ML20154S475
| ML20154S475 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/13/1977 |
| From: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154N521 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-URFO NUDOCS 9810270412 | |
| Download: ML20154S475 (11) | |
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i lt TESTIMONY OF NRC CHAIRMAN JOSEPH M. HENDRIE BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE 0N NUCLEAR REGULATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS UNITED STATES SENATE OCTOBER 13, 1977 i
Mr. Chairman, members of the Comittee, we are here today at your invitation to respond to an internal memorandum prepared by Mr. Bradford k!hitman of the Department of Justice and recently released in connection l
L with a Freedom of Information Act request. We are grateful to the i
i Comittee for this opportunity to respond to that memorandum and to lay i
l' before the Comittee a full exposition c'f the facts and circumstances surrounding the staff's role in the licensing process affecting the
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Virginia Electric and Power Company's North Anna nuclear plant.
As the l'
Comittee requested, we will also explain the steps that have been taken since.1973, and particularly since the formation of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission in January,1975, to improve the timeliness of submission of information from the staff to the Comission's licensing boards.
With me this morning are Mr. Lee Gossick, our Executive Director for Operations; and Mr. Ed Case, Acting Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Mr. Gossick will describe the staff's role in the I'
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2 licensing process generally, and will identify the present procedures for providing information to the licensing boards.
Mr. Case will des-cribe the specific events that occurred in the period May through August, 1973 in the North Anna proceeding.
I should like to divide my testimony into three parts:
First, a brief chronology and a summary of some points that I wish to emphasize so that they are not obscured in the detailed testimony that follows; second, a statement of my own recollection of-the North Anna matter as an official in the regulatory staff at that time; and third, a summary of the views of the Commissioners of the NRC in reviewing that matter l
.last year.
The chronology is given in tabular form in the Appendix to these i
remarks.
The points I wish to emphasize are as follows.
The staff action in 1973 in attempting to make at least a preliminary determination as to whether the newly-reported fault at the North Anna site was capable or not before informing the licensing board was consistent with practice up to that time.
It had always been the practice to evaluate the safety significance of a newly-reported matter before going forward to the boards.
In-the North Anna case, this practice resulted in an unfortunate delay in notification.
That delay has been extensively and publicly commented upon and criticized in Commission proceedings and decisions g
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- that predate the Whitman memorandum and that were fully available to Mr. Whitman long before his memorandum was prepared.
In its North i
Anna decision of November 12,.1976, the Comission stated:
"'4e find the staff's delay in informing the Board and the explanations given for that delay unacceptable.
The Licensing Board, the parties and the public have a right
.to be promptly informed of a discovery of this magnitude, before staff evaluation of that discovery and regardless of whether the record is technically open.
No other policy is consistent with the staff's obligation to help the Commission fulfill its statutory mandate."
In response to criticism and in response to this specific Commission l
order that old oractice of the staff has long since been changed.
The l
staff now informs licensing boards promptly of significant matters i
i and then carries out its safety evaluation, with subsequent reports to l
l the' boards.
Finally I should make clear, in light of some lack of pre-cision in Mr.14hitman's memorandum on the point, that the events in ques-I
' tion in 1973 were carried out under the Atomic Enerjy Commission and the corresponding Congressional oversight structure.
Now, as to my personal recollections of the matter.
During the period in question, in 1973, I was Deputy Director for Technical Review in the Atomic Energy Conmission's Directorate of Licensing.
I was responsible for the detailed safety reviews of all power plant licensing applications, including those at the North Anna site.
The staff geolocists and seismologists who worked on the North Anna fault 4.
-problem were members of my division.
I can recall a series of discussions y
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with my staff on the nature of the fault at North Anna and the progress I
in establishing its safety significance.
Somewhat later, on September 27, 1973 and again on October 1,1973, I presented testimony to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as to the safety significance of the faulting I
reported at the North Anna site.
That testimony was given during Joint ji Committee hearings on the status of nuclear reactor safety in the 93rd Congress and is reported in Part 1 of the record of those hearings.
L With regard to the' question of notifying the North Anna licensing board of the newly-reported fault, I cannot recall any specific dis-l j-cussions or decisions, nor do my records show any such discussions or i
decisions.
