ML20151W619
| ML20151W619 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 06/03/1988 |
| From: | Rich C RICH, C. |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151W612 | List: |
| References | |
| HLWR, OLA, NUDOCS 8808250057 | |
| Download: ML20151W619 (11) | |
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UNITED STATES CF AMERICA liUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSICN 000Kii[0 G%RC BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICDISI!!G APPEAL BOARD, E JA -7 P4 :47 In the Matter of
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Docket Nocr50-335-oLA.
FLORIDA PCWER AND LIGNT
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U!di
CCMPANY
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(SFPExpansion[
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(St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 1)
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i PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO LICDISEE'S APPEAL FROM LICDISING BOARD'S MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRMITING PETITION TO INTERVENE, REQUEST FOR HEARING N?D CCNTENTIONS Campbell Rich Pro Se Litigant 3 June 1988 8000250057 000603 PDR ADOCK 06000335 C
o UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMISSION BEFORE THE A'ICMIC SAFETY AND LICENSIttG APPEAL BOAFD Ir. the Matter of
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Cocket No. 50-335-OLA TLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT
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COMPANY
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SPP Expansion
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(St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 1)
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As the Licensee and Staff have alread d%*
'e/. the procedural background concerning this matter, Petitioner will n r,
Jypeal Board with a redundant recitation of the same materia'. a.itio'; e will, however, briefly and succinctly respond to the claim of the L. g..see on appeal.
Initially, Petitioner would like to contest Licensee's assertion that with this appeal they are not challenging the authority of tne Licensing Board. Clearly, this entire appeal implies that the Licensing t
Board and the NRC Staff have failed to meet their procedural obligations and have, in fact, abused their discretion. A review of the proceedings up to this point would reveal that this is incorrect.
...because a Licensing Board exercises a substantial amount of discretion in determining the adequacy of the bases for a contention, Appellate review is limited to whether the Board abused its discretion.
Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating Station, Units I & IIs, ALAB-845, 24 NRC 220,231 (1986).
In' addition, Petitioner feels this is a bold attempt by the Licensee to denyy Petitioner his clear right as stated under Section 198(a) of the Atomic Energy Act.
Licensee also claims that the Petitioner has an essential obligation to review all publicly available, documentary material. This is an
unne'es.;1ry and irrelevant burden upon an Inte-venor at this stage of the proceeding.
An Intervenor merely has the obligation to review enough material to present sufficient bases to satisfy the requirements of 10 C.F.R. @2.714(b).
I have enclosed a more complete copy of Intervenor's amended Petition than that provided by the Licensee in his appeal and would also ask that the Appeal coatd review th( transcript of the prehearing conference to gee that, clearly the Intervenor had reviewed and sd familiarity with enough, publicly ava,ilable material to satisfy the diligent concerns of the Licensing Board and the NRC Staff.
In addition, Petitioner finds it interesting to note that even in the Catawba case as cited by Licensee, the Appeal Board declined to examine each of the contentions in issue and to make individual determinations on their admissibility. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units I & II), ALAB-687, 16 NRC 465 (1982).
With regards to Licensee's concern expressed in Section III (b) of his appeal, obviously, these proceedings and those that occured at Turkey potnt have a great deal of similarity on the surface.
Thus it would be expected that many contentions would be similar in nature. To dismiss the contentions out of hand fails to go the merits of the contentions, which obviously must apply specifically to St. Lucie, Unit'No. 1, but lncorrectly assesses a contention based on its source.
Such an action is a violation l
of a most basic, logical, and in this case, legal principle.
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Intervener would also point out that Contention 5 as cited by Licensee on page 17 of his appeal includes the basis for the Contention which was withdrawn by Petitioner at the prehearing conference as irrelevant to the i
k' mm
instant case. At that conference, another basis was presented by the Petitioner.
Petitioner hopes that this cite by the Licensee was the result of ignorance and not any attempt to deliberately mislead the Appeal Board.
Finally, Intervenor having read the Brief of the Staff, agrees with the answer of the Staff and incorporates by reference their response and all the arguments advanced by the Staff, in addition to those already presented.
Therefore, Petitioner would ask that the Appeal Board deny this appeal and allow these proceedings to move beyond this idle, legal wrangling and on to those matters which concern this community so deeply. That is, the substantial discusssion of technical matters which will reveal the safety or unnecessarily, dangerous nature of this high-density, high-level radioactive waste dump.
Respectfully submitted, Campbkl1 Rich Pro SO Litigant 4626 S.E. Pilot Ave.
-Stuart, Florida 34997 407 286 5724 i
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Thus, the legislative history behind PL 97-415 clearly contcmplates that reracking is an example of licensing amendments involving a significant hazards consideration.
