ML20151W068
| ML20151W068 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/15/1988 |
| From: | Serkiz A NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| To: | Kniel K NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| References | |
| TASK-A-44, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8808230228 | |
| Download: ML20151W068 (36) | |
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MEMORAfiUM FOR: Karl Kniel, Chief Reactor and Plant Safety issues Branch Division of Safety Issue Resciution, RES
) FROM: Aleck W. Serkiz, Senior Task Manager Reactor and Plant Safety Issues Branch Division of Safety Issue Resolution, RES
SUBJECT:
MEETING MINUTES - NUMARC'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE A-44 RULE Date: July 20,1988 Location: Room 10 B-11, One White flint North Building Rockville, Maryland Agenda: See enclosed agenda.
Attendees: See enclosed attendance listing.
\ Meeting Purpora: This meeting was held at the request of NUMARC to obtain staff feedback on the following items:
r
- 1. NUMARC's "Draf t Generic Response to Station blackout i Rule fc.r Plants Not Using Alternate AC Power" (EnclosureA),
[
- 2. NUMARC's "Draft Generic Response to Station Blackout Rule for Plants Using Alternate AC Power" (EnclosureB).
- 3. NUMARC's "Dra' App..: ' . ' F: Assessmerits of Equipinent
- 1. 4: _. Areas Under Station Blackout Operability Conditions (Revis;.. if (EnclosureC).
- 4. NUltARC's "Draft Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors, Appendix F Topical Report",
July 21,1966, (Enclosure C).
Meeting Sumary: NRC and NUMARC staff exchanged initial views regarding the content of Enclosures A, B, C and D. The NRC staff stated that additional tir.e was needed tu adequately review these documents and a follow-up meeting was targeted for late August 1988.
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l MEETING AGENDA July 28,1988 NUMARC/NUGSBO MEETING FOLLOW UP A 44 DISCUSSIONS 10:00 20:15 AM Opening Remarks g 10:15 11:00 Draft Generic R* sport e to A-44 Rule 11:00 12:00 NUGSHO Review eft Draft Appendix F(NUMARC 87 00)
Draft Appendix F Topical Report 1:00 3:30 PM Discussions related to Draft Appendix F and Appendix F Topical Report d 3:30 4:00 Identificatic,n of Follow up Actions
Participants:
NRC and NUMARC Utaff (sa Attendance Sheet)
- _~
MEETING ATTENDEES July 28, 1988 A-44 FOLLOW-UP DISCUS $10NS with liUMARC/NUGSB0 Attendee Affiliation Phone Number Al Serkiz NRC/RES/RPSIB 301/492-3555 James E. Knight NRC/NRR/ DEST /SELB 301/492-0803 Warren Minners NRC/RES/DSIR 301/492-3980 Faul Gill NRC/flRR/ DEST /SELB 301/492-0811 Vittorio Pareto NUMARC/DEVENRUE 617/426-4550 Steve Maloney NUMARC/DEVENRUE 617/426-4550 Stephen D. Floyd Carolina Power & Light 919/836-6901 W. Joe Harnden TV Electric 214/812-8226 Michael Childers Northeast Ut.ilities 203/665-5949 Mike McGerry NUMARC/BCP&R 202/371-5733 Alex Marion NUMARC 202/872-1280 f *, Colmar NRC/NRR/PMAS/lLRB 301/492-3076 Faust Rosa NRC/NRR/ DEST /SELB 301/492-0837 Janak H. Raval NRC/NRR/ DEST /SPLB 301/492-0857 Paul E. Norian NRC/RES/RPSIB 301/4r,<-3538
e AUS 151988 X. Kniel Principal review responsibility rests with NRR/SELB and NRR/SPLB.
Outstanding Actions: Obtain review coments from NRR/SELB and NRR/SPLB prior to the next meeting with NUMARC.
l Aleck W. Serkiz, Senior Task Manager
/ Reactor and Plant Safety Issues Branch Division of Safety Issue Resolution l' Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research cc: w/ Enclosures T. Speis, RES R. W. Houston, RES W. Minners, RES K. Kniel, RE's
, A. Thadani, NRR F. Gillespie, NRR 4 , W. Schwink, NRR S. Crockett, OGC P. S. Tam, NRR PDR Central files cc: w/o Enclosures Attendees identified on Attendance .1 closure DISTRIBUTION: RES Circ; RES Chron;!DCS IR./007; DSIR C/F; RPSIB R/F; ASerkiz; i
PNorian; KKniel; WMinners) us)o 0FC: OSIR:RPilB D #: PSIB (
NAME: ASerkii.cic Phorian 9 DATE:
08/ll/88 C8//N88 08/l5 /88 w
ENC L.O S UR E A ,
DRAFT GENERIC RESPONSE TO STATION BLACKOUT RULE FOR PLANTS NOT USING ALTERNATE AC POWER the on (date of rule publication in the Federal Register), amended its regulations in 10 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)A new section, 50.63, was added which requires if C.F.R., Part 50.
