ML20154C918

Rev 2 to Application for Amend to License SNM-33,increasing U-235 Enrichment Limit to 5.0%

ML20154C918
Person / Time
Site:	07000036
Issue date:	04/29/1988
From:	ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY
To:
Shared Package
ML20153H245	List: ML20153H241 ML20154C918
References
NUDOCS 8805180372
Download: ML20154C918 (40)

Text

. J.. a.. r

';N

'.L.Lu

., ;.. a..j..u.--. L - c.. *"

.L. 2 -

CONIBUSTION ENGINEERING SNH-33 AMENDHENT APPLICATION LIST OF PAGE REVISIONS Paae f Revision #

Date Revised I.1-2 2

12/28/87 1.1-3 2

12/28/87 I.4-4 2

04/28/88 I.4-5 3

04/28/88 I.4-6 2

04/28/88 I.4-6a 0

04/28/88 II.7-18 2

04/29/88 11.8-7 3

04/29/88 II.8 8 2

04/29/88 II.8-9 2

04/29/88 11.8-10 1

04/29/88 11.8 11 1

04/29/88 11.8 15 1

12/28/87 11.8-17 2

04/29/88 II.8-19 2

04/29/88 II 8-20 2

12/28/87 11.8-21 2

04/29/88 II.8-22 1

12/28/87 11.8-23 1

12/28/87 II.8-24 2

04/29/88 II 8-29 1

12/28/87 11.8-31 2

04/29/88 11.9-1 1

12/28/87 II.9 2 2

04/29/88 II.9-2a 0

04/29/88 II.9-4 1

12/28/87 11.9 5 2

04/29/88 II.9 5a 2

04/29/88

!!.9-7 1

04/29/88 11.9 10 1

12/28/87 11.9-11 1

04/29/88 II.9-12 1

04/29/88 11.9-17 1

12/28/87 II.9-18 1

04/29/88 11.9-26 1

12/28/87 II.9-29 2

04/29/88 11.9-31 2

04/29/88 11.9 33 0

12/28/87 Power Systems Pos: CNe Sci 107 (314) 937-4691 Corwst on Eng neenng inc H,g % a, P (314) 236 M40 He-a*:e M ssoe 63047 8805100372 000429 PDR ADOCK 07000036 C

PDR

in; :.2M.../G%!u..;-a

.. ' : :...... u~.

..; tk.'....,(. %..' i v. a. W :? :. k L:i d.,; :

i t

o 3

4 s

1.4 Possession Limits Combustion Engineering. Inc., requests authorization to receive, use, possess, store and transfer at its Hematite site, the following quantities of SNM and source materials:

Material Form

. Quantity Uranium enriched to Any*

8,000 kilograms maximum of 5.0 weight contained U-235 percent in the U-235 isotope Uranium to any enrichment Any*

350 grams in the U-235 isotope Source material Uranium and/or 50,000 kilograms Thorium, Any*

Cobalt-60 Sealed Sources 40 millicuries total 1.5 Location Where Material Will Be Used All manufacturing activities are carried out within the security fenced 3;ca located on the central site tract. Fknufacturing activities utilizing radioactive materials are housed in several buildings containing equipeent for conversion of UFs to UO.

2 fabrication of UO2 nuclear fuel pellets and related processes.

Section 1.7 contains a list of the buildings, identified by number and name, showing their present utilization.

1.6 Defini tions Terminology is as defined ln standard references (e.g., Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations) or is explained in the section where it appears if unique to this application.

• Excluding metal powders License No. SNM-33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

2 Date: 12/23/07 Page: 1.1-2

".1&.:..iJfR. t 2.L%.!. :.2...

' E...a.......s>..

.L.r.

' ':t a i.:.a.N O.FLM D : 9. L.si:.i:n.. W j

i t.,

I.

1.7 Authorized Activities

l ll ll Receive, possesF, use ano transfer Special Nuclear Material

, under Part 70 of the Regulations of the' Nuclear Regulatory jj

.Connission in order to manufacture nuclear reactor fuel

}l utilizing low-enriched uranium (up to 5.0 weight percent in the isotope U-235).

Receive, possess, use and transfer Source Material under

'I Part 40 of the Regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission. Source materials are used for the same purposes as SN!!, and are generally used for start-up testing of a new process.

Sealed cobalt-60 sources are used for instrument calibration and testing.

Authorized activities are conducted in the following buildings and facilities on the Hematite site:

{*

Number Name Present Utilization 101 Tile Barn Emergency Center and equipment storage 110 New Office Building Guard Station and offices j,

120 Wood Barn Equipment storage Oxide Building UF6 to UO2 Conversion, i.

and Dock UF6 receiving i

j 235 West Vault Source material etorage j

240 240-1 Offices and Cafeteria 240-2 Recycle and Recovery area I

240-3 Incinerator and storage 240-4 Laboratory and Maintenance Shop 250 Boiler Room Steam supply, and Warehouse Storage i

251 Warehouse Shipping and Receiving, storage 252 South Vault Radioactive waste storage 4

255 Pellet Plant Pellet Fabrication, storage and packaging.

1 License No. SNM-33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

2 Date: 12/28/87 Page: 1.1-3 i

.a m. :. -.

. Gri.. u.w < -..... nu.m.wwne-.w;::.s sa.:n

-..==aa...;

4 4.2.3 Safety Marains for Individual Units Except as specified, safety margins applied to SIUs shall be as follows:

Mass 2.3 Volume 1.3 Cylinder Dia.

1.1 Slab Thickness 1.2 These values shall be further reduced where necessary to assure -

maximum fraction critical values of 0.4 for geometrically limited units, and 0.3 for mass limited units (when based on optimum water moderation). An additional reduction has been applied to several mass and volume limits to assure that spacing require-ments remain constant for all enrichments.

For validated computer calculations, the highest K,77 for a single unit or an array shall be 0.95 including a 2 sigma statis-tical uncertainty and including all applicable uncertainties and bias except for the UF6*

2 plant. Consideration shall be given to greater safety factors where there are large uncertainties.

The basic assumptions and criteria used in establishing safe j

parameters for single units and arrays shall,be as follows:

a) The possibility of accumulation of fissile materials shall be l

evaluated and, if the possibility exists for the accumulation of fissile materials, design changes or administrative con-trols must be imposed to eliminate the accumulation problem.

b) Nuclear safety shall be independent of the degree of modera-tion within the process unit when addition of moderating materials is considered to be credible.

l l

License No. SNM-33, Docket 70,36 Revision:

2 Date: 04/28/88 Page:

1.4 4

. ; :. u u

.tu m.u. 2. 7.u. v.

a.

-E..+

...........o u _... :

qc..wg 4.m w.

4.2.3 Safety Marains'for Individual Units (continued) c) Nuclear safety shall be independent of the degree of modera-tion between units up to the maximum credible mist density.