CONTENTION 2: Expansion of the spent fuel pool at the St. Lucie facility, Unit No. I constitutes a major Federal action and requires that the Commission prepare an environmental impact statement in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and 10 CFR Part 51.
BASES FOR CONTENTION: The proposed expansion and reracking of the spent fuel pool at St. Lucio, Unit No. 1 increases both the possibility and probability of an occurrence of a release of radiation or radioactive materials into the environment, both as a result of normal operation and in the event that there is a total or partial loss of coolant f rom the spent fuel pool. The licensee and the staff must
,o address the following:
a) As a result of the expansion tNuo will be an increased amount of spent fuel stored at the St. Lucie', Unit No. 1 plant. 7here is the possibility that this site could become a permanent waste disposal facility. The Licensee and staff have not looked at long term, perpetual maintenance of these wastes, or calcalated the costs associated with such l
in both monetary losses anu losses of land use.
b) There has not beenan examination of on-site and of f-site storage methods and alternatives to the expansions, including alternatives, such l
as derating which would reduce the amount of spent fuel produced.
CONTENTION 3:
That the calculation of radiological consequences l
resulting from a cask drop accident are not conservative, and the radiation releases in such an accident will no be ALARA, and will not meet with 3
the 10 CFR Part 100 criteria.
BASES FOR CONTENTION: The study prepared by the Department of Nuclear Energy, Brcokhaven National Laboratory entitled ' Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel pools in Support of Generic Safety", NUREG/CR-4982, BNL-NUREG-52093, indicates that,
"...the calculation of radiological consequences resulting from such an accident are, at this point in time, apparently impossible to determine."
"There is substantial uncertainity in t,he fission product release estimates. These uncertainties are due to both uncertainty in the accident progression (fuel temperature after clad oxidation and fuel relocation occurs) and the uncertainty in fission product decontamination."
(S.6)
In light of such uncertainty, no estimate can be determined to be conservative.
CONTENTION 4:
i'ust the consequences of a cask drop accident or an acci-dent similar in nature and effect are greatly increased due to the presence of a large crane to be built inside the spent fuel pool building in order to facilitate the rcracking.
BASES FOR CONTENTION: The presence of the crane is in direct contradic-tion to tho Final Safety Analysis Report in which it was indicated no crane capable of carrying heavy loads can move in the area of the fuel pool.
(9.1. 2. 3, FSAR, St. Lucie, Unit No. 1)
A primary, accident initiating event as cited by, "Severo Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Safety", is the structural failure of the pool due to a huavy load drop.
"However, the frequency estimates for' pool draining due to structural failure resulting from seismic events and heavy load drops were found to no quite uncertain.
In the case of seismic events, the seismic hazard '
and structural fragilities both contribute to the uncertainty range.
For heavy loads, human error probabilities, structural damage potentials and recovery actions are the primary sources of uncertainties."(S.3)
The presence of this crane inside the spent fuel pool building contributes to the potential for a heavy load drop in the pool and may inhibit the ability of the existing crancs to operate, if needed, in any recovery action.
CONTENTION 5:
That FP&L has not provided a site specific radiological analysis of a spent fuel boiling event that proves that off-site dose limits and personal exposure limits will not be e.xceeded in allowing the pool to boil with makeup water f rom only r aismic Category 1 sources.
BASES FOR CONTENTION: The saturation noble gas and iodine inventories 1
could be greater for the St. Lucie plant, Unit No. 1 as a result of fuel failure and increased enrichment more than 1% of the fuel rods may be defective at the St. Lucie plant, Unit No. 1 because of '.he same fuel failure and the gap activity of noble gases, such as krypton 85, and fission products, such as radioactive iodine, may also be greater at the St. Lucie plant, Unit No.
1.
CONTENTION 6:
The Licensee and Staff have not adequately considered or analyzed materials deterioration or failure in materials integrity resulting from the increased generation of! heat and radioactivity as as result of increased capacity and long-term storage in the spent fuel pool.
BASES FOR CONTENTION:
The spent fuel facility as the St. Lucie plant, Unit tb. 1, was originally designed to store a lesser amount of fuel for S-a short period of time.
Some of the problems that have not been analyzed properly arcs a) Deterioration of fuel cladding as a result of increased exposure and decay heat and radiation levels during extended periods of pool storage, b) Loss of materials integrity of storage rack and pool liner as a result of exposure to higher levels of radiation over longer periods, c) Deterioration of concrete pool structure as a result of exposure to increased heat over extended periods of time.
CONTENTION 7:
That there is no assurance that the health and safety of the workers will be protected during spent fuel pool expansion, and that the NRC estimates of between 80-130 rem / person will not meet ALARA requirements, in particular, those in 10 CFR Part 20.
