ML20195G735
| ML20195G735 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1987 |
| From: | Herdt A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20195G739 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-87-57, 50-425-87-38, NUDOCS 8711130263 | |
| Download: ML20195G735 (3) | |
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4 ENCLOSURE 1 NOTICE OF VIOLATION Georgia Power Company Docket No. 50-424 Vogtle License Nos NPF-68 During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on September 21-25, 1987, violations of NRC requirements were identified.
The violations involved failure to test the diesel generators in accordance with Technical Specification surveillance requirements and failure to report nonvalid diesel generator failures.
In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1986), the violations are listed below:
A.
Yogtle Technical Specification (TS) 4.8.1.1.2.a and Table 4.8-1 require that each diesel generator (DG) shall be demonstrated operable on a staggered test basis once per seven days if the number of failures in the last 20 valid tests is greater than or equal to two.
The associated test frequency shall be maintained until seven consecutive failure free demands have been perfonned and the number of failures in the last 20 valid demands has been reduced to one.
Technical Specification 4.0.2 requires that each surveillance requirement shall be perfortned within the specified time interval.
Contra ry to the above, the licensee failed to meet the above TS surveillance requirements as follows:
1.
Diesel generator 1A (DGIA) had a valid failure on August 24, 1987, (overspeed trip due to malfunction of the mechanical governor) which was the second failure in 15 valid tests since completion of the DGIA reliability testing during the preoperational test program.
The mechanical governor was replaced and the DG successfully tested on August 26, 1987. However, DGIA remained on the once per 31 days test interval (instead of once per seven days) going to the required increased test interval of from August 26, 1987 until September ?4,1987.
DG1A was therefore, considered to be technically inoperable from September 4-24,1987 (period that the surveillance time interval had been exceeded).
The next surveillance test was performed successfully on September 24, 1987, 2.
When Unit 1 entered operational Mode 4 on Tebruary 20,1987, both DGs were required to be operable.
At that time, DG1B had had three failures in nine valid tests since completion of DG1B reliability testing.
However, DG1B remained on the once per 31 days test l
interval (instead of the required test interval of once per seven l
days) from February 21, 1987 until September 29, 1987.
DG1B was i
therefore, considered to be technically inoperable at various times during the above period.
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Georgia Power Company 2
Docket No. 50-424 Vogtle License No. NPF-68 2.
Diesel generator 1A (DGIA) had a valid failure on August 24, 1987, (overspeed trip due to malfunction of the mechanical governor) which was the second valid failure in 15 valid tests since completion of the DG1A reliability testing during the preoperational test program.
The mechanical governor was replaced and the DG successfully tested on August 26, 1987.
However, DGIA remained on the once per 31 days test frequency (instead of going )to the required increased test frequency of once per seven days from August 26,1987 until September 24, 1987. DG1A was therefore, considered to be technically inoperable from September 4-24,1987 (period that the surveillance time interval had been exceeded).
The next surveillance test was perfonned successfully on September 24, 1987.
As a result of failing to meet the required test frequency based on the number of valid failures, both DGs were considered to be techni-cally inoperable simultaneously for over 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> on August 24 and 25, 1987 when DG1A failed its surveillance test and the time interval for testing DG1B (which was last tested on August 11,1987) had been exceeded.
Both DGs were again considered technically inoperable simultaneously for 11 days (September 4,1987 to September 15,1987) when each DG exceeded the time interval for testing.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
B.
Technical Specifications 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.8.2 require that all DG failures, valid or nonvalid, shall be reported to the Comission in a Special Report within 30 days.
Reports shall include the information recomended in Regulatory Position C.3 b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977.
Contrary to the above requirements, as of September 25, 1987, the licensee had not submitted a Special Report for DG1A failures which occurred on February 18, 1987, during DG1A start attempts nos. 43, 44, and 45.
The start attempts were evaluated by the liunsee and detennined to be non-valid failures.
These failures are documented in DG1A start records as nonvalid failures.
This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement I).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Georgia Power Co. is hereby required to submit to this Office within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice a written statement or explanation in reply including:
(1) admission or denial of the violation, (2) the reason for the violation if i
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- a Georgia Power Company 3
Docket Noa 50-424 Vogtle 1.icense No. NPF-68 admitted. (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further viola-tions, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
Where good
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cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
FOR THE NUCt. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ORMlilNAt scre gy AW R. HERDT Alan R. Herdt, Chief Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this 3 k day of S g 4 1987
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Report Nos.:
50 424/87-57 and 50-425/87-38 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.:
50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.:
NPF-68 and CPPR-109 Facility Name:
Vogtle 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
September 21-25, 1987 Inspect s: k d. d e
/d-/7 97 A. J. Szcztpaniec
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Date Signed
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Date Signed Approved by: hd.fp
_ _ /o f 7. F 7 g M. Jape, Cffie~f Date Sigr,ed Test Programs Section Division of Reactor Safety SUMKARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was in the areas of preoperational test program for unit 2 and review of the status of items on the outstanding items list.
