ML20141F362
| ML20141F362 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/30/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-0940, NUREG-0940-PT02, NUREG-0940-V15-N2-P2, NUREG-940, NUREG-940-PT2, NUREG-940-V15-N2-P2, NUDOCS 9705210290 | |
| Download: ML20141F362 (400) | |
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r' i . . . f - NUREG-0940 : - l p? y It, Enforcement Actions: - = Significant Actions Res.o lved. . . Reactor Licensees 1 1 e .. a s r
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[ !Seimannual: Progress Report 2 L Julp(-iDscemberl1996::L ,
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p 1U.S.' Nuclear.' Regulatory Commission
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52 AVAILABILITY NOTICE - x 1 Availability of Reference Materials Cited in NRC Publications ' Most docements cited in NRC pubDcations vyill be available from one of the following sources:
- t. ;The NBC Public Document Room,'~ 2120 L Street,'NWA Lower: Level, Washington, DC 20555-0001' ~
. . . .3 b - 2. ;The Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P. 0; Box'37082, O . : Washington,'DCL 20402-9328
- 3. [Tho[ National Technical Information Servico, Springfield, VA 22161-0002 J3
'A l Although the listing that follows repfesents the majority of documents cited in NRC publica ,
4 7 'W Etions,.it is not intended to be exhaustive.
' Q'
- Referenced documents available for. inspection and copying for a feo'from ths NHC Public?
. Document Room include NRC correspondence and interna! NRC memoranda; NRC bulletins?
circulars, ir, formation notices, inspection and investigation. notices; licensee event reports;-- vendor reports and correspondence;. Commission papers; and applicant and licenseo docu-
- monts and correspondonce.
The following documents in the NUREG series are available for purchase from the Government -- Printing Offico: formal NRO staff and contractor reports, NRC-sponsored conference pro-: coodings,'intomational agrooment reports, grantee reports, and NRC booklets and bro--
; churcs. JAlso available are regulatory guides, NRC regulations in the Code of Federal Regula-3- ' tions, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission issuances, 7 Documents available 'from the National Technical information Service include NUREG-series
[ repor's t and technical reports prepared by other Federal agencies and reports prepared by the p
~
. Atom!c Energy Commission, forerunner agency to the Nuclear Regulatory Comrnission'.
Documents avai!at>ie from public and special technical libraries include ad open literature
. items, such as books, journal articles; and transactions. Federal Register noticos, Federal and Stato legislation, and congressional reports can usually be obtained from these libraries.
Documents such as theses, dissertations, foreign reports and translations, and non-NRC con . forenco proceedings pro availabio for purchase from the organization sponsoring the publica-tion cited.
. Singlo copies of NRC draft reports are available free, to the extent of supply, upon written
, request to the Office of Administration, Distribution and Mail Services Section, U.S. Nuclear
- ~
Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001. Copion of industry codes and standards used in a substantive mancer in the NRC regulatory process are maintained at the NRC Library, Two White Flint North,11545 Rockvine Pike, Rock-
- ville, MD: 20852-273tl, for use by t.ho public. . Codes and standards are usually copyrighted (and may be purchased from the originating organization or, if they aro American National iStandards, from the American National Standards Institute,1430 Broadway, New York, NY f 10018-3308.l 7
A t E 6YNl r
NUREG-0940 Vol.15, No. 2, Part 2 Reactor Licensees ; i i i Enforcement Actions: l Significant Actions Resolved l Reactor Licensees j i b Sem.iannual Progress Report ! July - December 1996 l Manuscript Completed: April 1997 Date Published: April 1997 i i Omcc of Enforcement [ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 , pr= =. 9, i P
).
CONTENTS Paae , A B S T RAC T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i i i INTRODUCTION........................................................... 1 SUMMARIES.............................................................. 3 ? REACTOR LICENSEES A. Civil Penalties and Orden Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Lusby, Maryland (Calvert Cli ffs Nuclear Power Pl ant), EA 96-179. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1 Carolina Power & Light Company, Southport, North Carolina ' (Brunswick Steam Electric Pl ant), EA 96-354. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-7 Centerior Service Company, Oak Harbor, Ohio (Davi s-Besse Nuclear Power Station, EA 96-304. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-18 Commonwealth Edison Company, Downers Grove, Illinois (Quad Cities Station), EA 96-114...............................A-25 Commonwealth Edison Company, Downers Grove, Illinois (Dresden Station), EA 96-115...................................A-31 Commonwealth Edison Company, Downers Grove, Illinois (Zion Nuclear Station), EA 96-216..............................A-38 Con.umers Power Company, Covert, Michigan (Pali sades Nuclear Generating Pl ant), EA 96-131. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-46 Entergy Operations, Inc., Russellville, Arkansas (Arkansas Nuclear One), EA 96-274..............................A-55 Florida Power and Light Company, Juno Beach, Florida ' (Tur key Poi nt Nucl ear Pl ant) , EA 96-051. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-62 Florida Power Corporation, Crystal River, Florida (Crystal River Nuclear Pl ant), EA 95-126. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-71 Houston Lighting & , ..ver Company, Wadsworth, Texas (South Texas Project), EA 95-077...............................A-92
' Houston Lighting & Power Company, Wadsworth, Texas (South Texas Project), EAs 96-133 and 96-136..................A-100 Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Lycoming, New York (Ni ne Mil e Poi nt) , EA 96-116. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-111 ;
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Waterford, Connecticut (Mill stone Nuclear Power Plant), EA 96-059. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-ll7 NUREG-0940 v l
i Portland General Electric Company, Rainier, Oregon (Tro,Jan Nuclear Plant), EAs 96-111 and 94-067.................A-124 Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey (Hope Creek Generating Station), EAs 96-125 and 96-281. . . . . . . . A-132 Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Birmingham, Alabama ( Fa rl ey Nucl ear Pl ant ), EA 96-410. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-14 5 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation, Brattleboro, Vermont (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), EA 96-210. . . . . . . . . . . . . A-154 Wisconsin Energy Corporation, Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant), EAs 96-215 and 96-273. . . . .. A-161 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, Burlington, Kansas (Wol f Creek Generating Station), EA 96-124. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-175
-B. Severity level 1. II. III Violations. No Civil Penalty Boston Edison Company, Plymouth, Massachusetts (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), EA 96-271. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-1 Carolina Power & Light Company, Southport, North Carolina I (Brunswick), EA 96-181......................................... 8-B Carolina Power & Light Company, Southport, North Carolina
( B run swi c k) , EA 96-4 4 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B- 16 Centerior Service Company, Perry, Ohio (Perry Nuclear Power Plant), EA 96-367.........................B-24 Duquesne Light Company, Shippingport, Pennsylvania (Beaver Valley Power Station), EA 96-244.......................B-30 Entergy Operations, Inc., St. Francisville, Louisiana (River Bend Station), EA 96-329................................B-35 florida Power & Light Company, Juno Beach, Florida (St. Lucie), EAs 96-236 and 96-249.............................B-42 Georgia Power Ccmpany, Birmingham, Alabama (Vogtle Electric Generating Pl ant), EA 96-479. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-50 McEnany Roofing, Inc., Tampa, Florida EA 96-336......................................................B-57 Nebraska Public Power District, Columbus, Nebraska
. (Cooper Nuclear Station), EA 96-202. . . . . . . . '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-62 Nebraska Public Power District, Columbus, Nebraska
- f. '(Cooper Nuclear Station), EA 96-307............................B-68 NUREG-0940, PART II vi
i 4
, l Omaha Public Power District,' Ft. Calhoun, Nebraska - 'i (Fort'Calhoun~ Station), EA 96 204...............................B-77 .:
PECO Energy, Wayne, Pennsylvania ,
- (Limerick Generating Station), EA 96-209...................... 8-84 ;
4 LRaytheon Engineers and Constructors, Inc., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania EAs 96-134 and 96-137..........................................B-89 l l- Tennessee Valley Authority, Chattanooga, Tennessee l (Browns Ferry), EA 96-199.......-...............................B-97 i Virginia Electric and Power Company, Glen Allen, Virginia !
.(Surry Power Station), EA 96-231..............................B-105 Washington Public' Power Supply System, Richland, Washington
'(Wa shington Nuclear Project-2), EA 96-267. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-113 I
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1 NUREG-0940, PART-11 vii
- l c !
~, - . -- . ..
4 f ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: SIGNIFICANT-ACTIONS RESOLVED i REACTOR LICENSEES January - June 1996 INTRODUCTION This issue and Part of NUREG-0940 is being. published to inform Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reactor licensees about.significant enforcement actions and their resolution for the second half of 1996. Enforcement actions I are issued -in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy, published as s NUREG-16004 " General Statemeat of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions." Enforcement actions are issued by the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operation and Research (DEDR), and the Regional Administrators. The Director, Office of Enforcement, may act for the 1
- DEDR in the absence of the DEDR or as directed. The NRC defines significant l enforcement ' actions or escalated enforcement actions as civil penalties, )
! orders, and Notices of Violation for violations categorized at Severity Level i I, II, and III (where violations are categorized on a scale of I to IV, with I )
.being the most significant).
The purpose of the NRC Enforcement Program is to support the agency's safety mission in protecting the public and the environment. Consistent with that i ~ purpose, the NRC makes this NUREG available to all reactor licensees in the . interest of avoiding similar significant noncompliance issues. Therefore, it : is anticipated that the information in this publication will be widely ; - disseminated to managers and employees engaged in activities licensed by NRC. ; A brief summary of each significant enforcement action that has been resolved i in the second half of 1996 can be found in the section of this report entitled i
" Summaries." Each summary provides the enforcement action (EA) number to l l
E identify the case for reference purposes. The supplement number refers to the activity area in which the violations are classified in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.
- Reactor Operations I.
Supplement I ! Supplement II - Facility Construction ! Supplement III - Safeguards c Supplement IV - Health Physics , Supplement V - Transportation t ! Supplement VI - Fuel Cycle and Materials Operations
- Supplement VII - Miscellaneous Matters i Supplement VIII - Emergency Preparedness Section A of this report consists of copies of completed civil penalty or ;
Order actions involving reactor licensees, arranged alphabetically. Section B includes copies of Notices of Violation that were issued to reactor licensees ! for.a Severity Level I, II, or III violation, but for which no civil penalties : were assessed.
.The NRC publishes significant enforcement actions taken against individuals ;
and involving materials licensees as Parts I and III of NUREG-0940, respectively.~ l NUREG-0940,PARTLII I l 1
l 4 SUMMARIESL ;
- A. CIVIL PENALTIES AND ORDERS-
.i Baltimore Gas' and Electric Company, Lusby, Maryland . .
. (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant), Supplement I, EA 96-179 ~ ;
i
' A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the l amount of $50,000 was' issued July 25, 1996, to emphasize the importance of prompt identification of violations such that timely and ;
comprehensive corrective action can be taken of violations when they ; , exist. The action was based on violations of NRC requirements related : to the fire protection of safe shutdown equipment. The licensee , responded and paid the civil penalty on August 23, 1996. i Carolina Power & Light Company, Southport, North Carolina , (Brunswick Steam Electric Plant), Supplement I, EA .96-354 l A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposi t ion of Civil Penalties in the l amount of $150,000 was issued November 19, 1996, to emphasize the !
; importance of management oversight of the implementation of i environmental qualification requirements and the need for prompt ~
l identification and comprehensive correction of conditions adverse to i quality. The action was based on: (1) the failure to implement the EQ ! program in accordance with the requirements, and (2) a longstanding { failure to implement the corrective action program with regard to EQ l deficiencies. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalties on ! December 19, 1996. ! Centerior Service Company, Oak Harbor, Ohio l (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), Supplement I, EA 96-304 ; A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the
- amount of $50,000 was issued October 22, 1996, to emphasize the need for !
full coupliance with Appendix R, and performing conservative operability : and reportability determinations. The action was based on: (1) certain ! motor operated valves potentially being unable to perform their post- j fire safe shutdown function, and (2) degraded radiant energy shields in - the containment and containment annulus. The licensee responded and i paid the civil penalty on November 21, 1996. Commonwealth Edison Company, Downers Grove, Illinois . (Quad Cities Station), Supplement I, EA 96-114 l
.A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $50,000 was issued June '13,1996, to emphasize the need to j identify significant deficiencies requiring prompt corrective actions. l The action was based on a violation associated with the station's !
failure to promptly correct structural steel design deficiencies ! initially discovered in 1991. The licensee responded and paid the civil !
. penalty on July 12, 1996. l f
h 3 : 1
'NUREG-0940, PART II- 3 b
i Commonwealth Edison Company, Downers Grove, Illinois (Dresden Station), Supplement I, EA 96-115 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $50,000 was issued June 13, 1996, to emphasize the need to identify significant deficiencies requiring prompt corrective actions. The action was based on the station's failure to promptly correct structural steel design deficiencies initially discovered in 1991. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on July 12, 1996. Commonwealth Edison Company, Downers Grove, Illinois (Zion Nuclear Station), Supplement I, EA 96-216 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $50,000 was issued August 23, 1996, to emphasize the I importance of operator attention to equipment status and of prompt and comprehensive correction of violations. The action was based on violations associated with operational errors and unplanned changes to the status of safety-related equipment that occurred during the period of February through May 1996. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on September 27, 1996. Consumers Power Company, Covert, Michigan ! (Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant), Supplement I, EA 96-131 i A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $50,000 was issued August 13, 1996, to emphasize the need to initiate prompt and effective corrective action for significant fire protection deficiencies. The action was based on an inspection that identified 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, fire protection deficiencies i that resulted in the facility being outside the design basis. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on September 4,1996, i Entergy Operations, Inc., Russellville, Arkansas (Arkansas Nuclear One), Supplement I, EA 96-274 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $50,000 was issued September 6, 1996, to emphasize the importance of proper maintenance on safety-related components, including ! the need to identify problems encountered during the performance of such ; maintenance. The action was based on an event where a main steam valve failed to reseat following a reactor trip resulting in a steam generator boiling dry. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on October 7, 1996. Florida Power and Light Company, Juno Beach, Florida (Turkey Point Nuclear Plant), Supplement VII, EA 96-051 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $100,000 was issued July 16, 1996, to emphasize the importance cf ensuring that employees who raise real or perceived safety concerns are not subject to discrimination for raising those concerns and that every effort is made to provide an environment in which all employees may freely identify safety issues without fear of retaliation or j NUREG-0940, PART II 4 , I
i discrimination. The action was based on a violation involving discrimination against an engineer formerly employed by the licensee. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on December 3,1996. Florida Power Corporation, Crystal River, Florida (Crystal River Nuclear Plant), Supplement I, EA 96-126 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $500,000 was issued July 10, 1996, to emphasize effective licensee management oversight engineering, operations, and corrective , action activities. The action was based on violations that were identified by the NRC as a result of inspections and investigations following the licensee's identification that an unauthorized evolution had been conducted by a shift of licensed operators on September 4, 1994, and that it had resulted in operation outside the design basis of the facility. It was subsequently identified that the same shift of operators had conducted the unauthorized evolution also on the previous day. Both tests were performed in an effort to resolve a long-standing safety concern by demonstrating that an operating curve provided by the engineering department was non-conservative. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalties September 9,1996. Houston Lighting & Power Company, Wadsworth, Texas (South Texas Project), Supplement VII, EA 95-077 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $160,000 was issued October 17, 1995, to emphasize the importance of ensuring that appropriate controls exist to preclude discrimination against individuals for identifying safety concerns. The action was based on an investigation by the Office of Inspector General ' - and a recently issued Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge's Recommended Decision and Order that found that discrimination had occurred against two former members of the licensee's security department. The violations were cited at Severity Level II because the manager was in a position above first-line supervision. The licensee responded on November 15, 1995 indicating when a final decision was made they would make a decision about payment. They paid the civil penalties on November 14, 1996. Houston Lighting & Power Company, Wadsworth, Texas (South Texas Project), Supplement VII, EAs 96-133 and 96-136 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $200,000 was issued September 19, 1996, to emphasize the importance of protecting individuals against discrimination and taking comprehensive corrective action that includes establishing accountability for violations of this requirement. The action was based on a Department of Labor decision that found the licensee contractors discriminated against two employees that were engaged in protected activities, in violation of 10 CFR 50.7. One of the violations was , cited at a Severitv Level II due to the level of supervision that the ! discrimination occurred. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalties on October 22, 1996. NUREG-0940, PART II 5 I l l
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, .ycoming, New York (Nine Mile Point), Supplement VII, EA 96-116 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $80,000 was issued July 24, 1996, to emphasize the importance of continuously assuring a work environment that is free of any harassment, intimidation, or discrimination against those who raise safety concerns. The action was based on a violation of 10 CFR 50.7. The licensee terminated the employment of one of its nuclear engineers for raising safety concerns. The violation was cited at a Severity Level II because management above first line supervision was involved in the discrimination. The licensee responded on August 23, 1996 and paid the civil penalty on December 16, 1996. Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Waterford, Connecticut (Millstone Nuclear Power Plant), Supplement Vil, EA 96-059 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $100,000 was issued June 4, 1996, to emphasize the importance of maintaining a work environment in which employees are free to engage in protected activities without fear of retaliation. The action was ; based on a Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge Recommended Decision and Order finding discrimination by the licensee's contractor (Bartlett Nuclear, Inc.) against one of the contractor's former employees for engaging in protected activities. The licensee responded July 2, 1996 and paid the civil penalty on October 25, 1996. Portland Ge'neral Electric Company, Rainier, Oregon (Trojan Nuclear Plant), Supplement VII, EAs 96-111 and 94-067 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $50,000 was issued June 6,1996, to emphasize the significance of the management failures that led to this violation, and the importance of effective management processes to assure that information provided to the NRC is complete and accurate in all material aspects. The action was based on a violatior involving the submission of incomplete and inaccurate information to the NRC in a Licensee Event Report in June 1991, and in a revision in October 1991. These LERs addressed degradation of electrical penetration assembly module seals. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on July 3, 1996. Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey (Hope Creek Generating Station), Supplement I, EAs 96-125 and 96-281 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the ! amount of $150,000 was issued October 23, 1996, to emphasize the , importance of (1) appropriate planning for the testing of equipment following maintenance, (2) timely identification and correction of problems identified concerning safety-related equipment, and (3) appropriate evaluation prior to making changes to the facility. The action was based on violations involving: (1) two examples of failures l to plan appropriate surveillance testing for control rod drive systems, ) (2) two examples of failures to promptly identify and correct conditicas ; adverse to quality regarding reactor building ventilation supply duct , NUREG-0940, PART II 6 i
backdraft isolation dampers and excessive cortrol rod withdrawal speeds, (3) failure to obtain Commission approval prior to making changes to the facility's service water system design that involved an unreviewed
. safety question, and (4) failure to maintain the service water system in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications. The '
licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on November 22, 1996. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Birmingham, Alabama (Farley Nuclear Plant), Supplement I, EA 96-410 A Notice of Violation and. Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $50,000 was issued December 4,1996, to emphasize the importance of maintaining an adequate fire protection program for the ' protection of safety-related equipment and the need for prompt and comprehensive corrective actions. The action was based on a violation involving three examples in which the licensee failed to assure that one-hour fire barriers were installed in electrical cables associated with systems required for plant safe shutdown. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on December 23, 1996. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation, Brattleboro, Vermont (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), Supplement I, EA 96-210 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $50,000 was issued August 23, 1996. In order to emphasize the importance of ensuring the design of the safety-related residual heat removal system is not susceptible to single failure vulnerabilities, a Severity Level III violation was cited against the licensee. Although normal application of the Enforcement Policy would have resulted in no civil penalty being assessed, given the length of time (approximately 22 years) that this condition existed, as well as the number of prior opportunities that existed to identify and correct this violation sooner, the NRC staff exercised enforcement discretion and issued the violation assessing a civil penalty at the base amount. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalty on September 20, 1996. Wisconsin Energy Corporation, Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant), Supplement I, EAs 96-215 and 96-273 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $325,000 was issued December 3, 1996, to emphasize the need for full compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. The action was based on violations involving the failure to adequately: (1) conduct control room activities, (2) maintain plant configuration control, and (3) conduct independent fuel dry cask storage activities. The licensee paid the civil penalties on December 16, 1996 and responded on January 31, 1997. Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, Burlington, Kansas - (Wolf Creek Generating Station), Supplement I, EA 96-l'24 A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $300,000 was issued July 1, 1996. The action was based on NUREG-0940, PART 11 7 l l
violations that occurred during an event involving frazil icing on the safety-related essential service water system traveling screens and trash racks, which resulted in the loss of one train of the ultimate l heat sink and jeopardized the second train. The violations also ; involved: (1) the failure to assure that inadequate ESW system line flow J was promptly identified and corrected, (2) the failure to follow plant procedures while aligning the ESW system, and (3) the failures' tc incNde all work instructions and implement appropriate corrective action for the unit's turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, which had failed during the icing event. The licensee responded and paid the civil penalties July 31, 1996. B. SEVERITY LEVEL I. II. AND III VIOLATIONS. NO CIVIL PENALTY Boston Edison Company, Plymouth, Massachusetts (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), Supplement I, EA 96-271 A Notice of Violation was issued October 21, 1996, based on violations involving (1) two electrical containment penetrations there were not properly protected due to improper tripsettings on the circuit breakers, and (2) the failure to identify and correct this condition sooner, even though it existed as early as 1988. A civil penalty was not proposed I because the licensee identified the violation of the technical specification and took prompt and comprehensive corrective action once the violations were identified. Carolina Power & Light Company, Southport, North Carolina (Brunswick), Supplement I, EA 96-181 A Notice of Violation was issued July 12, 1996, based on a violation involving the licensee's failure to establish adequate design controls , measures for the verification and testing of material changes made in j the service water system pump during modifications implemented in 1993 i and 1994. A civil penalty was not proposed because the licensee l identified the violation and took immediate corrective actions which i included an evaluation which identified a potential common mode failure I mechanism that led to the subsequent shutdown of both units. Carolina Power & Light Company, Hartsville, South, Carolina j (Brunswick), Supplement I, EA 96-442
]
A Notice of Violation was issued December 13, 1996, based on violations ! involving the failure of the licensee to operate the facility at steady state reactor core power levels not in excess of 2436 megawatts and to maintain the average planar linear heat generation rate for each type of fuel as specified in the technical specifications. A civil penalty was not proposed because the licensee identified the violation and took immediate corrective and comprehensive actions. l l NUREG-0940, PART II 8 i i l
Centerior Service Company, Perry, Ohio (Perry Nuclear Power Plant), Supplement I, EA 96-367 A Notice of Violation was issued November 6,1996, based on violations Involving not taking Technical Specification required actions for an inoperable ECC train, failure to take effective corrective actions for significant conditions adverse to quality. A civil penalty was not proposed because the licensee identified the violations and the licensee took corrective actions. Duquesne Light Company, Shippingport, Pennsylvania (Beaver Valley Power Station), Supplement I, EA 96-244 A Notice of Violation was issued September 11, 1996, based on a violation which involved the failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.62 shich requires that the licensee provide an alternate means, independent of the Reactor Protection System, of tripping the turbine and actuating auxiliary feedwater under conditions indicative of an ATWS. A civil penalty was not proposed because the licensee has not been subject to an escalated enforcement action in the past two years and the licensee took prompt and comprehensive corrective actions. Entergy Operations, Inc., St. Francisville, Louisiana - (River Bend Station), Supplement I, EA 96-329 A Notice of Violation was issued November 7,1996, based on violations involving the failure to perform surveillance testing in accordance with , the requirements specified in Technical Specifications and involved the following equipment: (1) the Division I battery, (2) the Division III battery, (3) the drywell airlock, (4) the drywell combination equipment hatch / personnel door, (5) the prefilters for the standby gas treatment control room fresh air, and fuel building ventilation systems, and (6) a primary containment penetration isolation valve. A civil penalty was not proposed because the licensee has not been subject to an escalated enforcement action in the past two years, made prompt identification, and took comprehensive corrective actions. Florida Power & Light Company, Juno Beach, Florida (St. Lucie), Supplement I, EAs 96-236 and 96-249 A Notice of Violation was issued September 19, 1996, based on a violation involving the licensee's failure to recognize an unreviewed safety question related to the implementation of a valve lineup change to the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer system. A civil penalty was not proposed because the licensee has not been subject to an escalated enforcement action in the past two years, and took comprehensive corrective actions. Georgia Power Company, Birmingham, Alabama (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant), Supplement 1, EA 96-479 A Notice of Violation was issued December 31, 1996, based on violations involving (1) the inoperability of the Unit 18 Safety injection Pump for a period greater than that allowed by the Technical Specifications due NUREG-0940, Part II 9
.l
- t to inadequate pump motor cooling and (2) the licensee's. failure to establish adequate procedures for the disassembly and reassembly of.the ,
motor coolers during maintenance activities. A civil penalty was not ! proposed because the' licensee identified the violations and took prompt ' and comprehensive corrective actions. ! McEnany; Roofing, Inc., Tampa, Florida
- _ Supplement Vil, EA 96-336'
.A Notice of Violation was issued December 5, 1996, based on a violation involving the discrimination of an employee when the employee was ;
terminated for raising concerns about the failure of another employee to ' adhere to NRC security regulations at the Florida Power Corporation's Crystal River facility. The company described actions at the conference >
;taken to address the implementation of the requirements of ERA Section j
!. 211. These included: (1) strengthening the company's policies with regard to ensuring employee concerns are promptly addressed and t resolved. (2) training supervisors and employees with regard to their responsibilities in the area of employee protection, and (3) discussions : of employee rights with individual employees. Nebraska Public Power District, Columbus, Nebraska ] (Cooper Nuclear Station), Supplement I, EA 96-202 i A Notice of Violation was 1ssued September 30, 1996, based on violations . involving the failure to: (1) insert control rods in the proper sequence ! following.a loss of a reactor recirculation pump, (2) notify shift ; supervision of an unexpected situation, i.e., a mispositioned control 1
-rod, for approximately 20 minutes, and (3) obtain the concurrence of the l shift. supervisor and reactor engineer in developing a recovery . plan for :
a mispositioned control rod. A civil penalty was not issued because the ; licensee identified the violations and took comprehensive corrective I action of the violations. ] Nebraska Public Power District, Columbus, Nebraska (Cooper Nuclear Station), Supplement III, EA 96-307 A Notice of Violation was issued November 20, 1996, based on access : authorization violations involving multiple failures to (1) consider i criminal history information, (2) develop references for applicants, (3) , review military background information, (4) document interviews when derogatory information was discovered, (5) verify activities during periods of unemployment, (6) conduct complete background investigations r , when " updating" access, and (7) two failures to complete full background l investigations after granting temporary access. A civil penalty was not !
. issued because the licensee identified the violations'and took prompt !
and comprehensive corrective actions which included a change in i
. management in the security program. l NUREG-0940, PART II 10 )
i l 1 ee q r - tii- y-
i Omaha Public Power District, Ft. Calhoun, Nebraska (Fort Calhoun Station), Sipplement I, EA'96-204 L .
. A Notice of Viold1on was issued July 31, 1996, based on violations '
involving-the 3teensee's (1) providing inadequate procedural guidance c for pressurizer cooldown evolutions, (2) failing to follow procedures by not- taking adequate compensatory measures for disabling the LTOP q function, and (3) failing to follow procedures by not logging abnormal plant conditions and by not conducting proper shift turnovers. A civil ' penalty was not proposed because the licensee had not had an escalated action in the past two years and the licensee took prompt and s comprehensive corrective actions.
. PECO Energy, Wayne, Pennsylvania (Limerick Generating Station), Supplement I, EA 96-209 A Notice of Violation was issued October 17, 1996, based on a violation involving the failure to establish adequate controls for excluding foreign material from the Unit I suppression pool. A civil penalty was
- not proposed because the licensee had not had an escalated action in the past two. years and the licensee took prompt and comprehensive corrective actions. Raytheon Engineers and Constructors, Inc., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Supplement VII, EAs 96-134 and 96-137 A Notice of Violation was. issued September 19, 1996, based on violations [ involving discrimination against former employees who engaged in > protected activities at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station. Tennessee Valley Authority, Chattanooga, Tennessee (Browns Ferry), Supplement I, EA 96-199 A Notice of Violation was issued August 1, 1996, based on a violation involving the inoperability of the RCIC system. The reactor remained in operation durir g this period, which exceeded seven days. A civil penalty was not proposed because the licensee took comprehensive corrective actions and although there had been previous escalated enforcement action in the two years prior to the occurrence, that violation had occurred in 1993 and was not indicative of current licensee performance. That fact, in conjunction with the recent overall good performance of the licensee warranted the exercise of discretion, and no civil penalty was proposed. Virginia Electric and Power Company, Glen Allen, Virginia (Surry Power Station), Supplement I, EA 96-231 A Notice of Violation was issued August 16, 1996, based on violations involving'(1) the inoperability of the Unit 1 and 2 containment hydrogen analyzers for a period greater than that allowed by the Technical-Specifications, and (2) the failure to establish adequate procedures to assure the operability of the containment hydrogen analyzers.. A civil W
'NUREG-0940, PART II 11 !
penalty was not proposed because the licensee identified the violations and took prompt and comprehensive corrective actions. Washington Public Power Supply System, Richland, Washington (Washington Nuclear Project-2), Supplement III, EA 96-267 i A Notice of Violation was issued October 1,1996, based on a violation involving inadequate assessment and monitoring for potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition. A civil panalty was not proposed because the licensee identified the violation and took comprehensive action to correct the violations. 1
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July 25, 1996 EA 96-179 Mr. Charles H. Cruse Vice President - Nuclear Energy Daltimore Gas and Electric Company Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, Maryland - 20657-4702
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY - 550,000 , (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/96-05 and 50-318/96-05)
Dear Mr. Cruse:
This letter refers to the NRC inspection conducted from May 8 through 10, 1996, at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. The findings of the inspection were-discussed with your staff during an exit meeting on May 10, 1996, as well as during follow-up discussions with your licensing staff on May 24 and 30,1996. The inspection was conducted, in part, to review calculations and test results used to evaluate the acceptability of emergency ventilation provided for the emergency switchgear rooms on the 27 foot and 45 foot elevations in the event of a fire. During the inspection, apparent violations of NRC requirements were identified, and were described in the NRC inspection report transmitted with our letter dated June 13, 1996. On June 27, 1996, a predecisional enforcement conference was conducted with you and members of your staff to discuss the violations, their causes, and your corrective actions. Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information you provided during the enforcement conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty, , and the circumstances surrounding the violations are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The first violation involves the failure to l implement, prior to an NRC Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection (EDSFI) in 1992, a fire protection plan which described the means to limit fire i damage to the safe shutdown equipment in the 27 foot elevation Emergency i Switchgear Room (ESR) should a severe fire occur in the 45 foot ESR. ! Specifically, because the ventilation system for the switchgear rooms uses common ' ducting and fire dampers, a severe fire in the 45 foot ESR would disable the l ventilation system for the 27 foot ESR. As a result, safe shutdown equipment in 1 the 27 foot ESR would then be subjected to temperatures which would exceed those temperatures for which the equipment was designed. NUREG-0940, PART II A- 1
- i
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company 2 The second violation involves the failure to adequately verify the corrective actions taken when this lack of protection for the safe shutdown equipment in the 27 foot elevation Emergency Switchgear Room was brought to the attention of Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (BG&E) by the NRC in April 1992. Although the NRC EDSFI raised this issue as an unresolved item in 1992, the corrective actions taken by your staff were not verified by detailed analysis or test until May 1996. More specifically, subsequent to the EDSFI inspection, you concluded that a total flow of 10,000 cubic feet per minute (cfm) was needed to cool the emergency switchgear rooms adequately. In order to provide this amount, you staged a port 1ble fan in the area and developed and implemented procedural guidance to place a fan in the ESR rollup door with the steel rollup door lowered to the top of the fan housing, and the personnel door blocked open. However, you l did not verify that this configuration would provide the 10,000 cfm air flow rate , that was credited in your calculation. When questioned by NRC inspectors in 1 March 1996, you performed a test which indicated a flow rate of only 5,155 cfm. ! At the predecisional enforcement conference, you indicated that no safety issue exists because one fan subsequently was determined to be adequate for safe shutdown, even though you have added, since the recent inspection, a recond fan to provide additional flow. Nonetheless, the violations represent a significant i regulatory concern in that they demonstrate that the level of knowledge by engineers and supervisors on 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R issues was poor, and they neither adequately challenged assumptions in calculations nor verified them through testing. In addition, management's attention was insufficient to address these issues in a timely manner. As such, the violations represent a breakdown in the control of licensed activities that collectively represent a potentially significant lack of attention toward licensed responsibilities which resulted in your failure, for an extended period, to demonstrate that the safe shutdown equipment criteria had been met. Therefore, the two violations have been categorized in the aggregate at Severity Level !!! in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level !!! violation. Because Calvert Cliffs has been the subject of an escalated enforcement action within the last two years (namely, issuance of a Severity Level III violation and $50,000 civil penalty on January 2, 1996, for violations associated with deficiencies in the access authorization program; Reference, EA 95-170), the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit for Identification is not warranted because the violations were identified by the NRC. Credit for Corrective Action is warranted because once the violations were identified by the NRC in May 1996, your actions were considered both prompt and comprehensive. These actions, which were noted in your presentation at the predecisional enforcement conference, included, but were not limited to: (1) completion of an accelerated Appendix R overview evaluation on June 14, 1996, in which a contractor was retained to verify Appendix R support calculations, recommend a methodology for Appendix R equipment selection, review NUREG-0940. PART II A- 2
Baltimore Gas and Electric company 3 Appendix R Information Notices for applicability to Calvert Cliffs, and evaluate the feasibility of manual action by operators; (2) plans to perform an accelerated Appendix R Self-Assessment by November 1996 for the purpose of conducting a more comprehensive review of the program; (3) plans to develop and conduct Appendix R training for engineering support personnel by December 1996; and (4) review of the overall culture at Calvert Cliffs that allowed these conditions to persist. Therefore, to emphasize the importance of prompt identification of violations such tnat timely and comprehensive corrective action can be taken of violations when they exist, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Direct 3r, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice and Proposed Imposition if Civil Penalty in the base amount of $50,000 for the Severity Level 111 problers. You.are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your respense, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not include - any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If redactions are required, a proprietary version containing brackets placed around the proprietary, privacy, and/or safeguards information should be submitted. In addition, a non-proprietary version with the information in the brackets redacted should be submitted to be placed in the PDR. The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1900, Pub. L. No. 96.511. Sincerply.
' ~ p % /
homas T. Martin Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318 License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty NUREG-0940, PART II A- 3 i
ENCLOSURE! NOTICE OF VIOLAT[QH L bNQ PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Docket Nos. 50-317,-50-318 Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power. Plant License Nos. DPR-53, DPR-69 EA 96-179 During an NRC inspection conducted'on May 8-10, 1996, the results of which were. communicated to therlicensee during an exit meeting on May 10,1996 and in follow-up discussions on May 24 and 30, .1996, violations of NRC requirements were
. identified. In'accordance with the " General' Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, ' the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
' proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below:
l.A 10 CFR 50.4B(a) requires,'in part, that each' operating nuclear power plant
.have a fire protection plan that describes the means to limit fire damage to~ structures, systems, or components important to safety so that the ,
capability to safely shut down the plant is ensured.
)
Contrary to the above, prior to an NRC EDSFI inspection in March-April 1 1
; 1992, the Baltimore Gas and Electric (BG&E) Company fire protection plan l was' inadequate in that it did not' include the means to limit fire damage l to the safe shutdown equipment in the 27 fo'ot elevation Emergency i Switchgear Room (ESR should a severe fire occur in th- a5 foot ESR.
Specifically, because)the ventilation system for the switchgear roes uses l common ducting and fire dampers, a severe fire in the 45 foot ESR e 9id disable the ventilation system for the 27 foot ESR. As a result, safe shutdown equipment in the 27 foot ESR would then be subjected to temperatures which would exceed those temperatures for which the safe shutdown equipment was designed. (01013) 8. License Condition 2.C.3 for Unit I (and License Condition 2.C.4 for Unit
- 2) requires that BG&E maintain ~ the administrative controls (quality J. assurance program) identified in Section 6 of the NRC's Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated September 14, 1979. S?ction 6 of
' that SER, Administrative Controls, states that the quality assurance program will be submitted at a later date. The Quality Assurance Program l subsequently was submitted with BG&E's letter, dated December 31, 1979, which states that BGLE has implemented a program which meets the NRC's guidelines with specific exceptions. The NRC's guidelines were contained ! in Branch Technical Position (BlP) APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A. BTP APCSB ! 9.5-1, Appendix A requires, in part, that conditions adverse to fire I protection, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective components uncontrolled combustible meterial and non-conformances are promp,tly identified, reported, and corrected. I NUREG-0940 PART II: A- 4 1 E
Enclosure 2 Contrary to the above, from April 3,1992 until Jur,e 1996, conditions adver',e to fire protection were not promptly corrected when the lack of protection for the safe shutdown equipment in the 27 foot elevation ESR not.ed in Violation A above was brought to the attention of BGLE on Ap.*il 3,1992, via an NRC EDSFI inspection. Corrective actions which were taken were based on engineering judgement. Specifically, a 10,300 cfm fan was purchased to provide an estimated flow of 8,000 cfm in the 27 foot and 45 foot ESRs. When subsequent calculations determined that 10,000 cfri was j needed for adequate cooling, it was assumed that the 10,300 cfm fan would : provide the 10,000 cfm cooling. These corrective actions were not i verified by detailed analysis or test untfl May 1996, and were, in fact, l inadequate to satisfactorily resolve the condition, until June 1996, at I which time the required and calculated cooling flow provided by the ] emergency fans was determined and verified. (01023) l l These two violations are classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level i
!!! problem (Supplement I).
Civil Penalty - 550,000. Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons fcr the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as why the licen',e should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to tne Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the NUREG-0940, PART II A- 5 l I
Enclosure 3 Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an
" Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be im-posed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty.
la requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedura for imposing a civil penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public. Dated at King of Prussia Pennsylvania this 25th day of July 1996 NUREG-0940, PART II A- 6
l UNITED STATES
- ga es49'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
A A, G GA \ November 19. 1996 EA 96 354 Carolina Power & Light Company ATTN: Mr. W. R. Campbell Vice President Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Post Office Box 10429 Southport. North Carolina 28461
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES
$150.000 (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50 325/96 14 AND 50 324/96 14)
Dear Mr. Campbell:
This refers to the inspection conducted between June 24 and September 17. 1996, at the Brunswick facility. The inspection included a review of your environmental qualification (EO) program in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. You were informed of the results of our inspection on September 17. 10 6. and the inspection report was sent to you by letter dated October 4, 1996. An open predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region II office on October 21. 1996, with you and members of your staff to discuss the apparent violations, the root causes, and your corrective actions to preclude recurrence. A letter summarizing the conference was sent to you on November 1. 1996. Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information you provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. Violation A in the enclosed Notice, involves your failure to implement the E0 program in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. Specifically, numerous deficiencies were identified. some having existed since the EQ program was initially implemented. They involved failures to (1) incorporate appropriate equipment in the E0 program. (2) taintain documentation of gualification for safety related equipment, and (3) maintain E0 equipn.ent lists and files accurately. These deficiencies are significant in that, collectively, they represent a prograuatic breakdown in the implementation of your E0 program. The roct causes of Violation A were a lack of management oversight of the program, inadequate turnover of the E0 program implementation from contractors to licensee engineers, and the lack of E0 expertise in your program implementation and oversight. Violation B ir. the enclosed Notice, involves significant failures to implement your corrective action program with regard to EQ deficiencies over a long period of time. E0 nonconformances identified as early as 1991 were not properly '.orrected, and E0 deficiencies identified in contractor and I NUREG-0940, PART II A- 7
-i CP&L 2 self initiated audits as early as 1994 were closed without adequate resolution, were not placed in appropriate corrective action tracking programs, or remained open with no review of their impact on the EQ pro The root causes of this violation included informal followup of issues, gram. inadequate management revi+ of resolution, and paper-to paper closure of issues without ensuring that 1dentified basic program deficiencies were corrected. At the predecisional enforcement conference you indicated that no equipment operability issues had been identified during your review of the EQ program deficiencies. That fact notwithstanding, Violation A is of significant regulatory concern because the plant operated for a number of years without your staff ensurir.g the environmental qualification of key pieces of equipment such that there would be assurance that the equipment would operate if called upon to function. Therefore. Violation A is classified in accordance with the
" General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy). NUREG 1600, as a Severity Level III violation.
In addition to these E0 program deficiencies, the NRC is particularly concerned with your historically poor performance in implementing corrective actions for E0 program weaknesses, as cited in Violation B. Although you expended considerable effort for internal and contract assessment of your EQ l program, you failed to follow through to ensure correction of the identified deficiencies in that program. It is significant that many deficiencies were not entered into corrective action programs and remained uncorrected for a l number of years: however it is more significant that: (1) items were closed without proper assurance that the deficiencies were corrected, and (2) management failed to comprehend the full scope of problems that existed and failed to provide necessary direction and focus for the corrective action efforts. Therefore Violation B also is classified as a Severity Level III i violation, in accoroance with the Enforcement Policy. i In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level III violation. Because your facilitypasbeenthesubjectofescalatedenforcementactionswithinthelast two years , the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Iderrtification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process described in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. With regard to Violation A. the NRC concluded that it is not warranted to give i credit for Identification because the breakdown in the EQ program was identified by the NRC. With regard to consiv.eration for Corrective Action, l your corrective actions included: (1) reviews of program deficiencies by a relatively large team of licensee and contact employees with expertise in E0: l 3 A severity Level !!! violation w(s issued on July 12, 1996. (EA 96 181) related to design control measures for serv 1ce water estem modifications. A severity Level III violation was issued on April 4.1996. (EA 96 054) for failure to meet fitness for duty reautrements. A i severity Level !!! violation was issued on November 20. 1995. (EA 95 228) related to suitability of materials used in valves in the residual heat removal system. A Severity Level III problem was issued on september 8,1995. (EA 95166) related to design control, modtfication and testing of the high pressure injection system and reactor core isolation cooling syste's. NUREG-0940, FART II. A- 8 1
CP&L 3 (2) revis1ur of the E0 master list and identification of appropriate performa- 9ecifications and environmental conditions: (3) review of testing parametut. (4) staffing and training initiatives: and (5) establishina program audits. Based on the above, the NRC determined that credit was warranted for Corrective Action, resulting in a base civil penalty of $50,000 being proposed for V1olation A. Because the NRC identified the violation associated with the corrective action problem cited in Violation B. credit for gentification was not considered appropriate. With regard to consideration for Corrective Action for Violation B. you now require initiation of condition reports for audit findings, formal tracking of followup actions, and documented dispositions of deficiencies. You also now require approval of significant condition reports by a higher level of management. Therefore. the NRC determined that credit was warranted for Corrective Action for Violation 8, which would normally result in a civil penalty being assessed at the base amount of $50,000 for this violation. However, the NRC is concerned that the histor1 cal implementation of your corrective action program was deficient in several key areas. Since 1991. conditions adverse to quality in your E0 program: (1) were poorly tracked. (2) were closed without properly being dispositioned. (3) received inadequate management attention, and (4) were not assessed as indicators of overall weaknesses in the corrective action program. Accordingly in order to stress the significance of the NRC's concern associated with the past breakdown in the implementation of your corrective action program. I have decided to exercise enforcement discretion. in accordance with Section VII.A of the Enforcement Policy, and escalate the civil penalty for Violation 8 to twice the base amount for this Severity Level III violation. The civil penalty for Violation B is $100.000. Therefore, to emphasize the importance of management oversight of the implementation or EQ requirements and the need for prompt identification and comprehensive correction of conditions adverse to quality; and in consideration of your previous escalated enforcement actions. I have been (uthorized, after consultation with the Director. Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) for the two Severity Level III violations at the base amount of $50,000 for Violation A and twice the base amount, or $100.000, for Violation B. The total civil penalties proposed for this action is $150.000. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this Notice including your proposed corrective 6ctions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether NRC esorcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. I i l i l NUREG-0940, PART II 4, 9 l l
i l CP&L 4 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice." a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). Sincerely.
/
Ag Stewart D. Ebne Regional Admini ter Docket Nos. 50 325. 50 324 License Nos. DPR 71, DPR 62 Enclosura: Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties cc w/ encl: ! W. Levis. Director i Site Operations Brunswick Steam Electric Plant P. O. Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461 R. P. Lopriore Plant Manager Brunswick Stear.. Electric Plant Carolina Power & Light Company P. O. Box 10429 Southport. NC 28461 J. Cowan. Vice President Operations & Environmental Support MS OHS 7 Carolina Power & Light Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Gerald D. Hicks Manager Regulatory Affairs Carolina Power & Light Company P. O. Box 10429 Southport. NC 28461 cc w/enci cont'd: (see next page) 1 l 1 6 1 NUREG-0940, PART II A-10 ): 1
- CP&L 5 l l
cc w/enci cont'd: W. D. Johnson. Vice President Public Service Comission . I and Senior Counsel- State of South Carolina Carolina Power & Light Company P. O. Box 11649 P. O. Box 1551 Columbia, SC 29211. Raleigh, NC 27602. Jerry W. Jones. Chairman Dayne H. Brown, Director Brunswick County Board of Division of Radiation Protection Comissioners N. C. Department of Environmental P O. Box 249 Health & Natural Resources Bolvia NC 28422 P. O. Box 27687 Dan E. Summers ; Raleigh, NC 27611 7687 Emergency Management Coordinator i Karen E. Long New Hanover County Department of Assistant Attorney General Emergency Management . State of North Carolina P. 0.. Box 1525 , P. O. Box 629 Wilmington, NC 28402 l Raleigh, NC 27602 : William H. Crowe May]r : Robert P. Gruber City of Southport ! Executive Director 201 East Moore Street Public Staff NCUC Southport, NC 2B461 P. O. Box 29520 Raleigh, NC 27626 0520 ; i i i s I f i I J 1 NUREG-0940,'PART II A-11 i I.- j
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES Carolina Power and Light Company Docket Nos. 50 325. 50 324 Brunswick Nuclear Plant License Nos. DPR 71. DPR 62 EA 96 354 l As a result of an NRC inspection completed on September 17, 1996. violations I of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General i Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions". NUREG 1600. l the NRC proposes to impose civil penalties pursuant to Section 234 of the ' Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act) 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalties are set forth below: A. 10 CFR 50.49 (d) requires, in part the licensee to prepare a list of electric equipment important to safety covered by 10 CFR 50.49 (b) and ; include information concerning performance specifications, electrical characteristics and environmental conditions for this electric equipment ; in a qualification file: and, keep the list and information in the file l current and retain the file in auditable form for the entire period during which the covered item is installed in the plant or is stored for future use. 10 CFR 50.49 (f) requires. in part, that each item of electric equipment important to safety be qualified by testing of, or experience with. identical or similar equipment, and that such qualification shall include a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable. 10 CFR 50.49 (j) requires, in part a record of the qualification in auditable form to permit verification that each item is qualified and meets its specified performance requirements under predicted environmenti. conditions. 10 CFR 50.49 (k) states that electric equipment important to safety which was previously required to be qualified in accordance with NRC's
" Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors." November 1979 (Division of Operating Reactors (DDR) Guidelines), need not be requalified to 10 CFR 50.49. However. 00R Guidelines require that the radiation service condition include the sum of the gamma and beta doses unless it can be shown by assuming a consarvative unshielded surface beta dose of 2.0 X 10E8 RADS and considering shielding factors, that the beta dose to radiation sensitive equipment internals would be less than or equal to i 10 percent of the total gamma dose to which an item of equipment has been qualified. The 00R Guidelines further require that qualification records be complete and auditable for qualification to be considered valid.
Enclosure i NUREG-0940, PART II A-12
4 Notice of Violation and Proposed 2 ! Imposition of Civil Penalties 1 Contrary to the above, as of June 14. 1996, environmental qualification l requirements were not met, as evidenced by the following examples:
- 1. The licensee failed to: (1) include the R.G. Laurence solenoid valves in the post accident sampling system (PASS) and residual heat removal system of Units 1 and 2. identified by plant tag numbers 1(2) RXS SV 4180. 4181. 4193. 4194 and 1(2) E11 SV F079A.
F0798. F080A. and F080B on the list of electric equipment important to safety required to be qualified under 10 CFR 50.49. (2) test or demonstrate that the subject Laurence solenoid valves were identical or similar to an appropriately tested configuration, and (3) document the qualification of the subject Laurence solenoid valves in the auditable form.
- 2. The licensee failed to: (1) include the Target Rock solenoid valves in the PASS of Units 1 and 2. identified by plant tag numbers 1(2) RXS SV 4182. 4183. 4184. 4185 and 4192. on the list of electric equipment important to safety required to be qualified under 10 CFR 50.49. (2) provide an analysis demonstrating that the subject Target Rock solenoid valves were acceptable, and (3) document qualification of the subject Target Rock solenoid valves in an auditable form.
- 3. The licensee failed to: (1) include Target Rock open and close limit switches for PASS Valves 1(2) RXS SV 4182. 4183. 4184 and 4185. on the list of electric equipment important to safety required to be qualified under 10 CFR 50.49. (2) provide an analysis demonstrating that the subject Target Rock limit switches were acceptable. and (3) document qualification of the subject Target Rock limit switches in an auditable form.
- 4. The licensee failed to maintain the Environmental Qualifica21on (EO) equipment list and E0 files current and in an auditable form, in that: (1) the EQ equipment list was not being maintained current as demonstrated by hundreds of items identified on the list as environmentally qualified without a reference to a qualification data package (ODP) the document utilized to establish environmental qualification: (2) several ODPs had been in revision for over two years: (3) several 00Ps had never been '
issued. (4) Enertech/Herion solenoid Valve 2 B32 SV F019 was installed and declared operational without a ODP being issued and placed in the EQ File: (5) the CDPs did not include the latest Reactor Building environmental profiles which are required to establish predicted environmental condition: (6) Hydrogen Water Chemistry modifications changed the radiation profiles and they had not been addressed in the EQ files: and (7) Beta radiation effects were not addressed in the EQ files.
- 5. The licensee failed to provide documentation in an auditable form to verify qualification of the safety related Motor Control NUREG-0940, PART.II A-13
Notice of Violation and Proposed 3 ' Imposition of Civil Penalties i l Centers 1(2)XA. 1(2)XB. 1(2)XC. 1(2)XD. 1(2)XE. 1(2)XF '1(2)XH. 1(2)XM. 1(2)XA 2. 1(2)XB 2, 1(2)XDA, and 1(2)XDB which are located in the Reactor Building in that the heat transfer analysis included in the file to demonstrate qualification was not based on ! the most severe design basis accident conditions that had been i postulated based on the licensee's Reactor Building Environmental : Report. Revision 4. ; 1
- 6. The licensee failed to: (1) include the following equipment !
important to safety on the EQ equipment list required to be i qualified to 10 CFR 50.49: 120/208 AC distribution panels such as ' but not limited to Panels 1(2)A RX.1(2)B RX.1(2)C RX 1(2)D RX. and 1(2)AB RX: Potentiometers 1 1XE EBO POT. 1 1XF EE2 POT. ' 2 2XE EBO POT. and 2 2XF EE2 POT: various types of fuses identified as FRN.R. FNA. N05. RES. NON. and SC: and thread sealants. (2) test or demonstrate that the equipment listed in (1) above.-was similar to a tested configuration, and (3) document qualification of the equipment listed in (1) above in an auditable form.
- 7. The licensee failed to maintain the E0 equipment list current by deleting the 300 E0 components listed in CP&L Great Idea numbers l NED 326 and NED 327 without adequate justification and management review. Specifically, subsequent review of these EQ data changes in 1995 and 1996 disclosed that more than 50 of the 300 components had been downgraded i.e., removed from the licensee's EQ Program, incorrectly. (01013)
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I). j Civil Penalty - 550.000. ; B. 10 CFR 50. Appendix B. Criterion XVI, requires that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and i equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. 10 CFR 50. Appendix 8. Criterion V, requires that activities affecting ) quality be prescribed by uocumented inst v tions or procedures, and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions or i procedures. j Carolina Power and Light Company Plant Program Procedure PLP 4, i Corrective Action Managerent implements the requirements of 10 CFR 50. j Appendix B. Criterion XVI, at the Brunswick Nuclear Plant. Contrary to the above, as of the dates indicated, the licensee failed to assure that conditions adverse to quality were promptly identified and corrected and failed to follow Procedure PLP 4 as described in the examples below: l l NUREG-0940', PART II A-14 e
Notice of Violation and Proposed 4 Imposition of Civil Penalties
- 1. CP&L Procedure PLP 4 Revisions 4 through 17. dated December 26.
1990 through May 31. 1996. requires managers to assure that assigned corrective actions are implemented.
- a. Corrective actions associated with Adverse Condition Report (ACR) 91181 which was identified in April 1991 regarding maintenance of the EQ program required by 10 CFR 50.49 were not implemented as of June 14. 1996.
- b. Corrective actions identified on ACR number N93 0101 which was identified in August 1993 and subsequently reissued as ACR number 94 00980 in June 1994 regarding associated circuits were not implemented as of June 14, 1996.
- 2. Paragraph 6.0 of CP&L Procedure PLP 4 Revision 14. dated March 24. 1995, requires individuals identifying a condition to consult with their supervisors and initiate a Condition Report (CR). A condition is defined in paragraph 4.5 of PLP 4 as an adverse condition or a condition not meeting expectations.
Condition Reports (CRs) were not initiated to document and correct the following conditions not meeting expectations:
- a. The finding that EQ related 00Ps had not been updated to account for the impact of hydrogen water chemistry increased radiation levels on EQ equipment as documented in Engineering Service Request (ESR) 9400752 dated May 11, 1995.
- b. The finding that QDPs potentially impacted by engineering changes may require revision as documented in ESR 9400742.
dated May 11, 1995,
- c. The finding that procedures covering application of thread sealants for EQ equipment required revision and that unqualified thread sealants may have been used in EQ equipment applications, as documented in ESR 9400743. dated March 29, 1995.
- 3. Paragraphs 4.2 of CP&L Procedure PLP 4. Revision 15. dated June 7 1995. requires managers and personnel to ensure CRs are initiated when they become aware of adverse conditions.
Managers in the Design Control Group in the Brunswick Engineering Site Support Organization did not ensure that CRs were initiated to document and correct numerous deficiencies in the Brunswick EQ program which were documented in an unpublished, undated document, titled EQ Self Assessment, when it was discussed with them in November 1995 through January 1996. The individual who identified the conditions also failed to initiste a CR. NUREG-0940, PART II A-15
Notice of Violation and Proposed 5 Imposition of Civil Penalties 4 Paragraph 6.0 of CP&L Procedure PLP 4. Revisions 14 through 17. dated March 24, 1995 through May 31. 1996, requires managers to ensure that assigned corrective actions are effective and are implemented. Corrective actions to resolve discrepancies in the EDBS safety classification for EQ equipment documented on CR 95 00513. dated February 22. 1995, were not effective and were not properly implemented as of June 14, 1996.
- 5. Paragraph 4.2 of CP&L Procedure PLP 4. Revisions 17 and 18. dated May 13. 1996 and August 7, 1996, requires managers to assure CRs are initiated for adverse conditions and events.
- a. On August 22, 1996, the NRC identified that a CR had not been initiated to document the fact that Control Room personnel on duty at 3:00 P. H. on July 18, 1996 had not been informed regarding compensatory measures for potential failure of valves on the Post Accident Sampling System.
- b. On August 6,1996, the NRC identified that a CR had not been initiated to document that the Target Rock open and close limit switches for the PASS valves 1(2) RXS SV 4182, 4183, 4184, and 4185 were not EQ qualified. (02013)
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I). Civil Penalty $100.000. Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201. Carolina Power and Light Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation. (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective l steps that have been taken and the results achieved. (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken.- Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2232. this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalties by letter addressed to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, with l l 1 NUREG-0940, PART II A-16
Notice of Violation and Proposed 6 Imposition of Civil Penalties
'a check. draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalties in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director. Office of Enforcement.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalties will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violations listed in this Notice. in whole or in part. (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances. (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalties in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalties. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201. but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205. regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalties. Upon failure to pay any civil penalties due which subsequently have been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalties, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: James Lieberman. Director, Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike. Rockville. HD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Region II and to the Resident Inspector at the Brunswick facility. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy. proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the POR. and provide the legal basis to support your request for ' withholding the information from the public. Dated at Atlanta. Georgia this 19th day of November 1996 f NUREG-0940 PART_II A-17
p* *' 8 UNITED STATES
%[%, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f[. .m ; Recion m 3
l 801 WARAENVitLE ROAo
,i uste itusors cosn-e October 22. 1996 EA 96-304 Mr. John K, Wood Vice President - Nuclear Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station Centerior Service Company 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor. OH 43449
SUBJECT:
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY -
$50.000 (NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50 346/96008(DRS))
Dear Mr. Wood:
This refers to the inspection conducted on June 24 through July 11. and August 14-15. 1996. at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The inspection included a review of the circumstances surrounding certain motor operated valves (MOVs) being potentially unable to perform their post-fire safe shutdown function, and degraded radiant energy shields in the containment and containment annulus. These conditions were reported to the NRC in Licensee Event Reports dated April 19. May 17. and July 31. 1996. The report documenting the inspection was sent by letter dated September 12. 1996. and an open pre-decisional enforcement conference' was conducted on September 26. 1996. Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that was provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the ; enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) ' and the circumstances surrounding the violations are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violation in Section I of the Notice involves sixteen MOVs that were potentially unable to perform their post-fire safe shutdown function in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix R Section III.G. because their control circuits were susceptible to fire induced hot shorts. On February 28. 1992, the NRC issued Information Notice 92-18. " Potential for loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During a Control Room Fire." that identified a postulated common mode failure mechanism in which a postulated fire could cause hot short i damage to MOV control circuits resulting in damage to valves needed for post-fire safe shutdown. In April 1994 the Davis-Besse staff completed its initial evaluation of Information Notice 92-18 and determined that there were approximated 35 valves that were potentially affected by this scenario. ; However. the evaluation Concluded that no further action was necessary. based ' on the low probability for the scenario to occur. TMs conclusion was NUREG-0940, PART II A-18
4 J Wood 2 inappropriately based on a 1992 Nuclear Management and Resousses Council (NUMARC) recomendation that was not endorsed by the NRC. On March 20. 1996. the NRC Informed your staff that this approach was unacceptable. Your staff s suDsequent reevaluation of Information Notice 92-18 determined that 16 MOVs
. were affected requiring procedural changes. modifications, or compensatory measures to ensure Appendix R safe shutJown capability.
While the probability of a fire occurring as described in Appendix R 1s relatively low, the consequences of such an event occurring at Davis-Besse could have been high since the ability to maintain the plant in hot standby. as required by Appendix R. Could only have been achieved by significant l operator actions troubleshooting, and repair activities to compensate for the 1 design deficiencies. Therefore, the violation in Section I of the Notice h3s been categorized in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy). NUREG 1600. at Severity Level III. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy. a base civil penalty in the amount of 550.000 is considered for a Severity Level III violation. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 4 two years the HRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit w6s not warranted for identification because the NRC identified the violation in Section I of the Notice. Credit was warranted for your comprehensive corrective actions for the violation in Section I of the Notice. which included initiating a corrective action document based on reconsideration of Information Notice 92-18. verifying that appropriate compensatory measures (fire watches) were in place. expanding the scope of review beyond the control room fire described in Information Notice 92-18 to consider single hot shorts in all fire areas containing circuits for safe shutdown MOVs. reaffirming expectations regarding Information Notice evaluations, modifying the Information Notice review process to utilize the Corrective Action Process. planning an external peer assessment of the Davis-Besse industry experience program, and revisiting a sample of Information Notice responses where industry guidance was used. Therefore, to emphasize the need for full compliance with Appendix R. along with adequate review of NRC Information Notices. Conservative operability and reportability determinations, and the need to identify violations. I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director. Office of Enforcement. to issue the enclosed Notice in the total amount of $50.000 for the Severity Level 111 violation. Sectivi 11 of the Notice describes one violation not assessed a civil penal t,. involving the failure to take Compensatory measures for inoperable radiant energy shields in the containment and containment annulus. This violatior -is I
' A severity Level 111 problem (idemified in April 19%) was issued on June 13.1996 (EA 96122)
NUREG-0940, PART II A-19
J, Wood 3 been categorized at Severity Level IV in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.- While this violation is more than of ::iinor concern, a higher severity ! level was not assessed because the probability of fire occurring in these i
. areas was icw due to the lack of an ignition source and low combustible '
' loading. You are required to respond to this . letter and should follow the instructions specified In the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will l use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action 15 ' necessary'to ensure . compliance with regulatory requirements. l 1 in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice." a cooy of this letter; its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public ) Document Room (PDR). 1 Sincerely. 1 j ) .- { {^s jts - A. 6111 Beach Regional Administrator k Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF 3
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty l cc w/ encl: John P. Stetz. Senior ' Vice President - Nuclear J. H Lash. Plant Manager J L. Freels. Manager Regulatory Affairs State Liaison Officer. State i of Ohio ; Robert E. Owen. Ohio i Department of Health C..A Glazer. State of Ohio. Public Utilities Commission t i l l 1 l 1 NUREG-0940, PART II A-20
)
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSE 0 IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Centerior Service Company Docket No. 50 346 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station License No. NPF 3 EA 96-304 During an NRC inspection conducted on June 24 through July 11. and August 14-
- 15. 1996. violations of NRC requirements were identifled in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions."
NUREG 1600. the NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. as amended (Act). 42 U.S.C. 2282. and 10 CrR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth
- below:
- 1. Violation Assessed a Civil Penalty 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix R. Section ll!.G.2 requires. in part, that where cables or eoulpment including associated non safety circuits that could prevent operation or cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground, of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions which are located within the same fire area outside of primary containment, one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage shall be provided: (a) separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier naving a three hour rating: (b) separation of cab,les and equipment and associated non safety circuits of redundant train's by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no Intervening combustible or fire hazards: and, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area: or (c) enclosure of cables and ;
equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a one hour fire rating; and fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area. 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix R. Section Ill.G.3 requires, in part, that alternative or dedicated shutdown capability be provided where the protection of systems whose function is required for hot shutdown does not satisfy the requirements of Section Ill G.2. Contrary to the above. prior to March 20. 1996, the licensee failed to provide adequate protection to ensure operation of epipment for systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions or provide alternate or dedicated safe shutdown capability. in that sixteen motor-operated valves. necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown , conditions, were potentially unable to perform their post-fire safe r shutdown function because their control circuits were susceptible to fire induced hot shorts. (01013) This is a Severity level 111 violation (Supplemen't 1). : C1v11 Penalty - $50.000.
.NUREG-0940,lPART II A-21 i 1
1 Notice of Violation 2
- 11. ~ V1olation Not Assessed a Civil Penaltv, I License Condition 2.C.(4) requires ' hatt Toledo Edison implement and
- maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program as described in the Updated Saftty Analysis Report. Updated Safety Analysis Report Section 9.5.1. " Fire Protection Program." states that the " Fire Hazard Analysis Report (FHAR), which is part of the overall program. documents the analysis that ensures compliance with 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix R. Section Ill.G.
FHAR Section 8.1.4 requires that all fire barriers separating portions of redundant safe shutdown Systems required in the event of a fire shall be operable.
- FHAR Section 8.1.4.8 requires with one or more of the above fire barriers inoperable in the containment or conta1riment annulus, then
- 1) If the fire barrier (s) is located inside containment then within one hour, establish a fire watch to inspect one side of the affected barrier at least once per eight hours or monitor the containment air temperature at least once per hour utilizing the inlet temperature of one of the operating containment air coolers. l or
- 2) If the fire barrier (s) 1s located inside the containment annulus. j then within eight hours, establisti a fire watch to inspect one I side of the affected barrier at least once per eight hours during Modes 3. 4. 5. or 6. No inspection is required during Modes 1 or 2 due to ALARA concerns.
