Text

Rev 1 to Sentinel 5S Radiation & Thermal Evaluation (Application for Type B(U) Package Approval), as Rev 1 to Application for Certificate of Compliance 9205
	ML20154P192
Person / Time
Site:	07109205
Issue date:	02/28/1986
From:	; TELEDYNE ENERGY SYSTEMS
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20154P191	List: ML20154P187; ML20154P192;
References
	26509, TES-3205, TES-3205-R01, TES-3205-R1, NUDOCS 8603200166
	Download: ML20154P192 (105)
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SENTINEL SS RADIATION, STRUCTURAL AND THERMAL EVALUATION (Application for Type B(U) Package Approval)

TES-3205 September 1985 Revision 1 February 1986 O

SPTELEDYNE ENERGY SYSTEMS 110 W. Timonium Road i

Timonium, Maryland 21093 O

8603200166 960224 DR ADOCK 0710 5

a2B^o?

TABLE OF CONTENTS O

Section Description Page 1

GENERAL INFORMATION 1-1 1.1 Introduction 1-1 1.2 Package Description 1 -1 2

STRUCTURAL EVALUATION 2-1 2.1 Structural Design 2-1 2.2 Weights and Center of Gravity 2-2 2.3 Mechanical Properties of Materials 2-2 2.4 General Standards for All Packages 2-3 2.5 Standards for Type B and Large Quantity Packaging 2-12 2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport 2-13

2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions 2-17 2.8 Special Form 2-35 2.9 Fuel Rods 2-47 2.10 Appendix 2-48 3

THERMAL EVALUATION 3-1 3.1 Discussion 3-1 3.2 Summary of Thermal Properties of Materials 3-2 v

3.3 Technical Specifications of Components 3-8 3.4 Thermal Evaluation for Normal Conditions of Transport 3-9 3.5 Hypothetical Accident Thermal Evaluation 3-21

3. 6 Appendix 3-31 4

CONTAINMENT 4-1 4.1 Containment Boundary 4-1 4.2 Requirements for Normal Conditions of Transport 4-2 4.3 Containment Requirements for the Hypothetical Accident Conditions 4-2 4.4 Appendix 4-3 5

SHIELDING EVALUATION 5-1 5.1 Discussion and Results 5-1 5.2 Source Specification 5-la 5.3 Model Specification 5-3 5.4 Shielding Evaluation 5-6

5. 5 Appendix - References 5-9 6

CRITICALITY EVALUATION 6-1 Otg TES-3205 11

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

(

1 I

Section Description Page 7

OPERATING PROCEDURS 7-1 7.1 Procedures for Loading the Package 7-1 4

7.2 Procedures for Unloading the Package 7-2 7.3 Preparation of an Empty Package for Transport 7-3 i

7.4 Miscellaneous 7-3 l

7.5 Appendix 7-4 j

8 ACCEPTANCE TESTS AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM 8-1 8.1 Acceptance Tests 8-1 8.2 Maintenance Program 8-3 4

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Appendix A QUALITY ASSURANCE A-1 l

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1.

GENERAL INFORMATION IV This document is the application for approval of the package for transportation of the Sentinel SS Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) as a type B (U) package containing special form radioactive material.

The package has been designed to meet the current requirements of the U.

S.

Nuclear Regulatory Comission as provided in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, and of the International Atomic Energy Agency as provided in IAEA Safety Series No. 6, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, 1973 revised edition (as amended), published in 1979.

This report has been prepared in accordance with the instructions and fonnat of the U.S.

NRC Regulatory Guide 7.9, Revision 1, January 1980, modified as required to conform with the current regulations.

Quality Assurance Program informaion (as required by Para. 71.37) is provided in Appendix A of this report.

The new package consists of the Sentinel SS RM, an inner container R1 which houses the RM, and an outer container which houses the inner 2/86 container.

1.1 Introduction The Sentinel SS RTG is a thermoelectric generator designed for terrestrial operation to produce an electrical output of 5 watts, minimum, at the end of a 5 year service life.

The generator's internal shielding has s

been reduced to provide a lightweight generator for unique installation g

requirements.

During transportation, the generator must be shielded by the 2/86 shipping cask inner container to meet the radiation level requirements established by NRC and IAEA regulations for non-exclusive use shipments. The inner container, housing the RM, is installed in an outer container which includes provisions for lifting and tying-down the package. The package is designed to be transported in the non-exclusive use mode.

It has a calculated maximum transport index of 3.

1.2 Package Description 1.2.1 Pac,acina In the shipping configuration, the Sentiel SS radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RM) is preloaded within an inner container fabricated from low carbon steel.

The inner container is subsequently R1 installed into an outer container constructed of stainless steel.

The 2/86 package, as prepared for shipment, is shown in Figure 1.1.

This figure shows the RM/ inner container assembly enclosed within a two piece outer containeer; the two parts of which are sealed with a flat silicone rubber gasket. This figure shows the required markings and labelling applied to the outer container.

The figure also defines the overall package dimensions and g

the required bolt torque.

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1.2.1.3 Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RM).
The thermoelectric generator is made up of the following components: the fuel or
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radionuclide; the fuel capsule assembly, which provides double encapsulation V
of the fuel and which is defined as the containment vessel; the internal shield assembly, which serves to retain the fuel capsule in its correct position and to provide sufficient shielding to protect workers engaged in the installation of the RE; thermal insulation which completely surrounds R1 the shield except at the thermoelectric module interface; a thermoelectric 2/86 module; shield preload components; and a finned generator housing and lid assembly which contain all of the previously mentioned components.
The housing and lid are welded assemblies fabricated from 6061-T6 aluminum alloy.
The Sentinel SS RM assembly is shown in Figure 1.5.
The table of this R1 figure provides nomenclature and identifies the materials of construction.
2/86 Bolt torque requirements are also shown.
In operation, heat given up by the decay of the radioactive fuel is transmitted to the shield assembly and then directed by thermal insulation upwards through the thermoelectric module where a portion of the heat is converted directly to electrical energy.
A series of special alloy steel Belleville washers positioned between hardened bearing plates are employed to provide a pre-load on the shield assembly.
Pre-loading of components is required to withstand the shock and vibration environments imposed on the RTG by the user.
1.2.1.3.1 Fuel.
The fuel used in the Sentinel RTG is Strontium-90 fluoride processed arid encapsulated at the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) in Hanford, Washington.
Fuel from the WESF capsule is p
removed, hot pressed into pellets, and encapsulated at the Oak Ridge National
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Laboratory under contract to Teledyne Energy Systems in new encapsulation R1 hardware.
The evaluation of the package presented herein is based on a 2/86 maximum fuel loading of 220 watts or 32,900 Ci.
The solid, pelletized, Strontium-90 fluoride is encapsulated to meet "special form" criteria.
The fuel is not a fissile material. The fluoride form of Strontium-90 has been successfully used in the Sentinel 8S and Sentinel 1S RE models produced by Teledyne Energy Systems.
1.2.1.3.2 Heat Source Assembly (Fuel Capsule Assembly). The completed heat source assembly consists of a sealed, thick-walled outer capsule or strength member containing a sealed inner capsule or liner assembly with the liner assembly containing two hot pressed Sr-90 fuel pellets.
The heat source assembly is shown in Figure 1.6 and is designed to provide double encapsulation of the Sr-90 fuel.
The heat source is designed to meet the requirements of
" Guide to the Safe Design, Construction and Use of Radioisotopic Power Generators for Certain Land and Sea Applications,"
International Atomic Energy Agency Safety Series 33, 1970 Edition (see Section 2.8).
The liner assembly consists of a tubular housing with two welded end caps.
One of the end caps is welded and tested for leak-tight integrity and weld quality prior to any hot cell operations.
After the fuel pellets are inserted into the liner, the final weld closure is done in a hot cell by a O
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remote, automatic TIG process using weld parameters established in a development program.
The liner provides none of the structural integrity of (3
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attack by impurities in the fuel and to provide a convenient means to decontaminate the fueled package prior to its subsequent encapsulation in an outer capsule or strength member.
The strength member or outer capsule consists of a tubular housing with an integral solid end and one threaded end into which an end cap is screwed and subsequently welded.
Final weld closure of the end cap, following the insertion of the clean (decontaminated) liner assembly into the strength member, is an automatic plasma-arc type weld performed using weld parameters established in a develognent program.
The strength member or outer capsule is designed to provide the necessary structural integrity of the heat source assembly.
1.2.1.3.3 Shield Assembly.
The shield assembly consists of a shield plug attachd to a shield body with 3 steel bolts to form the container for the fuel capsule assembly.
The plug is designed with a " stepped" lower end which fits into a mating cavity in the body.
This arrangement serves as a guide for the plug as it is lowered into position in a hot cell following the R1 fueling operation. The shield assembly and construction details are shown in Figures 1.7a, 1.7b and 1.7c.
2/86 An alloy of depleted uranium with.75% titanium was selected as the shield material for the Sentinel SS RM because RM weight was a primary consideration.
This alloy has a minimum bulk density of 18.45 g/cc.
Each component is fabricated by rough casting and machining and each component is (a) clad in a thin stainless steel can to preclude oxidation.
The shielding R1 U
thicknesses are sized so that the RM, in its inner container, will not 2/86 produce radiation levels which exceed the limits specified in 49 CFR 173 and 10 CFR 71.
Additional information on shield components and the complete radiation analysis is given in Section 5, " Shielding Evaluation."
1.2.1.3.4 Generator Housing and Head Assemblies.
The outer shell of R1 the generator is comprised of a housing and a head which are bolted together.
2/86 The housing is a welded assembly consisting of a tubular shell with a flange welded at the head interface and a lower plate welded at the opposite end.
The lower plate is machined to accept a fueling access cover. The shell is stiffened by 12 vertical ribs velded around its circumference.
These ribs also tie-in the flange and lower plate. Cooling fins are bolted to the ribs for shipment.
Details of the housing weldment are shown in Figures 1.8a and 1.8b and the final, machined configuration is shown in Figure 1.8.c.
These figures define the welding procedure, inspection criteria, heat treating requirements, etc.
The head of the generator is welded and machined in a similar manner.
The close toleranced holes in the head are machined to accept a series of springs and pistons which apply a load on each individual thermoelectric couple leg in the assembled state.
Figures 1.9a and 1.9b show the welded assembly and detail components of the head and Figures 1.9c and 1.9d show the final maching of the welded assemby.
These figures also define the welding process, inspection criteria, heat treating requirements, etc.
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TES-3205 l-26 i
r i
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Both the housing and the head are manufactured from 6061-T6 aluminum alloy.
This material was selected because of its high strength to weight 86 ratio, its fabrication properties and.because the noterial can be heat j
treated to obtain its original properties after welding.
1.2.2 Operatonal Features i
l There are no special operational features of the package which could l
affect the safety of the unit.
That is, there are no cooling systems, pressure relief valves or moderating materials employed in the package j
design.
Once the RM is fueled and installed in its shipping containers, no special preparation is required for transport.
1.2.3 Contents of Packaging i
The contents of the Sentinel SS package could be as much as 32,900 curies (220 watts) (capacity of liner) of Strontim-90 as fluoride in the hot g
2/86 3
pressed pellet form.
The fuel does not release helium during its decay process, thus, there is no internal pressure buildup.
For purposes of l
evaluation for this license application, the maximum liner loading of 220 thermal watts or 32,900 C1 is assumed.
4 1.
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4 4
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TES-3205 1-27 1
f
d 4
2.
STRUCTURAL EVALUATION
-: O This chapter provides the identification, description and analytical
)
data required to evaluate the structural integrity of the packaging l
components important to safety in compliance with the performance
}-
requirements of 10 CFR Part 71 and IAEA Safety Series No. 6.
2.1 Structural Design i
j 2.1.1 Discussion There are five principal structural members affecting the safety of the Sentinel SS package.
These components are the fuel capsule assembly, the shield assembly, R1U housing, the shipping cask inner container and the shipping cask outer container.
Construction details of these components are provided in Chapter 1.
The shipping cask outer container, fabricated from austenitic stainless steel, is the primary structure for lifting and tie-down during transportation and provides a package envelope under the nonnal conditions of transport.
R1 The shipping cask inner container of carbon steel provides additional 2/86 l
radiation shielding and also provides a rigid foundation for the outer j
container.
j For evaluation of the package under the hypothetical accident i
conditions, no credit is taken for the structural integrity of either the i
outer or inner containers.
The RIG housing is sufficiently strong to j
survive the 30 foot drop to the extent that it provides protection for the i
subsequent puncture environment.
1 l
The shield / fuel capsule assembly is shown herein to survive the hypothetical accident sequence.
This unit provides fuel containment and j
radiation protection consistent with the requirements.
l The fuel capsule assembly consists of an outer strength member and a liner containing the fuel.
The strength member is the primary fuel containment and is designed to resist hydrostatic pressure.
i 2.1.2 Design Criteria t
l The design criteria used in this chapter to demonstrate compliance to the various requirements of 10 CFR Part 71 and IAEA Safety Series No. 6 are in general as itemized below.
1 For ductile materials the established criteria is as follows:
J Tension and Compression - For these applications the distortion a.
, O t
4 TES-3205 j
2-1 t
i i
.---,-,----,,,----.-,,-e------,-,-

