ML20196F248
| ML20196F248 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07200022 |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1999 |
| From: | Jacobs W AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, STONE & WEBSTER, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196F163 | List: |
| References | |
| 97-732-02-ISFSI, 97-732-2-ISFSI, ISFSI, NUDOCS 9906290167 | |
| Download: ML20196F248 (1) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
Before the Atomic Safety And Licensing Board i
In the Matter of
)
)
PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
)
Docket No. 72-22
)
(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
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ASL.BP No. 97-732-02-ISFSI I
DECLARATION OF WESLEY J. JACOBS Wesley J. Jacobs states as follows under penalties of perjury:
1.
I am the Lead Electrical Engineer for the Private Fuel Storage project for Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.
2.
I am duly authorized to verify Applicant's Response to State's Second Requests for Discovery; specifically, those responses concerning alleged hazards from electrical interference, Contention Utah K: Interrogatory No. 6.
3.
I certify that the statements and opinions in such responses are true and c,orrect to the best of my personal knowledge and belief.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on June 4,1999.
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Wesley J. Jgegp' 1
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202.663.8304 paul.gaukler@shawpittman.com Olb June 25,1999 gh
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Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 16 H23 0-16 Cl Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications StafT Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Re:
Private Fuel Storage L.L.C.,
Docket No. 72-22, ASLBP No.97-732
Dear Sir or Madam:
Enclosed please find the signed originals (plus two copies each) of the following declarations and affidavits to replace facsimile copies thereof:
- 1. Declarations of James L. Cole, William Hennessy, David Axt, Jerry Cooper, Donald Wayne Lewis, John Donnell and Wesley J. Jacobs, verifying Applicant's Discovery Responses to the State's Second Request for Discovery (Group 1) filed June 4,1999;
- 2. Affidavits of Wesley Jacobs, Jerry Cooper, Floyd Davis and Carlton Britton filed in support of Applicants' Partial Motion for Summary Disposition of Utch Contention K and Confederated Tribes B, filed June 7,1999;
- 3. Declarations of John Vincent and John Donnell filed in support of Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition of Utah Contention B, filed on June 11,1999; and
- 4. Declaration of Michael Ladd filed in support of Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition of Utah Contentions F & P - Training and Certification, filed on June 11,1999.
l Washington, DC I
New York 2300 N street, NW Washington. DC 20037-1128 202.663.8000 Fax:202.663.8007 wwwshowpittman.com London L
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) ' ShawPittman Secretary of the Commission June 25,1999 Page 2 l
Please call me at 202-663-8304 ifyou have any questions.
- Sincemly, CM Paul Gaukler Enclosures G. Paul Bollwerk, Esq. (without enclosures) cc:
Dr. Jerry R. Kline (without enclosures)
Dr. Peter S. Lam (without enclosures)
Sherwin E. Turk, Esq. (without enclosures)
Susan F. Shankman (without enclosures)
John Paul Kennedy, Sr. (without enclosures)
Denise Chancellor, Esq. (without enclosures)
Diane Curran, Esq. (without enclosures)
Richard E. Condit, Esq. (without enclosures)
- Jero Walker, Esq. (without enclosures)
Danny Quintana, Esq. (without enclosures) n
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k n,03-se 08:23pm Frem-SHAW PITTMAN 292E638907 T-189 P.02/02 F-EZF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety And Licensing Board In the Matter of
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)
PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
)
Docket No. 72-22
)
(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
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ASLBP No. 97-732-02-ISFSI DECLARATION OF JAMES L. COLE James L. Cole states as follows under penalties of perjury:
1 I am the Executive Director for the National Air Traffic Controllers Association and a consultant to Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C.
2.
I am duly authorized to verify Applicant's Response to State's Second Requests for Discovery; specifically, those responses conceming alleged hazards from air crashes and the use of air-delivered weapons on the Utah Test and Training Range and Dugway Proving Ground, Contemion Utah K Intetrogatory Nos.1,2, 5, and 6.
3.
I certify that the statements and opinions in such responses are true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge and belief.
I declare under penalty of petjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on June 3,1999.
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,C Jarhek L. Cole, Jr.
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t' 44 Jun 99 13s14 202.663.8007 1-704-373-8259 Shaw Pit.tman Pg 002 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety And Licensing Board In the Matter of
)
)
PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE LLC.
)
Docket No. 72-22
)
(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
)
ASLBP No. 97-732-02-ISFSI DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HENNESSY William IIennessy states as follows under penalties of perjury:
1.
I am the Assistant Project Manager and Lead Licensing Engineer with Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (Stone & Webster) for the Private Fuel Storage Facility (PFSF).
2.
I am duly authorized to verify Applicant's Response to State's Second Requests for Discovery; specifically, those plume-related aspects of the responses to the Request for Admission Nos.1-2, 9-10 and the Interrogatory Nos.1,3-4 with respect to Utah Contention K.
3.
I certify that the statements and opinions in such responses are true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge and belief.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on June 4,1999.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety And Licensing Board In the Matter of
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)
PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
)
Docket No. 72-22
)
(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
)
ASLBP No. 97-732-02-ISFSI DECLARATION OF DAVID AXT David Axt states as follows under penalties of perjury:
1.
I am the Corporate Senior Security Coordinator for Northern States Power Company and a consultant to Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C.
2.
I am duly authcrized to verify Applicant's Response to State's Second Requests for Discovery; specifically, those responses to Requests for Admissions 1-2 with respect to Utah Contention Security C.
3.
I certify that the statements and opinions in such responses are true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge and belief.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on June 4,1999.
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.j UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
Before the Atomic Safety And Licensing Board In the Matter of
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PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
)
Docket No. 72-22
)
(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
)
ASLBP No. 97-732-02-ISFSI DECLARATION OF JERRY COOPER Jerry Cooper states as follows under penalties of perjury:
1.
I am the Project Engineer with Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (Stone & Webster) for the Private Fuel Storage Facility ("PFSF") project. As Project Engineer for the PFSF, I am responsible for the execution and integration of the technical activities for the project.
2.
I am duly authorized to verify Applicant's Response to State's Second j
Requests for Discovery; specifically, those responses to Interrogatory Nos.1-4 with respect to Utah Contention M; Interrogatory Nos. 6 with respect to Utah Contention N; and Request for Admission Nos. 5-6 with respect to Utah Contention R.
3.
I certify that the statements and opinions in such responses are true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge and belief.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
i Executed on June 4,1999.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEA.R REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety And Licensing Board In the Matter of
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PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
)
Docket No. 72-22
)
(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
)
ASLBP No. 97-732-02-ISFSI DECLARATION OF DONALD WAYNE LEWIS Donald Wayne Lewis states as follows under penalties of perjury:
1.
I am Lead Mechanical Engineer with Stone & Webster for the Private Fuel Storage Facility (PFSF) project. In that position I am responsible for ensuring that all mechanically related systems for the PFSF meet the principal design criteria as stated in Chapter 3 of the PFSF Safety Analysis Report.
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2.
I am duly authorized to verify Applicant's Response to State's Second Requests for Discovery; specifically, those responses to Interrogatory No. 4 with respect to Utah Contention B; Request for Admission No.13 with respect to Utah Contention K, j
Request for Admission No. I and Interrogatory Nos.1-5 with respect to Utah Contention N; and Request for Admission Nos.1-4 and Interrogatory Nos.1-3 with respect to Utah Contention R.
3.
I certify that the statements and opinions in such responses are true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge and belief.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on June 4,1999.
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Donald Wayne LeM ghana % 4
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety And Licensing Board In the Matter of
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PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
)
Docket No. 72-22 I
)
(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
)
ASLBP No. 97-732-02-ISFSI DECLARATION OF JOHN DONNELL John Donnell states as follows under penalties of perjury:
- 1. I am the Project Director for Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C.
- 2. I am duly authorized to verify Applicant's Response to State's Second l
Requests for Discovery; specifically, those responses to Requests for Admissions 1,2, and 4 with respect to Utah Contention B.
I
- 3. I certify that the statements and opinions in such responses are true and correct l
to the best of my personal knowledge and belief.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
1 Executed on June 3,1999.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomie Safety And Licensing Board In the Matter of
)
)
PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
)
Docket No. 72-22
)
(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
)
ASLBP No. 97-732-02-ISFSI DECLARATION OF WESLEY J. JACOBS Wesley J. Jacobs states as follows under penalties of perjury:
1.
I am the Lead Electrical Engineer for the Private Fuel Storage project for I
Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.
2.
I am duly authorized to verify Applicant's Response to State's Second Requests for Discovery; specifically, those responses concerning alleged hazards from electrical interference, Contention Utah K: Interrogatory No. 6.
3.
I certify that the statements and opinions in such responses are true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge and belief.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on June 4,1999.
e Wesley J..ylcgf
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensine Board In the Matter of
)
)
PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
)
Docket No. 72-22
)
(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF WESLEY JACOBS J
CITY OF ENGLEWOOD
)
) SS:
STATE OF COLORADO
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I, Wesley J. Jacobs, being duly swom, states as follows-i
)
1.
I am a Lead Electrical Engineer for Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. I am providing this affidavit in support of a motion for partial summary disposition of Utah 1
K in the above captioned proceeding to show that smoke from a fire or explosion, in-cluding smoke from the Tekoi Rocket Engine Test Facility or a wildfire adjacent to the l
Private Fuel Storage Facility (PFSF), would pose no credible hazard to the facility and i
that potential electrical interference with respect to overhead aircraft would pose no 1
credible hazard to the facility.
2.
My professional and educational experience is summarized in the cur-riculum vitae attached as Exhibit I to this affidavit. I have worked as an electrical engi-I neer in the power industry for 17 years and I have specific experience in the licensing of away-from-reactor spent fuel storage facilities and their electrical and controls design. I have been responsible for the direction of engineering and design activities and equip-I
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l ment specification aM Wtion at a nuclear power plant. On the Private Fuel Storage L
(PFS) project I am responsible for electrical engineering and design, the site security system design, and support for security training, qualifications, and contingency plans.
3.
I am knowledgeable of the design and operation of the PFSF and the spent fuel casks that will be used there. I am specifically knowledgeable of the electrical and l
security systems at the PFSF, their importance to safety, and the effect of their potential l
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failure on operations at the PFSF.