The maximum mist density will be determined by studying all l

the sources of water in the vicinity of the single units or arrays. The maximum mist density may be limited by design and/or by administrative controls.

d) Buildings containing fissile materials will not have fire sprinkler systems. Water hoses will not be used to fight fires in building #255.

e) Optimum conditions (limiting case) of water moderation and heterogeneity credible for the system shall be determined in all calculations.

f) The analytical method (s) used for criticality safety analysis

• and the source of validation of the method (s) shall be specified.

g) Safety margins for individual units and arrays sh'all be based

• on accident conditions such as flooding, multiple batching, and fire.

h) No moderators, except for the operator's arms, and small items such as plastic bags, tools, and damp rags for cleaning, will t,e allowed in the agglomeration hoods while fissile material is in the hood.

i) The R-1, R-2 and R-3 inlet high pressure switches will be calibrated at least once every six months.

j) The following cylindrical tanks in the Recycle / Recovery Area (240-2) will have a barrier to insure no significant moderat-ing material can ba brought within one foot of the cylindrical tank surface.

1.

Dissolver 2.

Centrifuge Feed Vessel 3.

Dryer Scrubber Hold Tanks (2) j License No. SNM-33, Docket 70 36 Revision:

3 Date: 04/28/88 Page:

1.4 5

V:. a. f:

i!A.L._ ~.....i 4....t:.. x s

..:. a.3 2 ^. t.

. _ J';./;Ub;a 7 u.1 ;4.c. M,w.

l.

4.2.3 Safety Marains for Individual Units (c*ontinued) l j) 4.

NO Scrubber x

l 5.

Centrifuge Supernate Recycle l

6.

00 Precipitate Overflow Vessel 4

k) The hydrometer on the air inlet to the Dry Blender will be set to alarm at no more than 5% water and checked on a six month period.

1) The water content will be verified to be less than 0.05 w/o in storage cans on the conveyor storage area on a production lot basis (contents of two dry blenders).

4.2.4 Limits for Safe Individual Units (SIUs)

Table 4.i.4 Safe Individual Unit Limits for s 5.0% enriched 00 at optimum 2

moderation. All Mass and Volume limits have been adjusted to provide constant spacing areas for the enrichment shown. Hetero-I geneous limits have been developed with optimum rod sizes taken to allow for pellet chips, etc.

Nominal Enrichment /

HOMOGENEOUS HETEROGENEOUS Mass (Xg UO )

Limit f*

Limit f*

2

- 2.5% U235 54

.19 50

.26

>24 - 3.0%

41

.23 38

.29

>3.0 - 3.2%

36

.23 36

.29

>3.2 - 3.4%

35

.25 33

.29

>3.4 - 3.6%

32

.26 30

.30

>3.6 - 3.8%

28

.26 27

.29

>3.8 - 4.1%

24

.25 24

.27

>4.1 - 4.3%

22

.26 22

.27

>4.3 4.5%

20

.27 20

.27

>4.5 4.7%

18

.26 18

.27

>4.7 5.0%

16

.27 16

.27 License No. SNH 33, Docket 70 36 Revision: 2 Date: 04/28/88 Page 1.4 6

a; m

. m st.'.&.. :-. a...,.. -.,.

-... :....... w.... L......~... us a.a.J.<';. b. M :.r.\\~

4' 3

l l

i 4.2.4 Limits for Safe Individual Units (Slus)

(continued) l HOMOGENEOUS HETEROGENEOUS l

Volume fliters)

Limit f*

Limit f*

f 3.5%

31

.39 22

.40 3.5 4.1 25

.38 18

.38 4.1 - 5.0 22

.22 9

.38 Cylinder Diameter finches) 3.5 10.7

.34 9.5

.36 3.5 - 4.1 9.8

.33 8.9

.34 4.1 - 5.0 9.2

.34 8.4

.35,.

Slab Thickness (inches) t 3.5 5.1

. 36 4.4

.22 3.5 - 4.1 4.6

.32 3.9

.20 4.1 4.3 4.5.

.31 3.7

.20 4.3 - 5.0 4.0

.29 3.5

.20

• Fraction of the equivalent unreflected critical sphwrical volume or mass.

4.2.5 Surface Density Method The surface density method may be used to evaluate arrays of SIUs where each mass limit has a fraction critical of 0.3, and volume and cylinder limits have a fraction critical of 0.4. Spacing for mass limited Safe Individual Units is such that the contained 00 f

2 r

l I

r f

i l

License No. SNM-33, Docket 70 36 Revision:

0 Date: 04/28/88 I

Page:

1.4 6a i

i i

h i

.L a ?gJu.....;;w.

. t :

...... w.. ~. :. ~J:7!..n.: J U :.. U d.aj i E " C Q M.~J;.. G 7.. W J M e ]

o.

t t

7.7 Validation of Criticality Calculational Methodolooy I

The calculational anthodology used on this license is as described l

and validated in License $NM 1067.

i i

1 i

t l

i i

t a

l i

?

I i

i i

I l

i license No. SNM 33, Docket 70 36 Revision: 2 Date: 04/29/88 Page:

11.7-18 l

i f

i t

=- __

.w...,. e... : n. :..

L.:a..:. ;.c w.

. u:L.a m :s?.w+i

.w: u.. u:.;.r.w s.-.......:

8.1.5 Blendina (continued)

Blenders are arranged on six foot centers forming an inline array and are located at least four feet from other SNM-bearing equip-ment.

s

Packaaina and Storaae Dry UO2 product is transferred into stainless steel cans (9.75" p x 11" long) in the powder packaging hoods. A 10 mil poly bag may be used as an inner liner.

If used, it is sealed at the top with t ape'.

The can lid is a friction-fit type which is sealed on the outside with tape. This precludes any in-leakage of moisture from atmospheric humidity (the powder is not hygroscopic) or flooding.

Thus, the U02 product is kept dry (typically <.057. moisture) and moderation control is assured under all conditions. Section 11.9.7 describes all moderation controls in detail.

The sealed cans of dry UO2 product are then transferred to one of 5 roller conveyors on the north side of Building #255 as shown in Drawing D-5007-2001, Sheet 9 of 9.

The entire building is above the 100 year flood level as determined by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-in the Special Study for Joachim Creek, dated March, 1980.

Even if flooding were possible, the 30 kg weight of the cans containing high density U0 w uld prevent them from floating 2

and being moved. Building #255 is not sprinklered and firefight-ing would be done by dry chemical means. Thus, criticality safety is assured through moderation control (s 5.0Y. enriched UO 2

cannot be made critical without moderation).

License No. SNM-33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

3 Date: 04/29/88 Page:

11.8 7

2.f. n h L C....." B -.

...c =......u. a

'w '.'.v.

". whil E.d:T.h i..i. '..%si-e 8.2 Pellet Fabrication UO from the conversion process may also be withdrawn in five 2

gallon pails to be agglomerated and granulated to provide feed for pellet pressing.

After pressing, pellets are dewaxed, sintered, ground and in-spected. They are then packaged for shipment.

Process flow is shown in Figure II.8.1,.