,.,---c.----

- - - ~. - - -, -

,,.------...+n

,,-n-nn,r-
,-e-.---,
energy theory of von Mises is used where the equivalent uniaxial stress is limited to 2/3 of ultimate strength or 90% of the O
yield strength, whichever is less.
Membrane stresses in shells have the same limits whereas primary plus secondary stresses including discontinuity effects are limited to 90% of the yield strength.
b.
Shear - Shear stresses shall not exceed 2/3 of the material's ultimate shear strength at the temperature of interest.
c.
Elastic Stability - Members are evaluated at 1.5 times the anticipated load and are demonstrated not to buckle.
For brittle materials the maximum principal stresses are limited to 2/3 of the material's ultimate strength.
I 2.2 Weights and Center of Gravity i
The weight and balance statement for the components associated with the RM and shipping containers is given in Table 1.1.
The total weight of the package is 8460 lbs, where the RM is only 276.2 lbs of the total R1 i
weight.
The center of gravity of the package is 20.4 inches in the vertical 2/86
{
direction measured from the truck bed.
i 2.3 Mechanical Properties of Materials j
The cask outer container is fabricated from type 304L austenitic stainless steel.
The cask inner container body and lid are fabricated from A181 grade 2 and A36 low carbon steels respectively.
The RM housing is of 6061-T6 aluminum alloy whereas the shield is fabricated from U-3/4 Ti.
Structural properties for these materials are presented below.
Structural
]
properties of other materials are presented where applicable in the appropriate sections.
R1 3
2/86 A-181 A-36 6061-T6 U-3/4 Ti Type 304L i
Ult. Tensile Strength, 79,000 70,000 42,000 110,000 70,000 min, j
psi i
j Yield Strength, psi 45,000 36,000 35,000 45,000 25,000 min.
6 6
6 6
6 Modulus, psi 30 x 10 30 x 10 10 x 10 26 x 10 29 x 10 Elongation, %
31 18 8-10 5-15 50 3
Density, Ibs/in
.286
.286
.098
.672
.290 t
O l
TES-3205 2-2 l
2.4 General Standards For All Packages (G)
The general standards for all packaging, as specified in 71.43 and 71.45 are complied with, as demonstrated in the following paragraphs.
2.4.1 Chemical and Galvanic Reactions The outer container of the package is fabricated entirely from type 304L stainless steel alloy and finished with an epoxy paint system. The lid and body are joined by high strength alloy steel bolts which are cadmium plated. Although there is a slight galvanic couple between the bolts and the container and the cadmuim plating will likely rust, the threaded area of the R1 bolts will be coated with an anti-sieze compound to facilitate hardware 2/86 removal.
The inner container consists of a body fabricated from a forged steel alloy billet and a lid, made from hot rolled steel plate.
There are no dissimilar metals utilized in the cask assembly.
In addition, the entire unit is painted inside and out with a coat of zinc chromate wash primer and all exterior surfaces painted with 4 coats of epoxy paint.
The RM inside the cask is an epoxy painted aluminum alloy. The areas of the RM in contact with the cask are the housing lower cover and the tips of the three RM centering fins. The housing lower cover is machined with a lip or ring extending below the fuel access cover such that the actual bottom of the RM would sit about 1/8 inch off of the cask. The fins are bolted on to welded studs and are used only during transportation. Were the cask to be
[%V} completely filled with an electrolyte, such as salt water, the galvanic series grouping and the similar anodic and cathodic areas indicate that there would be no strong tendency to produce galvanic corrosion on each other.
Excepting the internal gaps of the fuel capsule assembly, spaces within the RTG housing contain inert gases.
Gaps between the depleted uranium shielding and its protective stainless steel clad are filled with helium.
All other spaces exterior to the fuel capsule assembly are filled with argon.
Prior to outgassing of the RM and backfill with argon, the insulation is baked out to remove absorbed water vapor.
The materials which comprise the RM were selected to preclude chemical reaction at the nominal RTG shipping and operational temperatures in this inert gas environment.
No galvanic reactions can occur because of the absence of an electrolyte.
2.4.2 Positive Closure, Seal The outer container lid is bolted to the body with twelve 3/4-10 UNC R1 bolts and nuts. One of the bolt heads will be wired to the structural rib on 2/86 the head and the wire sealed in a standard lead security seal. A broken seal will give evidence of tampering by unauthorized persons.
1
)
/O i
TES-3205 2-3
In addition to the external seal, the inner container lid is bolted O
to the body with twelve 3/410 UNC square head steel bolts which go through the lid into tapped holes in the cask body.
The square head bolts are R1 recessed 3/4 inch below the top surface in a hole whose diameter precludes 2/86 the use of a standard socket wrench.
Therefore, standard tooling must be machined to fit over the square head bolts.
These measures assure that the package cannot be intentionally opened.
2.4.3 Lifting Devices The package is designed to be handled either by forklift truck or by a four legged sling system.
The four lifting eyes are located on the top section of the cask outer container.
The four attachment points are required to be capable of supporting three times the weight of the package without generating stress in any material of the system in excess of its R1 yield strength.
To be conservative, the structure is also examined assuming 2/86 that only one lifting eye is utilized.
The load of interest is 3 (8460) or 25,380 lbs.
Each of the two sections of the outer container are flanged and held together with twelve 3/4 inch diameter steel bolts.
The analysis to follow will examine the lifting eyes, the shells at the flange-shell interface and the attachment bolts for two loading conditions as depicted in the sketches below.
a p I
h hg S E 4R 6 "
t y
e
\\
v
/ ' = 25,5.90 465.
C
\\6 O
I J
2.22 The lifting eye geometry is shown T
I in the adjoining sketch where its capa-
)
bility is a function of tear-cut or double shear.
R1 2./25 PM' The shear area is, 2/86 g - a erf 2
A, > 2 (2.22 - 2.125/2) (.875) = 2.026 in With a load of 25380 lbs and considerir.g tha,t an equivalent shear yield is about 60% of the tensile yield, O
TES-3205 2-4
= P/A, = 25380/2.026 = 12527 psi 7
The equivalent shear yield is 0.6 (25,000) = 15,000 psi (min.).
J For all four lifting eyes effective the structural margin is significantly higher.
Under the excessive load requirement the liftir.g eye (s) will eventually fail in shear without compromising the package.
During lifting the loads are distributed from the lifting eye (s) through the outer container shell into the flange and the bolts attaching R1 the two flanges.
In response to the excessive load requirement, it will be 2/86 shown that the outer container details cited above have a significantly higher structural margin than the tear out limit of the lifting eyes.
The same argument is also applicable when considering the tie-down load response (section 2.4.4) for excessive load.
As a result of the lif ting loads, the flanges and the shells are stressed where the maximum stress occurs at the flange-shell interface. The discontinuity shear force V and moment M at this interface are given by the following equations (Ref 2.1) as a fundion of the total axial load P.
P a
~f l
-,- t, I
a = 38.216 1
[
b = 40.942 h
d = 42.566 T-b t =.375 i
P 7
h =.875 d
i 2
l
-2 T2 (h +.5377 f) P V
1.86 ft + Ty [h (2 +.116 f T ) + 1.6103 fh +.866 f )
d 2
y p}
i 2/86 (h T + 1.86 f t) V + h T P y
2 "o
1.5 T h - 3.464 t y
l 1
where:
f = g at I
=
-t (3 a2+5d) 2 T
h3 (d2 _,2) 9 TES-3205 2-5
. ~.
= - - - - - -
- _.. - _ = -.. -.
s.
~
3 2
((d /3) In b/a +.1 M - ah T2*
3 (d,,2) 2 h
Substituting into the above equations, f = 3.786 Ty = 3.0108 T2 =.0507 1
i V, =.00429 P and M =.00872 P 9
l The stresses of interest are:
j
= 1 ngitudinal bending stress in cylinder oxbc i
6M
=.3721 P
=
2 R1 i
a bf = radial bending stress in flange 2/86 r
1(M, - V, h/2) =.0830 P 2
t h
4 oxdc = 1 ngitudinal direct stress in cylinder O
P/ a t =.0222 P
=
Ordf = radial direct stress in flange V /h =.0049 P
=
o g, = tangential bending stress in flange 2 (-15 M, + 7.5 h V, + 1.492 P in b/a)
[d rbf + h
= o 2 (d -a )
2 2
+.4475 P (b _,2))
2
.0676 P
=
Udf = tangential hoop stress in flange 2
3 h /4 t (T V ) =.0469 P
=
y g It can be shown that the maximum stress occurs in the cylindrical O shell and is, TES-3205 2-6
"xbc + "xdc =.3943 P omax l,h V
Although the lifting locations are finite points in space, the continuous longerons and the doublers were included in the design such that the reaction in the vicinity of the flange will be nearly uniform due to shear lag in the shell.
For all four lifting eyes effective, the maximum stress in the shell becomes, o
=.3943 (25380) = 10,007 psi When only one lifting eye is effective, the maximum axial force is approximated by a cosine distribution around the shell periphery where P
E 2 P sin 0 or 35,261 lbs.
.3943 (35261) = 13,903 psi
.. o
=
The minimum tensile yield stress for type 304L stainless steel is 25,000 psi.
The twelve bolts at the flanges are 3/4 -UNF where the stress area 2
per bolt is 0.3724 in.
The bolts are steel where the minimum tensile strength is 125,000 psi.
Therefore, the total required load for failure is more than a magnitude beyond the applied load.
R1 2/86 Pg = 125,000 (12) (.3724) = 558,625 lbs For the excessive load condition this capability is compared to the tear-out of all four lifting eyes where, Pg=7A
=.6 (70,000) (4) (2.026)
= 340,400 lbs 2.4.4 Tie-Down Devices The tie-down arrangement for package shipment, as shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, utilizes the same four attachment points as for the lifting configuration.
This system is capable of withstanding a static force applied to the center of gravity of the package having a vertical component of 2 g's, a horizontal component along the direction in which the vehicle travels of 10 g's and a lateral component of 5 g's.
Therefore, Weight = W = 8460 lbs Fore and Aft g's = G
= 10 FA q
1 TES-3205 2-7
Lateral g's = G
=5 Vertical g's = G
=2 y
Also with reference to Figure 2.2, Oy = 45
-1 42.4 02 = tan g,y9, 3
50.9
=
-1 42.47 03 = tan g
= 41.0
- 19.06 cos 0 1 To derive the maximum cable loading, each principal direction must be examined.
a.
Fore & Aft EFA (20.38) = (48 + 16.12) sin 0 P*
2 R1
,
8460 (10) (20.38) 2/86
= 34,651 64.12 (.776)
O l.P = 2 sO
(.707p 24,502 lbs y
b.
Lateral Wg (20.38) = (48 + 19.30) sin 0 P*
2
,
8460 (5) (20.38) = 16,507 67.30 (.776)
P*
P=2cw0 = 11,672 lbs 1
4 c.
Vertical V
8460 (2) 4 sin 0 4 (.656)
3 nU TES-3205 2-8
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2-9 I
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l 2/86 TES-3205 2-10 4
The total maximum load is the sunwation of the three loads derived abcVe or 42,622 lbs.
As in the previous analysis for lifting, double shear at the lifting / tie-down eye is examined.
From the sketch snown the applicable shear area is,
~- 2.45
I
= 2 [2.45
_ 2.125) (.875)
[
A 2
s cos e3 1
/
2./25}6 2
= 3.819 in
/%
N
/
/
42622/3.819 = 11,161 psi R1 7 =
2/86 The equivalent shear yield was earlier determined as 15,000 psi. As in the litting evaluation, excessive loading would fail the section shown above in shear with no jeopardy to the package.
For the excessive load criterion, the expected failure load of the eye is, Pg = T A =.60 (70,000) (3.819) = 160,400 lbs This load is transferred into a longeron and the shell of the outer container in compression.
The compressive capability along this load path is at least a magnitude above that which induces tear-out.
2.4.5 Package External Surface Temperature Para.
71.43 (g) requires
that, for a
package designed fgr non-exclusive use, the accessible surface teprature shall not exceed 122 P under conditions of ambient still air at 100 F and shade. Thermg1 analysis presented in Table 3.6 projects an average temperature of 113 F for the shipping cask outer container.
Variations in the temperature over the external surface of the outer container are small because of the high thermal conductivity of the stainless steel.
Hence, the above requirement for non-exclusive use shipment is met.
OV TES-3205 2-11
2.5 Standards for Type B Packaging d
The ctandards for Type B packaging are addressed in the following paragraphs to show compliance with each item.
2.5.1 Load Resistance In this analysis the package is regarded as a simple beam supported along its longitudinal axis with a uniformly distributed load equal to five times the weight of the loaded unit.
W = 5 (8460) 42,300 lbs
=
a o
y e e p a y a lb d.f.)
i The maximum bending moment occurring at the center is, R1 2/86 1/8 WL M
=
4
.125 (42300) (43.5) = 23 x 10 in-lbs p
=
The cross section of interest is through the inner container with an outside and inside diameter of 37.53 and 27.33 inches respectively.
sr/64 [(37.53)4 - (26.11)4] = 74.6 x 103 4
I
=
in The maximum bending stress becomes, a=
Mc/I 23 x 104 ( 37.53 )
= 57.9 psi (negligible)
=
3 74.6 x 10 2.5.2 External Pressure l
The following analysis will show that the package will suffer no loss of contents when subjected to an external pressure of 25 psig.