Contrary to the above. from December 15. 1992, until April 16. 1996. fire barriers (radiant energy shields utilizing Thermo-Lag) located in the containment and containment annulus were inoperable and (1) 'or the containment, action was not taken within one hour to establish a fire watch to inspect one side of the affected barrier at least once per eight hours or monitor the containment air temperature at least once per hour utilizing the inlet temperature of one of the operating containment air coolers: and (2) for the cortainment annulus, action was not taken within eight hours to establish a fire watch to inspect one side of the affected barrier at least once per eight hours during Modes 3. 4. 5. or 6. (02014) This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Centerior Service Company , (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to ' the Director. Of fice of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply.should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation. (2) the reasons for the l l l 1 i l NUREG-0940,_PART II A-22
i l Notice of Violation I v1olation if admitted, and if denied. the reasons why. (3) the Corrective f steps that have been taken and the results achieved. (4) the corrective steps 1 that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full l compliance will be achieved. l If an adequate reply is not received within the time spec 1 fled in'this Notice. an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as why the license should not be modified. suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2232. this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation, Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201. the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. with a check, draft. money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part. by a written answer addressed to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time spesified. an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty. In whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation listed in this Notice, in wnole or in part. (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances. (3) show error in this Notice. or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part. such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty. the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the st&tement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201. but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e 9. . citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205. regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205. this ; matter may be referred to the Attorney General. and the penalty unless compromised remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation. letter with payment of civil penalty. and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: James Lieberman. Otrector. Of fice of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. One White Flint North. 11555 Rockville Pike. Rockville. MD 20852-2738. with a copy to the Regional Administrator. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory NUREG-0940,-PART II A-23
l i Notice of Viciation Commission. Region III. and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that 15 the subject of this Notice. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). to
- the extent possible. It should not include any personal privacy proprietary.
cr safeguards information 50 that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the informatton that should be orotected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you 3111 specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g. explain why the disclosure of informatinn will create an uriwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial Information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptah!e response. please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at Lisle. Illinois this 22nd day of October 1996 i NUREG-0940, PART II A-24
I 8
# "'49 UNITED STATES .
ff k NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
, -' ( S REGION N
%- -l 801 WARRENVILLE ROAD j
- d. USLE, ILUNOIS 6o532-4361 June 13, 1996 2 '
EA 96-114-Mr. Thomas J. Maiman Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations Division-Conur.onwealth Edison Company Executive Towers West III 1400 Opus Place, Suite 300 '. Downers Grove, IL 6051$ i l
SUBJECT:
QUAD CITIES STATION'- UNITS 1 AND 2 NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMP 0$1 TION OF civil PENALTY -
$50,000 (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-254/96005(DRS); 50-265/96005(DRS))
Dear Mr. Maiman:
This refers to the inspection conducted on February 14 through April 1.1996, at the Quad Cities Station. The purpose of the inspection was to review the i circumstances surrounding the failure to ensure corrective actions to restore design margins to the structural steel for the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) corner rooms. Commonwealth Edison personnel were aware of the design
' deficiency for over five years without effective resolution. The report documenting the inspection was sent by letter dated April 11, 1996, and a pre-decisional enforcement conference was conducted on May 1, 1996.
Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that was provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) i and the circumstances surrounding the violations are described in detail in the subject inspection report. i Design organization interface weaknesses in the 1980s allowed modifications to e corner room pipirg supports without evaluating the impact on structural steel loading. Structural steel stress design margins were not met for seismic .
, loading conditions. The affected steel performed an important safety
, function, namely to support low pressure emergency core cooling system (ECCS)
-piping and heat exchangers. ,
, We are concerned that the engineering decision process failed to ensure timely ~ action to restore design margins. Commonwealth Edison personnel were aware of the design deficiency since 1991. Subsequent to an August 1995 operability f evaluation for both units -Quad Cities management missed an opportunity to ensure more timely. resolution of the deficiency. Although initially deciding ,
- to address the design deficiency during the Unit I refuel outage in early 4
1996, modifications were subsequently postponed until after the refuel outage. - These modifications were restored to the outage scope after timeliness ; concerns were raised by the NRC. i
+
NUREG i O940, PART;II- A-25
,~
1
)
l T. Maiman 2 There were a number of root causes for the violations. Some of these included inadequate turnovers between the multiple cognizant engineers as engineering functions were decentralized, and ineffective interfaces with the multiple architect engineering firms on-site. Because the technical knowledge on-site was not sufficient to recognize complex problems, input from contractors was not always evaluated or challenged. More recently, insufficient engineering management focus on maintaining Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) design margins resulted in a failure to recognize the full safety significance of the deficiency during the decision process which resulted in its untimely resolution. The failure to promptly correct this design deficiency in the installed structural steel is a significant regulatory concern. Therefore, the violation in Section I of the Notice has been categorized in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement policy), NUREG-1600, at Severity Level III. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level Ill violation. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years , the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit was not warranted for identification because the NRC identified the violation. Credit was warranted for your comprehensive corrective actions. Your short term actions included , reviewing deficiency backlogs for other UFSAR nonconformances and operability { concerns, defining an effective engineering management process, and conducting nonconforming condition process awareness training for engineering managers. Your long term actions will include performing modification design control assessments involving one or two systems, implementing engineering management performance meetings, and conducting nonconforming condition awareness training for all sites. Therefore, to emphasize the need to identify significant deficiencies , requiring prompt corrective actions, and thereafter take such actions, I have i been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice in the base amount of $50,000 for the Severity Level III violation. Section II of the enclosed Notice describes one violation not assessed a civil penalty involving the failure to report a condition outside the design basis of the plant.
' A Seventy Level 11 violation (identified in August 1994) and $100.000 civil penalty was issued on October 18.1994 (EA 94186); a Severity Level 11 problem (identified in April 1994) and $80,000 civil penalty was issued on October 12.1994 (EA 94188); two Severity Level !!! problems (identified in August 1994) and l $100,000 in civil penalties were issued on December 14, 1994, including failure to promptly correct degradation !
of control rod diaphragms (EA 94-220); and a Severity level 111 violation (identified in October 1995) and j
$50,000 civil penalty was issued on January 2,1996. for failure to promptly correct the potential for 480 VAC l motor control centers to trip on current overload (EA 95-241).
NVREG-0940, PART II A-26
)
T. Malman 3 You.are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in-the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you. plan to prevent recurrence. In addition to responding to the specific violations, please address the design control deficiencies that resulted in the structural steel design deficiency. After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory , requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR). To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. Sincerely, Y Hube t J. Miller Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty tc w/ encl: E. Kraft, Site Vice President J. C. Brons, Vice President, Nuclear Support H. W. Keiser, Chief Nuclear Operating Officer L. W. Pearce, Station Manager N. Chrissotimos, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor D. Farrar. Nuclear Regulatory i Services Manager i Richard Hubbard Nathan Schloss, Economist, l Office of the Attorney General
. State liaison Officer Chairman, Illinois Commerce l Commission J. R. Bull, Vice President, General &
Transmission, MidAmerican Energy Company Document Control Desk-Licensing NUREG-0940, PART 11 A-27
a., ,t *
; T .
t
- NOTICE OF. VIOLATION '
ANDJ PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY (CommonwealthEdisonCampa$y. . . . Docket Nos. 50-254: 50-265
. Quad Cities Stattor . . Units 1 and 2 . License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30 '
EA 96-114-
.During an NRC inspection conducted on February 14 through Apriltl, 1996,
. violations of NRC requirements were identified. in accordance with the
" General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," l NUREG-1600, the Nuclear: Regulatory Commission' proposes to impose a civil .
, penalty pursuant.to Section 234 of'the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended-(Act). 42 U.S.C. 2282,' and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil-penalty are set forth below.
.l. Violation Assessed a Civil Penalty -
10 CFR Pa'tr 50,. Appendix'B,-Criterion XVI, " Corrective Actio'n," requires, in part, that-measures be established to assure that ,
}
A conditions ~ adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. In ; the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and ; corrective action taken,to preclude repetition. The identification of : the significant condition adverse to quality,-the cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken shall be documented and i reported to the appropriate levels of management. J Contrary to the above, from September.1991 until February 1996, the licensee failed to. promptly identify and correct deficiencies in the Units I and 2 structural steel located in the low pressure coolant
' injection (LPCI) corner rooms. . Certain beams and connections exceeded '
the' allowable stresses for Class I building type structures specified in ' Quad Cities Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Table 3.8-11, a , significant condition adverse to quality. A letter dated September 10, l 1991, from the licensee's architect engineer to the Quad Cities Engineering Supervisor documented that during walkdowns 34 pipe supports had been identified which were not included in existing calculations and i
- that some stretural steel repairs would be necessary in order to -
accommodate the structural steel load data that had been collected. The structural steel-deficiencies were not appropriately identified and ! tracked until Problem Identification form (PIF) No. 95-2256 was written on August 21, 1995, and an Operability Determination was completed on August 25, 1995. In February 1996 the licensee included the ; modifications to correct the structural steel deficiencies in the Unit 1 i refuel outage following NRC expressing timeliness concerns. (01013) i This is a Severity Level Ill violation (Supplement I).
. Civil Penalty - $50,000. ;
. i i . i 1NUREG1094.0. PART-11 A-28 '
, , -r- e e,. , +v , e w ,, r -
Notice of Violatic,n 11. Violation not Assessed a Civil Penalty 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), requires that the licensee submit a Licensee Event Report within 30 days after discovery of any event or condition that resulted in a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant. Contrary to the above, as of April 1, 1996, the licensee failed to submit a Licensee Event Report within 30 days after discovery on January 6, 1994, that the structural steel in the Unit I and 2 LPCI corner rooms was outside the design basis of the plant. (02014) This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Commonwealth Edison Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved, if an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to ; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. , i i NUREG-0940, PART 11 A-29
L 1 Notice of Violation- l i in requesting mitigationof the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in . J Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written -l answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the !
' statement'or' explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may !
incorporate. parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., j citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the ; Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure-for imposing a' civil penalty. ~ i Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been ! determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of.10 CFR 2.205, this l matter may be referred to the: Attorney General..and the penalty. unless i compromised, remitted,~or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant j to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282c. - The' response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to:
' James Lieberman. Director, Office 'of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory- !
Commission,.One. White Flint North,-11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-
. 2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region Ill,-.and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the s? ject of this Notice. j
. Because your response' will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to )
the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, i or safeguards information so that it'can be placed in the POR without redaction. However, ;if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be J placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for I withholding the information from the public. , Dated at Lisle,' Illinois 1 this 1)lh day of June 1996 I i l NUREG-0940',L PART II. A-30
UNITED STATES g* "'%s,7',, gj NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
; . f ) 't S REGION m 3-
l eos wAn9ENviuE ROAo
.y
/ ustE, eamois sosmosi June 13, 1996 L
EA 96-115 Mr. Thomas J. Maiman Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations Division Commonwealth Edison Company Executive Towers West III
'1400 Opus Place, Suite 300 Downers Grove, IL 60515
SUBJECT:
DRESDEN STATION - UNITS 2 AND 3 NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY - 550,000 (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-237/96005(DRS); 50-249/96005(DRS))
Dear Mr. Maiman:
This refers to the inspection conducted on' February 14 through April 1, 1996, at the Dresden Station. The purpose of the inspection was to review the
. circumstances surrounding the failure to ensure corrective actions to restore design margins to the structural steel for the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) corner rooms. Commonwealth Edison personnel were aware of tho design deficiency for over five years without effective resolution. The report documenting the inspection was sent by letter dated April 11, 1996, and a pre-decisional enforcement conference was conducted on May 1, 1996.
Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that was provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding the violations are described in detail in. the subject inspection report. Design organization interface weaknesses in the 1980s allowed modifications to corner room piping supports without evaluating the impact on structural steel loading. Structural steel stress design margins were not met for seismic loading conditions. The affected steel performed an important safety function, namely to support low pressure emergency core cooling system (ECCS) piping and heat exchangers. , We are concerned that the engineering decision process failed to ensure timely
. action to restore design margins. ' Commonwealth Edison was aware of the design deficiency since 1991. Subsequent to a January 1994 operability evaluation of this issue for. both units, the Dresden engineering organization missed several opportunities to ensure more timely resolution of the deficiency. As a result, a refuel outage was conducted on Unit 3 in 1994 without addressing the-structural steel design deficiency. In late 1994, corrective action was further postponed due to other emerging issues. The proposed structural steel NUREG-0940, PART.II A-31
T. Naiman- '2 ,
~
modifications were. presented for review and approval in late 1995, but the engineering process and management oversight were insufficient.to adequately
~ identify the importance of returning the required design margin to the tstructural steel. Consequently, the modifications were further deferred until after the in-process Unit 2 refuel outage. The Unit-2 modifications.were completed during the refuel' outage subsequent to the NRC raising questions concerning the significance of the issue and timeliness of corrective actions.
Unit 3 will remain uncorrected until the next refuel outage.
, There were a number ~of root causes for the violations. Some of these in'.uded inadequate turnovers between the multiple cognizant engineers as engiiwring functions were decentralized, and. ineffective interfaces with the multiple architect engineering firms on-site. Because the technical knowledge on-site was not sufficient'to recognize-complex problems, input from contractors was not always evaluated or challenged. More significantly and recently,
- insufficient engineering and management emphasis on maintaining Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) design margins resulted in a failure to recognize the
~ full safety significance of the~ deficiency during the decision process and resulted in its untimely resolution.
The failure to promptly correct this design deficiency in the installed
~
structural steel is a significant regulatory concern. Therefore, the violation in Section.!'of the Notice has been categorized in accordance with the " General Statement' of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions"
'(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, at Severity Level III.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level !!! violation. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years , the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit was not warranted for identification because the NRC identified the violation. Credit was warranted for your comprehensive corrective actions, Your short term actions included reviewing deficiency backlogs for other UFSAR nonconformances and operability concerns, defining an effective engineering management process, and conducting nonconforming condition process awareness training for engineering managers.
.Your long term actions will include performing modification design control assessments involving one or two-systems, implementing engineering management performance meetings, and~ conducting nonconforming condition awareness training for all sites.
Therefore, to emphasize the need to identify significant deficiencies requiring prompt. corrective actions, and thereafter, take such acticns, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to
A Seventy level 111 violation (identined in February 1994) and $75,000 civil penalty was issued on
' May 17.1994 (EA 94 048) involving failure to promptly correct problems with reactor level instrumentation: a Seventy Level !!! problem (identined in January 1995) and $100,000 civil penalty was issued on April 5,1995 (EA 95-030); and a Severity tese! 111 violation (identified in August 1995) and $50,000 civil penalty was issued on December 5.1995 (EA 95 214).
NUREG-0940,'PART 11 'A-32
. .~ . - . ~ - - . .. .- ., , - - - -. - . ~ . . - . ~ . . ..-..
,y ;
?
J^
.-T. Maiman 3 1
~ '
.. i
. issue the enclosed Notice in.the base amount-of $50,000 for the Severity
, Level Ill violation. Section'll of the enclosed Ihtice describes one violation not assessed a civil penalty involving the failure to report.a condition outside the design basis : of- the plant. ! You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions j specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your i
; response, you should document' the specific actions taken and any additional i actions you plan to prevent recurrence. In addition to responding to the
~ specific violations, please address the design control deficiencies that- !
.resulted in the structural steel design deficiency. After reviewing your i r ' response to this Notice,. including your proposed corrective actions and the .l 4 results offfuture inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC
- ' enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory. ,
-requirements.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of- -! this. letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public ! Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not include ~ j any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be .i < placed in the PDR without redaction. ! Sincerely, l
- i ffR k Hubert J. Miller l Regional Administrator [
, Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249 i License Nos. DPR-19; DPR-25 l
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and- t Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty l Distribution: j See attached list , l i
;4 g:.
. ;' ?
. .NUREG-0940,4PART II A-33 x
T.'Haiman 4 > cc w/ encl: J. S. Perry, Site Vice President J. C. Brons, Vice President, Nuclear Support' H. W. Keiser, Chief Nuclear l Operating Officer
'T. Nauman, Station Manager Unit 1 H. \ieffley, Station Manager Units 2 and 3
- f. 1pangenberg, Regulatory Assurance Maqager D. Farrar, Nuclear Regulatory Services Manager Richard Hubbard Natharc Schloss, Economist, ,
Office of the Attorney General ' State Liaison Officer Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission Document Control Desk-Licensing 1 i 1 1 i 1 4 l NUREG-0940, PART II A-34
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL. PENALTY Commonwealth Edison Company Docket Nos. 50-237: 50-249 Dresden Station, Units 2 and 3- License Nos. OPR-19; DPR-25 1 EA 96-115-During an NRC inspection conducted on February 14 through April ~1,1996, violations'of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the !
" General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions;"
NUREG-1600, the Nuclear Regulatory Conmission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of-1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282 .and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below:
- 1. 11olation' Assessed a Civil Penalty l 10 CFR Part 50, Appendic B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action,"
requires, in- e, ,. measures be established to assure that conditions am .,se to qui.lity are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective-action taken to preclude repetition. The identification of the significant condition adverse to quality, the cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken shall be documented and i reported to the appropriate levels of management. Contrary to the above, from 1991 until March 1996, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct known deficiencies in the Units 2 and 3 i structural steel located in tne low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) corner rooms. Certain beams and connections exceeded the allowable stresses for Class I building type structures specified in Dresden Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Table 3.8-11, a significant - condition adverse to quality. In 1991, the licensee's architect engineer identified that some of the structural steel connections in the LPCI corner rooms appeared to be above FSAR limits because the original 1966 design analysis had never been updated to include as-built piping i loads. The structural steel deficiencies were not appropriately identified and tracked until the licensee committed to modify the Unit 3 structural steel during the next refuel outage (D3R14) in a letter to the NRC dated March 4,1996. The Unit 2 structural steel modifications were completed during refuel outage D2R14 which was ongoing in March 1996. (01013) This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I). ' Civil Penalty - $50,000.
- 11. LLqlgtion not Assessed a Civil Penalty
.10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ti)(B), requires that the licensee submit a Licensee !
Event Report within 30 days.after discovery of any event or condition , that resulted.in a condition that-was outside the design basis of the plant. I l , i 1NUREG-0940, PART-II A-35~ j
, . ~. _ .
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, , , [ Notice of Violation- ;.2-
~
Contrary to the above, as of April- 1,1996, the licensee failed to submit a Licensee Event Report within 30 days after discovery on !
- January 6.- 1994E that the structural steel in the Unit 2 and 3 LPCI- ~'
corner rooms was outside the design basis of the plant. (02014)' 4 l This.is a Severity level:!V' violation (Supplement'l). Pursuant .to the ' provisions of 10' CFR 2'.201, Com bonwealth Edison Company
.(Licensee) is hereby required to submit ~a. written statement or: explanation to j
the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, l within '30 days of the date 'of this Noticelof Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty;(Notice). This reply should.be clearly marked as a " Reply to ; a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: . 1 (1)' admission.or denial of the alleged violation,'(2) the reasons for the i violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons.why, (3) the corrective steps that have been-taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps
' that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the'date when full ,
icompliance will be achieved.
~
'l
.lf an. adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice. I
.an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response. time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of *Ae Act,'42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted-'under oath.or g a f fi rmation.
'Wl' thin the same: time as provided for.the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may. pay:the-civil penalty by letter addressed to 3 the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer )
of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or may e protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in.part, by a written ] answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear ! Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fall to answer within the time '
- specified,2an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty. in whole or.in part, such answer should be clearly marked j 3
as an." Answer to a Notice of Violation
- and may: (1) deny the, violation listed-in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating
' circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil ! penalty in whole or.in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. I
)
in requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in i Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205- should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in' reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may -{' incorporate parts of the 10 CFR Z.201 reply by specific reference (e.g.,
- citing page~and.partgraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the
. } J, ,
-NUREG-0940, PART II' A-36:
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Notice of Violation Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. ; Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this ' matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed tc: James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region Ill, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice. Because your > osponse will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent pca.,1ble, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public. . Dated at Lisle, Illinois this 131h day of June 1996 i l 1 'NUREG-0940, PART 11 A-37
August 23, 1996 EA 96-216 Mr. Thomas J. Maiman Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations Division Commonwealth Edison Company Executive Towers West til 1400 Opus Place, Suite 300 Downers Grove, Illinois 60515
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY - 550,000 (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-295/304/96007(ORP))
Dear Mr. Maiman:
This refers to the inspections conducted on January 27 through March 8, 1996, and A.pril 20 through June 7. 1996, at the Zion Nuclear Station. The inspections were conducted to evaluate a series of eight operational errors and unplanned changes to the status of safety-related equipment that occurred between February 8 and May 21, 1996. The reports documenting our inspections and eight apparent violations were sent to you by letter dated April 5 and July 5, 1996. A predecisional enforcement conference was held on July 19, 1995, to discuss the apparent violations, their causes, and your corrective actions. The report documenting the conference was sent to you by letter dated August 6, 1996. Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that Commonwealth Edison provided during the predecisional enforcement conference, the NRC has determined that five violations of NRC requirements have occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection reports. The violations involved operational errors and unplanned changes to the status of safety-related equipment that occurred during the period February through May 1996. These violations are of concern because operators made fundamental errors which demonstrated insufficient attention to detail during the performance of required duties and the corrective actions to prevent recurrence were either ineffective or untimely. Specifically, a series of personnel errors and inadvertent entries into Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operations (LCOs) occurred during the four month period beginning in February of this year. For example, operators repeatedly misaligned safety-related equipment and changed equipment operating status without following procedures applicable for the equipment. A contributing factor to these errors was the absence of supervision in the field to monitor operations and maintenance personnel and provide guidance during the performance of safety-related activities. NUREG-0940, PART II A-38
T. Maiman 2 August 23, 1996 Some of these violations are indicative of recurrent errors where Commonwealth Edison has not implemented effective corrective actions. For example, a similar. valve lineup error for an OB lake discharge tank overflow event in January occurred in July 1996 involving service water for the emergency diesel generators. Additionally, an identical error involving mis-operation of an emergency diesel generator control rheostat in May reoccurred in July 1996. These violations are similar to concerns documented in the NRC's most recent Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) report dated February 15, 1996. In the functional area of operations, performance was characterized as inconsistent, primarily due to the frequent occurrence of personnel errors caused by a lack of attention to equipment status. These personnel errors have continued, reinforcing our conclusion that these errors and the lack of effective actions by the Zion Station staff are of significant concern. The violations collectively represent a significant regulatory concern and, therefore, in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," (Enforcement Policy) NUREG-1600 (60 FR 34381,
' June 30, 1995), the violations have been classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level Ill problem. '
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is censidered for a Severity Level III p'roblem. Where there has been escalated enforcement within the last 2 years , Section VI.B.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy requires consideration of credit for both Identification and Corrective Action. Credit was given for identification because Commonwealth Edison identified each of the violations. However, credit was nut warranted for corrective actions. Although in the enforcement conference, a number of corrective actions were discussed, the Zion staff was unable to show a nexus between the root cause of the specific violation discussed and the corrective actions that were implemented or planned. In addition, specific corrective actions to control equipment and personnel errors were neither prompt nor comprehensive. For example, as of May 1996, your corrective actions to reenforce expectations for non-licensed operators subsequent to an OB lake discharge tank overfill event in January were not promptly completed. Consequently, another event occurred due to a valve lineup error on May 19, 1996, when the 2A diesel generator was run without service water. Following the trip of the 2A diesel generator due to operator error on May 19, 1996, comprehensive corrective actions were not taken to preclude recurrence of this type of error, as evidenced by a nearly identical error occurring in July 1996 involving the 28 diesel generator. Therefore, to emphasize the importance of operator attention to equipment status and of prompt and comprehensive correction of violations and in recognition of your previous enforcement action, I have been authorized, after
' A Seventy Level !!! problem (identified in June 6.1995) regarding 7 failures to meet Technical Specification surveillance requirements was issued on September 11. 1995; a Seventy Level !!! problem (idenufied in September 1995) and $50,000 civil penalty was issued on November 18.1995 (EA 95-144).
NUREG-0940, PART-11 A-39 t
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T; Maiman 3 August 23, 1996 l consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed ! Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the base l amount of $50,000.for this Severity Level 111 problem. l You"are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions ! specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your 1 response, you should document the specific actions taken and any addittorsi 1 actions you plan to prevent recurrence. In your response Commonwealth Edison 1 should document the specific actions taken in response ,to each example cited, i and indicate how the corrective action for the specific incidents will be i broadened to ensure it is effective. On August 9,1996, Mr. John Mueller, Site Vice President, requested a management meeting to discuss the initiatives being implemented to resolve these violations. We will schedule a transcribed meeting.in the near future following your response to this action. After this meeting and after reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcemea*. action is necessary to ensure ~ compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.
~
I In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public ; Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible .your response should not include i any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be , placed in the POR without redaction. ! Sin'cerely,
/s/ A. B. Beach A.' Bill Beach Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 License Nos. DPR-39; DPR-48 4
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty l Qistributign: See attached list 1 i l ~ NUREG-0940, PART II: A-40 l
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I T. Maiman 4 August 23, 1996-cc w/ encl: J. H. Mueller, Site Vice President D.-A, Sagar, Vice President, Generation Support H. W. Keiser, Chief Nuclear Operating Officer , G. Schwartz, Station Manager W. Stone, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor D. Farrar, Nuclear Regulatory Services Manager Document Control Room.- Licensing Richard Hubbard Nathan Schloss, Economist Office of the Attorney General Mayor, City of Zion State Liaison Officer Wisconsin State Liaison Officer Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission I 1 l NUREG-0940, PART II A-41
h NOTICE OF VIOLATION
-PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY I
' Commonwealth Edison Company DocketLNos. 50-295; 50-304 i
. Zion' Nuclear Station. -license Nos. DPR-39; DPR-48 l Units 1 and 2 EA 96-216 ,
During NRC inspections conducted on January 27 through March'8, 1996, and )
. April-20 through June 7, 1996, violations of NRC requirements were identified. i In accordance with the." General Statement of Policy and Procedure'for NRC ;
, Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600 (60 FR 34381, June 30, 1995), the Nuclear j , Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to j Section- 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act) 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2:205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are !
- . set forth below: j
,1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures and
, Drawings," requires that activities affecting quality shall-be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of'a.
- 1. . type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures or drawings. ]
4 A. Station Operations Instruction 501-36J. " Discharge Blowdown Monitor Tanks to Lake Discharge Tank 08," Revision 0, dated May 1, 1992, step 5.5.1 required that valve OA0V-WD0034, " Lake Discharge ] Tank OB Inlet Valve," be closed and in Step 5.5.2, required that < valve OWD-Oll8, "0B Lake Discharge Tank Inlet," be closed and 4 locked. Contrary to the above, on January. 20, 1996, during discharge of j the blowdown monitor tank to the OB lake discharge tank, valves ; OA0V-WD0034 and OWD-0018 were not closed. (01013)
- 8. Zion Administrative Procedure 1200-08 Risk Significant On-line l Maintenance, Revision 4, dated January 4, 1996, requires.
h In section F.1.d. that the Risk Management Team shall 4 identify compensatory measures and actions required to l remove, test or restore the system to service for each , voluntary entry into a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) or risk significant combination (sic) conditions. i In section F.3.a that the Work Control Center preplan and ) coordinate all. work' activities by all involved work : departments in order to minimize the downtime of out of
- service system (s) and the risk of losing redundant equipment.
In section F.5 that the Work Control Center shall be responsible for initiating Attachment A, " Voluntary LC0 l Entry Outage Approval Form." i b 1 1 i
-NUREG-0940,'PART II- A !
a
- . 4
Notice of Violation
- Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to identify compensatory measures and the actions required to remove, test or i restore systems to service during risk significant conditions; j work activities associated with the maintenance activities were I not pr elanned er coordinated witt. mil involved work departments- I to minimize the risk of losing redundant equipment; and the work ;
control center did not initiate Attachment A, " Voluntary LCO Entry l Outage Approval Form;" for the maintenance performed on Unit 1 on j the IB service water pump on February 8, 1996; for the maintenance ' performed on Unit 2 containment electrical penetration Zone 2 on February 12, 1996; and for the maintenance performed on the Unit 2 containment Zone 2 nitrogen and mechanical penetration pressurization systems on February 15, 1996, which required , voluntary entry into LCOs. (01023) C. Procedure PT-il-DG2A-R, "2A Diesel Generator 24 Hour Loading Test," Revision 1, dated June 16, 1995, the note following step 17 requires that 2HS-Ap51 " volts adjust rheostat" be adjusted to maintain 750 KVARS load for the duration of the 2A diesel generator run. Contrary to the above, on May 19, 1996, during the 2A diesel generator 24 hour loading test, a control room operator adjusted a speed control rheostat instead of the volts adjust rhecstn 2HS-AP51 to reduce indicated KVARS, tripping the 2A Diesel Generator. (01033) D. PT-il-DC28, "2B Diesel Generator 24 Hour Loading Test," Revision 5, dated June 16, 1995, section 3.1, requires Diesel Generator required auxiliary systems to be in service for the 28 diesel generator. Contrary to the above, on May 21, 1996, during the 28 diesel generator 24 hour loading test, the 28 diesel generator service water system, a required auxiliary system, was not in service. (01043) E. Licensee Procedure TSGP-156, " Timing and Adjustment of Safeguards Sequence Timers," dated January 8, 1993, requires in section 3.1 that no other safeguards testing be in progress and in section 4.1 that only one section may be performed at a time. Contrary to the above, on February 10, 1996, while timing and adjusting a Safety injection Timer, the licensee failed to identify that other safeguards testing was in progress and failed 4 to ensure that only one section was performed at a time when it 1 inadvertently placed both Safety injection timers (safeguard sequence timers) of Division 247 out of service at the same time. , (010C?l l NUREG-0940, PART II A-43
,7- . - . . .
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f j l 1 flotice of Violation '3 , c .! i 3 This!is a Severity Level Ill problem (Su'pplement I)'. ! Civil Penalty .550,000. I J i Pursuant to the~ provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Commonwealth Edison Company is I hereby required to submit a written statement'or explanation to the Director, ! Office of. Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of: the date of'this Notice of Violation and Proposed-Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This. reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of i Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or .i
- - denial of the alleged violations, (2) the reasons-for the violation if ' '
' admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that'have !
been.taken and the'results achieved,' (4) the corrective steps that will be ; taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will
.{
+ be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified '1 L in this Notice, an order or.a Demand for Information may be issued as to why '
.the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other i 1
action.as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to l" extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of .
- Section 182 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under .!
- oath or affirmation. l r
Within the'same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 1 :2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a l check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of i the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the D cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. [ Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the i time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should f the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 > protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be ; clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the ! violation listed in this notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate -] extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the , civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or l mitigation of the penalty. ! In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors in , Section VI.B.2 of the policy should be addressed. Any written answer in ; accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of ; the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing the page and ' paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. Upon failure'to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been
-determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this l
I 1 NUREG-0940,_PART II- A x . ___ -__ ______ _ _l
l
) p
. Notice of- Violation 4 ,
i matter may be'referied to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless I
. compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant i to Section.234c of the Act,.42 U.S.C. 2282c. j i
- The response noted above, should be addressed to: James Lieberman, Director, !
- Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint i North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,~ Region III.
Because your reepense will~be placed'in th( NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary.
- or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the'POR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your . !
response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you mg11 specifically identify the portions of i your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases , for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information ! will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the i information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding ; confidential commercial or financial information). ; Dated at Lisle, Illinois ! this 23rd day of August 1996 l t I 6 i i I l 5 s NUREG-0940,.PART'II A-45 ,
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' August 13, 1996 - -
- 1 X- .EA 96-131L
. Mr; T. Palmisano .- ,
General Manager . J :i Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant' : Consumt rs Power' Company ; s 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway j Covert, Michigan 49043-9530-
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSE 0' IMPOSITION OF CIVIL. PENALTY -
$50,000 (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-255/96004(DRS))~
~
Dear.Mr. Palmisano:
~ >
~ This' refers to the special inspection conducted on March 18 through April 29, 1996, at-the Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant. The purpose of the-
-inspection was to review several 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, fire protection deficiencies identified by your staff as being outside the design basis of the.
facility.and your immediate and long-term corrective actions for those deficiencies. The. report documenting the inspection was sent by letter dated ~
, May 20, 1996 . and a pre-decisional enforcement conference was conducted on June 21- 1996. The reportable deficiencies were described in seven Licensee :
. Event Reports submitted to the NRC between August 14, 1995, and April 22, I
~1996, Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that your staff provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation, which involves your i fai!ure to implement prompt and effective corrective action for these {
deficiencies, is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed i imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding the l violation are described in detail in the subject inspection report. Specifically, since the first NRC Appendix R inspection was completed at Palisades in September 1986, both NRC' inspection activities and your staff's ; self-assessments have repeatedly identified deficiencies in Palisades' i compliance with the requirements. of Appendix R. Your staff's corrective actions for identified Appendix R deficiencies were not always timely or effective. In mid-1994,..you initiated the Appendix R Enhancement Program to place an
- increased emphasis on the identification and resolution of long-standing Appendix R deficiencies at Palisades. On December 13, 1994, your engineering i' staff met with Region 111 staff to describe the breadth and depth of your engineering self-assessments, including the Appendix R Enhancement Program.
In recognition of the extent of your commitment to identify engineering n, NUREG-0940', p PART ' 11- A-46
,. n
T. Palmisano August 13, 1996 issues, in a letter dated February 23, 1995, documenting the December 1994 meeting, we indicated that our inspections would primarily concentrate on a review of the thoroughness of corrective actions to assure resolution of issues. As a result of the Appendix R Enhancement Program, your_ staff identified seven safety significant deficiencies that were the focus of our inspection. Our review has indicated that your staff's corrective actions for those issues were not effective and were not implemented within a time-frame consistent with the potential safety significance of the deficiencies. While you implemented a short term corrective action consisting of a compensatory hourly fire watch, your staff did not implement immediate and comprehensive corrective actions which were necessary to have ensured the ability to cope with the worst case fire scenario while long-term corrective actions were being planned and implemented. Your failure to implement prompt and comprehensive corrective actions was most evident with the lack of circuit fuse coordination in the Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 potential transformer circuit. Loss of this circuit could have caused a_ loss of automatic and manual voltage control and rendered the diesel generator inoperab'ie. Once this issue was identified on November 3, 1995, your staff failed to provide adequate guidance to the operators to enable them to promptly identify this condition and take action to recover the diesel generator and mitigate the consequences of this event. Your staff did not implement corrective actions commensurate with the potential safety significance of this issue until after the NRC inspection exit meeting conducted on April 29, 1996. For five of the seven deficiencies, immediate corrective action consisted of relying on a roving one-hour fire patrol as a compensatory measure for design deficiencies, pending implementation of long-term corrective actions. In each of these cases, your staff either relied or planned to rely solely on this compensatory measure for a significant period of time while your staff completed the Appendix R Enhancement Program. This reliance on roving one-hour fire patrols as interim ccmpensatory measures for several safety significant design deficiencies indicated a lack of sensitivity to implementing immediate corrective actions commensurate with the safety significance of the deficiencies. Our inspection also revealed that in instances where all corrective actions had been completed, the corrective actions were not sufficiently rigorous to adequately resolve the issues. In the case of the lack of procedural guidance to conduct cold shutdown repairs for the low pressure safety injection pump, the corrective actions were not adequate to isolate a fire induced fault and allow local manual operation of the pump to permit cold shutdown of the facility. In the case of the lack of circuit separation with the emergency diesel generators, the evaluation of the non-rated fire barrier between the Olesel Generator 1-1 room and the air intake plenum was not technically suff.icient to demonstrate that the barrier had a fire rating equivalent to the fire loading of the room. The ineffective resolution of these two issues, combined with the poor technical evaluations associated with the potential NUREG-0940, PART II A-47
4 I l I i T. Palmisano August 13, 1996. spurious operation and damage of alternate shutdown motor-operated valves and I the potential improper setting of the low voltage cut-off for the alternate shutdown panel inverter, indicate a lack of technical discipline in applying the corrective action process associated with Appendix R deficiencies. l While the probability of a fire occurring as described in Appendix R is relatively low, the consequences of such an event occurring at Palisades could have been high since the ability to maintain the plant in hot standby, as required by Appendix R, could only have been achieved by significant operator actions, troubleshooting, and repair activities to compensate for the design deficiencies. While you informed us at the enforcement short-term corrective actions have now been initiated, ',nference failure to that implement prompt and ef fective corrective actions for wriciencies in the Appendix R fire protection program is a significant regulatory concern. - Therefore, this violation has been categorized in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), HUREG-1600, at Severity Level Ill. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level III violation. Because your , facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last l two years', the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for ! Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit was not warranted for identification because the NRC identified the corrective action violation. However, credit was warranted for Palisades' planned and completed corrective actions initiated following NRC identification of the corrective action weaknesses. These included, but were not limited to: 1) reviewing the l corrective action process, including all open condition reports and all l corrective actions, for appropriateness of compensatory measures; 2) providing
" Group Think" training to managers; 3) scheduling lessons learned training to be completed prior to November 1996; 4) revising the plant modification process to strengthen fire protection and Appendix R review criteria; 5). modifying the Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 potential transformer circuit;
- 6) providing the operators with augmented procedural guidance and spare parts for cold shutdown repair of the low pressure safety injection pumps; and
- 7) establishing a periodic surveillance procedure to test the alternate shutdown panel inverter low voltage cut-off setpoint. Further, Palisades staff finalized schedules for modifications to coordinate the main power fuses ,
with the branch circuit breakers for the 125 volt DC panels, to improve ' emergency lighting in certain areas of the plant, and to eliminate the potential for fire induced control circuit damage on alternate shutdown motor-operated valves.
' A Seenty Level 111 problem (identified in October 1994) and $25,000 civil penalty was issued on Dnember 13,1994 (EA 94 222); and a Seventy Level !!! problem (idenutied in August 1995) was issued on September 20,1995 (EA 95169).
NUREG-0940, PART II A-48
f T.'Palmisano - August 13. 1996
- Therefore, to emphasize the need to initiate prompt and effective corrective action for'significant deficiencies, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, o issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil P alty-(Notice) in the.
base amount of.550,000 for the Severity Level III violation. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions ) specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this
. Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of ,
this letter,-its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public , Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not include i
. any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be -
- placed in the PDR without redaction.
Sincerely,
/s/ A. B. Beach A. Bill Beach Regional Administrator i
Docket No. 50-255 Lir nse No. DPR-20 ,
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and , Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty cc w/ encl: R. A. Fenech, Vice President, Nuc_l ear Operations R. W. Smedley, Manager, Licensing Department James R. Padgett, Michigan Public , Service Commission Michigan Department of Public Health Department of Attorney General (MI) i i 1 l NUREG-0940, PART II A-49 j _1.
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Consumers Power Company Docket No. 50-255 Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant License No. DPR-20 - EA 96-131 During an NRC inspection conducted from March 18 through April 29, 1996, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violation and associated civil penalty are set forth below: Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Operating License, DPR-20, Amendment No. 171, Section 2.2.C.(3), requires in part, that the licensee shall ' implement rond maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility and as approved in the SERs dated September 1,1978, March 19,1980, February 10, 1981, May 26, 1983, July 12, 1985, January 29, 1986, December 3, 1987, and May 19, 1989. Administrative Procedure 9.48, " Fire Protection Plan,' Section 6.0, which is contained in the Fire Protection Program Report as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.6.1.2, requires N ,: art, that the Quality Assurance Program described in CPC-2A, " Quality Program Description for Operational Nuclear Power Plants," will be applied to fire protection activities associated with Q-listed structures, systems, and components for corrective action. Con wmers Power Company Quality Assurance Topical Report CPC-2A, " Quality i Program Description for Operational Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 15, ' requires in part, that conditions adverse to quality of structures, systems, components, or activities are identified promptly and corrected as soon as practical. For significant conditions adverse to quality, tha cause of the condition is to be determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section Ill.G.2, requires in part, that for cables I .or equipment of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain l hot shutdown conditions which are located within the same fire area outside of i primary containment, one of the following means of ensuring that one of the ! redundant trains is free of fire damage shall be provided: (a) separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier had ng a three hour rating; (b) separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards; and, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area; or (c) enclosure of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a one-hour fire rating; and fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be in"talled in the fire area. NUREG-0940 PART II A-50
J Notice of Violation i, ! 10 CFR Part 50,-Appendix R, Section I!!.G.3,-requires in part, that ; alternative or dedicated shutdown capability be provided where the protection of systems whose function is required for hot shutdown does not satisfy the requirements of Section !!!.G 2. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R,'Section III.J, requires emergency lighting units with at least an eight-hour battery power supply shall be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.1, requires in part, that alternative or dedicated shutdown capability provided for a specific fire area shall be able to (a) achieve'and maintain subcritical reactivity conditions in the reactor;~(b)' maintain reactor coolant inventory; (c) achieve and maintain hot standby conditions; (d) achieve cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours; and (e) maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.5, requires in part, that equipment Land systems comprising the'means to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions shall not be damaged by fire; or the fire damage to such equipment and systems shall be limited so that the systems can be made operable and cold -i shutdown can be achieved within 72 hours. Materials for such repairs shall be readily available oc site and procedures shall be in effect to implement such ! repairs. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section li!.L.7 requires in part, that safe shutdown equipment and systems for each fire area shall be known to be
' isolated from associated non-safety circuits in the fire area so that hot shorts,.open circuits, or shorts to ground in the associated circuits will not prevent operation of the safe shutdown equipment.
Contrary to the above, .the licensee failed to promptly correct significant ;
- i conditions adverse to quality for Q-listed fire protection systems and ,
equipment, as evidenced by the following examples: , A. From November 3,' 1995, through April 29, 1996, the licensee failed to , implement timely and effective corrective actions for previous NRC and
- licensee-identified noncompliances with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, in that, the facility's alternate shutdown emergency AC power source, Diesel Generator 1-1, was not properly isolated from associated circuits. Specifically, the Diesel Generator 1-1 potential transformer circuit primary and secondary fuses were not properly coordinated which could have caused the loss of automatic and manual voltage control and rendered Diesel Generator 1-1 inoperable.
Although this deficiency was identified on November 3, 1995, the licensee failed to provide adequate guidance to the operators which would have enabled them to promptly identify this condition and to take the necessary actions to recover the diesel generator and mitigate the consequences of this event.
. B. From July 28, 1995, through March 27, 1996, the licensee failed to implement timely and effective corrective actions for previous NRC and licensee. identified noncompliances with the' requirements of NUREG-0940, PART-II. A-51 a-4
(
-+,.e.-
4 Notice of Violation 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. Specifically, procedures did not exist to conduct cold shutdown repairs to restore a low pressure safety injection pump following a fire in the east engineered safeguards room, Fire trea 10, or in the 590' corridor auxiliary building, Fire Area 13. The l icensee's corrective actions, which were completed on December 1, 1995,
.onsisting of proceduralizing the necessary repairs to allow local manual operation of the breaker were not adequate to isolate a fire induced fault and to allow local manual operation of a low pressure i safety injection pump to permit cold shutdown of the facility.
)
C. From February 28, 1992, through April 29, 1996, the licensee failed to implement timely and effective corrective actions for safe shutdown motor-operated valve circuits, which could have been affected by fire induced hot shorts as described in NRC Information Notice (IN) 92-18,
" Potential for loss of Remote Shutdown capability During a Control Room Fire." Specifically, in response to this IN, the licensee had performed three different safety evaluations which were not adequate to identify which motor-operated valves were susceptible to damage by this failure ,
mechanism. In addition, since the most recent evaluation completed on l December 19, 1995, no specific guidance was provided to the operators to 1 enable them to quickly identify this condition and take appropriate { actions to mitigate the consequences of this event. D. From July 14, 1995, through April 29, 1996, the licensee failed to implement timely and effective corrective actions for previous NRC and licensee identified noncompliances with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix R. Specifically, on July 14, 1995, the licensee determined that Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 power and control circuits were not adequately separated. The licensee's corrective action for this condition, an analysis to determine an j effective rating for the barrier between the redundant trains, ' EA-FPP-95-047, " Analysis of the Effects of a Fire on the Barriers Between Diesel Generator Room 1-1 and the East Air Plenum Room," dated November 14, 1995, which concluded the configuration was acceptable, was ' not adequate, in that: (1) the analysis did not consider all possible failure modes for an operating diesel or operating modes of the diesel room ventilation system; (2) the analysis did not evaluate the potential impact of degraded or inoperable suppression systems; and (3) the methodology utilized to evaluate the fire severity was not conservative. 1 E. From September 27, 1995, through April 29, 1996, the licensee failed to ' implement timely and effective corrective action for the improper setting of the Alternate Shutdown Panel Inverter low voltage cut-off ) setpoint. Specifically, the safety significance of this setpoint was ' not recognized; the condition report initiated due to the inverter failure was not comprehensive which resulted in a cursory evaluation of the condition and a failure to recognize the safety significance and reportability of the deficiency; and the adjustment of this setpoint was performed without an engineering evaluation or the use of any setpoint methodology. F. From February 2, 1996, through April 29, 1996, the licensee failed to implement timely and effective corrective actions for previous NRC and NUREG-0940, PART II A-52
Notice of; Violation a licensee. identified noncompliances with the. requirements of 10 CFR 50.. 4 ~ Appendix R. .Specifically, the main supply fuses for the 125 Volt D.C. panels, ED-ll-1 and ED-21-1, were not properly coordinated with the branch circuit breakers. .This condition was identified on February 2, 1996, but effective corrective action had not been taken to correct this deficiency as.of April 29, 1996. G. From November 14, 1986, through April 29, 1996, the licensee falied to implement timely.and effective corrective actions for emergency lighting deficiencies identified by the NRC during an Appendix R inspection completed in September 1986, and during a follow-up inspection completed in June 1988.~ Specifically, as of April 29, 1996, adequate emergency lighting had not been provided for the necessary illumination of: (1) Panel ED-21-2 in the cable spreading, room and (2) the condenser air ejection pump in the west mezzanine of the turbine building. (01013) 4 This is a Severity level 111 violation (Supplement I).
. Civil Penalty - $50,000.
. Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Consumers Power Company (Licensee) lis hereby required to submic a written statement or explanation to the Director.-Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice a
of Violation" and should include.for each alleged violation: (1) admission or e denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to _ avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
' If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice,
~
an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be' proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or
' affirmation.
Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or may protest imposition of.the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing'the civil penalty will be issued. Should the 4 Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting
.the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as' an " Answer to a Notice of Violatton" and may: (1) deny the violation (listed in this Notice, in whole or.in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances. (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other re'asons why
)
'NUREb-0940,PART:II.
'A-53
a f i l No'tice of Violation- 1 i the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil
~
Lpenalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation
- of the penalty. .j In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors a'ddressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. ~ Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately 'from the 1
' statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may.
]
incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., i . ' citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition' The attention of the Licensee ~is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2 205, regarding the l procedure for< imposing a civil penalty.
~
. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty,- unless compromised. remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant i
to Section 234c of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2282c.
.The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with~ payment of civil penalty,'and Answer. to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to:
James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory i' Commission, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852- ) i 2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory J Commission, Region III, and.a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the 1
~ facility that is the subject of_ this Notice. l i L Because'your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without ,
redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you , should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for ,. withholding the information from the public. { Dated at Lisle, Illinois, this 13th day of August 1996 P , i in t l l l l NUREG-0940,.PART II. 'A-54 ! t
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l [f t sii nyAN PLAZA on vs, SusTE aco ~
-% , AR UNGTON, TE XAS 760114064 September 6, 1996 l IEA96274'
-JJ W. Yelvertonj Vice President Operations Arkansas Nuclear One Entergy Operations. Inc.
'1448 S.R.-333
'Russellville, Arkansas J2801-0967
'SUOJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY -
$50.000 (NRC Inspection Report No. 50 313/96-21: 50-368/96 21) 1 g :
Dear Mr. Yelverton:
I i This is in reference to the matters discussed at a predecisional enforcement ; conference conducted on August 26, 1996, at the NRC's Arlington. Texas office. 1 iThe conference was conducted to discuss apparent violations related to a , May 19, 1996 event at Arkansas Nuclear One. Unit 1. during which a main steam j safety valve (MSSV) failed to reseat following a reactor trip. resulting in ; one of two steam generators boiling dry and the declaration of an unusual event. The apparent violations were described in the referenced inspection ! report; issued on August 12. 1996. The results of an Augmented Inspection i
, Team (AIT) follow up to this event were described in a previous inspection '
report. 50 313/96 19: 50 368/96 19. issued on June 12, 1996. A conference summary. Including the materials Entergy Operations. Inc. made available at , the conference. was sent to you and to the NRC's Public Document Room on September 4,. 1996. ! Based on the Information' developed during the inspection and the information f L that you provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that !
. violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations are cited in the -
4 enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty. The circumstances surrounding them were described in detail in the subject inspection reports. Briefly, the violations involve a failure to assure that ; , maintenance procedures were adequate to assure proper reassembly of MSSV components following testing, and a failure on the part of the mechanics involved in this~ activity to assure that the results intended by the l procedures were attained. i.e.. the proper installation of cotter pins through i slots in the MSSV release nuts. I do want to note that in addition to the apparent violations specifically discussed at the conference. Violation B includcs the failure of the mechanics to stop work when they recognized that they could not obtain full engagement of the cotter pins through the release out slots on some of the MSSVs. These violations resulted in one MSSV failing to reseat after a reactor trip
--on.May 19.11996. causing one of two steam generators to boil dry and removing 1t, albeit temporarily, as a source of cooling for the reactor. As documented in the inspection reports' operating personnel at ANO Unit I responded well to
~
this. event and the challenges created by it. Nonetheless. the-failure of this MSSV to reseat substantially complicated the recovery from this event. e
- NUREG-0940,.PART:II A-55 i l
4 9 4 s-
Entergy Operations..Inc. Furthermore; it was determined subsequent to this event that the cotter pins on at least two additional MSSVs were not fully engaged, and that the ; performance of the involved maintenance procedures prior to this event did not provide assurance that the cotter pins would be properly engaged. Thus, there ] was a potential, prior to the discovery and correction of this problem. for ' this same failure mechanism to have affected both steam generators, which would have presented a more difficult challenge to plant op3rators. Entergy's presentation at the conference indicated that the primary root cause of the MSSV malfunction on May 19 was a failure to adhere to procedural requirements, but noted that a number of dimensional variations in the manufacture of the MSSV components created competing requirements in performing the procedure. Entergy's corrective actions in response to this event included, but were not limited to. Inspecting all 16 MSSVs at ANO Unit
- 1. modifying the release nut slots to assure adequate room for proper engagement, modifying the procedures to eliminate the competing requirements and to include a caution statement. discussing this event with all maintenance personnel and other site personnel communicating with the industry on this '
event. and ultimately removing manual lift levers and associated release nuts from the Unit 1 MSSVs when it was determined that they were not required. In addition. the mechanical supervisor and craft personnel voluntarily discussed this event with their peers at other Entergy plants. , As discussed during the conference. this event was preventable in two respects. The most significant opportunity to have prevented this event rested with the mechanics who were performing the MSSV reassembly following , testing. They should have documented the fact that full engagement of the j cotter pins could not be attained in all cases when the exact specifications ; in the procedure were followed, and stopped work pending resolution of this ' problem. The other opportunity to have prevented this event involves Entergy's review of a report of a similar failure mechanism at the Crystal River plant which had resulted in a MSSV not fully closing. Based on the discussions during the conference. the NRC agrees with Entergy that it is not clear that a timely review of this report would have resulted in the discovery of the problem that caused the May 19 event at ANO. Notwithstanding that ' consideration. the NRC expects licensees to perform timely reviews of important industry communications and that did not occur in this case. The NRC has classified these violations in the aggregate. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy). NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level III problem. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy. a civil penalty is considered for a Severity Level til pr0blem with a base value of $50,000. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement action within the last 2 years.2 the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification *
- For example, on July 17. 1995, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III problem involving a number of violations associated with the movement of. the Unit 1 core support assembly, NUREG-0940, PART II A-56 i
l l l Entergy Operations. Inc. and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NRC has determined that i credit for identification is not warranted because the violations were ; discovered as the result of the May 19 event and because there were missed i opportunities to discover this problem earlier and pre'ent v the event from l occurring. As discussed above, the most significant missed opportunity was I the failure of the mechanics themselves to identify problems in performing the ' procedure. The NRC has determined ti.at credit for corrective actions 15 warranted, based on Entergy's prompt actions in ferreting out the root cause of the event. and subsequent actions to address all of the hardware and human performance problems revealed by this event. ' Therefore, to emphasize the importance of proper maintenance on safety-related components, including the need to identify problems encountered during the performance of such maintenance. I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director. Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of V1olation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) in the base amount of $50,000 for the Severity Level 111 problem described above and in the Notice. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response in your resporist. you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this Notice. Including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections. the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice. a copy of this letter. Its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR). To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the POR without redaction. Sincerely. i L.. Callan Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-313: 50 368 License Nos. OPR-51; NPF-6
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty cc w/
Enclosure:
see next page i l l 1 NUREG-0940, PART II A-57~ r
.Entergy 0perations. Inc. _ cc w/
Enclosure:
Executive Vice President.
& Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations. Inc.
P.O. Box 31995 Jackson. Mississippi 39286 1995 ; Vice President , Operations Support fntergy Operations, Inc. P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi 39286 Manager. Washington Nuclear Operations ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear > Power 12300 Twinbrook Parkway. Suite 330 Rockville, Maryland 20852 County Judge of Pope County Pope County Courthouse Russellville. Arkansas 72801 Winston & Strawn 1400 L Street. N.W. Washington D.C. 20005-3502 Bernard Bevill. Acting Director Division of Radiation Control and Emergency Management Arkansas Department of Health 4815 West Markham Street. Slot 30 Little Rock, Arkansas 72205-3867 Hanager I Rockville Nuclear Licensing ! Framatone Technologies 1700 Rockville Pike. Suite 525 , Rockville. Maryland 20852 1 i NUREG-0940, PART 11 A-58 l
m ; K', " L{ . 'r x
, ! NOTICE OF VIOLATION-
.AND D E PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF. CIVIL PENALTY' y,
;Entergy Operations;ilnc; .
Docket NosT 50 313: 50 368 e 1 Arkansas Nuclear One. Unit 1 - License Nos. DPR 51; NPF-6; EA 96 274
'During an NRC inspection conducted' July'12 to August 2. 1996, violations of.
-NRC requirements-were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement
- of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions." NUREG-1600, the Nuclear-
; Regulatory Commission proposes- to impose a civil pen 61ty pursuant 'to Section?
234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as dmended (Act). 42 U.S C.: 2282, and 10 CTR 2.205. The particular violations and-associated civil penalty are set ! forth below A; Unit:1 Technical . Specification 6.8.1.a states', in part, that written : procedures shall be established.' implemented and maintained covering.the ;
; applicable procedures recommended in Appendix "A"'of Regulatory Guide i
1.33. November. 1972. i
.Magraph I.1' of Regulatory Guide l.33 states in part. that maintenance l which can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be i per'ormed in accordance with written; procedures appropriate to the ]
circumstances. j t Procedure 1306.017. ." Unit'1'Hain Steam Safety Valve Test." revision 11 ! for the testing and restoration of the Unit 1 Main Steam Safety Valves. ! Step _8.2.22 requires in part, that the bottom of the release nut'should j clear the.. top of the lever by 1/16 to 1/8 inches and that a.new .! stainless steel' cotter pin be inserted through the release nut slots and !
, " spindle., -l'
' Contrary to the above, as of May 19. 1996, Procedure 1306.017 was not l appropriate to the circumstances for Valves PSV-2684. -2685 and .2695.
'In-that the cotter pin could not be' installed through the release nut
' slots and spindle if the bottom of the release nut cleared the top of the lever by 1/16 to 1/8 inches. :
r B ;. Unit 1 Technical Specification 6.8.1.a states, in part, that written : procedures shall be established implemented and maintained covering the ! applicable procedures recommended in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide i1.33. November. 1972. Paragraph 1.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.33 states, in part, that maintenance f which can affect the performance of safety related equipment should be i
- performed in accordance with written procedures appropriate to the i Circumstances. ,
j Procedures 1000.006. " Procedure Control." Step 6.5.1.of requires, in j part. that procedures shall be performed exactly as written. Step 6 5.L ; requires- in part, that.'if problems occur during procedure performance-due to unexpected results. the user shall stop work. ! j i I
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NUREGO940,fPARTIII i > -A-59 m <
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[ . Notice .of Violation ' . Procedure 1306.017.'" Unit 1 Main Steam Safety Valve Test F revision 11. !
.for the testing and restoration of the Unit 1 Main Steam Safety Valves. 1
-Step 8;2.22 requires, in part.'to insert a new stainless steel cotter i
- pin through the release nut slots and that.a second person verifier - )
- shall verify that the cotter pin has been installed properly. j
. : Contrary to the above. as of May 19. 1996. for Valves PSV-2684; 268C and >2695. Procedure 1000.006 had not been performed exactly as written ! in that:the cotter pins were found not inserted through the release nut-U . slots and the second person verifier had.not verified that the cotter-pins were properly' installed. In addition. Procedure 1000;006 had been performed on Valves PSV 2684. PSV-2685, and PSV-2695 with unexpected results and the users did not stop work. These violations represent'a Severity Level III problem (Supplement I). Civil Penalty ( 550,000- ,
)
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.2f" Entergy Operations, Inc. (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to
. the Director.. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
~ within 30 days of the date of- this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition 1
' . of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to ' a Notice of Violation" and should include for each' alleged violation:
- (1) admission or. denial of the alleged violation. (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why. (3) the corrective i steps that have been taken and the results achieved. (4) the corrective steps i that will be taken to avoid further violations. and (5) the date when full !
compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or.a Demand for Information may be- 3 issued as to why the license should not be modified; suspended, or revoked or. why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. ' Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2232J this response shall be s submitted under oath or affirmation. ' Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. . Nuclear Regulatory Commission with a check, draft; money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer , of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the i 3- cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is- ; proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part. ' by a written answer addressed to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the
+
time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance w th 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part. 5Jch answer should be i clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violeti'.in"~ and may: (1) deny the F violation (s) listed in this Notice in whole or In part. (2) demonstrate l extenuating circumstances. (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other l reasons why the. penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the ; f i
~ NUREG-0940, PART'II. A-60.
- f Notice of Violation Civil penalty in whole or in part. such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty.
In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty. the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201. but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g. . citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2 205. regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205. this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty. unless compromised. remitted. or mitigated. may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation. letter with payment of civil penalty. and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to-James Lieberman. Director. Of fice of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike. Rockville. MD 20852-2738. with a copy to the Regional Administrator. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory . Commission Region IV. 611 Ryan Plaza Drive. Suite 400. Arlington. Texas 76011. and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice. + Decause your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy. proprietary. or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the POR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the POR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the Information from the public. Dated at Arlington. Texas, this 6th day of September 1996 i l
)
NUREG-0940, PART II A-61 ; i I
s
#p ** *'%'a UNfTED STATES 4 NUCLEAR REGut.ATORY COMMISSION Y.. ' REGION N
$ 101 MARIETTA STnttT. N.W., SUf73 2500 W ATLANTA, GEORetA 3GI2H19e
%....., Jll 161996 EA 96-051' l
-Florida Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. T. F. Plunkett President Nuclear Div1slon P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach. FL 33408 0420 4
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY -
$100.000 (Department of Labor Case No. 92 ERA-010)
;0 ear Mr. Plunkett:
This refers to the Secretary c' Lacor Decis1cn anc Remand Order (Dec1slon) 1ssuea on January 19.-;996. 'c Ceoartment of Lacor t0CL) Case Nc. 92 ERA 010. l Regino R. 01a2-Robalnas s. Florica Power an0 Lignt Comoany. N e Secretary of ' Labor reversed previous CCL decisions by the DOL Area Director and DOL Administrative Law Judge and ccncluded that Florida Power and Light Company (FP&L) discriminated against Mr. Diaz-Roba1nas, a former FP&L emnloyee, when 'a he was terminated on August 19. 1991. for his failure to submit to a psychological evaluation wnich was ordered by FP&L in retaliation for his i engaging In protected activ1tles. The Secretary of Lacor founa that Mr. Diaz- i Roba1nas'. protected act1v1tles included: (1) laentification of various l technical 1ssues involving safety concerns. regarding projects .ath which he i was associated: (2) various vercal complaints to management alleging he was l being discriminated against for identifying safety concerns: ana ' (3) assertions mace to FP&L management that he would go to the.mecia and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The Secretary of Labor cenled your
. Motion for Reconsloeration oy Order dated April 15. 1996. 3 in a letter cated Marcn 25. 1996. Ine NRC cescr1cea tre apparer violation and transm1tted a copy of the Secretary of Labor's Decis1cn to you and provided you an opportunity to eitner respond to the apparent violation in writing or request a predecis1onal enforcement conference. In your April 24. 1996.
response you requested a predecisional enforcement conference. denied the violation. and stated that no corrective act1ons were required; however, you did refer to recent FP&L initlatives designed to ensure that emoloyees feel free to raise safety concerns. A predec1slonal enforcement conference regarding this matter was conducted in the Region 11 of'fice on June 14. 1996. This conference was closed to public observation and was transcribed. A letter summarizing the conference was sent to you Dy letter dated June 21. I 1996. i Based on the information developed by the Secretary of Labor, the information . provided in your April 24. 1996 letter, and the information you presented at ! the conference, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC recuirements ; occurred. The violation 1s c1ted in the enclosed Notice of Violation and >
- Proposed Imposition of Civil ~ Penalty (Notice) and involves the failure of FP&L to adhere.to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.7. Employee Protection, which )
I l 1 l NUREG-0940, PART II. A-62 l
FPL 2 prohibits discr1mination aga1nst employees for engaging in protected act1vities. At the predecisional enforcement conference. FP&L denied't N liolation stating that Mr Diaz-Roba1nas' referral to a psychologist to 2ndergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation was based on a pattern of declining performance and behavioral observations. and he was terminated for direct
' nsubordination for refusing to comply with the referral order. Despite your !! ental, the NRC adopts the Secretary of Labor's decision in this case and "inds that the action taken against Mr. Diaz-Robainas was an act of discrimination for his having engaged in protected act1vities. The Secretary of Labor's decision is based on his analysis of the 00L adjudicatory record and his determination that FP&L's order that Mr. Diaz-Roba1nas ' undergo a isychological evaluation was based solely on retaliatory animus for his protected activity." [92 ERA-010. Decision and Remand Order at 8.] In addition. FP&L had full and complete opportunity to present all relevant evidence before the 00L. Absent any compelling information to refute the Secretary of Labor's conclus1on. the NRC n nds no basis at this time to
- nallenge the cec 1ston. ,
1
~he NRC recognizes that licensees are required by 10 CFR 73.56 to observe !
employee behavior in order to detect behavioral changes which could lead to I acts detrimental to public health and safety: however. such programs cannot be I ut111 zed in retaliat1on for engaging in protected activities and raising safety concerns. Although at the conference you stated that the 00L decision in this case could result in increased management reluctance to question an individual's fitness-for duty for fear of legal retribution, the NRC ma1ntains that full compliance with access authorization and fitness-for-duty requirements can be cchieved through effect1vely implemented and safety-motivated programs. NRC agrees with the Secretary of Labor's findings in this particular case. as described in his Order dated April 15. 1996. denying your Motion for Reconsideration, -hat "this decision does not undermine the employer's duty to participate in the NRC's behavioral observation program and to refer or remove an employee whose fitness 1t questions."