4.
In its response to PFS's first discovery request, the State of Utah alleged that the function of the electrical systems at the PFSF could be impaired by a smoke plume potentially created by a fire or explosion at the Tekoi Rocket Engine Test Facility or by a wildfire adjacent to the PFSF. The State in Utah K (and Confederated Tribes in a contention combined with Utah K) had alleged that PFS had inadequately considered the impact on the PFSF of credible accidents, including potential rocket motor explosions at Tekoi and wildfires.
5.
Smoke simply would not pose a significant hazard to the PFSF. Even if one assumed that smoke could interfere with electrical systems at the PFSF (an assump-tion PFS believes to be wrong), PFSF SAR Section 8.1.1.3 states: "PFSF spent fuel stor-age nuclear safety functions do not rely on electrical power for their accomplishment."
The electrical systems at the PFSF are not classified as important-to-safety and their postulated malfunction would not have safety or radiological consequences - such mal-function would cause no release of radioactive material to the environment. If the spent fuel storage cask temperature monitoring systems were to fail, the cask air inlet and outlet ducts would be inspected visually until the temperature monitoring systems were re-1 stored, to ensure that the inlet and outlet ducts were not blocked. Therefore, smoke I
would pose no significant hazard to the PFSF.
6.
In addition, smoke would not cause a breakdown in security at the PFSF.
Any failure of any component of the security system at the PFSF will result in the im-2
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piementation of compensatory measures. These measures may involve increased security patrols until the component failure is rectified. Furthermore, if the electrical system at the PFSF were to fail, the emergency diesel generator would start and supply the neces-i sary power for the security loads.
7.
In its second set of discovery requests, the State implied that electrical in-terference from aircraft could cause the electrical or security systems at the PFSF to fail 4
and that electrical interference from the PFSF could cause an overflying aircraft to crash at the PFSF. The State had alleged in Utah K that PFS had inadequately considered the potential impact on the PFSF of aircraft overflying this area.
8.
Electrical interference from aircraft will not cause the PFSF electrical or security systems to fail. While PFS has not yet selected specific equipment or equipment suppliers, radio systems at the PFSF will have dedicated FCC-licensed frequencies for each system that will be different from any frequency utilized by military or other air-craft. Therefore, the frequencies used by military or other aircraft will not affect PFSF equipment. Further, PFS will use commercially available security, electrical, alarm and computer systems at the PFSF that have been used and found acceptable at other facili-ties. These systems will be shielded to prevent radio interference per the vendor recom-
. mendations utilizing standard practices.
9.
Electrical interference from PFSF equipment also will not cause aircraft to crash into the PFSF. Because PFSF equipment will operate on frequencies different from
. those used by aircraft, radio frequencies used at the PFSF would not affect the aircraft.
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Wesley J. facef6 V Sworn to before me this 7 day of June 1999.
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4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensine Board In the Matter of
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)
PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
)
Docket No. 72-22
)
(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY COOPER l
CITY OF ENGLEWOOD
)
) SS:
STATE OF COLORADO
)
I, Jerry Cooper, being duly sworn, state as follows:
1.
I am the Project Engineer with Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (Stone & Webster) for the Private Fuel Storage Facility (PFSF). Stone & Websteris the architect-engineer for the PFSF. As Project Engineer for the PFSF, I am responsible for directing the multidiscipline engineering and design activities of the PFSF project. I am providing this affidavit in support of a motion for partial summary disposition of Conten-tion Utah K in the above captioned proceeding to describe the ability of the PFSF to withstand heat and temperatures under conditions that might result from a wildfire adja-cent to the facility.
2.
I have participated in and am knowledgeable of the design and layout of the PFSF. My professional and educational experience is summarized in the curriculum vitae attached as Exhibit 1 to this affidavit. I have 28 years of experience in the engi-neering, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of naval nuclear power plants,
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commercial nuclear plants, spent fuel storage facilities, and environmental remediation
- projects.
i 3.
All spent fuel at the PFSF will be located inside the Restricted Area. The Restricted Area is a 99 acre, roughly rectangular area surrounded by two fences, which will contain the concrete storage pads on which the spent fuel storage casks will be lo-cated (8 casks per pad). The Restricted Area will also contain the canister transfer building, constructed of reinforced concrete, where the spent fuel canisters will be trans-ferred from transportation casks to storage casks.. The transportation casks containing the canisters will be brought into the canister transfer building from outside the ISFSI either on rail cars (via the PFSF rail line) or heavy-haul tractor trailers (via the PFSF access i
road). Finally,in a comer of the Restricted Area, removed from the canister transfer building and spent fuel storage casks, will be the security and health physics building, constructed of reinforced concrete masonry, which will contain.the offices and equipment
' for security and health physics personnel and an emergency diesel generator.
4.
The layout of the PFSF Restricted Area is shown in Figure 1.2-1 of the PFSF Safety Analysis Report (SAR), which is attached as Exhibit 2 to this affidavit. As can be seen on this Figure, the concrete storage pads and the spent fuel storage casks will be separated from the inner fence surrounding the Restricted Area by a minimum dis-tance of 150 ft. That portion of the Restricted Area not covered by the concrete pads will
' bave a crushed rock surface 12 inches deep. The inner fence is separated from the outer fence by a distance of 20 ft.' The area between the fences (referred to as the isolation zone on Figure 1.2-1), will have a crushed rock surface 12 inches deep. Surrounding the outer fence, at a distance of 10 ft. from the fence, will be a 20-foot wide perimeter road with a crushed rock surface 12 inches deep. (While SAR Figure 1.2-1 refers to the Re-stricted Area and perimeter road surfaces as " crushed rock" and the isolation zone surface
-as " compacted gravel," those surfaces will all be composed of the same aggregate road base.) The 10 ft. space between the outer fence and the perimeter road will also have a 12-inch deep crushed rock surface. PFS will implement a maintenance program to con-2
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trol any significant growth of vegetation through the crushed rock surface of the Re-stricted Area, the isolation zone, the 10 ft. space between the isolation zone and the pe-rimeter road, and the perimeter road. Thus, the surface of the Restricted Area from the concrete pads to the outside of the perimeter road will be non-combustible.
5.
I have read the affidavit of Carlton Britton. In addition to the surface of the Restricted Area being non-combustible, the spent fuel, the equipment, and the PFSF
. personnel inside the Restricted Area will be protected from wildfires by a barrier of crested wheat grass that PFSF will plant around the Restricted Area. The barrier will be 300 ft. wide and will run outward from the outer edge of the perimeter road around the Restricted Area. A barrier of crested wheat grass would remain in place with little main-tenance after it was planted. Britton Aff. at j 8. Crested wheat grass is fire resistant and thus would eliminate or greatly reduce the effect of any wildfire approaching the PFSF.
li 6.
The closest possible point of approach of a wildfire outside the Restricted Area, assuming that it penetrated the barrier of crested wheat grass around the Restricted Area, would be the closest total distance from the outer edge of the perimeter road sur-rounding the Restricted Area to a spent fuel storage cask or a structure used to handle spent fuel storage casks. Thus, the closest possible point of approach to any spent fuel storage casks inside the Restricted Area would be 162 ft., to any casks in the canister
- t'ransfer building. The spent fuel storage casks on the concrete storage pads would be at least 200 ft. from the outer edge of the road and thus at least 200 ft. from the fire. Ssg SAR Fig.1.2-1, Exhibit 2.
7.
The canister transfer building will have concrete walls two feet thick, with a concrete roof one foot thick and a concrete foundation five feet thick. Response to NRC Request for Additional Information 3-5, at 1, dated Mar. 24,1999. Thus it will be non-combustible and because of the low thermal conductivity and high specific heat of l
concrete, no fire outside the Restricted Area would pose a hazard to the building or to any 3
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i spent fuel, fuel casks, fuel canisters, or personnel located inside the canister transfer building.
8.
I have also read the affidavits of Krishna Singh, and Ram Srinivasan. The distance from the closest possible point of approach of a wildfire, combined with the temperatures generated by a fire, Britton Aff. at 116-7,9-10, and the resistance to fire of the spent fuel casks systems, Singh Aff. at j 7; Srinivasan Aff. at 115-6, and the canister transfer building, would prevent a wildfire from posing a hazard to the spent fuel, the fuel canisters, or the fuel casks.
- 9. '
The only significant sources of combustible material that would be present
' inside the Restricted Area would be: 1) the diesel fuel in the tanks of any heavy haul trucks bringing spent fuel transportation casks to the ISFSI, SAR { 8.2.5.1.; 2) the diesel fuel in the tanks of any train locomotive bringing transportation casks to the ISFSI, SAR Q 8.2.5.1; 3) the diesel fuel in the cask transporter vehicle that would move casks from the canister transfer building to the storage pads, SAR Q 8.2.5.1.; 4) the diesel generator fuel tank inside the security and health physics building; and 5) the diesel fuel storage
' tank, which would be located at least 50 ft. inside the inner fence surrounding the Re-stricted Area, approximately 200 ft. northeast of the canister transfer building and 700 ft.
east of the nearest fuel casks. Commitment Resolution Information, NRC RAI 8-2 (sec-ond round), dated Mar. 24,1999.
' 10.
A wildfire would not cause any of the fuel sources inside the Restricted Area to ignite or explode. The diesel tanks will be designed in accordance with the re-quirements of NFPA 30. The diesel storage tank will be located at least 50 ft. inside the inner fence around the Restricted Area, which would provide a 100 ft. firebreak between the outer edge of the perimeter road and the tank. The crested wheat grass barrier around the Restricted Area would provide another 300 ft. of separation between the fire and the tank. At that distance a fire would have no chance whatsoever ofigniting or exploding the diesel fuel in the tank. Britton Aff, at j 10. The diesel emergency generator tank will be a double-walled tank located inside the security and health physics building. The 4
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' building will be protected by the crested wheat grass barrier. Furthermore, even if the fire were to penetrate the crested wheat grass barrier, because the area between the outer edge of the Restricted Area and the outer edge of the perimeter road are covered with crushed rock, a wildfire could not come closer than 50 A. from the building. In addition, the tank will be protected from fire by the building, by virtue ofits of reinforced concrete masonry construction, by a sprinkler system within the building designed to NFPA 13 standards, and by the tank's own double-walled construction. Therefore, a wildfire would not ignite or explode the diesel generator tank. All other diesel fuel sources would be farther than 100 A. from any wildfire (assuming that it penetrated the crested wheat grass barrier around the Restricted Area) and would not be threatened by virtue of their distance from the fire.