8.2.1 Acalomeration and Granulation UO ' powder from the blenders is transferred to a V-blender having 2

a total volume of 25.7 liters. The blender is mounted on a scale and binders and other materials are added in predetermined quan-tities. The agglomerated material is discharged through a hopper to a drying belt which can contain up to a 1/2 inch thickness of material. The dry material is then dropped to a 15 liter granu-lator. This agglomerated press feed is then transferred to a press feed blender or into metal buckets (11" O x 1,3" long)

^

equipped with metal lids (which are tightly closed with a locking clamp-ring) for storage. The V-blender was conservatively deter-mined to be criticality safe by assuming the V-blender was a sphere with a total volume of 25.7 liters. The volume at a unre-flected optimally internally moderated sphere (ARH-600 volume 11 Figure III.B.3-4) is 50 liters applying the 1.3 safety factor the volume is 38.5 liters. Therefore, the 25.7 liters is less than 38.5 liters. The absence of a reflector will be contro11eo by allowing only limited moderating material in the hood (see 4.2.3, Safety Margins for Individual Units, Item b).

The granulator is a safe volume as shown in Table 4.2.4.

License No. SNM-33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

2 Date: 04/29/88 Page 11.8 8 G

.... -.. ~.

- a:- c-a:.%.t...Ae

...:nXi M.E.Ac M &.&.Y.: ;.t..

...:. 2.QJ-....-

8.2.2 Powder Storaae and Press Feed Storaae The agglomerated press feed in either the press feed blender or metal buckets sealed with a locking ring clamp are stored on a 1/4 inch thick steel mezzanine located above the product storage conveyors. This mezzanine is 81/2 feet above the concrete floor and the buckets are stored in a 13 x 13 array on 24-inch centers.

Metal rings are used to maintain this spacing.

The following assumptions were incorporated in the calculational model of the powder storage and the mezzanine press feed storage areas:

1.

The containers on the lower level were modelled as 9.75 inch diameter by 11 inch high cylindrical containers containing 35 kg of UO with.05 w/o water. The steel structure of the cans 2

were not modelled, as well as the 0.01" polyethylene bag j

which may be containing the U0 in the can.

2 2.

The lower level contained no external mist.

)

3.

The containers on the upper level were modelled as 11 inch diameter by 13 inch high cylindrical containers containing 41.0 kg of UO with 2.0 w/o water. The steel structures of 2

the cans were not modelled.

4.

The upper level assumed a.05 g/cc external mist.

5.

The lower level assumed the cans were stacked as shown in Drawing D-5007-2001 in the +/- x direction (horizontally) and that the cans were touching in the +/- z direction (depth) and infinite in length.

6.

The upper level assumed a separation distance of 2 feet between centers in the x direction and 1.7 feet (2.0 feet actual) between centers in the z direction and infinite in l ength.'

7.

The system was reflected in the +/- x and z directions. The K-eff obtained for the system is 0.65867 0.00862.

License No. SNH-33, Docket 70.36 Revision: 2 Date:

04/29/88 Page:

11.8-9 s

._.,,.._.y

.c xw:9. -... -..a..aa.-

..r

. c a.:. w

..a. c

.; a n : ::, a.:. m ; a :n w a :.w m,

8.2.3 Pressina Granulated material, contained in 5-gallon pails, is considered to be homogeneous for criticality safety evaluations. The 5-gallon pails of blended material are attached to the press-feed hopper mounted above each press. From this hopper, the material is gravity-fed to the press. The pressed pellets are then stacked onto sintering trays.

Each press consists of a 29 liter press-feed unit and several sintering trays, having a total volume of less than four liters.

Accordingly, each press is assigned a minimum clear area of 13 2

feet. Although this spacing is not taken from Table 1.4.2.4, it is based on the same criteria and constitutes a special unit spacing.

8.2.4 Dewaxina and Sinterina Pressed pellets are dewaxed and then sintered to achieve the specified ceramic properties.

Pellets are loaded onto sintering trays which may be stacked to a maximum safe slab height. The pellet containers are charged in a single line through the controlled atmosphere furnaces.

8.2.5 Grindina Sintered pellets are transferred to the grinder feed system and ground under a stream of coolant. The coolant is recirculated at a uranium concentration of considerably less than one gram per liter. The infeed, grinder and the outfeed pellet configurations limited to a safe slab thickness.

License No. SMi-33, Doqket 70 36 Revision:

1 Date:

04/29/88 Page:

!!.8-10

.2hk....-.L ;........~ :.c.

. a..- -

.r::.c.

'O'k.i '. wLDw?ii21 :D&:L.. &TT2: k t.iik: u, 8.2.5 Grindina (continued)

Grinder sludge is removed by a centrifuge and stored in mass limited SIUs. This material is subsequently loaded into trays to a maximum safe slab depth, dried in an oven and stored awaiting final disposition.

A complete enclosure is provided around the grinder to preclude dusting of V0. This enclosure is maintained at a slight 2

negative pressure with respect to the room The centrifuge is limited to a safe volume of less than 10 liters and is provided with a spacing area of 4.0 ft.2 Water from the centrifuge collects-in a 19 liter sump and is pumped back to the grinder.' The centrifuge sump is provided.with a spacing area of 8.0 feet. The centrifuge is cleaned periodically as required to permit continued operation.

Properly sized pellets are transferred on a conveyor to tray which are then moved to the inspection area. The pellets move in a safe slab configuration during inspection operations. After inspection, the pellets are stored in a safe slab and then packaged for shipment.

8.2.6 Packaaina The pellets awaiting packaging will form a safe slati with a thickness less than the safe thickness shown in Table 1.4.2.4.

The pellets are packaged in the licensed shipping containers in accordance with the applicable certificate of compliance.

^

License No. SNM-33, Docket *70-36 Revision:

1 Date: 04/29/88 Page:

11.8-11

4 2 2. w.. :..i...:

u.

..w c, du... i....

' }$d.hL:1::.G:LldD:-l'.#O.1hx. :.u 8.5.1 UFg Cylinder Washing.(continuedl d) The uranium in the wash solution will be precipitated by the addition of Anhydrous Anunonia.

The precipitate will be filtered on a 12" X 12" filter press.

e) Filtrate will be concentrated by evaporation, sampled and alpha and beta counted.

It will then be solidified by adding cement and packaged for shipment to licensed burial.

8.6.

Analytical Services Analytical services are provided in several laboratory areas.

St4M of any enrichment may be handled in these areas.

The laboratories are divided into sections consistent with the testing techniques employed. There are a general lab area, physical testing areas, office areas and storage.

The material handled includes feed material samples, process control samples, final product samples, and residue samples.-

Such samples may be liquid or solid.

Analyses are perfomed using destructive and non-destructive techniques. Unused sample portions are returned to the process streams. Analytical residues are collected, analyzed, and removed from the area for solidification for shipment to a licensed burial site or stored for recovery.

)

a.

General Laboratory Wet and dry analytical methods are used. The quantity of Stim in this area will be limited to 740 grams of U-235.

However, for enrichments in excess of 5.07., a limit of 350 gm U-235 applies.