.sh11e any discrimination against a person for engaging in protected activities ;s cause for concern to the NRC. this violation is of very significant regulatory concern because it involved discrimination by a memoer of management above first line supervision. The NRC places a high value on the freedom provided to nuclear industry employees to raise potential safety concerns to their management and to the NRC. Therefore. this violation has been categor1 zed in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy). NUREG-1600, at Severity Level II.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $80.000 is considered for a Severity Level 11 violation. In this case, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Correctfre Actfon in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NRC determined that credit for Ident1ffcatfon was not appropriate because the violation was identified by the 00L and not by the. licensee. In your letter of April 24. 1996, and at the conference you stated that corrective actions were not required because no violation occurred and that existing programs have been effective in assuring NUREG-0940,'PART II A-63
FPL 3 that employees feel free to raise safety concerns. However, you indicated that the following actions had been Initiated recently regarding the FP&L Employee Concerns Program: (1) you reaffirmed management expectations in this area by issuance of a memorandum dated December 11. 1995 (00L Case , l No. 94 EPA 53. Gary Phipps vs. Florlaa Power and Light Company): (2) in early 1996. selected FP&L managers were trained on handling employee concerns: and (3) an independent assessment of the Employee Concerns Program was conducted. Notwithstanding these actions. the NRC has determined that credit is not warranted for the factor of Corrective Action. Specifically, you have not reinstated Mr. Diaz-Robainas as directed in the Decision and Romand Order of the Secretary of Labor. We recognize that there is some question whether the Secretary's Order with regard to reinstatement and assessment of damages is final or 1mmediately enforceabic; however, we are concerned that lack of comp 11anco with the Secretary of Labor's Order may itself have a chilling effect on other employees. Based on the severity level cf the violation anu NRC's determinations regaraing Idenr7ficarron and Correcc7ve Aceton, a civil penalty in the amount twice tne .>ase would normally be assessed. However. consistent with
'iectica 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. 42 U.S.C. 2282 the
.naximum civil penalty for a single violation may not exceed $100.000 per day. ; Therefore, to emphas12e the importance of ensuring that employees who raise real or perceived safety concerns are not subject to discrimination for j raising those concerns and that every effort is made to provide an environment in wh1ch all employees may freely identify safety 1ssues without fear of retaliation or discrimination. I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director. Office of Enforcement. and the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation Regional Operat1ons and Research to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the maximum amount of $100.000 for the Severity Level II violation. At the conference you stated that FP&L has appealed the Secretary of Labor's Decision in this case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. In view of the judicial appeal in this case. NRC has cetermined that It is appropriate to defer your submittal of a written response to the Notice . l and payment of the associated civil penalty pending the outcome of the appeal j in this case. Accordingly. FP&L may defer written response and payment of the i proposed civil penalty until 30 days after judicial review of this case is completed and a decision based on the review is 1ssued. In the interlm. FP&L should keep the NRC informed of the status of the appeal and provide copies of the briefs and any other filings in the cash to the Director. Office of Enforcement. In addition. If the case ss successfully appealed and the Secretary of Labor's Decision is reversed, the NRC will reconsider this enforcement action at that time. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice." a copy of this letter its enclosure, and any response you may provide will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), Any response that is provided. to the , I extent possible, should not include any personal privacy proprietary, or safeguards informat1on 50 that it can be placed in the POR without redaction. However. if you find it necessary to include such information. you should l NUREG-0940, PART II A-64
FPL 4 clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR. and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public. Sincerely. Wa</ Stewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-250, 50-251 License Nos. OPR 31. DPR-41
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty
- wencl:
John Hosmer Vice President. Engineering Commonwealth Edison Company Executive Towers West III 1400 Opus Place. Suite 900 Downers Grove. IL 60515 H. N. Paduano. Manager L1 censing & Special Programs Florida Power and Light Company P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, tl 33408 0420 Plant General Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 029100 Miam1, FL 33102 R. J. Hovey Site Vice Presloent Turkey Point Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 029100 Miami. FL 33102 G. E. Hollinger Licensing Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 4332 Miami, FL 33032 4332 cc w/ encl: (Cont'd on Page 5) l NUREG-0940, PART 11 A-65 1
FPL 5 cc w/enci (Cont'd): J. R. Newman. Esq. i Morgan. Lewis & Bockius 1800 M Street,fM . Washington. D. C. 20036 John T. Butler. Esq. Steel. Hector and Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center Miami, FL 3?131 2398 Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee. FL 32304 Bill Passetti Office of Radiat1on Control Departmenc of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee. FL 32399-0700 Jack Shreve. Public Counsel Office of the Public Counsel c/o The Florida Legislature 111 West Madison Avenue. Room 812 Tallah.ssee. FL 32399-1400 Armando Vidal County Manager of Metropolitan Oade County i 111 fM 1st Street. 29th Floor Miami, FL 33128 Joe Myers. Director Division of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Orive Tallahassee. FL 32399-2100 ' Lydel L. Erwin. District Director U.S. Department of Labor t Employment Standards Administration Wage and Hour Division 299 East Broward Blvd. Suite 407 Fort Lauderdale. FL 33301 cc w/ enc 1: (Cont'd on Page 6) ' NUREG-0940,'PART II. A-66
'FPL 6 !
cc w/enci (Cont'd): ' Honorable Robert Gi Mahony Administrative Law Judge Office of Administrative Law Judges -800 K Street. N.W., Suite 400 Washington D.C. 20001 8002 Gail Coleman Deputy Associate Solicitor. Division of Fair Labor Standards Office of the Solicitor U.S. Department of Labor 200 Constitution Avenue. N.W. Washington DC 20210 k I NUREG-0940, PART II A-67
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Florida Power and Light Company-Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50 250. 50-251 4 License Nos. DPR-31. DPR-41 E1 96-051 { As a result of review of a Secretary of Labor Decision and Order of Remand dated October 23. 1995, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance w1th the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC c.nforcement Actions." MUREG-1600 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes
+o impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of l 1 @l, as amended (A:t). 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular l violation and associated civil penalty are set forth below. ,
I 10 CFR 50.7 prohibits discrimination by a Commission licensee against an employee for engaging in certain protected activities. Discrimination includes discnarge or other actions relatino to the compensation, terms, condit1ons. and priv11eges of employment. the activities wnich are protected include, but are not 11m1ted to. reoorting of safety concerns by an employee to his employer or the NRC. Contrary to the above. the Florida Power and Light Company (FP&L) discriminated against Mr. Regino R. Diaz-Roba1nas for engaging in protected activities. Spec 1fically, as determined by the Secretary of l Labor, on August 19. 1991. i FP&L terminated Mr. Diaz-Roba1nas for his failure to submit to a psychological evaluation which was ordered by FP&L on July 30 and August 19. 1991. in retaliation for his having engaged in protected activities. Mr. Diaz-Roba1nas' protected activities. among other things, included the identification and reporting August of safety 1991. (01012)concerns during the period of February through This is a Severity Level II violation (Supplement VII). ' Civil Penalty - $100.000. Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201. Florida Power and Light Company i is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation regarding the this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) to l the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. within 30 days after iudicial review of this case is comoleted and a decision based on the review is issued. This reply snoulo ce clearly markeo as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or den 1al of the alleged violation. (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied. the reasons why. (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved. (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations. and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified. suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be l l 1 1 l l 1 NUREG-0940, PART~11 A-08 l l 4
.n . . .
Notice' of Violation and Proposed ~2 and Imposition of Civil Penalty
~
[ takent Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good ! cause'shown. Under the authority of Sect 1on 182 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2232.~ this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. ;
'i Within the same time'as provided for the response required 'above under
'10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may. pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to
' the Director.' Office' of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commtssion, with.
a check.. draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer -
- of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above. or the cumulative amount of the c1vil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed. or may protest impos1 tion of the civil penalty in'whole or in part.
by a written answer addressed to the Director. Office of Enforcement. ': U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within i the time specified, an order 1mposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 . , , protesting the civil penalty. In whole or in part. such answer should be ' clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the : violations listed in this Notice. in whole or 1n part. (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances. (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other
- ~ reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the i civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remissio1 or ,
' mitigation of the penalty. j t
In requesting mitigat1on of the proposed penalty.-the factors addressed in i Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written l l answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the ! I statement or explanation in reoly pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201. but may
- l incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by spec 1fic reference (e.g.. citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention t of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205. regarding i the procedure for 1mposing'a civil penalty.
, t Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been ! determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this j matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless , compromised, remitted or mit1 gated. may be collected by civil action pursuant , to Section 234c of the Act. 2 U.S.C. 2282c. . 1 , The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of , civil penalty..and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: : Mr. James Lieberman. Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l
' Commission. One White Flint North.11555 Rockville Pike. Rockville. MD 20852- i 2738; with a copy to the Regional Administrator. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Reg 1on II and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the Turkey '
Point facility- l 1 Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). to I
.the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, i or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However. if you find it necessary to include such information, you ,
NUREG-0940,'PARTfil- A-69
4 Notice of Violation and Proposed- 3~ and Imposition of Civil Penalty j should clearly indicate the specific information that you' desire not to be. ; placed in the POR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for j withholding the information from the public, j
< Oated at Atlanta. Georgia- -
' this 16th day of July 19%- ;
i i t i
'i i
i I i i i i i i I f a ! l t NUREG-0940, PART-II'. A-70 e , - r .- r r , -, , - e
l b 1
-uwTeo sTAtss t
/. p a %% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N
- 4* maosom n ' s I- 101 MAmstTTA STREET N.W., SulTE 2000 ATLANTA, GEORGLA 20323415 -
.ogm ~I
***** Jw Aot@
.i EA 95-126
' Mr. P. M. Beara. Jr.
- Senior Vice Pres 1 cent. Nuclear Operat1ons (SA2A)
ATTN; . Manager. Nuclear Licensing Flor 1da Power Corooration Crystal River Energy Comolex ! 15760 West Power Line Street Crystal River. Florida- 34428 6708-l
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION'AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION 'F CIVIL PENALTIES -
$500.000- .
i' (NRC :nspect1on Report Nos. 50-302/95 13 and 50 302/95 22 and Invest 1 gat 1on Report Nos. 2 94-036 and 2-94 70365)
Dear Mr. Beard:
This refers to invest 1gations conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission i (NRC) Office of Investigations-(01) completed on May 24, 1995, and , February 13. 1996: and NRC Inspect 1ons conducted during the period ; September 5. 1994-. througn December 15. 1995. and documented in NPC Inspection Report Nos. 50 302/95 13 and 50-302/95 22. These inspection reports also sumar1ze relatec findinos discussed in NRC-Inspect 1on Report Nos. 50-302/94-22. 95 02. 95 07. 95-08 and 95-09.. During these reviews. the NRC-examined the facts and circumstances surrounding events involving control of the pressure and level for the reactor coolant system (RCS) make-up tank (MUT) between June 1994 and September 1994 and reviewed the adecuacy of design , control and correct ve act1ons that affected coerability of emergency core i cooling system (ECCS) pumos. By letters dated July 7. 1995, and March 8. i' 1996. you were provided synooses of the 01 investigation reports in this case and given an' opportunity to attend'a predeclslonal enforcement Conference to discuss the apparent violations. their cause. and the corrective actions to preclude recurrence. A closed, transcribed conference was conducted on
-Marcn 27. 1996. in the Region II office in Atlanta, Georgia. A summary of the conference was sent to you by letter dated April 2, 1996. Subsecuently, on April 4; 1996. you submitted supplemental information to the NRC regarding information wh1cn was not available at the time of the conference.
Based on the information developed during the inspections and investigations as well as the informat1on you provided during the conference and in your subsecuent submittal. tne.NkC has determined that a number of significant '
<1olat1ons of NRC recuirements occurrea. ' Enclosure 2 contains a Notice of Violation and Prcoosed Imoosit1on of Civil Penaltles (Not1ce) that describes i the violations. Te violations are discussed in more detail in Enclosure 1.
and the Circumstance: surrounding them are described in cetail in the subject . inspection reports and investigation report synopses. ( NUREG-0940, PART II A-71 2 s-
~m.m m_ 1 _. .-_r._-_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _.___________.________________-.____.___.__.____.____-..___i_._______....____.'_____._____
a
, , i.
3 I Florida Power Corporation
, t 2-
- a. y The violations'in the Notice are grouped as follows:
Part'I contains the violations for which c1v11 penalties have' been
. assessed; Item 1;A.1nvolves numerous instances in wnich operating j+
procedures were violated, demonstrating poor performance of the - operations decartment In that operating limits assoc 1ated with operating 1 procedure 0P-1038. Curve 8, were routinely exceeded. eihile there were ; numerous instances where operat1ng procedures were violated. the Notice '
, Identifies. examples in which operating limits were exceeded for more
.than 30 minutes with some as long as tnree hours. ,
itemII.B involves a violation in which a crew of licensed operators ! conducted unauthor1 Zed tests on two separate occasions in an effort to ! iresolve safety concerns that had not promptly been, addressed'by the i licensee.
~
Item I.C involves two separate violations involving the f511ure to . i promptly taentify and correct conditions adverse to Quality. First. the . ! l licensee failed to Ident1fy promptly that-the operating curve questioned iby'llcenseo coerators was, in fact, nonconservative and, second.'the
.i
-licensee's f1.rst three attempts at corrective action were inadequate.
Item I.0 consists of two separate violations involving inadequate .
. performance by engineering in design control. The first violation . )
Involves the 1ssuance of an inaccurate, nonconservative, design basis curve to operators to be used as an operating curve. The second-v1olation involves the use of an inaccurate. nonconservative setpoint 1 for tne swao over of the suction for emergency core cooling. system pumps ' from the borated water storage tank to the reactor building sump. Part II consists of additional violdtjons that were not assessed a civil penalty: an aaditional Severity Level III violation for inaceauate cesign controi'ana two Severity Level IV violations. Althougn these V1olations did not result in any actual 1moact on the public nealth and safety. the circumstances surrounding these violations represent significant regu'latory concerns. In particular. licensee management failed to exercise effective oversight in several areas that are each of vital 1mportance in assuring the safe operat1on of a nuclear facility. Operations management was unaware that essent1 ally all control room shifts were routinely i violating an operating curve yet these violations were being committed in ! attemots by operators to meet a chemistry goal set by senior management. 1 Furthermore, desD1te the fact that the safety adequacy of the curve was i formally quest 1onea in a problem report by licensed operators. not only did management not recu1re.that *he safety concern be resolved oromptly, but management insisted that the plant be maintainea .at a hydrogen concentration u tnat resulted in coerating on or near.the maximum point of the questioned ! ' curve'during the several months the issue was being cons 1dered. The operating
' environment mainta1ned contributed to the perceived need to conduct the Septemoer L5.1994 evolutions to resolve the matter. ,
I s l
'f 3 NUREG-0940,-PART?II. ,-- A-72 p _ ,
Florida Power Corocrat1on Management oversignt of engineering failed to ensure that the safety concern raised by licensed operators - stated by the licensee not to be a routine occurrence -- with an engineering-der 1ved curve was not agoress1vely pursued 41th a high decree of rigor. Not only did engineering fall to aadress the concern promptly, cesolte the fact that the plant was then operating in the very area of the curve questioned by the operators. but also the conclus1on reacned by engineering was wrong Decause calculational assumptions and evaluations failea to consider fundamental principles (e.g. gas absorption). These engineering performance inadequacles are of even greater concern because i the quest 1oned curve. althougn known oy some engineers to be a design basis curve, had at* been 1dentified to coerations as such and was being used as an ' operating curve even as its safety adecuacy was in dispute. Furtnermore, once the curve was confirmed to be wrong. the actions taken to correct the problem were repeatedly inadequate. Corrective action inadecuacles were also demonstrated in the licensee's review of the September 5. 1994 evolut1on. Althouan several ind1viduals with1n both
'the operations ana engineering departments fiad knowledge of a similar
.evolut1on conductea on the previous day, th6 licensee's investigation was limited to interviews only with the two senior reactor operators on sh1ft. and did not ident1fy tre occurrence of the previous evolution. A detailed event review and root cause analysis was not performed. Moreover. It was not until August 1995, about a year after the event. that a more comprehensive invest 1gation was conducted into this matter. The NRC ts very concerned about the ineffective management oversight of engineering, operations. and corrective action activities cemonstrated by these violations. The NRC expects licensees to promptly address safety concerns. especially those raised by licensed operators. ana to resolve them with a h1gh degree of rigor. You d1d not meet these expectations in this case: managers acoearea insensitive to safety concerns and did not aggressively pursue them engineers overlooked basic scient1fic orinciples and procucea inaccurate analyses. and investigations fallec to identify important case facts and unceriying root causes. In consideration of the nign > regulatory s1gnif1:ance that the NRC finas in these violations. ! have been authorized. after consultation with the Director. Office of Enforcement. the Deputy Executive Director for Reactor Regulation. Regional Ocerations and Researcn. and the Commission. to issue tne enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Impos1 Mon of Civil Penalties in the total amount of $500.000 for the violations discussed above. The assessment process for these pen 51 ties is more fully discussed in Enclosure 1. You are recu1 red to respono to this letter and snould follow the instructions spec 1fied in the enclosed Not1ce when preparing your response. !n your response, you should document the spec 1fic actions taken and any additional actions you plan t: prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this Notice. Including > cur crocosed correct w e actions and the resuits of future inspections, the MC .vtll cetermine whether further NRC enforcemt.nt action is i NUREG-0940, PART II A-73
Flcrida Power Corporation necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. I further note that the NRC :s continuing to review wnether there were other , j unauthor1 Zed evolutions at Crystal River. and further enforcement actions may be taken if addit 1cnal v1olations are ident1 fled. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice." a copy of this letter. Its enclosures and your response will be placed in the NRC s Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not l Include any persor.al pr1vacy. proprietary. or safeguards informat1on so that i it can be placed in the POR without redaction. Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us. Sinc ely.
, /ffy " do a
% ' Stewart D. Ebnr i f' Regional Admin " or l
/ ,
Docket No. 50 302 / l License No. CPR-72 )
Enclosures:
(1) Descr1ption of Violations (2) Notice of Violat1on and Proposed Imposit1on cf Civil Penalties CC w/enCls: Gary L. Boldt. V1ce Pres 1 dent Nuclear Production (SA2C) Florida Power Corecration Cgstal River Energy Comolex m o0 West Power ne Street Crystal River. FL 24428 6708
- 8. v. Hickle. Director Nuclear Plant Oper!!1ons (NA2C)
Florida Power Corocration Crystal River Energy Complex 15760 West Power :ne Street Crystal River. FL 34428-6708 L. C. Kelley. Director (SA2A) Nuclear Operations 51te Support Florida Power Corecration Crystal River Energy Comolex 15760 West Power _*ne Street Crystal. River, FL 14428-6708 cc w encis: See '. ext Page NUREG-0940, PART II A-74
4 Florida Power Corcorat1on e cc wiencis: (Con't) Rodney E. Gaddy Corporate Counsel Florida Power Corporation-
<MAC a5A P. O. Box 14042 St.: Petersourg. FL 33733 Attorney General Department of Legal Affa1rs
~The. cad 1tol Tallahassee, FL 32304 Bill Passetti Office of Radiat1cn Control Department of Health and Rehab111 tat 1ve Serv 1ces 1317 Winewood Bouievara
' Tallahassee. FL 32399 0700 Joe Myers. Director.
Division of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee. FL 32399-2100 Chairman ' , Board of County Ccm1ssioners Citrus County 110 N, Apopka Avenue Inverness. FL 34450 4245 4 RoDert S. Sorsum 1es 3&W Nuclear Tecnnoicq' 1700 Rockville Pne. Suite 525 Rockville, M0 :0852 1631 Richard W. Hendrix. Escuire Fincn. McCrante. Brown & Hendr1x 225 Peachtree Street. N.E. 1700 South Tower i Atlanta, GA 30303 Bruce H. Morris. Escuire Finestone & Morris Eutte 2540 Tower c' ace 1 3340 Peacntree Roao. N.E. ! Atlanta, GA 30326
.NUREG-0940,-PART II -A-75 l I
+1.
Description of Violations A. Failora to en11nw Procedures Violation A in Part' I of the Notice involves nine instances where ; operators violated plant proceaures for maximum MUT overpressure. , Spectf1cally. during the period July 23 tnrougn Septemoer 5.1994 ; operators. ..nlle adding hycrogen to the MUT for RCS cnemistry control. ; exceeded the maximum MUT overpressure limit as defined by OP 1038. I Curve 8 on numerous occasions. In addition, when plant alarms annunctatea curing these additions. indicating that the overpressure ; limit had been exceeaed, operaters failed to take timely action to l reduce pressure to within the acceptable operating region. In one case, j operat1on cutside of the acceptable region persisted for a period of i approximately three hours. i The violation is of significant potential safety consecuence. in that. ) unknown to tne operations staff at the time of the violation. OP-103B. Curve 8 was a des 1gn basis limit established for the protection of Emergency Safeguaros pumps in the event of a loss of coolant accident J (LOCA). Haa an Engineered Safeguarcs actuation occurred while the MUT pressure was in the unacceptable region of OP-1038. Cu a e 8 pump j cavitation and subsecuent inoperability of one train of high pressure 4 injection FPI) could have occurred. Your analysis founa that the one train of HPI subject to inoperaollity because of exceeding OP-1038. Curve 8.1s necessary equipment for accident mitigation for the specific design basis event of a core ficod 1;ne LOCA concurrent with a loss of i offs 1te power and the failure of one emergency diesel generator. From a 1 regulatory stanapoint. this violation is of substantial concern in that it was indicative of a lack of management awareness of centrol room activities. Essentially. 100 percent of the licensed operators on shift ,
'had exceedec OP 1038. Curve 8. and failed to take t1mely action in j response to a valid alarm. In part. cue to management directives to i maintain MUT oressure as nign as possible to meet cnemistry goals for !
RCS hyorogen concentration. despite voiced and documentec operator : concerns witn mainta1ning elevated MUT pressure. Therefore. in l accordance ,.itn the "3eneral Statement of Policy ana Procedures for NRC i Enforcement 4tions" ; Enforcement Policy). NUREG-1600. 1olation A in l Part I of tre Not1ce nas been categorized as a Severity Level III violat1on. , i in accordance with the Enforcement Policy. a base civil penalty in the l amount of $50 00(s is considered for a Severity Level III violation. j Because your fic111ty has been the subject of escalated enforcement action with1n tr.9 last two years
- the NRC cons 1dered wnether credit l was warranted f5r lost 7ficat7on and Correct 7ve Act7cn in accordance J with the cr/11 Deniai;f assessment crocess described in Section VI.B.2 of l 1
I A Notice of .4clStion and Proposed Imposit1on of Civil Penalty in the amount of $25.000. .sas issued on Marcn 24. 1995. assoc 1ated with non-consecvative setecints for safety relatea eculpment (EA 95-016). 1 Notice of Violation was also 'ssued en February 16. .'994. 3ssociated with employee discrinanation oy a contractor emplo'ea y by FPC (EA 93-226L Enclosure 1
-NUREG-0940, PART II A-76
, r Description of Violations
~
the Enforcement Policy.. In this case. the NRC has concluded that credit for Ident7f: car 7on would not be approcriate in that Information related to this violation was not identified tnrougn your internal company efforts.. At the conference. you stated that in direct response to this violation, a new management position was created to focus solely on the oversight ano assessment of control room shift operations and admin 1strat1ve crocecures for alarm response were revised. You stated further that many of the actions taken in response to the SeptemDer 4 and 5. 1994. evolutions also served to correct this violation. However. In considering all of the facts in the case. the NRC concluded that credit for the factor of Correct;ve Action is not apprcpriate in that these actions were not prompt. Scecif1cally. the violat1on occurred over a significant period of time without detection oy FPC management: and following the Septemoer 5.1994. evolution, you failed to fully investigate the operational information available to you to establish the extent of non-compliance with OP-1038. Curve 8. the numan factors problems associated with MUT ocerations. 6nd the existence of an operat1ng environment whicn contributed to the occurrence of this s1tuation. In v1ew of these facts, a civil penalty of $100.000, twice the base. 15 being assessed for this violation. 4
- 3. CondUCf of UnauthoM zed Tests Violation B in Part I of the Notice involves the conduct of unauthor12ed tests of MUT overpressure without precaration of the requireo written ,
safety evaluations, contrary to 10 CFR 50.59. On September 4 and 5. 1994. operators planned and executed evolutions. not recuired by plant conditions. to collect data in order to test the validity of an i operating curve. specifically. OP-1038. Curve 8. In performing these unauthor1:ed tests, procedures also were violated when the operators permitted the MUT pressure to exceed the acceptable operating region defined by CP-1.03B. Curve 8 and fa11ed to take timely action to restore MUT oressure to within limits wnen a valid alarm was received, in fact. during the evolutions. operators cont 1nued to take actions (1.e. decreasing MUT level) wnicn caused MUT pressure to diverge - further into the unacceptable reolon of OP-1038. Curve 8 in orcer to collect data to support their safety concern. On Novemoer 16. 1994, the ' licensee's evaluation determinea that CP 1038. Curve 8 was in error. was - non conservat1ve. and was a design basis limit. Therefore. during these unauthor12ec tests. ?he design cas1s limits for pressure / level of the MUT were exceeded. Although this violation resulted from the indeoendent actions of a sir.gle sh1ft coerating crew. FPC as the employer of the operators favolved bears . responsibility for their actions as employees. FPC also is culpaDie in this matter because of its failure to recognize and change the coerating environment which contributed to the occurrence of j the violat1:n. As discussed above, at the time these evolutions ! occurred. management appearea to accept operators routinely exceeding 1 OP-103B. C rve 8 in order to acnteve senior management mancated cnemistry ccntrol goals. This violation 1s of substantial concern. not only because a design cas1s limit was exceeded with 1ts associated potential safety consequences but also because of FPC's failure to 3 cefinitively establisn limitations on the authority of the Sh1ft l 1 NVREG-0940,-PART II A-77
Description of' Violations 3-Suoervisor and the operat1ng envelope in which he and memoers of his crew were expected to operate. Therefore in accordance with the Enforcement Policy. Violation 8 in Part I of the Not1ce nas been categor1 Zed as a Severity Level III violation. For Violaticn B i.n Part I of the Notice. the NRC similarly cons 1dered whether creoit was warranted for Identificat70n and Correct 7ve Act70n. ThD NRC concluded credit was not warranted for Ident7ficar70n. for althougnyouidentifiedtheunauthorizedtestonSeptember5.1994.your initia, investigation was inadeouate to ident1fy the occurrence of September 4 1994. Despite knowledge by staff in operations and engineering. It was not until June of 1995 that you became aware of the
'second test. Your more comprehens1ve investigation conducted in August 1995 snould have been conducted much earlier. Your corrective actions following 1centification of the Septemoer 5.1994 test included:
(1) establisnment of a Management Review Committee to review the event: (2) counseling of the operations crew involved as well as Drlefing and enhanced tra1ning of all coerating crews on the event and management expectat1ons: (3) issuance of stanaing orders to maintain MUT pressure at a specified margin below OP 1038. Curve 8: and (4) review of otner OP 103B curves for operat1onal constraints. Following icentif1 cation of the September 4. 19*4. test. you took the following act1ons: (1) formal disc 1plinary actn.1 Including termination of the licenses of four of the operators involved .n the unauthor1 Zed tests: (2) nitiat1on of the August 1995 investigation: (3) procedural changes proviaing additional guidance on infrecuently performed evolutions: 4) reinforcement of logkeeping practices; and (5) additional training for operat1ons personnel on shift supervisor authority. Based on the aoove. the NRC determined that credit for Correct 7ve 2ctron was warranted, which would normally result in a base civil penalt:. However, the NRC consloers this violation to be of hign regulatory significance. Also. your initial investigation failed to determine t at an aaditional test had been performed. and failed to icentify tnat at least one other snift supervisor continued to believe that sucn svoiutions were within the authority of the Shift Suoervisor. For these reasons the NRC is exercising discretion in accordance with Section VI.3.2.d of the Enforcement Policy and is assessing a c1vil penalty of $100.000 for this Severity Level III violation. C. Corrective ac t'en violations Violations 2.1 and C,2 in Part I of the Not1ce involve your failure to take aceduate 3ctions to correct design deficiencies associated with the MUT maximum overpressure curve. Recarcing violation C.1. operators nad expressed c:ncerns regarding CP-1038. Curve 8. and the concerns were formally cccumented in a May 1994 Problem Report (PR) following a failed high pressure nject1on flow surveillance test. Engineering reviews associatea 1tn the PR failed to identify errors ano improper assumotions " the CP-1038. Curve 8 calc'lations. u The errors were subseauentl. centified durina enoineering evaluat1ons performed following mtlation of PR 94:0267 .,nich documented the results of the operators' nauthor1:ed test on Septemoer 5. 1994, NUREG-0940. PART II A-78
Descr10tlon of Violat1ons 4-This violation was caused.by inadequate engineering review of the > calculations which formed the bas 1s of OP-103B. Curve 8. and management s ineffect1veness in ensuring that the operations and engineering departments worked together effect1vely to resolve the cocumented' safety issues regarding OP 1038. Curve 8. At the conference you stated tnat safety concerns by reactor operators were not routine occurrences. However. Instead of promptly and aggressively resolving- ' their concern, the issue persisted without insistence by sen1or management for resolution. Rather, management continued to focus on maintaining a reactor coolant system hydrogen concentration that tesulted in operation at or near the maximum allowable MUT pressure, which contr1buted to the operators' perceived need to conduct the tests in order to gather the data ne:essary to support their asserted safety concern. In addition. management's overall ineffectiveness in this matter contributed to continued. periodic operation outside the design basis for routine evolutions. Therefore, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy. Violation C.1 in Part I of the Notice ha been categorizec as a Sever 1ty 1.evel III violation. In assessing the appropriate c1v11 penalty for Violation C.1 in Part I of tne Notice. botn Ident1fication and Corrective Action were considered. It was concluded that credit was not warranted for' identiffcarton because the NRC ident1fied the violation. Regarding Correct 1ve Action at the conference. you stated that your corrective actions for the violation included: (1) counselling of the engineers involved: (2) initiation of a third party review of des 1gn calculations; (3) Interdisciplinary review and sign off of design calculations which included coerations and system engineering: (4) format 1on of a design engineering review board; (5) establishment of a management, single point of accountability for 1mportant technical Issues: and (6) relocation of design engineering to the site. Although the NRC ackncwledges these corrective actions. it was concluded that credit for Correctfve act7on was not warranted. This conclusion was baset1 on the fact that teginning in May 1994 with the issuance of PR 94-0149 ample opoortunities existea for aoprocriately acdressing and resolving the safety concern raised by the operators: yet tnis was not done. Further, nad the issues with regard to the PR been resolved satisfactorily, Violation C.: in Part I of the Notice would have been avolded. Therefore. a civil penalty in the amount of $100.000 1s assessed for this violation. Regarding Violation C.2 following the September 5._1994. unauthor1 Zed test. two secarate short term instructions (STP were issued to operators recu1 ring MUT pressure to be maintained at a specified margin Delow OP-1038. Curve 8 in orcer to ensure the plant was cperated within the design casts until a revised curve could be issued. The revised curves. OP-1938. Curves 8A ana B were 1ssued on January 30. 1995. However. On January 31. 1995. you again ident1fied tnat comoliance with the STIs anc the revised OP-103B. Curves 8A and 8B would not assure coeration altnin the cesign bas 1s cue to a discrepancy between Emergency Coerating Pocedure (EOP) recu1rements and the design assumotions for l the curves. To ensure an approorlate operating margin. anotner STI was l 1ssued on January 31. 1995. requiring maintenance of MUT pressure 7-11 i pounds per scuare Inch below the newly 1ssued OP-103B. Curves 8A and B. 1 I i l i NUREG-0940, PART II A-79 1 l
Descript1on of Violations This violation further exemplifies the ineffectiveness of the technical reviews assoc 1ated with the MUT 1ssue and management's inability to effect the proper and lasting correct 1ve actions necessary for assuring the opera 0111ty of equipment required to m1tigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy. Violation C.2 'in Part I of the Notice also has been categorized as a Severity level III v1olation. In applying the civ11 penalty assessment process to Violation C.2 in Part I of the Notice, the NRu determined that credit was warranted for-the factor of Identificat70n in that the licensee appropriately ident1fied and reported the erroneous $ tis and revised Curves 8A and 8B and the potential for further cperation outside the cesign basis. In - evaluat1ng Corrective Actfon. the NRC cons 1dered the corrective actions previously described for Violation C.1 in Part I of the Notice. Based on this information. the NRC concluded that credit was not warranted for Corrective Action.. due to the repetitive failures to institute a MUT overpressure curve which was tecnn1cally correct and appropriately conservat1ve to ensure that the operators could operate within the plant's design basis. Based on these determinations the base civil penalty normally would be assessed for this violation. However. In
. consideration of the multiple failures to correct the curve that are indicat1ve of the unacceptable performance of the licensee in resolving this issue. the NRC is exerc1s1ng discretion in accorcance with Section 8.2.d of the Enforcement Policy and is assessing a c1vil penalty of $100.000 for this Sever 1ty Level III violation.
D. Des 1on rentrol Violations Violations 0.1 and 0.2 in Part I and Violation A in Part II of the Notice involve the failure to incorporate the des 1gn cas1s of the ECCS into plant oroceaures as well as the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). a clation 0.1 in Part I of the Notice, involves your failure to assure that. from the t1:e OP-1038. Curve 8 was procecurally established in January .'993 until issuance of the STI on Septemoer 9.1994. an adequate safety margin was provided to ensure the availability of HPI fe' certain LOCA scenarios. The NRC 1s particularly concernea with this v1olation wnich reflects the inadequate engineer 1no and technical efforts that went into the develooment of OP-1038.' Curve 8. Specifically. evaluations and assumptions wnich formed the technical basis for tne MUT overoressure calculations failed to consider fundamental engineering principles (e.g.. gas absorption) which resulted in significant errors in OP-1038. Curve 8, In addition. although known to certain engineers no one informed operations and personnel using CP 103B. Orve 8 that it was a design basis limit rather than an administrative limit. These violations resulted from fundamental engineering errors and lack of attention to detail and significantly contributec to the other violations cescribed heretn: therefore, this violation ras been categor1ced as a Severity Level III violation. In assess v g the civil penalty to be applied to Violation D.1 in Part I of the Notice the NRC conclu'd ed that credit was warranted for Ident7ffcac;cn in that the violation was identiflea as a result of the licensee's follow up to PR 94 0267 which documented the results of the 1 NUREG-0940, PART II A-80
)
h c Description._ of Violat1ons -6 ] i Septemoer 5l 1994 ' unauthorized test. At the conference. you stated i that correct 1ve.act1ons for this ' violation were similar to those ' 10st1tuted for the violations in Part -I.C of the Notice. In addition. you issued a revised version of the MUT pressure / level curve on- l October 5. 1995. Althougn uoon ident1fication of the deficiency you , took immediate actions to 1ssue an STI to provide an-adeauate operating
~
p '
; marg 1n for the MUT. the actions were ineffective and required multiple attempts until a revised curve was issued. Thereforei it has been ;
.. determined that credit ~ for the factor of Correctfve Act70n is not warranted. resulting sin the base civil penalty of '$50.000 for this ,
Severity Level'!!! violation. Regarding V1olation 0.2 in Part I of the Notice. the FSAR.and implementing E0Ps directed that the swap over of the ECCS pumps' suction i
'from the borated water storage tank (BWST) to the reactor building sump i be initiated'et the five foot level in the BWST. This 8WST level was ,
too low'to ensure that the swao over from the BWST to the reactor bu11 ding sumo would occur in time to prevent. vortex 1ng in the BWST and > to ensure an adecuate net positive suction head for the ECCS pumps during post-LOCA operations. This violation is of significant potential safety consecuence in that it could have resulted in gas entrainment in ,
- the ECCS pumos causing them to be potentially inoperaole and unavailable .
for acc1 dent mitigation. In addition, the NRC is concerned that ' justification for the five foot swap over level was documented in an
. informal manner through an internal engineer 1ng memorandum. rather than j througn a formal revision to the engineering calculation. Therefore. .
'this violat1on has been characterized as a Severity Level III violation. ]
For Violation 0.2 in Part I of the Notice, the NRC determined that ; credit was not warranted for Identf f1 car 70n because the issue was ident1fied througn NRC inspection ef fort. In addition to the corrective
-actions previously described. on February 2. 1995.'STI 95-011 was. issued i followed by February 3, 1995 revisions to E0P-07 and 08 to reflect that the swap over snould be initlated at 15 feet and completea by 7 feet. .
BWST level, 31ven your timely action to evaluate the violation and ; 1ssue reviseo procecures-to correct the procedural deficiencies, the NRC concluded that creait was warranted for Corrective Actfon, resulting in ' a Dase civil penalty of $50.000 for this violation. ; For Violation A in Part II of the Notice, the E0Ps failed ~to incorporate . the' design basis of the ECCS during certain post LOCA conditions 3 reoutring both low pressure injection (LPI) and HPI. Speci fically. : under the conditions in which only one LPI pump was available, the E0Ps i d1rected the operators to cross connect the HPI suction header thus, i allowing the single LPI pumo to be aligned and to provide flow to the :
- reactor vessel as well as to the suction of two HPI pumps. As a result, an inadeouate water inventory would be available to provide adecuate net -
positive suction head once the suct1on source for the L?! was swapped
.over'to the' reactor building sumo. This procedural error could have
.resulted in the loss of the only operable LPI pump; tnus, the plant !
- ooerated outs 1ce of:its desian basis. Therefore in accordance with the Enforcement PolicyJ this violation is being cate orized as a Severity
= Level III v1olation. ' The root cause of this ,vio ation was insufficient :
review by.ces1gn engineering during the E0P revision process o l
,, .t NUREG-0940[PARTII S. LA-81 ,
+ ,
$-..+- J--
Description of Violations In considering the C1v11 pen 40 be applied for Violation A in Part 11 of the Not1Ce the f. cetermined that credit was warranted for Ident7f1 cation because you ident1 fled the violation as a result of your corrective actions associated with previous MUT 1ssues and appropriately reported 1t to the NRC. Regarcing the factor of Correct 7ve Action. at the conference. you advised that you have instituted design and system engineering reviews of operating procedure revisions. In add 1 tion, upon 1dentification. immediate actions were taken to implement STI 95-022 and initiate aporopriate revisions to the affected EOPs. The final revisions to the E0Ps were effective June 9,1995. Based on these actions, the NRC determined that credit was warranted for Corrective Action: therefore, no civil penalty will be assessed for this violation. E. Other Violations In addition Part !! of the Notice includes two Severity Level IV violations. The violations involve: (1) the failure to implement timely corrective actions for a previous emergency diesel generator fuel oli tank level deficiency which could have ident1fied earlier the 8WST level swap over issue identified in Violation D.2 in Part I of the Notice: ano (2) the failure of your fire protection surveillance, procedures to verify the minimum requirea water volume for the fire water storage tanks. Both v1olations Involved untimely corrective actions for Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 92-003.
\
NUREG-0940, PART II_ -A-82
. . - . _- - ~ . - - - . . - - - . .
l h 4 NOTICEOFVIOLATIOS AND i PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES
-Florida Power Corocratt'on: Docket No. 50-302
^ Crystal River Nuclear Plant' License No. OPR-72 >
' Unit 3 EA 95-126
. - During NRC inscections conducted dur1nc the period September 5.1994.. through Decemoer 15. 1995. and Office of Investigations investigations completed on l May:24'. 1995, and February 13. 1996. violations of.NRC reautrements were identified. 'In.accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and
- i. : Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions. NUREG 1600, the Nuclear Regulatory .
. 'Commiss1on proposes to impose' civil penalties pursuant to Section 234 of the l Atomic Energy Act of 1954.. as amended (Act). 42 U.S.C. 2282. and 10 CFR 2.205. )
-The particular violations and associated c1vil penalties are' set forth below:
~
!. Violations 1ssessed Civil Penalties
'A. Technical Specification 5.6.1.1 requires in part. that procedures .
De 1molemented covering activitles as recommended in Regulatory Guice 1.33. Rev1slon 2. Appena1x A. of February 1978. Appendix A !
< recommends acministrat1ve procedures to cover the authorities and ,
responsib111 ties.for safe operation and shutdown, and operating i procecures for the reactor coolant system make-up system. The e ' licensee implemented the acove Appendix A recommen d ations, in . part, tnrougn. Procedure AI 500. " Conduct of Operations." and *
. Procecure OP 402. "Make up and Pur1fication System."
Al-500. Revisions (Rev.) 80. 81. and 82. Step 4.3.1.1. stated that , . It 1s tne dut of every member'of the Crystal River Plant work force to como y with procedures. -In addition. Step 6 of-Enclosure 27 stated that it is the responsibility of the Chief Nuclear Operator to ensure that plant evolutions do not violate aaministrative controls. Procedure OP 402. Rev. 75.: Step 4.19.9. reautrea that coerators ensure that the make-uo tank pressure , limits of OP-103B. Curve 8. are not exceeded wnen adding hydrogen to tne maKe-uo tank by manually bypassing the 15 pounds per square inen gauge ^i.cs1gJ hydrogen regulator. Procedure OP 402. . Steo 4.19.8. reautred that coerators refer to Curve 8 of OP-1038 . for maximum maKe up tank overpressure when adding hydrogen to the l make t.D tank titrougn the 15 pS1g hydrogen regulator. Procedure ; e OP-1038. Curve 8.-Maximum Make-up Tank Overpressure. Rev. 12. ; definea the acceptable make up tank pressure versus level ! 4 . operating region. Procedure AR-403. "PSA-Z Annunciator Response." Annunc13 tor H 04 06. Make-uo Tank Pressure High/ Low. Rev. 21. .
- recuirec coerators to take action to reduce make-up tank pressure
to'within the limits of OP-1038. Curve 8. when a valid alarm is recenea. ! Centrary to the aoove, operaters failed to meet the reautrements , of Pececure Ale 500 to comply with proceaures and administrative .I contr::s.related to maximum make up tank pressure on numerous I l Enclosure 2 3
.s
- NOREGd940,PARTlII: iA-83 ,
I 4 1
- .. - . .. . . - . . .- . . .- - i
~_.
'Not1ce of Violation' and Proposed 2-Imposition of Civil Penalties occasions during the period June 1. 1994. througn September 4 l 1994. as evidenced by the following examples: ' (1) The limits of OP 1038. Curve 8 for acceptable make-up tank pressure were exceeded on July 23 1994, for approximately , 122 minutes continuously, from approximately 12:13 to 1 2:14 p.m., on July 25, 1994 for approximately 48 minutes !
. continuously. from approximately 10:27 to 11:14 a.m. . on l July 27, 1994 for approximately 78 minutes continuously. '
from approximately 2:44 to 4:01 p.m.. on July 28. 1994. for approximately 184 minutes continuously from approximately 2:26 to 5:29 p.m.: on July 30. 1994, for approximately 190 ' i minutes cont 1nuously. from approximately 9:28 a.m. to 12:38 p.m.. on August 6. 1994. for approximately 141 minutes continuously, from approx 1mately 9:55 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. on August 8. 1994. for approximately 67 minutes continuously, from approx 1mately 10:08 to 11:14 a.m., on August 24. 1994. for approximately 87 minutes continuously. from j approximately 1:24 to 2:50 p.m and. on Septemoer 4'/ 1994 1 for approximately 86 minutes continuously from i approximately 3:21 to 4:46 p.m.- (2) Procedure OP-402 Step 4.19.9. was not ccmplied with on ; July 27. July 28. July 30. August 6. August 8. August 24 I and Septemoer 4. 1994. In that the make-up tank pressure exceeded the limits of OP-103B. Curve 8. while adding hydrogen to the make-up tank by manually bypassing the 15 osig hydrogen regulator. Also. OP-402. Step 4.19.8. was not complied with on July 23. 1994 in that the make-up tank pressure exceeded the limits of OP-103B, Curve 8. while adding hyarogen to the make-up tank througn the 15 psig
'1ydrogen regulator.
(3) 3roceaure AR-403. Annunciator H-04-06. e.as not followed on ! July 23. July 25. July 27. July 28. July 30. August 6. August 8. August 24. and September J. 1994. in that timely l 1 action was not taken to reduce make-uo tank pressure to ! alth1n the limits of OP-1038. Curve 8, wnen a valid alarm ! aas received. (01013) ! l This is a Severity Level III proolem (Supplement I) ! Civil Penalty - $100.000 l l S. 10 CFR 50.59. " Changes. Tests, and Exoeriments." in part. allows i the l' censed facility to conduct tests not described in the safety i analysis report without crior Commission approval. unless the proposed test involves an unreviewed safety cuestion. A proposed i test snall be deemed to involve an unreviewed safety cuestion if the crocability of occurrence or the consecuences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analys1s report may be increased. The NUREG-0940, PART II A-84
(
;Not1ce of Violat1on and Frocosed' -
3-Impos1 tion of Civil Penalties-
. licensee shall maintain records of tests carried out pursuant to this sect 1on'1 including a wr1tten safety evaluation which provides
, the basis for the determination that the test does not involve an unreviewed safety question.
Contrary to the above. on Septemoer 4 and 5, 1994. operators conducted tests not.descr1 bed 1n the safety analysis report.
.lwithout written safety' evaluations to prov1de:a basis for a.
determination that the tests.did not involve an unreviewed safety question. ' Spec 1ficallyc operators conducted tests in that they.
- performed evolutions 1rvolving .make up tank pressure and level, not..requ1 red by plant conditions, to collect data. (02013)
This 15 a Severity Level III violation.-ISupplement I) Civil Penalty - 5100.000> y' ,
> C. 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B. Criterion XVI. " Corrective Act1on." '
states. In part, that measures shall be established to assure that conattlens adverse to quality, such as nonconformances, are promotly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality. measures shall assure that the cause of the condition Is cetermined and correct 1ve action taken to preclude repetition.
-(1) - Ccntrary to the above, significant conditions adverse to c -quality were not promptly identified and corrected, and action was not taken to preclude repetition. Specifically.
the licensee failed to perform an adequate review of Problem Report 94 0149.-issued on May 10. 1994, that identified 11 censed operatcr concerns with the accuracy of OP-1038.
'urve 8. The revtew failed to Ident1fy promotly the significant errors that were present'in OP-1038. Curve 8 and
*n the calculations that were the bas 1s for the curve. As a esult. plant operations using the curve frecuently were Outside Ine design bases of the facility. (03013)
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement 1) Civil Penalty - 5100.000 (2) :ontrary to the above significant conditions adverse to cuality were not'promotly identified and corrected, and
. action was not taken to preclude repetition. Spec 1fically.
Short Term Instruction (STI) 94-019 issued on September 9.
'994. STI 021 1ssueo on September 11. 1994. and Revision 13
-*o OP-1038. '" Plant Coerating Curves." issued on January 30.
,s 1995 were. corrective actions once problems with the make-up
- ant overpressure curve were 1dentified but were inadequate to. prevent operation outside of the design basis. (04013)
ThisL s a Sever 1ty Level III v1olation (Supplement I)
-Civil Penalty C 5100.000
~
E y lNUREG i O940,cPARTLII' . A-85
,y -l ,$ y n a.
= '
~- . . .. -- . . . , _ . . _ _ _
. Notice of Violat1cn and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties D. .10 CFR Part 50. Appendix 8. Criterion III. " Design Control." in
.part. requires that measures be established to assure that applicaole regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2. " Definitions." and as specified in the license applica;1on, are correctly translated into procedures and instructions.
(1) Contrary to the above. the design basis was not correctly
. translated into drawings' procedures, and instructions.
Specifically, between approximately Apr11 1993 and September 9. 1994. make-up tank procedure limits for make up tank pressure failed to meet the emergency core cooling system design basis in that Procedure ; OP-1038. Curve 8. " Maximum Make-up Tank Overpressure." Rev. 12. did not provide adeouste margin to ensure that hydrogen entralnment In the h1gn pressure make-up pumps was prevented when the make up tank was operated within the ' specified pressure and level limits. (05013) . This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I) ! Civil Penalty.- 550.000 (2) Contrary to the above. the des 1gn basis was not correctly translated into drawings procedures, and instructions. i Spec 1fically, between init1al operation on March 13. 1977 and February 2.1995. except for the time period of June , 1990 througn April 1993. the licensee failed to correctly 1 translate the design basis for the emergency core cooling system into the Final Safety Analysis Report. ' Section 6.1.2.1.2: Procecure E0P 07. " Inadequate Core Cooling:" and Procedure E0P-08. *LOCA Cooldown." The Final Safety Analysis Report. Section 6.1.2.1.2: E0P-07: and EOP-28 failed to meet the design basis in that the manual swap over from the borated water storage tank to the reactor ou11 ding sump was directed to be initiatec at a level of five feet or less in the borated water storage tank. which was insufficient to assure that all of the emergency core cooling system pumos would not be damaged by air entrainment from vortex 1n Additionally,g in the borated water storage tank.the licensee had no official des calculation to support the swap over level of five feet that was incorporated into emergency operating procedures in April 1993. The official calculation. 190-0024. supported a swap over level equivalent to approximately 14 feet In the borated water storage tank. An internal engineering yemorandum was inaoproor1ately used to support the swap over 4evel of five feet. (06013) ' This 's a Sever 1ty Level III violation (Supplement I) , Civil Denalty - 550.000 ' l NUREG-0940, PART II A-86 j:
s ...
-i Jotice of Violation'and Proposed' .5- 1 Imposition of Civil Penalties '
- 11. 'liolations Not Assessed a Civil Pdnalty -
-1 A. 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix B. Criterion III. " Design Control." in !
part. requires.that measures be established to assure that 1 applicable regulatory reautrements and the design basis, as ; defineo in 10 CFR 50.2. " Definitions," and as spec 1fied in the- .
- 1 license application, are correctly translated into procedures and instructions; i i
Contrary to the above. the design basis.was not correctly
- translated into drawings. procedures,.and instructions. ,
Specifically, between April 8. 1993. and March 22. 1995. ; Procecuresl0P-07andE0P-08fa11edtomeettheemergencycore ! cooling system design. basis ? Spec 1fically, during post loss-of- ! coolant acc1 dent operation with one low pressure injection pump
, and t'.vo high pressure injection pumos operating. and with the high -
pressure Inject 1on pump suction crosstle valve open, as directed- 1
. by Procedures E0P 07.and E0P 08. the licensee's engineering !
calculation M90 0021. Rev. 5. dated March 22, 1995. indicat'ed that l the water Inventory in the reactor building sump would not have , proviced adequate net pos1tive suction head to the one low ; pressure injection pump. This lineup could result in the loss of ; the only operable low pressure Injection pumo -(07013) l
-This 15 a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I)
B. 10.CFR Part 50. Appendix 8. Criterion XVI " Corrective Action." states, 1n part. that measures shall be established to assure tnat l conoltlons adverse to quality, such as nonconformances, are ! promotly ident1fied and corrected. In the case of significant ! conditions adverse to cuality, measures snall assure that the cause of the conaltion 15 cetermined and correct 1ve act1on taken , to preclude repetit1on. ' Contrary to the above, conditions adverse to quality were not { promotly 1dentified and corrected. .and action was not taken to a precluce repet1 tion. Spec 1fically, the licensee failed to . identify the root cause and take steps to preclude repetition of a : significant condition adverse to quality related to the emergency { diesel generator fuel' oil tank levels initially identified in ! License Event Report No. 92-003, dated May 15. 1992. As of ! Maren 27, 1996. corrective actions to determ1ne the relationship ~! of suction point to tant level for other tanks having a Technical ! Specification reauired minimum volume including the borated water E storace tank had not been imolemented. A' timely review of the ; calculation of.the coratea water storage tank volume could have resulted in earlier 1dentif1 cation ana correct 1on of the l Inaaecuacy with the borated water storage tank level for manual l i i l 1 NUREG;0940, PARTl11 ~A-87 !
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Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penaltles swap over of emergency core cooling system pumos' suction from the j boratea water storage tank to the reactor building sump. (08014) i This 1s a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I). C. Crystal River Facility Operating L1 cense No. DPR-72.' Paragraon 2.C.(9). Fire Protection. required that the licensee Implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as descr1 bed in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility. Final Safety Analysis Report. Section 9.8 stated that the fire protection program has been formulated in accordance w1th specific fire crotection coverning documents listed in Final Safety Analysis Report table 9-18. Table 9-18 included the Fire Protection Plan. The Fire Protection Plan. Table 6.1.a. Rev. 11 WaterSupply Operao111ty Recuirements. Compensatory Measures and Reports. required that at all times there be two separate water supplies, eacn with a minimum water volume of 345.000 gallons. Table 6.1.b. ; Water Supply Surveillance Requirements, stated: ' verify minimum required water volume of 345.000 gallons in each fire water tank. whicn 1s implemented by Procedure SP-300. ' Control Room Log Readings," Rev. 131. The Fire Protection Plan. Section 7.8 stated. In part. that in the case of sign 1ficant conditions adverse to fire protection. the cause of the condition 15 determined, analyzed. and prompt corrective actions are taken to preclude recurrence. Tecnnical Soecification 5.6.1.1.C recuired that written procedures snall :e establisned. 1m Fire Protection Program.plemented. and maintainea covering the Contrary to the above. the licensee failed to establisn an adeouate procedure to verify the minimum required water volume of 345.000 gallons in each of two fire water storage tanks. dpeC1f1Cally Proceaure $P-300 recuireo that the water level in ' the tank be verified to be 35 feet, which. under worst case canaltions verified a volume of water less than required by the Fire hotection Plan as well as the Enhanced Design Basis Document. In addition. prompt corrective actions for Licensee Event Recort No. 92-003, dated August 1 1991. aould have revealed this c:ncitlen aaverse to fire protection. (09014) This 1s a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I). Pursuant to the crovisions of.10 CFR 2.201. Florica Power Corporation (Licensee) is hereoy recuired to submit a written statement or explanation to the 0) rector. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. l l NUREG-0940, PART II. A-88
1 Not1ce of Violation and Droposed Imposition of Civil Penalties within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Not1ce). This reply snould be clearly marked as a " Reply 1 to a Notice of Viciation" and should include for eacn alleged violation: J
- 11) adm1ssion or den 1al of the allegea violation. (2) the reasons for the violation 1f acmitted. and If dented, the reasons wny. (3) the corrective steos that nave oeen taken and the results achieved. (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further v1olations. and (5) the date when full comollance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time spec 1 fled in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be 1ssueo as why the license should not be moalfied. suspended, or revoked or why sucn other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2232. this response shall be submitted under oath:or affirmation.
Within the same time as provided for the response required abose under 10 CFR 2.201. the Licensee may pay the C1vil penalties by letter addressed to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. with a check, draft. money order, or electronic transfer payaole to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the c1v11 penalties proposed above, or the cumulat1ve amount of the c1v11 penaltles if more than one c1v11 penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalties in whole or in part. by a written answer addressed to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fall to answer within the t1me spec 1 flea. an order 1moosing the civil penalties will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with IC CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties. In whole or in part, sucn answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violations listea in this Notice. In wnole or in part. (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances. (3) show error in this Notice or (4) snow other reasons wny the cenalties should not be 1mposed. In addition to protesting the c1v11 cenalties in wnole or in cart. such answer may request remission or mitigaticn of the cenalties, in reauesting mitigation of the proposed penaltles the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accorcance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or expianation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201. but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by spec 1fic reference (e.g., cit 1ng oage and paragrapn numoers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee 's directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205. regarding the procedure for imposing a c1v11 penaltles. Upon failure to cay any civil penalty aue which subsequently has teen determinec in accordance with the ap'licable o provisions of 10 CFR 2.205. this matter may be rev errea to the Attorney General, and the cenalty. unless comoremisea. remitted or mitigated, hay ce collected by civil action pursuant to Secticn 234c :1 the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2282c. the response notea acove (Reply to Not1ce of Violation letter with payment of civil cenalties, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: James Lieberman. Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 1 J NUREG-0940, PART II A-89 l
Notice of Violaticn and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties Commission. One white Flint North. 11555 Rockville Pike. Rockville. MD 20852-2738. with a copy to the Regional Administrator. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory : Commission. Region II and to the Resident Inspector Crystal River Nuclear J Plant. Because your resconse will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to tne extent poss1ble. It should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguaros information so that it can be placed in the PDR without , redaction. However. If you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly 1no1cate the specific information that you desire not to be Olaced in the PDR. and provide the legal basis to support your request for ; althholding the information from the public. Dateo at Atlanta. 5eorg1a this 10th oay of July 1996 l 1 l l i I l l i 1 i NUREG-0940, PART II A-90
Predecisional Enforcement Conference Attendees March 28. 1996 Licensee D. Fields, former Shift Supervisor. Crystal River Unit 3 R. Weiss, Former Assistant Shift Supervisor. Crystal River Unit 3
-R. Hendrix. Esquire D. Dickey. Escu1re B.-Weiss. Observer Nuclear Reaulatorv Comission L. Reyes. Deputy Regional Administrator Regicn II (RII).'
A. Gibson. Director. Division of Reactor Safety (ORS). RII J. Lieberman. Director. Office of Enforcement S. Richards. Chief. Operator Licensing Brancn. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
- 8. Uryc. Director. Enforcement and Investigations Coordination Staff (EICS) '
C. Evans. Regional Counsel L.- Clark Counsel . Office of the General Counsel K. Landis. Chief. Reactor Projects Branch 3. Division of Reactor Projects C. Rapp. Reactor Inspector u Enclosure 2 NUREG-0940,!PART-11 A-91 i
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}.
94 ~ 3 4 t y * *f85 # - - UNITE D STATES A. *. ' . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
'b REGION IV
~S .#- 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
\ ,. /- ARONGTON, TE MAS 78M18064 I
l
? ,
October 17,-1995 s (EA 95-077. I
? Houston Lighting &' Power Company l
, ATTN: -William T. Cottle, Group l
.Vice President, Nuclear J
' Post Office Box 289
;Wadsworth, Texas';77483 )
i
-)
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL. PENALTIES -
~$160,000 .
-(NRC- Office of Inspector General Investigation. 92-491) s
- I
Dear. Mr. Cottle:
1
!This letter refers to an NRC' Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigation ,
conducted at the Houston Lighting a Lighting Power (HL&P) Company's South j Texas Project (STP) facility and to a recently-issued Department of Labor j (00L) Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ)_ Recommended Decision and Order (R00) on i the same issue (93-ERA-7, 93-ERA-8, April 6, 1995). The purpose of this ; investigation was'to review details concerning the alleged discrimination, in j
. violation of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.7, by HL&P against two former ,
members of the licensee's nuclear security department (NSD), Messrs. David ! Lamb and James Dean. As indicated in the enclosed Notice of Violation j (Notice), the NRC has concluded, on the basis of the OIG investigatlon, the
' DOL RDO, .and a review of other available information, that HL&P discriminated against-these individuals by terminating their employment at STP as a result of their engaging in protected activities.
Based on the findings of the OlG investigation, as documented in its report c which was issued February 18, 1993. Demands for Information (DFis) were issued on September 29, 1993, to both HL&P and Mr. Richard.Balcom, the former manager ! of the NSO. Following HL&P's and Mr. Balcom's responses to the DFIs on 1 November 15, 1993.' the NRC informed both parties on December 30, 1993 that, because the issue of discrimination was then currently before a DOL ALJ, the staff would await the decision of the ALJ before determining if further i enforcement action was warranted. S0n- April 6,1995, the ALJ issued his RDO which found that the former NSD , lemployees had been discriminated against by HL&P in that their employment was !
. terminated on May 4, 1992, in retaliation for having earlier identified and 3~
-reported safety concerns to the NRC. Following the issuance of the ALJ's RDO, a predecisional enforcement conference was conducted with HL&P and Mr. Balcom 4
on June 16. 1995. This conference was transcribed and open to public observation. The purpose of the conference was to give'HL&P'and Mr. Balcom the opportunity to present their positions.regarding their action connected
< with-the alleged discrimination of the two.former NSD employees and to discuss any corrective action taken as a' result.of the ALJ's findings.
;NUREG-0940, PART II' A-92'
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d J f $ 1y - - '.
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i s i Houston Ligh'ing'& t' 2 Power Company .i l Based.on.its review of the OIG's report, the DFI responses,' the ALJ's RDO, and
~
the information that was obtained during the predecisional enforcement !
, conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurref. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Vivil Penalties. ;
The NRC recognizes'that these violat' ions occurred early in 1992, and that, since their occurrence, HL&P has' implemented many improvements both in its ! program for. addressing employee concerns without the employee's fearing retaliation, and in its program for-identifying and correcting problems. In , addition,- NRC recognizes that HL&P he instituted many significant management i changes _within its organization that appear to'have improved its overall e j performance and increased the desire of management to identify and correct problems. Notwithstanding these actions, the NRC-has decided that enforcement action is warranted to reinforce the message to HL&P's present organization : that discrimination against any individual who raises safety or regulatory ! concerns is unacceptable and will not be tolerated by the NRC. Therefore, ; each of the violations has been categorized in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action," (Enforcement i Policy) (60 FR 34381, June 30, 1995) at Severity Level II. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount ! of 580,000 normally is considered for a Severity Level II violation. In this
- case, in order to emphasize the importance of ensuring that appropriate ,
controls exist to preclude discrimination against individuals for identifying i safety concerns, I considered exercising enforcement discretion, in accordance i with Section VII of the Enforcement Policy, to increase the base civil penalty ! to the statutory maximum civil penalty amount of $100,000 fcr each of the two violations. However, after considering the efforts that HL&P has undertaken to improve its programs to identify and correct employee identified plant ' problems without fear of licensee management reprisals as described above, and after consultation with the Commission, I have been authorized to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $160,000, $80,000 for each of the two violations described in the ; Notice. HL&P is required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing its response. Since the NRC enforcement action in this case is being proposed prior to a final decision on this matter by the Secretary of Labor (SOL), you may delay payment of, or response to, the-proposed civil penalties and submission of certain portions of the response as described in the enclosed Notice until 30 days after the SOL's decision, at which time you may also supplement your earlier responses, i in the response required by this letter and Notice, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent i recurrence of violations of this type and any actions that you have taken or l planned to minimize any chilling effect that might arise from this incident. Also enclosed with this letter is a copy of a letter and Notice of Violation to Mr. Balcom. NUREG-0940, PART II A-93 o
i t Houston Lighting & 3 Power Company in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and HL&P's response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, the response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information that is not already in the public
. record, HL&P should clearly indicate the specific information that it desires not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support HL&P's request for withholding the information from the public.
The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96.511. Sincerely, M/ L. J Callan Re nal Administrator Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499 License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80
Enclosures:
Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties; Letter and Notice ci Violation to Mr. Balcom cc w/ encl: Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: Lawrence E. Martin, General Manager Nuclear Assurance & Licensing P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483 City of Austin Electric Utility Department ATTN: J. C. Lanier/M. B. Lee 721 Barton Springs Road Austin, Texas 78704 City Public Service Board ATTN: K. J. Fiedler/M. T. Hardt P.O. Box 1771 San Antonio, Texas 78296 cc w/ encl: See Next Page
~NUREG-0940, PART II A-94
-l i
s 1 Houston Lighting E 4 i Power' Company' ;
.cc'w/ encl: ~ (Con't): .. ~i
. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius' o ATTN: Jack R. Newman, Esq... l
'1800 M. Street,'N.W. 3 Washington, D.C. 20036-5869 i l
Central Power and Light Compa'ty -;
. ATTN: Mr. C. A. Johnson. '
P.O. Box 289 ! Mail Code: N5012 Wadsworth, Texas 77483 i
~INPO 6 Records Center. i 700 Galleria Parkway ;
Atlanta, Georgia 30339-5957. ;
'Mr. Joseph M. Hendrie~' l 50 Bellport. Lane !
Bellport, New York 11713 j Bureau of Radiation Control l State of Texas ' 1100 West 49th Street Austin, Texas- 78756 ! Office of.the Governor ' ATTN: Andy Barrett, Director
- Environmental Policy P.0,' Box 12428 i Austin, Texas 78711 ~
Judge, Matagorda County f Matagorda County Courthouse ; 1700 Seventh Street ! Bay City, Texas 77414 Licensing Representative Houston' Lighting & Power Company Suite 610: Three Metro Center Bethesda, Maryland 20814 i i Houston Lighting & Power Company
. ATTN: Rufus'S. Scott, Associate i
-General Counsel i
. =P.O. Box 61867 .