I 1.
Further, PFS has analyzed the potential consequences of diesel fuel fires and has found that they would pose no hazard to the spent fuel or the integrity of the spent fuel storage casks or the fuel canisters contained therein, even if the diesel fuel were somehow ignited. Section 8.2.5 of the PFSF SAR shows that fires involving diesel i
fuel from a heavy haul truck, the cask transporter vehicle, or the locomotive would not i
threaten the integrity of the spent fuel storage casks (or the fuel canisters inside). Diesel fires (and wildfires) would not threaten the integrity of any spent fuel transportation casks (or canisters contained therein), in that under 10 C.F.R. f 71.73(c)(4), certified transpor-
- tation casks are required to be designed to withstand a design basis fire. The explosion of vehicle fuel tanks is not a credible event because of the distance that would separate them from any wildfire. Britton Aff, at j 10.
12.
A fire involving the diesel fuel from the storage tank northeast of the can-ister transfer building would not threaten any spent fuel storage casks or canisters con-tained therein, in that the tank will be 700 A. from the nearest concrete storage pad and 200 A. from the canister transfer building. The explosion of the diesel storage tank is not credible because 'of the distance that would separate it from any wildfire. A fire or explo-sion involving the diesel fwl from the diesel generator tank inside the security and health 5
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- physics building would not threaten any spent fuel storage casks (or canisters inside), in that the security and health physics building is over 900 ft. from the nearest concrete stor-age pad and over 350 ft. from the canister transfer building. Commitment Resolution In-formation, NRC RAI 8-2 (second round), dated Mar. 24,1999, 13.
Any hazard that a wildfire might pose to any other structure or piece of
. equipment around or inside the Restricted Area is irrelevant, in that section 3.4 and Table 3.4-1 of the PFS SAR show that the fuel casks, the fuel canisters, the storage pads, and the canister transfer building (including components inside the building) cre the only
' structures, systems, and components important to safety"(defined by 10 C.F.R. @ 72.3) at the PFSF. The NRC defines as such those systems that 1) maintain the conditions re-quired to store spent fuel safely,2) prevent damage to the spent fuel container during
- handling and storage, and 3) provide reasonable assurance that the spent fuel can be han-died without undue risk to the public. Specifically, the security and health physics building and the security and perimeter lighting systems are not "important to safety."
Nor are any aspects of the PFSF electrical power supply or instrumentation systems.
Those systems provide for se safety of the PFSF only indirectly. The PFSF is designed so that no harm to the public health and safety would result from the failure of those sys-tems. If those systems were damaged by a fire, PFS would simply repair or replace them afterwards. NRC regulations do not require a higher level of protection for those sys-tem's.
14.
Finally, a wildfire at the PFSF would not cause the evacuation of PFSF se-curity personnel. By virtue of the 300-ft. crested wheat grass barrier surrounding the PFSF Restricted Area and the distance between the outer edge of the perimeter road around the Restricted Area and the location of the spent fuci storage casks and the canis-ter transfer building, the heat from the fire would not pose a threat to any personnel inside the Restricted Area.' Britton Aff, at110. Furthermore, PFSF security personnel will have appropriate emergency breathing apparatus available to them such that the smoke i
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4 from a fire at the PFSF would not force them to evacuate. The spent fuel casks inside the PFSF Restricted Area will be protected by PFSF security personnel at all times.
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Sworn to before me this 7d day ofJune 1999.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Matter of
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)
PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
)
Docket No. 72-22
)
(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF C. FLOYD DAVIS CITY OF MAGNA
)
) SS:
STATE OF UTAH
)
C. Floyd Davis, being duly swom, states as follows:
- 1. I am an Explosives Safety Specialist for the Utah Propulsion Center, Alliant Techsystems, Inc. In that position I coordinate explosive safety, explosive siting, process safety management and regulatory compliance with cognizant groups.
- 2. The following is a summary of my educational and professional experience. I have a Bachelor of Science Degree in Physics. I have worked in non-destructive testing, process and system safety, and explosive safety at Alliant\\ Hercules Inc. for 37 years. This experience includes 31 years in process hazards analysis, risk management, explosive operations, research and development, explosive testing and test development, development of explosive standards, risk analysis, hazardous material characteristics, accident investigation, explosive siting, and regulatory compliance.
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}I 3; I am knowledgeable of the siting requirements and general operation of the Tekoi r
Test Facility. I am also knowledgeable of the types of materials and rocket motors tested at Tekoi and how the rocket motors are static fired. Class 1.1 and Class 1.3 motors are static tested at the facility. Motors currently static fired at the test facility range in propellant weight from 4,500 to 82,000 lbs.
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- 4. ? The Tekoi Test Facility is comprised of two operational areas: the high hazard explosive test area and the static test range.. Both areas are sited as explosive facilities in accordance with the Quantity-Distance (QD) separation distances for the quantity of explosives involved as prescribed by the Department of Defense Contractors' Safety Manual for Ammunition and Explosives (DoD 4145.26M). Explosive quantity limits are set in terms of Class 1.1 explosives because those materials require greater separation distances than Class 1.3 explosives. Govemment approval agencies for Tekoi site plans include the Department of the Navy, Strategic Systems Project Office and the Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Contract Management Command.
- 5. L All classes of explosives are tested at the high hazard test area and intentional detonations are an inherent part of the testing. The high hazard test area has a posted explosive limit of 200 lbs. Class 1.1 explosives. Existing separation distances can allow testing of up to 11,775 lbs. of Class 1.1 material at the facility.
- 6. The static test range consists of tluce bays. Bay 1 is presently used for machining of largs rocket motors containing Class 1.1 and 1.3 propellants. Bays 2 and 3 are used for static testing of full scale rocket motors of explosive Class 1.1 and 1.3 propellants. Bay 1 has an explosive limit of 100,000 lbs. of Class 1.1 explosives. Bay 2 has a posted explosive limit of 150,000 lbs. Class 1.1 explosives but is sited for 100,000 lbs. Class 1.1. Bay 2 is not currently in use. Bay 3 has an approved explosive limit of 1.2 million Ibs. of Class 1.1 explosives. The explosive limits are fixed by the locations of the test bays and Department of Defense Quantity-Distance regulations and msy not be exceeded without an approved site plan.
- 7. ' Each static test bay is designed to hold rocket motors in place during testing and
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prevent escape in the event of a malfunction. The motors are restrained by the associated test stands and on the forward end by a thrust block or thrust tooling which measures thrust and
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I transfers the rocket thrust to the test pad. The rocket motor test pad in Bay 3 is of massive construction, approximately 23 feet wide by 101 feet long with embedded structural steel restraining members. In some places it is over 11 feet thick. Rocket motors are normally positioned in the test bays horizoctally for test firing. Occasionally motors are tested vertically, forward end down (i.c. nozzle up). Motors tested (horizontally) in Bay 2 and Bay 3 have the f
nozzles pointed west and south-east espectively. If a rocket motor were to come loose from the thrust block and attach points, if we uld normally impact the test stand structure or thrust tooling I
and cause motor case failure (i.e. t hamber rupture). Motor case failure reduces the probability of a motor escaping the stand and normally renders a motor incapable of flight. Some test stand q
designs at Tekoi incorporate specific anti-flight devices which are designed to intentionally l
rupture the case in the event of a restraint system failure. These systems are also intended to reduce the probability of a motor escaping the stand and render the motor incapable of flight.
8.
In addition to the facility design, safety procedures at the Tekoi test facility are also -
intended to minimize the potential for a motor static test failure. First, before a motor is static fired, it is X-rayed, its manufacturing and inspection records are reviewed, and any deviation from the motor's design is evaluated. Deviation from design requires engineering, quality, and l
safety approval before the motor is tested. Only motors which are expected to perform
. successfully are static fired at the facility. Second, no units can be tested without the test stand in place and the thrust assembly attached, l
.. '9.
No rocket motor has ever escaped a test stand at Tekoi. Only one rocket motor has (escaped a test stand in the 25 year history of static testing at the Bacchus Works, Magna, Utah static test range. This area was used prior to moving to the Tekoi test facility. In the early 1960's
- one rocket motor escaped the test stand and traveled a short distance from the test pad but did not leave the range. As a result of this incident thrust blocks and flight restraint systems were incorporated into the design of motor static test stands. In May 1974, a partially fired rocket motor detonated in place while being tested at the Bacchus Works. The motor did not escape the test stand but test stand hardware, motor fragments, and facility debris were projected outside the l
test range into the surrounding area.
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- 10. The information provided herein is meant to clarify factual issues only and in no way shall be deemed or construed as a position in support of or against the proposed nuclear storage waste facility.
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', b C. Floyd Davil ~
Swom to before me thi[ day of June 1999.
q PAMELA P ANDBtsON p
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t UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Matter of
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PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
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Docket No. 72-22
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(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
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AFFIDAVIT OF CARLTON BRITTON CITY OF LUBBOCK
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COUNTY OF LUBBOCK
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STATE OF TEXAS
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I, Carlton Britton, being duly sworn, state as follows:
1.
I am a professor in the Department of Range, Wildlife, and Fisheries Management at Texas Tech University. In that position I perform research in and teach subjects including fire ecology and range management. I am providing this affidavit in support of a motion for partial summary disposition of Contention Utah K in the above captioned proceeding to describe the nature and magnitude ofwildfires that could occur in the vicinity of the Private Fuel Storage Facility (PFSF) and steps that may be taken to protect the facility from their effects.
2.
My professional and educational experience is summarized in the curriculum vitae attached as Exhibit 1 to this affidavit. I have extensively studied and am knowledgeable about the effects of wildfires that can occur in semi-arid, rangeland regions such as Skull Valley, Utah. I have conducted numerous test fire burns over the past 30 years in fuel types which include shortgrass prairie, juniper woodlands, tall grass prairie, and sagebrush-bunchgrass in eastern Oregon, some ofwhich are very similar to the fuel types that occur in the Skull Valley. I have been involved in an estimated 500 experimental burns conducted under a wide variety of weather conditions and fuelloads.