that each light-water-cooled nuclear power plant be able to l withstand and recover from a station blackout of a specifiedIt also i ,
duration, Section 50.63 '-
in specifying the station blackout duration.for the station blackout duration, the requires that, J
capable of maintaining core cooling and appropriate containment integrity. Section 50.63 further requires that each licensee submit the following information: I
)
- 1. A proposed station blackout durationt i
- 2. A description ci the procedures that will be '
implemented for station blackout events for the !
proposed duration; i 3.
A list and schedule for any needed mod.ifications ar.d associated procedures. .
The NRC has issued Regulatory Guide 1.155 "Station Blackout" which describes a means acceptable to Regulatory the NRC staff Guide for 1.155 meeting the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 50.63.
states "Guidelines that the andNRC Technical staff has Basesdetermined for NUMARC that NUMARC Initiatives Addressing 87-00 1 Station Dlackout At Light Vater Reactors" also provides guidance t acceptable to the NnC stati for meeting these requirements.
Table 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.155 provides a cross-reference r between Regulatory Guide 1.355 and NUMARC 87-00 and notus wherc i the Regulatory Guide takes precedence.
(Utility Name) has evaluated the (Unit Name) against the i requirements of the Station Blackout rule using NUMARC 87-00. j The results of this evaluation are detailed below.
A. PROPOSED STATION BLACKOUT DURATION NUMARC 87-00 Section 3 was used to determine aIfpropesed the determined st.ation l (NOTE:
blackout duration of (2 or 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />). !
! category exceeds 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, modificatione and/or procedure c[ '
i or an alternate AC power source is required to meet the NUMARC initiatives.) >
l The following plant factors were ider.tified in determining the l l proposed station blackout duration: .
\ !
. r i
I h- . _ . _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . .
- 1. AC Pcwer Design Characteristic Group is (P1, P2, P2*,
P3 or P3*) based on:
- a. Expected frequency of grid-related LOOPS [3.2, / /$/,6 /A (docs /does not) exceed once per 20 years /, 3 -3 )
- b. Estimated frequency of LOOPS due to extremely severe weather places the_ plant in ESW Group (1, 2, 3, 4 or 5) 1($ 3.L. I WT l o , f. 3 - sf )
- c. Estimated frequency of LOOPS due to severe weather placou the plant in SW Group (1, 2, 3, 4 or5)1($y,2,j fM7tc,/3-1)
- d. The offsite power system is in the (I1/2 or I3 Group) 1([ 3. 2./ AM.T /D, A 3-to)
- e. Plant-specific prt hurricane shutdown recrairements and procedures which meet the guidelints of Section 4.2.3 of !!UMARC 87-00 have been implemented. (P2* and P3* units only.)
- 2. (A, B, C TheemergencyACmowerconfigur)ationgroupis or D) based ont (f 7 2,2j / J - /3 L./Mr2d,
- a. There are (insert number) emergency AC powar supplies pot crediteg as altprnate AC power sources , ( f 3,2.2. r8D//, A J-/5~) ,
- b. (Innert number) emergency AC power supplies are necessary to operate safe shutdown equipment following a loss of of fsite powcr.('[ J. 2. 2. /447 2 ded 3 ~/I)
- 3. The target EDG reliability As (0.95 or 0.975) . G J,2,7 j S.2.h IF A TARGET RELIABILITY OF 0.975 IS SELECTED USE OfiE OF Ti!E FOLLOWIt'G JUSTIFICATIO!1S :
A target EDG reliability of 0.5 was selected based on (insert one of the following),
- s. Itaving a nuclear unit average EDG reliability for) the last 20 demands 0.90 and the EAC Group classified as Group 'A, B, C or D) ;
- b. Itaving a nuclear 'anit average EDG reliability for the last 50 demands 0.94 and the EAC Group classified as Croup (A, B, C or D);
- c. Ilaving a nuclear unit average IDG reliability for the last 100 demands 0.95 and the EAC Group classified as Group (A, B, C or DJ. )
-2 -
MR B. PROCEDURE DESCRIPTIQH
- Plant procedures have been reviewed and modified, if necessary, to meet the guidelines in NUMARC 87-00 Section 4 in the following areas
- 1. AC power restoration per NUMARC 87-00 Section 4.2.2t
- 2. Severe weather per NUMARC 87-00 Section 4.2.3. ;
J Plant procedures have been reviewed and changes necessary to meet NUMARC 87-00 will be implemented in the following areas:
. 1. Station Blackout response per NUMARC 87-00 Section 4.2.1;
]
- 2. Procedure changes required after assessing coping capability per NUMARC 87-00 Section 7. i C. PLANT MODIFICATIONS AND PROPOSED SCHEDULE The ability of (insert unit name) to cope with a station blackout for (insert duration in hours) was assessed using NUMARC 87-00 1 Section 7 with the following results:
4 r
- 1. Condensate Inventory for Decav Heat Removgl j SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS: l j
1 It has been determined from Section 7.2.1 of NUMARC 1 87-00 that (insert number) gallons of water are required for decay heat removal for the proposed station blackout duration. The minimum permissible .
