ML20151Y763
| ML20151Y763 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 04/29/1988 |
| From: | GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151Y767 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8805050103 | |
| Download: ML20151Y763 (5) | |
Text
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GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16 Technical Specification Change Request No.173 Docket No. 50-219
' Applicant submits, by this Technical Specification Change Request No.173 to the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specifications, proposed changes to pages 3.13-1 and 3.13-2.
1 N
By W
JrIhd Barton A
ig Director, Oyster Creek
' fore me this /f day of[
,1988.
Sworn and Subscribed tt L
Akko A Notary PublJt of NJ DI AN A M. Oc8LASt0 My Commissica Expircs gJEgEg NOTARY PUBLIC OF NE,
8805050103 880429 DR ADOCK 05000219 p
r' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter
)
Docket No. 50-219 GPU Nuclear Corporation
)
CE_RTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that a copy of Technical Specification Change Request No.
173 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specifications, filed with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission on April 29.
, 1988, has this day of April 29
,1988, been served on the Mayor of Lacey Township, Ocean County, New Jersey by deposit in the United States mail, addressed as follows:
The Honorable Christopher Connors Mayor of Lacey Township 818 West Lacey Road Forked River, NJ 08731 By lM in Barton ing Directer, Oyster Creek
0YSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-16 DOCKET N0. 50-219 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST.N0.173 Applicant hereby requests the Commission to change Appendix A to the above captioned license as below, and pursuant to 10CFR50.91, an analysis concerning the determination of no significant hazards considerations is also presented:
1.
Section to be Changed Section 3.13 2.
Extent of Change Revise Technical Specifications 3.13.B.1 and 3.13.B.2.
Delete current Technical Speci fication 3.13.B.3.
Revise and renumber current Technical Specification 3.13.B.4 which becomes 3.13.B.3.
In addition, where Technical Specification definitions are used in specifications 3.13. A.1, 3.13. A.2, 3.13. A.3, and 3.13.C they are now capitalized.
3.
Changes Requested The requested changes are shown on attached Technical Specification pages 3.13-1 and 3.13-2.
4.
Discussion As a result of Reconraendation 2.1.3.a described in NUREG 0578, TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Tem Reconnendations, valve position indicating devices were installed on the five Electromatic Relief Valves (EMRV) and the sixteen Code safety valves at Oyster Creek in 1980.
Operability and surveillance requirements for these devices were subsequently incorporated into the Technical Specifications.
The primary devices are acoustic monitors and the backup devices are themocouples.
A control room alarm is provided for the acoustic monitors while thermocouple temperature indication is provided at a local panel on the 23 foot elevation in the reactor building. These devices provide a means for direct indication of valve position.
This change request concerns the Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation for the safety valves which are contained in Technical Specification Section 3.13.B.
In addition, an administrative change to Technical Specification Sections 3.13. A, 3.13.8 and 3.13.C would capitalize Technical Specification definitions where they appear in the specifications in these sections.
The addition of the acoustic monitors and discharge thermocouples to the 16 safety valves was required by NUREG 0737, ITEM II.D.3, in order to provide direct indication of safdy valve position to the operator in the control room.
The basic requirement was to provide the operator with unambiguous indication of whether the valve was open or closed so that the operator could take appropriate actions.
In addition, NUREG-0737 required plants to develop symptom-based Emergency Operating Procedures (E0Ps) to provide better operator guidance in coping with transients and accidents.
Oyster Creek has implemented symptom-based E0Ps based on the BWR Owners Group generic Emergency Procedure Guidelines.
The 16 safety valves at Oyster Creek are spring-loaded and do not have any mechanism for remote operator control of the valve's position from the control room. This means that if a safety valve has inadvertently opened or is stuck open, the operator cannot take any direct action to close the valve.
The control room alarm response procedure alerts the operator to an open safety valve based or. the acoustic monitors.
The procedure does not direct the operator to take any action other than to confirm that the valve did open based on increasing drywell pressure or an increase in safety valve discharge thermocouple reading.
After developing the symptom-based E0Ps, it was determined that safety valve position indication is no longer necessary based on the manner in which the E0Ps direct the operator's actions.
The E0Ps instruct the operator to respond to plant parameters withoist the need to diagnose the event.
The operator takes actions to control reactor vessel and containment conditions to bring these parameters under control.
The operator's actions in response to a loss of reactor vessel water inventory are the same regardless of the source of the inventory loss.
The discharge of steam to the drywell from the opening of a safety valve or any other primary system leakage path would be immediately evident to the operator by a rapid increase in drywell pressure and atmospheric temperature.
The high drywell pressure condition is an entry point into both the RPV (reactor pressure vessel) control and containment control procedures.
The RPV control procedure directs the operator to control RPV water level and pressure and confirm reactor shutdown.
The containment control procedure gives the operator guidance for controlling drywell pressure and temperature and torus pressure, temperature and water level.
The presence of the safety valve acoustic monitor alann does not alter the operator actions in controlling the changes in plant parameters during an event.
In summary, with the development and implementation of symptom-based emergency operating procedures, the operators response is governed by changes in plant parameters (symptoms) and not by what caused those parameters to change.
Consequently, operator response to a struck open safety valve is not affected or dependent on the operability of the i
valve acoustic monitors or thermocouples.
Thus, operability of the safety valve position indication is not necessary for transient or accident mitigation and Technical Specifications for safety valve position indication should not require a plant shutdown.
e
E In order to be consistent with the requirements of NUREG 0737, Item II.D.3, the proposed Technical Specifications will still require that all safety valve position indication instrumentation be operable prior to startup following each cold shutdown.
If a backup instrument becomes inoperable, no compensatory measures would be required.
If a primary instrument becomes inoperable, the acoustic monitor on an adjacent valve, if operable, would have its setpoint reduced.
5.
Detennination We have determined that the proposed Technical Specification change involves no significant hazards considerations as discussed below.
1.
The proposed change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.
Since no hardware modifications are associated with this change and since safety valve position indication is only a monitoring system, the operability of the monitoring system does not affect or prevent the function of the safety valves.
Therefore, the probability of any accident is unaltered.
As no automatic action is associated with safety valve position indication instrumentation and system and operator actions are not altered b/ knowledge of safety valve position, the consequences of any accident will not increase.
2.
The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated since the function of the safety valves is unchanged.
The state of operability of safety valve position indication instrumentation does not affect any system and as such will not alter any safety system function used to mitigate any accident.
Further, the operator is not dependent upon this indication for event mitigation actions.
3.
Safety system and operator response to a stuck open safety valve is not affected or dependent on the operability of safety valve position indication.
The Technical Specification basis for safety valve position indication instrumentation currently reflects that operator response does not rely upon safety valve position indication.
In addition, safety valve actuation setpoints are not changed.
Therefore, there is no reduction in margin of $3fety.