License tio. St4M-33, Oocket 70-36 Revision:

1 Date: 12/28/07 Page: !!.8-15

^

~~

f.iMa.i..

.'..u.:.....:.~.. l.. ;.. 2:.. c. * %.L : <.C l:03Glilbt:MSN$UO.'Y5.%B.i.re '.2.

8.7 Scrao Recovery 8.7.1 System Description The Scrap Recovery Process is designed for wet recovery and blending of scrap materials containing uranium having a maximum enrichment of 5.0%.

Clean dry scrap recycle (Section II.8.4) and UF cylinder wash precipitation (Section II.8.5.ld) operations 6

are also conducted in the Recycle / Recovery Area (240-2).

Except as specified, all units of equipment conform to the limits specified for safe mass, volume or cylinder diameter, and are spaced to conform with spacing requirements for SIUs. The uranium bearing units and their associated spacings are shown on Drawing D-f5009-2012, Rev. 5,- and the equipment layout is shown on Drawing D-5009-2010, Rev. 4.

Material flow diagrams are shown on the following Drawings:

D-5009-1011 Rev. 2 240-2 R/R Equipment Flow Diagram B-5009-1007 Rev.1240-2 R/R Process Flow B-5009-1008 Rev. 2 240-2 R/R Wet Recovery System B-5009-1009 Rev.1240-2 R/R UF Cylinder Wash 6

8.7.2 0xidation and Reduction Wet recovery operations will be performed on all types of scrap materials such as contaminated uranium cet

'ds, clean-up residues and combustible materials with rece, rable uranium con-tent. Most of these materials require oxidation and reduction prior to introduction into the Wet Recovery System, and are loaded into furnace trays in the muffle box hood. This hood is operated on a mass limit depending on whether it is a hetero-geneous or homogeneous material being processed.

License No. SNM 33, Docket 70 Revision:

2 Date: 04/29/88 Page:

11.8-17

.&.?

';...-.L.

.a..

a a.

. u.L:.P:h;;;.t... A. a.:1. :sw.D T.WI.';BJD.MKF% wax ~'.!,

8.7.2 0xidation and Reduction (continued)

Cooled boxes are unloaded in the muffle box hood, and the material processed through such steps as granulation, magnetic separation, sampling weighing, and blending, as appropriate.

Each of these operations is performed under a safe mass limit.

Material thus prepared is now ready for introduction into the first step of the Wet Recovery System.

8.7.3 Dissolution A preweighed charge of homogeneous material is introduced into a 9 3/4" diameter x 16" long vessel which is located in the slurry -

feed hood. This hood is limited to one safe mass.

The material is slurried with water and transferred to a dissolver.

The dis-solver is 9 3/4" diameter x 51" long. With the addition of nitric acid, the uranium is dissolved into a solution having a concen-tration of 50 to 250 grams per liter.

Concentrations of uranium in the 300 gram / liter range and higher form slurries which cannot be pumped by the centrifugal transfer pump.

The critical diameter for a fully reflected infinitely long cylin-der containing 5.0 wt % U-235 at optimum internal moderation is 10.4 inches. The critical diameter for an unreflected infinite cyl-inder is 13.7 inches. Therefore, a 9.75 inch diameter cylinder even at optimum internal moderation is a safe cylinder.

The criticality safety is assured by item "j" in Section 4.2.3, Part I.

Non homogeneous material (e.g., pellets) will not be introduced into the dissolution step.

License No. SNM-33, Docket 70-36 Rev %i a:

2 Date:

04/29/88 Page:

11.8-19

\\

ifali ~L~T..L

.8. 2 -

.... cL:2.bx.t Le.. D;k n i.~.l 2 D : D l %.d D G 2. % G i k.::a X ' nc 1

i.

8.7.3 Dissolution (continued)

Both the slurry and dissolver vessels have assigned spacing areas greater than 5 ft' per ft, of length.

8.7.4 Filtration, Storage, and Dilution After allowing digestion time to insure complete uranium dissolution, the UO2(NO3)2 solution may still contain aciu insolubles and is pumped through a filter press to remove these solids. The filter press is 8" x 8" x 8-1/2" and has an active volume of less than the allowable safe volume for non-homogeneous material.

After filtration, the solution is pumped into two safe diameter (6" diameter by 5' long) Pyrex clarity check vessels.

If any evidence of suspended solids remaining in the solution is observed, it will be recirculated through the filter until a clear solution'is obtained prior to release to the holding tank. The holding tank has a maximum capacity of 1285 gallons, and is also used for dilution and blending.

The holding tank is poisoned with Raschig rings in accordance with ANSI Standard N16.4-1979. Two Raschig ring sample tubes are provided to enable inspection for accumulation of solids and to provide samples for testing the physical and chemical properties of the rings. These inspections and tests will be ccnducted in accordance with the ANSI Standard.

I License tio. SNM-33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

2 Date: 12/28/67 Page: 11.8-20 m

.Af :..a.(.

..a:r..:..

...n.) ; C:.~i2.D.L.C L! w.Rnisi. 2.hck hdMM:M%.O.Mh.'*d?.9 t

8.7.4 filtration. Storaae. and Dilution (continued)

The acid insoluble filter and the clarity check vessels are assigned exclusion areas conforming with surface density spacing requirements. These exclusion areas are shown on Dwg 0-5009-2012, Rev. 5.

There are no. sumps nor. floor drains in the 240-2 area to which process material could flow from leaks or rupture of the equipment.

8.7.5 U0 Precioitation 4

Diluted UO (NO )2 solution is transferred to a horizontal trough 2

3 precipitator (8 3/8" x 12 5/8" x 10' long). An overflow is located at a height of 9 inches. Any overflow from this trough is collected in a (9 3/4" diameter x 39" long) unreflected over-flow vessel. Criticality safety is assured by limiting reflector (see item "j" section 4.2.3).

The critical diameter for a fully reflected cylinder containing 5.0% wt % U-235 at optimum moderation is 10.4 inches. The critical diameter for an unreflected cylinder is 13.7 inches. The trough precipitator is essentially unreflected. Further, the leakage'for a rectangular tank is greater than for an equivalent cross section area cylinder. The rectangular tank is equivalent to a 9.39 inch cylinder when corrected for leakage. Applying the 1.1 safety factor to the 10.4 inch fully reflected critical diameter cylinder of 10.4 inches results in 9.45 inch safe cylinder which is larger than the 9.39 inch equivalent cylinder representation of the trough precipitator.

The pH of the solution is adjusted with ammonium hydroxide from 1

the ammonium hydroxide makeup system. This system consists of a sealed tank with a vent to the atmosphere. Additional makeup solutions are introduced from tank 4-2 to precipitate the uranium as UO. After aging and the final pH adjustment is completed, 4

the UO slurry is discharged to a 9 3/4" diameter x 33" long 4

centrifuge feed vessel.

i License No. SM-33, Docket 70-36 Revision: 2 Date: 04/29/88 Page:

11.8 21

rn....

.a r:.:.

..a.