condensate storage tank level per technical [
3 specifications provides (insert number) gallons of
] water, which exceeds the required quantity for coping i with a (two- or four-) hour station blackout; or l It has been decermined from Section 7.2.1 of NUMARC j 87-00 that (insert number) gallons of water are required for decay heat removal for the proposed j] station blackout duration. The minirum permissible condensate storage tank level per technical specifications provides (insert number) gallons of water. The following additional water sources have been identified as being neces'ir y to provide the total required amount of condensat ~or decay heat removal for (two or four) hours: (L SOURCES AND NUMBER OF GALLONS PROVIDED BY EACH SOURCE). SELECT ONE OF THE FOLI4 WING SENTENCES AND INSERT HERE:
L MR
- a. No plant modifications or procedure changes are needed to utilize these water sources; or
- b. The following plant modifications are necessary to utilize these water sources: (LIST).
- 2. Class 1E Battery CaDacity SELECT ONE OF TP.E FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS: MMR h 2,1 A battery capacity calculation has been performedAto verify that the Class 1E battery nas sufficient capacity to meet station blackout loads for the proposed station blackout duration; or A battery capacity calculation verifies that the Class 1E battery has sufficient capacity to meet station blackout loads for the proposed station blackout duration assuming stripping of loads not needed to cope with a station blackout. These loads are identified in plant procedures; or The Class 1E battery was determined to be inadequate to meet station blackout loads for the propoced station blackout duration. The following modifications are necessary to provide the additional capacity to meet the proposed station blackout durations: (LIST).
- 3. Comoressed Air 7, 2 . 3)
SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS:
I No air-operated valves are relied upon to cope with a station blackout for the proposed duration; or Air-operatad valves relied upon to cope with a station blackout for the proposed duration can either be operated manually or have sufficient backup sources independent of the preferred and blacked out unit's t Class 1E power supply. Valves requiring manual l operation or that need backup sources for operation are identified in plant procedures; or i l
The following modifications are necessary to ensure that air-operated valves required for decay heat 7
! removal during a station blackout of the proposed '
duration have sufficient backup sources for operation or can be manually operatedt (LIST).
i !
J I
m W l
Eh 4.
Ef fects of Loss of Ventilation ( f 7.1 9()
FOR PWR's The calculated steady state ambient air temperature for the steam driven AFW pump room (the dominant area of concern for a PWR) during a station blackout induced loss of ventilation is (insert temperature).
FOR BWR's The steady state ambient air temperature has been calculated for the following dominant areas of concern:
AREA TEMPERATURE HPCI/HPCS Room (insert value)
RCIC Room (insert value)
Main Steam Tunnel (insert value)
ALL PLANTS - SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS:
Reasonable assurance of the operability of station blackout response equipment in the above arca(s) has been assessed using Appendix F to NUMARC 87-00. No modifications or associated procedures are required to provide reasonable assurance for equipment operability; or Reasonable assurance of the operability of station blackout response equipment in the above areas (s) has been assessed using Appendix F to NUMARC 87-00. The following modifications and associated procedure changes are required to provide reasonable assurance for equipment operability' (t.asT)
- 5. Containment Iselation (f 7,2, SELECT ONE Of THE FOLI4 WING PARAGRAPHS:
The plant list of containment isolation valves has been reviewed to verify that valves which must be capable of being closed or that must be r stated (cycled) under station blackout conditions e_n be positioned (with indication) independent of the preferred and blacked-out unit's Class lE power supplies. No plant modifi ations and associated procedure changes were dctormined to be required; or The plant list of containment isolation valves has been reviewed to verify that valves which must be capable of being closed or that must be operated (cycled) under r
bhbkflI) station blackout conditions can be positioned (with indication) independent of the preferred and blacked-out unit's Class 1E power supplies. The following modifications and associated procedure changes are required to ensure that appropriate containment integrity can be provided under station blackout j conditions: (LIST). ,
i The modifications and associated procedure changes identified above will be completed (insert time) after the notification provided by the Director, office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 50. 63 (c) (3) .