With reference to Figure 2.1, a 90 quadrant of the outer container has an effective radius of 18.92 inch and a thickness of 0.375 inch.
From Ref.
2.2, a conservative stress level can be obtained when considering the three edges simply supported where the maximttn moment becomes, OG TES-3205 2-12
2 M
=.0381 p r q
.0381 (25) (18.92)2 = 341 in-lbs/in R1 2/86 Therefore, the maximum bending stress is, 6 M/t G
6 (341
= 14,549 psi
=
(.375)
The minimum tensile yield strength for type 304L stainless steel is 25,000 psi providing a substantial margin.
2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport This section demonstrates that the package, when subjected to the Normal Conditions of Transport specified in 10 CFR 71.71, meets the standards specified in paragraph 71.51 (a) (1) for Type B packages.
The package is assessed against each condition that is applicable and a determination is made that the performance requirements specified in 71.51 (a) (1) have been satisfied.
2.6.1 Heat Detailed temperature distributions are provided in Section 3.4 for the package under conditions of still ambient air at 100 F and insolation (as derived from the insolation data of 71.71 (c) (1) for the generator on short circuit.
The RM on short circuit is the normal condition for transport.
The derived temperatures for the innermost components of the RTG (shield and fuel capsule assembly) are lower than for an RM operating on load and deployed as per the design operating conditions.
As a point of reference, the T/E module hot junction temperature under the above stated shipping condition is about 75 F lower than the RM oparational condition given the same fuel inventory.
Thus temperatures, pressures, thermal expansions and the resulting stresses under the transport conditions are within the design operating conditions for the RM.
2.6.2 Cold The ambient steady state environment of -40 F air and shade on the package produces no adverse effects. MIL Handbook 5 shows that ultimate and yield strengths and tensile an3 compressive moduli of the cask are actually higher than at room temperature.
Although the cask does not require a seal to meet any of the design criteria, thg lid to cask gasket is silicone rubber which is rated serviceable to -80 F.
At an ambient temperature of ONJ TES-3205 1
2-13
-40 F it is estimated that the average cask temperature would be -19 F.
(s~ i Under the same ambient egndition, the average RM housing surface R1 temperature would be about 63 F.
RM internal temperatures are well within 2/86 allowable operating temperature ranges for the materials of its construction.
It is concluded that no adverse effects could occur as a result of the cold environment.
2.6.3 Pressure Two pressure conditions are examined, a reduction in the external R1 atmospheric pressure to 3.5 psi and also an increased pressure to 20 psi.
From Section 2.5.2, the resulting stresses in the outer container will be 2/86 less than previously derived for the pressure differential of 25 psi.
g 2.6.4 Vibration Except for the tie-down provisions examined in Section 2.4.4, normal vibration effects on the package are negligible.
Although there is no analytical data supporting this conclusion, the R1 cask inner containers, (there are four in existence) as part of the Sentinel 2/86 8S and 1S packages, have been shipped overseas by combinations of motor vehicle and ocean vessel numerous times with no adverse effects.
These casks were originally shipped by authority of DOT Special Permit #5862 and more recently by Certificates of Compliance No. 9085 and No. 9153.
2.6.5 Water Spray The entire exterior surface of the shipping cask is steel. It should R1 be obvious that the unit would be unaffected by a water spray that simulates 2/86 exposure of rainfall as per 71.71 (c) (6).
2.6.6 Free Drop The effectiveness of the package must not be compromised as a result of the impact associated with the 1.2 meter drop.
To meet this requirement the cask configuration consists of two major components, a cask inner container and a cask outer container.
The former is fabricated from low carbon steel with sufficient wall thickness to provide a rigid foundation for the outer container in response to the impact loads.
The outer container is a close fitting shell fabricated from type 304L stainless eteel.
This material was selected for its ductility (greater than 50%
R1 elongation) such that an evelope is maintained for the cask inner container.
2/86 To estimate the maximum stress in the cask inner container the work of von Karman is applied by investigating a moving stress wave in the medium. The strain becomes, o
where v is the velocity at impact and C is the stress wave velocity.
g TES-3205 2-14
v=gf2 gh 3
C
=\\-
6 For the cask and e ironmeng/in of interest, b = 48 inches, E g 29 x 10 pgg 4
and P= 7.376 x 10 lb-sec Therefore, E = 9.713 x 10 in/in. From Hooke's Law, G = E E E 28,000 psi This value is well below the minimum yield strength of 35,000 psi.
Since the geometry of the inner container is basically a " thick walled" vessel negating any bending modes and the stress intensity is well below yield, the inner container provides a substantial foundation for the cask outer container.
R1 The outer container is designed to be a close fit such that no space 2/86 is available to allow crushing or local buckling.
A ductile material was selected such that any strain in the inner container can be accomodated by the outer container without excess deformation of the latter and a continuous envelope is maintained.
Given a rigid foundation for the outer container, the only stress that can be introduced into the outer container, regardless of impact orientatiaon, is compression.
Neither tension nor bending can take place.
An impact on either the top or bottom of the package implies a conpressive load transmitted directly into the inner container. A side impact transmits the compression through the flanges and a longeron. A corner impact results in a local coining at an edge of the outer container. Thus, following this incident, the package is tranportable and has not lost it structural effectiveness.
2.6.7 Corner Drop NOT APPLICABLE.
This test applies only to packages which are constructed primarily of wood or fiberglass and do not exceed 110 lbs gross weight.
2.6.8 Penetration From the geometry and materials of construction, it.is obvious that the package cannot be penetrated by a 3.2 cm diameter, 6 kg, bar dropped through one meter.
2.6.9 Compression For packages not more than 11,000 lbs in weight, a compressive load applied uniformly to the top and bottom of the package equal to either five times the package weight or 1.85 psi multiplied by the maximum vertical R1 projected area of the package (whichever is greater) shall not reduce the 2/86 effectiveness of the package. The potential loads are, TES-3205 2-15
_.-_.-+w-
+ -
e e v
^ F
L i
j P = 5 (8460) = 42,300 lbs I
and P = 1.85 (41.48) (42.57) = 3267 lbs i
i The cross sectional area of the outer container upper surface is, 1
2 A=2 w(19.10) (.375) + 1.988 (1) (4) = 52.96 in i
R1 l
'Ihe maximum compressive stress beoxes, 2l86 l
l 0 = P/A = 42300/52.96 = 799 psi (negligible) i I
I I
I
[
t 1
i i
f 4
I I
1 i
I 4
1 I
c I
i l
l l
TES-3205 2-16 l
i
.m,,,_..
2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions 1
The package, when subjected to the hypothetical accident conditions s
as specified in 71.73 of 10 CFR Part 71, meets the standards specified in 71.51 (b) of 10 CFR Part 71 as demonstrated in the following paragraphs.
With respect to these standards, the critical member of the package is the fuel capsule assembly installed within the shield assembly (clad shield body with attached clad shield plug).
Analysis is provided to show that the result of the hypothetical accident sequence would be (at least) an intact shield / fuel capsule cssembly with no breech of the fuel containment capability of the strength member (primary containment member).
This configuration would retain the radioactive material within the fuel capsule and, by design, exhibit an external dose rate of less than one rem per hour at one meter from its external surface (see Chapter 5).
Hence, the standards (71.51 (b)) are met.
The accident sequence consists of the following test conditions to be sequentially applied to the package: free drop followed by puncture followed by thermal.
Ambient air temperatures before and after the tests must be assumed constant at a value between -20 F and 100 F which is most unfavorable for the feature under consideration. Damage caused by each test is cumulative.
The evaluation of the ability of the package to withstand j
any one test must consider the damage resulting from the previous tests.
1 The residual configuration from a test becomes the initial configuration for the next test in the series.
i p
The configuration for the first test (free drop) is the nominal 1
()
package: RM installed within the inner and outer containers.
In the analysis to follow, no credit is taken for the structural integrity of the cask containers for the free drop.
Analysis is provided to examine the R1 effect of the drop on both the RM housing and the shield assembly.
2/86 Although some fin damage may occur, it is concluded that the housing is intact af ter the drop and that the shield assembly remains intact and within the housir.g.
From the drop analysis presented herein and from consideration of the IAEA Safety Series 33 drop test performed on the fuel capsule assembly (Section 2.8) it is concluded that there will be no loss of fuel containment capability and no loss of shield integrity.
The configuration for the punctare test is an RM containing the shield / fuel capsule assembly.
The puncture test acting on the housing constitutes a relatively mild environment due to the relative thickness of the housing and/or the protection afforded by the fin.
Puncture of the housing is not expected.
The nominal configuration for the thermal envirordnent is an RM housing w/ fins containing the shield / fuel capsule assembly.
Thermal analysis (Chapter 3) demonstrates that this environment would quickly (within a few minutes) effect melting of the aluminum fins and housing with little transfer of heat to the internals.
This results in the release of the shield / fuel capsule assembly such that it is exposed directly to the radiation environment.
Subsequent analysis assumed the shield / fuel capsule O
TES-3205 2-17
assembly was exposed directly to the fire (30 minute) environment. Maximum temperatures in the fuel capsule and liner occur in the post-fire period.
The maximum temperatures are well below the critical (melt) temperatures for j
these components.
Maximum thermal stresses in the shield occur during the post-fire cooling period.
The stresses are far below the yield stress for the shield material (see Section 2.7.3.2).
2.7.1 Free Drop For the hypothetical thirty (30) foot drop and impact against a nonyielding surface, all impact orientations will be evaluated.
As shown in Figure 2.3 the shield / fuel capsule assembly is surrounded on its side and bottom surfaces by Min-K insulation, a very compliant material where its crush-up capability will absorb available kinetic energy of the shield / fuel capsule assembly during impact. For an impact on the top of the package the Macor insulation shell and thermoelectric elements will be damaged.
However, a conservative approach will be assumed where credit will not be taken for the strain energy of these deformations or fracture.
In addition to the protection available from the housing, fabricated R1 from 6061-T6 aluminum alloy, and the compliant insulation, the shield / fuel 2/86 capsule assembly is canned within a.025 inch thick shell of type 321 stainless steel that provides a protective envelope.
Type 321 is extremely
ductile, in excess of 50% elongation at temperature, and the response stresses are always compressive since it is backed up by the rigid shield as a foundation.
(]m In the analyses to follow, it will be shown that for each principle impact orientation, a.
The compliant insulation will absorb all or a significant portion of the available energy (excepting upper surface orientation).
b.
The aluminum housing will not be breeched.
The stainless steel shell surrounding the shield will remain as c.
a continuous envelope.
During the impact the RTG and its components will decelerate.
A conservative upper bound of the deceleration is derived from Ref. 2.3 where the deceleration in g's is given as a function of drop height h where, hh G=
t represents the shock rise time in msec.
For steel impacting concrete the shock rise time is from 1 to 2 msec.
The former will be applied here such
that, a
TES-3205 2-18
OBEER COMPLIANCE PAD RTG PRELOAD ASSY.
- - - e 3
r N
I l
INSIDE CONTAltJER
+
INTERNAL EtaVELOPE.
mw'P h M N'mv 3
. 3
[
j
.rje gtemm j
H0031AJG(6061-TQ f
M
- xxxgs
~ @
i SmELD (gU '4T1 LocATI 6 N
3MIELD CLAD (3Z1 SS)
( 61 Tb k
D Q
F0EL D
i t
CF30'E i
t N
N k
///[. /,
MIN - K INSOLATION
. //
s s
O i ;-;
=
N s
\\
\\ u / / / / u/ / /uuni/unxu// /u nin a DISK SPRING 5 I
i FIGURt.
ZJ SENTINAL 53 RTG MTHIN INNER CONTAINER i
1 TES-3205 2-19
G=
Y30 (12) = 1366 g's V
This value is very conservative in that for the most severe impact orientation, where the package is inverted, the 3/4 inch rubber compliance pad (see Figure 2.3) will elastica 11y compress such that its significant displacement suggests a lower level of deceleration.