. Houston.-Texas 77208 I cc w/ encl: See Next Page l
-i i
!' .-4 -}
- s. I NUREG-0940;.PART 11 A-95~ -I
'l
Houston Lighting & 5
' Power Company cc w/ enc 1: (Con't)
Egan & Associates, P.C.
, ATTN: Joseph R. Egan, Esq. .
4 2300 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037 i Little Harbor Consultants. Inc. ATTN: Mr. J. W. Beck 3 44 Nichols Road i Cohasset, MA 02025-1166 l 1 l l I 1 1 l I 1 i l l 4 NUREG-0940, PART II A-96
I l i
' NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND A0 POSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES 1
Houston Ligh' ting & Power Company Docket Nos. 50-498; 50-499 South Texas Project Electric- License Nos. NPF-76; NPF-80
. Electric Generating Station EA 95-077 Based on an NRC investigation conducted May 1992 to February 1993 and a )
-Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge Recommended Decision and Order in ;
00L Case Nos. 93-ERA-7 and 93-ERA-8 issued on April 6, 1995, violations of NRC
' requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of i
- Policy and. Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action," (Enforcement Policy) (60 FR {
34381 June 30. 1995), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose ! civil penalties pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as l amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations i and associated civil penalties are set forth below:
- l. -10 CFR 50.7, Employee Protection, prohibits discrimination by a ;
Commission licensee against any employee for engaging in certain l protected activities. Discrimination includes discharge and other
- actions that relate to compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. Protected activities are described in Section 210 (now l 211) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and in ;
general are related to the administration or enforcement of a , requirement imposed under the Atomic Energy Act or Energy Reorganization Act. ! Contrary to the above, David Lamb, a supervisor in the licensee's Nuclear Security Department, was unlawfully discriminated against in i that on May 4, 1992, he was terminated from his position for engaging in protected activities. The protected activities included identifying safety concerns to the NRC. This is a Severity level 11 violation (Supplement VII). (01012) Civil Penalty'- $80,000 :
!!. 10 CFR 50.7, Employee Protection, prohibits discrimination by a Commission licensee against any employee for engaging in certain protected activities. Discrimination includes discharge and other i actions that relate to compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges j of employment, Protected activities are described in Section 210 (now t 211) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and in !
general are related to the administration or enforcement of a i requirement imposed under the Atomic Energy Act or Energy Reorganization i Act. Contrary to the above, James Dean, an employee in the licensee's Nuclear
. Security Department, was unlawfully discriminated against in that on j l
NUREG-0940, PART II A-97
< l i
-+
.f $ l Notice of Violation- "2 l
May'4. 1992, he was terminatsd'from his position for' engaging in protected activities. The. protected activities included identifying - safety concerns:to the NRC. This is a Severity Level !! violation (Supplement VII). (02012) l
. Civil Penalty - $80,000 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Houston Lighting & Pcwer Company J
.(Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation ~ to 4
.. the Director, Office of. Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, I within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include'for each alleged violation: (1) 4 admission or dental of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective i steps.that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps '
that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full ' compliance will.be achieved. At your election, responses to items (1) and (2) - 4 may be deferred until 30 days after the decision of the Secretary of Labor. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a , Demand for Information may,be issued as to why the Itcense should not be j modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper ; should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response ; time for. good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be. submitted under oath or~ affirmation.
]
Within 30 days of the final- decision of the Secretary of the Department of Labor.in this case, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed
'to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, '3 with a check, draf t, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the' amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole i or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of i Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalties will be-issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 }
, CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny-the violation (s) listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalties in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalties. In' requesting mitigation of the proposed penalties, the factors addressed in '
, Section'VI.B.2 of ' General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC '
Enforcement. Action." (Enforcement Policy) (60 FR 34381. June 30,1995), should ;
.be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be l
NUREG-0940 PART II A-98 j i
% V b
Notice of Violation 3 set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for 14 0 sing a civil penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalties due which subsequently have been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this ' matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalties, unless ! compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant i to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282(c). The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of i civil penalties, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: ) Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: ] Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional i Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas, 76011 and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the STP facility. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information that is not already in the public record is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then l f please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the j l information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that j deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you I _must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., i explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion
- j. of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
Dated at Arlington, Texas, this 17th day of October 1995 L NUREG-0940, PART II- A-99
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/8 611 RY AN PL AZA CRIVE. Sulf E 400 AR LsNGTON, TE M AS76011 5064 september 19, 1996 EA 96 133 EA 96-136 William T Cottle. Group Vice President. Nuclear l Houston Lighting & Power Company '
Post Office Box 289 Wadsworth. Texas 77483 i
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES 5200.000 (00L CASE NOS 93-ERA-016 & 95-ERA-004)
Dear Mr. Cottle:
This refers to the matters discussed at the predecisional enforcement conference conducted on July 19. 1996 in the NRC's Arlington. Texas office. As discussed in the NRC's June 19. 1996 letter to you, the conference was conducted to discuss two apparent violations of 10 CFR 50.7. Employee Protection, involving discrimination against employees who had engaged in protected activities Each apparent violation involved Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) contractors Ebasco Services. Inc (Ebasco) or Raytheon Engineers and Constructors. Inc (Raytheon) - discriminating against employees at HL&P's South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STP) A ; letter documenting the conference including the outline from HL&P and ' Raytheon's conference Public Document RoomPOR) (presentation. on July 31.was1996. sent toTheyoutranscript and placed ofinthe theconference NRC i also has been placed in the PDR. Both apparent violations were investigated by the Department of Labor (00L) and NRC's findings are based on the 00L determinations with respect to the two complaints. As indicated in our June 19 letter, the NRC normally relles on 00L determinations in deciding whether violations of NRC. employee protection requirements occurred The NRC recognizes that HL&P was not a party to either proceeding before the 00L: however, this does not relieve HL&P of its responsibility for the actions of its contractors. Thus, based on the decisions by 00L in these cases. and in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, the NRC has determined that violations of 10 CFR 50.7 occurred These violations are described in the enclosed Notice of Violation and ProposedimpositionofCivilPenalties. A Notice of Violation is being issued to xaytheon for the second violation described below, but not for the first violation since Raytheon was not a respondent in that 00L case. That Notice of Violation is being distributed to the same distribution list, so you will receive a copy The first violation (EA 96-133) is based on findinas from a 00L proceeding (93 ERA 016) in which the Secretary of Labor (SOL)! In a decision issued March 13. 1996. found that Thomas H. Smith was the subject of employment NUREG-0940, PART:II A-100 l
i Houston Lighting & Pcuer Company 42-discrimination in 1991 when he was subjected to a hostile work environment in retaliation for. raising concerns about scaffolding practices. The retaliatory treatment in Mr Smith s case consisted of offens1ve cartoons depicting Mr; Smith as a whistleblower. The Secretary's decision reversed a February 17. 1994 decision issued by the Ad:.1inistrative Law Judge (ALJ). who concluded that the actions taken were of an abusive and harassing nature, but did not constitute discrimination. At the time of the discriminatory . treatment, Mr Smith was an employee of Ebasco Services. Inc. (Ebasco), whose [ contract with HL&P was purchased by Raytheon Engineers and Constructors. Inc. (Raytheon) in December 1993. The second violation (EA 96-136) 1s based on a 00L proceeding (95 ERA-004) in which the presiding ALJ in a Recommended Decision and Order issued September 29. 1995, found that Earl V. Keene was subjected to discriminatory > treatment in 1994 af ter he raised concerns about signing off for electrical malnten6nce Work he did not perform. The discriminatory treatment in Mr. Keene's case consisted of his inclusion in a March 24, 1994 reduction in force, his receiving a lower performance appraisal rating, and his having been subjected to fitness for-duty testing on May 24, 1994 when he returned to the STP facility with another individual who w&S completing documentation related to pending employment = At the time of the discriminatory treatment. Mr. Keene was an employee of Raytheon. Raytheon personnel at the conference noted their , disagreement with the ALJ's findings and indicated a brief has been filed with the SQL describing their bases for their disagreement. The 00L's Administrative Review Board, which has been delegated the authority to decide these cases for the Secretary of Labor, has not 1ssued a final decision in this case. In addition to the potential for violations of this type to have an effect on ' safety. each of these violations raises significant regulatory concerns. In the case involving Mr. Smith, the SOL found that Mr. Smith had been subjected to a hostile work environment. In this case. Ebasco managers appear to have been aware of the harassment of Mr. Smith and allowed it to continue for approximately two and a half months. Thus, this violation has been classified at Severity Level 11 in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. In the case involving Mr. Keene. it is significant that the discriminatory treatment of Mr. Keene occurred in 1994, after HL&P had initiated efforts to address the environment at STP for raising concerns, including actions that were specifically addressed to contractors and their supervisors. This violation.- which involved discrimination by first line supervisors, is of significant regulatory concern and is classified at Sever'Ity Level 111 in accordance with the Enforcement Policy. Despite these violations having occurred some time ago, they are important because. absent prompt and decisive corrective action, such violations--and claims of discrimination that remain unresolved - can affect perceptions and have a chilling effect on the willingness of other employees to raise concerns to their employer or to the NRC. At the July 19 conference. HL&P a'id Raytheon NUREG-0940, PART II A-101
Houston L1ghting & Power Company 3-discussed at length the broad and comprehensive actions taken, both prior to i and after the 00L decisions in the specific cases to foster an environment at ! STP in which employees would feel free to raise concerns without fear of retaliation. Raytheon's corporate actions include the development of a hotline for reporting concerns and an employee concerns program procedure, issued March 20. 1996. Raytheon's actions at STE include posting copies of relevant requirements and the 00L's decision in the Smith case. and additional training for managers and supervisors. HL&P has taken numerous actions since 1993 to enhance the environment for raising concerns at STP. to assure that employees are aware of the various means for raising concerns. and to improve the STP employee concerns These actions include implementing a new employee concerns program, program. hiring a new manager for this program and having the manager of this program report directly to the group vice president. conducting periodic assessments of the environment and actions to make the employee concerns program more accessible and responsive to employee concerns. In response to the specific cases at issue. HL&P investigated the concerns raised by the employees, re-evaluated its past actions and has made presentations to Raytheon personnel on the STP employee concerns program. Many of the actions taken by HL&P began in 1993 in response to other discrimination issues that were pending at the time. One of these earlier . Issues resulted in the NRC proposing a $160.000 civil penalty on September 5. 1 1995. based on the NRC's determination that David Lamb and James Dean were laid offl in 1992 in retallation for their raising concerns about STP security issues (EA 95 077). The NRC acknowledges the comprehensive nature of the actions taken by HL&P and Raytheon to address the environment for raising concerns at STP. However, despite HL&P and Raytheon taking comprehensive actions with regard to the overall site environment, actions in response to these specific instances of discrimination were not taken until adjudicatory findings were made against Ebasco and, as of the date of the conference, no corrective actions were described that would foster a sense of individual accountability for this ob.lectionable behavior. For example, when asked at the conference whether the supervisors who were involved in these matters were counseled, the answer from Raytheon was that there had been no action to conduct individual counseling. Clearly some action should have been taken to assure that the individuals involved in these matters understand the protections afforded employees by law. the significance of violating such protections. and the possible consequences of doing so. Although the NRC understands that following the conference. steps were taken to ensure that the Raytheon supervisors involved in the discriminatory acts had been counseled, this fundamental corrective action should have been taken much earlier. This delay in counseling the supervisors gains additional regulatory significance because the delay may have created, or perpetuated, the perception among other employees that you were not serious about preventing these types of violations I HL&P was permitted to defer payment of that penalty pending a final decision of the Secretary of Labor. NUREG-0940, PART II A-102
Houston Lighting & Power Company 4-from occurring and may have detracted from your otherwise comprehensive actions to address these matters. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a civil penalty is considered for violations at or above Severity Level 111. Because the NRC considers these violations willful. in that there was a deliberate inten; to discriminate, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Actron in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. No credit is due for identification because these violations were identified as a result of the DOL's adjudicatory process. With respect to corrective action, the NRC finds your corrective actions with respect to the overall site environment satisfactory but, for > reasons discussed above, finds your corrective actions lacking with respect to ! these specific cases. l In the case involving Mr. Smith, the base value of a Severity Level 11 violation is 580.000. An adjusted penalty of 5160.000 could result from ; applying the civil penalty assessment process, as descri ; credit is given for identification or corrective action. ped above. where no In the case ' involving Mr. Keene the base value of a Severity Level lli violation is 550.000. As in the case involving Mr. Smith, giving no credit for identification or corrective action, an adjusted penalty of $100.000 could result from applying the civil penalty assessment process for this violation. resulting in total civil penalties of $260.000 for these combined violations. However, after balancing your failure to promptly counsel the Individuals who caused the violations with your extensive actions taken to address the overall environment for raising concerns at your facility, the NRC has decided to assess total civil penalties of $200.000. in accordance with the discretion permitted in Vll.B.f; of the Enforcement Policy. As indicated in the enclosed Notice. the civil penalties will be assessed at $100.000 each for EA 96133. for the case involving Mr. Smith; and EA 96-136, for the case involving Mr. Keene. Therefore. to emphasize the .1mportance of protecting individuals against discrimination and taking comprehensive corrective action that includes establishing accountability for violations of this requirement. I have been authorized, af ter consultation with the Director. Of fice of Enforcement, and the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Regional Operations and Research. to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and , 1 Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) In the amount of $200.000. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. As stated in a
' Although the NRC 1s limited by statute to 5100.000 per violation per day, a violation of 10 CFR 50.7 involving a hostile work environment is viewed as a continuing violation that may result in higher civil penalties being assessed NUREG-0940, PART II A-103
- Houston Lighting & Power Company' 5-i footnote to the Nottce. HL&P may defer its response to the civil penalty l assessed for Violation 2 in the Notice until 30 days following the DOL '
Administrative Review Board decision in 95; ERA-004. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this Notice. Including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice." a copy of this letter its enclosure. and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR). To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy. proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be pieced in the POR without redaction. Sincerely. L. Callan I Regional Administrator ' 1 Docket Nos. 498: 50-499 License Nos. NPF 76: NPF 80 e-
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties cc w/
Enclosure:
(See Next Page) i 1 l i i NUREG-0940, PART II A-104
Houston Lighting & Power Cc:npany ' 6-
.cc w/
Enclosure:
Lawrence E. Martin. General Manager Nuclear Assurance & Licensing Houston Lighting & Power Company P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth.' Texas 77483 Mr. J. C. Lani.er/Mr. M. B. Lee City of Austin i Electric Utility Department 72):Barton Springs Road Austin, Texas 78.704
'Mr. K. J. Fiedler/Mr. M. T, Hardt City Public Service Board
P 0. Box 1771-1
.. San Antonio. Texas 78296 Jack R. Newman. Esq.
Morgan Lewis & Bock 1us 1800 H. Street. N.W. Washington. O C. 20036 5869 , Mr.'G. E. Vaughn/Mr. C. A. Johnson *
. Central Power & Light Company P.O. Box 289 Mail Code; N5012 Wadsworth. Texas 77483 INP0 - Records Center 700 Galler.ia Parkway Atlanta. Georgia 30339 5957 ,
Mr. Joseph H..Hendrie 50 Bellport Lane Bellport, New York 11713 i y Bureau of Radiation Control State of Texas 1100 West 49th Street Austin.-Texas 78756 John L. Howard. Director i Environmental Policy ; Of fice of the Governor P.O. Box 12428 ! Austin Texas 78711 cc w/
Enclosure:
(See Next Page) l NUREG-0940,-PART II. A-105 lj
Houston Lighting & Power Company 7-cc w/
Enclosure:
(Con't) Judge, Matagorda County Hatagorda County Courthouse 1700 Seventh Street Bay City. Texas 77414 Licensing Representative Houston L1ghting & Power Company Suite 610 Three Metro Center ' Bethesda Maryland 20814 Rufus S. Scott, Associate l General Counsel Houston Lighting & Power Company P.O. Box 61867 I Houston. Texas 77208 Joseph R. Egan. Eso. Egan & Associates, P.C. 2300 N Street, N.W. Washington. 0.C. 20037 Mr. J. W. Beck Little Harbor Consultants. Inc ' 44 Nichols Road Cohasset, MA 02025-1166 David R Hyster Vice President, Nuclear Services Raytheon Engineers and Constructors P0 Box 8223 30 South 17th St. Philidelphia, PA 1910 8223 James Remelha Assistant Human Resources Counsel Raytheon Company 141 Spring Street Lexington, Massachusetts 02173 7899 Thomas H. Smith 1804 Lloyd Bay City. Texas 77414 cc w/
Enclosure:
(See Next Page) NUREG-0940 PART.11 ' A-106
-Houston Lighting'& Power Company 8-cc w/
Enclosure:
(Con't) Earl V,<Keene , 909 Virnham Woods Bl.vd. ,
#1 o rasadena. Texas 77503 ;
Timothy Sloan. Esq. , P.O. Box 2171 Bay City. Texas 77404-2172 Ms. Billie Garde. Esq. ' Hardy & Johns 2 Houston Center. Suite 500 Houston, Texas 77010 Edward A.- Slavin. Jr. , Esq.
'35.5.E. 8th Terrace i Deerfield Beach, Florida 33441-4340-NUREG-0940, PART II: A-107 '
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMP 051 TION OF CIVIL PENALTIES Houston Lighting & Power Company Docket No. 50-493: 50-499 South Texas Project Electric License No. NPF-76: NPF-80 Generating Station EA 96-133: EA 96-136 Based on the NRC's review of a March 13, 1996 Secretary of Labor's Decision i and Order of Remand in the case of Thomas H. Smith (93-ERA 016) and a September 29. 1995 DOL Administrative Law Judge's Recommended Decision and i Order in the case of Earl V. Keene (95-ERA 004). violations of NRC '! requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of l Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions." NUREG-1600, the Nuclear i Re9ulatory Commission proposes to impose civil penalties pursuant to i Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. as amended (Act). I 42 U.S.C. 2282. and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalties are set forth below: 10 CFR 50.7 states, in part, that discrimination by a Commission licensee or a contractor of a Commission licensee against an employee for engaging in certain protected activities is prohibited. The activities which are protected are defined in Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act as amended, and include, but are not limited to, reporting of safety concerns by an employee to his employer or the NRC.
- 1. Contrary to the above. the Secretary of Labor found in a decision issued March 13. 1996, that Thomas H. Smith was the subject of employment discrimination from October to December 1991. when he was subjected to a hostile work environment in retaliation for raising concerns about scaf folding practices. a protected !
activity. At the time of the discriminatory action. Mr. Smith was an employee of Ebasco Services. Inc. a contractor of the licensee. (01012) This is a Severity Level !! violation (Supplement VII). Civil Penalty - 5100.000 l
- 2. Contrary to the above, a Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge found in a recommended decision and order issued September
- 29. 1995. that Earl V. Keene was the subject of employment discrimination in 1994 for raising concerns about signing off on ;
electrical maintenance wort he did not perform a protected i activity. The discriminatory treatment included being selected l for a March 24. 1994 reduction in force, receiving a lower { performance appraisal rating, and being subjected to J fitness-for duty testing on May 24. 1994 At the time of the discriminatory actions. Mr. Keene was an employee of Raytheon ) i En91neers and Constructors. Inc. a contractor of the licensee. ' (07.013) This is a Severity Level ill violation (Supplement VII). Civil Penalty - $100.000 NUREG-0940, PART II A-108
i I l i Notice of Violation 4 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201. Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P or Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each i alleged violation: (1) admission or dental of the alleged violation. (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied. the reasons why. (3) the j corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved. (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations. and (5) the date when. full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or reycked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act. 42'U.S.C. 2232. this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalties by letter addressed to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.$. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft. money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States In the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalties in whole or in part, by a written answer addresseri to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commissior. 3 Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalties will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties. In whole or in part such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violations listed in this Notice, in whole or in part. (2) damonstrate extenuating circumstances. (3) show error in this Notice, or . (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalties in whole or in part. such answer may request , remission or mitigation of the penalties. In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalties, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the { statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201. but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g. , citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure:for imposing a civil penalties. 2 With respect to the response required and civil penalty assessed for ; Violation 2 above. HL&P may defer this until 30 days following the DOL's ~ Administrative Review Board decision in 95-ERA-004. , i NUREG-0940. PART II A-109
Notice of Violat:on .Upon failure to pay any_ civil penalties due which subsequently has been
; determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General. and the penalties. unless compromised. remitted, or mitigoted. may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act. 42 U S.C. 2282c The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalties, and Answer to a Netice of Violation) should be addressod to:
James Lieberman. Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. One White Flint North. 1,1555 Rockville Pike. Rockville. MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory . Commthion. Region IV. 611 Ryan Plaza Drive.- Suite 400. Arlington. Texas 76011. and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice.
-Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR), to the extent possible. It should not include any personal privacy. proprietary.
or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However if you find it necessary to_ include such information, you , should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR. and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public. Dated at Arlington. Texas, this 19th day of September 1996 ( 1 i LNUREG-0940, PART II A-110
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July 24, 1996 EA 96-116 Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia Executive Vice President Generation Business Group Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Post Office Box 63 Lycoming, New York 13093
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY -
$80,000 (Administrative Law Judge's Recommended Decision and Order ERA-005)
Dear Mr. Sylvia:
This letter refers to the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) Administrative law Judge's (ALJ) Recommended Decision and Order, dated Narch 15, 1996 (95-ERA-005), which found that a former employee of Nine Mile Point (NMP) was discriminated against by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) for raising safety concerns at the NMP facility. Based on the ALJ's Recommended Decision, a violation of the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR 50.7,
" Employee protection," has occurred. Under 10 CFR 50.7, discrimination by a Commission licensee against an employee or contractor employee for engaging in protected activities is prohibited.
On May 10, 1996, a transcribed predecisional enforcement conference was held with you and enembers of your staff, to discuss this matter, the apparent violation, its cause and your corrective actions. In accordance with current policy, the NRC intends to base its enforcement action on the ALJ's decision, concluding that a violation of NRC requirements occurred in this case. We note that at the enforcement conference you denied that you discriminated against the individual, and have indicated that you intend to appeal the ALJ's decision if it is affirmed by the Secretary of Labor. The violation of 10 CFR 50.7 is described in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty. The circumstances surrounding the violation are described in detail in the ALJ's Recommended Decision and Order. Specifically, according to the ALJ decision, the employee had raised concerns regarding compliance with the licensing basis in that the emergency method analyzed in the licensing basis was not employed in any operating or emergency operating procedure for the residual heat removal (RHR) system. Subsequently, the engineer's employment with NMP was terminated. Discrimination includes discharge and other actions that relate to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Protected activities are described in Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and, in general, are related to the administration or , enforcement of a requirement imposed under the Atomic Energy Act or the Energy ! l 1 , NUREG-0940, PART II A-111 l
Niagara Mohawk Power. , Corporation Reorganization' Ach Protected activities include, but are not limited to, an employee'providing the Commission or his or her employer information about
. alleged violations of either the Atomic Energy Act or the Energy
' Reorganization Act. .Since discriminatory actions in this case involved the then-Manager of Engineering for Unit 2, this violation has been categorized at Severity Level ~II in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. Such violations are.significant, because they could have a chilling effect on other licensee.or contractor personnel :nd deter them from identifying and/or i raising safety concerns. !
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount _ of $80,000 is considered for a Severity Level II violation. The NRC-
- considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and for Corrective !
Action in accordance with the civil penalty process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Because the violation in this case was identified by the 00L, credit is'not warranted for identification. Credit is warranted for your corrective actions, because your actions were considered both prompt and comprehensive. These actions, which were discussed during your presentation ; at the conference, include but are not limited to the following: (1) reemphasizing to management the= rights and responsibilities of employees to raise safety issues; (2) reinforcing, at all levels of management, the value of reporting issues to improve performance; (3) reemphasizing the availability of the Quality First Program, and (4) offering comparable , reemployment to the individual on May 3, 1996. Therefore, to emphasize the importance of continuously assuring a work environment that is free of any harassment, intimidation, or discrimination against those who raise safety concerns, I have been authorized, after . consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) in the amount of $80,000 for this Severity Level II violation in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process set forth in the Enforcement Policy. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified'in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. Since the NRC enforcement action in this case is being proposed prior to a final Secretary of Labor (SOL) decision on this matter, you may delay payment of the proposed civil penalty, as well as certain portions of the respense, as described in the enclosed Notice, until 30 days after the SOL decision, at which time you also may supplement your earlier responses. In the response required by this letter and Notice,' you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence of violations of this type, and any actions that you have taken or planned to minimize any chilling effect arising from this incident that might inhibit or prevent your emplnyees from raising safety concerns either to your own organization or to the NRC. After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective ar.tions and the results-of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC. enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC
'egulatory requirements.
~
NUREG-0940, PART.11' A-ll2
4 Niagara tiohawk Power. Corporation , l
'In accordance with 10 'CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public
- Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your responte should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the POR-without redaction.
The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject ! to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required - by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96.511. , Sincerely, I Thomas T. Martin i Regional Adminis.trator Docket No. 50-410
- License No. NPF-69
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty cc w/ enclosure: R. Abbott, Vice President & General Manager - Nuclear C. Terry, Vice President-Nuclear Engineering-M. McCormick, Vice President - Safety Assessment and Support l N. Rademacher, Unit 1 Plant Manager . J.' Conway, Unit 2 Plant Manager ! 0.- Wolniak, Manager, Licensing J. Warden, New York Consumer Protection Branch G. Wilson, Senior Attorney M. Wetterhahn, Winston and Strawn . Director Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York
. C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law J. Vinquist, MATS, Inc.
P. Eddy, Power Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York State of New York SLO Designee
?
l i i i NUREG-0940, PART II A-ll3
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Docket No. 50-410 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station License No. NPF-69 Unit 2 EA 96-116 l Based on the Recommended Decision and Order by a U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) Administrative Law Judge, dated March 15, 1996 (DOL case 95-ERA-005), a i violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the
- General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty ptrsuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C.
2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violation and associated civil penalty are set forth below: , 10 CFR 50,7(a), in part, prohibits discrimination by a Commission licensee against an employee for engagir.g in certain protected activities. Discrimination includes discharge and other actions that relate to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Protected activities are described in Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and in general are related to the administration or enforcement of a requirement imposed under the Atomic Energy Act or the Energy Reorganization Act, and include, but are not limited to, an employee providing the Commission or ) his or her employer information about alleged violations of either the Atomic Energy Act or the Energy Reorganization Act. Contrary to the above, as determined in the DOL Adminictrative Law i Judge's Recommended Decision and Order in cara E ERA-00b, dated March 15, 1996, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) discriminated against Mr. Robert Norway, a nuclear engineer, for engaging in protected activities. Specifically, NMPC terminated Mr. Norway's employment in February 1994 for raising safety concerns to his employer beginning in 1991. (01012) This is a Severity Level 11 violation (Supplement VII). Civil Penalty - 580,000 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, NMPC (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation. (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted and, iF denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, ano (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. At your election, responses to items (1) and the decision of the Secretary of Labor (2) . may Your be deferred response until 30 or may reference days af ter include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequttely addresses the required response. NUREG-0940, PART II A-ll4
l I Notice of Violation If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for Information may be issued as why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within 30 days of the final decision of the Secretary of Labor in this case, , the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of-Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, mrney order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating
- circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty.
In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: Mr. James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice. l i
)
i l l l l l NUREG-0940, PART II A-ll5 i
Notice of Violation Because your response will.be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the POR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public. Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 24th day of July 1996 1 l i l l l NUREG-0940, PART 11 A-l l6
I*g UNITED STATES {L g 8 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGloN I O 475 ALLENDALE ROAD KING oF PRVS$1A, PENNSYLVANIA 19404 1415
\ . . . . + ,,
June 4, 1996 EA 96-059 Mr. Ted C. Feigenbaum Executive Vice President - Nuclear Northeast Nuclear Energy Company c/o Mr. Terry L. Harpster Post Office Box 128 Waterford, Connecticut 06385 5UBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY - $100,000 (Administrative Law Judge's' Recommended Decision and Order - 95-ERA-18 and 95-ERA-47)
Dear Mr. Feigenbaum:
This letter refers to the Department of Labor (DOL) Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) Recommended Decision and Order, dated December 12, 1995, which found that a former employee of Bartlett Nuclear, Inc. (Bartlett), a contractor at your Millstone facility, was discriminated against by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) and Bartlett for raising safety concerns at the facility. Based on the NRC review of the ALJ Recomended Decicion, the NRC finds that a violation of the Comission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR 50.7, " Employee Protection," has occurred. Under 10 CFR 50.7, discrimination by a Commission licensee against an employee or contractor employee for engaging in protected activities is prohibited. Although both you and Bartlett were offered the opportunity for an enforcement conference, you both declined such a conference, and instead, submitted written responses to the apparent violations. Although you denied, in your March 20, 1996 letter, that you discriminated against the individual and have filed a motion for reconsideration of the 00L ALJ Decision and Order, the NRC adopts the findings of the DOL ALJ and concludes that a violation of NRC requirements occurred in cases 95-ERA-18 and 47. The violation is described in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposod Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). Protected activities include providing the Commission information about possible violations of requirements imposed under either the Atomic Energy Act or the Energy Reorganization Act, requestir,g the Comission to institute enforcement action against his or her employer for the administration or enforcement of these requirements, or testifying in any Commission proceeding. The artions taken against the former contractor employee (who was a Senior b.th Physics i Technician) after he raised concerns to line management and the NRC, constitute a violation of 10 CFR 50.7. The violation is categorized at Severity level III NUREG-0940, PART II A-117
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company 2 in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), (60 FR 34381, June 30,1995). Such violations are significant because they could have a chilling effect on other licensee or contractor personnel and deter them from identifying and/or raising safety concerns. The violation takes on even more significance because the NRC has issued two civil penalties to you since May 1993 for violations involving discrimination against employees who raised safety concerns. Under the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level III violation. Millstone Nuclear Station has been the subject of several escalated enforcement actions within the last two years involving all three units (for example, a Severity Level III violation with a $50,000 civil penalty was issued on May 25, 1995, for a violation involving the failure to identify and correct a potential degradation of certain motor-operated-valves at Unit 2). Therefore, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for identification ar.d corrective action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit was not given for Identification because you did not identify the violation. Credit was considered for Corrective Action, which you described in your letter, dated March 20, 1996. Those actions included: (1) designation of a single officer, reportable to the Chief Nuclear Officer, responsible for the overall implementation of the program for handling employee concerns; (2) plans to develop a set of actions to address, among other things, Nuclear Safety Concerns Program enhancements, as well as the contractor programs; and (3) plans , to revise certain group policies, and related training. However, credit was not given for your corrective actions because many of these actions are still in the planning phase even though the DOL had concluded, as early as the District Director's Decision on July 27, 1995, that discrimination occurred. Therefore, to emphasize the importance of maintaining a work environment in which I employees are free to engage in protected activities without fear of retallation, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the cumulative amount of $100,000, consistent with the Enforcement Policy because credit was not provided for identification or corrective action. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. Since the NRC enforcement action in this case is based on the Recommended Decision and Order of the DOL ALJ, which is still being reviewed by the Secretary of Labor, you may delay payment of the civil penalty and submission of certain portions of the response as described in the enclosed Notice until 30 days after the final decision of the Secretary of Labor. Notwithstanding your past corrective actions, as most recently documented in your response of March 20, 1996, in that portion of your response which describes corrective steps you have taken, you are required to describe any additional actions that you plan to take to minimize any potential chilling effect arising not only from this incident but other instances of discrimination that have occurred at your facility for which civil penalties have been issued in the past. After reviewing your response to this Notice, NUREG-0940, PART II A-l l8
' Northeast Nuclear Energy Company 3 including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to
, ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements, i j in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its . enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the POR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to .
include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire' not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public. The response directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Nanagement and Budget as required by I the Paperwork Reduction Act'of 1980, Public Lh No. 96-511. Sincerely, Thomas T. Nartin Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition < of Civil Penalty Docket Nos. 50-245; 50-336; 50-423 License Nos. DPR-21; DPR-65; NPF-49 I i l I I NUREG-0940, PART II A-119 l l
, _ _ , _ _ . _ . _ , l
$ Northeast Nuclear Energy Company .4 cc w/ enc 1: D. Miller,~ Senior Vice President, Nuclear Safety and Oversight S. Scace, Vice President, Reengineering
.E. DeBarba, Vice President, Nuclear Technical Services F. Rothen, Vice President, Maintenance Services W. Riffer, Nuclear Unii 1 Director .P.' Richardson, Nuclear Unit 2 Director ,
M.' Brothers. Nuclear Unit 3 Director .
.L. Cuoco, Esquire W. Meinert, Nuclear Engineer V.'Juliano, Waterford Library State of Connecticut SLO Designee We the People t
l l l
.NUREG-0940, PART II A-120
)
ENCLOSURE NOTICE OF VIOLATION. , AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Docket Nos. 50-245; 50-336; 50-423 , Millstone Nuclear Power Plant License Nos. DPR-21; DPR-65; NPF-49 ! EA 96-059 Based on the Recommended Decision and Order by a DOL Administrative Law Judge, dated December 12,1995, (
Reference:
' DOL cases Nos. 95-ERA-18 and 95-ERA-47), a
. violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the ' General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil- penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282,
!- and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violation and associated civil penalty is set forth below: 10 CFR 50.7(a), in part, prohibits discrimination by a Commission licensee against an employee or contractor employee for engaging in certain protected activities. Discrimination includes discharge and other actions that relate to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. The protected activities are established in Section 211 of ' the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974, as amended, and in general are related to the administration or enforcement of a requirement imposed , under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) or the Energy Reorganization Act. The r protected activities include but are not limited to providing the Commission information about alleged violations of the ERA or the AEA or possible violations of requirements imposed under either of these statutes. Contrary to the above, as determined in the DOL Administrative Law Judge's i Recommended Decision and Order in case 95-ERA-18 and 47, dated December 12, 1995, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) discriminated against : Adam McNiece, a senior health physics technician for engaging in protected activities. (01013) This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement VII). Civil Penalty - $100,000 = Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company ,
.(Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of the final decision of the Secretary of Labor. This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include !
for each alleged violation: (1) admission or dental of the alleged violation, and (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why. In addition, also pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee ; is required to submit a written statement or explanation within 30 days of the ! date of this Notice of Violation and should include for each alleged violation: ! (1) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (2) the l NUREG-0940, PART II A-121 corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. if an adequete reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order oc a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such i other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given ' to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within 30 days of the final decision of the Secretary of Labor in this case, the Licensee _may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. iiuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the : civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory , Commission.. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to. file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil pensity, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation listed in this Notice, in whole. or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this i Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposad. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. ; i in requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in ' Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page ard paragraph numbers)toavoidrepetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282c. NUREG-0940, PART II A-122
i-Enclosure 3 The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region j
~
I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly , indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, l and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the Information from the public. Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 4th day of June 1996 T i NUREG-0940, PART 11 A-123
i
* *' 4 t e UNITE D STATES
[* ' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'i f '4- REGION IV +
_611 RYAN PL#'A DAIVE, SUITE 400
' *d' , ,
. ARLINGTON, TEMAS 76o118064 June'6, 1996-4 . .
. EA'96-lll EA 94-067
~ Mr. Stephen M. Quennoz, Acting Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer LPortland General Electric Company
-Trojan Nuclear Plant 71760 Columbia River Highway-
. Rainier, Oregon- 97048: '
SUBJECT:
NOTICE 0F VIOLATION AND' PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY -
$50,000
-(NRC INVESTIGATION CASE NOS. 5-91-012 & 5-91-013)'
Dear Mr. Quennoz:
Thisiis-in reference to Portland General Electric's (PGE) May 6, 1996 response to the NRC's April- 5,,1996, letter which identified two examples of'an
. apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9. As described ir more detail in the NRC's
' April 5 letter,_the apparent violations involved: 1) the falsification of Operability Determination Notice (00N) 90-64, Revisions 0 and I, and Justifications for Continued Operation (JCOs) dated July 11 and October 3,
~1990; and 2) the submission to the NRC of inaccurate and incomplete information-in Licensee Event Report (LER) 91-11, Revisions 0 and 1, dated June 10,- 1991, and October 28, 1991, respectively. The NRC's April 5 letter stated that the NRC was considering escalated enforcement action for these apparent violations and requested a written response from PGE prior to ar, enforcement' decision being made.'
.PGE's May 6, 1996, response acknowledged that PGE failed to meet the requirements of.10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information, in both instances. PGE identified these two violations and contracted with Stier,
-Anderson & Malone (SAM) to investigate both issues. In its May 6, 1996
' letter, PGE stated-that the individuals who were the primary focus of the SAM investigations'were no longer employed by PGE; and that PGE's corrective actions taken in response to the SAM investigations provide reasonable assurance that PGE is currently in compliance with 10 CFR 50.9.
i
'. ~'
~ The NRC's letter l gave PGE the option of responding in writing or requesting a predecisional. enforcement conference. PGE elected to respond in wri t ing.- ,
/ t i
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!NUREG-0940,JPART'II: - A-124 -
l ;
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3 Portland General Elec Oic _ Company _ i .PGE's stated corrective actions included: contracting with SAM to investigate c the concerns;' suspending the individual involved in the first apparent '! L -violation:and reviewing a sample of his work; replacing the affected ! equipment, i.e., Raychem splices and electrical penetration assembly (EPA) , seals;; counseling of the. individuals involved as to both violations; removing j the signature authority.of an involved manager as.to certain documents, 3 f
, 'resulting :in increased oversight of the manager; revising LER 91-011 by :
submitting Revision 2 to correct deficiencies identified by SAM in Revisions 0 and I; and training of-Trojan managers and supervisors on the NRC's Deliberate i Misconduct Rule and incorporating this training into General Employae Training ] and retraining programs. PGE also cited steps being taken to avoid further ' violations, including additional training in the requirements of 10 CFR 50.9 and responsibilities relative to-assuring the completeness and accuracy of information provided to the NRC. l 4 The' NRC's April 5 letter also requested PGE's view with respect to whether the l _ violations were committed willfully. Regarding the first apparent violation, t PGE's.May 6 response stated that PGE accepted SAM's conclusion that the l
' individual involved in preparing the ODNs and JCOs knew when he formulated the 7 ' analysis in the ODNs and JCOs that it contained inaccurate and misleading information. 'The NRC's Office of Investigations reached this same conclusion
'(Investigation Report No. 5-91-012), as we stated in our April 5 letter.
.Regarding the second apparent violation, PGE's May 6 response stated that j
-because the two involved individuals are no longer PGE employees and had not i
< been available to meet with management, it had not drawn final conclusions ; about the conduct of the individuals involved in submitting the inaccurate LER ; to the NRC. -{ t Based on the NRC's review of a'.1 available information, including the results ,! of its own investigation of tie first matter, the NRC has determined that , violations of 10 CFR 50.9 did occur in both instances. The violations are , ~ described in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil ! Penalty. The NRC recognizes that these violations were discovered largely as i 1 the result of efforts undertaken by current Trojan management and do not : reflect the performance of current management. The NRC also notes that these i
- i. . violations occurred in 1990 and 1991, prior to a decision to shut down and !
decommission the Trojan facility. Nonetheless, these violations are i significant today and warrant appropriate dispositioning because: 1) the }
.Information involved was important at the time with respect to the safety and ;
continued operation of the facility; 2) the 1990 violation involving j inaccurate ODNs and JCOs resulted from apparent willfulness; 3) the violations y are the result of significant management failures to address the underlying j , technical issues as well as to establish an appropriate climate for being i candid with the NRC with regard to these issues; and 4) the licensee, during j the decommissioning process, will be submitting information to the NRC that ! [ must be complete and accurate. j
-Thus, each of the violations in the enclosure has been classified at Severity !
Level'111 in accordance with the'" General Statement of Policy and Procedure .;
.for NRC Enforcement Actions," (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. As stated in j l
I I
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NUREG-0940, PART 11l A-125 l l i l
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__. s _ i
Portland General Electric Company' the Enforcement Policy, pubitshed June 30, 1995, a civil penalty (with a base value of $50,000) is considered for a Severity Level 111 violation and is normally based on the NRC's determination of whether credit is warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2. In the case of the earlier violation, that involving the 1990 ODNs and JCOs, the NRC is not assessing a civil penalty because the violation occurred more than five years ago and therefore exceeds the statute of limitations for considering civil penalties. In the case of the second violation, that involving LER 91-011, Revisions 0 and 1, the NRC acknowledges that PGE would deserve credit under both the identification and corrective action factors, for reasons previously ; dircussed. Notwithstanding consideration of these factors, the NRC notes that the circumstances surrounding this violation involved significant management l failures, including improper operational safety decisionmaking by senior PGE ! management and the plant review board, and failures to adequately address
-problems with the EPA seals in 1987-1990. Also, in that timeframe, PGE management failed in its responsibilities by providing the NRC with j information in a manner that discouraged NRC's regulatory scrutiny (for j example, the misinforming of the NRC about Trojan's official determination of i the root cause of a 1987 EPA seal failure (LER 87-!!)). The resulting pattern )
of misinforming the NRC culminated in the inaccurate, incomplete and misleading information in LER 91-11, revisions 0 and 1. Based on these significant management failures, the NRC has determined that the circumstances surrounding this violation warrant the exercise of discretion under Section Vll.A.1 of the Enforcement Policy. Therefore, to emphasize the significance of the management failures that led to this violation, and the importance of effective management processes to assure that information provided to the NRC is complete and accurate in all material respects, I have been authorized, afte* consultation with the r Director, Office of Enforcement, and the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) in the amount of $50,000 for this Severity level til problem. The NRC notes that if it were not for the fact that Trojan has a new management team, that the plant has permanently ceased operations, and the current management keeps the NRC staff informed of onsite activities, the NRC would have considered a civil penalty up to the statutory limit of $100,000. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. As indicated in the Notice, you may , reference previous correspondence to avoid duplication. After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensurs compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. i NUREG-0940, PART II A-126 ;
._ . _ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ . . ~ . . . _ . . . . _ _ _ ._ . - _ .. ~~. ._ -- .
' Portland General Electric.
Company - i'
. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of
-this letter and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR). 'To the extent possible,'your response should not include any personal' -;
privacy,' proprietary, or safeguards information so that-it can-be placed in ! the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is
~
necessary to provide an acceptable. response, then please provide a bracketed. l' copy of your response that identifies the information that should.be protected and a redacted copy of your response .that deletes such information.' If you request withholding 'of such material, you must specifically identify the ' portions of your response that you seek to have withheld ~and provide in detail
- the bases for your claim of withholding-(e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide
.the information required by 10.CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential. commercial or financial information). ,
' Sincerely, L. Call an .
Reg nal Administrator ' Docket No. 50-344 License No. NPF-1
Enclosures:
i
- 1. Notice of Violation l
- 2. Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty ;
i cc w/
Enclosures:
Portland General Electric Company I Trojan Nuclear Plant ! ATTN: Harold K. Chernoff, Manager Licensing ! Compliance and Commitment Management l 71760 Columbia. River Highway -j Rainier, Oregon 97048 ! e Board of County Commissioners ;
- c. ATTN: Michael J. Sykes .
j
- ~
Board of County Commissioners ! Columbia County l St..Helens. Oregon 97501 j Oregon Department of Energy ATTN: David Stewart-Smith i 625 Marion Street RE Salem, Oregon 97310 j 7 .c , l I
' NUREG-0940,)PART II; - A-127 .
1 a.
?,
- I 'I
- Portland General-Electric ~
Company. i: ' 's, Mr.;l.loyd K. Marbet .
-19142'S.E. Bakers Ferry Road
_ 1
-Boring,' Oregon 97009.
^
Do It tourself. Committee : , .;
' ATTN: ' Jerry Wilson; 570 N.E. 53rd ,
- Hillsboro, Oregon'97124 NSrthwestilnvironment Adv'ocates .
ATTN:. Eugene'Roselle'
- 133 S.W.:Ind Avenue Portland, Oregon 97204'-
' Oregon Radiation Contr'o1IProgram.
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.)NUREG-0940pPART'!!!
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NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Portland General Electric Company Docket No. 50-344 Trojan Nuclear Plant License No.'NPF-1 EAs 94-067 and 96-111 During an NRC investigation conducted September 11, 1991 through March II, 1994, and the NRC's review of Portland General Electric Company's investigative report submitted by its contractor to the NRC on February 15, 1996, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below:
- 1. Violation Assessed a Civil Penalty 10 CFR 50.9(a) requires, in part, that information provided to the Commission by a licensee be complete and accurate in all material respects.
A. Contrary to the above, the licensee did not provide to the Commission information that was complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, on June 10, 1991, the licensee submitted LER 91-11 which was incomplete and inaccurate in that the LER did not describe: the electrical function of the electrical penetration assembly seals; the information from the vendor regarding the life of the seals; and the licensee's inadequate responses to previous seal issues. This information was material because the correct information would likely have resulted in substantial further inquiry by the NRC. (01013) B. Contrary to the above, on October 28, 1991, the licensee submitted LER 91-11, Revision 1, which was incomplete and inaccurate in a material respect in that the LER did not describe: the function of the inboard seal, the vendor information related to the reduced life of the seals, and the correct statement regarding the licensee's official cause of the 1987 seal failure. This information was material because the correct information would likely have resulted in substantial further inquiry by the NRC. (01023) This is a Severity Level 111 problem (Supplement VII). . Civil Penalty - 550,000. II. Violation Not Assessed a Civil Penalty 10 CFR 50.9(a) requires, in part, that information provided to the Commission by a licensee be complete and accurate in all material respects. NUREG-0940, PART II A-129 .
D: Notice'ofViolation 2 Contrary'to the above, the licensee did'not provide to the Commission
.information that was complete and accurate in all material respects.
Specifically, ODN 90-64, Revisions 0 and I, dated May 11, 1990 and July-4, 1990, and the JCOs dated July 11~and' October 3, 1990,- : incorrectly stated that test parameters.from another licensee's tests ' fully enveloped PGE's equipment qualification parameters; that the test environment conditions include direct chemical spray exposures; that - another licensee's test parameters enveloped PGE's plant specific peak
- . in-containment temperature of 303*F;.and that a failure.during another )
1-
' licensee's test was attributed to a particular'cause. -This information j is material because NRC. staff members relied on the false statements.in i allowing irojan to restart and continue operation. (02013) )
. l This is a_ Severity Level III violation (Supplement VII).
L Pursuant.to the provisions'of 10 CFR 2.201, Portland General Electric Company j (Licensee) is'hereby required.to submit a written statement.or explanation to. , the Ofrector, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
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,:within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Vic,lation and Proposed imposition Lof Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to. ,
a Notice of. Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: j (1) admission or denial'of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the , violation if admitted,'and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective l steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further. violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received'within the
. time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be j issued as why the license'should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why '
such other action as may be proper should not be'taken. Considerat ion may be < given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. , Within the same time as provided for the response required above under l
.i 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to
the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the l cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is J proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, , by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. l Nuclear. Regulatory Commission. -Should the Licensee fail to answer within the J time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should J the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 < protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be I clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the
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violation listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other NUREG-0940, PART 11 ' A-130 3
9 No'tice of Violation 3~ i I reasons why the penalty should not.be imposed. In addition to protesting the t
- civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty.
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In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section.VI.B.2 of the Enfortement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts _of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid. repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10-CFR 2.205, regarding the
. procedure for imposing.a civil. penalty .
Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in'accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be. referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless
- compromised,-remitted, or mitigated, may be ' . iected by civil action pursuant to Section.234c of the Act,'42.U.S.C. 2282c.
' The response n'oted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of ,
civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be~ addressed to: 's Mr.. James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to'the Regional Administrator, ATTN: Enforcement Officer, U.S. Nuclear 2egulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite , 400 Arlington, Texas 76011. ; Because your ic:ponse will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to , the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy,-proprietary, ! or safeguards information so that it can be placed:in the PDR without -' redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a . redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request f withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases
'for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal, privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in-10 CFR 73.21.
Dated at Arlington, Texas, this 6th day of June 1996 i l l NUREG-0940, PART II- A-131
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>e k UNITED sT ATis NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION D REGloN I % 45 ALLINDALE ROAD % KING oF PRUsslA. PENNSYLVANIA 194061415 October 23, 1996 EA 96-125 EA 96-281 Mr. Leon R. Eliason !
Chief Nuclear Officer and President Nuclear Business Unit PubRe Service Electric and Gas Company Post Office Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES -
$150,000 (NRC Inspection Reports No. 50-354/96-03 and 50-354/96-06)
Dear Mr. Eliason:
This letter refers to the NRC inspections conducted at the Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station between February 11 and March 30,1996, and between June 23 and August 3, 1996. The inspection reports were sent to you on April 26,1996, and August 29,1996, respectively. Brised on the inspections, apparent violations of NRC requirements were identified. On June 11,1996, a predecisional enforcement conference was conducted with you and members of yow staff to discuss five of the apparent violations identified during the first inspection, their causes, and your corrective actions. Regarding the sixth apparent violation, which was identified during the June-August inspection, you were offered the opportunity to either attend an enforcement conference, or provide a response, and you chose to provide a response, dated September 25,1996. Based on our review of the inspection findings, related Licensee Event Reports, information provided during the conference, and information provided in your September 25,1996 response, six violations are being cited and are described in tha enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice). The '.irst two violations relate to the failure to plan appropriate surveillance testing following completion of maintenance on control rod drives and their associated hydraulic operating systems during the November 1995 through March 1996 refueling outage, as well as previous failures to complete such surveillance testing prior to startups in February 1991 and April 1994. The third and fourth violations involve failures to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality regarding (1) 15 pairs of reactor building ventilation supply duct backdraft isolation dampers being installed in a configuration that deviated from plant design requirements, and (2) control rod withdrawal speeds being in excess of the values assumed in the Updated Final 1 NUREG-0940, PART II A-132
Public Service Electric and Gas Company Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The fifth violation involves the failure to obtain Commission approval prior to making changes to the facility's service water system design that involved an unreviewed safety question. The sixth violation involved the failure to maintain the service water system in 1ccordance with the Technical Specifications (TS) during the period November 1992 to March 1996 in that the safety auxiliary cooling system (SACS) heat exchanger throttie valves (manual flow path valves) were not property set which resulted in the service water flow rates to the SACS heat exchangers being insufficient for certain design basis requirements. With respect to the first two violations (Violations 1.A and 1.8 of the enclosed Notice), the inspectors found that maintenance had been performed on control rods during the November 1995 through March 1996 outage, yet appropriate testing had not been planned to be completed in accordance with the TS prior to restart. This maintenance on the control rods had the potential to affect the scram function of 68 control rods which required surveillance testing. As a result of the failure to follow procedures, you violated an administrative procedure which required that the post-maintenance testing be planned prior to restart. Rather than planning to perform the maintenance prior to the restart, your schedule for performing this required surveillance testing, as noted in your Licensee Event Report (LER) 96-007, was at 40% power after plant startup. Toward the end of the 1996 outage, we concluded that if the NRC had not intervened on March 13,1996, by questioning a control room operator about completion of the control rod testing, a TS Limiting Condition for Operation violation would have occurred. The second violation in Section I involved two separate previous occasions (in February 1991 and April 1994), in which you made mode changes without completing the required control rod testing prior to plant startup. The third vio!ation (Violation ll.A.1 of the enclosed Notice) involved the failure to cormet a condition identified in 1992 involving 15 pairs of reactor building backdraft isolation dampers having been installed backwards. At the enforcement conference, you indicated that this condition was first identiried by a contractor in 1984-1985. You were notified of this issue in 1992 and corrective action was not taken at that time to correct the problem. You reviewed the issue during your most recent 1995 refueling outage, and you again decided to defer corrective action. With the dampers installed backwards, the "self-sealing" feature of their design could not be assured, and sufficient analyses were not performed to ensure that the licensing bases of the facility were met with this nonconforming condition. These activities represent nonconservative decision making on your part, since you operated the unit for an extensive period with a known degradation, based on a less than fully rigorous engineering and safety analysis. With respect to the fourth violation (Violation ll.A.2 of the enclosed Notice), on March 14, 1996, during control rod withdrawal time testing, several control rods were found to wrthdraw faster than allowed by procedure HC.OP-FT.BF-0001, " Control Rod Drive insertion and Withdrawal Speed Test Adjustment and Stall Flows. In each case, the corrective action l l l l NUREG-0940, PART II A-133
Public Service Electric and Gas Company consisted of adjusting the rod to the desired speed, with no effort io eva'uate the significance of the misadjusted rods during previous operation or determine the cause. of the "out of tolerance" rods. Subsequent to questions raised by the NRC inspector an analysis was performed that concluded the "as-found" rod speeds measured during this 1996 testing were bounded by analysis. However, it was evident dudng this inspection that your organization lacked an appropriate appreciation of the safety significance of control rod withdrawal speed. In addition, further review identified that on May 10,1992, a control rod was found to be traveling at a speed in excess of that allowed by the UFSAR and was not corrected until October 12,1992. It was also travelling in excess of that allowed by a later analysis conducted on March 15,1996. Therefore, as described in the fourth violation, you operated the plant during this period without taking corrective actions to address a condition outside the design basis. With respect to the fifth violation (Violation 11.B of the enclosed Notice), changes were made to the facility (as described in the UFSAR) involving unreviewed safety questions, without prior Commission approval. Specifically, in February 1996, you implemented a design change which would automatically open the main backwash valve for the service water system strainers whenever the associated service water pump started, and leave the valve open as long as the pump was running, rather than maintain that valve in the normally closed posidon. Prior to the modification, the valve would automatically open for short periods either via a timer or a high differential pressure across the strainers, in order to backwash the strainers. This modification constituted an unreviewed safety question because it reduced the margin of safety, as defined in the TS basis, in that it decreased the amount of station service water system flow available for the SACS by diverting some of the flow away from the heat exchangers in order to backwash the strainers. Prior to implementation of the modification, you identified via calculations, that with the valve open, backwash flow through the service water (SW) pump discharge strainers was 2500 gallons per minute (gpm) which was much greater than the 430 gpm assumed in the UFSAR. Although your staff completed an Action Request to correct the UFSAR, you did not consider this discrepancy important for the purposes of this modification because a flow balance had been performed in 1992 which had verified adequate flow through the SACS heat exchangers with the backwash valve fully ope,s. However, in the revised safety evaluation completed after implementation of the modification, you stated that you discovered that flow measurements taken during post-modification testing did not compare favorably to SW flow benchmarks, thereby invalidating the earlier assumption regarding the amount of backwash flow not being important. Rather than close the valve, you allowed the condition to continue and compensated for it in the revised 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation done to support the modification, by administratively limiting the ultimate heat sink (UHS) temperature to 84.6 degrees F, a value less than the TS limit of 88.6 degrees F. This temporary reduction in UHS water temperature was made to ensure design basis heat removal requirements could be met until a complete service water flow balance could be conducted following plant restart. NUREG-0940, PART II A-134
l Public Service Electric and Gas Company You approved this design change in March 1996 and continued to control the systern with this administrative limit substituted for a TS limit, rather than closing the valve, or obtaining a change to the TS. At the enforcement conference, you maintained that an administrative limit could be sbbstituted for the TS limit for the UHS, since the administrative limit was more conservative than the TS limit. In support of this contention, you referenced a previous WNP-2 case where conservative administrative limits were used in lieu of a TS. You stated that the licensee in that case took the position that "a proposed change that involves the need to control plant operation in a manner more conservative than that required by the TS does not > require NRC approval prior to implementation." Notwithstanding your contention, while the inspection guidance in NRC Generic Letter (GL) 91-18 acknowledges the use of administrative controls when degradations are discovered at a facility, that guidance was not intended to condone the use of such controls when a degradation is either created or perpetuated by a licensee's actions, since this condition would be under direct licensee control. Thus, since you created the condition by opening the valves, and then perpetuated the condition by making the modification permanent, the circumstances involved an 4 unreviewed safety question arising from a change in the plant operation, rather than a corrective measure to promptly resolve a nonconforming condition in the existing plant design. The NRC position on this matter is stated in NRC Inspection Manual, Part 9900, issued April 9,1996, which states a licensee may change the design of its plant, as . desenbed in the FSAR, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59; however, whenever such a change , involves an unreviewed safety question, or change in the TS, the licensee must obtain a license amendment prior to operating the plant with the nonconforming condition. With regard to your reliance upon the WNP-2 case, the NRC cited the licensee in that case for a violation involving converting safety-related service water system motor operated valves to [ manually operated valves. The statement by the licensee that a " proposed change that involves the need to control plant operation in a manner more conservative than that required by the TS does not require NRC approval prior to implementation" does not reflect the
- position of the NRC relative to unreviewed safety questions. Rather, that statement simply reflected that licensee's view. ;
The NRC is concemed that your independent oversight groups also failed to identify these problems even though opportunities to do so were available in both the past and the present time frame. The independent oversight groups, like the Quality Assurance / Nuclear Safety Review Group and the Station Operations Review Committee, are expected to provide additional assurance that deficiencies either leading to, or resulting from, poor decisions are discovered and corrected. While these issues were ultimately corrected in a manner to avoid significant safety consequences, these actions were completed in response to the NRC's identification of the problems. For the issues that are the subject of these violations, your independent review was neither sufficient nor timely. i NUREG-0940, PART II A-135
Public Service Electric and Gas Company These first five violations represent a significant regulatory concem because they indicate that management did not aggressively assure (1) appropriate planning for the testing of equipment following maintenance, (2) timely identification and correction of problems conceming safety related equipment, and (3) appropriate evaluation prior to making changes to the facility. Given the significance of the findings, in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions"(Enforcement Policy). NUREG-1600, the first two violations are classified in the aggregate as a Seventy Level 111 problem, the third and fourth violations are also classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level 111 problem, and the fifth violation is individually classified at Severity Level lit in accoraance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level ill problem or violation. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years', the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit is not warranted for /dentification because you did not identify the violations, other than Violation 1.B. Credit is warranted for Corrective Action because at the time of the enforcement conference, your actions were considered both prompt and comprehensive. These actions, which were discussed during your presentation at the conference, include, but are not limited to the following: (1) performing an inclusive review of work activities to venfy TS compliance, including an Operations Department review of work order activities performed during the outage, departmental reviews of TS requirements under their control, and independent Quality Assurance / Nuclear Safety Review (QA/NSR) assessment; (2) developing a conditional TS surveillance list; (3) incorporating the post-maintenance event into the licensed operator requalification training; (4) setting all rods to within UFSAR assumed values before l completing plant startup from RF06; (5) revising the control rod speed verification testing procedure to be consistent with the UFSAR, and reducing withdrawal speed acceptance enteria from 20% to 10%; (6) performing stroke timing of rods at each Refuel Outage; (7) completing a comprehensive root cause investigation of these concems; and (8) providing j training on the importance of maintaining the design and licensing basis of the facility. Notwithstanding these corrective actions and consistent with the Enforcement Policy, to l emphasize the importance of (1) appropriate planning for the testing of equipment following l maintenance, (2) timely identification and correction of problems identified conceming safety related equipment, and (3) appropriate evaluation prior to making changes to the facility, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice in the amount of $150,000 (a $50,000 base civil penalty for each of the three Seventy Level !!! violations or problems).
'A $100,000 civil penalty was issued on December 12,1995 (EA 95-216), based on an inspection that ended August 24,1995.
NUREG-0940, PART II A-136
Public Service Electnc and Gas Company With respect to the sixth violation set forth in Section lit of the enclosed Notice, you had identified, as described in LER 96-009, that Hope Creek had operated in an unanalyzed condition due to inappropriate service water throttie valve settings. The NRC recognizes that during the period this condition existed, the service wa?er system flow path did in fact provide sufficient cooling to the SACS heat excnangers. -Nonetheless, the NRC is concemed that you failed to ensure that following a desig 1 change activity to replace the throttle valves during refueling outage 4 in November 1992, appropriate testing was not completed to establish the required throttle valve position and flow to the SACS heat exchangers for all design basis requirements, including expected tide conditions, pump degradation, and worst case ultimate heat sink temperatures. This violation also represents a significant regulatory concem, and, therefore, is also classified at Severity Level ill in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and
. Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions"(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.
Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for /dentification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit is warranted for Identification because you did identify the violation as part of an extensive review of the Service Water System in response to the violation concerning the Service Water backwash valve identified in item 11.B. Credit is also warranted for Corrective Action because the actions you took were considered both prompt and comprehensive. These actions, which were described in your LER and your September 25,1996 letter, include, but are not limited to the following: (1) repositioning of the throttle valves to ensure adequate system performance during all postulated design basis conditions; (2) performance of a flow balance to support a design change for the Service Water backwash strainer design change, which verified proper throttle position; (3) enhanced procedures clanfying the requirements for field venfication of plant conditions against the assumptions in the engineering evaluations; (4) review of a sampling of engineering evaluations to determine whether appropriate acceptance criteria had been provided; (5) conduct of a Configuration Baseline Document validation review of the Service Water System and the SACS; and (6) plans to conduct a Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection in October and November 1996 to confirm the validity of the design and licensing basis reviews which have been completed. Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty for this violation. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response, in your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After l i l l l l NUREG-0940, PART 11 A-137 i
1 i f Public Service Electric and Gas Company reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards informatior, so that it can be placed in the PDR. If redactions are required, a proprietary version containing brackets placed around the proprietary, privacy, and/or safeguards information should be submitted. In addition, a non-proprietary version with the information in the brackets redacted should be submitted to be placed in the PDR. Sincerely, H ert J. Miller Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-354 License No. NPF 57
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties cc w/enci: L. Storz, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations E. Simpson, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering E. Satowitz, Director - Nuclear Business Support C. Schaefer, Extemal Operations - Nuclear, Delmarva Power & Light Co. P. MacFariand Goetz, Manager, Joint Generation, Atlantic Electric M. Bezilla, General Manager - Hope Creek Operations J. Benjamin, Director - Quality Assurance & Nuclear Safety Review D. Powell, Manager - Licensing and Regulation R. Kankus, Joint Owner Affairs A. C. Tapert, Program Administrator R. Fryling, Jr., Esquire M. J. Wetterhahn, Esquire Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate W. Conklin, Public Safety Consultant, Lower Alloways Creek Township State of New Jersey State of Delaware NUREG-0940 PART II A-138
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES Public Service Electric and Gas Company Docket No. 50-354 Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station License No. NPF-57 EAs 96-125; 96-281 During NRC inspections conducted between February 11 and March 30,1996, and between June 23 rnd August 3,1996, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG 1600, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose civil penalties pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act),42 U.S C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalties are set forth belo v:
- 1. VIOLATIONS RELATED TO SURVEILLANCE TESTING OF CONTROL RODS ,
FOLLOWING MAINTENANCE A. ' Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.a requires, in part, that w1itten procedures in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978, shall be established, implemented and maintained. Sections 8 and 9, respectively, of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 specify procedures for performing surveillance tests and for performing safety-related maintenance. Hope Creek Nuclear Business Unit Adrninistrativa Procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0009(O), Revision 9. Work Control Process, Section 5.3.2.p. and Administrative Procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0050(Q), Revision 3, Station Testing Program, Section 5.1.2, require, in part, that appropriate TS surveillance testing be planned and conducted following maintenance on safety-related equipment. Contrary to the above, prior to March 13,1996, the licensee did not plan the appropriate surveillance testing on certain safety-related equipment following maintenance. Specifically, although maintenance had been conducted on 68 control rods (such as packing adjustments on scram inlet or outlet valves, or replacement of scram solenoid pilot valves) during the November 1995 through March 1996 outage, the licensee did not plan for testing the scram insertion capability for the control rods following these maintenance activities that could affect the scram inaertion time, but rather planned for deferral of testing until after the plant startup even though the TS would require testing prior to the startup. (01013) l l l l l l NUREG-0940, PART 11 A-139
(i ' i- ;l v r .g- ; 1 Enciosure -2 i . B .. TS Surveillance Requirement'4.1.3.2.b requires, in part, that the baximum scram insertion time of control rods shall be demonstrated for specifically affected control rods following maintenance on the control rod or control rod system which could affect the scram insertion time, o Contrary to the above, on February 15,1991, the plant started up without completion of surveillance tests required for 24 control rods following . maintenance, and on April 25,1994, the plant was started up without completing.the required surveillance testing on two control rods following
, , maintenance, (01023)
These two violations are classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level lil problem (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty 550,000
; 11.