l j very truly yours, 4
Company official :
i ,
! cc: NUMAPC
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ENCL OSURE B 15 6 %
DRAFT GENERIC RESPONSE TO STATION BLACKOUT RULE FOR PLANTS USING ALTERNATE AC POWER on (date of rule publication in the Federal Register), the Nuclear Regulatory commission (NRC) amended its regulations in 10 C.F.R. Fart 50. A new section, 50.63, was added which requires that each light-water-cooled nuclear power plant be able to withstand and recover from a station blackout of a spec.ified duration. It also identifies the factors that must be considered in specifying the station blackout duration. Section 50.63 requires that, for the statien blackout duration, the plant be capable of maintaining core cooling and appropriate containment integr!ty. Section 50.63 further requires that each licensee submit the following information:
- 1. A proposed station blackout duration;
- 2. A description of the procedures that will be implemented for station blackout events for the proposed durationt
} 3. A list and schedule for any needed modifications and i associated procedures.
> The NRC has issued Regulatory Guide 1.155 "Station Blackout" I which describes a neans acceptable to the NRC ctaff for meeting l
the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 50.63. Regulatory Guide 1.255 states that the NRC staff has determined that NUMARC 67-00 "Guidelines and Technicdl Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing i
Station Blackout At Light Water Reactors" also provides guidance acceptable to the NRC staff for meeting these requirements.
~
' Table 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.155 provides a cross-reference between Regulatory Guide 1.155 and NUMARC 87-00 and notes where the Regulatory Guide takes precedence.
1 (Utility Name) has evaluated the (Unit Name) against the j requirements of the Station Blackout rule using NUMARC 87-00.
i The results of this evaluation are detailed below.
l A. EROPOSED STATION BLACKOUT DURATION I
l An Alternate AC (AAC) power source will be utilized at (Unit l
Name) which meets the criteria specified in Appendix B to NUMARC i 87-00. ADD THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE IF THE AAC SOURCE 3 IS A CLASS
! lE EAC SOURCE: Tho AAC source is an FAC power source which meets
! the assumptions in Section 2.3.1 of JUMARC 87-00.
USE ONE OF THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS:
The AAC source is available within one hour of the onset of the station blackout event and has sufficient capacity to operate j systems necessary for coping with a station blackout for the time i
l l
required to bring and maintain the plant in safe shutdown.
Therefore, the proposed station blackout duration is one hour; or l The AAC source is available within 10 minutes of the onset of the station blackout event and has sufficient capacity to operate systems necessary for coping with a station blackout for the time required to bring and maintain the plant in safe shutdown.
Therefore, the proposed station blackout duration is zero hours.
BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE AAC SOURCE AND ITS CONFIGURATION REFERENCING A FIGURE IN APPENDIX C TO NUMARC 87-00 IF POSSIBLE.
B. PROCEDURE DESCRIPTION Plant procedures have bean reviewed and modified, if necessary, to meet the guidelines in NUMARC 87-00 Section 4 in the following areas:
- 1. AC power restoration per NUMARC 87-00 Section 4.2.2; i
- 2. Severe weather nor NUMARC 87-00 Section 4.2.3.
Plant procedures have been reviewed and changes necessary to meet J NUMARC 87-00 will be implemented in the following areas:
- 1. Gtation Blackout response per UUMARC 87-00 Section 4.2.1; i
- 2. Procedurt changes required af ter assessing coping capab.lity por NUMARC 87-00 Section 7.
- C. PLANT MODIFICATIONS AND PROPDSED SCHEDULE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ANY MODIFICATIONS AND ASSOCIATED PROCEDURE CHANGES REQUIRED TO UTILIZE THE AAC POWER SOURCE.
COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS FOR BOTH THE ONE-HOUR AND 10 MINUTE AAC OPTION.
The AAC source powers the loads necessary to cope with a station blackout in accordance with NUMARC 87-03 Section 7 for the required coping duration determined in NUMARC 87-00 Section ;
3.2.5.
