ML20196A753
| ML20196A753 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1988 |
| From: | George Thomas PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| NYN-88154, NUDOCS 8812060100 | |
| Download: ML20196A753 (7) | |
Text
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George S. Thomas 1
Vu heWoeN Nuch hoducMon l
Pubtc Service of New HampsNro NYN. 88154 New Hampshiro Yankee Division November 30, 1988 i
f United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555 Attentions Document Control Desk i
References:
(a)
Facility Operating License No. NPF-56, Docket No. 50-443 (b)
PSNH Letter (SBN-1211) dated October 9, 1986, '10CFR 50.59 Evaluations
- G. S. Thomas to V. S. Noonan Subjects 10 CFR 50.59 Quarterly Report
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Gentlemen:
Enclosed please find the Quarterly Report of 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations for Seabrook Station.
T7.is report covers the period of July 1, 1988, to Saptember 30, 1988, and is being submitted pursuant to the reporting requirements outlined in Reference (b).
Should fou require further information regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Richard R. Belanger at (603) 474 9574 extension 4048.
Very truly yours.
d Georg
. Thomas Encloture cc Mr. Victor Nerses Projec'. Manager Project Directorate I.3 Division of Reactor Projects United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission c
Washington, DC 20555 m
Mr. William T. Russell o$
Regional Administrator QQ-United states Nuclear Regulatory Comission r wa Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 O
Hr. David G. Ruscitto 4
NRC Senior Resident Inspector N
Seabrook Station M
Seabrook, NH 03874 A
coo.c 4
P.O. Box 300. Seabrook. NH 03874. Telephone (603) 474 9574 l
l ENCLOSURE TO NYN-88154 SEABROOK STATION 10 CFR 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATIONS QUARTERLY REPORT Ju.y 1,1988 to Septeraber 30, 1988 1.
DesiRn ChanRes The below listed design changes have been made at Seabrook Station and safety evaluations have been performed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
Design Coordination Report Number 86-341
Title:
Installation of Instrument Air System Dew Point Monitors Description To assist in monitoring the dew point requirements for the Instrument Air System, continuous reading dew point nonitor/ recorders were installed on the A and B *nstrument Air (IA) System loops. These monitor / recorders have an alarm capability to indicate when a high dew point has becn I
reached in either of the two IA loops.
The monitor / recorders are classified as non-safety related/non-seismic.
r Concluwlon A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it has bnen determined that this enange will not create any unreviewed safety concerns. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Design Coordination Report: Number 86-714
Title:
Freeze Protection of Main Steam Drain Lines l
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Description:==
This Design Coordination Report was initia*ed to add heat tracing to four lines in the Main steam Drain System. These lines are exposed to the elements and are subject to freezing. The addition of the heat tracing will not affect the design function of the main steam drain lines, but will i
eliminate the possibility of fracaing. The Main Steam Drain System is non-safety related.
A review of the additional electrical loads added to panel l
HT.CP-427 has indicated that they will not exceed the panel capacity.
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Conclusion:==
A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it has been deternined that this change will not create any unreviewed safety concerns.
Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by t
means of a future amendment.
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Design Coordination Report: Number 87.071
Title:
Hotor Operated Valve Limit Switch Rewiring
!)escription:
As a result of recent testing that was performed to support the requirements of I. E.Bulletin 85-03 (Motor-operated Valve Common Mode Failures), a problem with the 'open' torque bypass switch setting was identified.
The Motor Operated Valve Analysis and Test System (HOVATS) recommends thac the 'close-to-open" torque bypass switch setting be in the range of 20 to 252 of the valve open stroke. When the torque bypass switch is set at this setting, an inaccurate valve position is indicated on the main control board.
To correct the problem with the valve position indication, the
'open' torque bypass switch was rewired to a separate rotor in the motor operator. This change dot not affect any other controls in the valve control circuit and is only applicable to those valves identified in I. E. Bulletin 85 03.
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Conclusion:==
A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it has been determined that this change i
will not create any unreviewed safety concerns. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Design Coordination Report Number 87-166
Title:
Containment Ventilation Isolation Actuation Alarm
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Description:==
During a review of the Containment Ventilation System, it was identified that a Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI) that was initiated by a containment radiation monitor signal may not be readily identifiable as to the cause. A human factors review was performed and resulted in a new annunciator circuit for CVI Train A and Train B.
The new circuit also included individual Train A and Train B inputs to the Main Plant Computer System. The signals to the alare circuits are obtained from 8.solated outputs from the safeguards cabinet and will have no effect on the operation of the Containment Ventilation Isolation.
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Conclusion:==
A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it has been determined that this change will not create any unreviewed safety concerns.
Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
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l Design Coordination Report Number 87-401 1
Title:
Orifices for Cooling Tower Direct Recirculation Lines Description - Pstt 1:
The Service Water Cooling Tower pumps each have a tecirculation line from the pump discharge through a butterfly recirculation valve and back to the cooling tower basin.
This line was originally designed to be used during full flow tower i
testing.
It was identified that, as an enhancement to the Cooling Tower, this flow path could be used for deicing (during the winter months) and to recirculate the basin (during the summer months).
To implement this expanded use of the cooling tower recirculation lines, a flow orifice was installed downstream oJ each of the two recirculation valves.
The need for the flow orifice was identified during startup when extended operation of the butterfly recirculation valve in the throttled position caused cavitation damage in a downstream spool piece. The orifice plate was sized to reduce pipe line turbulence to i
acceptable levels while verif ying pump tanout did not occur.
