ML20154Q983
| ML20154Q983 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1988 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Dewease J LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154Q989 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8806070182 | |
| Download: ML20154Q983 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000382/1988200
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Docket No. 50-382
Louisiana Power and Light Company
ATTN:
J. G. Dewease, Senior Vice President
Nuclear Operation
317 8aronne Street
,
New Orleans, LA 70160
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Gentlemen:
SUBJECT: QUALITY VERIFICATION FUNCTION INSPECTION AT WATERFORD 3
NRC INSPECTION REPORT N0. 50-382/88-200
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Enclosed is the report of the special, announced NRC team inspection con-
ducted at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, frem February 1 through
February 12, 1988, of activities authorized by NRC License No. NPF-38.
The
' inspection team consisted of W. E. Scott, 8. L. Jorgensen, D. L. Kelley,
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S. Stasek, J. P. Stewart, and C. A. VanDenburgh of the NRC. The inspection
team's findings were discussed with J. G. Dewease, R. P. Barkhurst,
N. S. Carns, and other members of your staff at the conclusion of the
inspection.
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This inspection was the sixth in a series of NRC headquarters-directed
quality verification function inspections performed under the guidance of
Temporary Instruction 2515/78.
The inspection focused on the effectiveness
of your quality verification organizations in identifying, resolving, and
preventing the recurrence of safety-significant technical deficiencies. The
inspection also evaluated the effectiveness of your management in ensuring
that identified quality deficiencies were responded to promptly and
completely.
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Overall, the team found that your quality verification organizations are
staffed with individuals who are experienced and capable of conducting in-
depth technical verifications. The audits and surveillances they conduct
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are performance oriented and many times result in the identification of
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issues that affect plant reliability and safety. The team found that, in
the areas of operations and maintenance, your staff is generally effective
in identifying specific problems and resolving them.
However, your staff
does not always as effectively prevent recurrence or occurrence of similar
problems. Similarly, your line organization is generally effective in ensur-
ing that deficiencies are promptly addressed, but this does not always ensure
that the issues are completely resolved to prevent their recurrence.
Of special concern to the team were your organization's overall weakness in
preventing recurrence of significant deficiencies and your organization's
threshold for reporting events to the NRC.
In spite of repeated efforts to
correct failures to follow procedures, several instances of not following
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8806070182 880602
ADOCK 05000302
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Louisiana Power and Light Company
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procedures during the B diesel outage resulted in the loss of formal boundary
control between the ongoing maintenance activity and the safe operation of
the rest of the plant, the inability to formally track and control safety-
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related work in progress, and the inability to formally and safely restore
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safety systems upon completion of maintenance activity.
Other instances in
which which actions to prevent a deficiency's recurrence were unsuccessful
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include the operators' disregard of the bypassed and inoperable status indi-
cation system (BISIS), loose cables on locked valves, and lack of temporary
alteration control.
Your corporate goal of reducing licensee event reports by 50 percent in 1988
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appears to have adversely influenced the judgments regarding reportability.
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It was noted that this goal was rescinded midway through this inspection.
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However, the team identified 20 events which should have been reported to the
NRC in 1986-87, but were not reported.
Those events are detailed in Section
5 of the inspection report.
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The NRC inspection team identified two potential enforcement findings (PEFs)
and seven observations; these are described in the inspection report. The
PEFs, provided in Enclosure 1, are associated with the failure to report
,approximately 20 events to the NRC and control room personnel's not respond-
ing to signals on the BISIS. Those PEFs will be further evaluated by NRC
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Region IV staff for possible enforcement action.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosures
will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
No reply to this letter is
required at this time.
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Should you have any questions regarding this inspection, please contact me or
the NRC Region IV office.
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Sincerely,
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Dennis M. Crutchfield, Di
ctor
Division of Reactor Proj cts III, IV,
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V and Special Projects
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
1.
Potential Enforcement Findings
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2.