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3.
I have reviewed information and data concerning the potential hazard of wildfires to the PFSF and I have prepared a report which PFS submitted to answer a Request for AdditionalInformation made by the NRC Staff concerning the hazard posed by wildfires. My report is attached as Exhibit 2.
4.
< Based on my general knowledge of wildfires in rangeland regions of the westem United States, my review ofproject specific documentation, and my inspection of the Skull Valley site on May 13,1999, I am kabwledgeable of the nature of the vegetation present in and
' the climate of Skull Valley relevant to their effects on the occurrence and characteristics of wildfires. I found the Skull Valley site to be dominated by an oki growth cheatgrass community with isolated stands ofgreasewood and other plants. Sand dmpseed occurred as a subdominate on the better soils of the site. The growing season of 1998 was evidently excellent as the cheatgrass standing litter was estimated at 2,400 lbs/ac. This is an exceptional amount of grass l
fuel considering the appmximate 7-inch precipitation zone. My opinion is that this represents l
' the maximum grass fuel loading possible for this site. Gaexwood was the only shrub present l
on the site in significant quantities. Plants were widely spaced on the rare sites conducive to their presence. The densest stands, which were less than 0.1 acre in size, had a canopy cover of less that 10%. Therefore, fire behavior and rate offire spread wouki not be influenced by the i
l shrub component. Grass fuel wouki be the only significant contributor to fire behavior and rate
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of fire spmad.
5.
The residence time of a wildfire, the time it remains above some predetermined
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elevated temperature, is a direct function of the fuel available for combustion. In rangeland j
regions, like the area surrounding the PFSF, wildfires do not tend to burn for a long time at any one point because the fuel loading is not high. Tests fire burns conducted where the fuelloading varied between 1,500 and 13,500 lbs/ acre (which would encompass the available fuel loading in Skull Valley) show that the temperature at the soil surface (the most stable reference point for j
temperature measurement) wouki exceed 200 'F for no more than about 5.4 minutes at any one
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l point (see Wright and Bailey,1982; pg.10-11). During late April 1999, I conducted several j
experimental burns at fuel loads above 5,000 lbs/ac. The maximum teap.eurs at the soil surface reached about 1,200*F, and the duration above 200*F was only about 2.5 minutes.
Above the height of the dominant fuel supporting the fire, tewpieurs duration diminishes
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I rapidly with height (see Wright and Bailey,1982; pg. Il-14). With the cheatgrass fuel at the PFS site, I am confident that fire temperatures and the duration of those temperatures would not
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exceed those referenced above. This conclusion applies to conditions which would include the absolute maximum fuel loading that could be expected in any year in combination with the most j
extreme atmospheric conditions generally present during the fire season for this region of the l
United States.
6.
Furthermore, the climate and vegetation in Skull Valley is similar to the Horse Haven study site near Ely, Nevada, discussed in my report, where Phil Range conducted studies on the temperatures produced by wildfires. The Horse Haven study site, however, was more productive with greater fuel loads than Skull Valley. Thus, Range's data is at the upper limit compared to what might be found in Skull Valley. Range indicated that the Horse Haven study site had a fuel load of 5311 lbs/ acre. The fires measured burned in August, with the following atmospheric conditions: air temperature 86 to 92 'F; relative humidity of 13 to 17 percent; and wind speed of 8 to 10 mph, While these are not the maximum for extreme wildfire condition, they are sufficient to produce close to maximum fire behavior characteristics. Study measurements indicated that the peak temperatures close to the soil averaged about 1466 'F over a number ofdifferent locations. At mid-canopy of the sagebrush (18 inches) the average maximum temperature was 1220 *F. The fire spread at a rate between 50 and 100 ft/ min with a maximumof590 A/ min.
' 7.
In my estimation, the upper limit of the fuel loading, including shrubs in Skull Valley at or adjacent to the PFSF, would be no more than 4000 lbs/ acre, which wouki allow for
. significant additional growth beyond that viewed on my visit to the site. This is based on viewing the site and my experience in eastem Oregon. A wildfire at the PFSF site would produce no twpeurs or duration of temperatures greater than those reported in the literature.
A fire would move quickly and residence time over a given point would be very short, less than the maximum 5.4 minutes found in the literature. Smoke from an approaching fire coukt possibly be dense, reducing vision to 20 to 30 feet, for 5 to 7 minutes depending on how close the wind held the smoke to the ground. For an additional 5 minutes, vision distance would increase to about 100 yards. Even under worst case weather conditions with high wind speeds, smoke should clear the she sufficiently withht 30 minutes to see at least I mile.
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The effect ofwildfires in areas with vegetative cover of the type present in Skull Valley can be easily mitigated by fuel modification. For example, planting a 300 ft. wide strip of crested wheatgrass amund the site outside a 100 ft. fuel-free strip would virtually eliminate the impact of any wildfire. Crested wheat grass is a well known fuel which does not support fire spread easily. Plants typically have leaves close to the ground and are widely spaced. With summer dormancy, many leaves fall to the soil surface. These characteristics are not conducive to fire spread through crested wheatgrass stands. Even ifit were to burn, the intensity of the fire and the temperatures produced would be significantly lower than those that would result from a fire involving the fuel type currently in the Skull Valley. These are reasons crested wheatgrass stands are used as fuel breaks in the Great Basin. Furthermore, based on my observation of crested wheatgrass plantings in Utah, a crested wheatgrass barrier couki casily be established at the Skull Valley site. A single planting would be sufficient and the barrier would remain fire resistant with little maintenance required afterwards.
9.
A 100 ft. wide strip free of fuel wouki act as a firebreak and would prevent a fire.
from reaching the fuel-free PFS she. I have used 100 ft. as a safe standoffdistance in test burns measuring the effects ofwildfires for 30 years. These tests have been done with fuel loads varying from 1,000 up to 15,000 lbslac of grass, and under various weather conditions including win %A up to 20 mph. I have found that 100 ft. is a sufficient firebreak under these various conditions to stop the pmgress of the fire and to protect equipment and life. During experimental burns, I always station persons and equipment (pumpers, trucks, etc.) on the down wind side of a 100-ft. firebreak, with no adverse effects from heat, dense smoke, or carbon monoxide produced from burning grass fuel 10.
Therefore, with a 300 ft. fuel modified area (crested wheatgrass) plus a 100-ft.
fuel-free firebreak at a site, no heat damage wouki be possible to normal equipment or structures, such as buildings or vehicles, or to life forms inside the compound. Such a firebreak wouki also prevent a wildfire from causing diesel fuel stored in a tank inside the compound to ignite or explode. We carry drip torch fuel on our pumper, and the pumper is always stationed 100 ft.
down wind from our expA.eit.al fires. Drip torch fuel is a 60:40 mixture ofdiesel: gasoline, and the deck ofour pumper is generally covered with spilled fuel. We have not experienced ignition or explosion of drip torch fuel under these conditions in our many test burns.
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11.
I have reviewed the affidavit of Jerry Cooper regarding the design and layout of the PFSF. The PFSF Restricted Area will be enclosed by two fences and a perimeter road, all of which will have a surface ofcrushed rock. Cooper Aff. at 14. A wildfire could not be sustained within the crushed rock area because of the lack of fuel for the fire to burn.
12.
In summary, I do not believe any wildfire in the fuel present at the PFS site would present any danger to the facility or personnel, especially with a 100-foot firebreak and proper fuel modification.
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Carlton Britton Jav Swom to before me this N day ofMiry 1999.
0h011N-1 Notary Public My Commission expires
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4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety And Licensing Board In the Matter of
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PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L'.L.C.
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Docket No. 72-22
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' (Private Fuel Storage Facility)
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ASLBP No. 97-732-02-ISFSI DECLARATION OF JOHN A. VINCENT CITY OF PARSIPPANY
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) SS:
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
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John A. Vincent states as follows under penalties of perjury:
1.
I am employed by GPU Nuclear as Senior Engineer Nuclear Fuel in Par-sippany, New Jersey, and am the Chairman of PFS's Technology Committee. In my ca-pacity as Senior Engineer Nuclear Fuel, I am responsible for managing the external nu-
, clear fuel cycle activities for the nuclear facilities of GPU Nuclear, including the trans-portation of spent nuclear fuel. In this capacity I managed the GPU Nuclear spent fuel shipping campaign to retum 224 spent fuel assemblies to the Oyster Creek Nuclear Gen-erating Station from the Nuclear Fuel Services facility in West Valley, New York. As Chairman of PFS's Technology Committee, I am responsible for overseeing the activities j
of the Committee which focus on spent fuel storage and transportation technology, nu-clear fuel specifications and characterization, spent fuel transportation, dry transfer sys-tems, and storage space allocation and priority. My professional and educational experi-ence is summarized in the curriculum vitae attached as Exhibit I to this Declaration.
2.
As Chairman of PFS's Technology Committee, and based on my previous experience in transporting spent nuclear fuel, I have been actively involved in develop-ing,' and am knowledg 'ble about, PFS's plans for the shipment of spent nuclear fuel Tiu&t s W5 6Yf
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from the various originating reactors to the PFSF as well as PFS's plan for the operation of the Intermodal Transfer Point ("ITP"). PFS has generally addressed both these issues in its response to the NRC's Request for Additional Information ("RAI") ITP-1, submit-ted under cover letter dated February 10,1999.,S._g Exhibit 2 to this Declaration.
3.
PFS's current plan for the shipment of spent nuclear fuel to the PFSF is generally described in its application and response to RAI ITP-1. Under the PFS plan, spent fuel would be shipped in NRC-certified transportation casks from the originating reactor sites to the PFSF. The shipper will be the originating reactor licensee, who will ship the spent fuel under the general license authority of 10 C.F.R. { 71.12. Ownership of, and title to, the spent fuel will remain with the originating reactor licensee throughout the shipment (as well as at the PFSF).
4.