..-...: a.m.xu.< J.e...a:w.n w n.m w

=.w. w...c

.;az:s ;.;

8.7.6 Ma Separation The precipitated slurry is transferred from the centrifuge feed vessel into a centrifuge which has a maximum volume of 7.63 liters. The cake is discharged, by gravity, from the centrifuge into a steam heated screw conveyor dryer.

z The dryer has a total cross sectional area of 75.17 in (this includes the internal screw conveyor) The actual net internal volume available for uranium is 107.62 liters, based on the manufacturer's design, data, and allowing for the volume displaced by the internal screw mechanism. The centrifuge is located in line with the dryer, and has an internal volume of 7.63 liters.

The UO4 centrifuge-dryer-pail complex, as sketched below, has been evaluated in a 1000 x 1000 array to establish safe spacing requirements. The evaluation wcs made using KEN 0 with Hansen-Roach cross sections. The geometrical model used in the KENO calculations is shown in Figure 11.8-'2 p

l U(5.0) 02 + H2O 1

U

- -G- -

l 2 gm U/cc

x. 2.,

i L_

_ _J Z = 59",

+

x=2'

+

x=2' 4 --

Reflector assumptions used were a 16" thick concrete slab below and a 4: thick concrete slab above the complex.

License No. SNM-33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

1 Date: 12/28/37 Page: 11.8-22 j

'h

(:

g.

i r_-

n to e

3

e 4" Thick Concret* Staf "J

IJ.

l lll// lll //!/ //Y f/

y

}\\

f Centrifuge)

};

I,,

w La.D 8.41* d I'

Cyltader %

8.41" high

,7 h

c+

10" high.

Slab 11.5" wide y

d o

3.75" deep i.'

Cylinder 14' long g

M 9*8" S N

Z - 59" l

18" top width n

E Slab 8.375" deep g

[^*

(Dryer) 12" bottom width c

13.5" height 2

3 6.91" d (centerline) k 9.77" height' N

l

[

p.

(centeritne) 4

• --Cylinder 8

m I

to 4* d

<?

b g

9.5" high-M ylinder.

p.

2

.i 11.25" d U (5.Q 02 + H2O p

13" h1gh.

(Pall)

% Cy11nder

~2 gm U/cc

.r.

a.,

.(All units full).

}

i m

t.

I.

~

y,(

V Ej ll l l l // ll l l1glTfkefCbcrkek1af l l l l l h.

YM}: u.. <98 /fc _ :

'O

$ KETCH 4 - KEND MODEL'- CENTRIFUGE / DRYER / PAIL COMBINATION 5~C7EEMg* 7 '

[-

Y y

c.,

o.

o.

m g

b

[...:

e-o FC

• h

,o m

.r h.

C3 u

, ;.:.l.. e....

• :...' m.:L J w.......t;+.wd '..'1.i.-:s ;

-LWWd.S %'.' i&:L.h6%':,

. 2. a..

...: c 8.7.6 00 Seoaration (continued) 4 The KENO calculation gave k,7f=0.8966

.0099 at an optimum'UO 2

density of 2.0 gm/cc.

The following conservative assumptions were incorporated in the calculation:

235 1.

The powder was assumed to be 00 at 5.0 wt % U instead of 2

the actual U0. The powder density was assumed to be 2.0 g/cc.

4 The U0 was assumed to be optimally moderated.

2 2.

All steel structural materials were neglected.

The dryer driving screw was replaced by full density water.

3.

The system was assumed to be fully reflected by water.

4.

The net internal volume of-the Holo-Flite processor was 107.62 liters. The U0 was assumed distributed uniformly around the 2

dryer driving screw, which was modelled as a central cylinder occupying the remaining volume.

Accordingly, a minimum spacing of x - 2.0' will be provided for the centrifuge-dryer pail combination unit, given a total exclu-2 sion area of 72 ft for this unit. This spacing is more than adequate, as the KEN 0 model used was conservative. Af ter drying, i

the UO is transferred to safe volume containers in the dryer dis-4 charge hood.

This hood is limited to one such container. These containers are moved to approved storage spaces to await addition-al processing. Centrifuge supernate is discharged to a 9 3/4" diameter x 39" long overflow and filter recycle unreflected vessel (see item "j" section 4.2.3).

It is then pumped through a filter press for further clarification.

This filter press is limited to a safe volume and is assigned ex-2 clusion area spacing of greater than 9 ft.

Solids from this press are treated in the same manner as solids from the centrifuge.

License No. SNM-33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

2 Date:

04/29/88 Page:

11.8-24

.'a....:.,.~.. O.:...-. _ :::.a.a.i. ?'t:s i ? L<.v h R%lC1.~LDL.9 ~;l@$$itkh::.GW:k-hit w;.'b 8.8 Waste Incineration The incinerator / scrubber system is used to reduce the volume of low level uranium contaminated waste with a maximum enrichment of 5.0% U-235. The system consists of a gas-fired in::inerator, an air-cooled heat ex-changer, an ejector-venturi scrubber and a packed tower scrubber. The engineering flow diagram is shown in Drawing 0-5009-1020. The system is located in area 240-3.

The equipment layout is shown in Drawing D-5009-2015.

Low level wastes are dispositioned for incineration after ganma counting. The wastes are logged in on the Incinerator / Scrubber Continuous Iny'ntory Sheet and then e

subdivided into incinerator charges in the filter cut-up hood.

Individual charges are packaged in plastic or paper bags.

The typical incinerator charge contains a' out 10 kilograms b

of combustible waste and only a few grams of U-235. The ~

small size of the incinerator makes it necessary to vacuum out the ash long before the safe mass is reached.

Operating procedures require removal of the ash when it reaches a depth of 3 to 4 inches (less than a safe slab configuration). No significant ash accumulation has been observed in the secondary combustion chamber. Operating procedures, however, require inspection of the secondary chamber each time the ash is removed from the primary chamber. The probability of moderation by water flooding is essentially zero.

License No. SNM-33, Docket 70-36 Revision-1 Date: 12/28/87 page: II.8-29

..; L.. u -........... '

..uq

.u a:Li.1 e. L.:.Ren: :..:.:L -:1.awRj&cGHu.h.

• syk&

e 8.8 Waste Incineration (continued)

Charging of the incinerator is terminated when the inventory sheet shows that a total of 800 grams U235 (16 kg at 5.0 w/o U235) has been introduced into the system, or when the ash nears a safe slab depth, as stated above.

Ash will be removed from the incinerator via the vacuum collec-tion hood, analyzed for total uranium and dispositioned for burial or wet recovery.

o' The ejector-venturi scrubber recycle tank is drained after each safe mass charge is incinerated and therefore cannot exceed a safe ma,ss for 5.0% enrichment.-

The packed tower scrubber is very similar to the scrubber used with the furnaces in area 240-2. Thus, the'same control pro-cedures are used. The scrubber liquor is sampled weekly and analyzed for uranium concentration. The scrubber will be drained and flushed if the uranium concentration exceeds 1 gram per liter.