Inspection Report Nos. 50-382/88-200
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cc w/encis:
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R. P. Barkhurst, Vice President, Waterford 3 SES
N. S. Carns, Manager, Waterford 3 SES
S. A. Alleman, Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance, Waterford 3 SES
R. F. Burski, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs, Waterford 3 SES
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ENCLOSURE 1
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POTENTIAL ENFORCEMENT FINDINGS
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As a result of the NRC quality verification function inspection at Waterford
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Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, from February 1 through 12, 1988, the
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following(PEFs). items are being referred to Region IV as potential enforcement
findings
Section citations refer to the detailed descriptions in
the inspection report (Enclosure 2).
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1.
Section 2.B of Facility Operating License No. NPF-38, issued to
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Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 subjects the operating license
to the conditions and requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.
"Licensee Event Report System," specifies matters the licensee must
report to the NRC within 30 days.
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a.
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) requires reporting of any external condi-
tion posing a threat to the safety of the plant or significantly
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hampering site personnel in the performance of safety duties.
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Contrary to the above, potentially reportable event (PRE) PRE-87-015,
a valid actuation of the broad range toxic gas detection system
(BRTGOS),whichTechnicalS
tion from external threat (pecification bases describe as protec-
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within 30 days.
(Section5.0.1) gas),wasnotreportedtotheNRC
toxic
b.
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) requires reporting of a condition outside
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the design basis of the plant.
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Contrary to the above, PRE-87-019, the hydraulic closing pressure
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of the main steam isolation valve that could not be monitored with
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the valve full open because of a desi
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and PRE-87-039, a non-Class 1E load (gn error common to both valves,
telephone cabinet PEC-2) con-
nected to Class 1E circuitry through a single breaker in violation
of double isolation protection for such connections, were not
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reported to the NRC within 30 days.
(Sections 5.0.2 and 5.0.3)
c.
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) requires reporting of operations or
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conditions prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
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Contrary to the above, two instances were identified in which the
licensee failed to report operations prohibited by the Technical
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Specifications.
PRE-87-078, the failure to perform sampling and
analysis as required by Technical Specification Table 3.3-13, and
PRE-87-099, the failure to test valve CAP-205 for 146 days from May 6
to September 29, 1987 when the maximum permissible test interval
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was 115 days, were not reported to the NRC within 30 days.
(Sections 5.0.5 and 5.0.7)
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10 CFR 50.73(a)(I)(v)(0) requires reporting any event or condition
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that alone could prevent the fulfillment of safety functions needed
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to mitigate accident consequences.
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Contrary to the above, PRE-87-076, a routine relay replacement
wiring error thdt could have compromised both cooling trains for ac
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and de ewitchgear depended on for accident mitigation had the sane
error been made in the redundant channel (which was also subject to
routine relay replacement), was not reported to the NRC within 30
days.
(Section5.0.4)
Also, Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.3 requires the reporting of all
diesel generator failures.
Contrary to the above, PRE 86-113, four overspeed trips of emergency
diesel generator (EDG) A during the monthly engineered safety features
actuation system testing specified in procedure OP-903-069, were not
reported to the NRC within 30 days.
Further, since August 1, 1985,
PRES86-007, 86-020,87-028, 87-047,87-059, 87-061,87-073, 87-106,87-113, 88-005, and 88-015--eleven failures of the EDGs on trips that
are bypassed in the emergency mode--were not reported to the NRC within
30 days.
(Sections 5.0.8 and 5.0.10)
2.
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires the implementation of proced-
ures covering activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, including the procedures for abnormal, offnormal, or
alarm conditions. Licensee Procedure OP-4-020, "Bypassed and Inoperable
Status Indication System," requires the monitoring of safety equipment
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status by way of computer and requires operator acknowledgement and
evaluation of systems that have been computed to be inoperable.
Contrary to the above, the inspectors observed standing signals, which
had not been acknowledged, at various times during the inspection,
including February 5 and 9,1988.
Further, the inspectors observed signal
actuations at about 1:00 p.m. on February 8 (annunciator no. 6, trains A
and B - containment isolation) and at about 3:20_ p.m. on February 10
(annunciator no. 1, trains A, B, and AB - emergency feedwater), and on
neither occasion was the signal acknowledged as specified by procedure.
(Section 2.1)
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