The originating reactor licensees that ship spent fuel to the PFSF are authorized by the general license in 10 C.F.R. 71.12 to deliver the spent fuel to one or more carriers that would be authorized under 10 C.F.R. 70.20a to transport the spent fuel to the PFSF. Under PFS's current plan for the shipment of spent nuclear fuel to the PFSF, the transportation of spent fuel casks from the originating reactor to the PFSF would be undertaken by one or more carriers authorized to possess and transport the transportation cask under 10 C.F.R. 70.20a. The carrier in possession of a spent fuel transportation cask would have actual custody and control of the cask, subject to NRC and DOT regulations governing the transportation of spent nuclear fuel. Under applica-ble NRC and DOT regulations, more than one carrier may be involved in transporting the cask from the originating reactor to the PFSF.
5.
The ITP will be an integral part of transporting the spent fuel to the PFSF under the second of two alternatives being considered by PFS for the transport of spent nuclear fuel to the PFSF. Under this alternative, the spent fuel would be shipped by rail carrier to the ITP, and then transported the remaining 25 miles to the PFSF on Skull Val-ley Road by heavy haul.
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6.
Under PFS's current plan, described in PFS's response to RAI ITP-1, PFS would operate the ITP as a common / contract carrier under a transportation services agreement with its utility customers. Alternatively, PFS would arrange for a third party common / contract carrier to provide such services to its utility customers. See PFS RAI Response, ITP-1 at 2-3,6. PFS's current plans are for it to own the physical structures and equipment at the ITP in either event. In the latter case, where a third party com-mon / contract canier were to operate the ITP, the third party may lease the ITP facilities and equipmerit from PFS or otherwise contract with PFS for the operation of the ITP.11 at 5-6.
7.
' Should PFS choose the heavy-haul alternative for shipping spent fuel to the PFSF (which includes intermodal transfer at the ITP), under PFS's current plan it would file an appropriate application to qualify as, and to meet the applicable require-ments for, a motor common or contract carrier with the Federal Highway Administration (FWHA).19s PFS RAI Response,ITP-1 at 3-4. An entity seeking approval to become a motor common or contract carrier of property files a " fitness application"with the FHWA,49 C.F.R. Q 365.105, which the FHWA reviews in accordance with its safety fit-ness and financial responsibility policies,49 C.F.R. f 365.109(a)(4), and determines whether the applicant is " fit, willing, and able to perform the involved operations and to j
comply with all applicable statutory and regulatory provisions," 49 C.F.R. ) 365.107. In 6rder to comply with the safety fitness requirements, an applicant must implement certain j
safety programs such as a system to ensure compliance with Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, a driver safety training program and a means to oversee driver qualification i
requirements, an alcohol and controlled substances testing program, and a system for preparing and maintaining an accident register. 49 C.F.R. Parts 350-399. In order to comply with financial responsibility requirements, an applicant must submit proof of surety bonds for bodily injury, property damage, and cargo liability, which to carry radio-active materials requires providing a $5,000,000 surety bond. Finally, an applicant must submit a designation oflegal process agent. 49 C.F.R. { 365.109(a)(6).
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Should PFS choose the ITP/ heavy-haul alternative for shipping spent fuel to the PFSF, PFS would undertake all necessary steps to qualify as a motor carrier with l
the FHWA and would file an appropriate application and qualify as a carrier of hazardous l
l materials with the Department of Transportation (DOT), which entails registration with t
l DOT, payment of a nominal ($300) registration fee (49 C.F.R. @ 107.601(a)), and com-l l
pliance with DOT hazardous materials transportation requirements. S_qs PFS RAI Re-sponse, ITP-1 at 3-4. Beyond registration and applicable NRC requirements, these re-quirements include: 49 C.F.R. Part 171, (reports of accidents / incidents); Part 172 (hazard
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waming label, placarding, marking, shipping papers, and emergency response informa-tion); Part 173 (compatibility, segregation, loading, and shipment handling requirements);
and Parts 172 Subpart H and 177 (employee training including general awareness, famili-l arization training, function-specific training, safety training, and modal specific training).
9.
During intermodal transfer at the ITP, the spent fuel transportation cask will be under active shipping papers providing for the transit of the spent fuel from the originating reactor to the PFSF. No new shipping papers will be required for the inter-modal transfer. As discussed in the PFS response to RAI ITP-1, PFS (or a third party un-der contract operating the ITP) will v rify at a minimum that any transportation cask ar-riving at the ITP is accompanied by active shipping papers and is still marked, labeled and placarded in compliance with DOT regulations. San PFS RAI Response, ITP-1 at 3-l 4.
l 10.
Further, as discussed in the PFS response to RAI ITP-1, PFS (or a third party under contract operating the ITP) will perform all operations at the ITP in compli-l ance with applicable DOT and NRC regulations. PFS (or the third party) would comply with applicable DOT statutes and regulations pertaining to rail carriers or to motor carri-ers, as appropriate, and the related hazardous materials transportation requirements. Sag l
PFS RAI Response, ITP-1 at 3-4. The operations at tl:e ITP involving the transportation cask will be in compliance with the transportation cask's NRC Certificate of Compliance l
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and, to the extent appropriate, all operations at the ITP will be in compliance with PFS's Commission-approved Part 71 quality assurance program.
1 11.
As discussed in the PFS response to RAI ITP-1, PFS (or a third party un-der contract operating the ITP) will perform all operations at the ITP, as the carrier, in compliance with the physical protection requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.37, including the provision of escorts to maintain continuous surveillance of transportation casks at the ITP. See PFS RAI Response, ITP-1 at 4-5. These requirements have traditionally been l
readily met by shippers and carriers of commercial spent nuclear fuel.
12.
As discussed in the PFS response to RAI ITP-1, PFS would not transport spent nuclear fuel or operate the ITP as a private carrier because PFS will never take title to or own the spent nuclear fuel. See PFS RAI Response, ITP-1 at 6.
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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on June 11,1999.
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.lefm A. Vincent
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Document #: 773668 v.I 5
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of
)
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PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
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Docket No. 72-22
)
(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
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DECLARATION OF JOHN DONNELL CITY OF ENGLEWOOD
)
) SS:
STATE OF COLORADO
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John Donnell states as follows under penalties of periury:
1.
I am Project Director for Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. ("PFS"). I report directly to John Parkyn, the Chairman of the Board of PFS. In my capacity as Project Director, I am responsible for the execution and integration of the legal and technical activities of the Private Fuel Storage Facility ("PFSF") project I am providing this affidavit in support of a motion for partial summary disposition of Utah Contention B in l_
the above-captioned proceeding. My professional and educational experience is o'
summarized in the curriculum vitae attached as Exhibit I to this Declaration.
1 2.
As Project Director of PFS, I am knowledgeable about PFS's plan for the operation of the Intermodal Transfer Point ("ITP"). The ITP would be an integral part of transporting the spent fuel to the PFSF under the second of two altematives being considered by PFS for the transport of spent nuclear fuel to the PFSF.
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3.
The ITP will be located on a rail siding off of the Union Pacific rail line, 1.8 miles west of Rowley Junction, Utah near Interstate 80. The ITP is not on the same property as the PFSF, which would be located approximately 25 miles to the south on the Skull Valley Indian Reservation. At the ITP, the spent fuel would be transferred from rail car to heavy-haul truck.
4.
As discussed in the PFSF Safety Analysis Report (SAR) in Section 4.5, the ITP will consist of rail sidings off of the Union Pacific main rail line, a 150 ton capacity gantry crane, and a heavy-haul tractor / trailer yard area. The gantry crane will be single-failure-proof, and housed in a weather enclosure. The ITP will surrounded by a chain-link fence to provide industrial security.
5.
The spent fuel will arrive at the ITP sealed inside an NRC-certified transportation cask and will remain so sealed for the entire time that it is at the ITP.
Further, at all times while it is at the ITP, the sealed transportation cask will remain in shipment mode: loaded on its transportation cradle, in a horizontal configuration, with the impact limiters installed.
6.
The sole operation performed at the ITP will be to transfer the sealed transportation cask from one mode of transportation, a rail car, to anothei mode of transportation, a heavy-haul truck trailer. The ITP will not be used as a spent fuel
. repackaging facility, staging facility, or buffer storage facility. The sole purpose of the transfer will be to facilitate completion of the cask shipment to the PFSF, by transferring the cask from one mode of transportation, railcar, to a subsequent mode of transportation, j
heavy-haul truck. The specific steps that would be involved in this transfer are described in PFS's answer to the State's Interrogatory No. 4 for Utah Contention B. Ev.s Exhibit 2 to this Declaration.
7.
All operations at the ITP will be performed in compliance with applicable DOT and NRC regulations. The operations at the ITP involving the transportation cask will be in complianc'e with the transportation cask's NRC Certificate of Compliance and,
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i to the extent appropriate, all operations at the ITP will be in compliance with PFS's Commission-approved Part 71 quality assurance program.
8.
All operations at the ITP will be performed in compliance with the physical protection requirements of 10 C.F.R. 73.37, including the provision of escorts to maintain continuous surveillance of transportation casks at the ITP.
9.
Receipt and inspection for acceptance of a shipment by PFS for the purposes of storage at the PFSF will be performed at the PFSF on the Skull Valley Indian Reservation, not at the ITP. _S_ee PFSF SAR Sections 5.1,5.1.4.1, and Figures 5.1-1 and e
5.1-3.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on June j[,1999
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_8AA-A Jo nnell i
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I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Matter of
)
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PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
)
Docket No. 72-22
)
(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
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DECLARATION OF MICHAEL LADD Michael J. Ladd states as follows under penalties of perjury:
1.
I am the Training Process Manager at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generat-ing Station for the Northern States Power Company. In that position I am responsible for reviewing, evaluating, and implementing the training program at the Prairie Island plant.
I am providing this declaration in support of a motion for summary disposition of Con-tentions Utah F and Utah P in the above captioned proceeding to show that Private Fuel Storage's (PFS) training and certification program for the Private Fuel Storage Facility (PFSF) satisfies the requirements of Subpart I of 10 C.F.R. Part 72.
2.