, - OTHER VIOLATIONS OF NRC REQUIREMENTS ASSESSED A CIVIL PENALTY Ac 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality such as failures, 1-
. malfunctions, deficiencies, deviationsi defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Also, for significant
' conditions adverse to quality, measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude recurrence.
- 1. Contrary to the above, from January 1992 to February 77.1996, the licensee did not establish measures to assure that a censin condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, in January 1992, the licensee identified that 15 pairs of High Energy Line Break (HELB) reactor building ventilation supply duct backdraft isolation dampers were installed backwards (since original plant construction) in various reactor building filtration. recirculation, and ventilation system supply ducts. This configuration deviated from plant design requirements, in that the "self sealing" feature was invalidated, thereby causing a condition adverse to quality, and this condition adverse to quahty was not corrected until February 27,1996. (02013)
- 2. Contrary to the above:
- a. From May 10,1992 to October 12,1992, the licensee did not establish measures to assure that a condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, on May 10, 1992, the flow control needle valve for control rod No. 22-35
- was adjusted in an attempt to correct a double notching l
;NUREG-0940,-PART 11 ' A-140
=- _ _ _
- Enclosure condition. This adjustment resulted in a rod withdrawal speed of 5 inches per second, which was in excess of the value of 3.6 ;
inches per second assumed in Section 15.4.1.2 of the Updated
' Final Safety Analysis Report for rod withdrawal error analysis.
The withdrawal speed was also in excess o4ne speeds bounded by previously performed Geocal Electric analyses. ; However, the rod withdrawal speed was not corrected until October 12,1992. l
- b. On several occasions prior to March 1996, the withdrawal >
speeds were in excess of 3,6 inches per second and, although ' actions were taken in each case to adjust the withdrawal speed to be within limits, the licensee did not establish measures to address the cause of this significant condition adverse to quality, i (02023) This is a Severity Level !!! problem (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty - $50,000 B. 10 CFR 50.59(a)(1) states, in part, that the holder of a license may make changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis report, without prior Commission approval, unless the proposed changes involve changes in the TS incorporated in the license, or an unreviewed safety question.10 CFR 50.59(a)(2) states, in part, that an unreviewed safety question shall be deemed to exist if the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS is reduced. Contrary to the above, the licensee made changes to the facility as described in the Section 9.2.1.4 of the FSAR. Section 9.2.1.4 of the FSAR stated,in part, that a self-cleaning strainer downstream of each station service water pump continuously backwashes a small amount of water via a bypass valve ' and when the strainer is subjected to an excessive differential pressure, a high differential switch opens the main backwash valve. The changes to the facility involved unreviewed safety questions, without prior Commission approval. Specifically, t
- 1. In February 1996, the licensee implemented design change DCP 4EC3546 which would automatically open the main backwash valve whenever the associated service water pump started, and leave the valve open as long as the pump was running, rather than maintain the valve in the normally closed position. The modification constituted an unreviewed safety question because it reduced the margin of safety as defined in the basis of TS 3/4.7.1, " Service Water Systems" in that it NUREG-0940, PART II A-141
i i Enclosure decreased the amount of station service water system flow available for the safety auxiliary cooling system by diverting some of the flow away from the heat exchangers to backwash the strainers. However, this
. change was made without Commission approval.
- 2. After instailation of design change DCP 4EC3546 which permitted automatic opening of the main backwash valve whenever the associated service water pump started, the licensee discovered that flow measurements taken during post modification testing did not compare favorably to SW flow benchmarks. However, this discrepancy was not considered important because a flow balance completed in 1992 had venfied adequate flow through the station auxiliaries cooling system heat exchangers with the backwash valve full open. As a result, the licensee allowed the condition to continue and compensated for it by revising the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation performed to support the modification, by administratively limiting the ultimate heat sink (UHS) temperature to 84.6 degrees F, a value less than the TS limit of 88.6 degrees F. This temporary reduction in UHS water temperature was necessary to ensure design basis heat removal requirements could be met until a complete service water flow balance could be conducted following plant restart. The licensee approved this change in March 1996 and continued to control the system with this administrative limit substituted for a TS limit, rather than closing the valve or obtaining a change to the TS. (02033; l
1 This is a Severity Level 111 violation (Supplement 1).
- l. Civil Ponalty - $50,000 111. VIOLATION NOT ASSESSED A CIVIL PENALTY
! TS 3.7.1.2 (b) requires, in part, that the service water syster ' oops be comprised of an operable flow path capable of taking suction from the Del ware River (ultimate heat sink) and transferring the water to the Safety Auxiliary Cooling System (SACS) heat exchangers. l Contrary to the above, from November 1992 until March 17,1996, the service water i flow throttle valves to the SACS heat exchangers were improperty set following modification activities in November 1992. As a result, the flow path was not capable of transferring sufficient cooling water from the Delaware River to the SACS heat exchangers for certain design basis postulated operating conditions, namely, extreme low river water level, pump degradation, and high river water temperature. This is a Severity Level 111 violation (Supplement 1). NUREG-0940, PART 11 A-142 l l l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ _ . _
Enclosure t Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Public Service Electric and Gas Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalties by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the cumulative amount of the civil penalties, or may protest imposition of the civil penalties in whole or in part, by a wntten answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalties will be issued. Ghould the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such answer should be cleariy marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violations listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reanons why the penalties should not be imposed in addition to protesting the civil penalties in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penaltics. In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalties, the factors addressed in Section VI.B 2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing civil penalties. Upon fa;ure to pay any civil penalties due that subsequently have been determined in l accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attomey General, and the penalties, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c.
)
1 NUREG-0940, PART II A-143
Enclosure The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalties, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: James Lieberman, Director. Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852 2738, with, a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Senior Resident inspector at ther facility that is the subject of this N% ice. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR. If redactions are required, a proprietary version containing brackets p' aced around the proprietary, privacy, and/or safeguards information should be submitted. In addition, a non-proprietary version with the information in the brackets redacted should be submitted to be placed in the PDR. 1 Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 23rdday of October 1996 l l l l I NUREG-0940, PART II A-144
December 4. 1996 EA 96-410 t Southern Nuclear Operating Company. Inc. ATTN: Mr. D. N. Morey , Vice President P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham. AL -35201
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY -
$50.000 (NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT N05. 50-348 AND 50-364/96-09)
Dear Mr; Morey:
This refers to the inspection conoucted during the period Septemoer 1 through October 12, 1996. at your Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP). The inspection included a review of the fire protection program associated with the installation and , inspection of Kaowool fire barriers to meet the requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 and the FNP Fire Protection Plan. The results of this inspecticn were discussed with members of your staff on October 17, 1996, and were formtlly transmitted to you by letter dated November 8. 1996. In addition. on November 7. 1996. you submitted Licensee Event Report No. 96-006 00 which addressed Kaowool fire barrier installation deficiencies. A closed predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region II office on November 18. 1996, with you and members of your staff to discuss the apparent violations, the root causes, and corrective actions to preclude recurrence. A list of conference attendees. NRC slides, and a copy of your presentation materials are enclosed. In addition, at the conference, you identified errors in and/or disagreement with certo1n statements expressed in the subject inspect 1on report. the dispositon af your comments in this regard are also enclosed. Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that was provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violation described in Part I of the Notice involved three examples of Southern Nuclear Operating Company Inc.'s (SNC) failure to assure that one hour fire barriers, in this case Kaowool enclosures, were installed on Unit 1 electrical cables associated with systems required for safe shutdown. The components affected by the discrepant conditions were the dedicated 8 Train high head safety injection pump and its room cooler: the swing high head safety injection pump and its room cooler when aligned to the B Tra#n; one B Train main steam line isolation valve: and the B Train motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge flow control valves. The Kaowool in these areas was not installed as described in design drawings and your 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix R commitments. l i
)
1
-NUREG-0940,.PART I1: A-145 , i
1 SNC 2 At the conference, you admitted the violation and provided additional background information related to the circumstances surrounding the discrepancies and their Ident1fication. You described the root causes of the violat1on as personnel error and insufficient design guidance during initial installation, and stated that there was no reason to believe that a breakdown in your configuration management program occurred. Although the failure to install Kaowool fire barriers adequately did not result In an actual safety consequence, under certain circumstances, a fire could have adversely impacted your ability to achieve and maintain safe plant shutdown conditions (e.g., loss of charging). Overall. the violation is of significant regulatory concern in that the degraded fire barriers increased the vulnerability of safety related equipment to potential fire hazard or damage and compromised the design object 1ve of defense-in-depth. At the conference you stated that alternate methods were available to mitigate the consequences of a fire affecting these safety related components. Although NRC agrees that alternate methods were available to mitigate the consequences of a fire, several of these methods rely on operator recognition and intervention whicn are not proceduralized and cannot be assured for 10 CFR 50. Appendix.R compliance: and, the fire suppression system relied upon to mitigate a fire involving both trains of high head safety injection expertenced failures during April 1994 and 1995 surveillance testing. Furthermore. NRC 1s concerned that your independent verification program at the t1me of initial installation (Implemented by your construction organization) failed to identify the non-conformances, as has your periodic inspection program since then. This resulted in unknown, degraded fire barriers for an extended period of time. Therefore, this violation is classified in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures l for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy). NUREG 1600, as a Severity Level Ill violation. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civ11 penalty in the amount of $50.000 1s considered for a Severity Level III violation. Because your facility has not been the subject of escalated enforcement action within the ' last two years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Correctf ve Actfon in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process described in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. At the conference, you stated that your corrective actions taken and/or planned include: (1) the prompt establishment of fire watches: (2) the conduct of a walk-down of motor-operated valve Kaowool installations following 1dentification of deficiencies by the NRC: (3) conduct of a comprehensive inspection of all Kaowool installations in the plant utilizing newly trained. Level II inspectors: (4) correction of ident1f ted Kaowool installation discrepancles by January al.1997; (5) revision of Procedure FNP-0-FSP-43 to clearly identify the appropriate Kaowool periodic inspection criteria by January 31. 1997: and (6) conduct of additional training for the individuals who will implement the periodic inspection program. Although it appears that your corrective actions were ultimately comprehensive, the NRC determined that credit was not warranted for Corrective Act7on in that, collectively, your actions were not timely. Specifically. NRC identification of multiple examples of Kaowool and flammastic installation discrepancies over a several month period was required before you took comprehensive corrective actions. Although engineering NUREG-0940, PART II A-146
r
'j W
L :SNCD 3
' reviews 'and e'vt.luations were being performed as issues were identified, you
'did not'institJte the necessary positive actions to assess the extent of the
- > condition and to characterize the Kaowool fire barrier discrepancies fully until NRC identified examples of missing Kaowool.
j Therefore, to emphasize the importance of maintaining an adequate fire'
'protectionprogram for the protection of. safety related. equipment and the need I
,for prompt:and comprehensive corrective actions. I have been authorized after ,
'consultatian with the Director. Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed ,
Notice in the base amount of $50.000 for the Severity Level III violation. ;
.The violhtion' described in Part II of the Notice has been categorized at t Severity: Level IV. It involved the failure to adequately. implement a program-
-for the periodic inspection of Kaowool installed fire barriers. These
-inadeqvate inspections. lack of qualified inspectors, and incomplete f inspection criteria contributed to failure to identify the Kaowool .
' installation and material condition discrepancies earlier.
,You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions especified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will +
-consider your response. in part. to determine whether further enforcement
- action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice." a copy.of "this letter. Its enclosures, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR). Sincerely. L Original Signed by E. W. Herschoff Stewart O. Ebneter Regional Administrator Docket Nos.. 50 348. 50-364 ; < L1 cense'Nos. NPF-2 NPF-8
Enclosures:
- 1. Notice of Violation and Proposed l Imposition of Civil Penalty ,
. 2. Conference Attendees (Not to be Published in NUREG-0940) i
- 3. - Conrnents on Inspection Report No. 96-09 (Not to be Published in NUREG 0940) i
- 4. NRC Presentation Materials (Not to be Published in
. NUREG 0940)
- 5. Licensee Presentation Materials (Not to be Published in
~
NUREG 0940)
- U .cc w/encis: (See Page 4) e a
g .
-i NUREG-0940' PART'II?
, l A-147 r w - . . ~ i v, -e. .,-w
lSNC 4 cc w/encls: H. J; Ajluni. Licensing Serv 1ces Manager. 8 031
- athern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc 42 Inverness Center Parkway Birmingham. AL 35242 R.'O. Hill. Jr.
~ General Manager Farley Plant Southern Nuclear Operating Company. Inc.
P. O. Box 470 Ashfora. AL 36312
^ J. D. Woodard
' Executive Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Co m ny. Inc.
.P. O. Box.1295
. Birmingham. AL 35201
- State Health Officer Alabama Department of Public Health 434 Monroe Street Montgomery. AL -36130-1701 M. Stanford Blanton Balch and Bingham Law Firm P. O. Box 306 1710 Sixth Avenue North Birmingham. AL 35201 Chairman Houston County Commission P. 0.- Box 6406
. Dothan. AL 36302
)
L h ' NUREG-0940, . PART- II A-148
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Southern Nuclear Operating Company. Inc. Docket Nos. 50-348, 50-364 Farley Nuclear Plant License Nos. NPF-2 NPF-8 EA 96-410 i During an NRC insoection conducted during the period September 1 through October 12. 1996. violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions." NUREG-1600. the NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Sect 1on 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), j 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated - c1vil penalty are set forth below: I. Violation Assessed A Civil Penalty 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix R. Section III.G.2 requires, in part. where cables or equipment including associated non-safety circuits that could prevent cperation or cause maloperation of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions. are located within the same fire area outside of containment. the cables and eouipment and associated non safety circuits be separated by a fire barrier having a three hour rat 1ng, or separated by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire
. hazards or one redundant train be enclosed in a fire barrier having a one hour rating.
License No. NPF 2. Condition 2.C(4), for Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP). Unit 1. states, in part. that Southern Nuclear Operating Company. Inc. shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protect 1on program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). F5AR. Appendix 9B. Fire Protection Program. documents an evaluation of the FNP fire protection program as it complies with Appendix R to 10 CFP 50 and embodies the contents of the Fire Protection Program : ReevalJation a$ approved by the NRC. Appendix 98. Attachment B, 10 CF'< 50 Appendix R Exemptions. provides the NRC's discussion and evalt.ation of the licensee's Appendix R exemption requests, and also identifies those systems and components that require one-hour Kaowool fire barr1ers to meet Appendix R. Contrary to the above. the licensee failed to assure that electrical cables associated with systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions were enclosed in an one hour fire barrier as required by Appendix 9B of the FSAR as evidenced by the following examples:
- 1. On October 2.1996, the NRC identified that the 18 and 1C Safety 1 Injection Pump "B tr e r' power cables in Room 160 of Fire Area ,
i Enclosure 1 l l, NUREG-0940, PART II A449 O
_m _ ._ _ _ __ - - _. _. ... t r Notice of Violation and Prooosed: 2' Imposition of Civil Penalty
.1-004 were -not fully enclosed by 'a Kaowool fire' barrier
- (approximately 18 feet of cable tray was unwrapped).
~ 2. .During the period of October 5-8. 1996,~ the licensee identified- l that the 18 and 1C Safety Injection Pump "B train" power cables and room cooler cables in Room 175 of Fire Area 1-004 were not fully enclosed by Kaowool fire barriers (approximately 24 inches o of cable from four cable trays were unwrapped). '!
t 3. During the period of October 5 8. 1996.- the~ licensee also
-ident1fied that the cables for main steam isolation and auxiliary -i feedwater flow control in Room 319 of Fire Area 1-042 were not.
enclosed by an appropriate fire barrier. i.e.. Kaowool. (the entire four foot span of cable tray was unwrapped). (01013) This is a Severity Level III violation-(Supplement I). 5 Civil Penalty 4 150.000 e
!! ~ Violation Not Assessed A Civil Penalty License No. NPF-2. Condition 2.C(4), and License No. NPF-8,
- Condition 2.C(6), states, in part, that Southern Nuclear Operating Company,-Inc shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of ;
. the approved fire protection program as described in the FSAR.
FSARc Appendix 9B. Fire Protection Program. documents the evaluation of the FNP fire protection program against Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 and 1 embodies the contents of the Fire Protection Program Reevaluation as approved by the NRC. FSAR. Appendix 98. Section 98.6.1. requires periodic inspections of fire 1 protection systems and equipment to assure acceptable condition of these items, Administrative Procedure, FNP-0-AP-36. Fire Surveillance Procedures and Inspections. Revision 12, required that fire surveillance procedures are performed as written, by qualified personnel, and that these procedures provide the necessary detailed requirements. ) i Fire Surveillance Procedure, FNP-0-FSP-43. Visual Inspection of Kaowool Wraps. Revision 5. provided the acceptance criteria. instructions, and references to installation deta11s for conducting periodic inspections of Kaowool wraps used to provide the one-hour rated fire barriers prescribed by the Fire Protection Program of FSAR. Appendix 98. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to implement an adequate periodic inspection program for Kaowool one-hour fire barriers in that: , {
.1. The periodic inspections failed to verify that Kaowool fire barriers were being maintained in conformance with installation drawings and the acceptance criteria specified in 4
(# m I NUREG-0940, PART II : A-150 y ,
Notice of Violation and Proposed 3 Imposition of Civil Penalty Procedure FNP-0 FSP 43. During the period March 4-7. 1996, licensee personnel inspected Kaowool wraps in accordance with Procedure FNP-0-FSP 43 and did not identify any deficiencies. However, from July 24 - October 2.1996, the NRC identified multiple examples of installation deficiencies and deteriorating conditions of Kaowool wraps. Subsequent inspections by the licensee conducted during the per1od October 5-8. 1996. identified over a hundred s1m11ar installation and degradation problems with existing Kaowool wraps around electrical raceways.
- 2. Personnel performing the periodic inspection required by Precedure FNP-0 FSP 43 during March 1996 were not qualified, in that they were hot knowledgeable regarding the design.
Installation. or material condition requirements for Kaowool wraps. These individuals were not adequately trained on Xaowool requirements nor did they have adequate prior experience in installing or Insoecting Kaowool.
- 3. As of October 12. 1996. Procedure FNP-0-FSP 43. Revision 5. did not clearly identify all the crit 1 cal characteristics to be inspected to assure Kaowool fire barr1ers were maintained in conformance with installation drawings (e.g., flammastic fire seals and compression). (02014)
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, the Southern Nuclear Operating Company. Inc. (Licensee) is hereby required to submit I written statement or explanation to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation. (2) the reasons for the violation 1f admitted, and if denled, the reasons why. (3) the correct 1ve steps that have been taken and the results achieved. (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for ' Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified. suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201. the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. with a check. draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear NUREG-0940, PART II A-151
Notice of Violation and Proposed 4 Imposition of Civil Penalty Regulatory Comission. Should the Licensee ~ fail to answer within the time spec 1fied, an order 1mposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the v1olations listed in this Notice. in whole or in part. (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances. (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part. such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201. but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the L1censee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205. this matter may be referred to the Attorney General. and the penalty, unless compromised, rem 1tted, or mitigated. may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation. letter with payment of c1v11 penalties, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: Mr. James Lieberman Director. Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. One White Flint North.11555 Rockville Pike. Rockville. MD 20852-2738. with a copy to the Regional A6111nistrator. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission. Region II and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the Farley Nuclear Plant. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR). to the extent possible. It should not include any personal privacy. proprietary, or safeguards information 50 that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request I withholding of such material, you sp.11 specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g. . explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the
- information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
Dated at Atlanta. Georgia this 4th day of December 1996 NUREG-0940, PART II A-152 ! l
l l l l LIST OF PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ATTENDEES NOVEMBER 18. 1996 Southern Nuclear noeratina Comoanv. Inc. ISNC.). l
)
J. Woodard. Executive Vice President. SNC i D. Morey Vice President. SNC I R. Hill. Plant Manager. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) i D. Jones. Engineering Manager. FNP J. Thomas. Manager. Engineering Support. FNP J. McGowan. Manager. Safety Assessment and Evaluaticn Review L. Bailey. Project Engineer. SNC J. Love. Bechtel Nuclear Reculatorv Comission L. Reyes. Deputy :egional Administrator. Pegion II (RII) E. Merschoff. Director. Division of Reactor Projects (DRP). RII J. Jaudon. Deputy Director. Division of Reactor Safety (DRS). RII C. Evans, Regional Counsel B. Uryc. Director. Enforcement and Invest 1gations Coordination Staff (EIC3). RII H. Berkow. Directcr. Projects Directorate 11-2. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) P. Skinner. Chief. Branch 2. DRP, RII ' D. Verrelli. Acting Chief. Special Inspection Branch. DR5. RII T. Ross. Senior Resident Inspector. FNP R. Caldwell Resident Inspector . FNP R. Wright. Project Engineer. DRP. RII R. Carroll. Project Engineer. DRP. RII W. Miller, Reactor Inspector. DRS, RII A. Boland. Enforcement Specialist. EICS. RII E. Connell. Fire Protect 1on Engineer. Plant Systems Brancn. NRR*
- Participated by Telephone Enclosure 2 l
l 1 I NUREG-0940, PART II A-153 !
2 ff *g a
- UNrrED sT ATEs NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION b - ) e, I REGloN i 47s ALLENDALE ROAD KING of PRusstA, PENNSYLVANIA 1940M41s
*****/ August 23, 1996 EA 96-210 Mr. Ross Barkhurst President and CEO Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation RD 5, Box 169 Ferry Road Brattleboro, Vermont 05301
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY - $50,000 (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-271/96-07)
Dear Mr. Barkhurst:
l This letter refers to the NRC specialinspection conducted frem June 3 through June 14,1996, l at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The purpose of this inspection was to review the l circumstances surrounding your staffs identification, on April 11, 1996, of a single failure j vulnerability of the residual heat removal (RHR) system. This single failure vulnerability existed because of the potential for the minimum flow valve in each train not opening, as needed, to ensure that the pumps were not dead-headed" if reactor system pressure exceeded the pump ' head. The inspection report was sent to you on July 2,1996. Based on the inspection, two apparent violations of NRC requirements were identified, as described in the inspection report. On July 23,1996, a predecisional enforcement conference was conducted with you and members of your staff to discuss the apparent violations identified during the inspection, their causes, and your corrective actions. Based on our review of the inspection findings, your related Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 96410, dated May 9,1996, and information provided during the conference, one violation is being cited and is desenbed in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). The violation involves the failure to include an analysis of the most damaging single failure vulnerability for certain loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) in the analysis of possible failure modes of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) equipment and the effects of those fa; lure modes on ECCS performance. Specifically, the analyses performed fr each operating cycle since 1974, pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K, including the most recent Cycle 16, 17, and 18 analyses conducted in the past five years, did not consider a specific single failure vulnerability that existed for certain LOCAs. The condition involved intermediate and small break LOCAs in which the four RHR pumps (two per train) would receive a signal to start but would not be able to inject water to the vessel because reactor pressure would be greater than the pump's discharge pressure. In those cases, the possibility existed for damage to the RHR pumps because the motor-operated minimum flow valves (one per train) were normally closed, and if there was a failure of the related Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG), the valves would not automatically open and permit recirculation flow to provide pump coolir.g. The condition i existed since 1974 when a design change was implemented that resulted in cross powering the 1 l l NUREG-0940, PART II A-154 x
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 2 Corporation two RHR pumps in each train from separate EDGs (the minimum flow valve for that particular train was also powered from one of the two station EDGs). As a result, a loss of a single EDG that powered the minimum flow valve for a particular train would disable not only the RHR pump powered by the inoperable EDG, but also could result in damage to the RHR pump powered by the other opersble EDG because of the inability to open the minimum flow valve and establish pump cooling. The failure to consider this condition during the various analyses constitutes the violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K. The NRC recognizes and commends your Appendix R Project Team that ident:fied this single failure vulnerability in April 1996, as part of its Appendix R review. Nonetheless, the NRC is concemed that this cor dition existed for 22 years without being identified during any of the Cycle analyses, even though a number of plant and industry operating events and activities related to the RHR system had been reviewed and evaluated by your staff, as you acknowledged at the enforcement conference, and these reviews and evaluations should have resulted in the identification and correction of this problem much sooner. These opportunities included during: (1) the formulation of corrective actions to address a similar single failure vulnerability affecting the RHR Service Water Heat Exchanger outlet valves that was identified in July 1989 and documented in LER 89-09; (2) the design review activities involving the development of the Individual Plant Evaluation in December 1993, that correctly modeled this single failure issue, but failed to identify the vulnerability; (3) the June 1993 LOCA Reanalysis conducted by your staff for Cycle 17 operation that did not revalidate the previous LOCA analysis assumptions; and (4) the review of Revision 48, dated January 4,1995, to Piping and Instrument Diagram (P&lD) G-191172, which was a Corrective Update to revise the P&lD to specifica:ty indicate that the '. RHR minimum flow valves (V10-16A and V10-16B) were normally closed (although the valve position had been changed in 1971 during construction from "normally open" to "normally closed" because of concems about a draindown of the reactor to the suppression pool, the PalD had never been updated to reflect that change). In each case, the reviews were appamntly too narrowly focused and/or insufficient in scope or depth to identify the vulnerability. Given the significance of this finding, the violation has been categorized at Severity Levelill, in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Seventy Level ill violation. Your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years', therefore, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit is warranted for identification because you identified the violation. Credit also is warranted for Corrective Actions because your corrective actions, once the violation was identified, were considered prompt and comprehensive. These actions, which were discussed during your presentation at the conference, include, but are not limited to: (1) performance of an engineering evaluation to
'A Severity Level lli violation (identified in November 9,1995) without a civil penalty was issued on February 13,1996, for violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R (EA 95-268), and a Severity Level til violation (identified in April 25,1995) with a $50,000 civil penalty was issued on July 5,1995, for inoperable core spray injection valves (EA 95-070)).
I NUREG-0940, PART II A-155 ;
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 3 Corporation assess the significance of the issue; (2) performance of a 10 CFR 50.59 analysis to support repositioning the RHR minimum flow valves to "normally open" so as to allow minimum flow even in the event of a loss of the related EDG; (3) review of all plant programs to ensure that the correct position of the RHR minimum flow valves was reflected in each program; (4) examination of all ECCS for susceptibility to a single failure vulnerability; (5) update of the RHR system plant engineering drawings and UFSAR description regarding the minimum flow valve position and the LOCA analysis scenario; (6) review of the design change process to determine if any weaknesses remain that could result in similar problems with plant engineering drawings, specifications, and operating procedures; and (7) conduct of engineering staff training regarding the need for comprehensive, rather than narrowly focused, reviews of operating experience reports. Since credit is warranted for both identification and corrective actions, a civil penalty would not normt!!y be issued in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process set forth in the Enforcement Policy. However, given the length of time (approximately 22 years) that this condition existed, as well as the number of prior opportunities that existed to identify and correct this vio!ation sooner, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance with Section Vll.A.1 of the Enforcement Policy and issue the enclosed Notice that assesses a civil penalty at the base amount of $50,000. l The second apparent violation identified in the inspection report, involving the failure to take corrective action for particular aspects of the RHR system single failure vulnerability has been factored into the enclosed Notice and discussed in the description of missed opportunities that existed to identify the violation of Appendix K and is not being cited separately. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response, in your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. In your response, you also should address your actions to ensure that opportunities to identify existing problems are recognized promptly so that appropriate corrective actions are taken. After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.700 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response wi;l be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the POR without redaction. l l l l r l NUREG-0940, PART !! A-156 i - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _
l Vermont Yankse Nuclear Power 4 Corporation j ~ The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96.511. - Sincerely, Hubert J. Miller i Regional Administrator i Docket No. 50-271 , License No. DPR-28
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty t t F l l i i l 4 l l NUREG-0940, PART.11 A-157
l ENCLOSUR,1 NOTICE OF VlOLATION AND PROPOSED IM'OSITION OF CML PENALTY Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation Docket No. 50-271 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station License No. DPR-28 EA 96-210 During an NRC inspection conducted from Jene 3 through June 14,1996, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG 1600, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act),42 U S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violation and associated civil penalty are set forth below: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K, Section D.1, Shale Failure Criterion, requires, in part, that an analysis of possible failure modes M Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) equipment and of their effects on ECCS performance must be made. In carrying out the accident evaluation, the combination of ECCS subsystems assumed to be operative shall be those available after the most damaging single failure of ECCS equipment has taken place. Contrary to the above, prior to April 26,1996, the licensee did not perform an analysis of possible failure modes of ECCS equipment and of their effects on the ECCS performance that included an analysis of the most damaging single failure vulnerability of the ECCS equipment for certain loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs). Specifically, LOCA analyses performed for operating Cycles 17 and 18 by licensee staff, and the i LOCA analyses performed by contractor (General Electric) staff for Cycle 16, and earlier, (performed pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K) did not evaluate or acknowledge the single failure vulnerability that existed for certain loss of coolant accidents. In particular, for certain intermediate or small break LOCAs, a single failure vulnerability existed since 1974 in that for each train of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, the two pumps per train were powered from separate emergency diesel generators (EDGs), and the minimum flow valve for the train, which was normally closed, was powered from one of those EDGs. A loss of the EDG that powered the minimum flow valve for that train would disable not only the RHR pump powered by that same EDG, but also could result in damage to the RHR pump powered by the other EDG because of the lack of minimum flow for pump cooling. (01013) This is a Seventy Level ll1 violation (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty - $50,000 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (Licensee)is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly NUREG-0940, PART II A-158 marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results ; achieved (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a .' Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a wntten answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be cleariy marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the viola-tion (s) listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty. Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due that subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attomey General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory , Commission, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Senior Resident inspector at the facility that is 1 the subject of this Notice. l 1 l l NUREG-0940, PART II A-159
Enclosure - 3 Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent
.possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR. If redactions are required, a proprietary version containing brackets placed around the proprietary, privacy, and/or safeguards information should be submitted. In addition, a non-proprietary version with the information in the brackets redacted should be submitted to be placed in the PDR.
Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 23rd day of August 1996 . r
)
3 l NUREG-0940, PART II A-160
p" *% UNITED STATES
,, Ig NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y.kp!} }
REGON tit
;tsp ! e 6ot WAAAENVILLE ROAo g ,,4 p/ uSLE. ILUNOis 6o532-4351 Deccraber 3,1996 EA 96-273 Mr. R. A. Abdoo Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer Wisconsin Energy Corporation 231 West Michigan Street - P440 Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201-
SUBJECT:
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - UNITS 1 AND 2 NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF civil PENALTIES -
$325,000 (NRC Integrated Inspection Report Nos. 50-266/96006; 50-301/96006 and 50-266/96007; 50-301/96007)
Dear Mr. Abdoo:
This refers to the inspections conducted from June 12 through August 23, 1996, at the Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant. The inspections included a review of the conduct of control room activities, plant configuration control, post-maintenance and inservice testing, and conduct of dry cask storage activities. The reports documenting the inspections were sent by letter dated September 5, 1996, and November 6, 1996, and an open pre-decisional enforcement conference was conducted on September ~12, 1996. Based on the information developed during the inspections and the information that was provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding the violations are described in detail in the subject inspection reports. The. issues we identified reflect significant weaknesses in the areas of operations, maintenance, and engineering at your Point Beach facility which involve all levels of your organization. While these issues are of significant regulatory concern, we are also concerned by the inadequate response (and sometimes the lack of a response) by your staff to most of these issues. This indicates to us that there is a need for greater cttention to: (1) what Technical Specifications (TS), NRC regulations, and Point Beach procedures require; and (2) the importance of full compliance with these safety requirements. The violations'in Section 1 of the Notice involve three separate occasions when licensed operators were inattentive to their duties, in addition to examples of inadequate on-shift' staffing. On July 15, 1996, an NRC inspector observed on-shift control. room watchstanders viewing a training videotape in the control room. Further review determined that viewing videotapes in the control room was a routine practice that had been ongoing for several years. NUREG-0940, PART II A-161 .i
1 I i R. Abdoo 2 Decmber 3, 1996 ( On July 31, 1996, an NRC inspector observed that a Unit 1 Control Operator had l left his normally assigned watch station to get a cup of coffee without a required short-term watch relief. We are particularly concerned that when the Duty Shift Supervisor was questioned about these incidents, he incorrectly informed the inspectors that these activities were allowed by plant procedures. On August 14, 1996, an NRC inspector observed the Unit 1 Control Operator fail to respond to a control board alarm until prompted by a senior reactor operator. When we discussed this observation with the Operations Manager (in l the presence of the Site Manager), he indicated that he was not concerned because operators have good teamwork in the control room and an operator will occasionally miss an alarm. Finally, your staff identified that on August 14, 1996, the Duty Technical Advisor left the site while on duty, and, although capable of responding to the control room within the minimum time specified in the TS, being offsite was contrary to TS. This apparently had been an accepted practice for the past five years. The violations in Section I of the Notice represent inattentiveness to duty on ! the part of licensed personnel, This does not appear to be an isolated l problem at Point Beach and is a significant regulatory concern. Therefore, l the violations have been classified in the aggregate in accordance with the l " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" l (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level III problem. l The violations in Section II of the Notice involve the: (1) failure to maintain adequate configuration control of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system following maintenance on the turbine-driven AFW pump resulting in taking the reactor critical with the pump's discharge valves closed, in violation of TS; (2) failure of the inservice testing program for the safety injection pumps to incorporate appropriate design basis acceptance criteria; and, (3) failure to require testing gages to be accurate within acceptable i limits. During the 1996 Unit I refueling outage, the turbine-driven AFK pump l governor valve stem was replaced. Testing procedures conducted following the l stem replacement did not provide for restoration of the pump's discharge flow i path valve lineup following the maintenance activity. Additionally, the work l order associated with the stem replacement specified a cold fast start test as part of the required operability post-maintenance testing. Despite this requirement, the reactor was taken critical withnut the cold fast start test having been performed and with the pump discharge valves closed, which > rendered the pump's flowpath inoperable. The violations in Section II of the Notice represent a breakdown in control of licensed activities and have been classified in the aggregate in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, as a Severity Level III problem. The violation in Section 111 of the Notice involves your staff failing to take prompt corrective action following the identification of a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, after completion of a calculation in April 1996, your staff concluded that the number of service water pumps required to NUREG-0940, PART 11 A-162
R. Abdoo 3 December 3, 1996 l mitigate a design-basis accident was greater than the number specified in both the Final Safety Analysis Report and TS. Your staff implemented , administrative _ controls to increase the required number of service water pumps necessary for safe operation. However, this action was not adequate because you did not promptly request an amendment to the TS. As a result, the TS did not accurately specify the lowest functional capability or performance level of the service water system required for safe operation of your facility as ' required by 10 CFR 50.36. This violation represents a significant failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, and has been categorized in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, as a Severity level !!! violation. ,
.The violations in Section IV of the Notice are based on the rasults of an inspection performed by an Augmented Inspection Team following D e hydrogen ignition event which occurred during welding on a VSC-24 spent fuel cask. '
Pursuant to 10 CFR 72.210, the Wisconsin Electric Power Company has been
. granted a general license to store spent fuel in an independent spent fuel storage installation at its Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant. The inspection of activities conducted under that general license, found that the weight of the multi-assembly sealed basket (MSB) shield lid was not appropriately ,
translated from the safety analysis report into several procedures and there was an inadequate procedure for placing the MSB transfer cask into the spent fuel pool.- In addition to these findings, it was determined that the use of Carbo Zinc 11 paint, in a barated water environment was not properly assessed by you and your vendor, Sierra Nuclear Corporation. The paint generates hydrogen in a borated water environment and ade-quate controls to deal with the , hydrogen were not provided. Several opportunities to identify the generation ' of hydrogen during previous eask loading operations had been missed. Finally, a safety evaluation was not performed for improperly sized rigging utilized for lowering the MSB into the ventilated concrete cask, and a safety ; evaluation for weighing the MSB shield lid while in place was not adequate. , These violations of the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72 represent a breakdown i in control of licensed activities associated with dry cask storage activities and have been classified in the aggregate in accordance with the Enforcement , Policy, as a Severity Level 111 problem. During the enforcement conference, your staff identified a number of root causes for these violations including weaknesses in: (1) questioning attitudes, (2) management expectations, (3) resolution of issues, (4) attention to detail, (5) communications, and (6) organizational design. Numerous corrective actions were described to address these root causes. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 for power reactors was considered for each Severity Level 111 , violation or problem in Sections I, 11, and 111 of the Notice. A base civil ! penalty in the amount of $12,500 for independent spent fuel installations was i
' considered for the problem in Section IV of the Notice. Because your facility '
i i i NUREG-0940, PART II A-163 - l
\
R. Abdoo 4 Deccrber 3, 1996 has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years', the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit was not warranted for. identification because the NRC identified the Severity Level 111 problems in Sections I, II, and IV of the Notice and the Severity Level III violation in Section III of the Notice. Af ter consideration of the factor of corrective action, NRC has determined that credit was not warranted for the violations associated with licensed operator inattentiveness noted in Section I of the Notice because of your failure to recognize the unacceptability of the NRC identified operator performance-issues and the resulting failure to properly initiate corrective actions. As to the violations in Section 11 of the Notice, although you presented a number of corrective actions in LER No. 96-002, in response to the April 1996 AFW configuration control event, we note that following testing in August 1996, the Unit 2 service water valve SW-104 was found out-of-position by the NRC, indicating your corrective actions in response to configuration control inadequacies were not comprehensive. Finally, your staff's corrective actions for the inservice testing and post-maintenance testing violations were not prompt because they were only initiated just prior to the enforcement conference, despite these issues having been identified by the NRC at least a month earlier. In addition, credit is not warranted for your corrective actions taken in response to the violation described in Section III of the Notice, involving your staff's failure to take prompt corrective action to request an amendment to your 15. At the time of the pre-decisional enforcement conference, your staff had not requested an amendment to assure that the required number of service water pumps for safe operation of the
~
facility were accurately listed in the TS, and an amendment was not requested until September 30, 1996. Accordingly, the NRC has determined that credit is not warranted for the factor of corrective action for the Severity Level 111 problems in Sections I and II, and the Severity Level III violation in ! Section 111 of the Notice. Therefore, after consideration of the factors of identification and corrective action, a civil penalty of $100,000 is being assessed for each of the Severity Level 111 problems and violations in Sections I, 11, and !!! of the Notice. As to the violation described in Section IV of the Notice, NRC considered your corrective action prompt and comprehensive. With no credit warranted for the factor of identification, as described above, normal application of the Enforcement Policy would result in a base civil penalty of $12,500 being assessed for the violations associated with the VSC-24 spent fuel cask. However, because of the need to stress the importance of (1) properly conducting spent fuel cask loading operations; (2) being attentive to the indications of hydrogen generation that would have alerted your staff to the A Severity level III violation (identified in July 1995) was issued on - October 11, 1995 (EA 95-158). ! f NUREG-0940, PART II A-164
1 I l R. Abdoo 5 Dece:rber 3,1996 : L
)
need for adequate controls during welding operations; and (3) ensuring that . cask design details, such as paint, are thoroughly evaluated for interactions I with materials in the plant environment by cask vendors and plant engineering, I have been authorized to exercise enforcement discretion and double the proposed base civil penalty. The penalty for the violation associated with the VSC-24 spent fuel cask is $25,000. Therefore, to emphasize the need for full compliance with_NRC regulatory requirements, I have'been authorized, after consultation with the Director, ' Office of Enforcement to issue the enclosed Notice in the total amount of
$325,000 for the Severity Level III violation and problems described in the Notice, ,
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in'the enclosed Hotice when preparing your response. The NRC will ' use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is
.necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. i
-In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of j this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
1 Sincerely, A. Bill Beach # Regional Administrator l Docket Nos. 50-266;,50-301; 72-005
. License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27 ,
Enclosure:
' Notice of. Violation and Proposed ;
P Asition of Civil Penalties cc w/ encl: S. A. Patulski, 3ite General Manager A. J. Cayia, Plant Manager Virgil Kanable, Chief Boller Section Cheryl L. Parrino, Chairman, ; i Wisconsin Public Service Commission State Liaison Officer Sierra Nuclear Corporation
\
l l l NUREG-0940, PART II A-165 l I l
e NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF civil PENALTIES Wisconsin Electric Power Company Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301; 72-005 Point Beach Nuclear Plant License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27 Units 1 and 2 EA 96-273 During NRC inspections conducted on June 12 through August 23, 1996, violations of NRC requirements were identified. in accordance with the
" General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
NUREG-1600, the NRC proposes to impose civil penalties pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalties are set forth below:
- 1. Violations Associated with Licensed Ooerator Inattentiveness and On-Dutv Shift Staffing 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures and Drawings," requires that activities affecting quality shall be l prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures or drawings.
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Operations Manual (OH) Section 3.1, " Main Control Room Conduct and Access," Revision 3, dated November 7, 1994, Step 7.1.3 states, in part, that potentially distracting activities are strictly forbidden. Step 7.1.7.d requires that a watch relief must occur prior to the Control Operator leaving the surveillance areas. Step 7.1.8 states that the short-term watch relief is required to maintain a physical position in the normal area for the Control Operator. Section 7.0, requires, in part, that individuals on-watch in j the control room are expected to behave according to the highest standards of conduct. After assuming the duties and responsibilities of the watchstation, the operator is expected to be attentive to assigned duties, instrumentation, controls, computer monitors, and alarms, and operator response to alarms should be timely. OM 2.5, " Licensed Operators," Revision 0, dated June 10, 1993, Section 2.0, requires, in part, that the reactor operator has principle responsibility for the operations of his assigned unit and is responsible to remain alert to and knowledgeable of all plant conditions in progress that involve the functioning of equipment under his control. l Technical Specification (TS) 15.6.2:2.a.6 states that the Duty Technical Advisor is located on-site on ten minute call to the control room. A. Contrary to the above, on July 15, 1996, on-shift watchstanders (licensed reactor operators and senior reactor operators) were viewing a training videotape in the control room, a potentially distracting activity. (01013) NUREG-0940, PART II A-166
l i , . Notice of Violation -2 ; l B. . Contrary to the above, on July 31, 1996, the Unit 1 Control :
.0perator (licensed reactor operator) left the surveillance areas !
without a short-term watch relief maintaining a physical position ' in the normal area for the Control Operator. (01023) t C. Contrary to the above, on August 14, 1996, the Unit 1 Control - Operator (licensed reactor operator) was not attentive to his ; assigned duties; was not alert to and knowledgeable of plant status; and was not timely in responding to an expected alarm, in , that a main control board panel (C01) annunciator alarm was present for-15 seconds with no response from the operator. (01033) D. Contrary to the above, on August 14, 1996, the on-shift Duty , Technical Advisor went off-site while on duty. (01043)
- This is a Severity Level 111 problem (Supplement I)
' Civil Penalty - $100,000.
,11.- Violations Associated with~the Auxiliary Feedwater and Safety Iniection h11tLm,1 A. . TS 15.3.4.A.2.a requires for two-unit operation when the reactor is heated above 350*F, that the reactor not be taken critical '
unless'all four auxiliary feedwater pumps together with their associated flow paths and essential instrumentation are operable. Contrary-to the above, at 6:20 p.m. on April 22, 1996, during two-unit' operation when the reactor was heated above 350'F, Unit I was made critical with the Turbine Driven Auxiliary feedwater Pump IP-29 rendered inoperable in that the pump's discharge " isolation valves, IAF-4000 and 1AF-4001, were shut. (02013) B. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, CYiterion V " Instructions, Procedures ! and Drawings," requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures,'or drawings, of i a type appropriate to-the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with'these instructions, procedures or drawings.
- 1. Point Beach Nuclear Plant Operations Checklist CL-ID, "Heatup," Revision 9, dated November 20, 1995, Step 4.23, states, in part, that all four auxiliary feedwater pumps ;
together with their associated flow paths and essential ! instrumentation are operable for two-unit operation prior to ,
-proceeding with the plant heatup. Operations Checklist '
CL-1A, " Criticality Checklist," Revision 35, dated ; November 27,1995, Step 9.2, states, in part, that all four , auxiliary feed pumps, together with their associated flow ' paths and essential instrumentation, shall be operable for one-unit to be critical and the second unit being made ; critical.. ; l l NUREG-0940, PART-1I A-167 ) i
Notice of Violation ' L3 If I" j Contrary to the above, during the period including. April 15, 4 1996,;through April 22,-1996, operations personnel improperly initialed Step 4.23 of CL-ID and Step 9.2 of l CL-1A, indicating that the auxiliary feedwater system was. operable when the Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump and the pump's flow path was-inoperable due to the L . pump's discharge isolation valves lAF-4000 and 1AF-4001, l >- being shut. (02023)
- 2. Contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Point
!- Beach Nuclear Plant Work Order 9600818, issued on April 7, ll '1996, for the replacement of the Unit I turbine driven
- ' auxiliary feedwater pump governor valve stem, was 11 . inadequate, in that it did not specify steps to restore the
!. pump discharge flowpath to its normal and nperable i configuration. As a result, the pump's flow path was i rendered inoperable. -(02033) f
- 3. Contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Point Beach Nuclear Plant Procedure IT-2908, "Overspeed Test Turbine Driven Auxiliary feedwater Pump, Refueling Interval Unit 1," Revision 4, dated ~ April 8, 1996, was inadequate, in that it did not specify adequate testing to demonstrate that the pump's flow path was operable following the reconnection of the pump and. turbine. (02043)
- 4. Contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, prior-to making Unit I critical on April 22, 1996, the licensee failed to perform the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Work Order 9600818 specified post maintenance operability test, Procedure IT-08A, " Cold Start Testing of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump and Valve Test Unit 1 (Quarterly)."
.(02053)
C. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 8, Criterion XI, " Test Control," requires that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Contrary to the above, from March 28, 1994, through June 13, 1996, the licensee's inservice test program for the safety injection pumps did not incorporate the. requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Specifically, the
-licensee's test program did not incorporate the correct acceptance criterion of-1375 psig at 400 gpm which is derived from the reduce <l performance pump curve in Figure 6.2-4 of the Final Safety Analysis Report. (02063)
. NUREG-0940,._ PARTL II A-168 .
l
, ;)
l l- "
'Notic'e of Violation- 4 s D. '10 CFR Part 50,; Appendix B, Criterion XII, " Control of. Measuring ~
r .and Test Equipment," requires that measures.be. established to l assure that gages,. instruments, And other measuring and testing 1 devices used in activities affecting quality are properly controlled, calibrated, and adjusted at'specified periods to maintain accuracy within'necessary limits.- Contrary to'the above,-from Decembe'r 1992 until July 1996, the i four Ashcroft safety injection pump discharge pressure gages used ' for determining the acceptability of quarterly inservice testing, an activity affecting quality, were not properly controlled, calibrated, and adjusted at a sufficient frequency to maintain accuracy within necessary limits, Specifically, during the , period, the gages were found.within their required accuracy only 4 once in twenty calibrations. (02073) 4; This 'is a Severity Level 111 problem (Supplement I). , Civil Penalty.- $100,000. t lill. 'ylglgtf on Associated with the Servj.ge Water System j 1 TS 15.3.3.D requires that neither reactor be.made or maintained critical. k unless four-service water pumps are operable, two from each train. :The - l basis for TS 15.3.3.0 states, in part, that a total of six pumps are ; installed, only two of which are required to operate during the ~ injection and recirculation phases <of a postulated loss-of-coolant i accident. . ' 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action,"
. requires, in'part, that' measures shall be established to assure that i conditions adverse to quality,:such as deficiencies, deviations, and 1 nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure l that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action !
taken to preclude repetition. ! p Contrary to the rbove, on April 2, 1996, the licensee concluded in Calculation 96-0074 that a total of two operating service water pumps were not attequate to maintain required flows and pressures, ; and that.a total of three pumps were required to maintain desired i flows and pressuras throughout the service water system during the ; injection phase of a LOCA response. This conclusion that three i pumps were required rather than the two pumps specified in the TS . basis, constituted a condition adverse to quality. As a result,
~ TS 15.3.3.0 did not accurately specify the lowest function -
capability or performance level of the service water system required for safe operation of the facility. As of August 23, 1996, the licensee failed to take prompt action to correct this u condition adverse to quality by failing to request an amendment to l
' assure.that.the TS' accurately reflected the minimum number of .
service water. pumps necessary for the safe operation of the ; 1 : l i 4 NUREG-0940,1PART IF . A-169 q
y 3 T
.Noticeof' Violation- 5 facility. 'During'the period from April 2, 1996, through August '23,:1996, the licensee' operated the station _with one or -i
, both of'the reactors critical. (03013)
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I); i
. Civil Penalty -5100,000.
L IV .- ~ Violations Associated With Dry Cask Storace Activities A. ~10 CFR 72.212(b)(7) requires the licensee to comply with the terms and conditions ~ of the Certificate of Compliance for each cask , model used for storage of spent fuel. 1
' Certificate of Compliance 1007, Attachment A, Section 1.1.3, requires that activities at the independent spent fuel storage
. installation (ISFSI) be conducted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that applicable regulatory .i requirements and the design basis, as specified in the license ; application,.for those structures, systems, and components to i which-this appendix applies, are correctly translated into l procedures. Measures shall also be established for selection and review for suitability _ of application of Eterials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related ; functions of structures, systems, and couponents. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterior. V, " Instructions, Procedures and Drawings," requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of I a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished
~
in accordance with these instructions, procedures or drawings, j i 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action," 1 requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that conditicas adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. 1 The identification of the significant condition adverse to ! quality. the cause of the condition, and the corrective action ' taken shall be documented and reported to the appropriate levels of management.
- 1. Contrary to the above, as of May 28, 1996, with regard to l Point Beach ISFSI activities, measures were not established !
to assure that the design basis was correctly translate d
. into procedures. Specifically, the following procedures 4 listed _a weight of 4,429 pounds for the multi-assembly l
- sealed basked (MSB) shield lid while the VSC-24 spent fuel I
i INUREG-0940,' PARL II- , A-170 & w
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i i
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i
~ Notice of Violation 16: j
. i c cask Safety Analysis Report. Table 3.2-1 listed l
6,350 pounds. t- .
'e .RP-7, Part 1, " Move the Ventilated Concrete Cask (VCC). ?
- into the Auxiliary Building," Table 1, Revision 5, .i dated April: 29,.1996 j
- ' *. RP-7, Part 2, " Load the Multi-Assembly Sealed Basket i
-(MSB) into the MSB Transfer Cask (MTC)," Table 1, !
Revision 5, dated April 29, 1996 l e RPD, Part 5, " Remove the Multi-Assembly Sealed Basket-(MSli) r.nd MSB Transfer Cask (MTC) from.the Spent Fuel -l Pool t$FP)," Table 1,_ Revision 5, dated May 16, 1996 e 'P-8, R Part 4, " Placing the MSB Transfer Cask (MTC) ! into the Spent Fuel Pool " Table 1, Revision 1, dated ; December 8, 1995 (04013)
- 2. Contrarytto the above,.as of May 27, 1996, with regard to i the Point Beach ISFSI activities, Procedure RP-8, Part 4, t
" Placing the MSB Transfer Cask (MTC) into the Sper.t Fuel l Pool," Table 1, Revision 1, dated December 8,- 1995, was j inadequate in that: .;
- a. Step 4.3, required verification that the ambient temperature in the general, area surrounding the MTC to be greater than 45'F, but did.not specify the method .
of measuring temperature. As a result, a thermometer > near a space heater was used to measure' temperature i and this was-inadequate because measured temperature did not reflect the ambient temperature in the general ! I area surrounding the MTC; and ;
- b. no guidance was provided to remove the shield lid from the spent fuel ~ pool. This guidance was required to t complete the cask unloading operations. As a result, the shield lid was allowed to be suspended above the ;
spent fuel pool for an indefinite time presenting a ! potential hazard if dropped over spent fuel ! assemblies. (04023). i t
- 3. Contrary to the above, as of May 28, 1996, with regard to i Point Beach ISFSI activities, the licensee had selected ;
Carbo Zinc 11 to coat the interior of the multi-assembly s sealed basket without appropriately establishing the , suitability of application for use in dry cask storage ! activities. Specifically, Carbo Zinc 11 is not intended for
; immersion ~in acidic solutions, such as the spent fuel pool, :
i l 1 e ! i l i lNOREG-0940,?PART'II, ' A-171 - j!
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Il ; ___.____. _ . 1 ._. , _. .
Notice of_ Violation '7 b and 'there was' the potential' for zine borate to precipitate
!in the spent fuel pool water. (04033)-
- 4. Contrary to the above,'on May 22,.1996, with regard to Point Beach ISFSI activities, during the loading of a cask, a-small, unexpected blue flame was observed while welders were
' grinding a portion of the shield lid root weld. The
. identification of.this significant condition adverse to
. quality, the'cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken wr.s not documented and reported to the appropriate levels of management.- (04043) 5 .' Contrary to the above, on May 22, 1996,- with regard to Point Beach ISFSI activities, during the loading of a cask, unexpected water seepage from the cask drain line onto the
. top of the shield lid was observed. This was a condition adverse to quality because the presence of water was an indicator of pressure within the cask that was being caused by hydrogen being produced. The identification of this significant condition adverse to quality, the'cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken was not documented and reported to the appropriate levels of management. (04053)
B. 10 CFR 72.48(a),' states, in part, that a licensee may make changes to the ISFSI described in the Safety Analysis Report or in the procedures described in the Safety Ar.alysis Report if the changes do not constitute'an unreviewed safety question or a significant increase in occupational exposure. 10 CFR 72.48 (b)(1) requires, in part, that the Itcensee maintain records' of changes int the ISFSI, and changes in procedures made pursuant to this section if these changes constitute changes in the ISFSI or procedures described in the Safety Analysis Report. These records must include a written safety evaluation that provides'the bases for the determination that the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question; t-VSC-24 spent fuel cask Safety Analysis Report (SAR) describes, in part, that the purpose of the cover plate is to prevent inadvertent lifting of the MSB out of the MTC to ensure undue
- radiation exposure to nearby workers. The SAR further describes that the cover plate must have sufficient strength to support the MTC (since an-inadvertent MSB lift would imply lifting the entire MTC).
- 1. Contrary to the above, as of May 28, 1996, the licensee did not perform a safety evaluation to determine if an unreviewed safety question existed prior to a lifting evolution which created the potential for dropping the
"* A-172 NUREG-094dhPARTII.
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' Notice of Violation 8 MS8/MTC. assembly off of the VCC, an accident not described in the SAR. (04063)-
- 2. Contrary to 10 CfR 72.48 (b)(1), on May 29,L1996, Safety Evaluation Report (SER) 96-045 for weighing the MSB shield lid while in place did not provide adequate bases for the -
determination that the change did not involve an unreviewed ' safety question. Specifically, SER 96-045 did not address inadvertently removing the lid from the MSB Gring weighing E operations which would result in a significant increase in i occupational exposure. (04073) This is a Severity Level III problem (Supplement VI). Civil Penalty - 525,000,- Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Wisconsin Electric Power Company
-(Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to
. .the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, i
- a. - within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition '
- 'of' Civil Penalties (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation
(1) admission or dental of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if: denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps . that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as why the license should ' not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or
' affirmation.
Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10'CFR 2.201, the Licenseu may pay the civil penalties by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with , a-check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalties proposed above, or may protest imposition of the civil penalties in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalties will be issued. Should the Licensee-elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part sucn answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" had may: (1) deny the violation listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil 4
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20
'NUREG-0940. PART I'I- A-173 '
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, :u Notice of-Violation' 9 penalties in wholelor.in part. such answer may request remission or, mitigation' l of the penalties. ,
'In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalties, the factors ' addressed in' l Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. : Any. written answer.in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation.in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may
. incorporate parts of the'10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific' reference (e.g.,
. citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The' attention of the
. Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 GR 2.205, regarding the l procedure for imposing civil penalties. -;
'Upon failure to pay any civil penalties due which subsequently has been 1 determined in accordance with the applicable prcvisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this
- matter may be referred to the Attorney General, end the penalties, unless- '
compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil. action pursuant'
'to Section 234c of'the Act, 42 U.f.C. 2282c. ;
;The re'sponse noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of
. civil penalties, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: i James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory ,
Commission, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852- ; 2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory ; Commission, Region III and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice.
- Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to l the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary,
~
.or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without
'redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide.an acceptable response,' then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response.that deletes such info'rmation. If you request withholding of such material, you m it specifically identify the portions of ;
your response that you seek'to have withheld and provide in detail the bases i for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarrantni invasion of personal privacy or provide the , infcrmation required by b CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding i confidential commercial e financial information). If safeguards information ; is necessary to providi ar. acceptable response, please provide the level of -t protection described 19.10 CFR 73.21. ) 00ted at' Lisle, Illinois
-.th!s 3rd day of December 1996 i
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;NUREG-0940, PART II- A-174 d
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es 88 cy, yN itD57ATES ff \ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION tv $ 4 Gil RY AN PLAZA ORIVE, Sulf E 400 6, 5 ,0 ARLINoToN f E X AS 76011 6064
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July I, 1996 ffA96-124 Neil 5. Carns, President and Chief Executive Officer Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, Kansas 66839
SUBJECT:
NOTICE Of VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF civil PENALTIES -
$300,000 (NRC inspection Report Nos. 50-482/96-05 and 50-482/96-03)
Dear Mr. Carns:
This refers to the predectstonal enforcement conference held in the NRC's Arlington, Texas office on May 10, 1996. The purpose of the conference was to discuss apparent violations related to a frazil ice situation that occurred at the Wolf Creek Generating Station on' January 30-31, 1996. Wolf Creek personnel first reported the event to the NRC on January 30, 1995, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72. An NRC Augmented inspection Team (AIT) examined the facts surrounding the event during the period of February 6-15, 1996, and the results of the inspection were documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/96-05, issued on March 7, 1996. The scope of the Ali was fact-finding and did not include the identification of any potential violations of regulatory requirements. A subsequent special inspection was conducted on March 18-25, 1996, to determine whether activities were conducted safely and in accordance with NRC requirements, and ten apparent violations were ider.tified. The results of this special inspection were discussed with members of your staff during an exit briefing on April 5,1996, and were documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/96-03, issued on April 24, 1996. As described in the April 24, 1996 inspection report, the apparent violations stemmed from the NRC's review of the event that involved icing on the circulation water system / service water system traveling screens and trash
-racks which resulted in the decision to manually trip the reactor, and the subsequent event recovery actions. The NRC's Ali noted the event was safety significant in that ice formation on the essential service water (ESW) system trash racks resulted in the loss of one train (Train A) of the ultimate heat l sink and jeopardized the other (Train B). This event.also showed significant l weaknesses in engineering, operations, and maintenance.
The NRC has determined that the circumstances surrounding the event are of , very significant regulatory concern because: (1) the event was ' safety-significant; (2) the event was preventable; (3) although ultimately, l Wolf Creek personnel took positive actions to terminate the event, the plant ! i l NUREG-0940, PART II A-175 l l
j
' Wolf Creek Nuclear -Operating Corporation-operaticns staff made errors in the early stages which actually complicated, rather than-mitigated, the event; and (4) preventable problems with the
. packing.on 'the turbine-driven auxiliary' feedwater (TDAfW) pump, a isafety-related pumpf distracted plant personnel from focusing on a response to-the problems with the ESW system. Based on the information obtained during
.the NRC inspections, and the information provided during the predecisional enforcement conference, the NRC has determined that violations of regulatory
-requirements occurred. These violations are listed in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice). The more significant violations are grouped into three issues and are described below.
Thle first issue (Violation I. A in the enclosed Notice) is a violation involving a f ailure to assure that inadequate ESW system warming line flow, a condition adverse to quality, was promptly identified and corrected. This fallure, which'directly contributed to the January. 30-31, 1996 frazil icing event, involved at least four opportunities to have assessed the design basis of.the system and to have identified and corrected the inadequate warming line flow. .Although'not reviewed during the inspections associated with the 1 January 30, 1996, event and not cited in the Notice,= Generic letter 89-13,
" Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety Related Equipment," was another possible opportunity for the identification of the deficiency in the ESW warming lines. The failure to assure adequate warming line flow and the l' missed opportunities to identify and correct the problem is of significant regulatory concern. Therefore, this violation is c:tegori7ad in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level 111 violation. ='
The second. issue (Violation 1,8 in the Notice) is a violation involving a failure.to follow plant procedures while aligning the ESW system. The (> operator who performed the initial alignment did so without a procedure and E had concerns about the accuracy of his actions and an excessive period of time clapsed (about 6 hours) before ESW valve misalignments'were corrected. .This failure resulted in valve misalignments that contributed to, and hastened, the failure of ESW Train A and the degradation of ESW Train B, further # complicating the event. This failure is also of significant regulatory concern. Therefore, this violation is categorized in accordance with the Enforcement. Policy as a Severity Level ill violation, lhe third issue (Violations I.C.1 and I.C.2 in the Notice) involves two separate violations involving (1) a failure to include all work instructions for-installing packing on the TOAfW pump; and (2) inadequate corrective action for a problem with the TDAfW pump. The first violation contributed to the packing failure of the TDAfW on January 30, 1996, while the second violation represents a missed opportunity to have identified and adequately corrected the packing installation problem. It is questionable whether the TDAFW pump would have been able to perform its intended safety function if it had been called upon to function. Given the safety _ significance of the TDAFW pump and the distractions the leaking pump caused during the frazil ice event, these violations are of.significant. regulatory concern and warrant being classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level !!! problem. LNUREG-0940.PARTLII. A-176
1 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation i in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is normally considered for each Severity Level 111 violation or problem. However, each of these violations (Violations 1.A, 1.8, and I.C) reflect significant weaknesses in engineering, operations, and maintenance that cnntributed to the frazil ice event and complicated the recovery from a risk-significant event that was entirely preventable. These violations reflect particularly poor performance characterized by missed opportunities to identify and correct significant design problems, inappropriate operator actions that severely challenged event mitigation, and TDAFW pump maintenance and corrective action deficiencies that resulted in distractions in recovery from the event. In view of this particularly poor performance that substantially contributed to, and severely complicated the recovery from this risk-significant event, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director Office of Enforcement, and the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research, to exercise discretion pursuant to Section Vil A. of the Enforce m t Policy and to propose a civil E penalty in the amount of $100,000 for each of the two Severity tevel !!! ^ violations and the Severity tevel 111 problem. Accordingly, to emphasize the significance of the problems these violations represent, to encourage . improvement in performance, and to emphasis the need for lasting comprehensive corrective actions, I have issued the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) in the total amount of
$300,000.
Five additional violat ions are cited in the attached Notice for which no civil penalties are assessed. The first involves a failure to assure that the ESW system design bases were appropriately translated into specifications and , drawings in that design errors were made which caused the ESW system not to be protected against freeting. Spccifically, incorrect ast,umptions regarding warming line temperature and flow rates resulted in significant degradation in the freeze protection capability provided by the warming lines. The errors had existed since original startup of the plant. This violation is significant because the failure to design the ESW system properly was a principal contributor to the icing event. Therefore, this violation has been categorized in accordance with the Enforcement Policy at Severity Level 111. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, -ivil penalty is normally considered for a Seve 4ty tevel til violati,m. However, in this case no civi? penalty is proposed for this violation because the violation occurred beyond the 5-year statute of limitations for imposing civil penalties. The four remaining viciations, categorized at Severity Level IV, involve failures to: (1) ensure that copies of station prcredures were available in the control room, (2) comply with a technical specification limiting condition for operation when the plant did not achieve hot shutdown in the required , 6-hour timeframe, (3) determine whether less than full thread engagement for ' the TDAFW pump inboard packing gland follower nuts was acceptable, and (4) follow maintenance work instructions contributing to TOAFW pump packing loss. NUREG-0940, PART II A-177 l l
r - Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation You are required to respond to this letter' and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In y _r esponse, you should document the specific actions-taken and any at ional
' actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your respcnse to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC~ regulatory requirements.