2.7.1.1 Side Impact Orientation.
At impact the shield / fuel capsule 86 assembly inertia will crush Min-K 1800 insulation.
Recently, compression tests were conducted on three coupons (2.5" diameter and 1.5" thick) where the coupons were not laterally constrained.
The test results were nearly identical for all three coupons where the typical load-displacement curve is shown in Figure 2.4.
The tests were terminated at or near the 5000 lb level.
The area under a stress-strain curve represents the material's strain energy capability per unit volume of effective material.
From Figure 2.4 3
the area under the curve is 233.9 in-lbs/in.
The shield / fuel capsule assembly can be geometrically represented by conical frustrums and cylindrical volumes.
The crushable volume by projecting a typical section is shown in the sketch below.
ph
\\
V ip
/
or f
W*y' v -i N
I c
i t
j
'4 j
Mi @K 1800 HOJ5WCe WALL y
?Q
'R I
h (B + gBB' + B')
Volume
=
2 2 (2 0 - sin 2 a )
1/2 [rR where:
B
=
-r3 3
y 2
2 (2 a - sin 2 a I 1/2 rR
-r B'
=
2 2
2
~1
= cos a y
~I 0
= cos 2
TES-3205 2-20
F W U R W.
E.k COMPRESSIOM LOAD - DnOPLACEMENT DETA Fom. UNCONSTRAINED MN -K WSCO T
J W~
r000, l
"m*T m m TED 4000
$ gg, O
0 N Toc --@a W
h600-N'
~
~~
1 0
~
b o 500
'a g<
2000-y, gy, m-gg,
0 0
O
.R
.N
.Gr
.6 1.0 DISPLACEMENT IN.
~
o
.i
.z
.y
.4 5
.6 IN/IN.
STRAIN
~
i 1
O SPECIMEN D IA = E.*j lu.
mlCKN253 = j. ) IM.
l TES-3205 2-21
Considering the entire assembly with R = 6.75, the total compressible 3
(
projected volume of Min-K 1800 is 559.4 in.
The weight of interest is 180 lbs and the drop height is thirty feet.
Therefore, the available energy
becomes, E = 180 (30) (12) = 64,800 in-lbs The strain energy available is the multiple of area under the stress-strain curve and the volume.
E = 559.4 (233.9) = 130,840 in-lbs s
Hence, the strain energy capability far exceeds the available energy and the shield receives a ' soft' impact as a cosine distributed compressive loading or pressure.
During the side-on impact the R'IG must laterally displace until it strikes the inside wall of the cask.
Initially one or two cooling fins will either plastically bend or fracture at their interface with the fin stubs.
The fins are frangable since each fin section is fastened to a fin stub by means of only two quick disconnect thumb screws.
Failure will be local and have negligible influence at the fin stub-housing interface.
R1 2/86 When the housing impacts the cask, the housing will be locally deformed, however, this deformation is self limiting.
The protruding l
portion of structure is the bolted flange connecting the upper and lower housing sections.
The flange will be locally flattened by some displacement 6 (n) as shown in Figure 2.5.
The extremities of the housing cannot radially V
displace or deform due to the housing's rigid end closures. The fin stubs act as longerons that stiffen the housing shell.
Two circumferential impact orientations are examined, (1) direct impact on a fin stub and (2) an impact betwen two fin stubs.
6 is 0.20 and 0.43 inches respectively for the two cases.
max This deformation places the upper and lower housing shells in tension where the maximum strain is, f(2.44)2 + (.43)2 - 2.44 000) = 1.54%
2.44 This is not sufficient to breech the housing since the elongation for 6061-T6 aluminum is reported at 8-10%.
The above analysis is very conservative.
For examplo, the R'IG is conpressively preloaded within the cask with a force between 4800 and 6750 lbs.
This approach has taken to facilitate the response to transportation dynamic loads such as shock and vibration. When considering the side impact orientation a significant level of energy is dissipated in friction at both top and bottom RTG surfaces.
Credit for this energy was not taken when
(
evaluating the impact re:ponse.
TES-3205 2-22
O' 5
t=
I j
ik 1
l 2
l
,i T
l d
i 2o I
e D
Ib l !
a[
=*
2I s
E~
l a
E la l
Fia ad i
A 8
Ell
/
aF Ws I
/
iiig h
I I E
I I
l I
s c
[
~~
o I
I*I o
i TES-3205 2-23
Assume an average preload of about 6000 lbs and a sliding friction coefficent of 0.20.
Therefore, F = H N =.2 (6000) = 1200 lbs at each end The sliding displacement, assuming the RTG is centered in the cask, is the distance between the housing flange and the inner surface of the cask or 5.25 inches.
The work associated with friction is 1200 (5.25) (2) or 12600 in-lbs, a reasonable percentage of the available energy.
/86 2.7.1.2 Upper Surface Impact Orientation.
During the impact on the upper surface, the shield / fuel capsule assembly decelerates as its inertia crushes the relatively fragile thermoelectric module.
However, its motion (and the RM's) is constrained by the rigid support structure or RM preload assembly pedestal between the RM and the cask where there is a direct compressive load path (see Figure 2.3).
The preload assembly will withstand the applied force.
The cross section area of the preload assembly, which comp 1ptely spans the upper closure of the RM in one direction, is 12.23 in.
Considering the total RM weight of 276.2 lbs and assuming the deceleration upper bound previously derived at 1366 g's, the compressive stress in the upper closure is,
(
G = WG/A =
[2.23
= 30,850 psi This stress is less than the reported minimum yield strength for 6061 aluminum of 35,000 psi.
A similar force, but limited to the inertia of the shield / fuel capsule assembly of 180 lbs, provides a compressive stress in the stainless steel clad at the upper end of the shield.
The area of this circular section is r/4 (4.88)2 2
or 18.7 in.
Therefore, the stress becomes, a = 180 (1366) = 13,150 psi 18.7 The maximum temperature during transportation is 1106 F.
At this temperature the yield and ultimate strengths for type 321 are 24,000 and 52,000 psi respectively, and the elongation is in excess of 50%.
A flexural stress state is also distributed in the upper closure, as depicted in the sketch of Figure 2.6, due to the inertia of the housing mass.
To determine the maximura stress the closure is modeled by finite elements and a solution obtained using the ANSYS general purpose program.
The model boundry conditions included zero axial displacement at the extremities of the support pedestal and zero slope at the periphery of the closure.
The tractions included body forces within the closure due to its TES-3205 2-24 r
mr
h O
M60*EE 26 MAurM47A;W - EAD WARC7' d
J75 r>s*? -~
ty, M "
~
~
secricw A-A I
\\
l
\\
l
~ Atwsm I
sano/ne:o<mek my
\\
I l
\\
O
)
s N _ T/E FAM l y
[
I p sums _
emme g,,,f owgcz,osuer ganp
- RTG PRElaAp / 55y 1
1 A
A
<<<,<//77,
<<<</<<<,,,,<
CASK LIO V'O TES-32_05 -
2-25
own weight times deceleration and a uniform axial load around the periphery l
/' '
due to the inertia of the housing cylindrical shell, fin stubs and lower E\\
closure. The weight associated with this latter traction is 34.8 lbs.
The maximum equivalent stress occurs in bending at the periphery (upper closure - housing interface) and is, o
= 23.40 psi /g g
Assuming the deceleration upper bound of 1366 g's the maximum stress becomes 31,964 psi, slightly below the reported minimum yield of 35,000 psi.
2.7.1.3 Lower Surface Impact Orientation.
The response for an impact against the lower surface of the package is similar to the side impact response in that Min-K insulation becomes effective in absorbing energy by crushing.
In addition to compressing insulation, the six disc springs will flatten.
The force necessary to flatten a disc spring is 1560 lbs and is associated with a displacement of.116 inch.
Therefore, for six springs in the series-parallel arrangement applied in the design, R1 P = 3 (1560) = 4680 lbs 2/86 6 = 2 (.116) =.232 in This energy becomes, O
E = hP6 (4680) (.232) = 543 in-lbs
=
The central cylinder of Min-K has a height or thickness of 1.5 inch with a diameter of 5.35 inch. Therefore, its strain energy becevnes, E = w/4 (5.35)2 (1.5) (233.9) = 7887 in-lbs Additional insulation is crushed frorr tha projected arca of the shield's frustrum. This area is, A = r/4 [(7.344)2 - (6.425)2] = 9,94 in2
However, its compressive displacement is limited to the flattening of springs and the crushing of the previously examined insulation or about 0.85 +.232 or 1.082 in.
The effective strain becomes 1.082/5.25 =.206 in/in.
From Figure 2.4 the stress becomes approximately 240 psi.
Hence, the energy is
(.206) (240) = 24.72 in-lbs per cubic inch of effective material.
3 The volume is 9.94 (5.25) or 52.19 in. The strain energy becomes, E = 24.72 (52.19) = 1290 in-lbs i O l
i TES-3205 2-26
O Suming the strain energy derived above, a reasonable percentage of the available energy, implies a soft impact response such that an impact for this orientation is much less severe for the stainless steel clad surrounding the shield than the response associated with impacting the upper surface of the package.
The response of the housing will include deflection of both upper and lower housing closures.
The latter deflects due to inertia of the shield / fuel capsule assembly, however, there is a.055 inch gap between the center section of the lower closure and the cask to limit the stress.
During the design phase of the RM the lower closure was analyzed for the preload applip to the shield assembly. The results indicated a maximum stress of 482 x 10 psi per inch of deflection. Therefore, for.055 inch, o = 482 x 103 (.055) = 26,510 psi The minimum yield strength is 35,000 psi.
The upper closure will deflect due to its own inertia plus inertia of the 11.6 lb RM preload assembly (see Figure 2.3).
For the inertia of the R1 closure mass, 2/86 6 (center deflection) = 0.689 x 10 in/g o
= 8.767 psi /g max The reported stresses are equivalent stresses per the energy of distortion criterion.
Due to the inertia of the support pedestal,
-6 6 = 0.956 x 10 in/lb/g
" max = 1.486 psi /lb/g Therefore, assuming 1366 g's, the maximum stress becomes, O
= 1366 [8.767 + 11.6 (1.486)] = 35,522 psi max When one assunes a minimum yield strength for 6061-T6 at 35,000 psi, the plastic deformation would be negligible.
If the material's yield strength is a nominal value, no permanent deformation would occur.
l 1
v TES-3205 2-27 l
l
2.7.2 Puncture The second environment in the hypothetical accident sequence is a free drop of the package through a distance of 40 inches onto a stationary and vertical mild steel bar or rod of 6 inch diameter with its top edge rounded to a radius of not more than inch.
Following the 30 foot drop and impact against a non yielding surface, the resulting configuration is the intact RTG. Potential penetration of the RTG housing, fabricated from 6061-T6 aluminum alloy, is examined. From Ref.
2.4 the minimum thickness of the housing to resist penetration is given by the empirical equation,
= (W/cr ).71 tp l
where W is the RM weight of 276 lbs and cr represents the ultimate tensile strength of the aluminum which is 42,000 psi (minimum). Substituting in the above equation, t =.028 inch.
p The minimum thickness of the housing is the cylindrical housing shell at 0.236 inch.
However, with the radial cooling fins it is impossible for the 6" diameter pin to contact the cylindrical surface. Therefore, the only vulnerable surface is the lower closure where its minimum thickness is 0.500 inch, much thicker than that derived from the penetration equation.
2.7.3 Thermal The nominal configuration for the thermal environment is an intact RM housing containing the shield / fuel capsule assembly. The initial effect of the thermal environment is to quickly melt the aluminum housing which reduces the configuration to the intact shield / fuel capsule assembly.
The thermal environment was assumed applied to this configuration for the full 30 minute period.
The post thermal period was analyzed to a point in time for which steady state conditions had been attained. Details of the thermal analysis are presented in Chapter 3.
The following section present the major findings of the thermal analysis and analyses of pressures, differential thermal expansion and thermal stresses occurring over the thermal and post thermal periods.
2.7.3.1 Sunrnary of Pressures and Temperatures.
Maximum temperatures of individual components occurring as a result of the thermal environment are presented in Table 3.10.
Maximum temperatures of the shield body and plug, shield clad, strength member and liner are well below their respective material melt temperatures.
Internal pressures which may result within the primary fuel containment member (strength member) are insignificant when compared to the capability of this unit.
The strength member was tested to an external pressure of 1000 bars - see Section 2.8, IAEA Special Form Testing.
Internal pressures which may develop within the shield body and O
shield plug (gas gaps between shield and shield clad) are addressed in Section 2.7.3.3.
TES-3205 2-28
(D 2.7.3.2 Differential Thermal Expansion.
The effects of g
differential thermal expansion in the clad shield member are addressed in Section 2.7.3.3. below.
2.7.3.3 Stress, Pressure and Thermal Expansion Analysis.
The biological shield with the fuel capsule has been thermally analyzed for the fire environment.
The maximum thermal stresses occur at 0.05 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months after the initial exposure to the fire, at the time when maximum thermal gradients are achieved.
