ML20196D215
| ML20196D215 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 02/09/1988 |
| From: | Traficonte J MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| CON-#188-5588 OL-1, NUDOCS 8802170053 | |
| Download: ML20196D215 (12) | |
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'88 FEB 11 P5 :29 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0FFICE GF 5ECht!A 1Y 00CMETim a SEuvict ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARbRANCH Before Administrative Judges ggN Alan S.
R0.senthal, Chairman Thomas S. Moore Howard A. Wilber for the Appeal Board a.so.s%
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SecreQry tothe AppealBoard
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IN THE MATTER OF
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Docket Nos.
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5 0- 4 4 3-O L-1 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
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5 0 - 4 4 4 -Q L-1
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(Off-Site Emergency
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Planning and Safety (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
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Issues)
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February 9, 1988
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ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES M. SHANNON'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION a
On January 7, 1988, the Massachusetts Attorney General
("Mass AG') filed with this Board a Motion for Directed Certification seeking interlocutory review of certain orders of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ('ASLB").
On February 4, 1988, this Board denied that motion on the single ground that it was untimely filed.
Se Mass AG now seeks reconsideration of this decision.
In support of this motion, the Mass AG states:
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The legal. issues presented in the original motion are central issues in the ongoing proceedings on the adequacy of emergency planning.
Moreover, the-standard of adequacy to be applied by the NRC to emergency preparedness is'a matter'of substantial concern not only to those contemplating, reviewing, defending and attacking existing emergency plans but to the general public as well.
2.
Uncertainty regarding the proper interpretation of the "reasonable assurance" standard of planning adequacy set forth at 10 C.F.R.
S 50.47 (a)(1) has continued to affect the ongoing adjudication of the adequacy of the NHRERp.
Specifically, counsel for FEMA has indicated on the record that that agency is not certain how to interpret the adequacy standard applied by the NRC.
Transcript at pp. 8540 - 8543 attached as Exhibit 1.1#
(See also pages 8551 - 8556.)
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As a consequence, FEMA was not prepared to submit and Hefend its pre-filed testimony of September 1987 when hearings resumed on January 11, 1988.
FEMA filed Supplemental T 'timony on January 25, 1988.
In response to this filing the NR, Staff moved during telephone conferences on January 27 and 28, 1988 I
l to defer further evidentiary hearing on sheltering issues until l
the State of New Hampshire files a response to the FEMA
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supplemental filing and FEMA again files its testimony.
This motion was granted by the ASLB on February 3, 1988.
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The-Mass-AG's_ delay in filing _its Motion for Directed Certification was not in any manner an effort to delay or artificially extend these proceedings.1/
In fact, the Mass'AG decided at some point in light of the evolving scheduling posture of the proceeding that a fuller development of the issues in its motion was more important than an immediate filing.1 4.
Finally, assuming that-the standards for interlocutory review have been net, there is nothing gained from deferring judgment on the issue until an appeal under 10 C.F.R 2.762.
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One attorney was responsible for this motion.
That attorney was present in New Hampshire and actively participating (including cross-examining witnesses) during the two hearing weeks that were held between November 18 and January 7, 1988.
Further, Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Years holidays occurred in the intervening period.
- Finally, the argumants presented in the Motion to Certify at pages 22 througn 32 represent, at least to the author, a large amount of further research and analysis in comparison to the Mass AG's filing of October 15, 1987.
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Obviously, this judgment was incorrect.
Although in mid-November 1987 it appeared that these hearings might conclude before the end of January 1988, by mid-December it was clear that rebuttal testimony on ETEs as well as the presentation of the sheltering portion of the case would push these proceedings into February, 1988.
The present much more extended delay did not become apparent until after January 11, 1988.
The Mass AG was looking prospectively, and perhaps without good grounds, to the time still available for hearings in the event this Board granted interlocutory review and reversed the ASLB and not retrospectively to the time already past since November 18, 1987.
In fact, the Mass AG interpreted tna requirement that such motions be timely filed in this way assuming that sn objective test of actual impact on the proceeding would be applied to the issue of timeliness.
- Again, tnis was incorrect.
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'This is particularly.so in light of the present delay in the hearings on the sheltering issue which affords ample time for scheduling'the disputed testimony in the event the ASLB has
. erred.