In accordance with 10 CfR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal _ privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the POR without redaction. Sincerely,- L. .c jan
' Regional Administrator Q
Docket No. 50-482 License No, NPF-42 [nclosure: Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties ! cc w/ enclosure: Vice President Plant Operations Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. , P.O. Box 4}) ! Burlington, Kansas 66839 Jay Silberg, Esq. Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge ) l 2300 N Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20037 A Supervisor Licensing Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. P.O. Box 411 Burlington, Kansas 66839 Supervisor Regulatory Compliance Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. P.O. Box 411 Burlington, Kansas 66839 4 t NUREG-0940, PART II A-178
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.Wolf Creek Nuclear:. -5:
Operating, Corporation ,
't- 1 m Assistant Manager 1
. Energy Department- I Missouri Public Service Commission. !
P.O. Box 360 ..
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" Jefferson. City, Missouri. 65102. ;
. Chief Engineer,- -
.)
Utilities Division?
-Kansas Corporation Commission
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-1500 SW Arrowhead.Rd,. ;
Topeka, Kansas-- 66604-4027. { Office of the Governor )
! state of Kansas . :
lopeka, Kansas 66612 . Attorney' General }
- Judicial' Center 4 ;
301 S.W. 10th: , 1 '2nd floor. . . Topeka, Kansas .66612-1597 .j County Clerk ;
'Coffey County Courthouse Burlington, Kansas ' 66839-1798. !
~Public Health Phystcist !
' Division of Environment :j Kansas Department of tiealth i and Environment !
I Bureau ~of' Air & Radiation
-Forbes field Building 283 i Topeka:, Kansas 66620 a ..
Mr. Frank Moussa-Division of Emergency Preparedness' l- 2800 SW Topeka Blvd Topeka, Kansas 66611-1287
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- , . . . . .. . . - I 2NUREG-0940,-PART'-IIf .. A-179 i
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1 l NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation ' Docket No. 50-482 Wolf Creek Generating Station License No. NPF-42 EA 96-124 During an NRC inspection conducted on March 18-25, 1996, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose civil penalties pursuant to Section 234 of the. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalties are set forth below:
- 1. Violations Assessed a Civil Penalty A. Appendix B, Criterion XVI,. states that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures and malfunctions, are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, as of January 30, 1996, the condition of i inadequate essential service water system warming line flow (a j condition adverse to quality) was not promptly identified and corrected. There were several opportunities to have identified and corrected the design bases of the system specifically related to warming line flow: (1) during an evaluation performed in 1993 related to a warming line valve only capable of being 50 percent open; (2) while evaluating whether a frazil icing event at another l t plant in 1993 could occur at Wolf Creek; (3) while answering an ! internal question in 1991 directly related to a concern for frazil l icing; and (4) while reviewing a 1978 NRC Circular related to icing conditions (frazil ice was specifically considered by the licensee's architect-engineer). (01013) This ns a Severity level 111 violation (Supplement 1). Civil Penalty - $100,000. B. Technical Specifications Section 6.8.1 states that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities recommended in Appendix A, of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1976. Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, specifies procedures for abnormal, offnormal, or alarm conditions. The licensee's alarm response Procedure ALR 00-0088, " SERV WTR PRESS HI LO," Revision 8, directs the operator to establish operation of the essential service water system (ESW) using Procedure SYS EF-200, " Operation of the ESW System." Procedure SYS EF-200 requires that ESW Valves EF HV-37 and -38 be opened, and EF HV-39, -40, -41, and -42 be closed. l
- .NUREG-0940, PART II
- A-180 l
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<Noticeofl Viol _ationl . ' Contrary to the above, on January'30, 1996 - a control room
~
operator. while' aligning the ESW system as directed by alarm . ! response Procedure ALR 00-0088, failed to use system Procedure SYS [F-200, and consequently the. control room operator closed Valves' , LEF HV-37 and -38 (to throttled positions), and opened. Valves EF 1 HV-39, -40, -41, and which was not 'in accordance with j _ Procedure SYS EF-200. (02013) ;
. s This is-a Severity level:lli violation (Supplement 1). l Civil Penalty - 5100,000 f
.C. 1. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V states that li
' activities affecting quality shall. be prescribed by '
documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type
' appropriate to the circumstances, j i
Contrary to_ the above, on January 25 and 30,1996, work :l
' instructions provided for packing the turbine-driven -
i auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump (an activity affecting ; quality):for WP. 108952, Task 6, and WP 109087, Task 2, were l not appropriate to the circumstances in'that not all ! pertinent packing information in Component Change Package . 05767, which was contained in the TOAFW pump vendor manual, l was included. _Specifically, neither.WP 108952, Task 6, or WP 109087, Task 2, provided adequate instructions , concerning: (1) the proper tightening of the packing gland follower nuts, (2) guidance on proper installation of the , packing glard follower into the pump stuffing box, and * (3) directions on the pump's post maintenance run time ! required to obtain proper packing leakoff. (03013) 2.. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, specifies that , measures shall be established to assure that conditions *
' adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, 4 deficiencies, or deviations are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to l Quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude recurrence.
Contrary to the above, as of January 30, 1996, a significant a
. condition adverse to quality - improper adjustment of packing on the safety-related TOAFW pump - was identified, but actions were not taken to determine and correct the cause of the deficient condition. Specifically, Performance 1 Improvement Request (PIR) 94-1918 was issued on October 30, ,
1994 to address the improper adjustment of packing on the ; 5 4
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Notice'of Viol'ation < - 3.- TOAFW pump. However, the PIR was closed on the basis o'f repacking the pump without determining and correcting the,
.cause.of the packing installation problem. (03023)
This is a Severity Level 111 problem (Supplement 1).~ Civil. Penalty - $100,000.
- 11. Violations Not Assessed A Civil Penalty A. '10 CFR'Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion Ill, states that measures "
shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory .
' requirements and design bases for.those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated i into. specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions, j I
Contrary to the above, as of January 30, 1996,. design measures-failed to assure that the essential service water sys. tem design bases (protection against natural phenomena) were appropriately translated into specifications.and drawings in that design errors were made which caused the essential service water system not to be freeze protected. Specifically, incorrect assumptions ! regarding warming line temperaturc and flow rates (35'F and full pipe flow) resulted in significant degradation in tne freeze protection capability provided by the warming lines. (04013) This is a Severity level 111 violatio6 (Supplement 1). B. Technical Specification section 6.8.1 states that written f procedures shall be established, implemented,_and maintained
~
covering the activities recommended in Appendix A, of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Appendix A of Regulatory . Guide 1.33, Revision 2, specifies procedures for abnormal, ! offnormal, or alarm conditions. Operations Procedure ADM 02-014, " Control of Operations Documents. Revision 5, Section 6.9.3 states that, " Procedures will be filed ; in the appropriate Procedure File Drawers, Procedural Manuals or
- field areas as applicable."
Contrary to the above, on January 30 and March 22, 1996, control room procedures were not filed in the appropriate location. 3 Specifically: r
- 1. .On January 30, 1996, when needed during the transition from Emergency Procedure EMG E-0, " Response to Reactor Trip or !
Safety-Injection," to Emergency Procedurq EMG ES-02, !
" Reactor. Trip Response," EMG ES-02 was determined not to be filed in any of the four emergency operating procedure sets ;
~in the control room as' required. l l
i i NUREG-0940,-PART II A-182
E
' Notice of. Violation 2. On March 22, 1996,'an NRC inspector datermined that' alarm
- response procedure ALR 00-110. "SL4L Bus Trouble," was not located in the control room after it had been identified as missing during an earlier licensee audit of' procedures, i
(05014) Thisii's a Severity level IV violation (Supplenent'!). l
.' l C. Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation Action ;
Statement 3.7.2.b specifies that in Modes 1, 2, and 3, "With two- , auxiliary feedwater pumps' inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY j
;within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours."
Contrary to the above, on January 30, 1996,- when in Mode 3 (Hot .
' Standby) and with.two auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, hot' shutdown was not achieved as specified in Technical' Specification Action Statement:3.7.2.b. The second auxiliary feedwater pump (A i Train) became inoperable at 7:47 a.m. on January 30, 1996. Hot ;
shutdown, which should have been achieved by 1:47 p.m., was not j
- achieved until 3:31 p.m.'on January 30, 1996. (06014)- i This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1). !
O. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, specifies that > measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to j quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, or ; deviations are.promptly identified and corrected, in the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the. measures shall ; assure that' the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude recurrence. Contrary to the above, as of January 30, 1996, a significant ! condition adverse to quality was identified, but actions were not taken to correct the deficiency or to determine the cause of the ; condition. Specifically, Work Request 60242-94 was issued on ' October 20, 1994, to correct the TDAFW pump inboard packing gland follower nuts which had insufficient thread engagement; however, the Work Request was closed without further action on the basis i that a non-conformance report did not specify full thread j engagement was acceptable. (07014) This is a Severity level IV violation (Supplement 1). E. Technical Specification Section 6.8.1 states that written j procedures shall be' established, implemented, and maintained ! covering the activities recommended in Appendix A, of Regulatory } GuideLl.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Appendix A of Regulatory ;
- Gu.ide 1.33, Revision 2, specifies that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety related equipment should be properly !
preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, s I
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i
', .NUREG-0940,PARTfII' A-183 -l l
Notice of Violation Maintenance Procedure 16C-002, " Work Controls " Revision 2, Step 6.6.7.5 states, " Perform work in accordance with work instructions and referenced documents," Task 2, step 5.4 of work order WP 108952 specified that the packing gland follower nuts be tightened
" snug."
Contrary to the above, on January 25, 1996, maintenance personnel failed to follow established procedures in the implementation of work on the TDAfW pump. Specifically, maintenance personnel tightened the nuts-only " finger tight," instead of " snug." (08014) This is a Severity level IV violation (Supplement 1). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days-of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil penalties (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the
. reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not i received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for l Information may be issued as why the license should not be modified, i suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
I Within the same time as provided for the response required above under j 10 CFR ?.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalties by letter addressed to l the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check : draft, money order, or alectronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalties in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to t he Director, Office of Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Shauld the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalties will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file ar, answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violations listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate l extenuating circumstances (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalties in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalties. 1 l I L NUREG-0940, PART II A-184
i- Notice of Violation , in requesting mitigation of the proposed penalties, the factors addressed in , Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be sc t forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalties. Upon f ailure to pay any civil penalties due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalties, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be ~ collected by civil act-ion pursuant to Section-c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282c. The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalties, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: Mr. James Lieberman, Director. Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Ore White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, ATTN: Enforcement Officer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspectcr at the facility that is the subject of this Notice. , Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (pDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for withfiolding the information from the public. Dated at Arlington, Texas, this 151 day of July 1996 HUREG-0940, PART II A-185
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1 L q. B. SEVERITY LEVEL I, II, Ill VIOLATIONS, ; NO CIVIL PENALTY 1 s
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' NUREG-0940, PART II-1
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~ b - October 21, 1996 LEA 96 2711 a (
s E. Thomas Boulette[PhD, 1 Senior Vice PresidentV Nucleer : - d i Boston Edison Companyi - o l Pilgrim Nuclear' Power Station -1 ? L 600. Rocky Hill Road " . . Plymouthi Massachusetts 02360-5599 ,
SUBJECT:
. N
' OTI'CE O' F Vl'OLATION '
g (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-293/96-07) 1> w
Dear Mr. Bouletto:
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RThiriletter refers to the NRC inspection conducted from July 8 to July 12,1996, and July 22 l
~
L to ' July 26,1996; at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station facility to review the circumstances .! aurrounding an'svent. reported to the NRC in Licensee Event Report (LER) 96-04, dated' May 9,1996, involving the potential .degradatica of primary containment integrity. The _ [ findings of the inspection were discussed'wi'.n you and members of your staff during a i
' telephone ' exit meeting ,on September 3,199 i. In addition, the NRC inspection report was s
, - sent to you with our letter, dated September 20,1996. On October 3,1996, a Predecisional , - Enforcement Conference was conductou with you and members of your staff to discuss the
- related violations, their causes, n.d your corrective actions.
; Based on the infort ,sGn developed during the inspection, and the information provided during l
, the conferences and by the LER, two violations of NRC requirements were identified. The !
~ violatione are set forth in the enclosed Notice of Violation. The first violation involved the s ; failure to maintain primary containment integrity in accordance with Technical Specification 'i Section 3.7.A,in that two electrical containment penetrations were not properly protected due =
- to improper trip settings of 12 electrical penetration' circuit breakers. Und6r certain high-impedance f ault conditions during a postulated design basis accident, the trip settings, which
~
.were too high, could allow excessive current to pass'through the electrical penetration circuits, j
-thereby demaging the penetration seals, and causing the loss of primary centeinment integrity. {
This condition was discovered by your staff on April 9,1996, following an investigation of a i failed drywell-unit cooler fan motor that was powered by electrical circuits passing through _ one of the two penetrations. When you' discovered this condition, you declared primary containment inoperable and entered a 24-hour limiting condition for operation (LCO). 1
- -The second violation involved the failure to identify and correct this condition sooner, even I r : though it ' existed as early' as 1988 (and may have existed as far back as 1972). This l
? constitutes a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 8, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action" l Iwhich requires, in part. that measures shall be established to assure conditions adverse to 3
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Boston Edison Company 2 quality are promptly identified and corrected. For example, during a self-assessment that you performed in July 1991 of Pilgrim's electrical distribution system, your staff identified that electrical penetration protection for potential electrical faults within the primary containment had not been addressed. Although your staff later performed an operability evaluation to
- address this problem, the problem was not corrected because of an incorrect assumption
- regarding thermal overload of the motor starter, as described in the Notice. Therefore, the incorrect breaker trip setting problem was not corrected. Later,in 1992, while performing a calculation for the purpose of evaluating the penetration under normal plant operation, your engineers noted that some of the circuits protected from overload by thermal relays were not adequately protected from short circuits because the settings of magnetic-trip-only breakers exceeded National Electric Code (NEC) limits. Your engineers f ailed to pursue this further, and
, did not recognize that the circuit breaker manuf acturer's technical manuai required adherence to the NEC limits. In July 1993, your staff mischaracterized the corrective action for replacing the magnetic trip-only breakers as enhancements, and therefore, the af fected circuit breakers were not replaced until 1996.
The f ailure to maintain containment integrity under certain conditions, as well as the f ailure to identify this condition sooner, represent significant regulatory concerns. Therefore, these Lviolations have been classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level til problem in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcerr.ent Actions / (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. The NRC commends the'technicalinquisitiveness of the electricalengineer who identified this problem in 1996 during his follow up review of a starter problem with a drywell area cooler, if not for his inquisitiveness, this problem likely would have remained uncorrected. Nonetheless, if similar inquisitiveness had been exhibited by your staff when opportunities existed in 1991,1992, and 1993, this problem could have been corrected sooner. These findings demonstrate the need for management taking appropriate action to assure that your staff in general, and your engineers in particular, are sensitive to the importance of performing comprehensive evaluations whenever potential problems surf ace at the facility. Such reviews are needed to assure that all potentially degraded features are promptly identified and corrected. in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level ll1 problem. Your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years (namely, a Severity Level 111 violation without a civil penalty issued on March 3,1995, for failure to maintain containment integrity for approximately 30 days while the reactor was critica! (EA 95-010)). Therefore, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit is warranted for identification since you identified the violation of Technical Specification Section 3.7.A. Credit is warranted for corrective action because your corrective actions were both prompt and comprehensive once the violations were identified in 1996. Your corrective actions included, but were not limited to (1) immediately entering the Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation: (2) correcting the trip-setting of the L NUREG-0940, PART II B- 2 '
1 Boston Edison Company 3 affected circuit breakers within four hours; (3) replacing all 12 magnetic-trip-only circuit breakers with thermal-magnetic type circuit breakers; and (4) completing a root cause ' '
- evaluation, which identified additional corrective actions to be taken in the near future, namely establishing an improved tracking mechanism for periodic Long Term Plan (LTP) review, ,
revising the calculation procedure to require verification that corrective actions are tracked,- , reviewing' other calculations to determine if similar conditions exist,' and reviewing the electrical engineering design guide to determine whether improvements should be made. , Therefore, to encourage prompt and comprehensive identification and correction of violations, , I have been authorizedi after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to
- determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
t Sincere! Hubert J. Miller , Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-293 Licerise No. DPR 35
Enclosure:
. Notice of Violation k
1 8 NUREG-0940, PART II .B- 3
Boston Edison Company 4 cc w/ encl: L. Olivier, Vice President - Nuclear and St.ation Director , T. Sullivan., Plant Department Manager N. Desmond, Regulatory Relations
. D. Tarantino, Nuclear Information Manager R. Hallisey, Department of Public Health, Commonwealth of Massachusetts The Honorable Therese Murray
- t. The Honorable Linda Teagan 1B Abbanat, Department of Public Utilities ;
Chairman, Plymouth Board of Selectmen Chairman, Duxbury Board of Selectmen l Chairman, Nuclear Matters Committee ] Plymouth Civil Defense Director : P. Gromer, Massachusetts Secretary of Energy Resources )
'J. Sheer, Legislative Assistant l J. Fleming ]
' A. Nogee, MASSPIRG
-Regional Administrator, FEMA j
~ Office of the Commissioner, Massachusetts Department .of Environmental Quality l Engineering Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts I
- T. Rapone, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Chairman, Citizens Urging Responsible Energy Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SLO Designee 1
I 1 I i NUREG-0940, PART-11 B- 4
ENCLOSURE NOTICE OF VIOLATION Boston Edison Company Docket No. 50-293 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station License No. DPR-35 EA 96-271 During an NRC inspection conducted July 8-12,1996 and July 22-26,1996, for which a telephonic exit meeting was held on September 3,1996, two violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG 1600, the violations are listed below: A. Technical Specification Section 3.7.A., " Primary Containment Integrity," requires, in part, that the pnmary containment integrity shall be maintained at all times when the reactor is critical. Contrary to the above, for an indeterminate but extended period prior to April 9,1996, primary containment integrity was not maintained in that two electrical containment penetrations (Nos. Q105A and Q1058) were not property protected due to improper trip-settings on the circuit breakers for the two affected electrical-penetrations. Specifically, under certain high-impedance electrical fault conditions during a postulated design basis accident, the trip settings for the circuit breaker, which were set too high, could allow excessive current to pass through the electrical penetration circuits, damaging the penetration seals, and causing the primary containment to loose its integrity. (IFS 01013) B. 10 CFR 50, Appendix 8. Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure conditions adverse to quality such as deficiencies, deviations, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, prior to April 9,1996, measures were not established to assure that conditions adverse to quality were promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, a condition existed, at a minimum, from 1988 (and possibly as far back as the before initial startup in 1972) in which 12 circuit breakers (magnetic-trip-only breakers) for two electrical penetrations (Nos. Q105A and Q1058) had been set improperty, and the licensee did not identify this condition adverse to quality until 1996. The condition adverse to quality involved the failure to maintain primary containment integrity in that under certain high-impedance electrical fault conditions during a postulated design basis accident, the top-settings of the circuit breakers, which were set too high, could adow excessive current to pass through the electrical penetration circuits and damage the electrical penetration seals, causing a loss of primary containment integrity. The licensee had at least three opportunities to identify and correct this condition prior to 1996, but did not do so, as described below: l l 1 l l NUREG-0940, PART II B- 5
Enclosure 2
- 1. In July 1991, during a self-asaessment that the licensee performed of Pilgnm's electrical distribution system, the licensee identified that electrical penetration protection for potential electncal faults within the primary containment had not been addressed for Pdgnm Station. Although the licensee performed an operability evaluation to address this problem at that time, the evaluation was based on an incorrect assumption that the 1300 percent thermal overload of the motor starters (for the motors powered by the 12 affected electrical circuits) could provide adequate protection of the circuits. Therefore, the incorrect breaker trip setting problem was not corrected at that time.
- 2. In 1992, while performing calculation PS-119 for the purpose of evaluating electrical penetrations under normal plant operation, the licensee noted that some of the circuits protected from overload by thermal relays, were not adequately protected from short-circuits because the settings of the magnetic-trip-only circuit breakers exceeded National Electric Code (NEC) limits. The licensee failed to pursue this further to identify that the circuit breaker manufacturer's technical manual required adherence to the NEC limits. Therefore, the licensee again failed to correct the improper trip setting of the breakers.
- 3. In July 1993, the licensee initiated action to resolve the 1991 self-assessment
) findings by developing plans to replace the magnetic-trip-only breakers. However, licensee staff mischaracterized the corrective actions as enhancements, and therefore, the affected circuit breakers were not replaced until 1996. (IFS 01023) These violations represent a Severity Level ill problem $upplement 1). Pursuant to provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Boston Edison Company is hereby required to submit a wntten statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response, if an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other actions as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the i response time. NUREG-0940, PART 11 B- 6
M i i Enclosure ~3 Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR), to the extent ~! possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so , that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction if personal privacy or proprietary information ! t
- is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your ~
- response that deletes such information if you regiiest withholding of such material, you'must
- specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in
- detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e g., explain why the disclosure of information will l create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 l CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial
, information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please I . provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
l Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania i this 21 day of October 1996 i l i I
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NVREG'-0940,-PART II-B- 7 l
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..... July 12,1996 EA 96-181 Carolina Power & Light Company
~ ATTN: Mr. W. R. Campbell Vice President Brunswick' Steam Electric Plant P. O. Box 10429 Southport. NC 28461
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-325. 324/96-09)
Dear Mr. Campbell:
This refers to the in_spection conducted on May 1 through 28.19%. at your Brunswick facility. The inspection included a review of the circumstances surrounding the dual unit shutdown initiated on March 17. 1996, due to inoperable Service Water System pumps. You notified the NRC Operations Center on March 17. 1996, of the dual unit shutdown and followed-up with Licensee , Event Report No. 1 96 003, dated April 16. 1996. The results of our l' inspection were sent to you by letter dated June 7, 1996. A closed predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region II office on June 24. 1996, with you and members of your staff to discuss the apparent violation. the root cause. and your corrective actions to preclude recurrence. A list of conference attendees, NRC slides, and a copy of your presentation
- j. materials are enclosed.
Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that you provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violation involves the failure to establish adequate design control measures for the review and testing of material changes for Service Water System modifications. Specifically, your design control program did not include provisions for a suitable testing program to verify the performance of new materials used for
,certain Service Water System pump components following system modificatior in 1993 and 1994 As a result, on March 9. 1996 the 2A Nuclear Service Watti System pump seized after the thrust ring impeller bolts failed. Following further investigation and the discovery of degraded conditions on two other L Bumps,theremainingServiceWaterSystempumpsweredeclaredinoperablean nusual Event was declared, and both units were shut down. You subsequently determined the failure mechanism to be galvanic corrosion of the upper retaining ring Monel fasteners in proximity to stainless steel pump
-components.
Although your safety assessment concluded that nine of ten service water system pumps continued to meet their safety function, the violation is of significant regulatory concern because of the degraded pump conditions which NUREG-0940, PART.Il B- 8
CP&L 2 resulted. The failure to select appropriate pump internal bolting material and to monitor the performance of a dissimilar material application following installation introduced a potential comon mode failure mechanism into the . Service Water System which went undetected for an extended period of time.
- During the conference, you stated that the pump replacements had undergone; extensive material review since development of the original specification.
However, these reviews were not well documented and failed to identify this corrosion mechanism. Notwithstanding the fact that the new material used in the pump design should have been reviewed for suitability of application, an intensive program to examine in situ material performance and condition should have been instituted beyond that normally conducced to monitor overall performance. Therefore. the violation is classified in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy). NUREG 1600, as a Severity Level III violation. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50.000 is considered for a Severity Level III violation. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years.1 the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identfffcation and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process described in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. In this case the NRC has concluded that it would be appropriate to give credit for Identf ficatfon. Although the violation was revealed through an event, your initiatives to investigate and identify the cause of the March 9.1996, pump trip were prompt and appropriate. With regard to consideration for Correctf ve Actfon, your imediate corrective actions included an evaluation which identified a potential comon mode failure mechanism and led to the subsequent shutdown of both units. Additional corrective action included in part: (1) replacement of the Monel bolts with Hastelloy C bolting: (2) review. for proper material selection, of changes to the Service Water System since 1991, as well as approved modifications awaiting installation: (3) development of a Material Selection Guide and Procedure for material application reviews: (4) conduct of an assessment of Service Water System component material selection and application to be completed by August 30. 1996: and (5) schedule follow up inspections to evaluate the performance of the new Hastelloy bolting material. Based on these actions, the NRC determined that your corrective actions were both conservative and comprehensive and credit was warranted for the factor of Correctfve Action. Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations. I have been authorized, after consultation with the Office of Enforcement. not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty. I A severity Level 111 (sl III) violation was issued on April 4. 1996 (EA 96-054) related . to the 6CCess author 12ation and fitness for duty programs. A sl !!! violation was issued on l November 20. 1995 (EA 95 228) related to design control for the RHR service Water system. Two L olations were issued on september 8,1995 (EA 95166) related to design control for NUREG-0940, PART II B- 9
l l CP&L 3 l You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions i specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your l response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this Notice including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is
- - necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.
! In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice." a copy of this letter. Its enclosure. and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not include - any personal privacy. proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the POR without redaction.
)
! 1 l Sincerel . [' j l
/ A, tewart D. Ebne Regional Admini tr or
)
Docket Nos. 50 325 and 50 324 ' l License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 l
Enclosures:
- 1. Notice of Violation
- 2. List of Conference Attendees . i
- 3. Licensee Presentation Material
- 4. NRC Slides cc w/encis:
l W. Levis. Director Site Operations Brunswick Steam Electric Plant P. O. Box 10429 l-Southport. NC 28461 , R. P. Lopriore Plant Manager Brunswick Steam Electric Plant i Carolina Power & Light Company l P. O. Box 10429 Southport. NC 28461 cc w/encis (Cont'd on Page 4) { NUREG-0940, PART II B-10
P
' CP&i. 4 cc w/encis.(Cont'd):
J.-Cowan. Manager. Operations & Environmental , 1
-Support MS OHS 7' Carolina Power & Light Company '
, P. 0,- Box 1551 Raleigh. NC 127602 ;
W. D.' Johns'on Vice President-and Senior Counsel Carolina Power & Light Company P. O. Box 1551' Raleigh NC. 27602 l Dayne H. Brown. Director . l i Division of Radiation Protection e N. C. Department of Environmental i Commerce & Natural Resources P. 0. Box 27687 Raleigh.' NC - 27611 7687
' Karen E. Long l Assistant Attorney General State of North Carolina P. 0. Box 629 '
Raleigh. NC- 27602 Robert P. Gruber- - Executive Director Public Staff - NCUC P. O. Box 29520-
- Raleigh. NC 27626 0520 Public Service Comission -
State of South Carolina , . P. O. Box 11649 Columbia. SC 29211 Jerry W. Jones. Chairman Brunswick County Board of Comissioners P; 0. Box 249 Bolvia,'NC 28422 j, l Dan E. Summers ' Emergency Management Coordinator New Hanover County Department of : Emergency Management-P. O. Box 1525 Wilmington. NC 28402 l
! < cc w/encls: (Cont'd on Page 6)
- i l 1 NUREG-0940, PART 11 B ) I
l:li;! n
'T p-l CPE..l 5 Jec w/encis (Cont'd)i iNorman R. Holden. Mayor-t
~ City of Southport 2G1 East Moore Street.
Southport! NC .28461 4 I' l: r e s
.NUREG-0940,;PART$11 B-12
~. '
L. - _z-_ _ .-
NOTICE 0F VIOLATION Carolina Power and Light Company Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324 . Brunswick Steam Electric Plant License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR 62 EA 96-181 During an NRC inspection conducted on May 1 through 28, 1996. a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions." NUREG-1600, the violation is listed below: 10 CFR 50. Appendix B. Criterion III. Design Control, requires that measures shall be established for the review for suitability of applications of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of structures, systems and components. Design control measures shall be applied to the compatibility of materials and shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design such as by the performance of design reviews or a suitable test program. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to establish adequate design controls measures for the verification and testing of material changes made in the Service Water System pump during modifications implemented in 1993 and 1994. Specifically, the installation of new Monel bolts in the Service Water System pumps as part of a revision to modifications 82-220L and 82-221L were not adequately reviewed for suitability of application or adequately verified to be acceptable through a suitable test program. As a result. the 2A Nuclear Service Water pump seized on March 9. 1996, after the thrust ring impeller bolts failed due to corrosion. Degraded conditions were discovered in other Service Water System pumps following disassembly. (01013) This is a Severity Level 111 violation (Supplement I) Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201. Carolina Power & Light Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission. ATTN: Document Control Desk. Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator. Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or if contested, the b3 sis for disputing the violation. (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved. (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence. if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued Enclosure 1 1 l l NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-I3 l
i Notice of Violation 2 as to why the license should not be modified, suspended.' or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown. consideration will be given to extending the response time. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) to l-the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, i or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR. and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public.
-Dated at Atlanta, Georgia
! this12 day of July 1996 l' o t i NUREG-0940, PART 11- B-14 I
~. ~ . _ . , . . - - -. . - ,
., [I- g; i. ( . LIST OF PREDECISIONAL-EhFORCEPENT CONFERENCE ATTENDEES ) JUNd 24. 19 % l Carolina Power and Licht Comoany ~
-l
~ I W.'Orser. Executive Vice President, Nuclear Generation Wc Campbell. Vice President. Brunswick Nuclear Plant .
.H. Habermeyer..Vice President. Nuclear Engineering Department-
.. J.- Franke. Superintendent. Mechanical Balance of Plant Systems
- G. Hicks. Manager, Regulatory Affairs. Brunswick Nuclear Plant.
J. Lyash. Manager.. Brunswick Nuclear-Engineering T. Walt. Manager Performance Evaluation and Regulatory Affairs R. Grazio. Chief. Engineer-- Consultants:
- N.~' Cole, HPR Associates R. Hanford. Retired. Brunswick Nuclear Plant
- J. Nestell MPR Associates-
' Nuclear Reaulatory Commission
-+
L, Reyes Deputy Regional Administrator. Region II (RII) J. Jonnson Acting Director. Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)- ' C. Evans. Regional Counsel. RII G. Imbro; Director. Project Directorate II. Office of Nuclear . Reactor Regulation (NRR) ; B. Uryc. Director. Enforcement and Investigations Coordination Staff (EICS), ! RII C. Casto. Chief. Division Reactor Safety (DRS). Engineering Branch. RII , M. Shymiock Chief. Reactor Projects Branch 4 (RPB4). DRP RII D. Trimble. Brunswick Project Manager. NRR J. Davis. Division of Engineering. NRR - C. Patterson. Senior Resident Inspector. Brur.5 wick DRP. RII G. Wiseman, Project Engineer. DRP. RPB4, RII ; J. Lenahan. Reactor Inspector. DRS. Engineering Branch. RII i l l Enclosure 2 l i l w .+ 1
~ NUREG-0940,.PART 11 B-15 l
. ~ ~ . . . ~ . . . . . . . . .- . - . . - . . -. ~ . . , , , . . . . - . - - - - - - .
s S ]7 , UNfTIO STATES - D # , M*aye 'o . - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s' cy -
**L . nesioN n .
m uAne:TTA sinsfT. N.W.. SUITE l500
- ; ATLANTA. GEOnGIA 3MS 0190 s,.....
s . December 13; 1996 f 1 EA 96 442' L ' Caro 11na' Power & Light Company . . ATTNr . Nr; W.~ R.: Campbell - Vice President . I Brunswick Steam Electric Plant , 1 Post Office Box 10429 . Southport. North Carolina -28461-
SUBJECT:
. ; NOTICE OF VIOLATION. . l ,1 '(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS.. 50 325/96 16 AND 50 324/96 16) i
Dear Mr. Campbell:
0 'This refers to the integrated inspection completed on October 26 :1996 at your l Brunswick facility. The inspection, included a review of your failure to a provide temperature compensation for the Plant Process Computer (PPC) i feedwater. flow algorithm which resulted in operation of Brunswick Unit 2 in l e excess of (1) the maximum thermal power nthorized by the license and (2)' thermal limits required by Technical Specification PS) 3.2.1.' 1he . inspection report was sent to you by letter dated November 22. 1996. A , - closed, predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region II l office on December 9.1996, with you and members of your staff to discuss the ! apparent violations the root causes. and your corrective actions to preclude recurrence. A list of conference attendees. NRC slides, and a copy of your presentation materials are enclosed. ,
- Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information you provided during the conference. the NRC has determined that violations of
'NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of i
-Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them are described in l detail in the subject inspection report. ' Violation A involves the failure to I maintain the Unit 2 thermal power within the operating license limits. On ;
, - August 28, 1996.- a reactor engineer reviewing core thermal power calculations j U associated with the Power Uprate Project determined that the Unit 2 PPC point ? value for feedwater flow was not properly compensated for feedwater F temperature deviations from the normal operating temperature. The condition had existed on Unit 2 since the unit restarted after a refueling outage ending in July 1994 when Unit 2 was modified to add a new PPC and associated . software. Due to the failure to temperature compensate the feedwater flow process point value, the core thermal power calculated and indicated by the PPC was less than the actual core thermal power. During periods when feedwater temperature was lower than the normal-operating value. Unit 2 was . . operated'at indicated power levels of up to 100 percent power or 2436 megawatts (W) thermal which was equivalent to actual power levels of up to ; c j 102.4 percent power or-2494.W thermal. This'is a violation of License ! j' Condition 2.C.1'of Facility Operating License Number DPR 62 which requires
'that Unit 2 be operated at or less than 2436 W thermal.
1 l TNUREG-0940,'PARTfIIL B-16
'r
.'.i< +
--. -- - . . - ~s -- -. . - - - -- .n--.
t >: , 4
-CP&L' 2-Violation B involves the. failure to maintain the calculated Average Planar
- Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR) within the limits of TS 3.2.1. The APLHGR 110 vary based on power level and feedwater flow to assure that the fuel thermal mechanical' design criteria are preserved during abnormal transients. .TS 3.2.1 specifies the approved methodology for determining the
. limits placed on ALPHGR for a given power level and feedwater flow rate. Due
- to the failure to appropriately compensate for feedwater temperature, the - - calculated reactor power level inputs to the APLHGR calculation were incorrect and the resulting APLHGR value was non conservative. .The APLHGR values.'as calculated using the actual power levels exceeded the limits'specified by - - TS 3.2.1 between December 10 and December 20. 1995. During the predecisional i enforcement conference, your staff noted that the approved methodology for
- calculating the APLHGR limits specified by TS 3.2.1 was based on generic ,
APLHGR adjustment' factors. Your re analysis of the APLHGR limits using cycle ; specific adjustment factors indicated that the APLHGR values, based on actual ' power levels between December 10 and December 20, 1995. were within cycle-specific design limits. Although the re analysis indicates that the actual safety consequence of Violation B was low; the NRC considers any change in
! reactor parameters that cause unanticipated reductions _in the margin of safety to be a significant regulatory concern.
The root causes of the violations included the failure of your design team to properly link the Unit 2 feedwater flow process points to the appropriate . compensation formula in the Unit 2 compensation database. The.c er index l labels for the Unit 2 feedwater flow process points were changed [ additional process points were loaded into the database. Due to the ; inappropriate index labels, the computer linked a com the points instead of_the correct compensation value.pensationYour post modification value of one to acceptance testing for the new PPC did not verify that process point ntabering ; was the same in both units and did not verify that the correct relationships
~
between process points and compensation values were preserved when your design team, in an effort to reduce differences between the two units. copied the ' existing PPC database configuration from the Unit 1 PPC to the Unit 2 PPC. ( i These violations represent a significant failure to control design parameters ; that affected the integrity of reactor core protection systems. The MtC t l- expects licensees to provide meticulous oversight of vendor changes to plant i process computer software and to conduct comprehensive post modification 4- testing of new software used to assure operation within specified acceptable ,
- fuel design limits. In this case, the NRC is particularly concerned that specified core operating limits were exceeded due to the inadequate design !
control and testing. Therefore, these violations are classified in the aggregate in accordance with tha " General Statement of Policy and Procedures i for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy) NUREG 1600, as a Severity . Level III problem.. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level III problem. Because your facility.has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last - 4 i , d i DNVREG _0940,: PART II: B j I h
/' . . : .. -
l 1 I i I CP&L 3 two years1 . the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process descr1 bed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NRC concluded that credit was warranted for Identification because your staff identified both violations. With regard to cons 1ceration for Corrective Actiori, your corrective actions included: (1) effective, immediate corrective actions to reduce power and correct the software deficiency: (2) revalidation of critical plant process computer functions and confirmation of appropriate testing of the software: (3) review of other computer applications: (4) enhancements to the control of design and testing of computer products: and (5) training on lessons learned and software configuration control. Based on the above, the NRC determined that credit was warranted for Corrective Action. The application of the factors considered in the civil penalty assessment process, absent the exercise of discretion. resulted in no civil penalty. However, you should be aware that the NRC considered imposing a civil penalty, under Section VII.A of the Enforcement Policy because of the potential impact of weak vendor oversight and inadequate design control and testing of software affecting core operating parameters. However, because your reactor engineer demonstrated a safety conscious attitude which resulted in the identification of the software deficiency and to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations. I have been authorized, after consultation with the Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. Significant violations in this area in the future could result in a civil penalty. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow t k instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response. you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this Notice including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. I A severity Level III violation was issued on November 19. 1996. (EA 96 354) related to environmental qualification program deficienc1es. A severity Level III violation was issued on July 12.1996. (EA 96181) related to design control measures for service water system modifications. A severity Level !!! violation was issued on April 4.1996. (EA 96 054) for failure to meet fitness for duty requirements. A severity Level !!! violation was issued on November 20.1995. (EA 95 228) related to suitability of materials used in valves in the residual heat removal system. A severity Level III problem was issued on september 8.1995. (EA 9"A66) related to design control, modification and testing of the high pressure in,1ection systes and reactor core 1 solation cooling system. NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-18
I CP&L. 4 d In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790'of the NRC's " Rules'of Practice." a copy of ' this letter. its enclosures, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PM). Siricerely.
" lc A.
/ <
- ff ;
". Stewart D. Eb..ctmr Regional Administrator Docket Nos %.324 '
License Nc:. DPR.62-
Enclosures:
- 1. Notice of Violation :
- 2. List of Conference Attendees '
(hot to be Published in NUREG 0940) !
- 3. Licensee Presentation Material (Not to be Publ1 W,a in NUREG 0940) l
- 4. NRC Slides (Not ta be Published in NUREG 0940s -l r
cc w/ encl: W. Levis. Director Site Operations Brunswick Steam Electric Plant ' P. O. Box 10429 ; Southport. ']C 2B461 i R. P. Lopriore ~ Plant Manager Brunswick Steam Electric Plant > Carolina Power & Light Company P. O. Box 10429 : Southport. NC 2B461 J. Cowan. Vice President : Operations & Environmental Supoort MS OHS 7 l Caroiina Power & Light Company P. O. Box 1551 , Raleigh. NC 27602 l Gerald D. Hicks Manager Regulatory Affairs Carolina Power & Light Company P. O. Box 10429 Southport. NC 2B461 B-19
~
> NUREG-0940,1PART Il
.J
CP&L'- 5 cc w/encls cont'd: . W. D. Johnson. Vice President -Public Service Commission
-and Senior Counsel State of South Carolina Carolina Power & Light Company P. O. Box 11649 P. 0. Box 1551 Columbia. SC 29211 Raleigh, NC~ 27602 Jerry W. Jones. Chairman Dayne H. Brown. Director Brunswick County Board of Division of Radiation Procection Commissioners N. C. Department of Environmental P. O. Box 249 Health & Natural Resources Bolvia. NC 28422 P. O. Box 27687 Raleigh, NC 27611 7687 Dan E. Summers Emergency Management Coordinator Karen E. Long New Hanover County Department of Assistant Attorney General Emergency Management State of North Carolina P. O. Box 1525 P. O. Box 629 Wilmington NC 28402
-Raletgh, NC 27602 I William H. Crowe. Mayor
-Robert F. Gruoer City of Southport
' Executive Director 201 East Moore Street Public Staff NCUC Southport. NC 28461 P. O. Box 29520 Raleigh. NC 27626 0520 l
l t I L L NUREG-0940, PART II B-20
a NOTICE OF VIOLATION
. Carolina Power and Light Company Docket Nos. 50 324 Brunswick Steam Electric Plant License Nos. DPR 62 Unit 2'- EA 96 442 l
, Ouring an NRC inspection' completed on October 26. 1996. violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of f Policy and Procedures-for NRC Enforcement Actions." NUREG 1600, the violations :
4 are listed below: A. Facility Operating License Numoer OPR 62. Section 2.C.1, Maximum Power
. Level, authorizes the licensee to operate the facility at steady state reactor core power levels not in excess of 2436 megawatts (Mw) (thermal). ;
Contrary to the above during the time periods listed below, the licensee , failed to operate the facility within steady state reactor core power ! level limit of 2436 (Hw) (thermal): Qgtg hwer level (MW) Percent Power July 5. 1994 thru ieptember 6. 1995 2446 Hw 100.4% Power
. (including February 26, 1995 at 2460 MW 101.0% Power)
March 26 thru August 28, 1996 2441 Hw 100.2% Power (including April 17 thru 26, 1996 at 2492 Mw 102.3% Power and July 19 thru 26,1996 at 2494 Mw 102.4% Power)(0)013) , 6. Technical Specification 3.2.1 requires in part, that during power '
- operation, the AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (ADLHGR). for each type of fuel as a function of axisi location and AVERAGE PLANAR !
EXPOSUP.E shall not exceed limits based on applicable APLHGR limit values that have been approved for the respective fuel and lattice type and determined by the approved methodology described in GESTAR II. Contrary to the above, between December 10 and December 20. 1995, during power operation, the licensee failed to maintain the APLHGR within the applicable approved APLHGR limit values specified in Technical Specification 3.2.1. (01023) These violations represent a Severity Level III problem (Supplement I). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201. Carolina Power & Light Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear ; Regulatory Commission. ATTN: Document Control Desk. Washington. 0.C. 20555 with ! a copy to the Regional Administrator Region II and a copy to the NRC Resident - Inspector at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant. within 30 days of the date of
-the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be ,
clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for e%h ; violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, d contested, the bash y
. Esc 1osure 1 l 1
i
)
NUREG-0940, PART II. B-21 1 p ! I L j
N' ' - Notice of Violation 2
' disputing the violation..(2) the corrective' steps that have been taken and the results achieved. -(3) the corrective steps that will be taken to. avoid further-
.. violations, and -(4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your.
response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence if.the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice. an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended. or. revoked. or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will. be given to extending the response time. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. '2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. . Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary. or safeguards Information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, if you. find it necessary to include such-information. you should clearly indicate the specific 'information that you desire not to be placed in the POR, and provide the legal bas 1s to support your request for withholdir,g the information from the public. Dated at Atlanta, Georgis this f3Oday of December 1996 l L i NUREG-0940, PART II. B-22
4 . I s' i
' LIST OF PREDECISIONA ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ATTENDEES ;
f DEC EMB'ER 9. 1996 j Carolina Power'and Licht Comoany [
~ -
W. Orser. Executive Vice President. Nuclear Generation ; W. Campbell, Vice President. Brunswick Nuclear Plant i H. Habermeyer. Jr.. Vice President. Nuclear Engineering Department ' J. Lyash. Manager Brunswick Nuclear Engineering T. Walt. Manager. Operations and Environmental Support , i B. Boylston, Superintendent. . Information Technology M.' Carroll. Manager., Nuclear Information Technology ; B. Lindgren. Manager. Site Support Services i G. Smith. Superintendent. NSSS. Engineering , R. Hill, Reactor Engineer l Nuclear Reaulatory Commission L, Reyes. Deputy Regional Administrator. Region II (RII) ET Merschoff ' Director. Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) RII ; B.'Uryc. Director. Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS).RII l M. Shymlock. Chief. Reactor Projects Branch 4 (RPB4). DRP RII M. Reinhart. Director. Directorate 11 1, NRR (by phone) D. Trimble. Project Nanager. NRR G. Golub. Engineer. Reactor Systems Branch. NRR L. Watson. Enforcement Specialist. EICS. RII < C. Evans. Regional Counsel. Rll i C. Patterson Senior Resident Inspector. Brunswick. DRP. RII , J. Dixon Herrity. Enforcement Coordinator. Office of Enforcement (by phone) ; 1 1 l l . Enclosure ?. 1 l 1 - MUREG-0940, PART II. B-23 1
.L 4 1
g *" "'%cy UNITED STATES f, ?g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
$ )+( 'jg AEGION W 801 WAARENVILLE ROAD USLE, ILUNOIS 6(632-4351
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**"* Noverter 6,1996 EA 96-367 Mr. Lew W. Myers Vice President - Nuclear Centerior Service Company P. O. Box 97, A200 Perry, OH 44081 )
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION , (NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT N0. 50-440/96008(DRS)) j
Dear Mr. Myers:
This refers to the inspection conducted on August 26 through September 11, 1996, at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. The inspection included a review of the circumstances surrounding the loss of both trains of the Emergency Closed Cooling (ECC) system in 1993, and the loss of both trains of Control Room Emergency Recirculation due to low ECC temperature in 1994. The report documenting the inspection was sent by letter dated September 17, 1996, and a predecisional enforcement conference was conducted on October 11, 1996. Thr e events were reported to the NRC in Licensee Event Reports dated January 24 and October 28, 1994. Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that was provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding the violations are described in detail in the subject inspection report. In July 1993, during performance of a heat exchanger performance test on ECC Train A, the surge tank overflowed. Subsequent review determined that ECC/ Nuclear Closed Cooling butterfly isolation motor-operated valve (MOV) OP42-F295A was leaking in excess of 250 gallons per minute (gpm) because the valve was stroking past its full closed ptr on as a result of mispositioned limit switches and mechanical stops. The . m u switches and mechanical stops l were subsequently re-adjusted and the valve was satisfactorily tested. The valve limit switches and mechanical stops had been previously adjusted on March 19, 1993; therefore, the valve was unable to perform its isolation function from March 19 to July 2. 1993. ECC Train A was inoperable because in the event of a loss of offsite power / loss of coolant accident (LOOP /LOCA) with a single active failure of the Division 2 emergency diesel generator, it would have lost inventory at a rate such that, within one minute of receipt of the surge tank low level alarm, the Train A pump would begin to cavitate. The plant was in Operational Conditions 1, 2, or 3 from June 2 to July 2, 1993. Additionally, during this period both trains of ECC were inoperable for approximately 45 hours while the Division 2 emergency diesel generator was out of service. NUREG-0940 PART II B-24
L. W. Myers 2 Novmber 6, la6 The root causes of the event were personnel error and weak procedural direction for setting MOV limit switches and mechanical stops in 1993 and the failure to classify valves OP42-F295A/B as ASME Section XI Category A valves for which seat leakage is limited to a specific maximum amount. The violations in Section I of the Notice represent a significant failure to comply with the action statement for a Technical. Specification Limiting Condition for Operation and are classified in the aggregate in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level 111 problem. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level !!I problem. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the previous two years' prior to your identification of the violations in December 1993, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit was warranted for your architect / engineer's identification that both trains of ECC had been inoperable in December 1993. Credit was warranted for your corrective actions for the violations in Section I of the Notice. These included re-adjusting the limit switches and mechanical stops on valve OP42-F295A and conducting post-maintenance testing to verify the valve would function as required; initiating an engineering evaluation to determine if the potential for an incorrectly set butterfly valve limit switch or mechanical stop on other systems could cause a similar problem; revising the Limitorque Limit / Torque Switch adjustment procedure to require a post-maintenance leakage test on butterfly MOVs which hate an established seat leakage limit and clarify instructions for setting limit switches and checking mechanical stop nut settings; and providing training to maintenance and system engineering personnel on this event and the necessity of veril'ying proper butterfly valve closure. Although the NRC identified during the 1996 inspection that valves OP42-F295A/B and OP42-F325A/B were not properly classified as Category "A" in the in-service testing program, the valves had been tested within the frequency specified for Category "A" valves as a result of Generic Letter 89-10 and preventive maintenance activities. This failure to classify the valves as Category "A" had been previously identified by your staff in January 1994 but no action was taken. The failure i to take corrective action for this isolated deficiency is cited in Section II of the Notice. The in-service testing program was subsequently revised to l properly classify these valves. l 1 Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty. I A Severity Level III siolation for failure to take corrective action (identified in June 1993) was issued on August 31,1993 (EA 93176). l 1 NUREG-0940, PART Il B-25
l L. W. Myers 3 !bvccoer 6,1996 Section 'II of ~the Notice describes two violations involving failure to (1) take adequate corrective actions to prevent ECC system temperature from-decreasing below 55' F, and to (2) classify certain valves as Category "A" in the in-service testing program. Each of these violations has been categorized at Severity Level IV in accordance with the Enforcement Policy. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part .to determine whether further enforcement-action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CfR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). Sincerely, A.{ silleac *l Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-440
~ License No. NPT-58
Enclosure:
Notice 'of Violation cc w/ encl: J. P. Stetz, Senior Vice President, Nuclear L. W. Worley, Director, Nuclear Services Department J. D. Kloosterman,' Manager, Regulatory Affairs W. R. Kanda, Director, Perry Nuclear Assurance Department N. L. Bonner, Director, Perry Nuclear Engineering Dept. H. Ray Caldwell, General Superintendent Nuclear Operations R. D. Brandt, General Manager Operations Terry J. Lodge, Esq. i State Liaison Officer, State of Ohio Robert E. Owen, Ohio Department of Health C. A. Glazer, State of Ohio, Public Utilities Commission
't NUREG-0940, PART-.11' B-26
. . . ..- - - . - - - ~
l
)
' NOTICE OF VIOLATION )
Centerior Service Company: Docket No. 50-440
- Perry Nuclear Power Plant- License No. NPF-58 EA 96-367
' During an N'R'C inspection-conducted on August 26 through September ~11, 1996,
' violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the [
" General Statement'of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions., y NUREG-1600, the violations are listed below: a
]
LI. Technical Specific'ation 3.7.1.2 requires, for Operational. Conditions 1, ! 2, 3, 4, . and 5, the emergency closed cooling (ECC) loop (s) shall be operable which are associated with systems or components which are ? required to be operable. With an ECC loop (s) inoperable which is e i associated with system (s) or component (s) required to be operable,- ~ declare the' associated system (s) or component (s) inoperable and take the action required by the applicable specification (s). i A. . Contrary to the above, from March 19 to July 2,1993, while the plant was in Operational Conditions 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 ECC Train A
- was inoperable and its associated systems or components were not -
4 declared inoperable, and action was not taken for its associated .i systems or components as required by the applicable ; specifications. (01013) ; B. . Contrary to the above, from 3:13 a.m. on June 14, 1993, until 11:05 p.m. on June 15, 1993, a period of about 45 hours, while the ! plant was in Operational Conditions 1, 2, or 3, both trains of ECC l were inoperable and their associated systems or components were , not declared inoperable, and action was not taken for their , associated systems or components. as' required by the applicable j 4 specifications. (01023) This is'a Severity Level !!! problem (Supplement 1). l t II. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action," ! requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverso to quality are promptly-identified and corrected. In , the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures , shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and i corrective action taken to preclude repetition. l A. ' Contrary to the above, as of September 11, 1996, the licensee had ! failed to promptly correct a significant condition adverse to quality as demonstrated by the following: l
- 1. In february 1986, a control complex chiller tripped on low !
refrigerant temperature due to low lake water temperatures ] (Emergency Closed Cooling water to the chiller must ~oe greater than 55'.f to meet chiller design requirements). As corrective action.for this condition the licensee initiated Design Change Package (DCP) 86-0224 to alleviate the problem; however, the design change only considered ECC i I i ' J
' NOREG-094'0, L PART? II .B i l
i
X . . t
, Notice of Violation' . .
accident heat lo' ads and did'not consider minimum loads when Emergency. Service Water was less than 55' F.
, 2. In February 1994, with.ESW "A" and ECC "A" running and 1 supplying a minimal heat load, ECC "A" temperature was .
' observed to be below 55* f.
3; DCP 94-0027 was implemented in Spring 1996 to maintain ECC
. temperature above 55" F with low lake water temperature and low heat. load conditions and the post-modification test did not confirm the adequacy of the design. Subsequently, on-j March 7, 1996, ESW "A".and ECC "A" were in operation with no ;
' heat load, and ECC "A" temperature decreased from 64* F to i 56" f before ESW "A" was secured to prevent ECC "A". from i
< decreasing below 55" F. (02014) '
This is a. Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I). .J B. Contrary to the above, as of August 26, 1996, the licensee had not corrected a significant condition adverse to quality. !
'Specifically,'the licensee had previously identified on <
January 20, 1994, that valves OP42.F29EA/B and OP42-F325A/B were 1
, not classified as Category "A".in accorG nce with American Society I
- of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI,1981, Article IWV-2000, ,
'and no corrective action was-taken until this condition was ;- identified by the NRC during a 1996 inspection. (02024)
. This,is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Centerior Service Company is }
-hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. ;
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. ; 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region III, and a copy to the i NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, i
'within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violat;on" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the '
violation. or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the i corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the l' date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence- adequately ) addresses the required response, if an adequate reply is not received within ; the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be ' issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or-why such other action as may be proper should r,ot be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time. d i 4 NUREG-0940, PART:11I B-28
l l i -- l Notice of Violation. .Under the authority of Section 182 of--the Act, 42 U.S.C.'2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to , provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your _-response that-identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you mni specifically identify the portions-of ; your response that you seek to.have withheld and provide in detail the bases ; for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information , will create-an unwarranted invasion of personal-privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding i confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at Lisle,-Illinois th$s ifb day of November 1996 , i t t i i l l l
\ 'NUREG-0940,?PART.11 B-29
1 l p8 880g
- UNITEo STATES
, t y .er S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8 REGloN I O
Q 4M ALLENDALE ROAD
% ,# KINO oF PRusslA. PENNSYLVANIA 1940tL1415 September 11, 1996 EA 96-244 Mr. J. E. Cross Senior Vice President Nuclear Power Division Duquesne Light Company Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-334/96-05, 50-412/96-05)
Dear Mr. Cross:
l This letter refers to the NRC inspection conducted from May 14 through June 26,1996, at your Beaver Valley Power Station facilities in Shippingport, Pennsylvania. The findings of the inspection were discussed with your staff during exit meetings and follow-up discussions on l June 27, July 11, and July 12,1996. During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the l circumstances surrounding a design deficiency associated with the Anticipated Transient Without l Scram (ATWS) Mitigating System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC). The deficiency, which was identified by your staff and reported to the NRC, constitutes a violation of NRC requirements and l was described in the NRC inspection report sent to you with our letter, dated July 24,1996. On l August 28,1996, a predecisional enforcement conference was conducted with you and l members of your staff to discuss the violations, their causes, and your corrective actions. The violation, which is set forth in the enclosed Notice of Violation, involved the failure to comply t with 10 CFR 50.62 which requires that you provide an attemate means, independent of the Reactor Protection System, of tripping the turbine and actuating auxiliary feedwater under l conditions indicative of an ATWS. This system must be designed to perform its functions in a reliable manner. The AMSAC system protects the reactor coolant system from overpressurization in cases where there is a concurrent failure of the Reactor Protection System. The specific AMSAC design deficiency that existed in this case involved the failure to consider, when the AMSAC system was designed and installed, the effect of static pressure on feedwater l flow transmitters, as well as the effect of hydraulic fluctuations on feedwater flow, when l establishing the " flow out-of-range" setpoint. As a result, under one particular scenario where the main feedwater valves close with the pumps continuing to operate, the AMSAC system may have failed. As such, the AMSAC system was not designed in a manner to perform its function c in a reliable manner. This violation has existed since AMSAC was initially installed in Unit 1 in l 1988 and Unit 2 in 1989. l I NUREG-0940, PART II B-30
^l Duquesne Light Company 2 h . The equipment required by 10 CFR 50.62 is intended to serve an important safety function in f the event of the failure of the plant principal Reactor Protection System. This regulation was -
i adopted following actual failures of the reactor trip system at another pressurized water reactor in 1983 and is intended to reduce the risk posed by such events. Your failure to ensure proper functioning and reliability of this system since the original installation is a significant regulatory concem Therefore, this violation has been categorized at Severity Level lli in accordance with J the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"(Enforcement 4 Policy), NUREG-1600. The NRC commends the technicallnquisitiveness of the engineerwho identified this issue during l
~ his follow-up review, after the turt>ine trip of May 31,1996, during which AMSAC should have - ,
initiated, and after your initial post-trip review also failed to detect the deficiency. If not for his j inquisitiveness, this deficiency likely would have remained undetected. Nonetheless,' two other j AMSAC related problems were identified in 1993 and 1994, namely, the failure to have a lock-in , ,. circuit for a variable time delay, as well as a deficiency with the AMSAC blocking logic. Although , 4; those deficiencies were not specifically related to this recently identified problem, a more : j- thorough review of those issues at the time might have led to identification of this problem. In j i each case, however, a broader evaluation was not performed and this deficiency went !
' undetected. Also, an Information Notice (
Reference:
Information Notice No. 9175) was issued 8 in 1991 which informed licensees of the need to consider the static pressure effect on j transmitters. However, at that time, you failed to consider the static pressure effect on the : l transmitter used for AMSAC signals. l L . . t These findings demonstrate the need for management taking appropriate action to assure that ; your staff in general, and your engineers in particular, are sensitive to the importance of performing comprehensive, rather than narrowly-focused, evaluations in response to generic ; communications or site specific identified problems. Such broader reviews are needed to assure ; that all potentially degraded features are promptly identified and corrected. This is particularly l important for engineering issues identified on systems in which generic designs were altered l . prior to installation, as was the case with the AMSAC system. ; ! In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is f considered for a Severity Level lil violation. Because your facility has not been the subject of ,
- escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Conective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in
- , Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit is warranted because your corrective actions ;
were both prompt and comprehensive. Your corrective actions included prompt correction of the i AMSAC system via both hardware and software dos;3n modifications implemented within one , week ofidentification; revision of the feedwater flow trancmitter calibration procedures to account l for the static pressure effect, and subsequent recalibrat.3n of the flow transmitters; a review of ! the extent of static pressure effect on other transmitters installed in the facility; and a focused ; , . design review of AMSAC and three other systems, to ensure that similar deficiencies do not i n exist. The NRC also recognizes and commends, as indicated previously, the inquisitiveness of ' your staff in identifying this issue. ; i L l i NUREG-0940,.PART=ll- B-31 i i
/
' Duquesne Light Company 3 Therefore, to encourage prompt and comprehent,ive identification and correction of violations, -
' and in recognition of the absence of previous escalated enforcement action, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.
You are required to respond to 'Als letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when propering your response. In your response, you should document the
. specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence.- After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.7g0 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). Sincerely,
/
ubert J. r IW Regional dministrator Docket Nos. 50-334, 50412 License Nos. DPR 66, NPF 73
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation c w/ encl: S. Jain, Vice President, Nuclear Services T. Noonan, Vk:e President, Nuclear Operations
- L. Freeland, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department B. Tuite, General Manager, Nuclear Operations Unit K. Ostrowski, Manager, Quality Services Unit R. Brosi, Manager, Nuclear Safety Department M. Clancy, Mayor NRC Resident inspector - Beaver Valley Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State of Ohio I
h i
~NVREG-0940,.PART II B-32
1 ENCLOSURE l NOTICE OF VIOLATION I Duquesne Light Company Docket Nos. 50-334, 50-412 Beaver Valley Power Station License Nos. DPR-66, NPE 73 l l l During an NRC inspection conducted between May 14 and June 26,1996, for which exit meetings and follow-up discussions were held on June 27, July 11, and July 12,1996, a violation I of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and i Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG 1600, the violation is listed below- ) l 10 CFR 50.62(c)(1) requires, in part, that each pressurized water reactor must have I equipment from sensor output to final actuation device, that is diverse from the reactor trip (protection) system, to automatically initiate the auxiliary feedwater system and ini'Jate a turbine trip under conditions indicative of an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS), and that this equipment must be designed to perform its function in a reliable manner. Contrary to the above, since original installation in 1988 until June 1996 for Unit 1, and since original installation in 1989 until June 1996 for Unit 2, the ATWS Mitigation System Circuitry (AMSAC), (i.e., the equipment installed to automatically initiate the auxiliary feedwater system and initiate a turbine trip under conditions indicative of an ATWS) had not been designed to perform its function in a reliable manner. This equipment was not designed to perform its function in a reliable manner in that a design deficiency that had been present since the original installation of the system, namely, the failure to incorporate static pressure effect and hydraulic fluctuations in the design margin for "out-of-range" flow signals. The deficiency was evidenced by the fact that on May 31,1996, a transient occurred in which, although the reactor trip system functioned as required, conditions also existed (namely, a loss of normal feedwater) which should have caused the AMSAC to initiate. However, AMSAC failed to initiate as expected during this operational occurrence. (IFS 01013) This is a Seventy Level 111 violation (Suppleraent 1). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Duquesne Light Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Muclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 witt a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmittir:g this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspcndence, if the NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-33
l ! 1 Enclosure 2 correspondence adequately addresses the required response, if an adequate reply is not l received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for information may be - l issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other
- l. action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will l be given to extending the response time.
Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possibia, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction, if personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that chould be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must ! . specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this11thday of September 1996 NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-34
* "8 UNITED STATES 4 % ~l g- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REmoN ev
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$11 RY AN PLAZA DRIVE,SulTE 400
]
AR LINGTON, TE XAS 76011 4064 , 9, ,
-November 7. 1996.
-EA 96-329' cJohn R. McGana. Vice President - Operations ,
River Bend-Station-Entergy Operations,'Inc. ; P.O. Box 220 ,
,St. Francisville. Lobisiana 70775
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION '
- (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-458/96-26)
Dear Mr. McGaha:
d-This refers to an inspection conducted on July 29 through August 27. 1996, at the River Bend Station (RBS) reactor. facility. This special inspection included a review of the failure to perform or to properly complete surveillance testing on several safety-related components. The results of the
- inspection were discussed with your staff on September 6. 1996, and the
, subject inspection report was issued on September 10. 1996. The cover letter to the inspection report noted that the apparent violations identified in the. < report were being considered for escalated enforcement but that it was not , - necessary to conduct a predecisional enforcement conference in order for the NRC to make an enforcement decision, As such, we gave you the opportunity to either request a predecisional enforcement conference or respond to the- . apparent violations in writing. You did not request a conference but, instead, responded to the apparent violations by letter dated October 10.
'1996.
Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that you provided in your October 10 response, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC' requirements occurred. These violations are cited'in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them ' are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violations involve the failure to perform surveillance testing in accordance with the requirements specified in the Technical Specifications. The six violations involve the failure to perform or adequately perform surveillance testing on
.the following equipment: (1) the Division I battery. (2) the Division 1I1 battery. (3) the drywell airlock. (4) the drywell combination equipment hatch / personnel door. (5) the prefilters for the standby gas treatment. ,
control roor. fresh air.:and fuel building ventilation systems. and (6) a primary containment penetration isolation valve. As noted in your October 10 letter, prior to the identification of these violations; RBS.1dentified surveillance program weaknesses 'and a corrective action plan and improvement initiatives were underway. In July 1996, after issues were identified related to the Division I station service battery , performance discharge data. RBS initiated a Significant Event Response Team ! l
+
i
'NUREG-0940, PART 11 8-35
- . . . -. ~ . . - . . -
1 ENTERGYOPERATIONS[lNC. -(SERT) and developed corrective actions based on the SERT's findings.- When your staff reviewed other surveillance activities for similar problems. R85 found the remainder of the-surveillance discrepancies.