The heat exchanger, ejector-venturi separator box, and the packed tower scrubber are inspected at least annually for accumulation of uranium compounds.

No significant accumulation has been observed in over seven years of operation.

Pressure indicators are located before and after each stage of the system. Operating procedures require frequent checks of these ir,-

dicators to assure that the entire system remains under negative pressure.

License No. SNM-33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

2 Date: 04/29/88 Page:

11.8-3'l

..w. :.. w, ::...:.:4.. 2.;za "m..ysu..

~, e v>.a.m a.-,

w: ::... r ' uJ.\\ '

.;; w

..:.a r..:.....a ~. -

-.u

..J -

.s:

9.0 NUCLEAR SAFETY ANAL _Y. SIS OF UFg - U0 CONVERSION g

9.1 Reactor Vessel and Furnace a.

Description Cross section assembly drawing of the vessel and furnace jacket is shown in Figure 9-2.

The elevation view of the UF - U02 conversion reactor line is shown in 6

Figure 9-1.

The three reactor vessels, R-1, R-2, and R-3, are identical with the exception of the internal filters that are not included in R-2 and R-3.

b.

Nuclear Safety Assumptions :

1) Maximum enrichment 5.0%.

2) Under process design (nornel) conditions, SNM is only

^

in the 10" diameter lower section of the vessel.

3) Reflection as provided by furnace insulation; and vessel steel walls as shown'in Figure II.9-2.

Reactor vessels are supported 30, 20, and 10 feet above the ground level; infinite water reflection is, therefore, not credible.

License No. SNM-33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

1 Date: 12/28/87 j

Page: II.9-1

zG.;.< z. :.

.a c.C.-.

c. Ac. %.:v.L.1 e~ ;,h,un,x.W:e.bn tw;,uhu,a:.: :.s.%E e

.m.

,n O

l 9.1 Reactor Vessel and Furnace (continued) c.

Conclusions

1) Normal Conditions The SNH is in the lower 10" diameter portion of the reactor under normal. conditions.

2) Accident Conditions A loss of temperature could theoretically fill the 10" reactor and 12" disengaging section with condensed steam.

This could occur for any of four reasons -

1. Thermocouole Failure Failure of a single thermocouple could shut off the power to one of the two independently controlled heat sections. Since the temperature controller would fail up-scale, the high temperature alarm would sound assuring prompt corrective action. The al ternate heat section will, in any case, provide sufficient power to the reactor to prevent steam condensation.

2. General Power Failure Failure of the power supply to the plant would cause the steam control valve to fail closed, terminating the supply of steam and cause the nitrogen control valve to fail open, purging all steam from the reactor.

3. Failure of a Sinole Heatino Flement Since the furnace is connected to a three phase poder supply, the most common mode of failure is an open circuit in one of the three circuits leaving two circuits and the alternative furnace heating as well. This would prevent condensation and if 0

the reactor temperature dropped below 600 F, the low temperature alarm would sound.

License No. SNM 33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

2 Date:

04/29/88 Page:

11.9 2

uL_ i

.J.

.,. w.c. M2.it dc E:ll. Meli &:'.SELih5MG... ' Mli.55 9.1 Reactor Vessel and Furnace (continued) c.

4. Massive Failure of all Heatino Elements in Both Furnaces A massive failure of all heating elements in both furnace sections wo01d result in low temperature alarms on both controllers. Assuming the alarms were ignored or silenced r'epeatedly, condensation could begin after several hours 0

of cooling (the reactor and furnace are operated 1000 F over the condensation temperature).

The 1/8" holes in the bubble caps would plug when the water filled the lower bell housing. This would result in excessive feed system pressure and close the steam control valve and, sound the high pressure alarm when the pressure reached 18 psi. Further increases in pressure if the pressure-switch failed would cause the rupture disc and relief valve to open at 20 psi.

Failure of all these systems would allow water to enter the reactor and with the normal steam flow control setting, the level of water in the R-2 would rise to the bottom of the disengaging section five hours after the onset of condensation and more than eight hours after power loss, but even this would not occur unless the R 2 l

powder valve sealed and was not opened as required by procedures for unloading the R-3 reactor at two hour intervals.

The concurrent failures of independent equipment and procedures described in each of these circumt.tances is deemed incredible.

License No. SNM 33, Docket 70 36 Revision: 0 Date:

04/29/88 Page:

II.9 2a

2o

.2 d*/;G n s.g.. % L* w.xW::.;&..,w, ; 2.. d;

.p

.6' v < : -....

',. 1

.:. q,.:. s 3. D.. ',1.c u. 3 :. r.nn.~.1.

.h.-X h

Figure II.9-2 bs R s Ac.To o-DdvAiLe g$

i i

y]

i l

1 t t l

3 v

i 1

I 2

a j

l l

d h

l I

3 e

t 1

J

~

l t

c l

l c

v I

l r

t i

... c " c n., -)

g t._J R

.... +. s.nr. ( n,. n c->

4 c is.s

.)

[

3- +..-- -i " - 4 nc c i s. m s..)

l j

-- -- S.5

• C t i. C't -)

l w-.-

__( s s. 9 -)

- W e

A 17 75,( Vf o f f u) 1 j g " ( 4 5 7 2 cm) 1

!,g

._d, I

I

.{,

Y. N (.6 354 Y

vW my

.ns k E',(M i i l

l

- tv ---,

0 3s.5-i 2

36" 4

J t

i License flo. Sf!M-33, Oceket 70-36 Revision:

1 Date:

12/23/87 Page:

!!.9-4

}

m - - - - -

c.'d.L5.dN2Ak:$k.:::...n:

',$ Q.L.. p *l....

.u.

..,,:..c-l 2% aid. :. :..h.d0MW 9.1 Reactor Vessel and Furnace (continue'd) c.2 Conclusions (continued)

H.owever, a K,ff calculation has been made for an isolated Reactor as shown in II.9-2.

The k,ff = 0.9510

.0055.

c.3 Criticality Safety Analysis The following conservative assumptions were used in the calcula-tional model of the UF to UO conversion equipment analysis:

6 2

1.

Reactors R-1 and R-2 were assumed to be filled in the 10 inch portion (i.e., no overfill) with dry U0 at 2.5 g/cc density 2

235 of powder and 5.0 w/o U All structures consisting of 3

.375" steel wall, 7.75" of 37.5 lbs/ft firebrick insulation and.25" steel casing were included in the model.

2.

Reactor R-3 was assumed to be filled in both the 10" and 12" portions (i.e. overfilled) with saturated 00 at 2.5 g/cc 2

235 powder density and 5.0 w/o U All structures consisting of.375" steel wall, 7.75" firebrick insulation'and.25" steel casing were included in the model.

3.

The cooler was assumed to contain dry UO and to be enclosed 2

by a.5" external water. jacket.

4.

The silos were assumed to contain UO with 5.0 w/o water.

2 The.125" steel walls were also modelled.

5.

The U0 blenders contained U0 with 5.0 w/o water. The.125" 2

2 steel walls were also modelled.