Results:
Two violations were identified:
railure to Test the Diesel Generators in Accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements and Failure to Report Nonvalid Diesel Generator Failurcs.
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REPORT DETAILS s
1.
Pe? sons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
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- T. Greene, Plant Manager j
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- C Selflower QA Site Manager
- C, Whitney, General Manager - Project Support
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- H. Handfinger, Project S/0 Manager
- M. J. Ajuluni, Operations Superintendent 4-y'f
- W. C. Gabbard, Senior Regulatory Specialist
- S. Hall, Procedures Superintendent 3g
- R. Odom, Engineering Supervisor
- fX. Stokes, Test Engineer
- J. Aufdenkampe Engineering Superviscr
- J. E. Swartzwelder, Deputy Manager - Operations
+!G. B. Bockhold, Plant General Manager - Operatter.s Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, and office personnel.
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NRC Resident inspectors
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J. Rogge, Senior Resident inspector
- C Barger, Resident Inspector H. Livermore, Senior Resident Inspector, Conytruction j
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- Attended exit interview
- Contacted by telephone on September 29,19h7
+ Contacted by telephone on October 5,1987 ;
c 2.
Exit Interview i
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The inspection scope and findings were sumarized on September 25, 1987, and by telephone conversations on September 29, 1987 and October 5,1987, with those persons as indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection l
findings.
No dissenting coments were received frvn the licensee.
The following new items were identified during this inspection:
Violation 424/87-57-01 Failure to test DGIA ana DG1B in Accordance with the Test Interval Specified in iacanicil.5pecification qable 4.3-1 (Paragraph 6.a),
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Violation 424/87-57-02, Failure to Rep;rt Nonvalid Diesel Generator Failures (Paragraph 6b).
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b' The licensee did'not' identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous -Enforcement Matters a.
(0 pen) Violation 424/86-118-01, Failure to Adequately Document-and Evaluate Diesel Generator Performance.
During previous followup of 1
this item (documented in. NRC Inspection Report 56-424/87-17), a conce.n was raised regarding the amount of informas being recorded.
on the fonns for-some of the DG start attempts.. *. e information on ji the forms was not adequate to allow proper evaluation of the~ DG start i
attempts.
A-second concern was raised regarding evaluation of DG start attemp(ts by operations personnel below the level of the shift supervisor who holds a senior reactor operator's license).
With j
regard to the first concern, the records.for DGIA and OG1B start t
attempts were reviewed.
The inspectors found the records to be incomplete in that there were examples where some start attempts were logged as acceptable starts' but there was no indicaticn as to whether these were considered valid or nonvalid tests; and the time interval between DG starting and stopping times did not -agree with the times for DG engines hours (cumulative total) at shutdown. The inspectors also questioned what was meant when the "start acceptable" block ;on the DG start attempt log forms was checked yes.
Operating procedure l
13145-1 and surveillance procedure 14480-1 state that appropriate j
infonnation for each DG start attempt will be recorded in the shift supervisor's log. Review of the shift supervisor's log revealed that the log does not provide adequate information to assist in evaluating i
questionable DG start attempts.
The inspectors concluded that there are still instances where the information is not adequate to allow proper evaluation of some DG start attempts.
With regard to the second concern, the licensee has revised operating i
procedure 13145-1, Diesel Generators, and surveillance procedure 14980-1, Diesel Generator Operability Test, to require that DG start 1
attempts be reviewed by either the on shift operations ct.pervisor 1
(0505), shift supervisor (SS) or shift technical advisor (STA), each of which holds a senior reactor operator's license.
These actions I
are adequate to resolve this concern.
During the exit meeting, the licensee stated that the additional concerns will be reviewed and necessary actions taken.
This item remains open and will be reviewed during a later inspection along with any additional corrective actions taken by the licensee.
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(Closed) Violation 424/86-132-02, Documentation and Review of Remote Shutdown Panel Test Results.
The inspectors reviewed the borrective actions stated in the licensee's response to the violation dated February 27, 1987.
The corrective actions include counseling of Test Review Board members and revisions to the licensee's instructions for the Writer's and Reviewer's Guide and the Review Checklist, which-cover the review of supporting documents that may require sign-offs
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3 to demonstrate that testing has beer -ompleted.
