone conversations with Mr. Etheridge of your staff, the NRC concluded that the potential for inadvertent entry into the high radiation area was low. The manway opening was continuously monitored at a remote location with a video camera and . the individual monitoring the opening by camera was in direct communication with personnel l in the close proximity of the unlocked manway. Therefore, because it was licensee-identified; was corrected immediately; and was not repetitive within the last two years, the violation of the locked high radiation area AP will not be cited in accordance with Section Vll.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the ; enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to i de'.armine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with : regulatory requirements. i , in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its i enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). i l ! Sincerely, i
)
H ert J. Miller Regional Administrator ; Docket No. 50-289 , License No. DPR-50 l
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-48 l 1 i
GPU Nuclear Corporation 5 cc w/ encl: , , J.' Fornicola, Director, Nuclear Safety Review M. Ross, Director, Operations and Maintenance D. Smith, PDMS Manager TMI-Alert (TMIA) ., M. Leggart, Manager, TMI Regulatory Affairs E. Blake, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge (Legal Counsel for GPUN) Commonwealth of Pennsylvania W 4 i NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-49
i ENCLOSURE NOTICE OF VIOLATION GPU Nuclear Corporation Docket No. 50-289 Three Mile Island Nuclear Station License No. DPR-50 j EA 97-533 During an NRC inspection conducted between September 7 and November 1,1997, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordanco with the " General Statement of Policy i and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600,the violations are listed below:
- 1. VIOLATION ASSOCIATED WITH INOPERABLE PORV l Technical Specification 4.2.2 requires that in service testing (IST) of ASME Code Class l 1, Class 2, and Class 3 valves shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code). The ASME Code and OMa-1988, Part 10, paragraph 3.4, requires that, when a valve or its control system has been replaced, an in-service test must be performed prior to returning the valve to service.
Contrary to the above, on October 31,1995, the pressurizer power operated relief
- valve (PORV), a Class 1 vaive, was returned to service without performing an IST to i verify proper valve operation after the PORV was replaced. As a result, a wiring error, i that prevented the PORV from opening in response to an automatic or manual signal, ;
was not detected. Consequently, the PORV was inoperable for the operating cycle from October,1995, until September, 1997. (01013) This is a Severity Level lli violation (Supplement 1). ,
- 11. VIOLATION ASSOCIATED WITH RCS OVERFILL j Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1 requires, in part, that Written procedures be !
implemented covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix 'A' of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Repulatory G0ide 1.33, Appendix !
'A', section 3.0 recommends, in part, instructions for filling and venting the reactor !
coolant system (RCS) and for operation of decay heat removal systems. Operating procedure (OP) 1103-2, " Fill and Vent of the Reactor Coolant System," section 3.1.2, step 17.c, requires, in part, that when the level at the center control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) is observed at one to two feet below the top, terminate the RCS fill and hold le.el. OP 1104-4, " Decay Heat Removal System," section ll of Enclosure 2, "Make Up to the RCS Directly from the BWST," provides a caution that make up to the RCS directly ! from the borated water storage tank (BWST) must be carefully monitored since large NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-50
l 1 volumes of water can be transferred very rapidly. Step 1 of section ll states, in part, { that controlling the level in the RCS using this method is not considered to be, nor ! should it be, used as a major RCS fill and vent method. : Contrary to the above, on October 15,1997, the licensee failed to properly implement , operating procedures 1103-2 and 1104-4 while filling and venting the RCS following ! a refueling outage. Specifically, while filling the RCS from the reactor coolant bleed tank (RCBT) in accordance with OP 1103-2, make up to the RCS was established ' directly from the BWST, contrary to the instructions in Enclosure 2 of OP 1104-4. The additional makeup caused a prompt rise in pressurizer lesel. Even though the operators observed the level increase in the control room and terminated the RCS fill from the RCBT, the makeup from the BWST was not immediately terminated due to coramunications difficulties. Consequently, approximately 50 gallons of RCS water l overflowed out of the CRDM vents onto the reactor vessel head area. (02014) This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1). Ill. VIOLATION ASSOCIATED WITH HOT PARTICLE CONTAMINATION Technical Specification 6.11, Radiation Protection Program, requires that procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 20 and shall be approved, maintained, and adhered w for all operations involving personnel radiation exposure. 1 10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee shall make or cause to be made, surveys ' that may be necessay for the licensee to comply with the regulations in 10 CFR 20 and are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the extent of radiation levels, l concentrations or quantities of radioactive material, and the potential radiological l hazards that could be present. j Contrary to the above, as of October 4,1997, the licensee's hot particle control procedure, Procedure 6610-ADM-4110.04,was inconsistent with 10 CFR 20.1501, in that it did not cause surveys to be made to assure compliance with 10 CFR 20.1201(a)(2)(ii), which limits radiation expocure to the skin. Specifically, the procedure did not provide sufficient direction to assure that surveys to verify elimination of hot particles following decontamination of newly exposed surfaces upon raising the reactor vessel seal plate, were adequate to evaluate the potential radiation hazards. As a result, the hot particles were not sufficiently removed such that the area did not require hot particle controls, nor were hot particle controls established. Consequently, due to a hot particle, a radiation worker received a skin exposure of approximately 14 rem,30% of the 10 CFR 20.1201 annuallimit of 50 rem. (03014) This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1). NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-51 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, GPU Nuclear Corporation is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrat r, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time. j Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary l information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. if you request withholding of such material, you Elat specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have l withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an : acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 27thday of January 1998 I NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-52 i
_-. - - ~ __ .. _ _ _ _ - - _ ._ _ _ _ _ - .__ _ . _ . . . i l 4' I
, UNITED STATES j'
[ 5
}' j,j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGloN 1 ;
l
,* 475 ALLENDALE ROAD a KING oF PRUSSIA, PENNSVLVANIA 19406-1415
. . . . + /g I j
- EA No. ' 97 617 l February 8,1998
- l Mr. Michael B. Roche '
f Vice President and Director ! L GPU Nuclear incorporated '
- Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
- P.O. Box 388 i
Forked River, New Jersey 08731 j
SUBJECT:
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50 219/97-10AND NOTICE OF
- . VIOLATION i
Dear Mr. Roche:
i. On December 28,1997, the NRC completed an integrated inspection at your Oyster Creek reactor facility. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection, as wall as a radiological effluent inspection and follow-up for the period October 20 - 24,1997. During' the inspection period covered by this report, your conduct of activities at the Oyster
- Creek facility was generally characterized by safety-conscious operations, sound
- engineering and maintenance practices, and careful radiological work controls. Howe"er, based on the information developed during the inspection, and the information that you i provided in your response to our March 4,1997, Confirmatory Action Letter 1 008, the 4- NRC has determined that seven violations of NRC sequirements occurred. The violations j' are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the inspection report.
! The most significant of thase violations involved fe!!ures to perform safety evaluations prior to downgrading the quality classifications of plant components and systems that were i'
- described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Three examples in which safety
- evaluations were not performed are cited in Section A of the enclosed Notice. These l examples were identified at Oyster Creek after programmatic weaknesses in the equipment downgrading process, which was common to both Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island, !
were identified at Three Mile Island. On May 22,1997, a predecisional enforcement conference was conducted with GPUN staff to discuss the violations identified at Three Mile Island, their causes, and corrective i actions. - These programmatic issues were initially identified by the NRC, and a $210,000 l civil penalty was issued to GPUN on October 8,1997, for, in part, the equipment , classification problems at Three Mile Island. Since issues common to Three Mile Island and ! Oyster Creek, such as corporate procedures, were already addressed as part of that civil penalty, the enclosed Notice only includes those violations specific to Oyster
' NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-53
Michael B. Roche 2 Creek. In a telephone conversation between you and Mr. Peter W. Eselgroth, of my staff on January 16,1998, Mr. Eselgroth indicated that the NRC did not consider a predecisional enforcemerit conference necessary in order for the NRC to make an enforcement decision. You stated that you also did not consider such a conference to be necessary. Poor imp!ementation of the process for classifying components resulted in a number of nuclear safety related components being downgraded to a lower non-safety related classification without an appropriate safety evaluation or other supporting engineering documentation. Consequently, some components were inappropriately downgraded and others had the potential to be inappropriately downgraded. Components that were improperly downgraded were not subjected to the quality assurance program requirements necessary to assure system operability. The failure of your program for classifying components to assure that appropriate quality standards were maintained could have resulted in the failure of multiple safety-related components. Therefore, these violations are classified in the aggregate in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600 as a Severity Level lli problem. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level lli problem that occurred prior to November 12,1996. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement action within the last 2 years,' the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for /dentification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit was warranted for identification because your staff identified the violations at Oyster Creek in response to the problems that were identified at Three Mile Island. Credit was also warranted for corrective actions because your actions were considered both prompt and comprehensive. Those actions included: (1) completing safety evaluations for the downgraded equipment and restoring the inappropriately downgraded components to the original quality classification when needed; and (2) addressing the procedural and programmatic issues for the common GPU process by modifying procedures and providing training after the issues were identified at Three Mile Island. Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty. Because your prompt efforts properly evaluated this issue for root cause, and appropriate short and long term corrective measures have been developed and initiated, you are not required to respond to this violation unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your r.o rective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice.
'A Severity Level 111 Notice of Violation with no civil penalty was issued on November 17,1997 (EA 97-421) for violations related to design control.
NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-54
Michael B. Roche 3 Regarding the other violations, the NRC identified a violation related to equipment operators performing surveillance procedure steps out of sequence. This violation is cited in Section B of the enclosed Notice. Because your efforts in response to this violation were timely, identified the root cause, and addressed appropriate corrective actions, you are not required to respond to this violation unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice. The remaining three violations, as identified below, are cited in the Sections C, D, and E of the enclosed Notice. One of the violations involved the failure to properly implement technical specification requirements as related to the allowed number and configuration of inoperable local power range detectors during detector calibration activities. Two additional violations, identified by the NRC, involved failures to properly establish and implement adequate radiation monitoring system calibration and ventilation system oversight procedures. Please note that you are required to respond to this letter for these three violations and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). We appreciate your cooperation. Sincerely,
/
Hu ert J. Miller Regional Administrator Docket / License: ' 50 219/DPR-16 72-1004
Enclosures:
Notice of Violation NRC Inspection Report No. 50-219/97-10 cc w/ encl: G. Busch, Manager, Nuclear Safety & Licensing M. Laggart, Manager, Licensing & Vendor Audits State of New Jersey NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-55
APPENDIX A NOTICE OF VIOLATION GPU Nuclear incorporated Docket No. 50-219 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station License No. DPR 16 EA No. 97-617 During NRC inspect;ons conducted between October 20,1997, and December 28,1997, for which exit meetings were held on October 24,1997, and January 8,1998, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG 1600, the violations are listed below: A. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 111 (Design Control), requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and ( the design bases, as defined in 550.2 and as specified in the license application, for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies, are ; correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. l i These measures shall include provisions to assure that appropriate quality sta'ndards are specified and included in design documents and that deviations from such standards are controlled. Contrary to the above, between March 25,1991, and March 17,1994, the licensee failed to assure that deviations from appropriate quality standards were controlled in that they downgraded the quality classification of a number of systems and t components described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) without l performing associated evaluations for deviating from the existing quality classification. Examples, each of which constitutes a separate violation, are as l follows: , l
- 1. The quality control list (OCL) for main steam line flow transmitters FT-ID0033A and FT-IDOO33B, main steam line pressure transmitters PT-ID0046A, PT-1D0046B, and reactor vessel narrow range dome pressure transmitter PT-IDOO45 was revised on March 23,1992, to downgrade the components from a nuclear safety related (NSR) to a non-NSR classification without performing a safety evaluation. These transmitters are part of the reactor coolant pressure ,
boundary as described in UFSAR Section 5.1 and Table 5.1-2. -
- 2. The QCL for the five 4160 Vac breakers for the recirculation pumps was revised on March 17,1994, to downgrade the components from NSR to a non-NSR classification without performing a safety evaluation. The five -
recirculation pumps are required to automatically trip upon Isolation Condenser - system initiation as described in UFSAR Section 6.3.1.1. The OCL for the motors for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) lube oil circulating pumps (P-39 3 & P-39-4) and AC turbo lube oil pumps (P-39-23 & P- ; 39-25) each was revised on March 25,1991, to downgrade the components from a NSR to a non-NSR classification without performing a safety evaluation. NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-56 t 4 m_ ,#- ....
1 Appendix A 2 The UFSAR (Section 9.5.7) states that tube oilis warmed in the lube oil cooler and circulated through the engine by a circulating oil pump, and that an AC turbocharger oil pump circulates warm oil to turbocharger bearings when the diesel is not running. These violations represent a Severity Level lll Problem (Supplement 1). B. Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities recommended in Appendix 'A' of Regulatory Guide 1.33. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix 'A' recommends administrative procedures for procedure adherence. Administrative Procedure 107, Revision 49, Procedure Control, Step 4.2 requires personnel to follow approved procedures as written. Contrary to the above, personnel did not follow approved procedures as written as evidenced *by the following examples:
- 1. On November 15,1997, operators conducted procedure 614.4.001, Revision 27, fuel Pool Coo /ing Pump In-Service Test, and f ailed to follow the test sequence specified in procedure step 6.4. Specifically, with the 'A' pump initially in service, operators performed section 6.8.6 prior to performing section 6.5, as required by the procedure.
- 2. On November 20,1997, operators conducted procedure 607.4.004, Revision 33, Containment Spray and Emergency Service Water System 1 Pump Operability andin-Service Test, and prematurely isolated the 'A' emergency service water pump discharge pressure gauge. Specifically, operators shut V-3-157 after performing step 6.32 vice in step 6.60 as required by the procedure.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement 1). C. Technical Specification 3.1.B.3 requires that except during the performance of l Technical Specification required LPRM/APRM (local power range monitor / average I power range monitor) surveillance testing, reactor power shall be reduced below the 80% rod line or the corresponding RPS (reactor protection system) trip system shall be placed in the tripped condition whenever all three of the following conditions exist:
- 1. Reactor power is greater than 35%
-and-
- 2. More than one LPRM detector is bypassed or failed in the A level or
~
the B level assigned to a single APRM channel , 1
-and-NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-57
(_--..---.-..._..-.----_....-.-....---__--.--.._..-.-__ 4 Appendix A 3 l
- 3. The diagonally opposite quadrant contains a single APRM channel i with more than one bypassed or failed LPRM detector on the same i axial level as the bypassed or failed detectors specified in (2) above Contrary to the above, on February 21,1995, the licensee placed the unit in a
' lineup in which the above three conditions existed simultaneously, to perform a test not required by Technical Specifications, and did not reduce reactor power below
- the 80% rod line or place the corresponding RPS trip system in the tripped i condition. Specifically, with reactor power at 100% and B level LPRMs 04-25 and i 20-25 (associated with APRM channel 7) in the bypassed condition, the licensee
- removed APRM channel 5 (located in the diagonally opposite quadrant) to perform non-Technical Specification required testing.
- l 1
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I). I D. Technical Specificatinn 6.8.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, , 4
' implemented and maintained covering the activities recommended in Appendix 'A' i i of Regulatory Guide 1.33.. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix 'A' recommends procedures for the control of radioactivity, including procedures involving radiation monitoring systems (RMS).
Contrary to the above, as of October 24,1997, the licensee had failed to establish - and implement adequate RMS calibration procedures as evidenced by: (1) no documentation or poor documentation of the electronic calibration data, (2) inadequate testing to determine optimum operating high voltage, (3) incorrect performance of the secondary calibration, and (4) no determinations of conversion factors and linearity for the intended monitoring ranges. This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement IV). E. Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities recommended in Appendix 'A' of Regulatory Guide 1.33.. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix 'A' recommends procedures for the control of radioactivity, including procedures directed to ! performance verification of ventilation systems. i Contrary to the above as of October 24,1997, the licensee failed to establish and i implement procedures to verify that the design basis relative to air balance affecting the Auxiliary Offgas Building (AOG) building, New Radioactive Waste (NRW) , building, and turbine building area ventilation systems, was maintained within the specifications as described by the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement IV). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, GPU Nuclear Incorporated is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for violations C, D, and E: ' NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-58
- - .~ . , - ~ _
Appendix A 4 l l (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation; (2) ! the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations; and (4) the date when full compliance will be i achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if
- I the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an ariequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is '
shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time l Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you mVjil specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withhold-ing (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financialinformation), if safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at King of Prussia, PA this 8th day of February,1998. I i NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-59
euh q kg UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [ 8 REGION I
.Q 475 ALLENDALE ROAD f4 g[ KING oF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415
***** April 1, 1998 EA 98-073 Mr. Ted C. Feigenbaum Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
- Seabrook Station -
North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation c/o Mr. Terry L. Harpster Post Office Box 300 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION - (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-443/97-08)
Dear Mr. Feigenbaum:
This letter refers to the NRC inspection conducted between December 7,1997, and January 31,1998, at the Seabrook station, the results of which were discussed with you during an exit meeting on February .12,1998. During the inspection, apparent violations of NRC requirements were identified, as noted in the inspection report sent to you with our letter, dated February 27,1998. On March 24,1998, a Predecisional Enforcement Conference (conference) was conducted with you and members of your staff to discuss the related
. violations, their causes, and your corrective actions.
Based on the information developed during the inspection, and the information provided during i
. the conference, three violations of NRC requirements are being cited and are set forth in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). All three violations involve the failure to promptly identify and/or correct conditions adverse to quality at the facility. Collectively, these violations represent a significant lack of attention toward licensed responsibilities since ,
opportunities existed, in each case, to correct these adverse conditions sooner; yet appropriate ' actions were not taken. At the enforcement conference, you acknowledged these concerns, noting that a complacent attitude may have contributed to these failures. You also recognized .