The notification question was apparently discussed at a regular j
program review, or " Blue Book" meeting on June 22, 1973 when the status of
-a number 'of other applications for licenses was discussed. My appointment log from that time shows both the Blue Book meetina, and a conflicting i
meeting to brief a Commissioner.
I do not know which meeting I attended, b
but I suspect the Commissioner took precedence.
However, whichever L
meeting'I attended, I must have been aware of the decision to complete at least a preliminary evaluation of the fault before notifying the board.
Having been there at the time, I can personally assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the staff's primary concern was with the safety aspects of the fault at North Anna.
To the extent that there was any concern over possible licensing delays, which I believe there was, it was in the sense that an unevaluated reported of the fault might cause more confusion than good. There was no intent to conceal, or to prevent i
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. a full and proper review of the facts by the licensing board, as soon as those facts were reasonably in hand.
In hindsight, it is abundantly clear that the board should have been notified earlier than it was, and that any concern over confusing the proceeding was misplaced.
However, it is important to remember that in 1973, the policy thrust in this area, reflected from the Congress and the Atomic Energy Comission, was somewhat different than it is today.
Now, Mr. Chairman,' let me turn to Commission actions with regard to the staff's delay in notifying the licensing board of the North Anna fault.
As I noted earlier, it is not a new issue.
The matter has been the subject of public discussion for over two years. On thrr specific occasions the' staff's act' ions have been publicly examine' and criticized in Commission adjudicatory pronouncements -- most recently by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in its decision on the florth Anna matter published on November 12, 1976, which I have previously mentioned.
Similar criticisms of the staff's action are contained in minority comments in the decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that presided at the public hearings on the North Anna fault matter, published September 10, 1975, and in minority comments in the decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board that reviewed the licensing board's decision, published April 15, 1976.
Mr. Chairman, I would like at this time to offer for the Committee's record copies of these three l
published decisions.
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l There should be no misunderstanding on the point that it was not the recently publicized Department of Justice internal memorandum that I
first brought to public attention -- and criticized -- the staff's delay in notifying the licensing board.
That matter has been dealt with before.
Furthermore, we are not here talking about the safety signi-ficance of the fault.
After discovery of the fault, an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board conducted extensive hearings on the' question of whether the plant could be built safely.
During these hearings, experts from the Commission, the U.S. Geological Survey and the Virginia Depart-ment of Mineral Resources all testified that the fault was not of safety significance.
The licensing board which heard this evidence unanimously concluded that the fault was not of safety significance.
This conclusion was affirmed by the Commission's Appeal Board.
This final decision of the Appeal Board was reviewed and affimed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
As the Court concluded, "the evidence in this case establishes that the fault is not ' capable' and has not moved for at least 500,000 years."
What is new in Mr. Whitman's memorandum are the charaes of conceal-ment and pervasive staff bias against public scrutiny.
I believe the~ facts speak for themselves, and as the Commission has noted, they show an obsolete staff practice in not promptly notifying the licensing board, a practice judged unacceptable by this Commission in view of the need for all parties in the public hearing process to l
e be kept informed.
However, they do not show an attempt to hide or conceal, and the charge that they do is unfair and unsupported.
The Department of Justice has given us an opportunity to review some of their files on this matter.
NRC attorneys will be examining these files to determine whether they contain information not pre-viously available to the Commission that may be relevant to NRC's enforcement action against VEPCO which has resulted in a $32,500 fine.
Althouge it is not dire'ctly i subject of this hearing, I should note that we will be reviewing the Commission's recent enforcement action aoainst the Virginia Electric and Power Company in the light of any new information now available.
In connection with the staff's current procedures, I should note that from September 6,1973, with the publication of the Atomic Safety j
and Licensing Appeal Board's ficGuire decision (a copy of which I would now submit for the record), the staff has been admonished to notify the licensing boards of any change that is relevant and material and that bears on the licensing board's decision process promptly and in any event prior to the issuance of the initial decision.
Of course, the most recent direction is that contained in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's November 12, 1976 decision from which ! quoted earlier.
In l
that decision, the Commission noted the staff's description of its current practice:
"Our current practice in this reaard is to make every effort promptly to report information of this kind to the affected licensing boards and parties, and then to provide stsff evaluation of the information reported when it is completed."