To perform the thermal stress analysis, the shiold body, fabricated from U - 3/4 Ti, was subdivided into 152 finite elements for a solution utilizing the ANSYS program (Figure 2.7).
Each finite element is a ring with r, 0 and Z displacement degrees of freedom at each node required to define the element.
Figure 2.8 presents the isotherms resulting from the thermal analysis.
The gradients are not severe due to the high conductivity of the shield material.
The minimum and maximum temperatures are 997 and 1123 F respectively.
The thermal stresses are a function of both elastic mgulus and the coefficiegt of thermal expansion.
For U - 3/4 Ti, E = 26 x lO psi and a =
- in/in F (Ref. 2.5).
6.4 x 10 h3 The solution indicates a maximum equivalent stress (Mises) of 7250 V
psi at node 110 (see Figure 2.9).
This stress intensity is far below the yield stress.
The shield also includes a.025 inch thick stainless steel clad (Type 321).
The thermal expansion coefficients of the clad agd shield are
-6 different, 9.3 x 10 in/in F for the former and 6.4 x 10 in/in F for the latter.
Following the impacts, two possible conditions can exist, (1) the internal preload, or a portion of the preload, exists where the top and bottom faces of the clad are compressed against the rigid shield, or (2) no preload exists and the clad is free to expand away from the shield with no induced stress. The more critical environment is the former.
The inner clad shell is 4.822 inchgs in length where its maximum average temperature in the fire becomes 1075 F.
The change in length of the clad is, s
E
= 9. 3 x 10 (4.822) (1075-70)
~
c
. 04507 incli
=
For the idertical length of shield, i
E
= 6. 4 x 10 (4.822) (1075-70) s O
=. 03102 inch.
s TES-3205 2-29
O
.9. /88 2.654
/.1/0 l
1 s.s e
,n 7;/SS 15e
(.3 i
i l
t T-I l'iI\\
i IN4 itr l
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'i f
/.944;,
5s:
To l
i n
1
/N IG t7 j
i g
l to it;.
8 9
I 2
3 4
l srx. o 2 39/ ~
S.Emb2 i
1 dimensioca in inches 1
FIGURE 2.7 i
SHIELD FINITE ELEMENT MODEL O
TES-3205 2-30 i
i
/Q)
.9.18 8 2.466
/.1/0 l
=
e.sto e
~
_. i iluv 1
7 /39 s
--Ik 4e90 i_w'_i.\\
l il
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, ~,,,
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/
.]l\\l I
i /
six. o 2 39/ ~
S.6d2
=g dimensions in inches All Temperature in *F FIGURE 2.8 SHIELD ISOTHERMS O
TES-3205 2-31
O 4
(.
. (/ l l ANSYS 85/.7/te
---.N 11.5306 fI I
POST 1
~
PLOT NO.
1 1
STEP =1
(~ 1 ITER =1
~
STRESS' PLOT
! h_! ! !I SIGE ORIG SCALING ll l [
ZU=1 DIST=4.6 lll XF=1.82 YF=4.18
o07-ll DNAX=.0555 iso N DSCA=8.29 l
l l
P!X=7248 r-9 MN=133 L
,.l I l
INC=500 1a 0
g,-/,-$
1.. =.-
.:.=
1 l
i I I I t/
~ ~
l l i I I t/
I 1 1/
/l ITl_,
5 S SHIELD THE ST IT FIRE 1
FIGURE 2.9 SHIELD ISOSTRESSES O
TES-3205 1
2-32
n Therefore, the differential expansion is.04507.03102 or 01405
(]
inch.
This is equivalent to a strain of.01405 (100)/4.822 or 0.291%. This implies a very small plastic strain since the yield strength is defined at 0.2%.
Geometrically, this also implies an extremely small buckle pattern as shown in the preceeding sketgh. It is important to note that the elongation of Type 321 stainless at 1100 F is greater than 30%.
A similar condition exists in the circumferential direction. At room temperature there is a nominal five mil gap between the inner clad shell and the shield material.
As a result of the fire environment, the interference i
is approximately.001 inch implying an insignificant strain of 0.052%.
Failure at a weld is also impossible since a relative displacement i
cannot develop at either shell-closure interfaces.
The same argument is applicable with respect to the external shell of clad.
In addition to clad / shield interfaces the differential thermal expansions of the capsule strength member relative to the shield were investigated.
The design provides gaps between these members and the majority of the gap dimensions are preseved during the fire environtrent.
That is, no interferences are developed.
Another possible concern is the membrane stress in the outer clad shell from gas expansion between the clad and the shield.
During assembly assume that the helium at atmospheric gressure is at approximately 70 F.
At an average temperature of about 1100 F the air expands where the pressure
becomes,
( 1100 + 460 ) = 43.3 psi 14.7 p
=
70 + 460 Therefore, the differential pressure becomes 28.6 psi.
The maximum radius of the outer shell is 3.642 inch.
The circumferential membrane stress becomes, y, p R, 28.6 (.642) t
.023 4529 psi
=
At 1100 F, the yield strength for this material is 18,000 - 20,000 psi.
2.7.4 Inunersion - Fissile Material Not applicable. The package does not contain fissile material.
TES-3205 2-33 e-+
-m r.
m v+*-o+
2.7.5 Immersion - All Packages O
subjected to water pressure equivalent to inanersion under a head of water of Par. 71.73 (c) (5) states that a separate, undamaged specimen must be at least 15m for a period of not less than eight hours.
The equivalent external water pressure for this environment is 21 psig.
As per the definition, the package to be considered is the nominal shipping configuration - an RTG installed in the shipping containers.
The effects of the external water pressure on the outer container structure would be nil.
The shipping cask is a sealed unit.
The outer container includes a R1 silicon rubber seal between its body and lid.
This seal is capable of 2/86 preventing ingress of water under the 21 psig pressure.
O l
u TES-3205 2-34
2.7.6 Sumary of Damage The end result of the hypothetical accident sequence (drop, puncture,
'N thermal) is an intact shield / fuel capsule assembly.
The fuel containment capability of the primary containment member (strength member) has not been compromised.
There will be no release of the radioactive fuel which is contained within the strength member.
External radiation dose rates for this configuration are (by design) less than one rem / hour at one meter from the surface of the configuration.
The consequences of the immersion environment (for all packages) are less severe than those for the accident sequence.
Hence, the requirements of 71.51 (a) (2) have been met.
2.8 Special Form The contents of this package qualify as "special form" by virtue of the fact that the fuel is doubly encapsulated in a heat source assembly that has been tested to criteria that meet or exceed the test requirements for special form material as specified in Para. 10 CFR 71.77.
The actual tests applied to a sample heat source assembly containing fuel simulant are shown in Figure 2.10.
Of these tests only the impact test, percussion test and thermal test are required by 10 CFR Part 71.
(Note that the banding test of 10 CFR does not apply since the heat source U
length to diameter ratio is less than 10. )
The tests to which the heat source was subjected are those prescribed in the International Atomic Energy Agency's Safety Series 33, "A Guide to the Safe Design, Construction and Use of Radioisotopic Power Generators for Certain Land and Sea Applications."
Specifically, the tests are as specifed in Appendix I of that document, reproduced herein as Figure 2.10.
Sumary test results are as stated in the Certification Document provided by the Test Facility, Oak Ridge National Lab, and reporduced herein as Figure 2.11.
2.8.1 Description The strontium fluoride was processed at the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) at Hanford, Washington.
Basically the fluoride conversion process is as follows: A volume of aqueous feed solution containing etrontium is neutralized to ph 8-9 with sodium hydroxide solution.
Solid sodium fluoride is added to the solution to precipitate SrF.
The resulting slurry is digested at approximately 80 C for one hour with air sparging and is then filtered.
The filter cake is washed with water and fired at approximately 1100 C in argon for several hours.
After cooling, the SrF is pulverized and loaded into the WESF capsules by impact consolidation, bhich is essentially a cold step pressing operation.
Complete properties of the fuel can be found in ref. 2.6.
The fuel to be used in the Sentinel SS heat source is SrF which 2
O TES-3205 2-35
FIGURE 2.10 (APPENDIX 1, IAEA SAFETY SERIES 33)
HEAT SOURCE QUAIJFICATION TEST REQUthEMENTS I.0 GENERAI'
2. 2 Percussion test 1.1 De tests described la parasrephs 2.!
2.6 teclusive shall be applied
'she espoule shall be placed on a shest of leed which is supported to semples or prototypes of capsules constructed as vor use in a generator except by a. smooth solid surface and struck by the flat fece of a steel billet so as to that their radioec'dve content may be simulated by inactive material of the same or similar nature. His implies that, subsequet to satisfactory conclusion of produce an impact equivalent to that resultig imm the free fall of 7 kilograms through 1 meter. N flat face of the tdliet shall be 2.5 centimeters la diameter the testa, full inspection will be carried out during the production of capsule for with the edges roemded off to a radius of not less then 3 millimeters, & lead, operational use to ensure that the sesadertie schieved by the samples or proto-of hardness number 3.5 to 4.5 on the Brinell acele and not more than 25 milli-types are malsteined.
meters thick, aball cover an area greater them that covered by the espoule, h addition, every loaded capsule shall be subjected to the leekage A fresh surface of lead shall be used in each test.
test ladicated km paragraph 2.6 prior to installation la a generator.
2.3 hrmal test 1.2 h capsule shall be subjected to each of the tests indicated in Section 2 below, techMar those for corrosion sad vibration where appropriate ne capsule shall be heated to a temperature of 800*C and it shall for the particulst application.
be held at that temperature for a period of 30 minutes before being allowed to cool.
l H
1.3 I the teste de not require to be carried out et a particular tempera-ture, than they should be done at the operettag temperature if thle Is practicable.
2.4 nermal shock test "b
1.4 h teste shall be carried out in such a way as to meure that the
I * "**I""* *P'"N ""P'"**"
l sample capsule suffers maximum damage.
P aged in water et zero temperature where it shall be left for 10 1.5 After each of the toets, the espoule shall be shown to have retained its original leak-tightaase within the securacy of the chosen method.
2. 5 Wessum test i
1.6 A efferent sample or prototype capsule may be used for each of the h capsule shall be shown to be able to reelst se enternal pressure testa except in the case of that indicated in paragraph 2.6.
IM
, i.e. I Newtons per squam meter.
2. 0 TEST METHODS 2.8 Isakene test 2.1 knpoet test a test rehtee to b mq*ements d pengraph 1.5 Any canmonly 5
necepted leakage test may be used, provided it is of a senaltivity comparable with h capsule shall fall on to the target from a height of 9 meters, h the detection of leakage of 10-4 (STP) cm3/sec. E this degree of leakage can be target aball be a flet, borisontal surface of such a character that any increase in detected the test requirements will not have been met.
Its resistance to deplacement or deformation upon impact by the capsule would not significantly increase the damage to the capsule.
2.7 Other testa 4
For certain applications, cormston, vibration, irradiation and creep testa may be specified by the competent authority.
Modified by TES Dwg 015-800000 to require 10 sensitivity and 10 pass / fail criteria. See Appendix 4.4.1 of this application.
R1 t
2/86 I
i
AK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY
57 C"ict so, x CA< RIDGE TENNESSEE 3 631 wMRA*ED B' va*TP. MARIETTA ENERGY SYSTEUS
.NC.
September 26 1985 i
I Mr. John F, Yogt i
Project Manager I
leledyne Energy Systems 110 West Timonium Road
.imonium. Maryland 21093-3163 i
imar John:
Certification of IAEA Testing of the Sentinel SS Heat Source capsule for the 180 Watttt) Strontium-90 Generator
. luring tne period of September 4 to September 12. 1985 the heat source cap-sule for the Sentinel 5S strontium-90 generator was tested by the methods Mid out in the IAEA publication Safety Series No.' 33 (Guide to the Safe Design. Construction, and Cse of Radioisotopic Power Generators for Certain
'.and and Sea Applications. IAEA. Vienna. 1970).
The exact date test con-litions. and leak rates before and after each test are given in Table 1.
Table 1.
IAEA Testing Date Test Conditions Befor After ~
9 (; - f;5 Drop Test 9.0 ':1 2.0 x 10-9 1.4 x 10-8 9-05-85 Percussion 1.4 Kg x 5 m 1.4 x.10-8 1.4 x icd'
%09-85 Thermal 800*C for 30 min.
1.4 x 10-8 1.8 x 10-8 9-11-85 Thermal Shock 800*C - 0'C 1.8 x 10-8 2.4 x 10 9 9-12-85 Pressure 1000 bars (15 Kosi) 2.4 x 10-8 2.8 x 10-8 As can be seen from the leak rate data, the highest leak rate measured with our helium leak rate detector was 2.8 x 10-8 std. ecisec.
Since this is j
och less than the 1 x 10-4 std. cc see roquire'd by the IAEA test. I cer-
-ify that this capsule has successfully mc.'all test requirements.
1 i
FIGURE 2.11 IAEA TEST CERTIFICATION TES-3205 2-37 l
--, _ -, _ _ _ _... _, - -. - -. ~ ~.
~
Mr John F Vogt. Project Manager -
September 26, 1985 At ached you will finri a copy of the technician's logbook entries. photo-graphs. and leak rate testing data for the IAEA testing.
Very truly yours.
k lJ.A.
-s Tompkins Radioisotope Development and Tachnology Operations Division
A'."