My pt;aessional and educational experience is summarized in the cur-r riculum vitae attached as Exhibit I to this declaration. I have extensive experience de-signing and evaluating NRC training programs. I have been and am currently responsible for ensuring that all training programs for the Prairie Island Nuclear Site meet and or ex-ceed NRC and Institute of Nuclear Power Operations ("INPO") guidelines for training and qualification. This involves review and use of all NRC Regulations, NRC and INPO Guidelines, NRC Regulatory Guides, American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards associated with nuclear power plant training and simulator training, as well as acusax s
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L all rules ofusage, when implementing the NRC's " Systematic Approach to Training" to develop, implement and evaluate training programs.
3.
In addition, throughout my career, I have had a wide range of other re-sponsibilities related to the training of personnel for nuclear facilities. I have been an In-structor for General Employee Training, operations, engineering, maintenance, radiation protection and chemistry and emergency planning. I have also served as an Operations 1
instructor in which capacity I designed the initial, continuing training, and simulator -
training for the Monticello Nuclear Plant. I have also performed audit exams for various j
utilities across the United States on operator license candidates for both pressurized water reactors and boiling water reactors. I have also served as a Technical Training Superin-tendent in which capacity I supervised a staff of 11 instructors and engineers that ana-lyzed, designed, developed, implemented and evaluated training programs for Radiation
- Protection and Chemistry, Electrical and Mechanical Maintenance, Engineering, Instru-j mentation and Control, and Construction and Craft personnel at Prairie Island. I have also developed and reviewed task lists and associated training program descriptions and course outlines'as well as on-the-job training (OJT) and oral and written exams for all disciplines at a nuclear facility. In February of 1998, I assisted in an evaluation of the Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant in New York to evaluate their Operations training. In i
March of this year, I was team member of the World Association of Nuclear Operators that evaluated the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating plant. My area of concentration
~ was training qualification and management of all site training programs.
4.
I am knowledgeable of the PFS training program. Before providing this l
declaration,I have thoroughly reviewed the training program as described in the PFSF License Application (LA) and Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and evaluated it against the requirements set forth in 10 C.F.R. Q Q 72.190,192 and 194 and related NRC and industry guidelines, standards and practices.
5.
The State of Utah alleges in Utah F that the training and certification of PFS personnel as described in the LA and the SAR fail to satisfy Subpart I of 10 C.F.R.
.2
Ee.
Ii' Part 72 and will not assure that the PFSF is operated in a safe manner. I have reviewed the State's allegations and the PFSF training program and have determined that, contrary to the State's allegation, the PFS program provides for the proper training, testing, and j
certification of PFSF personnel in accordance with NRC regulations and well established 3
principles for the training 'of nuclear personnel. In addition, PFS has set forth in appro-priate detail personnel qualifications and testing and training requirements for PFSF per-sonnel.
6.
. NRC regulations provide that a program for the training ofIndependent Spent Fuel Installation (ISFSI) personnel is to consist of" training, proficiency testing, and certification ofISFSI... personnel." 10 C.F.R. Q 72.192. The PFSF LA and SAR provide for such a training program. The PFSF training program as described in the LA J
and the SAR identifies those PFSF personnel that are to be trained and the specific areas in which training is to occur. It provides for systematic approach to their training by adopting the " Systematic Approach to Training" (SAT), which is a well defined training
~
process mandated by the NRC for the training of nuclear plant operators under 10 C.F.R.
Q 55.4 for developing the detailed curriculum for training PFSF personnel in the areas identified in the LA and the SAR. As it does for operator training, the PFS program similarly provides for a systematic approach for testing operator proficiency and it pro-j vides the standards which are to be used in operator certification for the PFSF. This is a comprehensive program that more than adequately covers each of the points that 10 b.F.R. { 72.192 mandates for the training ofISFSI personnel.
7.
In terms of those persons who are to be trained, the SAR provides that
"[i]ndividuals who operate equipment and controls that have been identified as 'impor-tant to safety' in the Safety Analysis Report and in the NRC license must be trained and i
. certified. Supervisory personnel who direct the operation of equipment and controls that are 'important to safety' must also be certified." SAR at 9.3-3. Thus, the scope of the
. PFS training program is in accordance with NRC requirements set forth in 10 C.F.R. Q o
1
.l
\\
!(
l 72.190, which mandates the training of personnel operating equipment important to safety and their supervisors.
8.
The SAR goes on to identify the specific areas in which these persons are to be trained. It provides that "the "PFS Operator Training Program" will address the folloiving subject areas: 1) canister transfer system design and operations,2) canister transfer system normal and off-normal procedures,3) storage facility normal and off-normal procedures,4) normal and off-normal transportation procedures for on-site trans-portation 5) maintenance,6) storage cask temperature monitoring system,7) radiation detection, monitoring, sampling, and survey instruments, 8) facility layout and functions,
- 9) operator responsibility and authority,10) Technical Specifications,11) normal and emergency communications,12) transportation, and 13) topics covered in General Em-ployee Training (GET) with specific emphasis on operations. SAR at 9.3-3 to -4. (The SAR also specifies the topics in which GET will be provided, which includes facility op-eration and design. SAR at 9.3-2 to-3.)
9.
In addition to substantive topics, the SAR provides that "[a]Il [PFS] per-sonnel involved in activities important to safety will be trained on the associated proce-dures prior to conducting the activity. Formal training of personnel on facility procedures will be substantially complete prior to the receipt of radioactive materials at the PFSF."
j SAR at 9.4-5. Further, PFS has specified the " format and depth of coverage" of the for-rnal procedures that PFS will generate for the activities important to safety at the PFSF and on which all PFSF personnel involved in such activities will be trained. SAR at 9.4-4.
10.
As part of their certification training, appropriate personnel will also con-duct preoperational testing of the actual storage system components at the PFSF. The testing will be conducted without fuel but will include full-load testing of all rigging and attachments, and limits of travel on lifting and transfer equipment. SAR at 9.2-4. "The purpose for operational testing is to ensure that... personnel involved in spent fuel ship-ping, receipt, and canister transfer, onsite transport, and storage operations perform their intended tasks in accordance with approved procedures, with ALARA awareness, with j
4
y j
y efficiency, and'without compromising personnel or public safety." SAR at 9.2-5. The
~ specific pieces of equipment on which PFS personnel will conduct preoperational testing as part of their certification are specified in the PFS SAR. SAR at 9.2-4. The specific operational tests that PFS personnel will perform as part of their certification are also specified in the SAR. SAR at 9.2-5 to -6.
11.
Finally, the SAR provides that where training in addition to that specified
' in the S R is required, training materials will be developed using the Systematic Ap-proach to Training (described in Paragraphs 12-14).' SAR at 9.3-4. Exceptions to the use of the SAT method in the development of the curriculum for the training program will be approved on a case-by-case basis by the emergency preparedness coordinator. SAR at 9.3-4.
12.
Thus, the SAR identifies the areas on which PFSF personnel who operate equipment and controls that have been identified as "important to safety" and their super.
visors are to be trained. Further, the SAR provides that training in these areas will be im-plemented "using a Systematic Approach to Training," SAR at 9.3-1, which as previously noted is a well defined process mandated by the NRC for the training of nuclear plant op-erators under 10 C.F.R. f 55.4. The SAT as defined in'10 C.F.R. { 55.4 includes five ba-sic elements. These are:
- 1) Systematic analysis of thejobs to be performed.
l
' 2) Learning objecuves derived from the analysis which describe desired
, performance after training.
- 3) Training design and implementation based on the learning objectives.
- 4) Evaluation of trainee mastery of the objectives during training.
1
,5) Evaluation and revision of the training based on the performance of trained personnel in the job setting.
13.
The PFSF SAR elaborates on how PPS will use the SAT to implement its training program. The SAR provides that following the SAT method, the training pro-i 1
5 t
i
r7; l
c gram will be " based upon analysis of thejob performance requirements to establish the knowledge level and skills that are required for each position" at the PFSF. SAR at 9.3-
- 1. The SAR goes on to state that:
Explicit learning objectives and performance measures are generated from this analysis. Training plans are then developed which identify training settings, sequences, and materials required. The training program is im-plemented by conducting the training activities, documenting the training and evaluating the program's effectiveness.
Job descriptions will detail the training, education, and experience re-quirements for each position. An individual assessment of the employee's needs will be conducted relative to the identified training requirements of each of the respective positions. Training will consist of classroom and on-the-job training (OJT), as appropriate, for all individuals, commensu-rate with theirjob duties an responsibilities.
SAR at 9.3-1. " Training materials will be developed by the site personnel qualified on
[the relevant] tasks. Training will also be delivered by individuals qualified on the par-ticular tasks, or by appropriate contractors." 11 at 9.3-4. In conducting their training, trainers will follow a curriculum that outlines the steps necessary to perform each task on which they are instructing. PFS Response to RAI 9-10 (Mey 19,1998), attached as Ex-hibit 2 to this declaration.
14.
Thus, the PFS training program provides for the comprehensive training of EFSF personnel in the various areas that they will be required to function in accordance with the well-established principles of the SAT. The SAT is a well-defined process -
implemented at nuclear power plants throughout industry - by which PFS will identify the functions to be performed at the PFSF, develop individualjob tasks for each of the functions, and link those individual job tasks to individual training curriculum and objec-tives, testing requirements and ultimately certification. The implementation of the PFS training program through the well defined industry-wide approach defimed by the SAT is analogous to a quality assurance program that is implemented through its quality assur-ance procedures.
6
1 15.
The PFS training program also provides personnel qualification and test-ing and certification requirements for PFSF personnel. PFS has specified, pursuant to 10 -
7 C.F.R.
72.28(a), the minimum personnel qualification requirements for holders of key L
positions at the PFSF, including: General Manager / Chief Operating Officer, Radiation
(
Protection Manager, Radiation Protection Technicians, Lead Mechanic / Operator, Me-chanics, Lead' Instrument and Electrical Technician, Instrument and Electrical Techni-cians, Lead Quality Assurance Technician, Quality Assurance Technician and Quality Assurance Auditor, Lead Nuclear Engineer, Nuclear Engineers, Security Captain, and the Emergency Preparedness Coordinator. SAR at 9.1-23 to -27.
16.