These ccrrective actions are applicable to Unit 2 and de not apply to Nit 1 s!nce the preoperational test program has been completed.
An Operations
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9eficiency Report (ODR) T-1-86-4680 was written to document the test discrepancy of the unsigned: step %
The ODR was dispositioned by rigned statements from personnel involved in the test attesting that estrols had been transferred dom the main control room (NCR) to the auxiliary shutdown panel B +nd raquired actions completed satisfactorfly during performance of the remote shutdown panel preoperational test 1-300-10 ana' abnonnal operating procedure 18038-1.
i Proner' implementation of the cqrrective actions applicable to Unit 2 preopa ational testing will be veviewed during in.spections of the cogNW greoperational test program for Unit 2.
This item is chnsideredclosed.
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Unresolved Items s,
No itw.s were 193 unresolved from this inspection following telephone conversatMns of, September 29, 1987, and October 5, 1987.
5.
Unit 2 Preoperational Test Program (70301, 703G2, 70341, 70441)
During this inspection, the inspectors met with key licensee personnel associa'id with the Unit 2 preoperr$1onal test program._
The inspectors discussed, the proposed preoperatiu.gl test program, its current status, and its implementation schedule with these personnel.
A listing of preoperational test program procedures was obtained,.as well as the testing schedule for the remainder of 1987.
The inspectors also reviewed and observed preoperational test procedure 2-3KUO2, Diesel Generator Train B Starting Air System. The inspection of tne program as planned has indicated that lessons learned during the Unit i oreoperational test l
' program are being applied to Unit 2.
Within the areas inspected no ~lolations or deviations were identified.
6.
Review of Georgia Power Company Specid heport The inspectors reviewed licensee Special) Report 50-424/87-001, Valid a.
Diesel Generator Failure Mechanical Governor Malfunction, dated September 23, 1987.
The failure occurred on DG1A on August 24, 1987, and the licensee submitted the report per the requinements of Yogtle TS 4.8.1.1.3.
While reviewing the special report and related DG start attempt records, the inspectors raised several questions.
The I
first question pertained to the licensee's statement that this was the first valid failure of DGIA in 11 valid start attempts since e
Unit I received an operating license on January 16, 1987, Tne inspectors stated that, per Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, in I
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4 order to determine that periodic test interval for DGs during plant operation, DG start attempts and failures are to be counted from the time of completion of DG reliability demonstration test (which is
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performed during the preoperational test program). The periodic test interval depends on demonstrated performance since the DG reliability demonstration test rather than since issuance 'of the operating license (OL).
The inspectors further stated that this issue was the subject of a previous violation (424/86-118-01) which is discussed in paragraph 3.a above.
During review of the DGIA start attempt records, the inspectors found that the August 24, 1987 failure (start attempt no. 58) was the second valid failure of DG1A since completion of the DG reliability demonstration testing.
The first valid failure occu'
' on December 2,1986 during start attempt no.16.
Start attemyc no. 58 was the second valid failure in 15 valid tests since completion of the reliability demonstration testing.
The special report stated that DG1A was still on the once per 31 days test interval.
This test frequency did not appear to be in accordance with TS 4.8.1.1.2.a and TS Table 4.8-1 which require that each DG shall be demonstrated operable on a staggered test basis once per seven days if the number cf failures in the last 20 valid tests is greater than or equal to two.
The associated test frequency shall be maintained until seven consecutive failure free demands have been performed and the number of failures in the last 20 valid demands has been reduced to one.
It had been more than seven days since DG1A had been tested and this did not appear to be in accordance with TS 4.0.2 which specifies that each TS surveillance requirement shall be performed within the specified time interval with:
(1) a maximum allowable extension not to exceed 25% of the surveillance interval, but (2) the combined time irterval for any three consecutive surveillance intervals shall not exceed 3.25 times the specified surveillance interval.
The inspecturs were unable to determine if the TS requirements had been met in that there were a number of DG1A start attempts which were marked as acceptable starts but had no indication as to whether the start attempts were valid or nonvalid tests. During the exit meeting on September 25, 1987, the inspectors stated that the start attempts which were not classified as neither valid or nonvalid needed n be evaluated and a detennination made concerning their validity because this would have an impact on the TS surveillance test interval and also on whether the licensee has been in compliance with applicable TS.
The i'censee stated that all the start attempts in question would be evaluated to determine if they were valid or nonvalid tests.
The licensee further stated that some of the star attempts were performed during engineered safety features acts ation system (ESFAS) preoperational testing.