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Conclusion:==
A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it has been determined that this change will not create any unreviewed safety concerns. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Description - Part 2:
To support of the addition of orifices in the Service l
Water Cooling Tower pump recirculation lines, it was identified that the closing atroke times for the recirculation valves must be increased. With the previous design, the butterfly recirculation valves were throttled partially open. With the addition of the new orifices, the valves are operated at a greater opening and therefore the valves have a greater distance to travel to the closed position.
t to support the requirements for the faster closing times, larger Cisss 1E motor operators were installed on the recirculation valves. A review was performed to verify that the increased loading on the unit substation and Dierel Generator was acceptable.
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Conclusion:==
A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performsd for this design change and it has been determined that this change will not create any unreviewed safety concerns. Changes to the Final l
Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future l
amendment.
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Design Coordination Report Number 87-428
Title:
Fire Detector Replacement in the Control Room
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Description:==
The Main Control Room kitchen area fire detector is an ionization-type fire detector and is subject to alarming due to smoke caused by cooking. To reduce the number of spurious fire alarms in the control room, the ionization-type fire detector was replaced with a thermal detector. The replacement of the ionization detector with a thermal detector does not reduce the original level of fire protection for the control room. The applicable NFPA, ANI, BTP and 10 CFR 50 Appendix R criteria are met by this design change.
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Conclusion:==
A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design change and it has been determined that this change vill not create any unreviewed safety concerns. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
Design Coordination Report:
Number 88-25 l
Title:
Jacket Coolant Pressure Switches
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Description:==
The Diesel Generator Coolant System has two control pressure switches that receive their input from the same pressure tap.
The first switch, the Diesel Generator Jacket Coolant System Pressure Switch (CPS), functions as a backup to the tachometer relay and is set to close at a pressure that correlates to a diesel engine speed of 375 RPM. The second switch, the Jacket Coolant Low Pressure Switch (CPLA), controls four way solenoid valves to align and start the auxiliary coolant pump to supply jacket coolant in the event of low pressure.
This Design Coordination Report relocated the pressure tap to a point in the Jacket Coolant System that had a higher operating pressure.
The original tap location only had a 4 psig differential between the static head pressure and the operating pressure.
The new location will allow the system to operate as the manufacturer intended.
Conclusion A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was,erformed for this design change and it has been determined ti this change vill no.
create any unreviewed safety concern-Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
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Design Coordination Report: Number 88-064
Title:
Seismic Monitor 1-SM-XR-6707 Relocation
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Description:==
This Design Coordination Report was initiated to relocate seismic monitor 1-SH-XR-6707 to an area where it will be less susceptible to moisture damage.
The monitor was located in the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) 25 foot elevation near Service Water piping that develops condensation during the.ummer months.
The s91smic monitor is intended to measure floor acceleration of the Component Cooling Water pumps. The new location on the East side of the PAB is still located in the rigid floor area of the Component Cooling Water pumps.
Conclusion A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was perfctmed for this design change and it has been determined that this change will not create any unreviewed safety concerns. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
2.
Temporary Hodifications No temporary modifications thr4t required a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation were made during this reporting quarter.
3.
Technical Requirements Manual No changes were made to the Technical Requitements Manual during this reporting period.
4.
Zigel Safety Analysis Report The below listed Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) change was made and a safety evaluation was performed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
FSAR Change Number Number 88-052
Title:
Secondary Chemistry control Parameters
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Description:==
Westinghouse Electric Corporatien submitted updated secondary chemistry contro) parametet guidelines for control of the secondary system chemistry.
The recommendations have no impact on the facility description, but will require changes to Station procedures.
The latest Westinghouse chemistry recommendations will improve secondary plant performance and reliability.
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Conclusion:==
A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design chant.e and it has been determined that this change will not create any unreviewed safety concerns. Changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report will be incorporated by means of a future amendment.
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5.
Procedure Changes Procedure changes require review and approval by the Station Operating Review Consnittee (SORC) and are subject to the requirements of 10 CFR50.59 safety evaluation.
Procedure Numbers:
Operating Procedures OS 1001.01 and OS 1001.02 l
Title:
Draining and Filling / Venting the Reactor Coolant System
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Description:==
Draining or fill / venting the Reactor Coolant System (RC) are l
normal shutdown evolutions following cooldown or prior to i
hestup of the reactor plant. These operations are a routine part of preparing for core refueling or performing maintenance on reactor coolant pressure boundary components during cold shutdown conditions.
It was identified that during RC loop partial draindown and refill in Mode 5, certain instruments would be required to be isolated during the evacuation sequence to prevent over-ranging. Reactor Coolant pressure transmitters RC-PT-403 and 405 are instruments that fall in this category.
The cold I
shutdown functions of these instruments involve low temperature over-pressure protection (1. TOP) and automatic closure of the Residual Heat Removal (RH) pump suction valves.
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t To support the isolation of the Reactor Coolant pressure transmittsrs RC-PT-403 and 405, tv, Operating Procedures (Reactor Coolant System Evacuation Fill and Vent and Draining
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the Resctor Coolant System) were revised.
The two main i
functions of the pressure transmitters were reviewed. The low temperature over-pressure protection (1. TOP) function was established in accordance with Technical Specification requirements using the Residual Heat Removal System pump
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suction relief valves. The second function, the signal for automatic closure uf the Residual Heat Removal (RH) pump suction valves, will be isolated and would prevent automatic closure should a high pressure condition be created in the RC/RH systems. However, this auto. closure feature is prov!ded as a backup to administrative operator actions to prevent i
expcsure of the RH system to RC operating pressures above RH design pressure and, therefore, is nos required during loop draindown conditions.
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Conclusion:==
A 10 CPA 50.59 safety evaluation was performed for this design j
change and it has been determined that this change vill not create any unreviewed safety concerns.
6.
Test or Experiments There were no test or experiments performed during this reporting period that require evaluations in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.
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