. The Commission then said:
"We believe this statement of current practice correctly reflects the staff's obligation, and the staff is hereby directed to insure the practice is fully enforced."
I agree with that directive and intend that it be fully implemented.
Additionally, Congress, the public, and the regulated industry should be aware that the business of the Commission is the administering of a licensing system which protects the public health and safety.
While we strive to eliminate' unnecessary delay from our licensing process, our primary mission is to assure that the health and safety of the public are protected.
I might note that the Commission will be discussing l
the details of current procedures for keeping the licensing boards informed in the near future, to see how the proce'dur1ts are working and whether any additional measures are appropriate.
With the Committee's permission, I would now like to ask Mr. Lee I
Gossick to discuss the staff role in licensing and the staff procedures for notification of our licensing boards.
Mr. Ed Case will then des-cribe the events of the period from May to August of 1973, l
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I CHRONOLOGY -- NORTH ANNA UNITS 1, 2, 3 & 4 The following is a chronology of significant. events related to the licensing of North Anna Units 1, 2, 3, & 4, particularly with regard to NRC staff actions associated with identification of a fault at the North Anna site.
The site is located in Louisa County, Virginia on the south shore of Lake Anna, 24 miles S.W. of Fredericksburg and 40 miles NNW cf Richmond, Virginia.
l Units 1 and 2 are 943 MWe Westinghouse reactors.
Unit 1 is 99", complete and Unit 2 is 86% complete.
Units 3 and 4 are 907 MWe Babcock and Wilcox reactors.
Owing to construction delays announced by VEPC0, Unit 3 is,7% complete, and Unit 4 is 4% complete.
Presently, an NRC public hearing is in progress on operating licenses for Units 1 and 2.
The application for operating licenses for Units 3 and 4 is not expected before late 1979.
Application to construct Units 1 and March 21, 1969 2 filed Construction permit for Units 1 and 2 February 19, 1971 issued Application to construct Units 3 and 4 Sep tember 15, 1971 filed Hearing on construction permit for May 7-10, 1973 Units 3 and 4: record remained open pending Virginia water quality l
certification AEC staff informed by VEPC0 of " chlorite l
May 17, 1973 seam" AEC staff, including staff Project June 18, 1973 Manager and USGS, visit site and first learn of " fault" Trip report of site visit prepared by June 21, 1973 staff Project Manager; staff geologist I
leaves for European trip i
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. Scheduled " Blue Book" meeting discussion June 22,1973 regarding notifying Licensing Board of fault Staff Project Manager's trip report
. June 26, 1973
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of site visit placed in AEC Public Document Room July 5,1973 Staff geologist returns from European trip First draft of staff geologist's July 18, 1973 affidavit sent to Office of General
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Counsel Completed staff geologist's affidavit August 3,1973 forwarded to Licensing Board Virginia Water Quality Control Board August 29, 1973 decision issued regarding the VEPC0 water quality certification (401 certificate)
Public charges made that VEPC0 concealed
.. August-September,1973 information about fault AEC issues show cause order for. nits 1 U
October-17, 1973 and 2 on fault matter which commences hearing process on that issue
- AEC staff motions to Units 3 and 4 October 17,'1973 Licensing Board to reopen hearing on the matter of the geologic fault
- The AEC ordered separate hearing on May 28,1974 allegations against VEPC0 of material false statements Licensing Board decision finding fault
. June 27, 1974 not " capable" in show cause proceeding
- These two proceedings were consolidated by order of the Licensing
-Board.
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~ Initial decision authorizing issuance July 18, 1974 of construction permits for Units 3 and 4 Construction permits issued for Units 3 July 26, 1974 and 4 Licensing Board decision on material September 10, 1975 false. statement issue imposing
$60,000 penalty on VEPC0 U. S. Court of Appeals (0.C. Circuit)
' March 3, 1976 affirmed that North Anna fault was not capable Appeal Board decision reduces penalty April 15,1976 to $17,500 NRC decision increases penalty to $32,500 November.12,1976 VEPC0 appeals NRC decision to 4th Circuit November 12, 1976 Court of Appeals Hearing on operating license for Units 1 November 30, 1976 and 2 commenced e
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