The licensee requested an interpretation as to whether some of successful ESFAS start attempts could be considered valid tests.
The inspectors stated during the exit that this item would be unresolved until an Interpretation could be obtained from NRC-NRR on the successful ESFAS start attempts, and until the licensee completed its evaluation of the start attempts which were not classified.
5 The inspectors discussed the question of successful ESFAS start attempts with NRC-NRR personnel on September '28 and 29,1987, who stated that the ESFAS start attempts must meet the criteria specified in Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide 1.108 in order to be considered a valid successful test.
It was further stated that per TS Table 4.8-1, DGIA should be in a once per seven days test interval
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rather than once per 31 days.
During review of DG1B start attempt records, the inspectors found that DG1B had had three valid failures after completion of the DG reliability demonstration test but prior to issuance of the OL. The test frequency for DG1B was increased from once per 31 days to once per seven days, licensee personnel stated that the frequency was increased so that the numbar of tests required by TS Table 4.8-1 (i.e., perform seven consecutive failure free demands and the number of failures in the last 20 valid demands has been reduced to one) would be performed prior to issuance of the OL and DG1B could be returned to the once per 31 days test interval.
Diesel generator IB was returned to the once per 31 days test interval after start attempt no. 42 was performed on February 21, 1987.
In reviewing DG1B start attempts, the inspectors noted that for a number of the start attempts, DG1B operated for only a short period of time.
When questioned on the run times, licensee personnel stated that the runs were considered to be DG demands.
A valid demand was interpreted to be different from a valid test in that a demand was a DG start only (no loading) and, therefore, did not have to meet the valio test criteria specified in Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide 1.108.
During telephone conversations with MRC-NRR personnel on i
September 28 and 29, 1987, the inspectors also requested an interpretation from NRR regarding "valid tests" and "valid demands" (both of which are used in Vogtle TS Table 4.8-1).
NRR personnel stated that the terms were synonymous, and the licensee's interpretation of valid demands as used in TS Table 4.8-1 was incorrect.
In order to have a successful valid demand, the valid test criteria in Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide 1.108 must be met.
Therefore, DG1B should have remained on the once per seven days test interval instead of returning to the once per 31 days test interval.
During a telephone conversation with licensee personnel on September 29, 1987, the inspectors informed the licensee of interpretations received from NRR.
The licensee acknowledged the in forma tion.
The licensee also stated that the start attempt records for both DGs have been evaluated and the following determinations made:
(1) DGIA had two valid failures in 17 valid tests since completion of DG1A reliability demonstration testing.
DG1B had three valid failures in 18 valid tests since completion of DG1B reliability demonstration testing.
Therefore, beginning September 29, 1987, both DGs would be tested on the once per seven days test interval.
The
6 inspectors requested that copies of the updated DG start attempt record:; be sent to the NRC Region II office for review.
During review of the updated records, the inspectors made the following
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observations:
(1) After the valid failure to DG1A on August 24, 1987 (due to the mechanical governor malfunction), the governor was replaced and DG1A was successfully tested on August 26, 1987.
However, DG1A remained on the once per 31 days test Interval (instead of going to the increased test frequency of once per seven days) from August 26, 1987 until September 24, 1987.
Therefore, DGIA was considered to be technically inoperable from September 4 through 24, 1987, (period that the surveillance test interval had been exceeded).
The next surveillance test was performed successfully on September 24, 1987; (2) When Unit 1 entered operational Mode 4 on Februa ry 20, 1987, both DGs were required to be operable.
At the time, DG1B had had three valid failures in nine valid tests since complation of the DG1B reliability demonstration testin However.
DG1B remained on the once per 31 days test interval (g.instead of returning to the required once per seven days test interval) from February 21, 1987 until September 29, 1987.
Therefore, DG1B was considered to be technically inoperable at various times during the above period.
As a result of failing to meet the required test intervals (based on the number of valid failures), both DGs were considered to be technically inoperable simultaneously for over 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> on August 24 and 25, 1987, when DGIA failed its surveillance test, and the time for testing DGIB (which was last tested on August 11,1987) had been exceeded.
Both DGs were again considered to be technically inoperable simultaneously for 11 days (September 4, 1987 to September 15,1987) when each DG had exceeded the time interval for
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testing.
The inspectors infonned the licensee by telephone on October 5,1987, that failure to test the DGs in accordance with the requirements of TS surveillance requirements is a violation and would be identified as item 50-424/87-57-01, Failure to Test DGIA and DG1B in Accordance with the Test Interval Specified in Technical Specification Table 4.8-1.
Although the test interval was exceeded for both DGs, the inspectors noted that except for the DGIA failure on August 24, 1987, the DGs performed success fully during surveillance testing, b.