6.

The UF scrubber was assumed dry U0 with no external 6

2 structures modelled.

7.

The R-1 hopper was assumed to be filled with dry U0 and 2

surrounded by l' of water.

8.

An external mist of.001 g/cc was assumed.

License No. SM 33, Docket 70 36 Revision:

2 Date: 04/29/88 Page:

11.9 5 4

i s

e-

-e -

-.m.. - -

'KS-..,'..a

.:3:au i...:. AOM.GOlMc:i;%.nL0E'$ded::...%

• w.'

- c.

9.1 c.3 Criticality Safety Analysis (continued)

The KENO-IV code with Hansen-Roach cross-sections was used to determine the criticality of the system. The K,77 obtained was

.9714 1 0058.

9.2 Cooler The couler is an eight inch diameter with an external water jacket.

Eight inch diameter is safe at 5.0% enriched.

Reference:

Section 4.0.

P 9.3 Interaction of the UF; - UO3 Conversion Eouioment These following interaction analysis show that the reactors are the most reactive components in the UF6 - UO2 e nversion system.

235 Though the reactivity analysis was done for 5.0 w/o U using KENO, the interaction calculations are still valid and can be used for small changes to the system.

Such modifications will be limited to solid angle changes which would not increase the total solid angle.

The interaction of the conversion equipment has been evaluated by the solid angle method. The total solid angle subtended at R-2 by other equipment is 0.70 steradians which slightly exceeds the allowable solid angle of approximately 0.5 steradians. The KEN 0 results verify that the interaction with the R-2 reactor with the other systems did indeed increase the reactivity of the system.

license No. SNM 33, Docket 70-36 Revision: 2 Date:

04/29/88 Page:

II.9-Sa

.11..i

s. K cu 2 l& h.C: e O.iL%5 1.'i % !1i?M D iUi? k lia k 1.v: '.3.h

~

\\

9.3 Interaction of the UF3-UO, Conversion Ecuf pment (continued) b.

Contributed by R-1 Product Hopper 112 = 2.67

\\

p Tan e1 = 42 R-1 Produ %

\\

ct e = 69.5' Hopper 1

A

//2 Sin e = 0.935 j

E

1.81 Tan e yg 2

42 S/

p e2 = 61' Oz y

/

y Sin e2 = 0.874 42-*+

=

~'

d = 12" h = 42" ahopper=4h2 x (0.935 - 0.874) = 0.0175 steradians.

Contribution by hopper bottom is.005 and is neglected.

c.

Contributed by R-1 n

= 0 (shielded by product hopper)

R-1 d.

Contributed by stortge vessels (silos) 01 and 02 (a) Nearest Silo 01 d = 12" L = 23' L/2 = 138" h = 13.5' = 162" n=[(0.649)=0.096 f

Tan e

= 0.852 Sin e= 0.649 steradia ns.

(b)

Farthest silo 02 Tane=h=0.807 d = 12" L= 23' L/2 = 138" h = 171" Sin e= 0.641 n=

(0.641) = 0.090 steradians.

)

License No. SNM-33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

1 Date: 04/29/88 Page: 11.9-7 l

32

..:.~.J.1,..C_e..:.n

.......m_..: E12ik25::L di.G.hfisdiid:::UJdl.tbMfSA, sis /I.4W 4

9.4 Storage Vessels a.

Equipment Description

1) Storage vessels: 12 inch diameter x infinite length, 1/8 inch stainless steel wall thickness.

2) Milling equipment:

10, inch diameter x 2 foot high hopper; 10 inch x 1 inch deep mill; 5-gallon recycle pail.

3) Blending vessels:

14 inch diameter x 20 foot length, 1/8 inch stainless steel wall thickness.

4 b.

Nuclear Safety

1) Assumptions Maximum enrichment is 5.0%

Limited or no moderation Partial reflection 2)

Individual Units Individual vessels and units contain dry UO2 under normal operating conditions and therefore are safe.

Further details of the control of moderation are set forth in the Nuclear Safety Analysis - Control of Moderation.

3)

Interaction

)

The interaction of blenders has been evaluated by the solid angle method. The total solid angle subtended at the most central blender is 1.123 steradians which compares with an allowable interaction of 2.16 steradians. Detailed calculations follow.

License No. SNM-33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

1 Date: 12/28/07 Page: 11.9-10

--._~

~ --

~B2.L.L4.Q

.a...:..a

....n..uLil'ci'..UL.u.diMCCf..bMstw.s;2.7:5.

9.4 -

Storage Vessels (continued) b.3) continued Interaction at the mill and storage vessels (silos) is less than at the blenders and since these vessels have a smaller diameter, they are less reactive and are allowed a larger solid angle.

9.5 Dry Blenders a.

Description

1) The #03 dry blender is centermost unit.

~

2) All equipment is separated by at'least 4 feet.

3) Maximum enrichment is 5.0%.

b.

Assunptions 1)

Individual blenders are safe as per NDE0-1137;

2) Maximum moderation not exceed V

/Y

=.51 H0 UO (5w/owater) 2 2

3) Reflector savings is 3 cm (unreflected).

4)

K bare calculated using data of NDEO 1137.

eff c.

X Calculation eff d = 14" = 35.6 cm r = 17.8 cm height = 20' = 240" :=

=h 6 = 3 cm = reflector savings 2

2 2

2=

2.405

=

2.M5 0134 cm'2 89 r+6 h + 26_

=

17.8+3 K- = 1.11

]

Figure 1 and 2, NDEO 1137 M = 44.2 cm

)

1.icense No. SNM-33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

1 Date: 04/29/88 Page: 11.g-11 f

13.' '._"..... L.:.=~.

.~ --.:...; n..a..* h2cGi..&...adidi:?i.'.wi. '5.RiNc:&.dGil&'ds:.LEiu ~'

9.5 Dry Blenders (continued) e k,ff Calculation (continued) c.

k,ff =

k=

2 2 1 + H Bg 1.11

=

1 + (44.2 x.0134 )

1.11

.697

=

=

, 1.592 l'

d.

Interaction Calculation:

Subtended at blender #03 by:'

1) Blender #04 d = 14", L = 20' = 240" h = 68" L

= 120 j

Tane=f=I

= 1.76 Sin e=.866 2d 28 04 p Sin e = g x.866 =.356 steradians 0

=

i

2) Blender #02 Same as Blender #04 i

U O2 =.356 steradians

3) Blender #01 01 = 0 (shielded).

0 i

license No. Stim-33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

1 Date: 04/29/88 Page: !!.9 12 t

]

e

a.

.,--.a u..

......L r:. wanz.... - ta.ru twi.mle.Mca:.wo ;u wam ~

9.6 Agglomeration Blenders a.

Description 1)

The 02 Blender is the centemost unit. All equipment will be separated by at least 4 feet.

2)

The maximum enrichment processed will be 5.0%.

b.

Assumptions 1)

Individual blenders are safe as shown in 9.6.c.

2)

Blender has optimum moderation.