d r w i.nrlosures cr-H.
Adair F.
DeVore N.
W.
Haft
_... Mezg:t 1.
Ottinger W.
E.
Pasko. DOE GRO W.
Remini. DOE HQ
~
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Row s.
A.
Setaro 1
l FIGURE 2.11 (Cont'd. )
TES-3205 2-38 f
. ~.. -. - - -,
.~,
has been encapsulated at WESF.
The SrF within the WESF capsules is 2
extracted as sintered agglomerates, pulverized to smaller pieces and hot (n) pressed in a graphite die to a " puck" or pellet about 2.56 inches in diameter and 1.16 inches thick.
Hot pressing and reencapsulation of the fuel is accomplished at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
The liner assembly consists of a tubular housing with two welded end caps.
One of the end caps is welded and tested for leak tight integrity and weld quality prior to any hot cell operations.
Details of the liner assembly and internal shims are provided in Figures 2.12 and 2.13.
After the fuel pucks are inserted into the liner the final weld closure is performed in a hot cell by a remote, automatic TIG process using weld parameters established in the development program.
The strength member or outer capsule consists of a deep bored cylinder with one end integral and the open end machined to accomodate a threaded and welded end cap.
Final weld closure of the end cap, following the insertion of the clean (decontaminated) liner assembly into the strength member, is an automatic plasma-arc type weld performed using weld parameters established in a development program.
A stainless steel handling knob is threaded into the end cap to facilitate transfer of the assembly between adjoining hot cells and to permit lowering of the heat source into the R'IG.
The knob is removed after capsule installation.
Details of the strength member and ' handling knob are shown in Figures 1.4, 2.14 and 2.15.
The strength member is designed to meet the test requirements of IAEA Safety Series 33 previously described in Figure 2.10.
[ ] Paragraphs 2.8.2 through 2.8.5 v
These sections of the Regulatory Guide 7.9 pertain specifically to the special form testing as prescribed in 10 CFR 71. As previously stated, the actual testing performed is as per Appendix I of IAEA Safety Series 33 (reproduced herein a Figure 2.10).
Sumary results of this testing are provided in Figure 2.11.
With regard to the pressure test (test 2.8 of Figure 2.12),
additional analysis is provided below in Section 2.8.6.
The sumary statement required by Regulatory Guide 7.9 is provided in Section 2.8.7.
2.8.6 External Pressure on Strength Member The fuel capsule strength member, fabricated from Hastelloy C-276 is a cylindrical shell of 0.384 inch (min.) thickness with end closures.
The end closures, one of which is threaded and seal welded, are 0.744 inch in thickness.
The inside and outside radii are 1.476 and 1.860 inches respectively.
The environment of interest is an external pressure of 14,500 psi per IAEA Series 33 representing deep submergence.
A prototype heat source assembly" has been hydrostatically tested to this level where the test specimen includes a fuel simulant of lava. The fuel is an attribute in that it provides a rigid foundation to restrain any large plastic deformation or p collapse (instability).
Q)
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The structural properties for Hastelloy C-276 at room temperature are tabulated below.
Minimum Values per ASTM 8574-83a Typical Values l
Ult. tenslie strength, psi 100,000 115,000 Yield strength, psi 41,000 52,000 Elongation, %
40 59 6
Elastic Modulus, psi
29. 8 x 10 The minimum values will be used in the analysis to follow.
An estimate of the strength member capability can be obtained from the classical thick wall cylindrical shell equations where the maximum stress occurs at the inside surface.
The circumferential and meridian stresses of interest are, P
"O =
(1) 2 v
b -a l
h i
e =
(2) x where:
b = outside radius = 1.860
)
a = inside radius = 1.476 Since Hastelly C-276 is a very ductile material, an equivalent stress rather than a maximum principal stress can be compared with the yield strength to determine insipient plasticity.
From the energy of distortion or von Mises yield state, the equivalent stress is given by, (t -r ) + #x -Fr) + @r ~ "o)
(3) t
=
o o
x Substituting Eq. I and 2 into Eq. 3 with' a = o at the inside surface, the pressure required to achieve initiation of y#relding is, k
TES-3205 2-44
l 2
o @2 r
-a) g P
2 Y
1. 732 b 41000 [(1.860) -(1.476) )
1.732 (1.860)2 8765 psi
=
An estimate of ultimate capability can be made by letting o@ essure becomes represent the ultimate strength of 100,000 psi in Eq. 3.
The associated p 2],380 psi.
However, there is concern for more than the cylindrical shell such as the end closures, seal weld and the closure-cylinder transitions.
To evaluate the strength member in detail the ANSYS finite element program was t
j utilized to obtain an elastic-plastic solution. Figure 2.16 illustrates the applied finite element model where the elements are axisymetric 2D isoparametric solid elements defined by four nodes per element and two degrees of freedom (displacements) at each node.
The material model input is identical to the linear strain hardening stress-strain curve for Hastelloy C-276 as shown below.
]
01 P5i 10 0, 0 o 0 -
6
~~
E - 29. 8 - 10 P3t I
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dimensions in inches Mat'l: Hastelloy C-276 FIGURE 2.10 FUEL CAPSULE STRENGTH MEMBER 1
FINITE ELEMENT MODEL TES-3205 2-46'
The results of the elastic-plastic analysis is as follows:
O Equiv. Stmss, Equiv. Strain, psi Thmaded closure - outside center 41,316 0.41 Thmaded closure -inside center 41,905 0.81 Weld 24,765
< 0.2 Threaded closure - shell irterface 64,697 16.19 Cylindrical wall - outside
41,927
0. 83 Cylindrical wall - inside*
41,884 0.80 Lower closure transition 58,153 11.77 Lower closure - outside center 41,260 0,38 Lower closure - inside center 35,450
< 0.2 The total axial displacement at the center line is. 011 inch
Remote from the end closures; approximately mid length.
2.8.7 Summary A single heat source assembly was subjecte to all of the tests shown in Figure 1
2.10 and exhibited a leak rate of less than 1 x 10-6 (STP) cm3/see helium as shown in the certification given as Figure 2.11.
2. 9 Fuel Rods Not applicable.
O TES-3205 l
2-47 i
i
. ~.
_..._..___.m
1 I
i 2.10 Appendix 2.10.1 References - Chapter 2 2.1
" Formulas for Stress and Strain," by R. Roark, McGraw-Hill, 1%5.
3 2.2
" Theory and Analysis of Plates," by R.
Szilard, Prentice Hall, 1974.
2.3
" Design for Shock Resistance,"
by R.
Magner, Product Engineering, 1%2.
R1 2.4 ORNL-NSIC-68,
" Cask Designers Guide,"
by L.
Shappert, February 1970.
2.5 Nuclear Metals Inc. - Private Comunication.
2.6 PNL-3846,
" Strontium-90 Fluoride Data Sheet," Battelle Pacific Northwestern Laboratories, June 1981.
1 i
4 L
l 1
i t
I J
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TES-3205 2-48
3.
THERMAL EVALUATION 1
Since the time of original issue of this report (September 1985), two changes have occurred which affect the thermal analyses presented in this chapter: (1) the shipping cask outer container has been added to the package j
and (2) the maximum loading of the fuel capsule has been increased from 210 watts to 220 watts.
Analyses presented herein have been revised to reflect these changes up to the point of predicting new cask temperatures, the new RM surface i
temperatures, and the new RM head temperatures.
Results are reported in the revised Table 3.6.
Appropriate descriptive sections (including the
}
model descriptions of Appendix 3.6.2) have been modified accordingly.
With respect to package surface temperatures under normal conditions of transport, the modificatons result in a slight decrease (-1 to -5 F).
(The increase in temperature associated with the higher fuel inventory is more than offset by the increased surface area of the added outer container. )
RM surface and head temperatures increased from 13 to 16 F.
This increase is mainly due to the gap between the cask outer and inner containers - the R1 increase due to the increased fuel inventory alone is about 3 F.
2/86 Analyses of RTG internal temperatures under normal conditions of transport and thermal analyses for the hypothetical accident sequence were i
not revised.
The results presented in Tables 3.1, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, j
Figure 3.12 and Appendices 3.6.6 and 3.6.7 are for the original package configuration and the previous 210 watt thermal inventory.
Based on a review of recent analyses and results of tests performed at TES (January,
(~T February 1986), it is estimated that, given these changes, the RM intenal
() component temperatures would be, at most, 50 F higher than those reported in the above cited tablesd ) figures and appendices.
The maximum estimated 1
increase (less than 50 F occurs in the innermost fuel region.
Hence, temperatures of components critical to safety (e.g., liner, strenggh member, shield, shield clad) reported herein would increase by less than 50 F.
Under both normal conditions of transport and the thermal environment l
of the hypothetical accident sequence, temperature increases associated with the changes are insignificant.
(Temperatures remain well within design temperatures for normal conditions of transport; temperatures for critical components given the accident sequence remain well below critical i
temperatures. )
i l
{
3.1 Discussion i
l The Sentinel SS RTG themally consists of a cylindrical heat source capable of containing up to 220 watts of thermal energy of the currently R1
}
available fuel form.
Therefore, for purposes of the transportation safety 2/86 l
analysis, a thermal inventory of 220 watts is assumed for conservatism.
The thermal energy is created by the decay of the radioisotope Sr-90 and its a
I daughter product Y-90 in the SrF fuel form.
The fuel is encapsulated and 2
j shielded as described in othe chapters of this report.
Excepting the i O j
TES-3205 3-1 i
thermoelectric (T/E) module contact area above the shield, the shield is surrounded by a high purity, low conductivity, high temperature, molded fibrous insulation called " Min-K" which is made by the Johns-Manville Company of Denver, Colorado.
This insulation serves to direct the majority (about 60%) of the heat output from the fuel through the T/E module which is 4
located at the top of the shield.
A small amount of the heat (8 to 9%)
which passes through the T/E module is converted to electrical power for use in an extenal rsistive load.
The remainder of the heat passing through the 1
module and the heat losses through the insulation must be rejected by the generator housing and fins to the ambient. Therefore, 95 to 96% of the heat source energy must be rejected during normal generator operations and/or normal transport conditions.
'the generator is, for the most part, filled with inert gasses.
The single exception to this are spaces within the fuel capsule assenbly.
Construction of this assembly is performed in air.
Gaps internal to the clad on the shield body and plug cladding are purged and backfilled with helium.
All other spaces within the generator are purged and backfilled l
with pure argon.
Internally, a bellows seal exists between the T/E module assembly and the insulation spaces.
A consequence of the loss of seal to the insulation spaces would be the gradual replacement of argon with air which would result in higher heat losses.
The increased heat losses would result in lower internal RTG temperatures; an inherently safer condition.
The T/E material used for this generator would be adversely affected by air.
The effect would be a net decrease in the efficiency of the module to conduct heat which would tend to increase internal temperatures. This event is readily detectable as a substantial decrease in the generator output electrical failure.
Sentinel operating experience infers a low probability of the occurrence of this event (leakage of air to the module region).
There have been no known occurrence of this for the many Sentinel type generators produced by TES over the past 20 years.
For all power tet.:ts and transport the SS generator is installed within a shipping cask.
The cask has a large outer surface area to reject the relatively small fuel heat energy.
the Sentinel 8S unit which contains l R1 This cask (less the outer container) was originally designed to transport 2/86 over twice the fuel thermal inventory.
For transport, the generator is placed on short circuit - a condition which produces lower internal temperatures than those for which the unit was designed to operate.
As will be noted in subsequent sections, the analyses reported herein is conservative.
Conservative assumptions include the assumption of maximum i
possible fuel loading and the assumption that the thermal environment of the hypothetical accident sequence is applied directly to the shield and enclosed fuel capsule.
That is, no credit is taken for the cask, generator housing or thermal insulation.
1 f
The analysis sumarized herein shows that the package is capable of withstanding the various thermal extremes associated with the normal l
conditions of TES-3205 3-la
3.4 Thermal Evaluation for Normal Conditions of Transport
\\d 3.4.1 Thermal Models and Results Thermal analysis included herein assesses package temperatures over the various thermal states related to the normal conditons of transport.
Detailed descriptions of the models developed for and employed in the analysis are provided along with results of the analyses.
3.4.1.1 Shipoing Cask and RTG Surface Temperatures.
Two thermal models were developed to relate the shipping cask temperatures and the RM surface temperatures to the external ambient conditions:
a.
Cask Temperatures - This model predicts the average temperatures of the shipping cask inner and outer containers given the internal heat source (220 watts or 751 Btu /hr) and the external ambient air temperature and external insolatin heat input (if present).
Details of the model and thermal properties used are provided in Appendix 3.6.2.
For subsequent analyses, the inner and outer containers of the cask are assumed to be of uniform (but different) temperatures.
(The high conductivity of either R1 the stainless steel of the outer container or the carbon steel 2/86 of the inner container precludes the establishment of any significant temperature gradient in either component.
The temperature differential through the thickness of either the inner or outer container at any point is estimated to be less than a few degrees F.)
V b.
RTG Surface and Head Temperatures.
This model computes the average RM housing and fin surface temperature given the shipping cask inner container temperature and the internal heat source Q.
It embodies both convection and radiative heat transfer links from the inner container surfaces to the housing and fin surfaces.
Details of the model and thermal properties and provjded in Appendix 3.6.3.
The RTG head temperature is, then,10 F hotter than the average surface temperature (based on the rsults of detailed thermal analysis of the RM and internals).
Both models (a) and (b) are in the fonn of heat balance equations which are readily solved by an iterative technique.
Cask and RM surface temperatures derived using these models are provided in Table 3.6.
Case 1 of this table provides (in part) the boundary condition for the detailed RM thermal model described below. It relates to 71.71, (c) (1) " Heat."
The insolation heat, Q was derived as explained in Appendix 3.6.2 from the Insolation Data of b,l (c) (1) (also IAEA Series 6, Table III). Case 2 addresses 71.71 (c) (2) " Cold."
Case 3 of Table 3.6, package in still, ambient 100 F air and in shade was evaluated for compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 71.43 (g),
(IAEA Series 6,
230. (b)) for non-exclusive use shipment (non-full load 3
v) shipment).
The package external surface temperature, according to the 1
TES-3205 3-9
requirements, shall not exceed 122 F for thg above stated conditions.
The.
R1
(
calculated average cask temperature of 113 F demonstrates compliance with 2/86 the requirements.
3.4.1.2 Detailed Model for Assessing RM Tenperatures.
Detailed thermal analysis for the RM was performed using a thermal model developed for the ANSYS program.
ANSYS (Ref. 3.4) is a finite element computer program which has been used extensively for structural and thermal analyses.
e l
i 4
1 4
.t 1
1, 4
t 4
h 4
l a
TES-3205 3-9a 1
t O
O O
1 TABLE 3.6 TEMPERATURES: CASK, RTG SURFACE AND RTG HEAD 7
EOR NORMAL CONDITIONS OF TRANSPORT - RTG IN CASK i
i.
Temperature ( F)
Case No.
Boundary Condition Cask R1G Surface RIG Head Outer Inner
]
Container Container 4
1 Still Ambient Air at 100 F, 174 188 235 245 l
0
= 751 Btu /Hr (220 watts) i g
Q
= 4536 Btu /Hr i
y, j
gg 2
Still Ambient Air at -40 F,
-19
-3 63 73 i R1 O
o
= 751 Btu /Hr 2/86 g
Q
= 0 Btu /Hr (shade) l 1
Still Anbient Air at 100 F, 113 128 181 191 O
= 751 Btu /Hr g
j O
= 0 Btu /Hr (shade) g
{
i i
l i
4 i
I
3.4.3 Minimum Tenperatures
' f Under conditions of still, ambient air at -40 F and ghade, the R1 average shipping cask outer container temperature is about -19 F and the 2/86 average R'IG surface temperatrre is about 63 F for a fuel loading of 220 watts. Temperatures are well within design limits given this environment.
3.4.4 Maximum Internal Pressure The RTG is charged with argon gas at BOL under one atmospheric pressure.
Viton 0-rings in the housing end covers and around the electrical connector assembly provide positive seal and cause internal gas pressure buildup.
Under the normal conditions of transport, this increase would not be more than 5 psi.
3.4.5 Maximum Thermal Stresses The small temperature gradients, especially in the shield, of about o
15 F do not cause any significant amount of thermal stresses.
3.4.6 Evaluation of Package Performance for Normal Conditions of Transport t
A review of all component temperatures of the package computed for the