For all the' reasons set forth above,.this Board should reconsider its denial of the Mass AG's Motion for Directed Certification and permit interlocutory review of the ASLB's orders of November 16 and 18, 1987.
Respectfully submitted, ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES M. SHANNON
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ohn Traficont Assistant Attorney General duelear Safety Unit t
v/' Department of the At*orney General One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108 (617) 727-3393 DATED:
February 9, 1988 0537n:EJK/ JCT U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION... ATCHIC SAFETY AFD
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Docket 1091M9gg$2-OLA -
FHILA. ELEC. CO.
Linerick Can.Sts. Uni t 1.
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N TO THE LICENSEE'S PCTIM % TifK
- 1NTERVEUOR ROBERT L. AFTHONY'S OPPOSITIO AL FACTS" FOR THE ABOVE AMENDMENT TO THE LIHERICK LICENSE. AND RE j
JUDCHENT fc
[.L lu r WedonotacceptPECo'sversionof"maM,ab/d/tsasto NEW RELEVANT REPORTS j
which there is r.o genuine issue to be heard ".
We set forth below our rebuttal of r
many of the points and the irrelevance of most of the others in PECo's statement. We k
on the iodine spikes issue and PECo's otso call attention to two reports which bear
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itability to protect the public under the present /ECo monitoring and response systems.
.f 11/23/87, "TECHNICAL EVALUATION The first was forwarded to us in a letter f rom NRC, REPORT for the EVALUATION OF ODCH REVISION 4,(PECo -Limerick), published by Idaho 4
The second National Engineering Laboratory, May 1987, prepared for NRC, Washington."
k report is, "A RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR P0tlER PLANT J
land Public Health Fund, Dr.Jonathon Berger, Exec.Sec., Advisory Board, Decem We include excerpts f rom the Idaho report as Attachment i 1 and excerpts frca the TM1 The former casts doubt on PECo' ability to properly measure report as Attachment #2.
or calculate radiation doses from Limerick routine releases of radioactive effluents ;
the latter questions the ability of nuclear power plants, including Limerick,to monitor These two reports er react to radioactive releases either inside or outside ele plant.
' change the whole perspective on PECo's iodine spikes amendment in such a drastic way that the Board should postpone any further consideration of the amendment until these has been a new period of time set aside for discovery and investigation and a hearing on thase new f actors which call into question PECo's ability to safeguard the public from iodine and other radioactive releases. From the outset it is obvious t Board should take no esove to reduce the requirements on iodinc spike reporting,rather, furtheUs(udyshouldbecarriedoutontighteningetandardsofmonitoring,response 85-19, 9/27/85, control. In cas'e' there is any doubt as to the purpose of Generic Letter No.
in' the second paragraph in connection with "primary coolant iodine spikes"NRC states We have determined that the reporting requirements for iodine spiking can be (Esp. a 4
included in the Annual Report.'
l reduced from a short term report...to an item...
l I
REBITI""AL OF PEC0"STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS" We do not accept PECo's assertionthat "there is no genuine issue to be heard"Lu relation to the the supposed f acts which PEco l
l We ask the Board to consider the following in PECo's statement:
submitted 11/23/87.
l 1.and 2. The Literick release limits do not protect the public properly because they
} ars based on boundaries beyond the railroad,so limits and effluent repors are skewed.
- 3. & 4. We have seen no evidence from NRC to back up these assertions.
5.- 8. We have seen no figures from PEco or NRC to support these figures, but in
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any event they do not respond to the issue,which odiue spikes not averages.
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-o cr n We do not necessarily dispute thess itens but they are also not relevant 10-15.
iodine spikes which oight causo surges of releases j
, ts the he Ords te the public froe of radioactivity to the public without staf f action or isscediate registration or alarm f,i inadequate monitoring or limits based on erroneous site bondaries.
due to 16.--21. We do not question that the reporting procedures exist but they are based I!
on criteria which do not provide an immediate response, presumably plant shut down, to levels of radioactive iodine which could cause severe damage to children walking along the railroad right of way or workers there.
i It may be true that the design basis for iodine levels in the coolant
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l 223-- 25.