During review of the DG start attempt records, the inspectors noted that there were several unsuccessful start attempts for DG1A (start nos. 43, 44, and 45 performed February 18, 1987) which were classified as nonvalid tests.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluations of these trips (memoranda dated March 3,11, and 20, 1987).
The evaluations stated that the trips were due to low turbocharger oil pressure, which is a trip :nat is bypassed in the emergency operating mode.
The evaluations further stated that one of the trips was due to an improper valve alignment and the other trips
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were due to loose oil fittings which resulted in oil leaks.
The inspectors asked licensee personnel if the nonvalid failures had been reported to the NRC per the requirements of TS 4.8.1.1.3.
This TS requires that all DG failures, valid or nonvalid, shall be reported to the Commission in a Special Report within 30 days.
Based on the lic7see's evaluation of the failures, it appears that one or all of the failures should have been reported.
Licensee personnel stated that the failures had not been reported.
During the telephone call on October 5,1987, the inspectors informed the licensee that failure to report the nonvalid DG failures is a violation and will be identified ab item 50-424/87-57-02, Failure to Report Nonvalid Diesel Generator Failures.
No other violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
c.
(Closed) Temporary Instruction TI 2500/16 Inspection to Determine if a Potential Seismic Interaction Exists Between Movable Incore Flux Mapping Systems and Seal Table at Westinghouse Designed Facilities or Facilities with Similar Designs.
This concern was transmitted to all licensees in NRC Information Notice 85-45.
The licensee detennined that this concern was applicable to Vogtle and reported the item per the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 and 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The corrective actions stated in the construction deficiency report (CDR 85-83) have been completed for Unit 1.
The CDR was reviewed and closed for Unit 1 in NRC Inspection Report 50-424/86-103.
Licensee personnel stated that the corrective actions have not yet been completed for Unit 2.
Therefore, this item is considered closed for Unit 1 and remained open for Unit 2.
d.
(Closed) TI 2515/69, Inspection of Response to IE Bulletin 85-01.
Licensee actions concerning this item are documented in NRC Inspection Reports 50-424/86-117 and 424/86-132.
Licensee actions were considered adequate.
This item is closed for Unit 1 only.
7.
Outstanding Item List Status Update a.
(Closed)IFI 424/86-65-03, Review Final Resolution MSIV Coil Failures and Subsequent Retest.
Test procedure 1-500-04, Attachment 10.7 was performed in March 1987 to test closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) at normal operating pressure and temperature.
The inspector reviewed the procedure and the test results.
The closure time test results met the acceptance criteria for each MSIV.
It was also observed that since completion of testing and subsequent plant startup, the original problem with the valves has been resolved, as evidenced by continued plant operation.
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NOV 0 51987 l
Docket Nos. 50-424, 50-425 License Nos. NPF-68, CPPR-109 Georgia Power Company ATTH: Mr. James P. O'Reilly Senior Vice President-Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Gentlemen:
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SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION (MRC INSPECTION REPORT N05. 50-424/87-57 AND 50-425/87-38)
This refers to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted by A. Szczepaniec on September 21-25, 1987.
The inspection included a review of activities authorized for your Vogtle facility.
At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed inspection repert.
Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation of activities in progress.
The inspection findings indicate that certain activities appeared to violate NRC requirements. The violation, references to pertinent requirements, and elements to be included in your response are described in the enclosed Notice of Violation.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part -,
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures
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will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
The responses directed by this letter and its enclosures are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely, 4
OR)CINAL SIGNID BY ALAN R. HEROT Alan R. Herdt, Chief
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Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosures:
(See page 2)
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NOV 0 5 27 Georgia Power Company 2
Enclosures:
1.
NRC Inspection Report
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cc w/encls:
P. D. Rice, Vice President, Project Director C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager G. Bockhold, Jr., General Manager, Nuclear Operations I.. Gucwa, Manager, Nuclear Safety and t.icensing J. A. Bailey, Project t.icensing Manager B. W. Churchill, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge J. E. Joiner, Troutman, Sanders, t.ockerman and Ashmore D. Kirkland, III, Counsel.
j Office of the Consumer's Utility Council D. Feig, Georgians Against Nuclear Energy M. B. Margulies, Esq., Chairman, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Dr. O. H. Paris, Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and t.icensing Board Panel G. A. !.inenberger, Jr., Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and 1.icensing Board Panel bec w/encis-E. Reis, OGC M. Miller, NRR M. Sinkule RII NRC Resident inspector Document Control Desk State of Georgia R
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