. the need for greater operational focus, and more aggressive follow up, by staff at the station. l 1
i in one case, in November 1996, your staff identified potential leakage (in the form of boric acid residue extemal to the fire protection pipe wrap material) from stainless steel piping in the ! vicinity of the "B" Residual Heat Removal pump suction relief valve (RC-V-89). However, this ' l( condition was not promptly corrected, despite opportunities to do so. Specifically, the pipe ,
. wrap material was not removed until December 5,1997 to identify the source of the residue, l
even'though severalindividuals, including engineers, supervisors, and maintenance and health
. physics technicians, had been aware of this condition. in addition, while your staff had made :
' plans to remove insulation and inspect this section of piping during the June 1997 refueling ;
l outage, this work activity did not occur. Although a system engineer recognized that the l l piping had not been inspected, on or about June 15,1997, and informed his supervisor, no l. adverse condition report was generated, and actions were not taken to remove the insulation and inspect the pipe prior to the start-up on June 26,1997. , NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-60 x c ____L.__'__.._____. i_______________.________________
North Atlantic Energy Service 2 Corporation in another case, the control building air conditioning (CBA) compressors, used to cool critical instruments within the control room following a postulated accident, were degraded resulting in multiple compressor failures since 1993, including some instances when both subsystems were inoperable at the same time. However, action was not taken until December 1997 to address the root causes for the compressor failures, despite prior opportunities to address this problem. Specifically, your staff completed an engineering evaluation in 1994 (to address a 1993 CBA compressor failure), and that evaluation resulted in development of a design change request to correct the root causes for the compressor failure. Those causes included: loss of bearing lubrication caused by refrigerant contamination of the lubricating oil; and/or refrigerant slugging to the cvlinder piston assembly. Although the modification was scheduled to be implemented in the third quarter of 1996, it was delayed several times and not implemented until after another CBA compressor failure on December 16,1997. In each of the prior cases when the compressors failed, your corrective actions focused on component replacement rather than correcting the root causes of the failures. In the third case, in November 1997, the NRC observed that a caution tag on the control switch for the Positive Displacement Charging Pump indicated that the pump could trip after starting due to an oil leak from the pump's sensing line. Although this leak challenged the reliability of the pump, a component important to safety, your plans did not include repair of the leak until after installation of a modification to relocate the pressure switch. However, in October 1997, the plans for the modification were canceled without resolving this adverse condition. Failure to correct these conditions sooner indicates a decline in your performance with respect to analysis of root causes of problems, as well as implementation of appropriate corrective action. This concern was previously highlighted in my January 23,1998, letter transmitting the latest SALP report to you. In that report, the NRC noted that operators and engineering personnel did not aggressively pursue resolution of degraded conditions on equipment important to safety. Given the number of examples of this problem, despite opportunities to correct the conditions, the violations represent a significant regulatory concern. Therefore, these violations have been classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level lli problem in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000is considered for a Severity Level lli problem. Your facility has not been the subject of escalated enforcement actions wkhin the last 2 years. Therefore, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty. Credit is warranted for corrective action because, at the time of the enforcement conference, the actions taken to improve the corrective action process were considered prompt and comprehensive. Your corrective actions included, but were not limited to:(1) creation of a multi-disciplined team to look for problems at the facility; (2) retention of a contractor to address the broader issues of improved root cause analysis and corrective actions; (3) conduct of meetings with all employees to communicate management expectations regarding these issues and the need for improved operational focus; (4) addition of an engineer to each shift to assist with ensuring appropriate configuration control; (5) retraining of staff; (6) lowering of the threshold for classifying equipment as degraded. NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-61
North Atlantic Energy Service 3 Corporation Therefore,in view of these corrective actions, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to not propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty. In addition to these three violations, the inspection report identified another apparent violation related to your opening of the safety injection test header return isolation valve SI-V-131 (between August 6 ano 8,1997, and between October 21,1997 and December 6,1997) for the purpose of redirecting reactor coolant isolation check valve leakage to the primary drain tank to prevent the undesired boron dilution of the Si accumulators. The NRC previously issued to you a Notice of Violation on September 23,1997, for deviation from procedural requirements, without proper approval as required by the technical specifications. Since your subsequent analysis indicated that this action did not render the 'A' Safety injection pump inoperable, no further violation is being cited. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the : enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with l regulatory requirements. 1 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). Sincerely, Hu ert J. Miller p Regional Administrator i I Docket No. 50-443 License No. NPF-86
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation l l i l l NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-62 l l l
North Atlantic Energy Service 4 Corporation cc w/ encl: B. Kenyon, President - Nuclear Group J. Streeter, Recovery Officer - Nuclear Oversight W. DiProfio, Station Director - Seabrook Station R. Hickok, Nuclear Training Manager - Seabrook Station D. Carriere, Director, Production Services L. Cuoco, Senior Nuclear Counsel W. Fogg, Director, New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management D. McElhinney, RAC Chairman, FEMA R1, Boston, Mass R. Backus, Esquire, Backus, Meyer and Solomon, New Hampshire D. Brown-Couture, Director, Nuclear Safety, Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency F. W. Getman,'Jr., Vice President and General Counsel - Great Bay Power Corporation R. Hallisey, Director, Dept. of Public Health, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Seacoast Anti-Pollution League D. Tefft, Administrator, Bureau of Radiological Health, State of New Hampshire S. Comley, Executive Director, We the People of the United States W. Meinert, Nuclear Engineer NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-63
- - - - - . --- - . ~ - - - . - - . _ . - - - - - - . _ . _ - .
ENCLOSURE NOTICE OF VIOLATION North Atlantic Energy Service Docket No. 50-443 Corporation License No. NPF-86 Seabrook Station EA 98-073 During an NRC inspection conducted between December 7,1997, and January 31,1998, for which an exit meeting was held on February 12,1998, three violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600,the violations are listed below: 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies , deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. The identification of the significant condition adverse to quality, the cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken shall be documented and reported to appropriate levels of j management. Contrary to the above, measures were not established to assure that significant conditions adverse to quality were promptly identified and corrected, and the causes of the conditions were determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. Specifically,
- 1. Between November 1996 and December 5,1997, a condition adverse to quality existed involving leakage from stainless steel pipe in the vicinity of the "B" Residual Heat Removal pump suction relief valve (RC-V-89), and this condition adverse to quality was not identified until December 5,1997, despite prior i opportunities to do so. Specifically, j
- a. In November 1996, the licensee had been aware of the existence of boric acid residue external to pipe wrap material on the piping.
However, the licensee did not remove the pipe wrap material to positively identify the source of this residue until December 5,1997 , even though engineers, supervisors, and maintenance and health physics ; technicians had been aware of this condition. l
- b. During the June 1997 refueling outage, the licensee planned to remove the pipe wrap material and inspect this section of piping. Although a system engineer determined, on or about June 15,1997, that this work activity did not occur and informed his supervisor, an adverse condition report was not generated, and actions were not taken to remove the ,
I insulation and inspect the pipe prior to the start-up on June 26,1997. (01013) NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-64 _ _ _ - _ _ - _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _-___-._)
_ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ m l Enclosure 2 j .2. Since 1993, a condition adverse to quality existed involving degradation of the control building air conditioning (CBA) . compressors, used to cool critical l l instruments within the control room for up to thirty days following a postulated I accident, which resulted in multiple compressor failures. Corrective action was
- not taken until December 1997 to address the root causes for this condition, i even though prior opportunities existed to address this problem. . Specifically, the licensee's staff completed an engineering evaluation in 1994 (to address a
- 1993 CBA compressor failure), and that evaluation resulted in development of
! a design change request to correct the root cause(s) for the compressor failure. , Those causes included: loss of bearing lubrication caused by. refrigerant contamination of the lubricating oil; and/or refrigerant slugging to the cylinder
' piston assembly. Although the modification was scheduled to be implemented
, in the third quarter of 1996, it was delayed several times and not implemented - unti! after another CBA compressor failed on December 16,1997. In each of l the prior cases when the compressors failed, the licensee's corrective actions j focused on component replacement rather than correcting the root causes of
- the failures. (02013) l
- 3. In November 1997, the NRC observed that a caution tag on a pressure switch
- for the Positive Displacement Charging Pump indicated that the pump could trip off from starting due to an oilleak from the pump's sensing line. Although this i leak challenged the reliability of the pump, a component important to safety, the a
licensee's plans did not include repair of the leak until after installation of a
- modification to relocate the pressure switch. However,in October 1997, the i plans for the modification were canceled without resolving this adverse
- i. condition. (03013) 1
{ These violations represent a Severity Level lli problem (Supplement 1). Pursuant to provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation is he.reby i required to submit a written statement or' explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the I Regional Administrator, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" i and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the i basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results ! achieved, (3) the corrective Reps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the i date 'when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous L docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. j If an adequate reply _ is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or j Demand for information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, !- ' suspended, or revoked, or why such other actions as may be proper should not be taken. j Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
)
l Urider the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be ! submitted under oath or affirmation. ) NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-65 L i 1
. _ .~
Enclosure 3 Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information.' If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential l commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 1st day of April 1998 l L I NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-66
M [$ UNITED STATES [ ,. g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5 8 REGION I t, 475 ALLENDALE ROAD g
- e . e * /[ KING oF PRusslA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 1415 May 6,1998 EA 98-179 Mr. M. L. Bowling, Recovery Officer - Technical Services C
, /o Ms. Patricia Loftus, Director - Regulatory Affairs for Millstone Station NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY PO Box.128 Waterford, CT 06385
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION, EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION, AND NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-423/98-01
Dear Mr. Bowling:
This letter refers to the inspection conducted on February 23-26,1998, at the Millstone Unit 3 facility, the findings of which were discussed with your staff during an exit meeting on February 26,1998. During the inspection, apparent violations were identified related to the failure to maintain the post accident sampling system (PASS) operational within technical specification (TS) requirements. The inspection report addressing the findings of that inspection, with the exception of the findings related to the PASS, was previously forwarded to you on April 1,1998. On April 3,1998, we sent you a letter providing the preliminary results of the PASS inspection. In a telephone ::onversation between you and Mr. J. Durr of the NRC on April 6,1998, Mr. Durr informed you that the NRC was considering escalated enforcement action relative to the PASS. You also elected to waive a predecisional enforcement conference to which Mr. Durr agreed. Based on the information developed during the inspection, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation involved failure to maintain an adequate PASS program thut ensured the capability to obtain and analyze samples under
. post accident conditions. The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report.