- Your October 101etter stated that:you believe there is adequate justification for imposition of one' Severity Level IV violation based on several factors regarding the circumstances of the violations (e.g.. self-identified, comprehensive corrective actions, lack of actual safety significance, and others), While we generally agree with the circumstances as you ,
characterized, they do not provide a basis for NRC to conclude that the circumstances amounted to Severity Level IV violations. The NRC's concern is that these issues. collectively represent a' breakdown in your surveillance ; testing program and, as such, represent a significant regulatory concern. Therefore, these violations are classified in the aggregate in accordance with-the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement: Policy). NUREG-1600, as.a Severity Level Ill problem. .j in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount 1 of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level III problem. Because your facility has not been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years. the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Corrective Action-in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy.- Based on the various corrective actions i
> ' taken by RBS staff, the NRC determined that corrective action credit is warranted. RBS took prompt corrective actions for each of the violations.
including procedure revisions. discussions with personnel regarding personal . accountability. enhanced training, and an additional' staff engineer to provide J oversight of the surveillance testing program. . In addition,' corrective action credit was warranted because of the comprehensive nature of the corrective actions addressing the programmatic issues. Specific corrective actions to address the program concerns included followup by Quality Assurance. -
' additional training on technical specification bases, departmental "all-hands"
. meetings, comparison of the RBS program with other sites, surveillance program self-assessment, evaluations of procedure verification and validation, and '
' focusing' additional management observations on the performance of surveillance tests.
Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations, and in recognition of the absence of previous escalated enforcement action, I have been authorized not to propose a civil penalty in l this case. However, significant' violations in the future could result in a l civil penalty,
=The NRC has also concluded that information regarding the reasons for the 'l violations, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violations and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance will be achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in the subject NRC inspection report. LER 96-014 00 dated August 9. 1996. and your October 10 response.
Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position'. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional y NUREG-0940fPART.II. B-36 4
)
CNTERGY OPERATIONS,.INC. 3-
' information,/you should. follow th'e instructions specified in the enclosed' ;
Not1ce;
!!n'accordance with ?10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice." a copy of.
this letter..its enclosure, and your 0ctober 10 response.will be placed in the. ; NRC Public Document Room. Sincerely. 4 ,
.<. Ca lan :
. Reg onal Administrator l
. Docket'No.: .50 458: -
License No.. NPF Endlosure: ' Notice of Violation ' Jcc (w/ enclosure)) Executive Vice President and
. Chief Operating Officer-
.Enterby0erations,-Inc.
P.O. oxl1995 ; EJackson. Mississippi 39286 1995 ' Vice President' Operations Support Entergy.0perations. [nc. P.O. Box'31995 . Jackson. Mississippi 39286 1995
- General Manager ,
Plant Operations ~ River Bend Station ;
-Entergy Operations, Inc. t
.P.O. Box 220 ;
- St. Francisville. Louisiana 70775- ,
4 Director Nuclear Safety l River Bend Station ! Entergy.0perations, Inc. P.O. Box 220 i' St. Francisville. Louisiana 70775
-Wise, Carter, Child &. Caraway-P.O.. Box 651J j Jackson. Mississippi 39205 j i
. :h =-' i NOREG-0940,-.PART1-II- B :
- ENTERGY OPERATIONS.'INC. Mark J. Wetterhahn. Esq.
Winston & Strawn
'401 L Street. N.W.
Washington. 0 C. 20005-3502 Hanager -Licensing
-River Bend Station Entergy Operations. Inc.
P.O. Box 220-St. Franctsville. Louisiana 70775 The Honorable Richard P. Ieyoub Attorney General -l P.O. Box 94095 i Baton Rouge. Louisiana 70804-9095 q H, Anne Plettinger j
- 3456 Villa Rose Drive Baton Rouge Louisiana 70806 l President of West Feliciana
! Police Jury i- P.O. Box 1921 l St. Francisville. Louisiana 70775 ' Larry G.' Johnson. Director , Systems Engineering
^ Cajun Electric Power Coop. Inc.
I- 10719 Airline Highway ! P.O. Box 15540 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70895 William H. Spell. Administrator Louisiana Radiation Protection Division
~ P.O. Box 82135 Baton Rouge. Loutstana 70884-2135 I
l i 1 I I o NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-38 km . _
~. .. __ .- - . . .. - -~ - .-
b I NOTICE OF VIOLATION Entergy Operations. Inc. Docket No. 50 458 , License No.. NPF-47 l
~ River Bend Station- :
EA 96 329 1 During an NRC. Inspection conducted on July 29 through August'27, 1996. . violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the j '
." General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions."
NUREG 1600. the violations are listed below: Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement.3.01 states. in part. that Surveillance Requirements shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for individual Limiting Conditions for Operation.-unless otherwise stated in the Surveillance Requirement. ; 4 A. - Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.8 requires the licensee to verify j that battery capacity is = 80% of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test. The FRE0VENCY of this . test is 60 months AND 18 months, when the battery shows degradation or has reached 85% of_ expected life. Contrary to the above. the licensee failed to perform Surveillance ' Requirement 3.8.4.8 within the 18-month required frequency, the appropriate frequency since the battery had shown degradation. ) (01013) . i
- 8. Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.7. requires the licensee to verify that battery capacity is adequate to supply, and maintain in ,
OPERABLE. status, the required emergency loads for the design duty cycle when subjected to a battery service test. The FREQUENCY of :
.this. test is 18 months.
Contrary to the above. the licensee failed to perform Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.7 within the 18-month required frequency. . (01023) C. Surveillance Requirement 3.6.5.2.5 requires the licensee to verify, from an initial pressure of 75 psig, that the drywell air lock seal pneumatic system pressure does not decay at a rate 4 equivalent to > 0.67 psig for a period of 24 hours. The FREQUENCY of this test is 18 morths. Contrary to the above. the licensee failed to perform Surveillance Requirement 3.6.5.2.5 because a satisfactory test of the drywell air lock seal system was not performed within the required 18-month frequency. (01033) , 0, Surveillance Requirement 3.6.5.1.2 requires the licensee to I verify, from an initial pressure of 75 psig, that the personnel
. door inflatable seal pneumatic. system pressure does not decay at a
'I l
l NUREG-0940', PART II~ B-39 .j i 4 ! l
- , . l
ENTERGY OPERATIONS. INC. rate ' equivalent to a 0.67 psig for a period of 24 hours. The FREQUENCY of this test is 18 months. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to perform Surveillance Requirement 3.6.5.1.2 because a satisfactory test of the personnel door inflatable seal pneumatic system was not performed within the required 18-month frequency. (01043) E. Surveillance Requirement 3.7.2.2 requires the licensee to perform required CRFA [ control room fresh cir] filter testing in accordance with Ventilation Filter Testing Progrea. Surveillan,.e Requirement 3.6.4.3.2 requires the licensee to perform required SGT [ standby gas treatment] filter testing in accordance with Ventilation Filter Testing Program. Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.6.2 requires the licensee to perform required fuel building ventilation charcoal filtration filter testing in accordance with Ventilation Filter Testing Program. The Ventilation Filter Testing Program. Section 5.5.7.d of the j Technical Specification requires the licensee to demonstrate for ) each of the ESF [ engineered safeguards features) systems that the l pressure drop across the prefilters is less than the value specified below. Controcy to tM above, the licensee failed to perform Surveillance Requirement.s 3.7.2.2. 3.6.4.3.2. and 3.6.4.6.2 because testing of the system prefilters was not performed. (01053) F. Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.1.1 requires the licensee to perform required leakage rate testing in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. The FREQUENCY of this test is in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program The Primary Containment Leakage Rate Program, as provided in Procedure ADM 0050. Revision 4. states, in part. that if the leakage for Valve ISWP-H0V503A'is less than 1200 scfm for two consecutive tests. then the valve can be tested every 5 years vice every 2 years. Contrary to the above. the licensee failed to perform Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.1.1 because the as-found leakage for Valve ISWP MOV503A was not measured during the last test performance and the licensee incorrectly assumed that the valve had passed the leakage criteria, and as a result the test at the , 2 year interval was not performed. (01063) : These violations represent a Severity Level 111 problem (Supplement 1). NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-40
ENTERGY OPERATIONS. INC- The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reasons for the violations, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violations and prevent recurrence and the date when full compliance will be achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/96-
- 26. LER 96-014 00 dated August 9. 1996, and Entergy's October 10. 1996.
" Response to Apparent Violations." However. Entergy Operations. Inc. (Licensee), is required to submit a written statement or explanation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect its corrective actions or its position. In that case, or if the Licensee chooses to respond, clearly mark the response as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation." and send it to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ATTN: Document Control Desk. Washingion. 0.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator. Region IV. 611 Ryan Plaza Drive. Suite 400, Arlington. Texas 76011. and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). Dated at Arlington Texas this 7th day of November 1996 i NUREG-0940, PART II B-41
l H j ase UNrreo sTATas
. / . g'.t- NUCLEAR MEGULATORY COMMISSON nemon n t
I b * %^ ,*E"'dM"E ""
% ,, September 19. 1996 EA 96 236 and EA 96-249 Florida Power & Light Company ATTN: Mr. T. F. Plunkett President - Nuclear Division Post Office Box 14000 Juno Beach. Florida 33408 0420
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC Special Inspection Report Nos. 50-335 and 50 389/96 12)
Dear Mr. Plunkett:
This refers to the inspection completed on July 12. 1996, at your St. Lucie
- facility. The inspection included a review of selected aspects of your conf 1guration management and 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation programs. The results of our inspection were sent to you by letter dated July 26.19%. A closed, predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region II office on August 19. 1996, with you and memters of your staff to discuss the apparent violations, the root causes, and your corrective actions to preclude recurrence. A letter summarizing the conferent.e was sent to you by letter dated September 11. 1996.
Based on the information developed during the Inspection and the information you provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violation in Part I of the Notice involves your failure to recognize an unreviewed safety question related to the 1mplementation of a valve lineup change to the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fuel oil transfer system. Spec 1fically. in July 1995 the licensee implemented a change to the 2B EDG system to permit closing of a manual isolat1on valve from the Diesel Fuel 011 Storage Tank to the day tanks in order to minimize fuel oil ground leakage between the two tanks. As part of the change, the licensee instituted administrative measures including dedication of a non-licensed operator and procedural revisions to assure timely opening of the valve following an EDG start. Although a safety evaluation performed to evaluate this change concluded that the probability of loss of the 283 emergency bus increased by six percent, it erroneously concluded that no increase in the probability of a component failure was created. In addition the NRC has concluded that two new failure modes were introduced by the change: (1) potential failure of the operator to unisolate the fuel 011.line and (2) failure of the manual
.NUREG-0940, PART II B-42
. . . . - . .. - . ~ - . ~ . - - . - . - - . . - . .
. Florida Power & Light Company- '
isolation valve'to open; .Therefore, both the possibility for a malfunction of a type different than any evaluated previously,in the Updated Final Safety-Analysis Report (UFSAR) was introduced, and the probability of a failure of a : component important to safety was increased.: representing'a valid'unreviewed- ' l
. safety question, At the conference, you stated that a safety evaluation was prepared for this ;
change consistent with Florida Power and Light Company procedures and industry ! 4 guidance (NSAC-125). Hwever, NRC's position with respect to an " increase in , probability" differs. Although the NRC recognizes in this case that the-increase in probability of component failure was small, a normally passive , C0iiponent was made active and an absolute increase in probability was
. realized. Notwithstanding the small probability increase, the violation in
'Part I of the Notice is of significant regulatory concern because a change was imade to the EDG system resulting in the emergence of an unreviewed safety !
question for which a license amendment and NRC approval was not sought. . Further, such failures to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 i
<resulted in facility operations which depart from the licensing and or design bases described in the UFSAR. Therefore, the violation in Part I of the !
Notice is classified in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and
= Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, as a t Severity Level 111 violation. ;
In accordance with the' Enforcement Policy. a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level III violation. Because your i l facilitypasbeenthesubjectofescalatedenforcementactionswithinthelast two years .- the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for < Identf ffcatfon and Correctf ve Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process described in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. In this case, the NRC concluded that it is not appropriate to give credit for Identiffcatfon because the violation was discovered by the NRC. With regard 4 to consideration for Correctfve Actfon. at the conference you stated that your actions related to the violation in Part I of the Notice included revision of engineering safety evaluation guidance to clarify the definition of an increase in probability and issuance of a technical alert to all engineers " l regarding this issue. Further, although not directly related to this violation, additional emphasis has been placed on the importance of 10 CFR ' 50.59 and the UFSAR. Your recent actions in this regard include: (1) 10 CFR 50.59 reviewer certification:-(2) additional 10 CFR 50.59 training for designated staff: (3) 10 CFR 50.59 procedural ennancements; and (4) imolementation of the UFSAR Review Project. Based on the above. the NRC - determined that credit was* warranted for Correctfve Actfon resulting in the base civil penalty. ., 1 4 I'A severity '.evel !!! croelem and preposed civil penalty of $50,000 were issued on i
. March 28, 1996 (EA 96 040) related to a reactor coolant system boron ollution event. A severity l Level 111 v1olation and propose 3 civil penalty were issued on NovemDer 13. 1995 (EA 95-180)
' related to inoperable power operated relief valves. I ~ l 1 INUREG-0940, PART II B-43
I Florida _ Power & Light Company - 3.-
- As a result of these considerations, a civil penalty of $50.000 would normally be warranted for this Severity Level III violation. However in this case, you did perform a 50.59 evaluation and promptly thereafter communicated with the NRC staff and discussed your plans to reposition the fuel oil transfer -
1 solation valve. as well as your preparatory and compensatory measures to minimize the potential for system failure. Accordingly, under the
- circumstance of. this case, a civil penalty is not warranted. I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director. Office of Enforcement, and
'the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Regional Operations and Research. to exercise enforcement discretion. in accordance.
with the' guidance set forth in Section VII.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy, and not propose a c1vil penalty in this case. Violations. A and B described in Part II of the Notice have been categorized at
-. Severity Level IV. The violations involve four instances where you failed to effectively incorporate design changes into plant operating procedures or drawings.. These violations were NRC 1dentified and are of concern because of
!the potential for misleading operators and the similarity of the violations to annunciator response procedure deficiencies identified during previous inspections. The fifth apparent example of the configuration management violation discussed at the conference involved your failure to incorporate properly the spent fuel pool heat load calculation into operational procedure limitations prior to initiating core off-load. For this issue, the NRC has decided to exercise discretior, and characterize the violation as non-cited (NCV 50-335/96-12-01) in accordance with Section VII.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy. Specifically. you identified the violation and promptly instituted appropriate corrective action.
NRC has concluded that no violation occurred with respect to the three
' additional apparent failures to comply with 10 CFR 50.59 addressed in the subject inspection report and discussed at the conference. Specifically.
(1) the Unit 2 Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System Enclosure was not required to be included in the UFSAR. and installation and subsequent Wifications did not require 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations; (2) the znfiguration of a temporary fire pump placed in stand-by during the 1996 Unit 1 refueling outage did not require a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation in that the configuration was as described in the UFSAR (i.e., the discharge valve was closed and the pump was 1solated from the system); and (3) the failure to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation to change the setpoints and procedures for operating the fuel hoist was ~1dentified and corrected by you prior to actual fuel movement. This letter closes any further NRC action on these matters. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this Notice. Including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-44 1 w__ - - _ - _ . _ . L__-__.____
r u Florida Power'& Light Company - 4_- Lin accordance with: 10 CFR 2.790 offthe NRC's " Rules of Practice." a copy off
'this letter. Its enclosure. and your_ response will be placed in the NRC Public-Document Room (PDR) To the extent possible. your. response should not include any personal privacy. proprietary, or safeguards information.so that it can be ,
placed in the PDR without redaction. Sincerely'. .I C/ /- 1 [WVk Stewart D'. Ebneter l Regional Administrator i Docket Nos. ~ 50-335. 50-389- )
' License Nos.'DPR-67. NPF-16 .
l
Enclosure:
Notice of Violations
- cc w/ encl:
J A. Stall i
Site Vice Pre'sident St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 . Ft. Pierce. FL - 34954-0128 H. N. Paduano, Manager
' Licensing and Special Programs :
Florida Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 14000-Juno 8each. Fl. 33408 0420 J. Scarola Plant General Manager- ,
'St. Lucie Nuclear Plant ,
P. O. Box-128 ft. Pierce, FL 34954 0128 ~ E. J. Weinkam Plant Licensing Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 , + Ft. Pierce. FL 34954 0218 ,
' cc w/encli (Cont'd on Page 5)
E i i l o e 4 NUREG-0940,.PART'.Il B-45 ; i
i
. Florida Power & Light Company _ - cc w/enci (Cont'd):
J, .R. Neman. Esq. .. Morganc Lewis & Bockius :
. 1800 N Street. NW:
Washington, D C. 20036'- John T. Butler, Esq,7
. Steel. Hector and Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center
. Miami, FL:: 33131 2398 Bill Passetti
' Office of Radiation' Control. Department of Health and.- Rehabilitative Services
. 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399 0700 Jack Shreve. Public. Counsel'
? Office of the Fublic Counsel c/o The Florid 6 Legislature 111 West Madison Avenue. Room 812 Tallahassee, FL '32399-1400
' Joe Myers, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness
' Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Or1ve Tallahassee, FL 32399 2100 Thomas R. L. Kindred County Administrator St. Lucie County 2300 Virginia, Avenue-Ft Pierce,-FL 34982 Charles B.' Brinkman Washington Nuclear Operations ABB Combustion Engineering Inc.
12300 Twinbrook' Parkway. Suite 3300 Rockville, MD 20852
~ NUREG-0940, PART..-11 B-46 3 , ,
h -
k NOTICE OF VIOLATION Florida Power and Light Company Docket Nos. 50-335. 50-389 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant License Nos. DPR-67. NPF-16 EA 96 236 and 96-249 During an NRC inspection completed on July 12, 1996. violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions." NUREG-1600. the violations are listed below: , I. :10 CFR 50.59. " Changes. Tests and Experiments." provides. in part, that the licensee may make changes in the facility as described in the Safety
' Analysis Report (SAR) without prior Commission approval, unless the proposed change involves an unreviewed safety question. A proposed change shall be deemed to involve an unreviewed safety question if the probability-of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR may be increased if a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR may be created, or if the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is .
reduced. Contrary to the above. In July 1995, the licensee made a change to the facility which involved an unreviewed safety question without prior Comission approval. Specifically, the 2B Emergency Diesel Generator ' (EDG) fuel oil line was manually 1solated to secure a through-wall fuel oil leak. In taking this action. the licensee introduced two new failure modes for the 2B EDG, which both increased the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of the EDG above that previously evaluated
'in the SAR and _the possibility for malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR. resulting in an unreviewed safety question. (01013)
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I) II. 10 CFR 50. Appendix B. " Quality Av urance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants.'" Criterion III requires in part. , that measures be established to assure that applicable regulatory ! requirements and the design basis for safety-related struttures. ; systems. and components are correctly translated into specifications, i drawings, procedures. and instructions. j Florida Power and Light Company Topical Quality Assurance Report. l TOR 3.0 Revision 11 1mplements these requirements. Section 3.2. l
" Design Change Control," provides in part. that design changes-shall be reviewed to ensure their implementation is in each case. coordinated with any necessary changes to operating procedures. In addition, Section 3.2.4. " Design Verification." provides. in part. that design control measures shall be established to verify the ces1gn inputs, design process and that the design inputs are correctly incorporated into the design output. ;
i I 1 NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-47 , l 1
Notice.of Violation A. Contrary to the~above. the licensee failed to coordinate design changes with the necessary changes to operating procedures as evidenced by the following examples:
- 1. Plant Change / Modification (PC/H) 109-294. "Setpoint Change
.to the Hydrazine Low Level Alarm (LIS 07-9)." was completed-
= cn January 6.1995, without ensuring that affected Procedure ON0P 2-0030121. " Plant Annunciator Sumary." was revised.
This resulted in Annunciator S-10. "HYORAZINE TK LEVEL LO." showing an incorrect setpoint of 35.5 inches in the procedure. ,
- 2. FC/M 268-292. " Intake Cooling Water Lube Water Piping Removal and Circulatory Water Lube Water Piping Renovation." .
was completed on February 14. 1994, without ensuring that i affected Procedure ONOP 2 0020131. " Plant Annunciator I Summary." was revised. This resulted in the instructions l for Annunciator E 16. " CIRC WTR PP LUBE SPLY BACKUP IN J SERVICE." incorrectly requiring operators to verify the ! position of valves MV 21-4A and 48 following a safety i Injection actuation system signal to ensure they were 7 de energized and had no control room position indication. )
- 3. PC/M 275 290. " Flow Indicator / Switch Low Flow Alarm and Manual Annunciator. Deletions." was completed on October 28.
1992 without ensuring that affected Procedure i ONOP 2 0030131. " Plant-Annunciator Summary." was revised. ' This resulted in the instructions for safety-related Annunciators LA 12. "ATM STM DUMP MV-08-18A/18B OVERLOAD /SS ISOL." and LB-12. "ATM STM DMP MV-08-19A/19B OVERLOAD /SS i ISOL." incorrectly requiring operators to check Auto / Manual > switch or switches for the manual position. (02014) , ,n This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I). j
- 8. Contrary to the above the licensee failed to assure that the .'
design of the Circulating and Intake Cooling Water System was correctly translated into plant drawingt. Specifically, during ' implementation of PC/M 341-192. " Intake Cooling Water tube Water
- Piping Removal and Circulatory Water Lute Water Piping 1
. Renovation." the as-built Drawing No. JPN-241-192-008 was not I incorporated into Orawing No. 8770-G-082. " Flow Diagram I Circulating and Intake Cooling Water System." Revision 11. Sheet !
- 2. issued May 9. 1995 for PC/M 341 192. This resulted in Drawing No. 8770-G-082 erroneously showing valves 1-FCV-21-3A and 38 and
< associated piping as still installed. (03014) This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I). Pirsuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201. Florida Power & Light Company is-hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the NUREG-0940, PART 11 8-48
Notice of Violation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ATTN: Document Control Desk. Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator. Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the fac111ty that is the subject of this Notice.
~ within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice'of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested.. the basis for disputing the violation. (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved. (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence. If the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within' the time specified in this Notice. an order or a Demand. for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked. or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response
. shall be submitted under oath or affirmatMn.
Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it thould not include any personal privacy, proprietary. or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your responsJ that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you EWil specifically 1dentify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the Information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential comercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to prov1de an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at Atlanta. Georgia this 19th day of September 1996 4 NUREG-0940, PART II' B-49
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' NUCLEAR RE U T maios a CoMMISsloN
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" $ $?l N S i$ $ "
g ,,,, e - December 3},1996-
.EA 96-479.
J
. Georgia Power Company.
ATTN:. Mr. C. K, McCoy Vice President ' - .. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. P. 0.' Bw 1295-. Birmingham, ALo 35201
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC Inspection. Report Nos. 50 424 and. < 50 425/96-11)_ This refers to the inspection conducted during the period Se tember 29 through November 9,1996, at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (!EGP). The Einspection included a review of the facts and circumstances surrounding
-installation deficiencies. associated with certain safety-related motor coolers as well as the program for maintaining this equipment. The results'of this
' inspection were discussed with members of your staff on November 12, 1996. and were formally transmitted to you by letter dated December 5, 1996, in addition, on November 27, 1996, you submitted Licensee Event Report No. 50 424/96-010 which addressed the inoperability of the Unit 1 safety injection pump B (IB SIP) due to degraded motor cooling. An open predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region II office on-December 19, 1996, with you and members of your staff to discuss the apparent violation, the root causes. and corrective actions to preclude recurrence. A
' list of conference attendees, a copy of your presentation materials, and NRC slides are enclosed.
Based on the information developed during the inspection and the inforulation that was provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. Violation A involved the inoperability of the IB SIP for a period greater than that allowed by Technical Specifications (TS) due to inadequate pump motor cooling. The inoperable condition existed from at least September 1991 when maintenance was last performed on the IB SIP motor coolers and may have existed for some indeterminate Specifically. during the period l October 23 25, period prior to that time.1996. you determined that the cooling flow through the two motor coolers for this pump was degraded to approximately one sixth of the normal flow. The condition was caused by improper installation of a gasket on the inboard motor cooler which blocked all flow in that cooler and improper installation of a it by two thirds, plenum in the In addition, other your motor cooler subsequent investigation which identified reduced flow through similarl
- cooler, y reversed plenums on a Unit' 2 Train A containment spray pump motora Unit 1 Auxiliary C
- and both Unit 2 ACCW Pump 1_ motor coolers.
NUREG-0940, PART 11~ B-50
\
GPC 2 Violation B involves your failure to establish adequate procedures for the disassembly and reassembly of the motor coolers during maintenance activities. l Although some guidance was provided in the maintenance checklist to instruct personnel to re-install gaskets and plenums, the procedure was general and provided insufficient specific guidance or precautions regarding gasket or plenum orientation. The procedural deficiency was compounded by the lack of detailed information in the vendor manuals and a lack of knowledge on the part of plant personnel that the motor coolers were three-pass coolers instead of the assumed one-pass configuration. , Although the inoperability of the IB SIP did not have a significant consequence to safety because it was not called upon to operate during this period. the violations are nonetheless of significant regulatory concern because an important emergency core cooling system (ECCS) component was inoperable for an extended period of time. Although your safety analysis indicates that the IB SIP would have operated for approximately one-hour post-accident, it would have likely failed following that period due to motor bearing failure resulting in its unavailability for subsequent accident mitigation. The NRC also recognizes that the overall safety function was not lost in this case due to the availability of the 1A SIP. However, as you described at the conference there were periods during the time in which the IB SIP was inoperable that the 1A SIP was out of service for maintenance or testing: thus, the plant was operated for short periods of time in a condition which was prohibited by TS. Therefore, these violations are classified in the aggregate in accordance with the General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy). NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level III problem. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level 111 problem. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement action within the last two years the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identf fication and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process described in Section VI B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NRC concluded that credit was warranted for Identification because your staff identified the violations. The attentiveness and questioning attitude of the plant equipment operator responsible for identifying and pursuing temperature differences in the two motor coolers for the IB SIP and the site engineer who identified the possibility of reversing the motor cooler plenums are particularly noteworthy. With regard to consideration for Corrective Action, at the conference you stated that your immediate and long term corrective actions included: (1) proper installation of the gasket and plenum on the 1B SIP: (2) inspection and correction of other ECCS motor coolers for reversed plenums: (3) development of a plant procedure which provides detailed instruction for correct disasser.cly and reassembly of motor coolers and revision of the existing maintenance checklist to reference the new procedural requirements: (4) inspection and correction of ACCW motor coolers plenum installation deficiencies: (5) training of maintenance personnel scheduled in January 1997 and continuing as part of the Continuing Training Program: (6) establishment of concurrent, dual verification of gasket and plenum installation; and (7) initiation of a review to determine the appropriate methodology for NUREG-0940, PART II B-51 e
GPC 3 periodic functional testing of heat exchangers, Based on the above, the NRC determined that your corrective actions were prompt and comprehensive, and credit was warranted for this factor. Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive corrective action for violations, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In addition, at the conference you stated that efforts have been initiated to determine the appropriate functional testing criteria for heat exchangers. Due to the importance of this effort in assuring future operability of heat exchangers i for safety related equipment, we request that your response include a detailed description and proposed schedule for your actions in this regard. The NRC will consider your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement l action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. I in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). , 1 Sincerely, l Stewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-424, 50-425 License Nos, NPF-68, NPF-81
Enclosures:
- 1. Notice of Violation
- 2. Conference Attendees
- 3. NRC Slides
- 4. Licensee Presentation Material cc w/encis:
J. D. Woodard Senior Vice President Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 i cc w/encis: (Cont'd on Page 4) l NUREG-0940, PART II B-52
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-5 GPC , .4- ,
~
ccw/encls(Cont'd)! >
'JF B. Beasley.
General Manager, Plant Vogtle >
- Georgia Power Com lP. Of Box.1600 . pany.
,Waynesboro.-GA f30830
~J.DA. Bailey. .
7 Manager-Licensing .
~ Georgia Power Company '
P. 0.: Box 1295 Birmingham. AL -35201-
-]
i
' Jim Hurt? Director . .
. Consumers' Utility Counsel Division j
Governor's'0ffice of Consumer Affairs !
-2 Mc L;: King, Jr. Drive _ '
-: Plaza Level.--East: Suite 356- '
? Atlanta. GA. 30334-4600-i
' Office of Planning and Budget
- Room 6158 ;
i
'270 Washington Street ~ SW'
' Atlanta, GA- 30334 .
i l 0ffice of the County Comissioner Burke County Commission- ,
.Waynesboro, GA 30830 !
i Harold Reheis.! Director Department of Natural Resources ; 205 Butler Street. SE. Suite 1252 Atlanta, GA 30334 ,
*i '
. Thomas Hill, Manager '
Radioactive Materials Program
. Department of Natural Resources 4244 International Parkway !
- Suite 114 i Atlanta, GA' 30354 Attorney. General
- Law Department 132 Judicial Building l E Atlanta, GA.. 30334' cc-w/encis: .(Cont'd on Page 5) j
,I-
i f.' <.
. NUREG-0940, PART'II; .B-53 :J
- l
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S. .~ .
, _ t #
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.GPC-. 5:
ccw/enbls(Cont'd):
' Thomas P. Mozingo .
Manager of Nuclear Operations Oglethorpe' Power Corporation l2100 E.' Exchange Place?
~
~
Tucker l GA: 30085-1349.
' Charles A.LPatbizia. Esq.
~
Paula Hastings.' Janofsky & Walker fl0th Floor
- 1299 Pennsylvania-Avenue
. Washington. D. C. :20004 9500 T Steven M.l Jackson. .
1 Senior Engineer -: Power Supply Municipal Electric Authority. of Georgia-
;1470 Riveredge Parkway NW-cAtlanta. GA:.30328 4684-
; y i
(NUREG-0940,'. PART'. II - B-54
. ' ' y
. , , . . . ~ . . .
I l NOTICE OF VIOLATION . Georgia Power Company Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant License Nos. NPF-68. NPF-81 . EA 96-479 ! During an NRC inspection conducted on September 29 through November 9.1996. violations of NRC requirements were identified. . In accordance with the'
" General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions."
NUREG-1600, the violations are listed below: A. ' Technical Specification (TS) 3 5.2 Limiting Condition for Operation. Greater than or EmerencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS) Equa to 350 *F. requires that two independent Subsystems-Tlubsystemsbe ECCS operable when in modes 1, 2. or 3. Each subsystem is comprised of one , operable centrifugal charging pump.:one operable safety injection pump, one operable residual heat removal heat exchanger, and one operable residual heat removal pump. TS 3.5.2 Action Statement (a) re. quires that with one ECCS subsystem inoperable that the inoperable subsystem be restored to operable status within 72 hours or be in Hot Standby within the next six hours and in c Hot Shutdown within the following 6 hours. , Contrary to the above, from at least September 30, 1991, through - October 23, 1996, when Unit 1 was cperated in modes 1, 2. and 3. the licensee failed to maintain two independent ECCS subsystems operable, and the provisions of TS 3.5.2 Action Statement (a) were not met. . Specifically, the Unit 1. Train 8 safety injection pump (1B SIP) was ' inoperable due to blocked cooling flow to one of its motor coolers and approximately one-third flow to its other motor cooler. (01013)
- 8. TS 6.7.1.a requires that written procedures be established covering activities delineated in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33. ;
Revision 2. dated February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33. Revision 2, dated February 1978, requires that procedures be written for performance,of maintenance that can affect safety related equipment. Maintenance Procedure Checklist SCLO22238. Nuclear Service Cooling Water l Heat Exchangers - Periodic Inspections. Revision 8. dated September 29, 1 1995, provided general instructions to remove, replace, and re-install I heat exchanger gaskets and plenums. Contrary to the above, as of October 25, 1996, the licensee failed to establish adequate procedural guidance to assure the correct installation of motor cooler gaskets and plenums for safety related equipment. As a result, the gasket for the 18 SIP inboard motor cooler was installed backwards and the plenum on the outboard motor cooler was reversed rendering the pump inoperable. Additionally, the plenums were Enclosure 1
)
l
.NUREG-0940, PART'II
- B-55
.- - , . , . . .. - - . ..~ . . . . . -- ~ .
i
- Notice of Violation 2 installed backwards on a Unit 2 Train A containment spray pump motor cooler, on a Unit 1 auxiliary component cooling water (ACCW) Pump 2 motor cooler, and on both Unit 2 ACCW Pump 1 motor coolers.'(01023) n This-is a Severity Level III problem (Supplement 1).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, the Georgia Power Company is (hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATIN: Document Control Desk, Washington. 0.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator Region II and a copy to the
-- NRC Resident Inspector at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, within 30 days-of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice).
This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if the violation. (2) the corrective steps contested, that have been thetaken basis forthe and disputing'Its resu achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses
- the required response, if an adequate reply is not received within the time
- specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued
- as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation, { i Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR), to ! the extent possible. it should not include any personal privacy. proprietary, 1 or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the POR without redaction. However..if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be ' placed in the POR. and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information'from the public. Dated at Atlanta. Georgia this31st day. of December 1996 e a NUREG-0940, PART !! B-56_ -1 i N--- w-m-en 4- -,v y w -r-
4 4 uswrso states , (# %q'g NUCLEAR REGULATOftY COMMISSION
- 77wtrA . Yim"oise "
- %, . . . . / December 5. 1996 1 EA % 336
~Mr. Michael McEnany, President McEnany Roofing, Inc. ,
i 8803 Industrial Drive
- Tampa, F1orida_'33637
~
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION 5 (Department of Labor Case No. 96 ERA 5) (NRC Office of Investigations Case No. 2 95 27) 1
Dear Mr. McEnany:
! On August 22.' 19%. the presiding Adninistrative Law Judge (ALJ)' issued a finding in U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). proceeding 96 ERA 5. J=as v. Pritts McEnany Roofina. Inc. The ALJ in a Recommended Decision and Order (RDO). i - found that Ms. Tracy A. James was the subject of employment discrimination in October 1995 when your company, formerly known as Pritts McEnany Roofing, Inc., terminated her for raising concerns about the failure of another
. employee of McEnany Roofing, Inc., to adhere to NRC security regulations at Florida Power Corporation's (FPC) Crystal River facility. The circumstances surrounding the apparent violation were also investigated by the NRC Office of ;
Investigations (01). 01 found that Pritts McEnany Roofing, Inc., , discriminated against Ms. James for engaging in protected activities.
- The apparent violation. a copy of the ALJ's Reconnended Decision and Order and the synopsis of the O! investigation were transmitted to you by letter dated October 8. 1996. A closed transcribed predecisional enforcement confemnce
~ was held in the Region II office on October 22, 1996, to discuss the apparent violation, the root causes, and your corrective actions to preclude recurrence. The predecisional enforcement conference was a joint conference involving your company, McEnany Roofing, Inc.: you as the individual ! responsible for the discriminatory act; and. FPC. The report susuarizing the 4 L conference was sent to you by letter dated November 8.1996 l Based on the ALJ decision, the OI findings, and the information you provided during the conference, the l#tC has determined that a violation of 184C l requirements occurred. The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of
! Violation (Notice). The violation involved discrimination against Ms. James by senior management. Under 10 CFR 50.7. discrimination by a contractor of a Commission licensee against an employee for engaging in protected activities protected by Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) is pmhibited.
The activities which are protected include, but are not limited to, reporting
- or safety soncerns by an employee to her employer.
! ' While discrimination against any rson for enga ing in ected activities is'cause for concern to the NRC. is violation s consi to be a very significant regulatory concern because it involved discrimination against an employee by. senior contractor management. Therefore. this violation has been t p NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-57
?____.______ __._______._1.__ .
McEnany Roofing. Inc. 2 categorized in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy). NUREG 1600, at Severity
-Level II.
During the conference. it was your position that although Ms. James was terminated. you terminated her in the heat of the moment to address a business issue and did not terminate her in retaliation for raising safety concerns. After review of the information provided during the conference, we conclude that but for her engaging in protected activities she would not have been terminated. Therefore. the MtC adopts the ALJ's Recommended Decision and 4 Order, as well as the 01 conclusion in this case and finds that the actions taken against Ms. James were in retaliation for her having raised safety
' Concerns.
I Therefore. I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director. Office of Enforcement, and the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Regional Operations and Research to issue the enclosed Notice of
. Violation categorized at a Severity Level II to emphasize the importance of
. ensuring that employees who raise real or perceived safety concerns are not
. subject to discrimination for raising safety concerns and that every effort is made to provide an environment in which all employees may freely identify- )
safety concerns without fear of retaliation or discrimination. l
\
During the conference, you described those actions taken to address concerns. j i about the implementation of the requirements of ERA Section 211. These l included: (1) strengthening your policies with regard to ensuring employee concerns are promptly addressed and resolved: (2) training supervisors and 3 employees with regard to their responsibilities in the area of employee protection; and. (3) discussions of employee rights with individual employees. As a contractor to Cosmission licensees, it is important that you, your supervisors and your employees fully understand that amployees should be free to raise concerns and tnat discrimination will not be tolerated. Should discrimination be found in the future you may be subject to an Order prohibiting you and your company from engaging in activities at an NRC licensed facility. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In particular. l your response should describe the basis for our confidence that in the future. McEnany Roofing. Inc. will abide by the employee protection requirements of Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act and in 10 CFR 50.7. In addition. the Mtc is concerned that the ongoing DDL proceeding could have a chilling effect on your employees. Therefore, please provide a written response descr1bing the actions taken or planned to assure that the st& ject employment action will not have a chilling effect in discouraging other McEnany Roofing employees from raising real or perceived safety concerns related to activities at MIC licensed facilities. The MIC will use your response. in part to detemine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. NUREG-0940, PART.II B-58 L -- - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _
1 l McEnany Roofing. Inc. 3 l In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice." a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR). Should you have any questions concerning this Notice of Violation, please contact Mr. Bruno Uryc at (404) 331 5505 or Mr. Kerry Landis at (404) 331 5509. Collect calls will be accepted. You may also contact us by calling 1 800 577 8510. Sincerely. t vw) (, tewart D. Ebneter h Regional A&inistrator Docket No.: 9999
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation cc w/ encl: Mr. P. M. Beard. Jr. (SA2A) Sr. VP. Nuclear Operations Florida Power Corporation - Crystal River Energy Complex 15760 West Power Line Street Crystal River. Florida 34428 6708 Ms. Tracy James 7915 West Missy Place-Dunellen. Florida 34433 1 i i l I NUREG-0940, PART II 8-59
i-
. NOTICE-0F VIOLATION McEnan Docket No. 9999 Tampa,y Roofing,,Inc.
Florida EA 96 336 As a result of review of a U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) Administrative Law
-Judge (ALJ) Reconsnanded Decision and Order, dated August 22. 1996, and an investigation by the NRC's Office of Investigations (01) completed on September 24, 1996, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions." NUREG 1600, the violation is listed below:
10 CFR 50.7 prohibits, in part. diserlaination by a contractor of a 4 Cosuaission licensee against an employee for engaging in certain protected activities. Discrimination includes discharge or other
. actions relating to the compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges i of employment. The activities which are protected include, but are not
' limited to, reporting of safety concerns by an employee to her employer.
Contrary to the above, McEnany Roofing. Inc., formerly known as Pritts
- McEnany Roofing. Inc., a contractor employed by Florida Power Corporation at the Crystal River Nuclear Plant, discriminated against Ms. Tracy A. James, a former security escort and firewatch.
Specifically, as found by the DOL ALJ in Case No. 96 ERA 5
-(August 22. 1996) and by OI in Case No. 2 95 027 (September 24, 1996).
- on October 11. 1995. Pritts McEnany Roofing, Inc., terminated the -
employment of Ms. James as a result of her reporting a violation of security escort requirements imposed at Florida Power Corporation's 4 Crystal River Nuclear Plant pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act. (01011) This is a Severity Level II violation (Supplement VII). I l Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201. McEnany Roofing, Inc., is hereby ! required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear ! Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk. Washington, D.C. 20555 + with a copy to the Regional Administrator. Region II, and a copy to the MC i Resident Inspector at Crystal River, within 30 days of the date of the letter ' transmitting this Notice of Violation. This reply should be clearly marked as i a
- Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: -
(1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results
- achieved (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further 4
- violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed corres <
correspondence adequately addresses the required response.pondence, If an te if the reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an or a j Demand for Information may be issued. Where good cause is shown. - consideration will b3 given to extending the response time, ! Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. ; Enclosure ! l , 1 l NUREG-0940, PART II B-60 l i l
- Notice of Violat1on 2 In accorda'n ce with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice." a copy of a this. letter, its enclosure. and your response will be placed in the NRC Public q Document Room (POR). To the extent possible, your response should not include . J
!- any personal privacy proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the POR without redaction. However. if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific infomation that you desire not to be placed in the PDR. and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public. Dated at Atlanta. Georgia ! this 5th day of December 1996 i l l f 1 4 k 6 h I s l h i NUREG-0940, PART 11 8-61
l 1 is ma% uNtTED STATES { [e \. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REoloN lv k% . 611 RYAN PLAZA DRivf. sulTE 400 ARL8NoToN, texas 76011-8064 September.30, 1996 EA 96-202 Guy R. Horn, Vice President Nuclear Nebraska Public Power District - 141415th Street Columbus, Nebraska 68601
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLAfiON (NRC Inspection Report 50-298/96-18 and Investigation Case No. 4-96-002)
Dear Mr. Horn:
This refers to the matters discussed at the predecisional enforcement conference conducted on August 5,1996, at the NRC's office in Arlington, Texas. As indicated in our letter dated June 27,1996, the conference was conducted to discuss apparent violations related to a control rod mispositioning event that occurred on January 7,1996, at the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS). A summary of the predecisional enforcement conference, including the information presented by the Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) at the conference, was issued on August 7,1996. Subsequent to the conference with NPPD, the NRC also conducted individual conferences with two former CNS licensed operators who were involved in the rod mispositioning event. Based on the information developed during the inspection and investigation, a review of NPPD's investigation of this matter, and the information obtained from the conferences, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). Each involves a f ailure by licensed operating personnel to follow procedural requirements, including: 11 a f ailure to insert control rods in the proper sequence following a loss of a reactor recirculation pump; 2) a f ailure to notify shift supervision of an unexpected situation, i.e., a mispositioned control rod, for approximately 20 minutes; and 3) a f ailure to obtain the concurrence of the shif t supervisor and reactor engineer in developing a recovery plan for a mispositioned control rod. This event began when the involved operators, af ter being directed to insert control rods in reverse sequence following a reactor recirculation pump trip, mistakenly inserted control rods on the wrong page of the control rod sequence book. The operators recognized their mistake but continued inserting control rods without notifying shif t supervisory personnel L of their error and without seeking concurrence in a recovery plan. This event was
- l. . investigated by NPPD and resulted in NPPD terminating the involved licensed operators.
The NRC agrees with NPPD's expectation that the operators should have promptly informed shift supervisory personnel of their mistake and the abnormal conditions that developed. The information available to the NRC, however, does not support a conclusion that they intentionally violated any CNS procedural requirements. Although their actions i NUREG-0940, PART II- B-62
Nebraska Public Power Distnct 2-I I violated CNS procedures and NPPD management expectations, the operators appear to j have been focused on inserting control rods to avoid exceeding plant administrative limits and an automatic plant trip'. And, while they should have been mindful of the procedural requirements, they were not. The f acts that they maintained accurate logs and informed i the reactor engineer of the mistake when he approached the panel do not suggest a j deliberate intent to cover up their mistake or violate procedures. The NRC recognizes that the actions taken by the involved operators did not place the plant in an unsafe condition. Nonetheless, there is regulaicry significance to licensed operato's.not recognizing their r:bligation to obta:n chift supervisor and reactor enaineer coc.currence before proceeding to insert control rods in this situation. The NRC also attaches regulatory significance to the fact that the contici room supervisor, despite being aware that the operators were inserting rods on the Emergency Cc,ntrol Rod Movement sheet, an unusual situation, did not take sction to determine what was occurring and to understand the situation. As noted in NPPD's investigation of this matter, the control room supervisor's attention appears to have been focused heavily on balance of-plant activities. While the NRC does not conclude that the control room supervisor's actions violated the Conduct of Operations procedures, an apparent violation discussed at the conference, this remains a concern. Finally, the NRC notes that NPPD's investigation team found inconsistent crew members' knowledge of the requirements of CNS procedure 10.13,
" Control Rod Sequence and Movement Control," which calls into question the adequacy of CNS's training on the specific requirements of this procedure.
Based on the regulatory significance of these violations, they have been categorized in the aggregate in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Proceaure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level lit problem, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a civil penalty, with a base value of $50,000, is considered for a Severity Level lll problem. Because your f acility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the 2 years preceding the identification of this problem,' the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for /denti// cation and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Pokcy. These violations were identified as a result of the involved operators informing NPPD managers of their mistake, and NPPD's follow-up investigation into this matter. Thus, credit for identatication is warranted. The NRC also has determined that NPPD is deserving of credit for its corrective actions, which consisted of: immediate actions to assure the safety of the f acihty and assure that thermellimits had not been exceeded; meetings with all operating crews to discuss issues arising from this event; initiation of an independent revisw team investigation; disciplinary action against the involved operators; clarification and revisions to procedures and Ops instructions; and assessment of the environment for reporting errors.
' For example, on December 12, 1994, a Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties in the aniount of $300.000 was issued for three Severity level 111 problems involving primary contamment integrity, electrical buses, and the control room emergency filtration system (EAs 94164,94165,94-166).
NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-63 i
Nebraska Public Power District ' 3 '-
~ Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations, I have been authorized, af ter consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to l propose a civil penaity in this case. However, significant violations in the future could
- result in a civil penalty.
- You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the l enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part,
[ to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with l regulatory. requirements. l
- In accordance with.10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Gules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
l l Sincerely, L.J Callan Regional Administrator Docket No.: 50 298 License No.: DPR-46
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation cc w/
Enclosure:
John R. McPhail. General Counsel Nebraska Public Power District P.O. Box 499 Columbus, Nebraska 68602-0499 John Mueller, Site Manager Nebraska Public Power District E P.O. Box 98 Brownville, Nebraska 68321 Robert C. Godley, Nuclear Licensing
& Safety Manager Nebraska Public Power District P.O. Box 98 Brownville, Nebraska 68321 R. J. Singer, Manager Nuclear
' Midwest Power 907 Walnut Street P.O. Box 657 Des Moines, Iowa 50303
- NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-64
-.__.___m _ _ . _ _ . . _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ . , _ _ _ _ _ _
?.. ,o .m .
i 1
' '~ Nebraska Public Power District - -:
; Mr. Flon Stoddard Lincoln Electric Systern 11th and O Streets'-
' Linc'oln, Nebraska 68508 Flandolph Wood, Director -
Nebraska Department of Environmental
- Quality.. f ,
P.O. Box 98922 _ Lincoin, Nebraska 68509-8922' l Chairman Nemaha County Board of Commissioners. Nemaha County Courthouse . > 1824 N Street '
' Auburn, Nebraska' 68305, Cheryl Rogers, LLRW Program Manager
' Env_ i ronmental Protection Section -
Nebraska Department of Health -
? 301 Centennial Mall, South .
P,0. Box 95007 Lincoln, Nebraska 68509 5007 Or, Mark B. Horton, M.S.P.H. , Director - _ Nebraska Department of Health P.O. Box 950070 Lincoln, Nebraska 68509 5007 ri, A. Kucera, Department Director
-. of Intergovernmental Cooperation Department of Natural Resources P.O. Box 176' Jefferson City, Missouri 65102 4
.- Kansas Radiation Control Program Director . ,
i I 1 l
- ( ,
- r. ( i
. rx . r,-
D+ $NUREG-0940,;PART@' B265 , 4 ( ri~ \ h t f- , _. ,i J j 5 4 ;,
NOTICE OF VIOLATION Nebraska Public Power District' Docket No. 50-298
' Cooper Nuclear Station License No. DPR-46 EA 96 202 During an NRC investigation concluded on May 8,1996, violations of NRC requirements
-were identified, in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the violations are listed below:
A. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires, in part, that, " Activities affectmg quality shall bef. . . accompl;shed in accordance with these mstructions, procedures, and drawings." Step 8.2.6 5 of Cooper Nuclear Station Operations Manual, " Conduct of Operations Procedure 2.0.3," Revision 20, dated August 21,1995, states, " Operators should
- notify the control room supervisor and shif t supervisor of any unexpected situations encountered in monitoring the main control boards."
Contrary to the above, on January 7,1996, operators did not notify the control room supervisor and shift supervisor of a mispositioned control rod, an unexpected situation encountered in monitoring the main control boards, until approximately 20 minutes af ter discovery. (01013)
- 8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,"
requires, in part, that, " Activities affecting quality shall be . . accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, and drawings." Step 8.1.5 of Cooper Nuclear Station Operations Manual, Nuclear Performance Procedure 10.13," Control Rod Sequence and Movement Control," Revision 26, dated December 24,1995, requires that operators, ". . . Dal deviate from the sequence unless approved by a reactor engineer (or shif t supervisor in an emrtgency) or per a SORC approved procedure." Contrary to the above, on January 7,1996, operators deviated from the approved sequence when operators inserted control rods starting with the incorrect page of the control rod sequence book without the express permission of a reactor engineer or the shift supervisor, or a SORC approved procedure. (01023) C. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires, in part, that, " Activities affecting quality shall be . . . accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, and drawings." Step 8.4.4 of Cooper Nuclear Station Operations Manual, Nuclear Performance Procedure 10.13, " Control Rod Sequence and Movement Control," Revision 26, dated December 24,1995, requires that operators, "With concurrence of the shif t supervisor and reactor engineer, implement a recovery plan . . . ." when recovering from mispositioned control rods, n l l y NUREG-0940,PART1II B-66
Notice of Violation 2-1 1 Contrary to the above, on January 7,1996, operators f ailed to properly implement j this procedure when the control room operators took actions to recover from ] mispositioned control rods using their own judgement rather than a recovery plan which had been concurred in by the shif t supervisor and the reactor engineer. 1 (01033) l These violations represent a Severity Level lit problem (Supplement 1). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Nebraska Public Power District is hereby required to submit a wr:tten statement or explan, tion N the U.S. Nuclear Regu!atory Commission, ATTN: . Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C M555 witn a copy to the
- Regional Administrator, Region IV,611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the f acility'that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the . results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction, if personal pnvacy or , proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information, if you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withhold-ing (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financialinformation). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. Dated at Arlington, Texas this 30th day of September 1996 NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-67
-t
# "8k, uNif tD STATES '
e \ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION h J R EQloN lv
.,~ ' sit RYAN PLAZA oRivt, sutit 400 o - ARLINGfoN,if XAs760114064 .
November 20, 1996 EA 96-307 G. R. Horn, Senior Vice President of Energy Supply :
. Nebraska Public Power District 141415th Street -
Columbus, Nebraska 68601
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50 298/9618and 96-02)
Dear' Mr. Horn:
This refers to your letter dated October 25,1996,in which you replied to our letter and NRC Inspection Report 50 298/9618 dated September 18,1996. The inspection report described eight apparent violations of access authorization requirements at Cooper Nuclear Station (Cooper), most of which had been identified by NPPD following a change in management of the security program in late 1995. Our letter indicated that the NRC was considering escalated enforcement action and provided the Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) with the option of responding in writing or requesting a predecisional enforcement j conference. NPPD provided a written response to the apparent violations in its letter dated l October 25,1996. In its response, NPPD admitted the apparent violations, but stated that some appeared to be deviations from regulatory guidance contained in NRC Reguistory Guide 5.66 rather than violations of requirements. NPPD also noted that all but two of the violations were self-identified, and that NPPD was in compliance with the involved requirements at the j time the inspection (96-18) was conducted. NPPD described numerous corrective actions, l including: consolidation of the security program under the Nuclear Power Group to increase oversight and control; revisions to Cooper's security procedures to remedy the cited deficiencies; retraining of the access authorization staff; and a review of active access files to assure that unescorted access was based on appropriate information and that required information was in each file. Finally, NPPD acknowledged that a deficient access ' authorization program existed, but noted that aggressive steps were taken to assess and correct all deficiencies. As noted in NRC's inspection report, there was a complete [ turnover in the access authorization staff since the discovery of these violations in late 1995, Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that you provided in your response to the inspection report, the NRC has determined that violations ' of NRC requirements did occur. These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). The circumstances surrounding them were described in detail in the
' subject inspection report. With regard to NPPD's position that some of the apparent ,
violations appeared to be deviations from regulatory guidance, and not violations, the NRC
- NUREG-0940, .- PART i ll . B-68.
4 ,- l-i
. . Nebraska Public Power District 2-notes that NRC Regulatory Guides are enforceable if they are referenced or contained in a ! license or other legally binding requirement. In this case, NRC License DPR 46 states that - NPPD will fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Security Plan for the Cooper Nuclear Station. The Security Plan commits NPPD to implementing all elements of ~;
Regulatory Guide 5.66. Thus, the guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 5.66 is considered by the NRC to be legally binding on NPPD and deviations from Regulatory Guide 5.66 are considered violations of requirements. The enclosed violations involved several past f ailures to implement requirements related to granting access to Cooper, including: 1) multiple f ailures to consider criminal history information; 2). multiple f ailures to develop references for applicants, includin0 a willfu! failure on the part of a former Cooper access authorization technician to develop references in two cases; 3) multiple f ailures to review military background information; 4) multiple f ailures to document interviews of . applicants when derogatory information was discovered; - 5) multiple f ailures to verify activities during periods of unemployment; 6) multiple f ailures to conduct complete background investigations when ." updating" access: 7) two f ailures to
. complete full background investigations af ter granting temporary access. In addition to these past f ailures, one current violation was discovered, involving a vulnerability in the badging process for individual access authorization.
.The NRC acknowledges that most of the violations were discovered in late 1995 and early 1996 following a change in management of the security program at Cooper, and were ,
corrected by NPPD prior to the NRC's inspection (96-18). Nonetheless, these violations indicate that for an extended period of time prior to late 1995, Cooper's access authorization program was barely functionalin several areas. This appears to have been caused by inadequate or non existent management of this program. While the NRC does not have information indicating that the violations resulted in granting unescorted access to individuals who should not have been permitted access to Cooper, the program was being run in a manner that significantly increased the likelihood of that occurring. The manner in which the access authorization program was being run was contrary to the objective in 10
- CFR 73.56 of providing high assurance that unescorted access be granted only to ;
individuals who are reliable and trustworthy. Therefore, these violations are classified in , f the aggregate in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG 1600, as a Severity Level lli problem. I In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a civil penalty with a base value of $50,000is considered for a Severity Level 111 problem. Because your f acility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the 2 years preceding the discovery of this problem in late 1995 and early 1996', the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NRC determined that credit was warranted for both: Cooper security management identified most of the violations and, as 6
' For example, on December 12,1994, a Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition 4
of Civil Penalties in the amount of $300,000 was issued f.or three Severity Level til , problems involving primary containment integrity, electrical buses, and the control room emergency filtration system (EAs 94 164,94-165,94 166). ; NUREG-0940, PART II B-69
Nebraska Pubhc Power District 3-discussed above, initiated prompt and comprehensive corrective action. While Section Vll.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy states that the NRC may increase sanctions for violations involving particularly poor licensee performance, regardless of the identification and f%rrective Action factors, the NRC has decided not to assess a civil penalty based on the specific circumstances of this caae.' As NPPD stated in its October 25 letter, these problems were identified as the result of " positive action to aggressively self-identify, correct and improve" the access authorization program. Therefore, to recognize and encourage self-identification and prompt and comprehensive correction of violations,I have been authorized after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation without a civil penalty in this case. However, NPPD is reminded and cautioned that significant violations in this program area in the future could result in a civil penalty. The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violations, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violations and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket m inspection Report No. 50-298/9618,and NPPD's October 25,1996 letter. Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additionalinformation, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and any response you choose to submit will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR), Sincerely, l L. Callan l Regional Administrator l
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation 1 i l Docket No.: 50-298 License No.: DPR-46 cc w/
Enclosure:
John R. McPhail, General Counsel Nebraska Public Power District P.O. Box 499 Columbus, Nebraska 68602-0499 I ( \ \ l I' i i NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-70
s Nebraska Public Power District P.'D. Graham, Vice President of Nuclear Energy Nebraska Public Power District
' P.O. Box 98 Brownville, Nebraska . 68321 Kansas' Radiation Control Program Director B. L. Houston, Nuclear Licensing
- and Safety Manager Nebraska Public Power District P.O. Box 98 Brownville, Nebraska . 68321 R. J. Singer, Manager-Nuclear Midwest Power 907 Walnut Street
- P.O. Box 657 Des Moines, Iowa 50303 Mr, Ron Stoddard Lincoln Electric System 11th and O Streets Lincoln, Nebraska 68508 Randolph Wood, Director Nebraska Department of Environmentai Quality P.O. Box 98922 Lincoln, Nebraska 68509 8922 Chairman Nemaha County Board of Commissioners Nemaha County Courthouse 1824 N Street Auburn, Nebraska 68305 Cheryl Rogers, LLRW Program Manager Environmental Protection Section Nebraska Department of Health 301 Centennial Mall, South P.O. Box 95007 Lincoln, Nebraska 68509 5007 Dr. Mark B. Horton, M.S.P.H.
. Director Nebraska Department of Health P.O. Box 950070 Lincoln, Nebraska 68509 5007 NUREG-0940, PART,11 ~B-71 j
I-l l Nebraska Public Power Distr.ict R.' A. Kucera, Department Director of Intergovernmental Cooperation Department of Natural Resources P.O. Box 176 Jefferson City,' Missouri 65102. I l t l-NUREG-0940, PART I'I B-72
I NOTICE OF VIOLATION Nebraska Public Power Dit,trict Dacket No. 50-298 Cooper Nuclear Station License No. OPR-46 EA 96 307 During an NRC inspection conducted from July 29,1996 to August 2,1996, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy j and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600,the violations are listed l below: I NRC License DPR 46 states,in part, that NPPD will fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved Security Plan for the Cooper Nuclear Station, including ar.endmenti, y4 changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p). Paragraph 1.2.1 of the Cooper Nuclear Station Physical Security Plan states, " Effective April 27,1992, Nebraska Public Power District will' adhere to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.56," Personnel Access Authorization Requirements For Nuclear Power Plants." All . elements of Regulatory Guide 5.66 will be implemented to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56." A. Paragraph 6.2.3 of Regulatory Guide 5.66 states, in part, that the utility shall ptarform a criminal history record check that includes the entire criminal history record of the individual as an adult. Paragraph 7.1 states, in part, that in making a determination of trustworthiness or reliability, that a criminal history without adequate evidence of rehabilitation must be considered. It further requires consideration of willful omission or f alsification of materialinformation submitted in support of employment or request for unescorted access. Contrary to the above, during the latter part of 1995 or early 1996, the hcensee identified approximately 10 individuals who had been granted unescorted access without a criminal history being completed. Further, approximately another 10 files contained criminal history that was not reported in the personal history questionaires and the licensee staff did not review the information to determine if the information was willfully omitted or f alsified in the criminal history portion of the personnel history questionaire. (01013) B. Paragraph 6.2.5 of Regulatory Guide 5.66 states, in part, that the applicant's reputation for emotional stability, reliability and trustworthiness must be examined through contact with two references supplied by the oppucant and at least two additional references (not related to the applicant) developed during the background investigation. Paragraph 6.4.8 of the licensee's Procedure AAPP 3.3, " Background investigations", states, "A total of four character and reputation references shall be contacted during the conduction of the Bl. Two of the references shall be developed (not provided by the SUBJECT)." NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-73 I
+
Notice of Violation: 2-Contrary to the above, during an outage conducted in late 1995, a licensee Access - Authorization Program Technician wilfully directed two contractor Access Authorization Program Technicians to use references provided by applicants as developed references. (01023) C. ' Paragraph 63.4 of Regulatory Guide 5.66 states, in part, that military period of
- service within five years of an applicant requ'esting unescorted access must be
- verified by receipt of a Department of Defense (DD) Form 214 or other National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) records. The utility may grant unescorted access for 180 days or less prior to receipt of such records if all other applicable elements of the guidelines are met and a record is maintained which documents that the ,
request for military history was submitted within 10 working days of granting the ! unescorted access. 1
.l
- Contrary to the above, during the latter part of 1995 or early 1996, the licensee identified approximately 5 persons who had been granted unescorted access I
- without verifying the applicable military history of the individuals in one case, the request for military records was not submitted within 10 days af ter temporary
- access was granted. (01033)
D, Paragraph 6.6.1, of Cooper Nuclear Station Procedure AAAP3.3, Revision 1, ! [ requires, in part, that the results of the investigation be documented in a formal report of investigation. Paragraph 6.5.1 of Procedure AAAP3.3, Revision 1, states, in part, that if derogatory information is developed, a non accusatory interview will be conducted. Contrary to the above, during the latter part of 1995 or early 1996, the licensee identified that between 1993 and 1995: 1) numerous background investigation files did not contain a formal report of investigation; and 2) in several cases, no interv'ews i had been conducted even when derogatory information was discovered during the background investigation. (01043) E. Paragraph 6.2.1 of Regulatory Geide 5.66 states, in part, that activities during interruptions of employment in exceu of 30 days must be verified.
' Paragraph 6.4.5 of the licensee's procedure AAPP 3.3, " Background investigations", requires that employment interruptions in excess of 30 days will be )
verified and activities during that period will be determined. Contrary to the above, during the latter part of 1995 or early 1996, the licensee identified numerous files in which activities during periods of unemployment in excess of 30 days were not verified. (01053) F. Paragraph 8.3 of Regulatory Guide 5.66 states, in part, that a utility shall not authorize unescorted access where the individual's unescorted access has been
~ interrupted for more than 365 calendar days unless the psychological evaluation and
- the. background investigation is updated to cover the individual's activities from the et
, LNUREG-0940,7 PARTlI1 B-74
_ - - _ _ = -
Notice of Violation date of the previous background investigation, not to exceed retrospective periods i in Section 6.2 or to the period when unescorted access last held, whichever is less. Paragraph 6.2.3 of Regulatory Guide 5.66 states, in part, that the utility shall perfoim a criminal history reccrd check that includes the entire criminal history record of the individual as an adult. Paragraph 6.2.5 of Regulatory Guide 5.66 states, in part, that the applicant's reputation for emotional stability, reliability and , trustworthiness must be examined through contact with two references supplied by ) the applicant and at least twe additional references (not related to the applicant) i developed during the backg.md investigation. i Contrary to the abova, during the latter part of 1995 or early 1996, the licensee identified that update background investigations included only one listed reference 1 and one developed reference, in addition, the updated background investigations did not include a review of criminal history information. (01063) G. Regulatory Guide 5.66, Clarification to the Guidelines, paragraph 2, states that the NUMARC 3uidelines provide for temporary access authorization for 180 uninterupted days. Any longer access authorization is not temporary. Using this provision to allow back to-back temporary access authorizations for an individual by the licensere would be a misuse of this provision. Paragrr.n 6.2.2 L? Cooper Nuclear Station Procedure AAAP3.3, Revision 1, states, m part. that "once a temporary bachground clearance has been completed, the expanded tvetground clearance must be completed within 180 days." Contrary to the above, during a 1995 outage, the licensee granted back-to-back temporary unescorte f access to two individuals without completing the full background investigations. (01073) H. Section 10.2 of the licensee's physical security plan states, in part, that the security program meets the general performance requiremerns of 10 CFR 73.%Ia). 10 CFR 73.55(a) requires, in part, that the licensee's physical protection system be designed to protect against the design basis threat of sadiological sabotage as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a). 10 CFR 73.1(a) states, in part, that the design basis threat of radiological sabotage
- t ;,l ants is a determined violent external assault on the plant by several well trained persons, with inside assistance from a knowledgeable individual (insider),
participating in an active role (e.g., f acilitating entrance and exit). Contrary to the above, as of July 30,1996, the licensee's physical protection system was not adequately designed to protect against the single insider in the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. Specifically, the licensee's system afforded each of two supervisors (insiders) the opportunity to actively f acilitate i entrance and exit to the plant to unauthorized persons, by allowing these l supervisors (insiders) the opportunity to f abricate unauthorized photo identificatiun ] i NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-75 i
n
. Notice of Violation 4-
. security b'adges and the opportunity to approve bogus unverified access
. authorization data for entry into the security computer, (01083)
These violations represent a Severity Level lli problem (Supplement till, The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violations, the
- corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violations and prevent recurrence, and ~ the date when full compliance was achieved, is already adequately addressed on the - docket in Inspection Report No. 50-298/9618 and NPPD's letter dated October 25,1996.
