ML20184A011

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July 7, 2020, Teleconference Regarding NRC Observations on the June 24, 2020, License Amendment Request to Make a One-Time Change to Technical Specification 3.7.19, Safety Chilled Water
ML20184A011
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  Luminant icon.png
Issue date: 07/02/2020
From: Dennis Galvin
Plant Licensing Branch IV
To: Peters K
Vistra Operations Company
Galvin D - NRR/DORL 301-415-6256
References
Download: ML20184A011 (3)


Text

JULY 7, 2020, TELECONFERENCE REGARDING NRC OBSERVATIONS ON THE JUNE 24, 2020, LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO MAKE A ONE-TIME CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.19, "SAFETY CHILLED WATER" VISTRA OPERATIONS COMPANY LLC COMANCHE PEAK UNIT 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 By , Safety Chilled Water|letter dated June 24, 2020]] (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML20176A281), Vistra Operations Company LLC (the licensee) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) for Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval for an amendment to the facility operating license for the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Comanche Peak). The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.19, "Safety Chilled Water," Condition A, One safety chilled water train inoperable, to add new required action A.2 with a 7-day completion time. This one-time change is to allow the replacement of the Comanche Peak Unit 2 Safety Chiller 2-06 compressor. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff is conducting an acceptance review of the LAR and has identified the following observations/potential issues.

SCPB

Enclosure, Section 3.6, states that Comanche Peak would not enter the one-time extended COMPLETION TIME if severe weather is anticipated. The NRC staff notes that this is one of the recommended compensatory measures for other allowed outage time extensions (see NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, Branch Technical Position 8-8, Onsite (Emergency Diesel Generators) And Offsite Power Sources Allowed Outage Time Extensions).

APLC LAR Enclosure Section 3.5.3, Avoidance of Risk Significant Plant Configurations, states that the dominant impact of the above scenarios on critical safety functions is the loss of heat removal from the Steam Generators due to failure of all the auxiliary feedwater pumps (random or induced) or loss of room cooling to the motor driven pumps.

STSB