In November 1997, you identified during an internal audit that the PASS may not have been capable of obtaining and analyzing reactor coolant system (RCS), containment atmosphere and containment recirculation sump samples during a design basis accident as required by TS. You reported this condition in a Licensee Event Report (LER) on January 8, 1998. During the February,1998 inspection, the NRC confirmed that the PASS had not been fully operational since 1988. Specifically: (1) PASS maintenance was ineffective resulting in continual system problems; (2) procedures lacked sufficient detail and wars missing steps; (3) technicians were unfamiliar with the sampling procedure and; (4) PASS drills were ineffective in that the routine surveillance procedure was used instead of the emergency procedure and post accident sampling was only simulated during emergency NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-67
UNITED STATES c NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [
; :! REGloN I
./ '"'~^""^
KING oF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 May 6,1998 EA 98-179 Mr. M. L. Bowling, Recovery Officer - Technical Services C/o Ms. Patricia Loftus, Director - Regulatory Affairs for Millstone Station NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY PO Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION, EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION, AND NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-423/98-01
Dear Mr. Bowling:
This !stter refers to the inspection conducted on February 23 26,1998, at the Millstone Unit 3 facility, the findings of which were discussed with your staff during an exit meeting on February 26,1998. During the inspection, apparent violations were identified related to the failure to maintain the post accident samplir g system (PASS) operational within technical specification (TS) requirements. The insoection report addressing the findings of y that inspection, with the exception of the findings related to the PASS, was previously forwarded to you on April 1,1998. On April 3,1998, we sent you a letter providing the preliminary results of the PASS inspection. In s telephone conversation between you and Mr. J. Durr of the NRC on April 6,1998, Mr. Durr informed you that the NRC was considering escalated enforcement action relative to the PASS. You also elected to waive
- a predacisional enforcement conference to which Mr. Durr agreed.
Based on the information developed duiing the inspection, the NRC has determined that a violation of N9C requirements occurred. The violation involved failure to maintain an adequate PASS program that ensured the capability to obtain and analyze samples under
. post accidont cenditions. The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report.
In Novemiser 1997, you identified during an internal audit that the PASS may not have been capable of obtaining and analyzing reactor coolant system (RCS), containment atmosphere and containment recirculation sump samples during a design basis accident as required by TS. You reported this condition in a Licensee Event Report (LER) on January 8, 1998. During the February,1998 intoection, the NRC confirmed that the, PASS had not been fully operational since 1988. Specifically: (1) PASS maintenant,w was ineffective resulting in continual system problems; (2) procedures lecked sufficient detail and were missing steps; (3) technicians were unfamiliar with the sampling procedure and; (4) PASS drills were ineffective in that the routine surveillance procedure was used instead of the emergency procedure and post accident sampling was only simulated during emergency NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-67
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M. Bowling 2 exercises. Based on these findings, the inspector concluded that your staff would not have been able to obtain and analyze samples under post accident conditions within 3 hours as specified in the Updated Final Safety Report (UFSAR). Additionally. the containment sump portion of the liquid sample module was not tested periodically to ensure system availability as specified in the UFSAR and the procedure steps to take a sump sample were deleted from the chemistry surveillance test procedure. TM failurn to adequately maintain the PASS and the failure to provide adequate procedures and training for operation of the PASS under post accident conditions could have resulted in the inability to collect and effectively analyze samples following an accident. The information obtained from the PASS is necessary to accurately reflect plant radiological conditions in order to make the appropriate mitigation and protective action recommendations follov ing an accident. It appears that the failure to maintain an adequate PASS program was caused by ineffective management oversight. Prior to 1995, engineering staff turnover and lack of expertise and treining contributed to the deficiencies in the PASS program. Although, a dedicated system engineer was assigned to the PASS program in 1955, the problems with the program were not resolved. The failure to maintain an effective PASS program represents a significant lack of attention toward , licensed responsibilities; therefore, this violation has been categorized at Severity Level lli in accordance with the General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.
~
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000 is considered for a Severity Level lli violation. Since escalated enforcement action has been issued to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company within the last 2 years,' the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for identi// cation and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Although you began to identify problems with the PASS program in 1995, you did not take comprehensive action to prevent recurring failure of the system. You performed an audit in November 1997, which identified some of the deficiencies in the PASS program and concluded that the PASS may not have been capable of obtaining and analyzing the required samples during an accident in accordance with TS. The NRC identified additional deficiencies in the PASS program, including the inadequate drills and the inability to report sample results within three hours. In your January 8,1998 LER, you indicated that you had incorporated the PASS into the Maintenance Rule program as a system that requires a higher level of attention and established a corrective action plan. You also indicated that you had revised the PASS preventive maintenance (PM) schedule and committed to perform the PM procedures prior to entry into Mode 3. You also committed to provide training for all personnel performing PASS sampling and analysis activities prior to entry into Mode 3. However, as stated in our letter dated April 3,1998, the corrective actions documented in your LER did not fully address the weaknesses the NRC and your staff identified with the PASS. In particular, you did not include emergency preparedness corrective actions to address the training and procedural weaknesses associated with operation of the PASS under emergency conditions.
' A Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty - $2,100,000 was issued on December 10,1997, for multiple Severity Level ll and Severity Level ill problems and violations involving design issues and Technical Specification violations.
NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-68
M. Bowling 3 A civil penalty could be proposed for your failure to take corrective action to prevent recurring failure of the PASS and your failure to fully identify and correct the weaknesses in the PASS program during your internal audit. However, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, and the Director, Special Projects Office, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to exercise enforcement discretion pursuant to Section Vll.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy and not propose a civil penalty in this case. j The decision to exercise discretion was made because your facility has been in an 4 extended shutdown, the NRC has taken significant enforcement action for the performance issues that led to the shutdown and considering that the violation was: (1) based on ' NNECo practices prior to the shutdown; (2) not classified higher than Severity Level ll; and 1 (3) not willful. Although some of the weaknesses in the PASS program were identified by the NRC, the NRC has in place a formal restart plan that will confirm that you are taking corrective action for these issues before restart is authorized. Therefore, further i enforcement action is not necessary to achieve remedial action. ! in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure and your respo 1se will be place d in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). Sincerely,
\
N JaWnes T. Wiggins, Director Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-423 License No. NPF-49 i i
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Inspection Report No. 50-423/98-01 l i l NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-69
M. Bowling 4 cc w/ encl: B. Kenyon, President and Chief Executive Officer - Nuclear Group M. H. Brothers; Vice President - Operations - J. McElwain, Unit 1 Recovery Officer J. Streeter, Recovary Officer - Nuclear Oversight G. D. Hicks, Unit Director - Millstone Unit 3 J. A. Price, Unit Director - Millstone Unit 2 D. Amerine, Vice President - Human Services E. Harkness, Director, Unit 1 Operations-J. Althouse, Manager - Nuclear Training Assessment Group i F. C. Rothen, Vice President, Work Services J. Cantrell, Director - Nuclear Training S. J. Sherman, Audits and Evaluation L. M. Cuoco, Esquire J. R. Egan, Esquire V. Juliano, Waterford Library J. Buckingham, Department of Public Utility Control - S. B. Comley, We The People , State of Connecticut SLO Designee i FEMA, Region I D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN) i R. Bassilakis, CAN J. M. Block, Attorney, CAN S. P. Luxton, Citizens Regulatory Commission (CRC) Representative T. Concannon l E. Woollacott, Co-Chairman, NEAC l i- ; i l l NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-70
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I l NOTICE OF VIOLATION 1 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Docket No. 50-423 Millstone Unit 3 License No. NPF-49 l EA No. 98-179 l During an NRC inspection conducted from February 23 - 26,1998, for which an exit meeting was conducted on February 26,1998, a violation of NRC requirements was l identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC l Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600,the violation is listed below: l Millstone Unit 3 Technical Specification 6.4.8.d, " Administrative Procedures and Programs," " Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)," requires that there be a program in place to ensure the capability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant, I radioactive iodine and particulates in plant gaseous effluents, and containment atmosphere samples under accident conditions. The program shall include: training, procedures for sampling and analysis, and provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment. Contrary to the above, between 1988 and February 26,1998, the licensee failed to l maintain an adequate PASS program that ensured the capability to obtain and analyze samples under post accident conditions. Specifically: l ,
- From 1988 to 1995, maintenance was ineffective in that continual system
! problems were found during semi-annual surveillance tests, such as ! instrument tubing and fitting leaks, valve position indication failures, and solenoid valve failures. Further, although a dedicated system engineer was assigned in 1995 to maintain the system, problems continued to occur as evidenced by the fact that 31 condition reports were generated between 1995 and January,1998. . l
- As of February 26,1998, valves at the sample panel were improperly marked and system identification tegs could not be distinguished from some of the valve identification tags.
- As of February 26,1998, PASS procedures and maintenance were inadequate in that the containment sump portion of the reactor coolant liquid j sample module was not operationally tested at least semi-annually to ensure system availability, as described in section 9.3.2.6.4 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
- As of February 26,1998, PASS proceduras were inadequate in that surveillance procedures lacked sufficient detail to provide the technicians with the information needed to successfully acquire a samplo and the e prerequisite steps in that procedure omitted the type of sample containers needed.