I would be effective in shutting the plant in case of a steamline break and implementa-tion of the emergency plan,but we assert that monitoring of releases should be con-(
tinuous and should not only be tied to stack release levcis but should alarm the sta-tion staf f via continuing monitor registration of on-site and of f-site instruments which J
could alert the operators to dangerous 1svels of radioactivity from an accident like 4j Chernobyl or THI, or a nuclear bomb accident, to which Limerick could add a lethal leverage.
As we showed above PECo's statement provides a partial and inaccurate t
CONCLtJSION.
k view of the situation involved with PEco's request to reduce the requirements to pro-tect the public from the consequences of iodine spikes.
The Idaho report raises basic 1
doubts on PECo's dose calculation methods,to the extent that as a minumum the Board should postpone any action on the amendment until af ter the date of PECO's response i
j to the conclusions on"major discrepancies" and "addit.ional discrepancies" in the Idaho I
report. This date is 4/1/88.
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The TH1 report,(N17.#2) reconneeds new methods of monitorin;; within the reactor for more building and outside and a coordination of all information sources in order P
L adequate protection of the public by immediate response to dangerous radioactive levels.
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We do not suggest that these changes can be implemented in relation to the iodine spikes amendment,but we believe she Board will find a study of the report imparative before it acts on the amendrent. We move that the Board set a period for discovery on the contents of the THI Fund study with depositions f rom the Public Health Fund Advisory We move also that the Board set up a hearint af ter the discovery
,N Board and experts.
period to take testimony on the adequacy of Limerick monitoring and dose calculation and release limits,as to whether the public is presently protected under the Limerick operating license 3 Cc: NRC Docketing, Staff, PECo.
Respectfully submitted, drhe Ps + t.
Box 166, Moylan,Pa.19065-
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EGG-PHY-7712 s
A TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT
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for the EVALUATION OF ODCM REVISION 4 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
'y' LIMERICK GENERATING STATION
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NRC Docket NO 50-352 NRC LICENSE NO. NPF-39
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I W. Serrano T. S. Bohn s
Published May 1987
!daho National Engineering Laboratory EG6G Idaho, Inc.
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I Prepared for the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C. 20555 Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-761001570 FIN No. D6034 Y
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CONCLUSIONS The licensee's 00CM, including all revisions through Revision 4, for the Limerick Generating Station was reviewed, it was determined that the 1
00CM uses methods that are, in general, consistent with the guidelines of
<l MUREG-0133. However, it is recommen 6d that another revision to the 00CM be submitted to address and correct the numerous discrepancies identifie:f in the review.
3-l The following are considered to be major discrepancies:
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Section 11.A the value for A, the cooling tower blowdown flow, j
o should be defined as the actual value at the time of ' discharge.
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,r-q Section 11.B, the definition for F1 must be modified to read I
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.... Defined as the ratio of the maximum undiluted liquid waste flow during release to the average dilution flow during the
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reporting period." The average dilution flow can be adjusted to ip 1000 ft /sec as allowed in Section 4.3 of NUREG-0133 as long as 3
the Schuylkill River can maintain the dilution flow during the reporting period. The adjustment is allowed for plants with, cooling towers to consider the effects of near-field dilution in the receiving body of water. IIithout this adjustment the, s calculated doces could exceed the dose limits of the technical specifications for liquid radwaste releases.
Section !!!.C ci the ODCM only includes the grass-goat-milk o
ingestion pathway.
It is not clear why the inhalation, n. cat, and vegetation pathways are not included.
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anset of decay is common to radionuclidas produced by wecpons testing.
Probably the mest important of those cro th0 lodina radioistopes: I-131 (8d), I-132 (2.26h), I-133 (20.3h),
I-134 (52m), I-135 (6.68h), and I-129 (1.7 x 10 y).
Other important 7
radionuclides include the noble gases, all of plant-produced than a few which (except Kr-85 (10.7y)) ha7e half-lives shorter days.
Currently, weapons fallout contains very little Sr-89 is essentially all strontium-90 (28y), and has a very (50.5d),
small strontium-89/90 ratio.
A comparatively high strontium-89/90 ratio is characteristic of radionuclides from plant
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emissions or fallout from a plant accident such as Chernobyl f
(Whalig, et al. 1987 ).