The PFS training program also sets forth both formal testing requirements, tied to specific passing examination grades as well as on-the job training (OJT) require-ments that "will be documented in a set of Qualification Cards containing the Job Per-formance Measures of practical factors that are required to be performed by the Opera-tor." LA at 7-1 The LA sets forth the related proficiency testing and certification stan-dards as follows:
[As described above,] [t]he OJT requirements will be documented in a set of Qualification Cards containing the Job Performance Measures of prac-tical factors that are required to be performed by the Opemtor. Each per-son to become Certified must have these Qualification Cards completed prior to being allowed to independently perform the applicable tasks....
The operators will have to pass comprehensive written and practical ex-aminations in order to become Certified. The trainee must score 80% or higher on the written exam to pass. The practical exam shall be on a pass / fail basis, as evaluated by previously Certified personnel....
LA at 7-1. Thus, the PFS training program provides that proficiency is to be tested by l
completion of OJT qualification cards, a practical exam based on the OJT, and a formal written exam. PFS elaborated on the formal testing process in response to a Request for Additional Information from the NRC Staff. PFS reiterated that,"[a]t the conclusion of task training, proficiency testing will be administered to ensure that proper understanding has been achieved by the person being trained. A test will be prepared and graded by the instructor and will be retained in the facility records for a two year period." Response to 7
i
{.'
)
lRAI 9-10 (May 19,1998). Such testing will flow directly from PFS's use of the SAT to
. implement its training program, for under 10 C.F.R. 55.4 the SAT calls for " training 1
. design and implementation based on the learning objectives" and " evaluation of trainee g
mastery of the objectives during training."
- 17. =
Finally, the PFS training program provides the standards under which op-erators are to become certified before independently operating equipment important to
' safety.' Specifically, they follow the areas of proficiency testing. An operator must have completed the OJT qualification cards, pass the practical exam, and achieve an 80% or o
' higher on the formal written exam. LA at 7-1. PFS will certify that all personnel are trained as required as part of the PFSF Operational Readiness Review, before receiving
. spent fuel at the PFSF. SAR at 9.2-7.
18.
Further, in accordance with the SAT methodology, the SAR provides for the evaluation of the PFS training program: "the effectiveness of the training, and the training program will be evaluated by reviewing written test performances, performance on walk through evaluations, on-the-job training, and feedback from trainees, supervi-
' sors, and instructors." If at 9.3-2 19.
After initial training, testing, and certification, all PFS employees will re-ceive periodic retraining. All PFS personnel will receive GET retraining - on all GET j
, topics -'at least once every two years. S AR at 9.3-5. PFS employees will also receive job-specific and certification retraining at least once every two years. Topics for retrain-ing will be' selected from initial training, NRC bulletins and information notices, major equipment and procedure changes, relevant industry events, and topics designated by the
. PFSF General Manager or requested by other site personnel. SAR at 9.3-5. PFS elabo-
. rated on the retraining that it would undertake in response to RAI 9-10 as follows:
Retraining and refresher training will be provided at intervals that are ap-propriate to the specific task. Retraining will involve a review of the basic tasks plus special attention to those items within the task which have un-l dergone change. When new equipment is added or modifications in ex-8
O.
I isting equipment of a significant nature are made, procedures will be modified and retraining on the revised procedure and equipment by a -
qualified instructor will be provided to those persons already certified prior to operation of that equipment.
Exhibit 2, Response to RAI 9-10 (May 19,1998).
20.
In summary, PFS has described in detail the specific subject areas and PFSF systems and components on which PFS employees will receive training, defined the process (i.e., the SAT) by which this training is to be implemented, and set forth the requirements and standards for the testing of proficiency and certification of PFSF per-sonnel. The PFS training program more than adequately addresses each of the three NRC requirements specified in 10 C.F.R. Q 72.192 and there is no basis for the State's claim in Utah F that PFS has not submitted or adequately " defined a training and certification pro-gram" for the PFSF.
I 21.
Indeed, the level of detail in the PFSF training program as described in the LA and the SAR is equivalent to, or exceeds, that found in the license applications and safety analysis reports for other ISFSis. Attached as Exhibit 3 to this declaration is the training program included in the Part 72 license application for the ISFSI located at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant; attached as Exhibit 4 is the training program included in the Part 72 license application for the ISFSI located at the Prairie Island Nuclear Gen-erating Plant. As can be seen from reviewing these programs, the level of detail in the NFSF license application on the whole exceeds that found in these two ISFSI applica-i tions. Although both generally referred to using their existing nuclear plant training pro-grams, the development of the training program for ISFSI specific activities in these ap-i plications was generally less than that set forth in the PFSF application. Thus, based on accepted NRC practice, and the SAT principles on which the PFSF training program is based, the training program set forth in the PFSF LA and SAR provides sufficient infor-mation regarding the " training, proficiency testing, and certification ofISFSI... person-nel" to satisfy NRC requirements set forth in 10 C.F.R. 72.192.
9
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22.
In Utah F, the State raises a number of specific alleged deficiencies in the PFS Training Program. I have reviewed each of these assertions and have found none to l-be meritorious. First, the State asserts in basis 1 for Utah F that PFS has failed to submit a " listing of physical conditions that would bar a person from employment in specific po-sitions." However 10 C.F.R. Q 72.194 (Physical requirements) requires no such listing of physical or mental conditions that would bar a person from employment at an ISFSI. It simply requires that "[a]ny condition that might cause impaired judgement or motor co-ordination must be considered in the selection of personnel for activities that are impor-tant to safety." It explicitly goes on to state that "[t]hese conditions need not categori-cally disqualify a person, if appropriate provisions are made to accommodate such de-fect." 10 C.F.R. @ 72.192.
23.
In basis 3 to Utah F, the State asserts that PFS has not shown that the qualifications that will be required of PFSF personnel are sufficient to guarantee that the facility will be operated safely in a number of respects, the first being that neither the General Manager nor the Operators are required to have any experience in dry storage operations. The State's assertion is unfounded, in that the General Manager and the Op-erators will be trained to operate the PFSF safely as described above and moreover, their qualifications will be consistent with the qualifications of similarly situated personnel at nuclear power plants licensed by the NRC as well as those personnel that operate ISFSIs h; censed under Part 72 located at nuclear power plants.
24.
In addition to being trained and certified, the PFS General Manger and op-erators will have sufficient education and experience to operate the PFSF safely. The PFS SAR states that the PFS General Manager will have ten years of" responsible experi-j ence within the nuclear industry" and a bachelor's degree "in an engineering or scientific field generally associated with nuclear power production, fuel storage, or radiation pro-j tection." SAR at 9.1-23 to -24. Furthermore, the General Manager shall be familiar with j
all applicable rules, regulations, codes and procedures. SAR at 9.1-15. Thus the PFS 10
4 General Manager's qualifications will be more than sufficient to ensure that the PFSF is operated safely.
3 25.
Further, prict experience in dry-storage operations per se is not required.
NRC regulations require that the license application include "the technical qualifications, i
including training and experience, of the applicant to engage in the proposed activities."
' 10 C.F.R. 72.28(a). American National Standard N18.1-1971, Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel, f 4.1 (March 1971), states that l
Nuclear power plant personnel shall have that combination of education, experience, health, and skills commensurate with their level of responsi-bility, which provides reasonable assurance that decisions and actions during all normal and abnormal conditions will be such that the plant is operated in a safe and efficient manner Thus the standard does not call for prior experience in the specific jobs that personnel will perform at a plant. The NRC Staff has stated that it accepts the ANSI standard "as
~ [a] source [] for criteria and guidance, as applicable, for ISFSI... training." Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities, NUREG.1567 (Draft, Oct.1996), at 13-7 Indeed, given the greater complexity of operating and maintaining a nuclear power plant compared to that of an ISFSI, application of the ANSI standard for nuclear power
. plants to ISFSIs is conservative.
26.
The ANSI standard continues, regarding plant managers: "At the time of i
initial core loading 'or appointment to the active position, the plant manager shall have ten j
years of responsible power plant experience, of which a minimum of three years shall be nuclear power plant experience." IA 4.2.1.' " Nuclear power plant experience" is de-fined as "that nuclear experience acquired in the design, construction, startup, or opera-tion of nuclear power plants." Id.
4.1. Thus the standard does not call for plant manag-l ers to have specific experience in any single facet of plant operation, but rather that they have sufficient nuclear experience generally to understand plant operations and to make decisions such that the plant is operated in a safe and efficient manner. Moreover, the 10 i
I1 L
I
. g.
years of nuclear experience to be required of the PFSF General Manager substantially exceeds the 3-year minimum required by the ANSI standard.
27.
' Regarding the education of plant operators, the ANSI standard indicates that those plant operators who will not be licensed reactor operators should have a high school diploma ' r equivalent. ANSI N18.1-1971 4.'5.1. Under this standard, non-o licensed operators need not have prior nuclear plant experience or prior experience at the F
specific jobs they'will perform at the plant. PFS operators - who will not be licensed re-actor operators - will have high school diplomas plus four to six years of prior experience in mechanical maintenance. SAR at 9.1-24 to -25 Thus, they will have more experience than c'alled for by the ANSI standard and therefore will be more than sufficiently quali-
' fled to operate the PFSF safely.
28.
Finally, as indicated in paragraph 7, all operators and all personnel who supervise them must be trained and certified. The PFS SAR, as shown above, describes the initial and continuing training programs and how each job and task at the PFSF will be constantly evaluated to ensure the training program is effective. Potential PFSF op-
. erators and the General Manager will have to complete a combination of classroom, OJT, and practical factors to demonstrate their mastery of the tasks they will be required to perform as PFSF operators.
29.
In basis 3 to Utah F, the State asserts further that PFS has not shown that the qualifications that will be required of PFSF personnel are sufficient to guarantee that the facility will be operated' safely, in that the detail ofinstruction courses, training pro-
- grams, or wo' k on simulation facilities is not laid out.
r 30.