I j - Training of technicians expected to obtain the samples under post accident conditions was inadequate in that the technicians performing the surveillance l NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-71 i 1 4
2 on February 26,1998, were not familiar with the procedure and needed guidance from chemistry personnel. Training was inadequate in that PASS drills, that are to be conducted annually per the licensee's Emergency Plan, did not ensure the capability to obtain and analyze samples under post accident conditions because routine surveillance procedures were used to obtain samples during the drills rather than the emergency PASS procedure. The PASS procedure specifies requirements for sample acquisition, radiological protection, analyses and timeliness under emergency conditions. During emergency exercises, post accident sampling was only simulated. Without use of the emergency procedure during PASS drills or during emergency exercises, there was no assurance that a cample could be obtained and analyzed under accident conditions within 3 hours as described in section 9.3.6.2 of the UFSAR. (01013) This is a Severity Level lil Violation (Supplement 1). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a
" Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, cr, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response mcy reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response, if an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to exteMing the response time, if you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-72 4
4 3 , Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction, if personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide , a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected : and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you myg specifically identify the portions of your response ' ', that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withhold-
- ing (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide tha level of
! protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
1 l 5 Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 6th day of May,1598 l NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-73
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UNITED STATES g l g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [ j REGloN i
$ 475 ALLENDALE ROAD
- g KING oF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415
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***o April 24,1998 EAs 97-351 97-422 Mr. Harold W. Keiser Executive Vice President Nuclear Business Unit Public Service Electric and Gas Company Post Office Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC Office of Investigations Nos. 1-96-024 and 1-96-031)
Dear Mr. Keiser:
This letter refers to the two subject NRC investigations conducted by the NRC Office of Imrestigations (01), the results of which were sent to you on October 1,1997. 01 inve:stigat i on No. 1-96-024, the synopsis of which was sent to you with the October 1,1997 letter, found that inaccurate information regarding the posting of compensatory measures was recorded in the Safeguards Event Log, and that, at a minimum, the deliberate actions of two Wackenhut personnel caused this documentation inaccuracy. 01 investigation No. 1-96-024, a redacted version of which was also sent to you on October 1,1997, found that a contract security officer employed by Wackenhut at Salem / Hope Creek was discriminated against for raising safety concerns. A DOL Area Director (AD) had similarly found discrimination, as did a DOL Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in a Recommended Decision and Order issued on January 22,1998. Predecisional enforcement conferences were conducted with Mr. L. Storz and other members of your staff on December 9,1997, to discuss the violations, their causes, and your corrective actions. Based on the information developed during the investigations, and the information provided 1 during the December 9,1997, conference, the NRC has decided, with respect to the discrimination issue, to await issuance of the DOL Secretary of Labor's Administrative Review Board (ARB) decision prior to making a final enforcement decision, as noted in a letter from James Ueberman, NRC Director of Enforcement, on March 20,1908. With respect to the falsification issue, one violation of NRC requirements is being cited. The violation is described in detailin the enclosed Notice of Violation and involves inaccurate security records created by two Wackenhut security personnel indicating that compensatory measures were in place within the required time (10 minutes) following the failure of the security computer in May 1996. Specifically, a security officer did not arrive at a certain post for 18 minutes after the computer failed, yet the record (Safeguards Event Log) created by a Systems Operat ;ns Supervisor, based on information received from a CAS/SAS operator, indicated that the offier arrived at the location within the allotted 10 minutes. The failure to respond within 10 minutes is a security event that licensee procedures require to be recorded in the Safeguard Event Log. You previously investigated this matter and confirmed that the timeliness requirements were not met and that the record was inaccurate. NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-74
l Public Service Electric and 2 Gas Company These actions by the Systems Operations Supervisor, and the CAS/SAS operator constitute a willful violation of NRC requirements. Based on a careful review of the 01 report, and the details discussed at the predecisional enforcement conference, the NRC has concluded that individuals involved had information that the area was not posted within 10 minutes. This determination was based on the f act that the Systems Operations Supervisor was approached by other security personnel and told that compensatory assignments may not have been met within 10 minutes, and he attempted to verify that information by making a call to the CAS/SAS operator. Assuming the CAS/SAS operator provided accurate information (the CAS/SAS operator informed the Systems Operations Supervisor that the posting had been completed within the required 10 minutes), he did not resolve the difference. Also, the CAS/SAS operator was informed by the security officer as to when the orficer actually arrived at the post and this time was not within the required 10 minutes. Therefore, their actions are considered willful within the context of the NRC Enforcement Policy, and this constitutes a significant regulatory concern. The NRC has previously issued dccuments emphasizing the importance of maintaining complete and accurate records of activities performed, such as in NRC Information Notice 92-30 issued on April 23,1992, and NRC Generic Letter 93-03 issued on October 20,1993. Those documents describe similar occurrences of records being falsified ut other facilities. At the predecisional enforcement conference, you admitted that the records were inaccurate, but you stated that you were unable to conclude that the actions were willful. Rather, you attributed the violation to a failure of security leadership which resulted in a cultural decline within the security organization. While the failure of security leadership likely contributed to this violation, the NRC maintains that the violation was willful for the reasons discussed above. Therefore, given the significance of willful violations of NRC requirements, the "iolation is classified at Severity Level lli in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600 (Enforcement Policy). In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000is considered for a Severity Level 111 violation. Because PSE&G has been the subject of escalated enforcement action in the past two years', the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for /dentification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy, in this case, credit is warranted for both factors because the inaccurate information was identified by your staff and prompt and comprehensive corrective actions were taken thereafter. Those corrective actions included, but were not limited to: (1) changes in the security management organization at the facility, l including new supervision; (2) briefing of the security officers regarding expectations; (3) revision of procedures; (4) discussions with the individuals involved in this event regarding l management expectations on posting and logging requirements, and the seriousness of recording inaccurate information; and (5) other actions, including communication of the Employee Concerns Program and the Corrective Action Program, to improve the climate and culture within the security organization.
' For xample, on December 11,1996, two civil penalties were issued to PSE&G, which consisted of (1) a $100,000 civil penalty for violations of security requirements (
Reference:
EA 96-344), and (2) a $80,000 civil penalty for violations involving discrimination of individuals who engaged in protected activities (
Reference:
EA 96-177) NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-75
Public Service Electric and 3 Gas Company Therefore, to emphasize the importance of prompt identification and correction of problems at the facility, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. Although the NRC has decided, with respect to the discrimination matter, to aweit issuance of the DOL Secretary of Labor ARB decision, you should ensure that all of your management and supervisors understand the need for, and encourage, staff to bring forth concerns when they exist, and also understand the importance of not taking any retaliatory action against individuals for bringing forth safety concerns. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with
' regulatory requirements. ,
in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). Sincerely, Hu rt J. Miller p Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-272;50-311;50-354 License Nos. DPR-70; DPR-75; NPF-57
, i
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation : i NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-76 l'
- . .- . . - ....- ~ . _ ~ - . . - . . ~ . --.
i , i i Public Service Electric and 4 Gas Company cc w/ encl: L. Storz, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations E. Simpson, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering E. Salowitz, Director - Nuclear Business Support A. Kirby, Ill, External Operations - Nuclear, Delmarva Power & Light Co. C. Bakken, General Manager - Salem Operations M. Bezilla, General Manager - Hope Creek Operations J. McMahon, Director - QA/ Nuclear Training / Emergency Preparedness
- - D. Powell, Manager, Licensing and Regulation R. Kankus, Joint Owner Affairs A. Tapert, Program Administrator ,
- M. Wetterhahn, Esquire l l
J. Keenan, Esquire l J. Isabella, Manager, Joint Generation Atlantic Electric I Consumer Advocate, Office of Consurner Advocate W. Conklin, Public Safety Consultant, Lower Alloways Creek Township i Public Service Commission of Maryland
; State of New Jersey l- State of Delaware l
J a e 4 NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-77 i
ENCLOSURE NOTICE OF VIOLATION Public Service Electric ar d Gas Docket Nos. 50-272;50-311;50-354 Salem Units 1 and 2 License Nos. DPR-70; DPR-75; NPF-57
- Hope Creek Unit 1 EA No. 97-422 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey As a result of an investigation conducted by the NRC Office of Investigations, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the particular violation is set forth below:
10 CFR 50.9 requires, in part, that information required by the Commission's regulations or license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. License Condition 2.E of License Number NPF-57 for the Hope Creek facility, and License Conditions 2.E of License Numbers DPR-70 and DPR-75 for Salem, require, in part, that PSE&G fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the safeguards contingency plans approved by the Commission and all amendments and revisions to such plans made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). Section 4.3.1 of the PSE&G Safeguards Contingency Plan requires that the licensee establish, implement, and maintain, security contingency procedures. , i Security Contingency Plan Procedure (SCP-15), " Safeguards Event Reporting Procedure", requires, in Section 4.6.1 that the licensee record in the Safeguards Event Log, and retain on site for inspection by the NRC, any failure or degradation of a safeguards system or a discovered vulnerability that could have allowed unauthorized or undetected access to the protected or vital area, if compensatory measures had not been established. Section 4.3.1 requires that compensatory measures be placed in - effect within ten minutes of security management becoming aware of the event. , Contrary to the above, a Safeguard Event Log, required to be maintained by the 6 licensee, was not complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, after 1 security management became aware of the failure of the security computer at i 6:10 a.m. on May 25,1996, security post No.127 was not manned until 6:28 a.m., i approximately 18 minutes after the computer failure. However, the Safeguards Event t Log was inaccurate in that it documented that the compensatory measures were : Implemented at 6:19 a.m.. These records were material because they provide evidence ; as to whether the licensee met the requirement for manning the post within 10 : minutes. (01013) This is a Severity Level til violation (Supplement Vil). l { NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-78 ! I t l
Enclosure 2 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Public Service Electric and Gas' Company (Licensee) U hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and a copy t the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting l this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violaons, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such nther action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time. if you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. t i Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be l submitted under oath or affirmation. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If persenal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed l copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you EME.1 specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the infomaation required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 24th day of April 1998 I l I f { NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-79 i k
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'k t [/ l sit av4N etAzA on vt. suite 4o0 ARLINGTON. TEXAS 76o118o64 February 18, 1998 EA 97-585 Harold B. Ray, Executive Vice President Southern California Edison Company San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station P.O. Box 128 . San Clemente Califomia 92674-0128
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-361/97-24; 50-362/97-24)
Dear Mr. Ray:
This refers to the predecisional enforcement conference conducted in the NRC's Region IV office in Arlinejton, Texas on January 20,1998, and to the supplementalinformat;on Southern j California Edison umpany (Edison) provided in its letter dated February 3,1998. The conference was held to discuss the results cf a routine inspection conducted on November 17 through December 5,1997, at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. The findings from
' the inspection were discussed with your staff during a telephonic exit briefing on December 18, 1997, and documented in the subject inspection report dated December 24,1997.
Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information thbit Edison provided during the conference and in its February 3 letter, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The most significant violation involves a failure to protect safeguards information. Specifically, a Safeguards Contingency Plan was lost and has not been recovered. During the conference, Edison's position was that there is sufficient justification to believe the loss of the Safeguards Contingency Plan wbs an inadvertent act, and not a de5 berate attempt by an unauthorized person to gather information about the Edison security contingency plans. Edison noted that although the plan contains much information about how the security organization would respond to various events, the plan does not contain every key detail. Edison also stated that its program for the control of safeguards information substantally exceeds regulatory requirements and that the loss of the plan was an anomaly. As a result, Edison concluded that the violation should be classified at Severity Level IV because it was an isolated personnel error, aggressive corrective action was taken, the loss was not indicative of a programmatic breakdown or a loss of safety function, and it was not willful. Notwithstanding Edison's position, the circumstances involving the locRon, duration (until identification), and the importance of the information are significant. The plan was lost from a building located outside the protected area, up to one month had passed before Edison discovered that the plan was missing, the plan has not yet been recovered, and the plan contains significant safeguards information. These factors create the poterdal for secunty to be NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-80
l compromised; and a violation of this type is considered significant. Therefore, this violation has been categorized at Severity Level lil in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions"(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. , l l In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a civil penalty with a base value of $55,000 is
]
considered for a Severity Level lit violation. Because your facility has not been the subject of ' escalated enforcement action within the last 2 years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Edison's corrective actions included immediately i l initiating a significant investigation, taking aggressive measures to find the plan, immediately l l implementing security compensatory measures, notifying the NRC, enhancing requirements for l l controlling safeguards information, soliciting the assistance of the entire site population, revising ; the plan, and relocating some key security contingency equipment. The NRC has concluded that Edison's corrective actions were sufficiently prompt and comprehensive, and that Edison is deserving of corrective action credit. Therefore, to encourage prompt and comprehensive correction of violations, and in recognition of the absence of previous escalated enforcement action, I have been authorized not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil ; penalty. i The attached Notice contains three additional violations involving failures to: (1) secure l ~ contingency weapons in two instances, (2) report to the NRC the discovery of weapons that were out of the control or physical custody of security personnel, and (3) provide emergency l power supply to a small portion of the intrusion detection system, in accordance with the l enforcement policy, each of these four violations has been classified at Severity Level IV. l During the conference, Edison stated that these remaining violations were either not violations or, for those issues which Edison agreed were violations, satisfied the enforcement policy criteria for non-cited violations (NCV). Edison's arguments are addressed below. Regarding the failure to secure contingency weapons, Edison agreed that a severity level IV violation occurred but that it met the enforcement policy criteria for NCV. However, the NRC has determined that the corrective actions for th'e first instance of this violation (July 30,1997) could reasonably be expected to have prevented the second instance (November 7,1997). Therefore, this does not meet the criteria for treatment as an NCV.
- Regarding the fai!cre to report the loss of the security computers, Edison's position was that its i compensatory measures taken were adequate, and therefore the failure of the security computer
( did not have to be reported consistent with Edison's reporting procedure. While the NRC still i has questions about the adequacy of the compensatory measures, Section IV.D of the Enforcement Policy states that a licensee will not normally be cited for a failure to report a condition or event unless the licensee was actually aware of the c,ondition or event that it failed to report. As such, no violation is being cited for this issue. Regarding the failure to report the discovery of the unlocked and unattended contingency weapons, Edison argued that insufficient guidance exists for what constitutes the
- loss" of a NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-81
3-weapon. The NRC's position is that the weapons were out of the control and physical custody of security personnel inside the protected area on July 30,1997, and therefore, in accordance with Edison's reporting procedure, required a 1-hour report. Regarding the failure to provide emergency power supply to cne portion of the intrusion detection system, Edison's position was that this violation satisfied the enforcement policy criteria for and should be characterized as an NCV. The NRC's position is that, although Edison's long term corrective action (a permanent engineered fix) was appropriate, the immediate corrective actions were inadequate in that no interim measures were taken to immediately return to compliance (i.e., to provide backup power supply or uninterruptible power, or implement compensatory measures) until the permanent engineered fix could be implemented. As a result, the violation continued to exist for several weeks after discovery. Therefore, this violation does not meet the enforcement policy criteria for an NCV. Regarding the improper implementation of compensatory measures during times when the security computers were not functioning, Edison's position was that no regulatory violation occurred because compensatory measures were properly implemented. However, during the inspection, the NRC inspector requested that security personnel demonstrate satisfactory performance of three different patrol routes for a simulated computer outage. Edison security personnel did not properly complete two of the three patrol routes within the allotted time. During the conference, Edison did not adequately show that these failures were isolated and the NRC requested further information regarding the control of the security procedures and guidance that ensure compensatory measures are adequately implemented. In its February 3, 1998, letter, Edison provided further information regarding the adequacy of its procedures and the adequacy of the compensatory measures taken during the computer outages. However, the NRC does not have sufficient information to determine whether a violation occurred, and this Neue will be tracked as an Unresolved item pending further review. Edison's February 3 letter also provided comments to the inspection report. The comments reasserted Edison's perspective on the issues discussed during the predecisional enforcement conference. We acknowledge Edison's position, and we provided the NRC's position in the
- inspection report and, where appropriate, wg are responding to Edison's positions in this l enforcement action. We have determined that there were no factual errors in the inspection report; therefore, a revision to the report will not be issued.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further er,7orcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-82
4 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. Sincerely, C w h Ellis W. Merschoff Regional Administrator Docket Nos.: 50-361, 50-362 License Nos.: NPF-10; NPF-15
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation Chairman, Board of Supervisors County of San Diego 1600 Pacific Highway, Room 335 San Diego, California 92101 Alan R. Watts, Esq. Woodruff, Spradlin & Smart 701 S. Parker St. Suite 7000 Orange, California 92868-4720 Sherwin Harris, Resource Project Manager Public Utilities Department City of Riverside 3900 Main Street
~ Riverside, California 92522 R. W. Krieger, Vice President Southem California Edison Company San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, California 92674-0128 Stephen A. Woods, Senior Health Physicist Division of Drinking Water and Environmental Management Nuclear Emergency Response Program California Department of Health Services P.O. Box 942732, M/S 396 Sacramento, California 94334-7320 NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-83 i
5 Mr. Gary D. Cotton, Sr. Vice President
- Energy Supply San Diego Gas & Electric Company P O. Box 1831 San Diego, California. 92112-4150 Mr. Steve Hsu Radiological Health Branch State Department of Health Services ' l P.O. Box 942732 -l Sacramento, California 94234 Mayor l City of San Clemente - 100 Avenida Presidio San Clemente, California 92672 Mr. Truman Burns \Mr. Robert Kinosian California Public Utilities Commission 505 Van Ness, Rm. 4102 '
San Francisco, California 94102 i h
'NUREGG40, PART 2 B-84 l
I NOTICE OF VIOLATION Southern California Edison Co. Docket Nos.: 50-361;50-362 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station License Nos.: NPF-10, NPF-15 EA 97-585 During an NRC inspection conducted on November 17 through December 5,1997, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600 the violations are listed below: A. 10 CFR 73.21(b)(1)(viii) requires that the composite safeguards contingency plan for the facility or site will be pro;ected as safeguards Information.10 CFR 73.21(d)(1) and (2) require that safeguards information shall be under the control of an authorized individual or if in storage, shall be locked in an a locked security storage container. Contrary to the above, on October 27,1997, the licensee discovered and reported that a copy of the composite safeguards contingency plan was lost, i.e., not under the control of an authorized individual or locked in a locked security storage container. The plan was missing from the safeguards storage container in the security operations office, located outside the protected area. A search of the site did not result in the discovery of the safeguards document. (01013) This is a Severity Level 111 violation (Supplement Ill). B. License Condition 2.E of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Operating License dated August 25,1988, requires, in part, that the license fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security plan. This includes amendments and changes made persuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).
- 1. Paragraph 9.2 of the physical security plan states, in part, " Additional unloaded weapon locations, secured inside locked storage containers, are described in the security contingency plan." Paragraph 3.4.5 of the security contingency plan states, in part, ' Weapons and ammunition are secured in fixed and mobile strategically located containers."
Contrary to the above, on July 30 and November 7,1997, secunty officers discovered weapons and ammunition that were not secured. Specifically, in each instance, security officers found that a safeguards contingency cabinet was unlocked and unattended: The contingency cabinets contained weapons and ammunition and were unsecured for several hours. (02014) This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement lil). NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-85
2-
- 2. Paragraph 3.2.4 of the physical security plan states, in part, " SCE has established a management system that provides for the developmer't, implementation, and enforcement of security procedures." Paragraph B.14 of Security Procedure SO123-IV-11.2 (Attachment 2,1-Hour Reportabihty Criteria),
"' oss or Unattended Weaoon in the Protected Area, requires that the following be reported to the NRC: "Any weapon which becomes lost or out of the control or physical custody of security personnel for any length of time. The 10 minute rule is not applicable."
Contrary to the above, on July 30,1997, Security Procedure SO123-IV-11.2 was not adequately implemented when no 1-hour report was made to the NRC upon discovery of a weapon which was out of the control or physical custody of security personnel for several hours. Specifically, a contingency weapon container located inside the protected area, with a weapon and ammunition inside, was unlocked and unattended. The incident was logged in the safeguards , event logs instead of being reported w; thin 1-nour to the NRC. (03014) 1 This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement Ill).
- 3. Paragraph 6.3.4 of the physical security plan requires that intrusion detection system units will be powered by either station power, with a 4-hour rated, self-contained battery for backup power supply, or station uninterruptible power supply.