However, you are required tc submit a written statement or explanation pursuant to , 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions ( or your position, in that case, or if you' choose to respond, clearly mark your response as a .{
" Reply to a Notice of Violation," and send it to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: . Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region IV,611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington,. Texas 76011, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at Cooper Nuclear Station, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice).
Dated at Arlington, Texas - this 20th day of November 1996 l^ l l r l l l L L . . l NUREG-0940, PART.11- B-76
p*""6g .
, UNITE D ST AT ES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j' ?
LJ'/g):i. l .>. nsalos lv 611 RY AN PLAZA ORIVE. SulTE 400 5, ,,,,/- . ARuNoroN texas 76011 8064 July 31, 1996 [ t EA 96-204 ; T. L. Patterson, Division Manager !
. Nuclear Operations- .
I Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm. ! P.O. Box 399, Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun , Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023-0399 , i
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-285/96-05) , i
Dear Mr. Patterson:
This refers to the predecisional enforcement conference held on July 22, 1996,
.in the NRC Regica IV office in Arlington. Texas. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the apparent violations identified in the subject inspection report involving operator actions which disabled the Low '
Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) function of the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs). The LTOP function i:. provided to protect the reactor vessel from brittle fracture when at low temperatures. The inspec'. ion . report identified three apparent violations: (1) providing inadequate ! procedural guidance for pressurizer cooldown evolutions, (2) failing to follow l procedures by not taking adequate compensatory measures for disabling the LTOP function, and (3) failing to follow procedures by not logging abnormal plant conditions and by not conducting proper shift turnovers. Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that you provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC' requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. In summary, the violations were identified after plant operations staff recognized that they ) had disabled the LTOP function on several occasions during pressurizer i cooldown on March 18, 1996. Plant procedures had called for cooling down the pressurizer by, among other actions, cycling the PORVs. Although the procedure was specific in requiring that PORVs be opened by pulling, and thus disconnecting, two reactor protection system (RPS) pressurizer pressure trip i units, the procedure was not specific in discussing how the PORVs would be closed. During the cooldown evolution on March 18, operators closed the PORVs
.by mant ;11y switching the PORV hand control switches from AUTO M CLOSE ,
without reinstalling the RPS pressurizer pressure trip units. Inis disabled i the LTO.' function. . i The PORb; were cycled over a period of two shifts, without the operations i staff reco9.. zing that LTOP had been disabled and that it remained disabled after the cooldown evolution had been completed. During the subsequent i i I i NUREG-0940, PART 11- B-77
-.my
1 t afternoon' shift, operators did not notice that-the pressurizer pressure trip units were' disconnected (pulled out) nor that the associated annunciator lights were.liti Evaluation of the issue indicated that there was inadequate j l supervision and oversight, inadequate procedures, inadequate shift turnover from the day shift to the afternoon shift, a lack of a questioning attitude, inadequate logkeeping, training deficiencies, and weaknesses in the plant's ; initial review of the ment.
'( :
In reviewing the safety significance of the issues, we noted that the actual and potential. safety significance of.this problem were limited by design features of the system and by the fact that operations staff had used a
' dedicated operator to oversee pressurizer cooldown, (It is important to note the distinction that the dedicated operator was not assigned to manually
.~ perform the necessary actions to restore LTOP in the event it was needed and was not fully cognizant that the LTOP. function had been disabled.) However, the number and fundamental nature of the issues identified collectively crepresent a potentially significant lack of attention toward licensed responsibilities. Therefore, these violations are classified in the aggregate in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy). NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level 111 ,
problem. in accordance'with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of 550,000 is considered for a Severity Level 111 problem. Because your j facility has not been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI_B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NRC evaluated your short term and longer term corrective actions, in addition to the adequacy of the root cause analysis. Although there were deficiencies in the initial root cause analysis, which NRC inspectors later discussed with plant management, these deficiencies did not provide a sufficient basis for denying corrective action credit. As a result,:the NRC staff concluded that credit for the Corrective Action factor was warranted. After discussions with NRC inspectors, plant personnel re-evaluated the event and improved the initial root cause analysis and the corrective actions. The corrective actions included revising the I applicable procedure, training on the procedure, crew briefings by the shift supervisor, discussinq the event and the root causes with all crews, I conducting refresher training on LTOP/PORV circuitry, emphasizing the importance of questioning attitude and quality procedure verifications, better defining the purpose and expectations of a dedicated operator, reemphasizing management expectations for logkeeping and shift turnover, and improving the formality of shift turnovers, board walkdowns, and annunciator responses. Longer term corrective actions included further procedure revisions, upgrading
.the PORV control switches, and evaluating the potential for unique marking of normally lit annunciators during shutdowns and out-of-normal switch positions.
Therefore, in recognition of the absence of escalated enforcement action i within 2 years and of your. comprehensive corrective actions, I have been ] NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-78
4 authorized not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatery requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the POR without redaction. Sincerely, L. . Callan Regi al Administrator Docket No. 50-285 License No. OPR-40
Enclosure:
Notice cf Violation cc w/ enclosure: Mr. James R. Curtiss 4 Winston & Strawn 1400 L. Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005-3502 Jack Jensen, Chairman Washington County Board of Supervisors Blair, Nebraska 68008 Cheryl Rogers, LLRW Program Manager
- Environmental Protection Section Nebraska Department of Health 301 Centennial Mall, South P.O. Box 95007 Lincoln, Nebraska 68509-5007 2
t I NUREG-0940- PART II
, B-79 l
4
-Dr. Mark B. Horton, M.S.P.H.
Director Nebraska Department of Health P.O. Box 950070 Lincoln, Nebraska 68509-5007 James W. Chase, Manager Fort Calhoun Station P.O. Box 399 Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023 l l NUREG-0940, PART II B-80
. _, ._ _ . _. _ ~ .-
- 1 4
l l
~
.N0TICE OF VIOLATION- :
l
' Omaha:Public'PowerLDistrict!
Docket Noc 50-283 ' a *
, fort Calhoun. Station' License No DPR-40: 1
-EA 96-204 m I
.l During'an NRC? inspection' conducted on May 20'through June 13,-1996, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General. ;
a Statement'of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement' Actions," NUREG 1600, : the violations are listed belowr ,
~
4 A .- . Technical-Specification 5.8.1 states, in part, that written procedures ! and ' administrative policies shall be established and implemented:that meet'or. exceed the minimum requirements of Appendix A of Regulatory ; C -Guide 1.33. .-Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 1.j, requires , procedures for the bypass of safety. functions. ; Procedure 50-G-100, " Operability Dispositions When Calibrating or ; s ' Testing Safety Related Equipment,"' Revision 1, provides procedural { 4 Irequirements for the bypass of' safety functions. Specifically, when : safety related equipment is configured such that without manual operator -l action the equipment,would be unable to perform its intended design ' function, procedure requirements include: (a) declaring the piece of
~
. equipment inoperable, (b) rescheduling to such a time when the limiting
- conditions for operation (iCO) action statement or safety system would not be challenged, (c), reconfiguring such that the equipment is not impaired,- the LCO action statmenent is not entered and/or the safety
. systems are not-challenged, or (d) changing the activity to incorporate :
4: ' the use of a dedicated operator to' take manual actions to fulfill the l l automatic action.- : Contrary to the'above, on March ~ 18,'1996, the licensee failed to
. implement' Procedure 50-G-100 by taking no actions when safety related '
- equipment,.specifically the reactor protection system (RPS) pressurizer pressure trip. units and the pressurizer power operated relief valves - (PORVs)',.were configured such that without manual operator action the
< equipment would have been unable to perform its intended design
' function. Specifically, the RPS~ pressurizer pressure trip units were disconnected (pulled) and the' hand switches for the pressurizer PORVs l were moved to the CLOSE position,. disabling the low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) function, and none of the required actions were taken. (01013)
- 8. Technical Specification 5.8.1 states, in part, that written procedures
- .and administrative policies shall'be implemented that meet or exceed the !
j' minimum requirements of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide'l.33. Regulatory ! Guide 1.33, Appendix A Sections 1.g and l.h, require procedures for shift and relief; turnover and log entries. , Procedure 50-0-1, " Conduct.of Operations," Revision 29, provides
. procedural requirements for the conduct of shift and relief turnover and ,
-log' entries. ;Those' requirements include: (1) the oncoming shift shall !
i E 9 I l
..NUREG-0940[ PART:. ll ' B-81, 1'
3
. - - - - .- - , - , er
familiarize themselves with the conditions in areas to which they are responsible; (2) each person will brief his/her relief on the condition and status of that portion of the plant to which he/she is assigned,
~
including abnormal conditions or alignments and inoperable equipment:
'(3) prior to assuming the shift, each_ operator shall personally verify the status of important system operating parameters, especially those relating to safety systems; and (4) log entries into the official control room log shall be made when major equipment / systems placed in or out of operation.
Contrary to_the above, on March 18, 1996, the licensee failed to implement Procedure 50-0-1 with regard to the disabling of the LTOP function when the_P0kV hand switches were moved to the CLOSE position
. and the RPS pressurizer pressure trip units were disconnected.
Specifically, (1) the appropriate oncoming (afternoon) shift operators did not familiarize themselves with the conditions regarding the LTOP functional status; (2) the appropriate (day shift) operators did not brief his/her reliefs on the condition and (inoperable) status of the LTOP function; (3) prior to assuming the afternoon shift, the appropriate operators did not adequately verify the status of important safety systems, specifically the RPS pressurizer pressure trip units and the pressurizer PORV hand switch positions; and (4) log entries into the official control room log were not made each time major equipment / systems (charging pumps and PORV hand switches) were placed in or out of operation. (01023) C. Technical Specification 5.8.1 states, in part, that written procedures shall be established that meet or exceed the minimum requirements of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Sections 3.a and 3.u, require procedures for startup, operation, and shutdown of safety related systems, specifically the reactor coolant f system and the reactor protection system. Contrary to the above, on March 18, 1996, adequate procedures were not provided for the operation and shutdown of safety related equipment affecting the LTOP function, part of the reactor protection system. Specifically, Procedure OI-RC-4A, Attachment 1, " Pressurizer Cooldown," Revision 1, did not provide adequate guidance to prevent the disabling ( '~ of the LTOP function of the pressurizer P0RVs without taking appropriate j compensatory measures, nor did the procedure provide guidance to ensure system restoration to an operable status following the completion of pressurizer cooldown. (01033) These violations represent a Severity Level 111 problem. (Supplement 1) Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Omaha Public Power District (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington 0.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, 611 Ryan NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-82
< I
33- ) i
?
JPlaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlingto'n, Texas 76011, and 'a copy to the NRC Resident'.
- Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days
. of- the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation'(Notice); + !? This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and. .
4: should include for each violation * (1) the reason for the violation, or, if. ! contested, the basis for disputing the violation '(2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective' steps that-will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full , compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous -
; docketed correspondence, if-the correspondence adequately addresses'the
J required response. .If an adequate reply is not received within the time. .. specified in this' Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued ; as to why the license should not be modified..-suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not.be taken. .Where good cause is r
! shown,' consideration will be given to extending the response time.
Because.the response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to -
.the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary.
-or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the POR without _ ;
redaction. However', if it necessary to include such.information, it should clearly indicate the specific information that should not be placed in the ' POR, and provide the legal basis to support the request for withholding the
~
information.from th_e public. Dated at Arlington, Texas this 31st day:of July-1996 i ; 1 i: t
- NUREG-0940,iPARTTI1" B-83 l
i l
. . ~ .
[. 3
+,
g uNITEo STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8 RtGloN i D 8, 4M ALLENo4LE RoAo
%, * * * *
- p[ KING of PRusslA, PENNSYLVANIA 19405-1415 October 17, 1996 EA 96 2u9 Mr. D. M. Smith, President PECO Nuclear Nuclear Group Headquarters Correspondence Control Desk Post Office Box 195 Wayne, Pennsylvania 19087 0195
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-352/96-04; 50-353/96-04)
Dear Mr. Smith:
1 This letter refers to the NRC inspection conducted from May 7 through July 1,1996, at your Limerick Generating Station facinty. The findings of the inspection were discussed with your staff during an exit meeting on July 3,1996. During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the 1 J t circumstances surrounding the substantial accumulation of debris on the Unit 1 "A" RHR pump suppression pool suction strainer which had been identified by your staff after an inadvertent j actuation of a Unit 1 safety relief valve (SRV) that had opened and caused the reactor coolant l system to depressurtze on September 11,1995. Approximately 30 minutes after the event, an l j , i RHR pump, which had been operating in the suppression pool cooling mode of operation, showed signs of cavitation. Subsequent underwater inspection indicated that the cavitation was caused by a collection of fibrous material and corrosion products on the pump's suction strainers. l 4 Based on a review of the event and its associated causes a violation of NRC requirements was identified involving the failure to establish adequate controls for excluding foreign material from the Unit 1 suppression pool. The violation was desenbed in the NRC inspection report sent to you with our letter, dated July 30,1996. In that letter, you were informed that this apparent violation was being considered for escalated enforcement and that a predecisional enforcement l conference may not be necessary in order for the NRC to make an enforcement decision. In ! your response, dated August 29,1996, you agreed that a conference was not needed and you l desenbed your corrective actions in that response, j l ! The violation, which is also set forth in the enclosed Notice of Violation, involved the failure to l comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V," instruction, Procedures, and Drawings," which requires that activities affecting quality shall be presenbed by documented instructions, l procedures or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Prior to the SRV actuation l on September 11,1995, you had not established an effective instruction for a foreign materials exclusion (FME) program to ensure that the suppression pool did not contain materials which could clog the ECCS suction strainers. Specifically, the FME procedure for the suppression pool did not contain adequate cleanliness acceptance criteria, and did not provide adequate instructions on how to assess the effects of items dropped into the suppression pool; As a result, after the SRV opened on September 11,1995, the A RHR pump was considered NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-84
PECO Energy 2 l inoperable due to the accumulation of debris on its suppression pool suction strainers. l Therefore, this violation has been categonzed at Seventy Level 111 in accordance with the l " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," (Enforcement l Policy). NUREG-1600. During your follow-up of the event, you noted that there was debris on the B RHR strainer, but to a lesser extent, and that the remaining ECCS suction strainers were essentially clean. You attributed the substantial accumulation of debris on the A RHR strainer to the significant period of time the pump had been operated in the suppression pool cooling mode of operation, compared to a much lower run time in that mode for the B RHR pump. You also concluded that the remaining ECCS strainers were essentially clean since they were operated infrequently. Notwithstanding your contentions, the A RHR pump was significantly degraded, and the RHR system could have been inoperable or in a degraded condition for an extended period because of such debris. In addition, debris on the A suction strainer may have been due to the fact that the majonty of the blowdown occurred in the vicinity of this strainer, and not due to the length of time the A system operated. In either case, the NRC is concemed that PECO Energy was unaware that debris had accumulated in the Unit 1 suppression pool water or the suction strainers due to the inadequate Forei0n Material Exclusion (FME) program and plant housekeeping programs and procedures. Although debris was found in the Unit 2 suppression pool by your staff in February 1995, and Unit 2 was cleaned following that discovery, you were not proactive in aggressively pursuing at that time whether a similar condition existed at Unit 1. In fact, you did not perform inspection of the Unit 1 suppression pool during two maintenance outages that followed the Unit 2 suppression pool cleaning to determine if foreign material existed in the Unit i suppression pool. These findings demonstrate the importance of management taking appropriate action to assure that (1) the Foreign Material Exclusion Program is appropriately implemented, and (2) your staff is proactive in evaluating adverse conditions identified at one unit to ensure degraded conditions do not exist at the other unit. It may have been fortuitous that only a limited amount of debris had collected on the other ECCS suction strainers at Unit 1. Additional debris, or lifting of other SRVs, may have rendered other systems inoperable. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amour.t of $50,000 is considered for a Seventy Level lll violation. Because your facility has not been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assesament process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit is warranted because your corrective actions were both prompt and comprehensive. Your corrective actions included, but were not limited to, the following: (1) cleaning the Unit i suppression pool; (2) testing of RHR pumps and declaring them operable prior to start-up; (3) implementing a program to monitor the differential pressure of the Suppression Pool saction strainers; (4) initiating FME accountability tracking during unit outages for Suppression Poeland Primary Containment; (5) sampling and tranding suppression pool water for fibrous content on a monthly basis; and, (6) providing training to planner supervisors and lead technicians on the importance of FME controls for work in the drywell and suppression pool. NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-85
PECO Energy 3 Therefore, to encourage prompt and comprehensive correction of violations, and in recognition of the absence of previous escalated enforcement action, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, it is important that you clearly understand that any future performance problems, especially involving missed opportunities to aggressively pursue a condition adverse to quality, could result in more significant enforcement action and civil penalties. The NRC has concluded that the reason for the violation, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved, are already adequately addressed on the docket in LER 95-008, and your. letters dated October 6,1995, November 16,1995, March 1,1996, June 10,1996, and August 29,1996. Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additionalinformation, you should follow the instructions specifiod in the enclosed Notice. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.700 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, and its enclosure will be placed in the NPC Public Document Room (PDR). Sincerely, Y f H ett J. Miller Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-352, 50-353 License Nos. NPF-39, NPF-85
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation NUREG 0940 PART II B-86 1
ENCLOSURE NOTICE OF VIOLATION l l PECO Energy Docket No. 50-352 l Limerick Generating Station License No. NPF-39 l Unit 1 EA 96-209 i During an NRC inspection conducted between May 7 and July 1,1996, for which an exit meeting was held on July 3,1996, a violation of NRC requirements was identified in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG 1600, the particular violation and associated civil penalty is set forth below: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Contrary to the above, as of September 11, 1995, activities affecting quality were not prescribed by documented instructions, procedures or drawings of a type appropriate to the drcumstances in that effective instructions had not been established for a foreign materials exclusion (FME) program to ensure that the suppression pool did not contain materials which coLld clog the ECCS suction strainers. Specifically, FME procedures for the suppression pool did not contain adequate cleanliness acceptance criteria, and did not provide adequate instructions on how to assess the effects of items dropped into the suppression pool. For example,
- 1. Procedure A 30, " Housekeeping Requirements," stated that if debris was dropped into the suppression pool and not recovered, it was the responsibility of the work group, who dropped the item, to disposition the issue; however, the procedure did not contain enteria that should be considered if material remained in the suppression pool;
- 2. Procedures A-30, as well as Procedure A C-131, " Foreign Material Exclusion,"
also did not require personnel to track dropped, unrecovered items in the suppression pool in a deficiency tracking system; and
- 3. Procedure A-30 contained vague acceptance criteria for suppression pool cleanliness requirements in that a!though the procedure required personnel to inspect the suppression pool prior to plant startup and ensure no foreign material was in the water, the procedure did not contain qualitative or quantitative suppression pool water cleanliness acceptance criteria.
As a result, on Septamber 11,1995, after a safety relief valve opened and caused the reactor coolant system to depressurize, the A RHR pump was inoperabie due to the accumulation of debris on its suppression pool suction strainer. (IFS 01013) This is a Severity Level ill violation (Supplement 1). NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-87
Enclosure 2 The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was tschieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in LER 95-008, and letters from the Licensee dated October 6,1995, November 16,1995, March 1,1996, June 10, 1996, and August 29,1996. However, you are required to submit a written statement or explanation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to respond, clearly mark your response as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation," and send it to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Senior Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this17ttday of October 1996 1 NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-88
, , _ _ _ - . _ . _.. . - _ . . _y. ~ ~ m._..~ .__.~m _-
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-September. 19. 1996 t
EA'96 134 !
-EA 96-137: 3 t
- l David R; Hyster
.Vice President, Nuclear Services .
Raytheon Engineers and Constructors. Inc. Li
- . Post Office Box 8223 1 i' 30 South 17th Street. .
6 Philadelphia; Pennsylvania 19101-8223
^
SUBJECT:
- NOTICE OF' VIOLATION (00L CASE NO 95 ERA-004) i 4 ,
L
Dear Mr Hyster:
- This rJfers to the matters discussed at the predecisional enforcement '
4 .' conference conducted on July 19. 1996. in the NRC's Arlington. Texas office
.'As discussed in the NRC's June 19. 1996 letter to Raytheon, the conference was 5
- conducted to discuss two apparent violations of NRC requirements barring l g
discrimination against employees'who engage in protected activities, i.e., { s10 CFR 50.7. -Each apparent violation involved Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) contractors - Ebasco Services. 'Inc. (Ebasco) or Raytheon [ Engineers and Constructors. Inc. (Raytheon) -- discriminating against ; t e employees'at HL&P's South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STP). A letter documenting the conference. including the outline from HL&P and l n -Raytheon's conference presentation, was sent to HL&P'and placed in the NRC's ' Public Document Room (PDR) on July 31. 1996. The transcript of the conference also has been placed in the PDR. , Both apparent violations were based on adjudicatory determinations of the U.S. I . - Department of Labor (00L). ~ As indicated in our June 19 letter. the NRC
.normally relles on such determinations in deciding whether violations of NRC l requirements occurred. Thus, based on the decisions by 00L in these cases. l and in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, the NRC has
!, determined that violations of 10 CFR 50'.7 occurred. As a result, the NRC is issuing to HL&P a Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) in the amount of $200,000. That Notice is being , distributed to the same distribution list. so you will receive a copy. . 1 I , With regard to the action against Raytheon. the NRC recognizes that Raytheon was~a respondent in only one of the two 00L cases discussed at the conference. 1 t that? involving Earl V. Keene. Nonetheless. it was appropriate for Raytheon to 1 address both 1ssues at the conference because Raytheon purchased the contracts
?previously held by Ebasco, the' respondent in the case involving
'Mr.: Thomas H. Smithe and became the employer of the individuals who were involved in the issues' involving Mr;' Smith. In that respect. Raytheon assumed a responsibility for corrective actions even in the Smith case. .
~
Notwithstanding that responsibility, the NRC has determined not to 1ssue a i ll: L NUREG-0940, PART B-89' k w 1 -- p. b g
Raytheon Engineers and 2-Constructors. Inc. Citation to Raytheon for the violation involving Mr. Smith. Thus, the only violation described in the enclosed Notice of V1olation is that associated with Mr. Keene. The violation (EA 96 137) is based on a 00L proceeding (95-ERA-004) in which the presiding ALJ. in a Recommended Decision and Order issued September 29. 1995 found that Mr. Keene was subjected to di,scriminatory treatment in 1994 after he raised concerns about signing off for electrical maintenance work he did not perform. The discriminatory treatment in Mr. Keene's case consisted of his inclusion in a March 24, 1994 reduction in force. his receiving a lower performance appraisal rating, and his having been subjected to fitness-for-duty testing on May 24, 1994 when he returned to the STP facility with another individual who was completing documentation related to pending employment. At the time of the discriminatory treatment. Mr. Keene was an employee of Raytheon. Raytheon personnel at the conference noted their disagreement with the ALJ s findings and indicated a brief has been filed with the SOL describing their bases for their disagreement. The DOL's Administrative
. Review Board which has been authorized to decide these cases for the Secretary of Labor. has not issued a final decision in this case.
In addition to the potential for violations of this type to have an effect on safety. this violation is significant from a regulatory perspective as well. In the case involving Mr. Keene. It is significant that the discriminatory treatment of Mr. Keene occurred in 1994. after HL&P had initiated efforts to address the environment at STP fnr raising concerns. including actions that were specifically addressed to contractors and their supervisors. Thus. this violat1on has been classified at Severity 1.evel 111 in accordance with the
" General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy). NUREG 1600. Despite this violation having occurred in 1994, it is important because. absent prompt and decisive corrective action.
such violations can have a chilling effect on the willingness of other employees to raise concerns to their employer or to the NRC. The NRC acknowledges the actions taken by Raytheon to address the environment for raising concerns at STP. These corrective actions were summarized in the documentation of HL&P and Raytheon's conference presentation which. as Indicated above, has been placed in the NRC's Public Document Ronm. In brief. HL&P and Raytheon described numerous actions taken to improve the STP employee concerns program and to assure that all STP employees are encouraged to raise concerns without fear of retaliation. However despite HL&P and Raytheon's response to these specific instances of discrimination, as of the date of the conference no corrective actions were described that would foster a sense of individual accountability for this ob,lectionable behavior. For example, when asked at the conference whether the supervisors who were involved in these matters were counseled, the answer from Raytheon was that there had been no action to conduct Individu31 counseling. While it is not the NRC's role to specify what action would have been appropriate, clearly some action should have been taken to assure that the individuals involved in these matters understand the protections afforded employees by law, the significance of NUREG-0940, PART II B-90
1 Raytheon Engineers and 3- i Constructors. Inc. ! l violating such protections, and the possible consequences of doing 50 i Although the NRC understands that following the conference, steos '.<ere taken i to ensure that the Raytheon supervisors involved in the discriminatory acts , had been counseled, this fundamental corrective action should have be3n taken j much earlier. The delay in counseling the suoervisors gains additional regulatory significance because the delay may have created or percetuated. the perception among other employees that you were not serious about preventing these types of violations from occurring and may have detracted from your otherwise comprehensive actions to address these matters. This apparent lack of accountability was a factor in assessing the civil penalties against HL&P. 'Therefore. to emphasize the importance of protecting individuals against discrimination and taking comprehensive corrective action that includes establishing accountability for violations of 10 CFR 50.7. I have been authorized to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation to Raytheon for the Severity Level !!! violation described above. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the Instructions spectfled in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this Notice. Including your proposed corrective actiMs and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice." a copy of this letter. Its enclosure. and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy. proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. Sincerely.
' L. J. Callan Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-498: 50-499 License Nos. NPF 76; NPF 80
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation to Raytheon i' cc w/ Enclosure (See Next Page) I NUREG-0940, PART II B-91
Raytheon Engineers'and' 4-Constructors ~Inc,
.'cc w/Enclosurei Lawrence E. Martin. General Manager Nuclear Assurance & Licensing.
Houstoit Lighting & Power Company P.O. Box 289
'Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Mr. J. C. Lanier/Mr. H: B. Lee City of Austin Electric Utility Department 721 Barton Springs Road Austin. Texas 78704 Mr. K.'J. Fiedler/Mr. M. T. Hardt ' City Public Service Board P.0, Box 1771-San Antonio, Texas 78296 Jack R. Newman. Esq.
Morgan, Lewis & Bock 1us 1800 M. Street, N.W.
. Washington, D C. 20036-5869 Mr. G. E. Vaughn/Mr. C. A. Johnson Central Power & Light Company P.O. Box 289 Mail Code: N5012 Wadsworth, Texas 77483 INP0 Records Center .
700 Galleria Parkway l Atlanta, Georgia 30339-5957 i l Mr. Joseph H. Hendrie
-50 Bellport Lane Bellport, New York 11713 Bureau of Radiation Control State of Texas 1100 West 49th Street Austin. Texas '78756 John L. Iloward. Director Environmental Policy Office of the Governor P.O. Box 12428 .
Austin. Texas 78711 . NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-92
Raytheon Engineers and Constructors. Inc. cc'w/
Enclosure:
(Con't) Judge. Matagorda County Natagorda County Courthouse 1700 Seventh Street
-Bay City. Texas 77414
-Licensing Representative Houston lighting & Power Company.
Sutte 610 Three Metro Center Bethesda. Maryland 20814 Rufus 5. Scott.' Associate General Counsel '
~ Houston Lighting & Power Company 9.0. Box 61867 Houston. Texas 77208
- Joseph R. Egan. Esq.
Egan & Associates. P L. 2300 N Street. N.W Washington. D.C 20037 Mr. J. W. Beck Little Harbor Consultants. Inc 44 Nichols Road Cohasset. MA 02025-1166 James Remeika Assistant Human Resources Counsel Raytheon Company 141-Spring Street
~
Lexington. Massachusetts 02173-7899 Thomas H, Smith 1804 Lloyd Bay City. Texas 77414 Earl Vc Keene 909 Virnham Woods Blvd.
#1 Pasadena. Texas 77503 Timothy Sloan. Esq P.O.' Box 2171 Bay City. Texas 77404 2172 cc w/
Enclosure:
(See Next Page) NUREG-0940, PART'll. 1 B-93 o
f '
. Raytheon Engineers and ,
Constructors. Inc. .j cc w/
Enclosure:
-(Con't)
Hs. Billie Garde. Esq. Hardy & Johns 2 Houston Center. Suite 500 Houston, Texas 77010 Edward A. Slavin. Jr. Esq. 35 5.E. 8th Terrace Deerfield Beach Florida 33441 4340 l l L l l i l-t l NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-94
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
-Raytheon Engineers and Constructors. Inc. EA 96-137 Based on the NRC's review of-a September 29. 1995 00L Administrative Law
' Judge's Recommended Decision and Order in the case of Earl V. Keene (95 ERA-004) a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the
" General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions." ,
NUREG 1600. the violation is listed below. 10 CFR 50.7 states. in part, that discrimination by a Commission licensee or a contractor of a Commission licensee against an employee for engaging in certain protected activities is prohibited. The activities which are protected are defined in Section 211 of the Energy Reorgantration Act. as amended, and include, but are not limited to. reporting of safety concerns by an employee to his employer or the NRC. Contrary to this requirement, in March and May 1994. Raytheon Engineers and Constructors.'Inc.. a contractor of Houston Lighting & Power Company, a Commission licensee. discriminated against an employee who engaged in protected activities. Specifically. a Department of Labor
. Administrative Law Judge found in a Recommended Decision'and Order issued September 29. 1995.'that Earl V. Keene was the sub,)ect of employment discrimination in 1994 for raising concerns about signing off on electrical maintenance work he did not perform. a protected activity.
The discriminatory treatment included being selected for a March 24. 1994 reduction in force. receiving a lower performance appraisal rating. and being subjected to fitness-for-duty testing on May 24. 1994. (01013) This is a Severity Level 111 violation (Supplement VII). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201. Raytheon Engineers and Constructors. Inc. a contractor to a Commission licensee, is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ATTN; Document Control Desk. Washington. D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator. Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive. Suite 400. Arlington Texas 76011 and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or if contested, the basis for disputing the violation. (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved. (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achic'ted. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response, if an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice. an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extanding the response time. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U S.C. 2232. this. response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. i l NUREG-0940, PART 11 8-95 I i L j
I Notice of Violation 2-Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). to the extent possible. It should not include any personal privacy, proprietary. Or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, t f you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR. and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public. Dated at Arlington, Texas, this 19th day of September 1996 I l l NUREG-0940, PART II B-96
I August 1. 1996
. EA %-199 ,
^
Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN: Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr. President. TVA Nuclear and
, Chief Nuclear Officer 6A Lookout Place-1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801-
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION . . (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50 259. 50-260. and 50-296/96 05)
Dear Mr. Kingsley:
This refers to the inspection conducted on April 28 through June 8. 1996, at your Browns Ferry facility. The inspection included a review of the circumstances surrounding the response of the Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System following a reactor scram on May 10. 1996 The results of our inspection were sent to you by letter dated June 19. 1996. A closed. predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region II office on July 11, 1996. with members of your staff to discuss the apparent violations, the root causes.-and your corrective actions to preclude recurrence. /, list of conference attendees. NRC slides, and a copy of your presentation materials are enclosed. . Prior to the conference, you provided in a letter dated July 8. - 1996, your views on the application of the Enforcement Policy in this case. Based'on the information developed during the inspection and the information that you provided during the conference, the NRC has determined-that violations of NRC requirements occurred. The. violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. Violation A involved the inoperability of the Unit 2 RCIC for a period greater than that' allowed by Technical Specificatier.s (TSs). Specifically, on May 10.19%. in response to a feedwater transient and subsequent reactor scram. RCIC briefly initiated and then tripped on high turbine exhaust pressure which rendered the ' system inoperable. The root causes of the RCIC inoperability'were determined to be inadequate design review and post-modification testing for the replacement of the turbine exhaust check valve during the 1996 refueling outage. Specifically. the engineering evaluation associated with the check valve replacement used improper steam flow inputs and failed to consider RCIC system startup transient behavior. Further. engineering failed to recognize and require the performance of an adequate post modification test to assure the equipment change did not affect full RCIC system performance. As a result of these deficiencies, the RCIC turbine exhaust peak pressure exceeded the NUREG-0940, PART'!!- - B-97 1 1
1 I TVA 2 turbine trip setpoint causing the system to fail when called upon to operate on May-10. 1996. Although the inoperability of RCIC did not have a significant consequence to safety because RCIC was not needed to t;1tigate the May 10. 1996 transient, the violation is nonetheless of signif4 cant regulatory concern because multiple failures occurred in your engineering design, review, and testing programs which permitted the plant to operate under conditions in which RCIC could not perform its intended function in the automatic mode of operation: Although NRC recognizes that RCIC is not a 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix B safety system it is important to safety, and your failure to ensure adequate design controls and conduct testing to verify the system was fully functional following system alterations resulted in a significant failure to comply with TS. Therefore. Violation A 1s classified in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy). NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level III violation. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50.000 is considered for a Severity Level III violation. Because your facilityhasbeenthesubjectofescalatedenforcementactionswithinthelast 2 years , the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identf fication and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process described in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. In this case, the NRC concluded that it-is not appropriate to give credit for Identiffcatfon because the violation was discovered as a result of the May 10. 1996 event, and prior opportunities existed for you to identify the problem earlier. These opportunities included your in1tial engineering calculation and modification , review processes; your designer / checker independent verification process; review of a previously issued General Electric Service Information Letter, that provided you information relative to a more appropriate setting for the i RCIC turbine exhaust pressure trip setpoint; and conduct of testing following implementation of the check valve modification. With regard to consideration f for Corrective Action. at the conference you stated that your actions included: (1) performance of a detailed root cause analysis: (2) implementation of higher turbine exhaust trip setpoints: (3) performance of an extent of condition review on previously issued and implemented design change notices: (4) counseling of involved employees and reinforcement of expectations and lessons learned for other engineering personnel: (5) establishment of an Engineering Review Board to independently review design changes and non conformances; and (6) procedural revisions to effect improvements in design reviews, coordination between design and system engineering, the independent verification process, and designer testing I 1 I A severity Level 11 violation and proposed civil penalty of 180.000 were issued on
,19% (EA 95 220) related to employee discrimination in Department of Labor Case No.
NUREG-0940, PART II 8-98
I l TVA 3 program responsibilities. Based on the above. the NRC determined that your corrective actions were comprehensive, and credit was warranted for this factor. In the application of the Enforcement Policy as described above. NRC considers previous escalated enforcement, actions, and in this case, would normally result .in a base civil penalty for this action. However, the purpose of this portion of the Policy is to reflect past licensee performance including cons 1deration of whether the current violation at issue is a relatively 1solated Severity Level III violation. In this case, there has been a previous escalated enforcement action, which, although issued in 1996. Occurred in 1993, and is greater than two years prior to the occurrence of this violation. This fact. In conjunction with the recent overall good performance at Browns Ferry warrants the exercise of discretion in accordance with Section VII.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy. Therefore, after consultation with the Director. Office of Enforcement, and the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Regional Operations and Research, no civil penalty is being proposed in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty. Violation B has been categorized at Severity Level IV and is also described in the enclosed Notice. It involved the failure to ensure that the post-modification testing required by your in-Service Testing Procedures were performed following the aforementioned RCIC turbine exhaust check valve replacement and the High Pressure Coolant Injection turbine exhaust valve replacement conducted during the 1996 refueling outage. Although conduct of such testing may not have prevented Violation A. Violation B is of concern because 1t was identified by the NRC. it revealed weaknesses in personnel knowledge and coordination of American Society of Mechanical Engineers Section XI testing requirements, and had the potential for impacting a safety system required for accident mitigation. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this Notice. Including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirerwnts. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice." a copy of this letter its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR). To the extent possible. your response should not include n. 1 l NUREG-0940, PART Il B-99 l
.TVA 4 any personal privacy, proprietary. or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction.
Sincerely, Original signed by L. A. Reyes Stewart D. Ebneter. Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-260 License No. DPR 52
Enclosures:
1, Notice of Violation
- 2. List of Conference Attendees
- 3. NRC Slides
- 4. Licensee Presentation Material cc w/encis:
- 0. J. Zeringue. Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations
, Tennessee Valley Authority ! 6A Lookout Place l 1101 Market Street Chattanooga. TN 37402-2801 Dr. Mark 0. Hedford. Vice President Technical Services Tennessee Valley Authority
- 6A Lookout Place L
1101 Market Street { Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 1 R. D. Nachon. Site Vice President Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P. O. Box 2000 Decatur. AL 35602 Raul R. Baron, General Manager Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 4G Blue Ridge 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 cc w/encis: (Cont'd on Page 5) NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-100
)
1 l
-1 TVA- -5
- -cc w/encls (Cont'd)~- .
1 Pedro Salas Site Licensing Manager-Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. Tennessee Valley Authority : P, O. Box 2000 . Decatur;~AL' 35602-
-TVA~ Representative . l
; Tennessee Valley Authority ~
One Massachusetts Avenue. Suite 300.' Washington .DC 20001 , General Counsel _. !
-Tennessee Valley Authority
- ET 10H .. .
>400 West.-Sumit Hill Drive !
iKnoxville> TN 37902. i Chairn.an .
- . Limestone County Comission
- 310 West Washington Street Athens, AL 35611 i State Health Officer .
Alabama Department-of Public Health 434 Monroe Street ' Montgomery,~AL 36130-1701 I a 4 i I i r s l 1 l l l 1 l NUREG-0940,: PART 'II.;
. 8-101- -
1
-i
NOTICE OF VIOLATION Tennessee Valley Authority Docket No. 50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. Unit 2 License No. OPR 52 EA 96-199 During an NRC inspection conducted on April 28 through June 8. 1996. violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the
" General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions."
NUREG-1600, the violations are listed below: A. . Technical Specification 3.5.F.1. requires, in part, that the reactor / core isolation cooling (RCIC) system be operable whenever there is 1rradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and the reactor vessel pressure is above 150 pounds per square inch gauge (psig). If the RCIC system is inoperable. the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed seven day" 'f the high pressure coolant injection system is operable during .- time. Contrary to the above, from April 23 to May 10,1996, the RCIC system was inoperable with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and reactor vessel pressure greater than 150 pounds per square inch gauge. The reactor remained in operation during this period, which exceeded seven days. (01013) This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I). B. Technical Specification 1.0.MM.1 requires that In-service Testing of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 1. 2. and 3 valves shall be performed in accordance with Sect 1)n XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by ( 10 CFR 50. Section 50.55a(f). IWV 3200 of Section XI of the AshE. Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requires that when a valve has been replaced or repaired or has undergone maintenance that could affect its performance, and prior to the t1me it is returned to service it shall be tested to demonstrate l that,the performance parameters. Which could be affected by the replacement, repair, or maintenance. are within acceptable limits. l Site Standard Practice-8.6. ASME Section XI In Service Testing of Pumps and Valves. Revision 12. Implements the requirements of IWV-3200 of , Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (In-Service } Testing Program). Appendix H of Site Standard Practice 8.6 requires Procedure 2 SI-4.5.F.1.d., Revision 25. to be performed following maintenance on the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Turbine Exhaust Check Valve. 2 CKV 71-0580 and Procedure 2-SI 4.5.E.1.d. Revision 34, or 2 SI-4.5.E.1.d(dp). Revision 4. to be performed following maintenance on the High Pressure Coolant Injection System Turbine Exhaust Check Valve, 2-CKV-73-0603. Enclosure 1 NUREG-0940, PART II 8-102
Notice of Violation 2 Contrary to the above: (1) On April 23. 1996, the RCIC system turbine exhaust Check Valve. 2-CKV-71-0500 was returned to servi:e after having undergone maintenance (replacement), without Procedure 2-SI-4.5.F.1.d being performed on the valve. (2) On April 23. 1996; the High Pressure Coolant Injection System Turbine Exhaust Check Valve 2-CKV-73-0603 was ,eturned to service after having unkrgone maintenance.(replacement). without Procedure 2-SI 4.5.E.1.d or 2-SI-4.5.E.1.d(dp) being performed on the valve. (0Z014) This is a Severity IV violation (Supplement I). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, the Tennessee Valley Authority is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ATTN: Document Control Desk. Washington. 0.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator. Region II. and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violatica: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested. the basis for disputing the violation. (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved. (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence. if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply 1s not received within the time spec 1fied in this Notice. an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended or revoked, or why l such other action as ma be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown. consideration W1 1 be given to extending the response time. l Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 2232. this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). to the extent possible it should noc include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without i redaction. . However if you find it necessary to include such information. you should clearly indicate the specific Information that you desire not to be l placed in the PDR. and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the oublic. Dated at Atlanta. Georgia this 1st day of August 1996 l l
-NUREG-0940..PART 11 B-103
, =- i i I.IST OF PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ATTENDEES JULY 11. 1996 Tennessee Valley Authority
- 0. Zeringue. Senior Vice President. Nuclear Operations D. Machon. Site Vice President. Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN)
G. Preston. Plant Manager. BFN R. Baron. General Manager. Nuclear Assurance and Licensing H. Williams. Site Engineering. BFN T. Shriver. Nuclear Assurance and Licensing Manager. BFN P. Salas. Licensing Manager. BFN B. M eris. Licensing. BFN J. Wolcott. Engineer 1ng. BFN D. Green. Acting Chief Engineer Nuclear Reaulatory Conrnission L. Reyes. Deputy Regional Administrator. Region II (RII) J. Jaudon. Acting Deputy Direct r. Division of Reactor Projects (DRP). RII B. Uryc. Director. Enforcement and Investigations Coordination Staff (EICS). , RII I M. Lesser. Chief. Projects Branch 6. DRP. RII P. Fredrickson. Chief. Special Ins;3ction Branch. Division of Reactor Safet." J. Williams. Project Manager. Projects Directorate II-3 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation C. Evans. Regional Counsel RII L. Wert. Senior Resident Inspector, BFN ! A. Boland. Enforcement Specialist. EICS. RII l M. Satorius. Enforcement Coordinator. Office of Enforcement
- l l
- Participated by Telephone ,
1 l Enclosure 2 l l l l ~NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-104 l
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*,*.... August 16, 1996 EA 96-231 Virginia Electric and Power Company ATTN: Mr. J. P. O'Hanlon Senior Vice President - Nuclear Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen VA 23060
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC Special Inspection Report Nos. 50-280 and 50-281/96-08
Dear Mr. O'Hanlon:
This refers to the inspection conducted on June 17 through July 1, 1996, at the Surry facility. The inspection included a review of the circumstances surrounding the inoperability of the Unit I and Unit 2 containment hydrogen analyzers. On June 10, 1996, you formally notified the NRC of this condition in Licensee Event Report No. 50-280 and 50-281/96-004-00. The results of our inspection were sent to you by letter dated July 11, 1996. A predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region II office on August 7, 1996, to discuss the apparent violation, the root cause, and your corrective actions tn preclude recurrence. This conference was open for public observation in accordance with the Commission's trial program for conducting conferences as discussed in the Federal Reaister, 57 FR 30762, July 10, 1992, and 59 FR 36796, July 19, 1994. A list of conference attendees, NRC slides, and a copy of Virginia Electric and Power Company's (VEPCO) presentation materials are enclosed. Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that was provided during'the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requ'rements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. Violation A involved the inoperability of the Unit I and Unit 2 containment hydrogen analyzers for a period greater than that allowed by Technical Specifications (T5s). The inoperable condition existed for at least five and a half years l (frcm October 1990 through May 1996), and may have existed as long ago sa l October 1986 and November 1985, for Unit I and 2, respectively. Alt bugh the l containment hydrogen analyzer hardware was capable of performing its intended j function, the system was not capable of performing its design function given l the as-left, standby system configuration (function selector switch in the ZERO position), the in-place procedural requirements for calibration and system operation, and the lack of operator awareness of system operation. Violation B involved the failure to establish adequate procedures to assure the operability of the containment hydrogen analyzers. Specifically, instrumentation and Control (l&C) Procedures and Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) lacked the continuity necessary to assure operation of the NUREG-0940, PART II B-105 i l I 1
4 hEPC0 2 system during'an emergency. Since October 1990, I&C Procedures have required
'that the function selector switches (FSS) at the remote and local containment hydrogen analyzer panels be placed in the ZERO position. For the hydrogen analyzers to operate properly, the FSS position on either the remote or local hydrogen analyzer. panel must be in SAMPLE, and the post-accident monitoring (PAM) main power switch in the Control Room must be in ANALYZE. Although the system does not automatically start and could be operated manually with FSSs in an initial position of ZERO or SAMPLE, the E0Ps did not. address the need to verify or switch the FSS position from ZERO to SAMPLE in order to initiate containment sampling. Only the position of the PAM main power switch was .
described in the E0Ps. Further, operators were unaware of the FSS required _ position. In their as found configuration in May 1996, the hydrogen analyzers would not have indicated actual hydrogen atmospheric concentration when aligned to containment. Gduch the. inoc.crability of the containment hydrogen analyzers did not have a significant u.w quence co safety because they were not called upon to operate during this period, the violations are nonetheless of significant regulatory concern. Notwithstanding the fact that the equipment was technically capable of performing its function, recognition of the FSS mispositioning by operations, I&C, or other support personnel would have been
. required during an emergency and the switch repositioned for proper system i operation. Although other means would have been available to datermine hydrogen concentration following an accident, the dagree to which operators would have relied upon the erroneous information from the hydrogen analyzers and for how long, to make decisions regarding start-up of the hydrogen recombiners to reduce hydrogen levels in containment, is uncertain. In addition, the NRC is concerned about the length of time this condition went undetected and the procedural revision and review processes which failed to uncover this condition. Therefore, these violations are classified in the aggregate in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level ill problem.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level III problem. Because your facilitw has been the subject of an escalated enforcement action within the last two years,' the NRC considered'whether credit was warranted for Identification and-Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment pro:ess in Section VI.B.2 af the Enforcement Policy. In this case, credit is varranted for Identification in that you identified the violation. The attentiveness and questioning attitude of the visiting North Anna operator who initially identified the mispositioned FSSs is particularly noteworthy. With regard to Corrective Action, your immediate actions included verification of the proper configuration and placement of the FSSs in the SAMPLE position. At the conference, you stated that additional corrective actions included:
' On November 22, 1995, a Severity Level !!! problem was issued related to multiple violations associated with the September 1995 unplanned reduction in reactor. vessel water level (EA 95-223).
NUREG-0940 PART.11 8-106 c-___-_____--___________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _
VEPC0 3 (1) revision of the calibration procedures to require that the FSSs be left in the SAMPLE position; {2) addition of the containment hydrogen analyzer FSS
' position verification to the operator legs; (3) comparisen of Surry and North Anna operator logs to identify inconsistencies; (4) review of the TS and -
Emergency and Abnormal Procedures to determine if other procedural interfpce inadequacies existed on other safety related equipment; and (5) review of the procedure change process. At the conference, you indicated that no similar issues were identified as a result of these efforts. Based on the above, the NRC determined that your corrective actions were prompt and comprehensive, and credit was warranted for this factor.
.Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Office of ' Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty. 3 J
At the predecisional enforcement conference you offered three clarifications f related to the content of NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-280, 281/96-08. These l comments were: (1) At various locations in the Inspection Report it is > indicated that the mispositioned FSSs resulted in a loss of safety function. You stated that although the containment hydrogen analyzers were declared inoperable, the overall safety function was not lost; (2) Page 2, the 5th Paragraph of the report states " Return to service. in CAL-GW-175 placed the i FSSs in the SAMPLE position which is the correct position." You stated that the sentence should state "... which is ona of two correct positions;" and (3) Page 3, the 3rd Paragraph of the report states that NRC concluded that an additional root cause of this event was a lack of knowledge by the I&C technicians. You clarified that this was not a licensee position, and that I&C personnel fully understood the system, they just were not knowledgeable of the procedural interface deficiency which existed with the E0Ps. Operations personnel, however, were unfamiliar with the requirements for FSS positions. We have evaluated your comments and acknowledge that the total safety function for analyzing post accident hydrogen concentration in containment was not lost s a result of the inoperability of the hydrogen analyzers. Specifically, the nydrogen' analyzer hardware was functional, and redundant containment sampling means were available. However., the certainty with which these redundant methods would have been employed is unknown. In addition, we have determined that your position with respect to items (2) and (3)'above are not valid. Specifically, the appropriate system alignment to permit operation of the ' containment hydrogen analyzers from the Control Room Annex or the Auxiliarv Building is with the FSSs in the SAMPLE position. In addition, I&C personnel were not knowledgeable of the relationship between the as-left configuration of the containment hydrogen analyzers and the E0Ps. We do agree that operations personnel also exhibited a lack of knowledge with respect to the , required position of the FSS. Lack of operator knowledge was not specifically j addressed as a root cause in the Inspection Report; however, no addendum to i the Inspection Report is required, in that, the report reflects NRC understanjing at the time the report was issued. This letter and enforcement , action corrects NRC's understanding with respect to the acceptable positions of the FSSs and the root causes of the violations, i NUREG-0940 PART 11 B-107
VEPC0 4 You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure cor.:911ance with regulatory requirements. In accordanca with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Reles of Practice," a copy of this letter, it enclosures, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR). Sincerely. Ar Stewart D. E e r Regional Adm strator Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos. OPR-32 and DPR-37 f
Enclosures:
- 1. Notice of Violation
- 2. Conference Attendees (not to be published in NUREG-0940)
- 3. NRC Slides (not to be published in NUREG-0940)
- 4. VEPC0 Presentation Materials (not to be published in NUREG-0940) cc w/encis:
M. L. Bowling, Manager Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support Virginia Electric & Power Company ! Innsbrook Technical Center l 5000 Dominion Boulevard ! Glen Allen, VA 23060 David A. Christian, Manager
- Surry Power Station Virginia Electric & Power. Company ,
5570 Mog Island Road Surry, rA 23883 W. r. Matthews, Manager ! North Anna Power Station P. O. Box 402 Mineral, VA 23117 Ray D. Peace, Chairman Surry County Board of Supervisors P. O. Box 130 Dendron, VA 23839 l cc w/encis: (Cont'd on Page 5) I I t { 1 NUREG-0940, PART 11 8-108 i
VEPCO 5 cc w/encis (Cont'd): Dr. W. T. Lough Virginia State Corporation Commission Division of Energy Regulation P. O. Box 1197 Richmond, VA 23209 Michael W.-Maupin Hur. ton and Williams Riverfront Plaza, East Tower 951 E. Byrd Street Richmond, VA 23219 Robert B. Strobe, M.0,, M.P.H. State Health Commissioner Office of the Commissioner Virginia Department of Health l P. O. Box 2448 Richmond, VA 23218 Attorney General Supreme Court Building 900 Ea-t Main Street Richmond, VA 23219 l l f 1
.NUREG-0910, PART 11 B-109 l
i NOTICE OF VIOLATION Virginia Electric and Power Company Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 Surry Power Station License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 EA 96-231 During an NRC inspection conducted on June 17 through July 1, 1996, violations of NRC requirements was identified. Irt accordance with the
" General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
NUREG-1600, the violations are listed below: A. Technical Specification 3.7.G.1 requires that two independent containment hydrogen analyzers be operable during reactor critical or power operation. Contrary to the above, the Unit 1 and Unit 1 :ontainment hydrogen analyzers were inoperable during reactor critical or power operation from February 28, 1991, and October 21, 1990, respectively, until May 22, 1996, due to the function selector switches being placed in the ZERO position following calibration. (01013)
- 8. ' Technical Specifications 6.4.A.I. and 6.4.A.2 require, in part, that detailed written procedures with appropriate instructions be provided for the operation, calibration and testing of all systems and components l involving nuclear safety of the station, t
Contrary to the above, from October 24 and October 20, 1990 for Units 1 and 2, respectively, Emergency Operating Procedures 1-E-1 and 2-E-1,
" Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," and Calibration Procedures l l-IPT-FT--GW-A-104 and 2-IPT-FT-GW-A-204, Containment Hydrogen Analyzer
! H2A-GW-104(204) Quarterly Functional Test, did not provide appropriate l instructions to place the hydrogen analyzers (systems involving nuclear l- safety of the station) in service. Specifically, the procedures did not require placing the function selector switches for the hydrogen analy2ers in the SAMPLE position, which is the required position for sampling the containment atmosphere for hydrogen concentration. (01023) This is a Severity Level 111 problem (Supplement I). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Virginia Electric and Power Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D. C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administutor, Regon II, and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the Surry Power Station, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full l Enclosure 1 l l NUREG-0940, PART II 8-110
. - - _ .- . ~ . . . . _._ -. _ _ _ _ -_ __. -
t l t
' Notice of Violation 2 compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include
~
- - previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses
' the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or Demand for Information may be issued.as such .
towhy.thelicenseshouldnotbemodified, suspended,orrevoked,orwhy(hown, other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is - consideration will be givea to extending the response time.
~
Under the authority cf Section 182 of.the Action, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this : response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Because your' response will. be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to
- the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, 4'
I , . or safeguards.information so that it can be placed in the PDR without
- redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary.information is necessary to l t
provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your ' U . response that' identifies the.information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If'you request withholding of such material, you mg11 specifically identify the' portions of your response that.you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases . .. for your claim of withholding-(e.g., explain why the disclosure of information
- : will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the
. information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information), if safeguards information I is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of j protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. l Dated at Atlanta,' Georgia this 16th day of August 1
I i d 1 i R NUREG-0940, PART.ll B-ll!
, ., . . ~ , -
LIST OF CONFERENCE ATTENDEES. AUGUST 7, 1996 Viroinia Electric and Power Comoany
.R. Saunders,-.Vice President , Nuclear Operaticns M. Bowling, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support D. Christian, Surry Station Manager
- 8. Shriver, Assistant Station Manager . Nuclear Safety and Licensing B. Stanley, Director,: Nuclear Oversight
.T.'Stafford. Instrumentatio'n and Control Department
'Nuci k e Reculatory Commission S. . Ebnehr, Regional Administrator,. Region II (RII)
. J. Jaudot, Acting Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII A. Gib '... Director, Division of Reactor Safety B.'Ury'... Director, Enforcement and Investigations Coordination Staff (EICS),
R!l -
<C.tEvans,. Regional Counsel, Ril
- G Belisle, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5 (RPBS), DRP, RI!
- GiiEdison, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Re5ulation, R.' Musser, Senior Resident Inspector, RPBS, DRP K. Poertner, Resident inspector, RPBS, DRP, RIl, RII P. Hopkins, Project Engineer, RPBS, DRP, RII A. Boland, Enforcement Specialist. EICS, RII R. Hannah, Office of Public Affairs, R!!
! .M. Satorius, Enforcement Coordinator, Office of Enforcement
- l Members of the Public
- Ne members of the public attendcd the conference.
L I'
' Participated by Telephone Enclosure 2 L
6 INUREG-0940,PART11 B-112 g 4
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m.___ __ __ ____ _
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""a owif to STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g- 3
{ j E REGION IV D 611 RY AN PLAZA DRIVE. Sulf f 400
%, ,. ARLINGTON TEMAS 76011 8064 October 1. 1996 EA 96 267 J. V. Parrish. Chief Executive Officer Washington Public Power Supply System 3000 George Washington Way P.O. Box 468. HD 1023 Richland. War.hington 99352
SUBJECT:
NOTICE Of VIOLATION (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-397/96-15)
Dear Mr. Parrish:
This refers to the inspection conducted from June 24 through July 29. 1996 at the Washington Nuclear Project-2 (WNP-2) reactor facility. The inspection was conducted to review the ef fluents program. including a review of the problems associated with the primary calibration of the reactor building stack effluent monitor. Your staff determined that these problems represented a loss-of-emergency assessment capability and subsequently notified the NRC on March 6, 1996. in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(v). Your staff issued a Special Report to the NRC dated March 20. 1996, further describing the problems. A telephonic exit briefing was held on July 29. 1996, to inform WNP-2 personnel of our disposition of the inspection results. The results of our inspection are docunented in the subject report. The inspection report was issued on August 9. 1996. and described an apparent violation of requirements for which the NRC was considering escalated enforcement action. Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information that you provided in your response to the inspection report dated September 9. 1996, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violation involved WNP-2's failure to meet an emergency planning standard involving assessment (10 CFR 50.47(b)). During the Spring of 1993. WNP-2 installed a radioactive monitoring system for post-accident gaseous discharges. An engineer recorded an incorrect reading during the primary calibration of the m1d range monitor. and the resulting erroneous values (calibration factors) were used in offsite dose assessment software. The calibration factor was low by a factor of about 4.4 for the mid-range monitor and by a factor of about 8.1 for the high range monitor. As a result of WNP 2's long term self assessment program, the errors were discovered in March 1996. Your September 9, 1996. letter stated that the violation resulted from an inadequate test procedure and that contributing causes included undetected personnel error. Possible effects of excessive overtime and inadequate management involvement. NUREG-0940, PART Il B-ll3
J. V. Parrish The violation is significant because it could have resulted in delays in assessing the significance of the offsite consequences during an actual event. although no such emergency occurred. As a result. WNP-2 was not able to meet one of the emergency planning standards involving assessment (10 CFR 50.47(b)). Therefore. this violation has been categorized in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy). NUREG-1600 at Severity Level Ill. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of 550.000 is considered for a Severity Level 111 violation. Because your facilityhasbeenthesubjectofescalatedenforcementactionswithinthelast 2 yeors , the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Because WNP-2 personnel identified the violation, the NRC has determined that credit is warranted for the Identification factor. Further. the NRC has determined that credit is warranted for the Corrective Action factor. Your September 9. 1996. response stated that the corrective actions for the violation included promptly declaring the post-accident monitoring system inoperable. taking appropriate compensatory measures. notifying the NRC, changing the offsite dose assessment software to correct the deficiency. comparing setpoint data with vendor data for consistency, reviewing other effluent monitors for similar problems. and counseling the Plant Oversight Committee members regarding schedule pressures and the necessity to perform detailed technical reviews. Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations. I have been authorized not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However. significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty. The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, j the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent l recurrence is already adequately addressed on the docket by your March 20. 1996. Special Report to the NRC: NRC Inspection Report No. 50-397/96-15: and your September 9. 1996 response to the apparent violation. Therefore, you l are not required to respond to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201 unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional Information you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice.
' A seventy Level til violation and a proposed imposition of a 550,000 civil penalty we issued on September 7.1995. (EA 95109). De violation was associated with the removal and transfer of spent Reactor Water Cleanup system filters.
NUREG-0940, PART 11 B-114
J. V. Parrish 1 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if you choose to submit one, will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR). Sincerely. I an Re[ionalAdministrator Docket No. 50 397 1.icense No, NPF-21
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation cc (w/ enclosure): Frederick S. Adair. Chairman 9'ergy Facility Site Evaluation Council P.O. Box 43172 Olympia. Washington 98504-3172 Chairman Benton County Board of Commissioners P.O. Box 69 Prosser, Washington 99350-0190 Mr. Paul R. Bemis (Mail Orop PE20) Vice President. Nuclear Operations
. Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 i Richland, Washington 99352-0968 i
Mr. Rodney L Webring (Mail Drop PE08) Vice President. Operations Support /PIO Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 l Richland. Washington 99352-0968 Mr. Greg O. Smith (Mail Drop 927M) WNP 2 Plant General Manager
. Washington Public Power Supply System P,0. Box 968 Richland. Washington 99352-0968 l
NUREG-0940, PART.11 3-115 , l
NOTICE OF VIOLATION Washington Public Power Supply System Docket No. 50-397 Washington Nuclear Project-2 License No. NPF-21 j EA 96 267 : 1 During an NRC inspection conducted on June 24 through July 29, 1996, a f violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions." NUREG-1600, the violation is listed below: 10 CFR 50.54(q) states. "A licensee authorized to possess and operate a nuclear p ser reactor shall fol N end maintain in effec; " emergency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b). 10 CFR 50.47(b) states. "The onsite and. ..offsite emergency response plans for nuclear power reactors must meet the following standards:. .(9) Adequate methods. systems. and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use." Contrary to the above, from July 1993 through March 1996, adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were not in use. Specifically, errors were made during the initial calibration of the intermediate range monitor PRM-RE-1B and high range monitor J PRM RE-1C of the reactor building effluent monitoring system resulting in the errors in establishing a correlation between the post-accident I monitor indications and radionuclide contents in the elevatei release (; duct. This is a Severity Level 111 violation (Supplement Ill). The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation. the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket by your March 20. 1996. Special Report to I the NRC: NRC Inspection Report No. 50 397/96 15: and your September 9, 1996. response to the apparent violation. However, you are required to submit a written statement or explana".on pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case. or if you choose to respond. clearly mark your response as a
" Reply to a Notice of Violation." and send it to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccnmiission. ATTN: Document Control Desk. Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator. Region IV. ATTN: Enforcement Officer. 611 Ryan Plaza Drive. Suite 400. Arlington. Texas 76011. and a copy to the NRC Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days I of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice)
Dated at Arlington. Texas. this 1st day of October 1996 i NUREG-0940. PART 11 B-ll6
R$HC *omy 335 U.S. NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1. REPORT NUMBER I AasW tiv NRC. Add Vol., Supp., Rev., a een sad Addendurn Numbers,it any.) hacy 1iQ nm. nw BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET (See trufrucf rons Ort the reversef NUREG-0940, PART II
- 2. tit LE AND SusiiTLE VOL. 15, No. 2 Enforcement Act$.ons: Significant Actions Resolved Reactor Licensees 3 oATE REPORT PUBLISHED e '" " ^ "
Semiannual Progress Report l July - December 1997 April 1997
- 4. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER S AUTHORIS) 6 TYPE OF REPORT Office of Enforcement Technical I. PE H IOD COV E R E D unctuuee Desest R
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, tn a* sa AT lON - NAM E AN D ADDR ESS to! NMC pro ** Dovann. owe
- or Regwn. v.s Nucker Rosatorary Conwnmen, and nwome ndem ** e Office of Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
. Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 9 SPoNSQRING oRG ANIZ ATtoN , N AM E AND ADDRLS$ tor knc. tvoe '5 ann as ehod. ot contran tur. orov& NRC 0*vss.on. 0Hnco or Reason. u s Nucker Reputarorv commosuun, end asettung adttressJ Same as above 10 SUFPLEME NTARY NOTES
- 11. ABSTR ACT (100 wwm or ess)
This compilation summarizes significant enforcement actions that have been resolved during the period (July - December 1996) and includes copies of letters, Notices, and Orders sent by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to reactor licensees with respect to these enforcement actions. It is anticipated that the information in this publication will be widely disseminated to managers and employees engaged in activities licensed by the NRC, so that actions can be taken to improve safety by avoiding future violations similar to those described in this publication. l 12 K E Y WORL'$'DL SCR' PIONS it os meeds or parews rear w,n suni n, rca,y m une, rang ree smorr # 13 AV AILA0t u i v S I Al t Mt NI Technical Specifications, Quality Assurance, Radiation Safety Unlimited Program, Safety Evaluation > < se cua'i c'^ a 'ca ' 'u~ (Ihos Vsert Unclassified iThe Mecorr) Unclassified Ib. NUMBER OF PAGES
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