CONTENTION 8: That the high-density dec.ign of the fuel storage ra:ks will cause higher heat loads and increases in water temperature which could cause a loss-of-cooling accident and/or challenge the reliability and testability of the systems designed for decay heat and other residual heat removal, which could, in turn, cause a major elease of radioactivity into the environment.
BASES FOR CONTD1 TION:
a) The NRC has stated in numerous documents that the water in spent fuel pools w ould normally be kept below 122 degrees F.
The present temperature of the water at the St. Lucie plant, Unit No. 1 is estimated to be 110 degrees F.
After the rcracking, the tcmperature of the water would rise to 152 degrees F on a normal basis, and could reach 182 degrees F with a full core load added.
b) There is also the possibility that a delay in the make-up emergency water could cause tho zirconium cladding on the fuoi rods to heat up to such high temperatures that any attempt at later cooling by injecting water back into the pool could hasten the heat up, because water reacts chemically with heated zirconium to produce heat and possible explosions.
Thus, the zirconium cladding could catch on fire espccially in a high-density design and create an accident not previously evaluated.
CONTENTION 9: That the cooling system will be unable to accomodate the increased heat load in the pool resulting from the high-density storage system and a full core discharge in the event of a single failure of any of the pumps or the electrical power supply to the pumps on the shell side of the cooling system and/or in the case of a single failure of the electrical power supply to the pumps on the pool side of the spent fuel pool cooling system. This inability will, therefore, create a greater potential for an accidental release of radioactivity into the environment.
CONTENTION los That in calculating time to boil after loss of cooling i
after completion of full core discharge with the presence of the proposed 1706 assemblics, FP&L utilized a different set of assumptions than in determining the original figures for time to boil as indicated in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the St. Lucie plant, Unit No. 1.
(9.1-49. Table 9.1-3)
CONTENTION 11:
That the proposed use of high-density storage racks designed and fabricated by the Joseph Oats Corporation is utilization.
of an essentially new and unproven technology.
BASES FOR CONTENTION: As recently as 8 September 1987, the NRC has provided information concerning these racks to all nuclear power reactor facilities warning of a,
...potentially significant problem pertaining to gaps..."
"The concern is that separation of the neutron absorbing material used in high-density fuel storage racks might compromise safety."(NRC Information Notice No. 87-43. SSINS No.:
6835) Again on 23 Ocqpber 1987, the NRC is requiring more information of FP&L in order to assess the integrity of the boraflex system. The answer to this latest inquiry has not yet been made availabic to the public.
FP&L's response to these and other probleg s relating to the use of Boraflex incorporated into a system designed by the Jospeh Oats Corporation represents an essential modification of the current technology to such an extent that it, in fact, represents utilization of a new technology and fabrication process that is thus, unproven and untested.
CONTENTION 12: That the presence of deg/'aded Boraflex specimens or absorber sheets on the floor of the pool will pose an increased hazard in promoting the propagation of cladding fire to low power bundles and thus promote a far larger spent fuel pool accident.
BASES F10R CONTENTION: As indicated in document no. 8709040387 870901 PDR ADOCK 05000335, the presence of degraded Boraflex (oecimens or absorber sheets on the fl or of the spent fuel pool floor is anticipated.
The presence of this debris on the pool floor will promote the propagation of cladding fire to other fuel bundles in the pool.(Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools in _apport of Generic Safety, NUREG/CR-4982, BNL-NUREG-52093.. -.
population projections for this area.
CONTENTION 15:
That the increase of the spent fuel pool capacity, which includes fuel rods which have experienced fuel failure and fuel rods that are more highly enriched, will cause the reqairements of AN31-NI6-1975 not to be met and will increase the probability that a criticality accident will occur in the spent fuel pool and will exceed 10 CFR Part 50, A 62 criterion.
BASES FOR CONTENTION: The increase in the number of fuel rods stored and the f act that many of them may have experienced fuel failure or may be more highly enriched and have more reactivity will increas'e the chances that the f;.el pool will go critical, and cause a major criticality accident and perhaps, explosion that will release large amounts of radluactivity to the environment in excess of the 10 CFR 100 critoria.
CONTENTION 16:
That FP&L has not responded to the concerns as presented by the NRC by outlining a loading schedule for the spent fuel pool detailing how the most recently discharged spent fuel will be isolated from other recently discharged fuel and/or a full core discharge in order to mitigate potential risks from fires in the spent fuel pools resulting in releases of radioactivity into the environment in excess of the 10 CFR 100 criteria.
DASES FOR CONTENTION:
"For those plants which have a significant spent l
fuel pool risk, the one preventive measure which appears to have a substan-tial effect on risk (a risk reduction of 5 or more) is to maintain recently l
discharged fuel in low density storage racks that are isolated from the rest of the fuel racks by a foot or more of space."(Severe Accidents
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