" heat" condition and those temperatures inferred for the " cold" condition indicates that temperatures are well within acceptable values for the component materials.
J The RTG housing can withstand a hydrostatic pressure of 25 psig.
Internal pressures which may be created by the heat condition are well below this value.
There are no significant thermal stresses generated in any component.
3.5 Hypothetical Accident Thermal Evaluation In this section, the effects of the hypothetical accident thermal environment are evaluated and discussed. The environment is as specified in 71.73 (c) (3).
Specifically, the configuration resultant from the free drop and puncture environments is to be subjected to a heat flux not less than that of a radiation environment of 1475 F with an emissivity coefficient of least 0.9 for a time period of not less than 30 minutes. For purposes of at calculation, the surface absorptivity of the configuration must be either that value which the package is expected to possess if exposed to a fire or 0.8, whichever is greater.
As previously discussed (see Section 2.7), the initial configuration j
for the thermal environment is assumed to be an R'IG containing the chield/ fuel capsule assembly.
'Ihe evaluation provided herein first shows that the initial effects of the thermal environment would be to quickly i
offect complete melting of housing components which allows the exposure of the shield / fuel capsule assembly.
Subsequent analysis, then, examines the cffects of the " fire" applied dirctly to shield / fuel capsule TES-3205 3-21
3.3 "Thermo-Physical Properties of Matter," TPRC Data Series, O
Purdue University, LaFayett, Indiana.
V 3.4 "ANSYS Engineering Analysis System," Swanson Analysis Systems, Inc., Houston, Pennsylvania, Rev. 4.lE.
3.5 Brochures from the Stellite Division of Cabot Corporation, Kokomo, Indiana.
3.6 Brochure from Corning Glass Works.
3.7 Johns-Manville Product Information Data Book (and in-house tests).
3.8 "The Use of Uranium as a Shielding Material," E. F. Blasch, G.
L. Stukenbroeker, et.al., Nuclear Engineering and Design, No.
13, 1970.
3.9
" Aerospace Structural Metals Handbook," Belfour Stulen, Inc.
3.10
" Thermal Interface Conductance of TEG Hardware," J. Hargodon, Martin Marrietta Corporation, July 30,1%5.
3.11
" Simplified Method for Calculating Thermal Conductance of Rough, Nominally Flat Surfaces in High Vacuum" D.
McKinzie, Jr., Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, NASA Technical.
p Note: TN-D-5627.
3.12
" Thermal Conductivity of Lead Telluride" -
R.
Taylor &
H.
Groot, Properties Research Laboratory, W. Lafayette, Indiana.
3.6.2 Cask Temperatures Thermal models and associated material properties used to determine the average temperature of the shipping cask inner and outer containers for normal conditions of transport are described herein.
The average outer container temperature was determined through a solution of the heat balar)ce R1 equation which includes the specified insolation rate (if present), ambient 2/86 air temperature and convection and radiation between the container surface and the ambient air.-
Given the outer container temperature, the inner container average temperature is computed from a heat balance equation which considers the internal heat generation and convective and radiation linkage to the outer container.
To determine the insolation rate, Q
the surface areas assumed (as h, ed were the full areas of the surfaces to the more realistic projected area).
A surface absorptivity of 0.8 was assumed. This value is twice the absorptivity for the white epoxy paint on the cask's exterior surface.
The factor of two was applied for conservatism and to account for some degradation of the paint surface. Hence, Q
= 0.8 [R g + R A ],
SOL g3 TES-3205 3-32
where: R and R are the top and side heating rates and A,
T y
pre tFie top and side surface areas, respectivel,?,
A y
(kt).
Here, R 246 Btu /ft -hr, if the average rate corresponding to the
=
7 i
specified value of 800 cal /cm on a flat surface for a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months day, transported horizontally:
123 Btu /ft -hr is the average rate corresponding to the R
=
specifiedvalueof400 cal /cmj on a curved surface for a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months day. Thus, Q
= 0.8 (246 (8.1) + 123 (29.9)]
SOL R1
= 4536 Btu /hr 2/86 The heat balance equation for the outer container is, (O 'IU + Oggg) = [a A (T 0 ) + (h g +h A ) (T -0)]
R C
y 2T C
where: O
= R'IN reject heat = maximum thermal loading of the R1 RTG heat source (220 w(t)).
2/86 Q
= specified insolation input to the cask (Btu / hrs).
SOL
-12
=Stephan-Bglgzy) o
constant, (1714 x
10 Btu /hr-ft - R
= cask outer surface emittance = 0.85 (epoxy paint) 2 A
= total surface area = g + g, (38.0 ft )
g
= cagk lateral area (cylindrical surface), 29.9 R1 ft )
2/86 A
= cask top area (flat surface), 8.1 ft )
T T
= unknown outer container average temperature, ( R)
C 8
= ambient air temperature, ( R) h,h2 = natural convection coefficients for the cask y
cylindrical surface respectively.
(Btu /hr-ft ganp )the top
surface, F
further,
[T -
C h
= 0.281 I
for the side and 1
g
/ T - OY/4 C
h
= 0.281
)
for the top 2
D
)
O TES-3205 3-33
~.
with, cask height, (2.% ft)
H
=
cask diameter, (3.22 ft)
D
=
Given the outer container temperature T,
the inner container C
s fo d from temperature, TCI, air ^i CI ~ C 4
4 RE 1
* ^i ( TCI C
O
-T I
where, A.
= radial and base surface area of the inner 1
container (34.1 ft )
R1 k.
= conductivity of air (inner-outer container gap) 2/86 "l#
(.016 Btu /(hr-ft-F))
1
= nominal gap dimension = 0.0129 ft T
= effective emittance
( = 0. 2 for unpainted stainless steel,
= 0.85 for epoxy painted inner surface)
T
= [1/0.85 + 1/0.2 - 1]-1 = 0.19 T
= the unknown inner container temperature ( F)
CI Because of the high conductivities of the steels in both the outer and inner container, there is essentially no AT across the thickness of either container.
3.6.3 RTG Surface and Head Temperatures A heat balance equation is used to determine the RIG surface temperature for the RIG within the inner and outer containers. The average inner container temperature is computed according to the method and data of 3.6.2, along with the RM internal heat source inventory as the input boundary conditions.
The equation provides for convective and radiative links between the Rm surface (housing) and the inner containers internal surface. The heat balnnce equation is, O
" U Afin /hsg + b Astring h - CI RIG eff c
where:
O and T are as defined earlier in 3.6.2.
g7g CI n,gg
= effective fin efficiency for the entire RTG, 0.9 A
areas of fins and housing fin /hsg "A top fins
Abottom fins # Ahousing, side + top
= 17.84 i
TES-3205 3-34
2
^ tring = lateral envel Pe area = 9.2 ft s
h
= natural convection coefficient for the c
enclosed space between the cask and the RM h is of the form, 1
c 0.0732K (GrPr) ! /S(L/S) !, Btu /hr-ft - F h
=
e t
where:
K
= thermal conductivity of the air film over the temperature range of the system
-5
Thus, K
- -2.6956 x 10
+ 3.2603 x 10 Tggy,
l
-9 2
+ 7.2433 x 10 T
(Btu /hr-ft-F)
fHm,
{
ggy, T
= 1/2 (Th+Tc, ( R)
L,S
= characteristic length of the RM and the average spacing between RM and the cask.
L
= 1.521 ft, S = 0.504 ft.
The product of the Grashoff-Prandtl numbers, N j
evaluated from a function fit:
Gr~ Pr i!O 4
I l
1 4
.i i
i I
i*
TES-3205 3-34a
4.1. 4 Closure The closure for the fuel capsule assembly is a seal weld described in Section
4. 2 Requirements for Normal Conditions of Transport 4, 2.1 Release of Radioactive Material A heat source assembly identical in every aspect to a fueled Sentinel SS heat source, except that it used a fuel simulant, has been subjected to the tests defined in Figure 2.12 herein. These tests either meet or exceed the environments defined for both normal transport conditions and the hypothetical accident conditions. The tests also meet or exceed "special form" requirments defined in 10 CFR Part 71. The test results (see Figure 2.13) clearly demonstrate radioactive material containment.
One parameter that has not been specifically addressed is the effects of seawater corrosion.
If a conservative seawater corrosion rate of 0,0001 inch per year is used, the
. 000 inch minimum weld thickness will provide a capsule seal for approximately 900 years. 'Ihe maximum activity of the capsule, 32,000 curies will decay to a level of R1 one curie in approximately 432 years. The corrosion resistance of Hastelloy C-276 2/86 in seawater is addressed in Appendix 4.4.2 IIydrostatic pressure analysis is provided in Section 2. 8. 6.
4.2.2 Pressurization of Containment Vessel Not applicable.
4.2.3 Coolant Contamination Not applicable - there is no coolant in the fuel capsule.
4.2.4 Coolant Loss 1
Not applicable - there is no coolant in the fuel capsule.
4. 3 Containment Requirements for the Hypothetical Accident Conditions See discussion under 4.2 4.3.1 Fission Gas Products Not applicable - no fission gas products available in the containment vessel.
O 1
TES-3205 4-2
SE C U R IT Y UNCL CONF. SECRET l REVislO45: St!SrEIT Rty ttytt REVIEW 01 RD GP 1234 THis AP 5HG1 i CL A SStFIE R raV.i A
gv b
C TABLE OF CONTENTS Title Page 1
h Revisions 2
Change Index 3
Procedure Index 4
g Procedure 5
%C mi
-+
al 2/86 NOTE:
This drawing releases no parts.
f>,
.i y
rr?
pFfct W m DAS N AIb IlY N@
IIII g.
== H A5 Y A55 ct APPtlCAil0N QTY Rt00
'"'7. Ruts.
1.'N'_ e s-SeTELEDYNE ENERGY SYSTEMS
"""V
M f 2" ',, au.,"l. '=L':'m,u, entcuan C e i.,q.gf
vs t an'fi IIEAT SOURCE SPECIFICATION manmng/..,,. A f.
SENTINEL SS RTG nina.,rf-f ovauty %,f//_ 7 4 sei
=. -
now A
30856 01.5-600000 tasm surrow wh,,1-s5-4 -SCALE dco 831-0Ml SMEIT 1 0F 16 cu e.
O TES-3205 4-4
saavassoons sm PAGE DESCJtIPTces DATE APMtOYED A
7 Th::rmal inventory wu 185 watts. Desired loading was 185-190 watts in Pars. 3.1.3.
'9/4 R1 8
Inventory was 185 watts, power density was.91 w/ce' specific power was.246 w/g and fuel density was 3.7 2/86 g/cc in Para. 3.3.1.
i CODS DOENT eso.
3s33 30856 A
'"-'a w
.103 I
i
)
i i
TES-3205 4-5
-. ~...
,n (J
v INDEX SHEET REV.
SHEET R EV.
SHEET
Rey,
.I 2
3 4
5 6
R1 e
A 2/86 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 es 17 k
k,j N 10 SIZE CODE IDENT.NO.
A 30ss6 015-80000o REV.
~
A SCALE l$HEET 3
t i
i Nv/
TES-3205 4-6
b
+
3.0 REQUIREMENTS Each heat source assembly and its components shall meet the
l requirements of this section.
3.1 Fuel The basic fuel, for purposes of this specif! cation, shall be tb*
radioisotope strontium-9C.
3.1.1 Chemical Form - The fuel shall be in the fluoride form ( SrF )*
2 3.1.2 Fuel Composition - The fuel composition, for purposes of this specificatian, shall be "SrF as synthesized and stored at the Waste 2
Encapsulatig and Storage Fact!1ty (WEST) in Richland. Washington.
The WESF SrF 18 precipitated an;1 subsequently processed from a 2
feed solution stose composition is given in Appendix A. Fuel from the WESF capsules is further densified by hot pressing at the Oak Ridge National IAboratory (ORNL) but its composition is unahered.
3.1.3 Fuel Quantity - The fuel is to be hot pressed into discs utth a nominal l R1 diameter of 2.577 inches and a density in range of 3.7 - 4.0 g/cc. These discs are loaded into liners to a nominal thermal investory of 210 2M g )
A watts t 5% with the desired loading in the 210-215 watt range.
(
The thermalinventory of each liner le to be measured by a calorimeter with en accuracy of 3% (representing 3 o of a normal distribution).
3.2 Heat Source Components 3.2.1 Liner Components - The liner consists of a tubular housing with an end cg welded on each end. Details of the liner components are shomu on TES Dwg. No. 015-200002. The housing and end caps of the liner are fabricated from 'Hastelloy C-276' bar stock procured in the solution heat treated condition and certified te ASTM-B574-83A specification. Shim detalls shown on the drawing are used only to hot press the fuel discs, with one shim on each side of the fuel to prevent the fuel from adhering to the graphite press rams. The shims are fabricated from IIastelloy C-276 sheet to be compatible with the fuel.
SIZE CODE IDENT NO.
A 30856 01s 00000 REV A
SCALE l SHEET 9
ES-211 J b O
TES-3205 4-10
N
)
+
One of the end caps is welded in place at TES prior to shipping the components to the fueling facility. The weld joint is leak tested at ambient temperature and radiographed prior to shipment. The maximum acceptable leak rate is 1 x 10-8 cc/sec-helium at STP.
The weld joint is also radiographed in accordance with M11eSTD-2710 Section 3 to assure full weld fusion. Radiographic quality level specified is 2-2T. A matching serialized end cap is provided which ORNL will weld.
3.2.2 Strength Member Components - The strength member consists of a thick walled tubular housing with one end closure of solid material machined as an integral part of the housing and the open end threaded to accept an er.d cap which is installed and subsequently welded in place at ORNL. Details of the strength member components are shown on TES Dwg. No. 015-200003. The housing and end cap are fabricated from Hastelloy C-276 bar stock procured in the solution heat treated cedition and certified to ASTM-B574-83A speelficatlan.
Each housing and end cap are serialized as matched sets.
3.3 Heat Source Assembly The heat source assembly, shom2 on TES Dwg. No. 015-200000 consista of a sealed liner assembly inserted and sealed within a strength member assembly. Only one such heat source assembly 4
is required for the SENTINEL SS radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG).
g s
3.3.1 Liner Assembly - The laternal volume of the liner assembly is designed to contain a thermalinventory of 210 watts (t) at a power density of - 1.0 w/cc. This number was derived by taking the R1 h
average specific Mwer of 0.25 w/g hot pressed to the minimum expectaf 2/86 fuel density o14.0 g/cc. The liner assembly is shown on TES Dwg. No. 015-200001.
Two hot pressed fuel discs will be inserted into each liner prior to welding the final end cap in place. The thermalinventory of each fuel disc will be determined by the fueling facility. Adjustments are to be made between fuel discs to arrhe at the required heat source inventory. The completed liner assembly is to be subjected to calorimetry measurement to determine the actual fuel thermal invertory.
After the two fuel discs are inserted in the liner, the end cap is to be installed and welded in place.
SIZE CODEIDENTNO.
A 30856 025-80 "
REV A
SCALE l$HEET 8
ES-2H J b V
TES-3205 4-11
5.
SHIELDING EVALUATION O
This chapter identifies, describes and analyzes the principal shielding design of the package. Dose rate analyses for the Sentinel SS unit as packaged for shipment under normal transport conditions and as a result of the hypothetical accident conditions (Para. 71.73) are presented.
The analyses are evidence of compliance with the requirements of the external radiation standards for non-exclusive use package of 71.47 and the additional radiation requirements for Type B packages of 71.51 (a) (2).
5.1 Discussion and Results i
The Sentinel 5S R'IG design includes a stainless steel clad shield assembly (body and plug constructed of depleted uranium (DU)) which encloses the fuel capsule assembly.
The combinatin of radiation attenuation within the fuel capsule assembly (including the SrF fuel form), the shield assembly 2
and the steel shipping cask serves to reduce dose rates to permissible levels during transport. Specifically, as required for non-exclusive shipment, dose rates at the surface of the package are everywhere less than 200 mrem / hour.
Dose rates at one meter from the external surface of the package are less than 10 mrem / hour.
By design, the configuration consisting of the RTG shield assembly containing the fuel capsule assembly has external dose rates less than one rem / hour at one meter from its external surface consistent with the requirement for Type B packages subjected to the hypothetical accident sequence. This configuration is postulated to be the (minimum) configuration resultant from the accident sequence (see Chapters 2 and 3).
1 Since the original submittal of this application (September 1985), the transport package has been modified by the addition of a shipping cask outer container and an increase in the maximum fuel inventory at time of fueling from 31,400 Ci (210 thermal watts) to 32,900 Ci (220 thermal watts).
For normal conditions of transport, the effcet of these modifications is to reduce the dose rates outside the package.
(The additional attenuation afforded by the 0.375 inch thick stainless steel outer container more than offsets the approximate 5% increase due to change in fuel inventory.) Under hypothetical accident conditions, dose rates for the resulting configuration increase by 5%.
A sumary of the maximum dose rates under normal conditions of transport and for the configuratien resulting from the hypothetical accident Il sequence is provided in Table 5.1.
Therein, results for normal conditins are 2/86 as previously reported. As expleined above, the modificatins would result in lower dose rates than are shown in the table.
Dose rates for the hypothetical accident have been increased to reflect the modification (5%
higher than previously reported values).
Succeeding sections of this chapter have not been modified.
Source p
strengths (Table 5.6), power density and dose rates reported therein are for d
the 31,400 Ci loading.
l TES-3205 l
5-1 l
5.2 Source Specification 5.2.1 Gama Source The radioactive source consists of up to 31,400 Ci of Sr-90 in the SrF 2
fuel form.
Sr-90 and its relatively short lived daughter product Y-90 are considered, for all practical purposes, pure beta emitters.
External i
l radiation consists of Bremsstrahlung radiation (hereafter referred to herein as gama radiation) which is produced by the betas emitted in the decay i
process.
Energy dependent gama source distributions are derived using the theory and conputational technique of Evans (Ref. 5.1) for external Bremsstrahlung.