The State's assertion is unfounded, in that, as shown above, the PFS SAR does provide sufficient detail regarding the PFS training program. PFS has Aso it forth i
the instruction courses that will be used to train PFS employees. As described it para-graph 8, PFS has specified the subject areas in.which trainees will be instructed. As de-scribed in paragraphs 9-10, PFS has specified that trainees will be instructed on PFSF 12
s;;
i l
procedures and will be trained on actual PFSF equipment. As described in paragraph 9, PFS has specified the format and depth of coverage of the procedures on which trainees l
will be instructed. Further' details are generated through the implementation procedures and are not required to be submitted with the application. Finally, the State's contention
~-
r l
. regarding simulator training is simply irrelevant, in that (as described in paragraph 10 i
above) PFS personnel will not be trained on simulators but rather, at least the initial PFSF personnel, will be trained on actual PFSF equipment prior to the receipt of fuel at the fa-I
- cility.' PFS SAR at 9.2-4 to -5. Therefore, contrary to the State's claim, trainees will l-have successfully manipulated real equipment prior to the receipt of spent nuclear fuel at the PFSF.
31.-
In basis 3 to Utah F, the State asserts further that PFS has not shown that
_ the qualifications that will be required of PFSF personnel are sufficient to guarantee that the facility will be operated safely, in that PFS has not specified any written examinations and operating tests, including the items that would be on such a test. The State's asser-tion is wrong. PFS has specified the examinations and test that will be given to operators before they are certified. As described in paragraphs 16 and 17 above, PFS has described its testing and certification programs. Furthermore, as also described above, PFS has specified the subjects and equipment on which operators are to be trained. Thus, PFS has j
specified the examinations and operating tests that PFSF trainees will take; hence, PFS's submission is sufficient to meet NRC requirements.
32.
In basis 3 to Utah F, the State asserts further that PFS has not shown that the qualifications that will be required of PFSF personnel are sufficient to guarantee that the facility will be operated safely, in that PFS has not specified the terms of qualification and revocation of operator license, provisions for requalification, and enforcement.
33.
This claim is wrong as well. As described in paragraphs 16 and 17 above, PFS has specified the terms for qualification of PFSF operators. Furthermore, as de-scribed in paragraph 19 above, at least once every two years all PFS employees will be j
retrained generally and operators will receive certification retraining. The SAR also i
I 13
1 F.
l; j
l t
states specifically that personnel failures during operational testing, which is part of the l
operator certification program, will result in " additional training, reeaining, or dismissal of personnel." SAR at 9.215. Thus, PFS has in fact specified the terms of qualification and requalification of PFSF operators and the means of enforcement of PFS training re-quirements.
34.
Furthermore, PFS will constantly evaluate its training program and the performance ofits employees in order to correct any deficiencies that might develop.
Page 9.3-2 of the SAR states,"[t]he training program depends on a constant evaluation of the job or task to be performed, the work environment, and the training provided, to de-l termine whether the program is effective in producing and maintaining competent em-ployees. Data from these evaluations are used to identify and correct deficiencies and to accommodate changing needs." The SAR commits PFS to the ongoing evaluation ofits training program; this is the final step in the SAT. The Evaluation phase of the SAT en-sures that the PFS training program is dynamic and maintains its effectiveness by evalu-t ating the operator's performance with written and practical evaluations at a minimum of every two years. This methodology ensures that any change in operator proficiency or knowledge that is training-related will require a change in the training program'. Also, ongoing evaluation will require reviewing the training process to ensure that it is effec-tive in maintaining qualification and certification of PFS personnel.
I 35.-
In basis 3 to Utah F, the State asserts further that PFS has not shown that j
the qualifications that will be required of PFSF personnel are sufficient to guarantee that j
the facility will be operated safely, in that PFS merely states that "each member of the site staffinvolved with important to safety activities will be required to meet the mini-
= mum qualifications of the License," without stating those qualifications and how they l
l will assure the public health and safety.
36.
The State overlooks important material in the PFS SAR. SAR section 9.4 states that "all personnel involved in activities important to safety will be trained on the associated procedures prior to conducting the activity.... Personnel performing activi-14 L.
n7 1
l l
i i
- ties important to safety will be certified to perform such functions and will undergo re-fresher training and testing a minimum of every two years." SAR at 9.4-5. Those per-sonnel will go through the PFS training program described above, including its testing j
and certification programs. Furthermore, in the implementation of the PFS training pro-L gram, the SAT will identify those critical tasks important to operator, site, and public health and safety. Personnel involved in activities important to safety will be trained on
- those tasks and will be certified and reevaluated at least once every two years to ensure proficiency. Nuclear industry accredited training facilities follow this same methodology to ensure that site personnel are qualified and the health and safety of the public is main-tained at and around nuclear facilities.
37.
In basis 3 to Utah F, the State asserts further that PFS has not shown that the qualifications that will be required of PFSF personnel are adequate, in that PFS promises " Programs for additional site familiarization training and ongoing training and J
retraining" without stating the specific details of the training program and the minimum passing grade for certification.
38.
Contrary to the State's claim, PFS has indeed described the process by which PFSF employees, including operators, will receive training and be certified subse-quent to receiving their initial training (see paragraph 19). Retraining will ae conducted by means similar to those used to conduct initial training and on subjects similar to those dn which initial training was conducted, but, consistent with the SAT process. PFS will
. continuously reevaluate its training program to ensure that it is flexible and best imparts j
to PFSF operators the knowledge and skills necessary to operate the PFSF safely. Re-garding certification grades, the PFS trammg program meludes (as indicated in para-graphs 16-17) details such as the minimum passing grade for written exams (80%) and L
the standards for evaluating trainee performance on the OJT and practical factors j
(pass / fail)c Furthermore, during the implementation of the PFS training program, course -
descriptions and outlines will be written and derived, by following the Systematic Ap-
. proach to Training, that will provide greater detail related to initial, familiarization, certi-4 15
7, I
l i6 fication and qualification, and continuing training for all PFSF technical disciplines. As reflected by the Calvert Cliffs and Prairie Island ISFS1 applications, Exhibits 3 and 4, those course descriptions and outlines, as products of the implementation of the training program, do not need to be submitted with the license application. The State is simply calling for a level of detail that is not required at the license application stage.
39.
In basis 3 to Utah F, the State asserts further that PFS has not shown that the qualifications that will be required of PFSF personnel are sufficient to guarantee that the facility will be operated safely, in that specific operational tests are stated on SAR 9.2-5 without indicating the minimum terms for passing the course. The State's claim is baseless and simply ignores what the PFS LA and SAR says about the examination and 1
certification of PFS employees on OJT and practical factors. As described in paragraphs 16-17, the PFS training program sets forth both formal testing requirements, tied to spe-cific passing examination grades as well as OJT requirements. The SAT to be followed by PFS requires that training objectives are written at the right cognitive and psychomo-tor level to ensure that the trainee has mastered the necessary knowledge or ability upon completion of the evaluation phase of training. Each training objective will include a condition, a behavior to be demonstrated, and a standard for mastery. OJTs, JPMs, prac-tical factors, written exams, oral exams are written from the training objectives. Again, as stated above, the PFS License Application states that "OJT requirements will be d,ocumented in a set of Qualification Cards containing the Job Performance Measures of practical factors that are required to be performed by the Operator. Each person to be-come certified must have these Qualification Cards completed prior to being allowed to i
independently perform the applicable tasks." LA at 7-1. Therefore, PFS has specified how it will derive performance measures for operational tests and how it will evaluate trainees against those performance measures.
40.
In short, the various claims raised by the State in its basis 3 to Utah F are without merit. Throughout this basis, the State is seeking more detail than that required by the NRC regulations at the license application stage, as is reflected by the Calvert 16
4 Cliffs and Prairie Island ISFSI training programs attached as Exhibits 3 and 4 to this declaration. There are sound reasons why such detail is not required at the license appli-cation stage. Among other reasons, the equipment on which training would be required has not yet been acquired. Nor are the procedures on which training would be required developed, or required to be developed, at the license application stage; such procedures are not written until plant staff are on board. Moreover, as a practical matter, it is desir-able to have the plant manager and other senior staffinvolved in preparing the curriculum and other detailed aspects for the implementation of the training program.
41.
In Utah P, the State contends that the Applicant has failed to describe a fully developed radiation protection program that ensures ALARA occupational expo-sures to radiation by not " adequately describing a training program that insures all per-sonnel" who direct activities or work directly with radioactive materials or areas are ca-pable of evaluating "the significance of radiation doses in terms of potential risk, includ-ing outlines of the training classes." I have reviewed the PFS application with respect to training for radiation protection and have determined that the information in the applica-tion is more than adequate at this, the license application stage. A fully developed Ra-diation Protection Training program, as alleged by the State, need not be described in the SAR. In particular, an outline of courses is a level of detail that far exceeds that required at the license application stage. The training information provided in the PFS SAR is suf-ficient for purposes of the application.
42.
In the SAR, PFS has committed to implementing a Radiation Protection Program in accordance with 10 C.F.R. Q@ 72.126,20.1011, and 19.12, and an ALARA program following the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 20 and the guidelines of NRC Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10. SAR at 7.1-1 to -3. These provisions to which PFS has committed require instruction in the significance of radiation dose. For example,10 C.F.R. Q 19.12(a) calls for instruction in "the health protection problems associated with exposure to radiation." Further, the SAR expressly provides that "PFSF personnel will be trained and updated on ALARA practices and dose reduction techniques to assure that 17
,=
u b
a each individual understands and follows procedures to maintain his/her dose ALARA."
Id. at 7.1-3. Further, during General Employee Training, all PFSF personnel will be -
trained in "[t]he nature and sources of radiation and contamination, interactions of radia-
. tion with matter, biological effects of radiation, methods of detecting and controlling ra-diation and contamination, ALARA concepts, facility access and visitor controls, decon-tamination procedures, use of monitoring and personal protective equipment, regulatory
. and administrative exposure and contamination limits, and site specific hazards." SAR at
~
9.3-3. Thus, PFS has committed to, and has made provision for, educating PFSF person-nel in radiation safety, including the significance of radiation dose. The SAT will pro-vide further detail in the implementation of this training.
43.
In conclusion, the PFS training program meets the requirements of the law.
as stated in 10 C.F.R. 72.192. The specific details of course outlines, program de-scriptions, exams, objectives, OJTs and practical factors will be written and rewritten as PFS uses the SAT to implement its training program. The details submitted in the Private -
Fuel Storage Safety Analysis Report exceed what 10 C.F.R. Q 72.192 requires.
I declare under penalty and perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
~
. Executed on Junel1,1999.-
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MichyfJ. Ladd 18 L
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