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Radionuclides produced by nuclear plants and having somewhat longer half
- lives, which are virtually absent from N
weapons
- fallout, include:
Sr-89 (51.7d);
Cs-134 (2.04y);
and 31:
4 such as Co-58 (?l.3d), Co-60 (5.26y), Cr-51
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corrosion products (27.8d) and Mn-54 (303d).
(Radiocesium remaining in fallout
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today (1987) is essentially all cesium-137.)
Radioactive include those resulting f rom irradiation products in the reactor of the dissolved or suspended corrosion products from piping gaskets and other structural elements.
The most important of chromium, iron, and manganeee these are radioisotopes of cobalt, (Whalig, et al., (a) 1987).
The radionuclides most likely to be released from in either normal operation or accident con-nuclear power plants, l
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N. Assonsm 1 nf Actual orcndTuy-Populations Potontini Dosps to Groups l measurements should con, Both in-plant and environmentadionuclide dese a Together radiation tribute to radiation and ra integrated well a could provide measurements these m varning and assessment progra. In-plant Monit_oring should monitoring systems and 11guld effluent for planned and unplanned l Gaseous warning real-time in monitor on-line improvements an provide Recommended nt hardening (l a, releases. radionerclidefrequency of sampling, and equipme diation fields) placement, to high temperatures and raproblems b resistance equipment capability to detect Plant personnel or would upgrade plant environment. with h active releases could reach t e data this in-plant I integrate tr agency should site-specific meteorologic in e - independent ate an the on-line meteorologic data, sment models to obtain an accur and pretations, and the dose asses affected populations risk and dose of potential estimate ecosystems. ing i Fixed Off-Site Network Monitor and in TLDs increase recommended trarsmission the implemented, data and remote If improved placement assessment. The adequate dosimetric and the
- PICS, would provide capability,
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icn retrospactiva valuo, whilo the fectmmand;d TLD n twork hos would provide real-time on-line warning and dose chambers (PICS) Thus, the fixed in-plant and fixed off-site networks
- cssessment.
would provide a predictive, retrospective, and real-time popula-tion dose assessment capability. n Off-Site Environmental Monitoring 1 If a gap in the in-plant and off-site fixed systems ? the ex-the emission of undetected radionuclides, should permit tensive environmental sampling network would provide the neces-and emission locations, fallout sary data on specific nuclides, Environmental samples could reveal and varied exposure pathways. Environmental monitor-which isotope is involved in an exposure. ing of bioaccumulators and local food and water sources would U provide the back-up data for regarding immediate and long-term M presence of particulates, lodine, and noble gas radionuclides. Selected animals and individuals should be monitored for dos i' assessment. If the frequency and location of bioaccumulator envir-sampling were sufficient to provide dosimetric coverage, ~a onmental monitoring would provide the program with an independent retrospective back-up system that would function without electric 'f power. ? 0' ,\\ '\\ - gt g*
COLnE n: thNHC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '88 F0911 P5 :29' ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD OHItt u. 57 m 00CMETun;6 3tygg.7- ) BRANcq In the Matter of ) ) PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL-1 NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. ) 50-444-OL-1 ) (Seabrook Station, Units 1 ) (Onsite Emergency Planning and 2) ) and Safety Issues) ) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that, on this 10th day of February, 1988, I mailed a copy (first page only) of the Appeal Board's denial by stamp endorsement of "Attorney Genercl James M. Shannon's Motion for Reconsideration," dated February 9, 1988, to each of the following: Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., Esq. John Traficonte Ropes & Gray Assistant Attorney General 225 Franklin Street Nuclear Safety Unit Boston, MA 02110 Department of the Attorney General Docketing & Service Branch One Ashburton Place, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 19th Floor Commission Boston, MA 02108 Washington, DC 20555 Diane Curran, Esq. Robert A. Backus, Esq. Harmon & Weiss Backus, Meyer & Solomon Suite 430 116 Lowell Street 2001 S Street, N.W. P.O. Box 516 Washirgton, DC 20009 Manchester, NH 03105 Paul McEachern, Esq. Sherwin E. Turk, Esq. Matthew T. Brock, Esq. Counsel for NRC Staff Shaines & McEachern Office of the General 25 Maplewood Avenue Counsel /Bethesda P.O. Box 360 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Portsmouth, NH 03801 Commission Washington, DC 20555 C,b4Naeb C. Je g Sh6emaker Secretary to the Appeal Board DSo.2}}