3)

A reflector savings,of-3 cm will be used to describe the unreflected case.

4)

The unre?heted effective multiplication factors will be calculated using the data in NDE0-1137.

5)

The blender geometry will be _ treated as a cylinder with a diameter equal to the blender diameter and the length determined by the blender volume and diameter.

c.

Effective Multiplication Factor Calculation - Nomal Moderation The blender has a volume of 25.62 liters and a diameter of 9-1/4" (23.5cm)

The equivalent height is x 25620 102480 h=

58.8 cm, r = 11.75 cm

=

u2 535 x w 1740 - =

d Assuming the unreflected reflector savings is 6 = 3 cm License No. SNM-33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

1 Date: 11/28/87 Page: 11.9 17

N.'.'l.

N...:s nW n$.I..it.

a ' Yih!2.O:.i..wi':.a.h.6XMil$LAt w:::.r.'x.T:; U%

P 9.6 Acolomeration Blenders (continued) c.

Effective Multiplication Factor Calculation - Normal Moderation (continued) 1 Use the Buckling equation 0

B

+

=

(r + 6)g (h+26)2 The geometric buckling is 2

2 B2, 2.405 w

-2

.0289 cm (1175 + 3)2 (58.8 + 6)2 At 5.0% enrichment, the optirhum infinite multiplication I

factor and migration length occur at V

/Y 4'0 HO UO 2

2 K-=

1.48, Fig.1. NDEO-1137 2

2 M

29.8 cm. Fig. 2. NDEO-1137 Using the effective multiplication factor fonnula k=

k,ff = ), g g22 1

Tne urreflected effective multiplication factor for the V-Blender 1

is i

1.488 1.48 k

• 80 eff =

1+(29.8 x.0289), 1.861-

=

License No. SNM-33, Ocek'et 70-36 Revision: 1 Date: 04/29/88 Page: !!.9-18

.a:.' -j..'.

.u.1-.. u. a.w

' GMW2A.M.CO2:.:M ib:.W...... 1.:.x.bsO.b 9.7 Moderation Control The process of convertirg UF6 to UO2 is performed in three closed systens. Equipment for the first portion includes the attached UF6 cylinder, the UF6 to U02 conversion rc;etors -

and the in process storage silos. A break in the system occurs at the milling equipment to allow charging of recy.16 material. The second portion includes the milling equipment, the dry blenders and breaks at the bottom of the dry blenders to allow charging the agglomeration V-blenders. The last portion includes the agglaneration V-blenders and granulator, both of which have openings.

Under normal operating conditio,ns, moderation and moisture control are rigidly maintained to insure product quality.

This control also is necessary for material transfer through the various process steps.

Both mechanical and administrative controls are used.

Assumptions a.

Maximum enrichment 5.0%

b.

Controlled moderation c.

Nominal water reflection License No. SNM 33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

1 Date: l'2/28/87 Page: !!.9-26

',10 lb u.'. 2. 0 22w0.h; 'eln' : w -..xh'L. O -?...u....J.:.uf.. ' '. :'M

.: -..c. L.

%., w f

pe e

4 NuclearSafety(continued) a.

Reactors t

If one malfunction occurred allowing the 12 inch upper section

(

to fill with SNM and water at optimum moderation ratio, the j

effective multiplication factor for an isolated reactor would be l

t K,ff = 0.9510

.0055 A second unrelated event such as substituting a more effective reflector would be required before accidental t

criticality could occur.

b.

Storage Silos (

Reference:

NDEO-1137)

Two unrelated equipment failures would be required to cause, -

water moderation. These failures are:

1) The continuous drain on the U0 screw cooler would have 2

to plug.

l

2) The screw cooler water jacket would have to rupture, allowing the inleakage of water.

I I

i I

1 l

I License No. SNM-33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

2 Date: 04/29/88 Page:

II.9 29 1

i I

e;,

4 7

,e 74

'J..

s.:.,'.M &.;.if lf1% '~ u.a c.C'. b.hl...' C.:.:. ;. c'n.::Ll.;,1:. :L w'.-

ll?'*M..,!:2 & u 1.. *l.

~

NuclearSafety(continued) d.

Dry Blenders (

Reference:

NDE0-1137) (continued)

4) Water could be introduced through the plant air system.

However, the following failures would be required:

Failure of the dryer Failure of the alarm Failure of water separator with the automatic blowdown The automatic blowdown on the blender air receiver would have to fail. This applies only to the blend air system.

5) Water could be introduced through the roof mounted vacuum transfer system blower: This requires physical damage to the blower or accessories followed by forced introduction of water.

6) Loss of moderation control on recycle green scrap.

This material is certified equal to or less than 5% water by-process and check.

See item "m" in section 4.2.3.

e.

Agglomerators This equipm'ent is safe if optimally water moderated and unre-flected. It is in a hood and is elevated off the floor, making flooding impossible, f.

Granulators This equipment is safe if optimally water moderated and com-pletely water reflected.

License No. SNM-33, Docket 70-36 Revision:

2 Date: 04/29/88 Page:

11.9 31

.,.. y (p g %.. o OY. < w s'( u

.s

.,, f..;;3ifgn.].g?, Jj];M.;v,c,E,..,

i..

i 9.9 Slab Limits ~for Pellets

,e The following analysis was done for a slab filled with 0.4" diameter pellets.

Pellets, when randomly loaded, pack to an average density of 5.95 gm/ce, with a sigma variation of 0.264, as determined from a series l

2 of 14 measurments. Thus, at a 95% confidence level, the volume of I

H O to volume of UO2 ratio does not exceed 1.0 and from fig. I.E.16 2

of UKAEA Handbook AHSB1, the critical slab thickness is 6.2 inches.

Dividing by the safety margin of 1.2, results in a slab thickness of 4.8' 'i nche s.

The water to fuel ratio is actually lower than the above as the pellets are normally loaded on corrugated plates, which are stacked to obtain the. stack height. The sides of the stack are oper !n this arrangement.

4

?

i i

1 e

i License flo. Sf01-33, Docket 70-36 Revision: 0 Dete:

12/28/07 Page:

!!.9-33 I

. - - - - - _. - _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _I *f j [f]j ;';D ;, ', 9 ;.y,.J, s..

,+V.

4

. ~

, ~ _

- ~..ap.. ;a..;a. 5.

..; u u:.. _,.;,,,.,.,.

..e.

,3;,;,

e s

-*3e.a..i. 4 '..

.4

• e

-..$*...~.-,

x.s.a.g.,_; g;j~;;.yg.y;,--

3

);

. -.......u c.v. x:.t x.,., 3 ;.,.,g,y.,,,.

.s 4

• '*x i

I I

1 ll t

?

l l

70- A DOCKET NO.

N '2b CONTROL NO.

S 2bbb DATE OF 000. 5 bb DATE RC'D.

FCUF #

I PDh 7

FCAF LPDR l S E REF.

V

[

SAFEG'JARDS 1

~

FCTC OTHER DATE 4k INITIAL.D 5

3 g

n g

4 g

a