Contrary to the above, between July 31 and October 29,1997, Guardwire GW-645, a portion of the intrusion detection system unit, was powered by station power without a 4-hour rated, self-contained battery for backup power supply. Also, it was not powered by station uninterruptible power supply. (04014) This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement lil). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Southern California Edison (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondance, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time. NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-86
If you contest this enforcemdnt action, you should also provide a copy of your response to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response chall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Because your response will be placed in the NRC.Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal rivacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction.,if personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracke'ed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and n Rw.
- c.opy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of s.a m ; af, you_ alp _st specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withiud and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
Dated at Arlington, TX this 18th day of February 1998 i NUREGM, PART 2 B-87 e
p acecu, M \ _ uNITEo STATES E' h NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION c nEGION IV 0, ,f Cil RYAN PLAZA drive SUITE don
%'***** [ AnUNGToN. TEX As 76011 8064 June 1. 1998 EA 97-573 Mrc J. V. Parrish (Mail Drop 1023)
Chief Executive Officer Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 Rich'.and, Washington 99352-0968
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-397/97-13)
Dear Mr. Parrish:
This refers to your letters dated March 10 and 23,1998, in response to our btter and inspection report dated February 9,1998. The inspection was completed January 12,1998, and it identified two apparent violations of NRC requirements related to the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system at the Washington Nuclear Project-2 facility. The apparent violations involved failures to: (1) perform an adequate safety evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 when the RCIC System was downgraded from a safety-related system to a nonsafety-related system svithout NRC approval (we stated that this downgrade apparently constituted an unreviewed safety question), and (2) maintain the acceptance criteria for the opening stroke-ti ne testing of six RCIC System valves and the failure to maintain inservice testing of Valve RCIC-V-45 as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(f). Our February 9 letter indicated that the NRC was considering escalated enforcement action for these apparent violations and requested that the Washington Public Power Supply System (Supply System) respond to the apparent violations in writing, or request a predecisional enforcement conference. The Supply System opted to submit a written reply.'
~
in its March 10 letter, the Supply Systeni admitted the violations and emphasized that the actual impact to the RCIC System was very small, that the downgrade resulted in minimalimpact on system reliability during the downgrade period, and that the risk associated with the downgrade
- was considered small. The Supply System acknowledged that it misapplied generic technical guidance, and that this resulted in a failure to identify an unreviewed safety question. In addition, the Supply System stated that although it had informed the NRC of its intent to downgrade RCIC, a license amendment should have been specifically sought for downgrading the system. The Supply System also agreed with the NRC's view that the inappropriate downgrading of the RCIC System resulted in the failure to maintain the acceptance critena for the opening stroke-time testing of six RCIC System valves and the failure to maintain inservice testing of Valve RCIC-V-45.
The March 10 letter also described a number of corrective actions related to the RCIC downgrade issues and the more general concern of the inappropriate use of generic guidance related to other safety evaluations We noted that, in its March 19,1998, letter, the Supp:y System stated that it had completed on March 16,1998, a comprehensive review of other safety NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-88 i a
.___-m._________
Washington Public Power Supply System I evaluations and associated changes made to the facility since startup to determine if the ! misapplication of generic guidance resulted in other similar violations.' Based on the information developed during the inspection, and the information provided in the March 10 letter, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. A [ detailed description of the circumstances resulting in these violations was contained in the l inspection report, and are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). These violations include failures to: (1) perform a safety evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 prior to downgrading the RCIC system from a safety-related system to a nonsafety-related system, a change which constituted an unreviewed safety question, and (2) maintain the acceptance criteria for the opening stroke-time testing of six RCIC System valves and the failure to maintain l inservice testing of Valve RCIC-V-45 as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(f). The NRC agrees with the Supply System's position regarding the safety consequences of these
- violations, discussed above. Although the system was nonconforming, it was found to be l operable. The significance of these violations rests in the processing failures that occurred, l failures which, if applied to other modifications or changes to plant systems and procedures, could adversely affect plant safety. In addition, the NRC normally considers as significant faiiures to properly implement 10 CFR 50.59 in situations involving an unreviewed safety i- question that could have a safety impact. Therefore, these violations are classified in the l aggregate at Severity Level ill in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and -
j Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions"(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. l in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, normally a civil penalty with a base value of $55,000 is considered for a Severity Level 111 problem. Given prior escalated enforcement action against the Supply System, and the NRC's identification of these violations, a civil penalty would have , resulted had we followed the normal civil penalty assessment process described in VI.B 2 of the '
, Enforcement Policy. However,in consideration of the circumstances of this case, and after L ' consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, I have been authorized not to assess a civil penalty, in accordance with Vll.B.6 of th,e Enforcement Policy. Specifically, the NRC's basis for discretion include: (1) the NRC's determination that the reason for these violations (i.e., the misinterpretation of industry guidance documents) was similar to the reasons for these violations related to response-time testing procedures (EA 97-138) for which the NRC has recently issued enforcement action, (2) the corrective actions for EA 97-138 encompass the corrective actions for this issue, and (3) the fact that the Supply System continued to meet the Technical Specification surveillance requirements even after RCIC was downgraded.
' The NRC notes similarities in the reasons for the occurrences between this issue and another recent issue. On February 20,1998, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation and Exercise l of Enforcement Discretion involving the Supply System's inappropriate use of generic industry l guidance regarding changes made to response-time testing procedures (EA 97-138). The l- Supply System's corrective actions involving its comprehensive review of other safety j evaluations was actually begun as a result of this previous enforcement action, but had not been started at the time this RCIC downgrade issue had been identified.
l NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-89 1. 4
Washington Public Power Supply System The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violations, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct these violations and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in the Supply System's letters dated March 10 and 23,1998, and the subject inspection report. Therefore, no further response is required unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enc!osed Notice. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and any response you choose to submit will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. Sincerely, l [( i 6't ' h,5 Ellis . Merschoff Regional Administrator Docket No.: 50-397 License No.: NPF-21
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation cc w/
Enclosure:
Chairman Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council P.O. Box 43172 Olympia, Washington 98504-3172 Mr. Rodney L. Webring (Mail Drop PE08) Vice President, Operations Support /PIO Washington Public Power Supply Syctem P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968 : Mr. Greg O. Smith (Mail Drop 927M) WNP-2 Plant General Manager Washington Public Power Supply System l P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968 l NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-90
l Washington Public Power Supply System i
~ Mr. David A. Swank (Mail Drop PE20)
- Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- Washington Public Power Supply System
- P.O. Box 968.
~ Richland Washington 99352-0968
- Mr. Albert E.'Mouncer (Mail Drop ~396)
Chief Counsel
- Washington Public Power Supply System 1
- P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968 4
Mr. Paul inserra (Mail Drop PE20) Manager, Licensing i Washington Public Power Supply System { i . P.O. Box 968 ^ Richland, Washington 99352-0968' Perry D Robinson, Esq. Winston & Strawn 1400 L Street, N.W.- L -Washington, D.C. 20005-3502 l l l i I i' < l i r l i l i 1 i NUREG-0940, PART 2 . B-91 I ys,- ~<
[
/g
/ NOTICE OF VIOLATION
/ Washington Public Power Supply System Docket No. 50-397
/ Washington Nuclear Project-2 License No. NPF-21
/ EA 97-573 i
During an NRC inspection completed January 12,1998, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, these violations are listed below: A. 10 CFR 50.59 (a)(1) requires that the holder of a license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility may make changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis report without prior Commission approval unless the proposed change involves an unreviewed safety question. 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2) requires that a proposed change shall be deemed to involve an unreviewed safety question if the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased. FSAR Table 3.2-1 specifies the reactor core isolation cooling system as a Safety Class 1 or 2 system. FSAR Section 3.2.3.2 defines Safety Class 2 systems as those systems that are necessary to accomplish the function of providing emergency core cooling and removing residual heat from the reactor. FSAR Section 5.4.6.2.3 specifies that the reactor core isolation cooling system is designed as Seismic Category I equipment and Section 5.4.6.2.4 specifies that the system is designed to meet Safety Class 1 $ requirements. FSAR Table 7.1-1," Design and Supply Responsibility of Safety-Related Systems," lists the reactor core isolation cooling system as a safety-related system required for safe shutdown. Contrary to the above, in 1985, without prior Commission approval, a change was made to the facility as described in the safety analysis report involving an unreviewed safety question. The reactor core isolation cooling system, a system required for safe shutdown, was downgraded frorii safety-related to nonsafety-related which also redesignated the system such that it was no longer Seismic Category 1. This change constituted an unreviewed safety question in that it increased the p*obability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. (01013) B. 10 CFR 50.55a(f) requires inservice tests to verify the operational readiness of pumps and valves, whose function is required for safety, to comply with the requirements set forth in Section XI of the appropriate edition and addenda of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Article IWV-1100 of the ASME Code provides the rules and requirements for inservice testing to assess operational readiness of certain ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3, valves which are required to perform a specific function in shutting down a reactor to the cold shutdown condition or in mitigating the consequences of an accident. NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-92
Notice of Violation Contrary to the above, as of December 1994, the inservice testing for certain reactor core isolation cooling valves, whose function was required for safety, was not implemented as required by Section XI of the appropriate edition and addenda of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Specifically, as the result of downgrading the reactor core isolation cooling system from safety-related to nonsafety-related, Valves RCIC-V-13, the head spray isolation valve; RCIC-V-19, the minimum-flow to suppression poolisolation valve; RCIC-V-28, the auxiliary cooling to suppression poolisolation valve; RCIC-V-31, the suporession pool to RCIC suction valve; RCIC-V-40, the turbine exhaust to suppression pool isolation valve; and RCIC-V-66, the head spray isolation valve were not timed during stroke testing in the open direction to assure that they met specified acceptance criteria. In addition, Valve RCIC-V-45, the turbine steam supply kolation valve, was no longer tested for either opening or closing stroke times. (01023) These violations represent a Severity Level ll1 problem (Supplement 1). The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violations, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct these violations and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in the Supply System's letters dated March 10 and 23,1998, and NRC Inspection Report No. 50-397/97-13. However, you are required to submit a written statement or explanation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to respond, clearly mark your response as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation," and send it to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ARN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region IV , and a c' opy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Under the authonty of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, any resronse you choose to submit shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Because your response, if you choose to submit one, will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, youmylt specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-93
- - - - - - - - ' - - - - ' - - - ' ' - ' ' - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
' Notice of Violation provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a' request for withholding
-confidential commercial or financial information)f If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.-
Dated at Arlington, Texas this 1st day of June 1998 - S \ .h I fL NUREG-0940, PART 2 B-94
1 i j j I 1 l l l C. NON-LICENSED VENDOR 1 i I l l l 1 i l I i l l NUREG-0940, PART 2
,mg y . UNITED STATES g
j e NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .
, wAswiwaton. o.c. sanee.cooi l \,*****/ i January 16, 1998 EA 97-471 l
Construction Products Research, Inc. Five Star Products, Inc. ATTN: Mr. H. Nash Babcock 435 Stillson Road Fairfield, Connecticut 06430-3148 i l
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION l (Office of investigations Case No.1-93-027R) Dear Mr. Babcock. This letter is in reference to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations report of investigation, which was completed on September 23,1997. The report concluded that Construction Products Research, Inc. (CPR), and Five Star Products, Inc. (Five Star), violated the employee protection provision of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA). The NRC's investigation found that CPR and Five Star, through the actions of senior management officials, discriminated against Mr. Edward P. Holub, former Director of Research for CPR, for engaging in protected activities within the scope of the ERA. A copy of the synopsis of the Office of Investigations report is enclosed. Mr. Holub's protected activities included raising safety concems with the NRC regarding the quality of testing products that CPR and Five Star supplied to nuclear power plants, and cooperating with the NRC in connection with its investigation of CPR and Five Star. As determined by NRC's Office of investigations, during the period December 22,1992, to January 22,1993, CPR and Five Star discriminated against Mr. Holub by: (1) placing him on an involuntary leave status; (2) instructing other employees not to discuss the ongoing NRC investigation of CPR and Fiva Star with him; (3) denying him access to his office and other facilities in the companies; and (4) terminating him from employment. Based on the information developed in this case, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice), and involves the failure of CPR and Five Star to adhere to the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 50.7, which prohibits discrimination against employees for engaging in protected activities. The violation is of very significant regulatory concem because it involved an act of employee discrimination by senior corporate officials, the president and vice president of CPR, and t5e president and vice president of Five Star. The sphere of influence of such individuals is significant, and the impact of discrimination committed at this level has the potential to create a l chilling effect throughout the company. The NRC places a high value on the freedom provided , to nuclear industry ernployees to raise potential safety concems to their management or to the NUREG-0940. PART 2 C-1 l l
NRC. Section 211 of the ERA and 10 C.F.R. 50.7 establish strict requirements for th3 protection of employees against discrimination for raising nuclear safety issues. The NRC considers cases such as these, where senior corporate officials discriminate against an employee in violation of 10 C.F.R. 50.7, to be very sigr.ificant. Therefore, in accordance with the "Generat Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600), this violation has been categorized Ot Severity Level I. CPR and Five Star are not permitted at this time to provide or supply products, including grout and concrete, certified as safety-grade to NRC licensees, as a result of a prior enforcement action which was issued by the NRC on December 1,1995 (IA 95-058), and modified by a Stipulation entered into on December 28,1995. Notwithstanding that prohibition, CPR and Five Star have a continuing obligation to comply with 10 CFR Part 21 with respect to the products it has supplied to NRC licensees and contractors for licensees in the past. It is important that CPR and Five Star maintain an environment conducive to raising concerns relating to the companies' continuing responsibilities to meet NRC requirements. Accordingly, you are required to respond to this Notice within 30 days of this letter. Any response should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice. Your response should document the specific actions taken and any i additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. It should explain why the NRC should have confidence that your employees, to the extent that they are engaged in licensed activities, are free to raise safety concerns to their employer or to the NRC, without fear of retaliation. After i reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions, the NRC will t determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 C.F.R. 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). Your response to this letter will also be placed in the PDR. Accordingly, to the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public. The enclosed Notice is not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511. Sincerely,
\ Samuel J. lins, i or q Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation b
Docket No. 999-01253
Enclosures:
- 1. Notice of Violation
- 2. Synopsis of 01 Report NUREG-0940. PART 2 C-2
NOTICE OF VIOLATION l Construction Products Research, Inc. Docket No. 999-01253 Five Star Products, Inc. EA 97-471 l Fairfield, Connecticut l As a result of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staffs review of the NRC Office of ' I investigations report of investigation, which was completed on September 23,1997, a violation ! of NRC requirements wau identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the violation is listed below:
\
10 C.F.R. 50.7, in part, prohibits discrimination by a contractor or subcontractor of a i Commission licensee or applicant against an employee for engaging in certain protected l activities. Discrimination includes discharge or other actions relating to the l compensation, terms, conditions and privileges of employment. Protected activities are described in Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and in general relate to the administration or enforcement of a requirement imposed under the Atomic Energy Act or the Energy Reorganization Act. i Contrary to the above, in December 1992 and January 1993, Construction Products Research, Inc. (CPR), and Five Star Products, Inc. (Five Star), a subcontractor and a contractor to Commission licensees, respectively, through the actions of the president and vice president of CPR, and the president and vice president of Five Star, i discriminated against Mr. Edward P. Holub, former Director of Research of CPR, as a ! result of his having engaged in protected activities. The protected activities included Mr. l Holub raising safety concems to the NRC regarding the quality of testing products CPR and Five Star supplied to nuclear power plants, and cooperating with the NRC in connection with its investigation of CPR and Five Star. Between December 22,1992 and January 22,1993, CPR and Five Star: (1) placed Mr. Holub on an involuntary leave status; (2) instructed other employees of CPR and Five Star not to discuss the ongoing NRC investigation of CPR and Five Star with him; (3) denied him access to his office and other facilities in the companies; and (4) terminated him from employment. CPR and Five Star committed these acts in retaliation for Mr. Holub's engaging in protected activities. This is a Severity Level i violatior (Supplement Vil). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, CPR and Five Star, a subcontractor and contractor to Commission licensees, respectively, are hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Chief, Special Inspection Branch, Division of Inspection and Support Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The reply must be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include: (1) the reason for the violation, or if contested, the basis for disputing the violation; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations; (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved; and (5) a statement as to why the NRC should have confidence that your employees, to the extent that they are engaged in licensed activities, are free to raise safety concems to their employer or to the NRC, without fear of retaliation. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence,if the NUREG-0940. PART 2 C-3
Notice of Vioiction correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time. Under the authority of Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act,42 U.S.C. 2201(c), the response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public. Dat at Rockville, Maryland this tiay of January 1998 - i i b NUREG-0940. PART 2 C-4 i
SYNOPSIS I The U.S.- Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Region I, Office of Investigations (01), initiated this investigation on June 21, 1993, to ' determine if the Director of Research of Construction Products Research Inc. (CPR)/Five Star Products. Inc. (Five Star), was terminated for raising safety concerns to the NRC regarding the quality of testing of Five Star products. This case was placed in a pending status from April 1994 to April 1997 awaiting the outcome of protracted subpoena enforcement litigation between the principals of CPR/Five Star and the federal government. Based upon the evidence developed during the 01 and Department of Labor investigations, it is concluded that CPR and Five Star, and their respective presidents, discrir.inated against the Director of Research. NUREG-0940. PART 2 C-5 i
t IEC sorv 335 U.S. NUCLE AR REGULATO;1Y CoMMisslON 1. REPORT NUMBER O"J'" ,'1",l6,,,i,,r!fldi"~ ""'-
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noi. nw BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET rsee in,rruero,w . <n, r, r,,e NUREG-0940, PART 2 .
- 2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE VOL. 17, No. 3 Enforcement Actions: Significant Actions Resolved R: actor Licensees 3 DATE REPORT PUBLISHED
=='" " ^a Semiannual Progress Report l November 1998 January - June 1998
- 4. f IN OR GR ANT NUMBE R b AUTHOR (S) 6 TYPE OF REPORT ;
r Technical Office of Enforcement
- 1. PE R10D COVE R E D Isactss** Derest L
t s. *E AF ORMING ORGANtZAT ION - NAME AND ADDR ESS (st Nec. prey.e p v.sen. Offere or avveon. u.s. Nuc*er muyuserory commesuon. ems inesung eddern. u conerstor, preres flFf** end n'e83884 ethfrFSLi i Office of Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission W shington, DC 20555-0001
- 9. SPONSOR ING ORG ANIZ ATlON - N AME AND ADDR E SS ur NRC. tenw how as erme=". et n oncretor prov>& NRC O*vwon. Ortwe or Reeoon U S. NucJeer Frosuratorv Comm* won and menkna address.)
Same as above
- 10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
- 11. ABST R ACT rJoo words e, *ui !
This compilation summarizes significant enforcement actions that have been resolved during the period (January - June 1998) and includes copies of letters, Notices, and Orders sent by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to reactor licensees with respect to these enforcement actions. It is anticipated that the information in this publication will be widely disseminated to managers and employees engaged in activities licensed by the NRC, so that actions can be taken to improve safety by avoiding future violations similar to those described in this publication. u xe , aOsos oEsca eiosS ,-. r . ~ .,,~,. e...,,,- , .- . , , , , , . , , - , - o avaaa m n siau w ~i Technical Specifications, Quality Assurance, Radiation Safety Unlimited Program,' Safety Evaluation iemcusin uasm .wiu~
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