Source strength distributions derived for the SrTiO I"*1 3
form, using this method, were verified by comparison of computed dose rates with measured values beyond varying thicknesses of lead shielding (Ref. 5.2).
O j
l i
O TES-3205 5-la
O O
O TABLE 5.1
SUMMARY
OF MAXIMUM DOSE RATES (mrem /hr)
One Meter from Package Surface Serface of Package Side Top Bottom Side Top Bottom Normal Conditions 19.
O.32 40.
2. 0
0. 03
2. 7 I
I 5
Hypothetical Accident Conditions ")
1.4 x 10 746 R1 yp 2/86 to g 8
10 CFR Part 71 Limit 1000 1000 1000 I"IMaximum dose rates to side and top of unit not computed for this case. Dose rates will be lower than values given for bottom. Bottom is ama where shield thickness is minimum.
(
I
7.
OPERATING PROCEDURES n
This chapter describes the operating procedures used in the loading and unloading of the Sentinel SS package.
These procedures are intended to assure that occupational radiation exposures are maintained as low as is reasonably achievable.
7.1 Procedures for Loading the Package Prior to shipping the units to the fueling facility each generator is completely assembled (except for the heat source) and leak tested.
The assembly includes the precise sizing of the internal components required to properly pre-load the shield.
Each head / module assembly installed on a generator is first tested on an electrically heated body to assure proper performance.
The assembled generator is installed in the shipping cask inner container with the RM pre-load assembly sized to give the proper RM R1 pre-load for shipment.
The inner container is then installed in the 2/86 shipping cask outer container.The unit is then transported as an unfueled package to the fueling facility.
Teledyne Energy Systems requires the fueling facility, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to follow a complete, detailed, procedure covering pre-fueling inspections and checks of the RTG and fuel capsule assembly; installation of the capsule into the RM and closure of the RTG.
[_.si Most of these operatins are performed in a " hot cell" by the fueling V
facility operators, with Teledyne personnel present to monitor the operations.
The actual loading or installation of an RM into the shipping cask R1 inner container, is performed by Teledyne personnel at the fueling facility, 2/86 and is an easy and straight forward procedure.
This procedure is briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.
Prior to moving an RTG into a hot cell for the fuel capsule installation, the shipping cask inner container is prepared in the following R1 The internal surfaces of the container body and lid are inspected manner.
2/86 for cleanliness.
The lid attaching hardware, RM pre-load hardware, with spares; RM outgassing fixtures and electrical monitoring equipment are collected in an area to facilitate an expeditous RM loading operation.
All personr.el involved in the package loading operations are equipped with individual monitoring devices.
The devices consist of both TLD badges and pocket dosimeters and, where applicable, additional pocket chambers and ring chambers are used.
When the RTG is removed from the hot cell, wipe tests are perfonned R1 by ORNL Health Physics to check for removable contamination on the RM 2/86 housing:
The RM is irrrnediately set into the shipping cask inner container and the irrrnediate vicinity of the container is evacuated of personnel, V
TES-3205 i
7-1
pending Health Physics approval. The level of surface contamination must be 2
less than 6600 DPM as picked up over a 300 cm area. This is in accordance O',
with the requirepnts of 71.87 (i) (1) for non-exclusive use shipments (less than 22 DPM/cm for beta-gtTca emitting radionuclide).
If surface contamination exceeds the level specified, the RM is removed from the the surface contamination is at an acceptable level the procedur container and scoured with water and detergent. When it has been determined 2/86 that be continued.
At this point in the initial RM load procedure, the RM cables are routed through the two inner container openings, and the RTG outgassing R1 plumbing is attached to the RM head.
This plumbing is made up so that it 2/86 exits radially from the container just above the container body and is mated to the RM with a single pipe thread fitting. The container's lid is set in place on spacer blocks to allow passage of the outgassing line.
This arrangement provides good shielding for personnel in the area and permits conditioning of the RM's internal environment (evacuation, leak check and backfill) and electrical performance monitoring without impairing work from proceeding on other units.
When the RM is fully conditioned, plumbing is removed and the outgassing port sealed with a Teflon wrapped pipe plug.
The pre-load i
assembly is then positioned and the container lid is installed.
The bolts i
are then torqued to specified values.
Next, the inner container is placed in the shipping cask outer R1 container.
The gasket is installed and the lid is set in place.
The 2/86 attaching hardware is then installed and torqued to the specified value Installation of the security seal completes the assembly procedure.
The shipping cask outer container is wipe tested for surface contamination to insure compliance with 10 CFR 71.87 (i) (1).
Radiation dose rates are measured at the containers surface and at 1 meter from the surface to assure compliance with 71.47 for non-exclusive use shipment. The container is labeled with " Radioactive Yellow-III" labels and is then ready for delivery to a carrier.
The procedure used to load the RM for subsequent shipment is the same as sumarized above except that it normally will not be necessary to condition the interior of the RM or monitor electrical performance.
7.2 Procedures for Unloading the Package The procedures for removal of the RM from its packaging are discussed in the following paragraphs.
All personnel involved in the receipt and/or unloading of the Sentinel SS package are to be equipped with appropriate ionizing radiation monitoring devices.
' O TES-3205 7-2
Upon receipt of the package, radiation dose rates should be inunediately measured.
These dose rates should be less than 200 mrem / hour at s
the surface of the shipping cask outer container and less than 10 mrem / hour at one meter from the surface.
Wipe tests to determine the removable surfacg contamination should also be perfog and should be less than 22 dpm/cm as determined over an area of 300 cm.
Assuming that the package is received in the expected condition and R1 the radiation safety checks are satisfactory, the unloading operation can 2/86 proceed.
All of the tools, socket wrench extensions and special handling equipment should be amassed to prevent unnecessary delays.
First, the cask outer container lid is removed and set aside.
The cask inner container is then swiped to check for removable surface contamination.
Next the cask inner container is lifted clear of the outer container, set down, and it's lid removed.
The RM pre-load assembly can then be removed since it is merely held in position by the lid.
The RM can now be easily removed (there is no attachment hardware).
The RM removal should be planned to occur after preparations have been made either for ininediate installation at the users site or for temporary storage in an adequately shielded facility.
7.3 Preparation of an Empty Package for Transport D'
The shipping cask inner and outer containers will be checked for removable surface contamination.
Container components will be checked for damage and replaced if required.
All radioactive material-related markings and labels will be removed or covered so as not to be visible. Lid hardware will be torqued to their specified values.
The cask assembly (inner g
container installed within outer container) can then be delivered to a carrier for transport.
2/86 7.4 Miscellaneous Teledyne Energy Systems provides an Operation and Maintenance Manual with each Sentinel SS RM.
This manual includes step by step instructions for loading and unloading the package.
It also provides measured exposure rates around the RM and around the shipping cask inner container with the R'N installed.
An example of the type of exposure rate information provided is shown in Appendix 7.5.
p TES-3205 7-3
. = -. _.
'l 7.5 Appendix Radiological Safety R1 4
2/86 This appendix provides an example of the exposure rate information which is part of the Operation and Maintenanco Manual supplied with each Sentinel model. This example is taken from the Sentinel 8S manual.
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TES-3205 l
7-4
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8.
ACCEPTANCE TESTS AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM _
b)
\\s 8.1 Acceptance Tests The following paragraphs discuss those tests to be performed prior to the first use of the Sentinel 55 package.
8.1.1 Visual Inspection The safety related components of the Sentinel SS package are the fuel capsule assembly, which includes the capsule housing and end cap and the liner assembly; the shield assembly consisting of the shield body and shield plug; and the shipping cask which includes the inner and outer containers.
All of the safety related items are subjected to rigid dimensional inspections to assure that proper fits, clearances and material thicknesses specified on the applicable engineering drawings are satisfied. In addition to the dimensional checks, visual inspections are made to detect material surface flaws, blemishes and other finish defects that could impair the function of the part.
Material certifications are also required on all safety related component raw materials.
These certifications must contain material chemical composition, heat treatment condition, physical test reports and material heat and traceability numbers, as appropriate.
R1 The shipping cask inner containers were fabricated and inspected many 2/86
(]
years ago. Additional containers of this design will not be fabricated.
V The control of inspections, non-conforming materials and components, etc.,
is addressed in Teledyne Document TES-3134 " Sentinel Product Line Quality Assurance Program Plan," Docket Number 71-0397 (see Appendix A of this report).
Tests performed on the fuel capsule assembly, shield assembly and the shipping cask outer container are described in Sections 8.1.2 - 8.1.5.
8.1.2 Structural and Pressure Tests Structural and pressure t ests have been performed on the fuel capsule assembly (containment vessel),
Ne fuel capsule assembly has been subjected to the complete set of tests pn,cribed in IAEA Safety Series 33 (see Section 2.8).
Following the tests, the test specimen passed the leak test required of the fuelg hardware; that is, the test specimen had a leakage rate less than 1 x 10 cc/sec.
8.1.3 Leak Tests Both the liner assembly and the fuel capsule assembly are subjected to leak tests at the fueling facility, Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Leak testing of encapsulated fuel is done routinely at ORNL using a variety of methods. The requirements for the test and acceptance criteria are specified n
in Teledyne Energy Systems Drawing No. 015-800000, " Heat Source Specification
- Sentinel SS," included in this report as Appendix 4.4.1.
TES-3205 8-1
The RM assembly, sealed with dual Viton O-rings at the receptacles to '
head interfaces, the head to hous.ing interface, and the housing to fuel
(
access cover interface, is leak tested. The sealed stainless steel " canning"
\\
surrounding the uranium alloy shield components is also leak tested.
However, containment does not depend on the integrity of these seals.
h86 8.1.4 Component Tests In addition to the tests previously described, the capsule and liner hardware are also subjected to radiography as specified in MIL-STD-271D Section 3.
This is a non-destructive test used to detect flaws, such as voids, cracks or inclusions in the finished fabricated parts.
The shield components are subjected to dimensional and weight checks to ;
verify that the minimum material density has been obtained.
Welds in the RM head and housing and in the shipping cask outer container are subjected to dye penetrant tests.
Test procedures and g
acceptance criteria are specified on the appropriate drawing.
2/86 8.1.4.1 Valves, Rupture Discs and Fluid Transport Devices.
Not applicable. Tne Sentinel SS package contains none of these units.
8.1.4.2 Gaskets. The shipping cask outer container is equipped with a gasket between its body and lid. The gasket is not required for containment l
purposes.
However, to preclude the chance of water intrusion, if the gasket is more than one year old at the time of a shipment, it will be replaced.
8.1.4.3 Miscellaneous.
There are no components, other than the fuel capsule assembly, shield assembly and shipping cask containers previously discussed, whose failure would impair the effectiveness of the package.
8.1.5 Tests for Shielding Integrity R1 Experience has shown that the dimensional inspections and weight 2/86 measurements mentioned in 8.1.4 above are sufficient to insure that the shield components have been fabricated properly.
The shield integrity (design) is tested (verified) after fueling by Health Physics personnel at ORNL using appropriate radiation survey instruments.
Dose rates at the shipping cask outer container surface and at one meter from the surface are expected to be far less than the~ allowable limits of 200 mrem / hour and 10 mrem / hour, respectively, for non-exclusive use shipments. See Chapter 5.
8.1.6 Thermal Acceptance Tests No acceptance tests are planned to verify the thermal analysis shown in Chapter 3.
O TES-3205 8-2
m 8.2 Maintenance Program The following paragraphs discuss the inspections and tests which are performed prior to each subsequent use of the Sentinel SS package.
8.2.1 Structural and Pressure Tests No structual or pressure tests are required to ensure the continued performance of the packaging.
8.2.2 Leak Tests The RTG and the shipping cask inner and outer containers will be
" swiped" to check for the presence of removable radioactive contamination.
This test verifies that containment has not been breached since the previous shipment and is the basis for demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 71.87(i).
8.2.3 Subsystems Maintenance No actions are required to maintain package subsystems / components. By design, the RTG (and hence its components) is maintenance-free. The shipping cask inner and outer containers, except for the gasket (see below), are fabricated from materials which do not require maintenance / refurbishment except for occasional painting, which would be done purely for cosmetic purpcses.
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8.2.4 Valves, Rupture Discs, and Gaskets on Containment Vessel 2/86 The containment [ vessel] was previously defined as the strength member of the fuel capsule assembly.
It contains no valves, rupture discs, or gaskets.
The shipping cask outer container includes a gasket.
Although it is not required for containment purposes, it will be replaced to preclude water instrusion if it is more than one year old at the time of a shipment.
8.2.5 Shielding The maximum exposure rate at the surface of the package and at one meter from the surface of the package will be determined prior to each shipment.
These measurements can be used to detennine whether or not the shielding is still adequate and to document that the requirements cf 10 CFR 71.47 have been met.
8.2.6 Thermal No inspections or tests are necessary to check for degradation of thermal performance.
Heat dissipation and hence, component temperatures do not rely on coolant flow and associated circulation systems, special coatings which may degrade, or other extraordinary cooling means. As the radioisotope p
decays, component temperatures decrease predictably.
Shipping procedures, included in an Operation and Maintenance Manual, will require that the cooling fins shown on Figure 1.1 be installed.
TES-3205 8-3
8.2.7 Miscellaneous 9
In addition to the inspections and tests mentioned above, the Operation and Maintenance Manual will require that:
a.
The bolts which attach the shipping cask inner container's lid to its body and the outer container's lid to its body be installed and torqued to specified values.
b.
The security seal be installed on the shipping cask outer container, c.
A visual inspection be conducted to insure that the inner and outer containers' physical condition is unimpaired except for
dents, marks, scratenes and other insignificant surface imperfections which normally occur during transportation.
d.
The shipping container inner cask be visually inspected R1 specifically to determine if there are any cracks in its lid or 2/86 body. If cracks are found, that inner container will not be used.
If cracks are not found, the R'IG will be installed and the entire surface of the inner container will be scanned with a radiation survey instrument to check for streaming or points where the exposure rate is substantially greater than the exposure rate at points in the surrounding area.
If no anomalies are found, the container will be used.
If streaming or unusual variations in exposure rate are detected, the suspect area will be reinspected using a dye penetrant test.
If the dye penetrant test shows a crack, that container will not be used.
Otherwise, the inner coutainer will be deemed satisfacory for use.
The Operation and Maintenance Manual will also include procedures for loading the RTG in the shipping cask inner container, loading the inner container in the outer container, marking and labelling the outer container, and tieing down the package to the transport vehicle, f
O TES-3205 8-4

ML20154P192

Text

.0381 (25) (18.92)2 = 341 in-lbs/in R1 2/86 Therefore, the maximum bending stress is, 6 M/t G

.:.=

SUMMARY

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