- 1. Condensate Inventory of Decay Hr d .Renov.al SELECT ONE OF UIE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS:
- It has been determined from Section 7.2.1 of NUMARC 87-00 that (insert number) gallons of water are required for decay heat removal for (insert required coping duration category from NUMARC 87-00 Section 3.2.5)
(
- 2 -
i
hours. The minimum permissible condensate storage tank level per technical specifications provides (insert number) gallons of water, which exceeds the required quantity for coping with a (insert required coping
' duration category from NUMARC 87-00 Section 3.2.5) -hour station blackouts or It has been determined from Section 7.2.1 of NUMI#C u 87-00 that (insert number) gallons of water are required for decay heat removal for (insert required coping l duration category from NUMARC 87-00 Section 3.2.5) hours. The minimum permissible condensate storage tank level per technical specifications provides (insert i
number) gallons of water. The following additional water sources have been identified as being necessary to 4
provide the total required amount of condensate for decay heat removal for (insert required coping duration i category from NUMARC 87-00 Section 3.2.5) hours: (LIST 1 SOURCES AND NUMBER OF GALLONS PROVIDED BY EACH SOURCE).
SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES AND INSERT HERE:
. a. No plant modifications or procedure changes are needed to utilize these water sources; or
}
l
- b. The following plant modifications are necessary to utilize these water sources: (LIST).
COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING ADDITION.TL SECTIONS IF THE AAC SOURCE IS AVAILABLE WITHIN ONE HOUR OF THE 'JNSET OF STATION BLACKOUT:
Class 1E Battery Capacity
- 2. (( K g,3)
SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS:
A battery capacity calculation has been performed to verify that the class 1E battery has sufficient capacity to met station blackout loads for one hour; A battery capacity calculation verifies that the Class 1E battery has sufficient capacity to meet station blackout loads for one hour assuming stripping of loads not needed to cope with a station blackout. These loads are identified in plant procedures; or The class 1E battery was determined to be inadequace to meet station blackout loads for one hour. The following modifications are necessary to provide a one-hour capacity: (LIST).
- 3. Comoresse3_ Air 7, 2.
SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS IF THE COMPRESSOR IS POWERED FORM THE AAC SOURCE. OTHERWISE USE THE COMPRESSED AIR SECTION FROM THE GENERAL RESPONSE FOR PLANTS NOT USING AAC POWER:
r No air-operated valves are relied upon to cope with a (
station blackout for one hours :
Air-operated valves relied upon to cope with a station i blackout for one hour can either be operated manually or ;
i have sufficient backup sources independent of the preferred and blacked out unit's Class 1E power supply.
Valves requiring manual operation or that need backup l sources for operation are identified in plant procedures; or j The following modifications are necessary to ensure that I air-operated valves required for decay heat removal !
J during a station blackout of a one-hour duration have
{ suffic.ent backup sources for operation or can be manually operated: (LIST).
- 4. Effects of Loss of Ventilation 73, FOR PWR's ,
The calculated steady state ambient air temperature for r the steam driven AFW pump room (the dominant area of i
concern for a PWR) during a station blackout induced (
- loss of ventilation is (insert tesperature). l i , j l FOR BWR's !
r The steady state ambient air temperature has been !
calculated for the following dominant areas of concern: l i
- AREA TRMPERATURE l HPCI/HPCS Room (insert value) [
f RCIC Room (insert value) ;
Main Steam Tunnel (insert value) ,
- ALL PLANTS
- SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS: !
i
, Reasonable assurance of the operability of station I l blackout response equipment in the above area (s) has
! been assessed using Appendix P to NUMARC 87-00. No j modifications or associated procedures are required to !
i provide reasonable assurance for equipment operability; )
l or l I
- Reasonable assurance of the operability of station
! blackout response equipment in the above areas (s) has l been assessed using Appendix F to NUMARC 87-00. The l
4
following modifications and associated procedure changes are required to provide reasonable assurance for equipment operability.
- 5. containment Isolation ( I f, 2,f")
SELECT ONE OF THE FOLI4 WING PARAGRAPHS:
The plant list of containment isolation valves has been reviewed to verify that valves which must be capable of being closed or that must be operated (cycled) under 4 station blackout conditions can be positioned (with indication) independent of the preferred and blacked-out unit's Class lE power supplies. No plant modifications and associated procedure changes were determined to be required; or j The plant list of containment isolation valves has been reviewed to verify that valves which must bm capable of being closed or that must be operated (cycled) under station blackout conditions can be positioned (with indication) independent of the preferred and blacked-out l
' unit's class lE power supplies. The following modifications and associated procedure changes are required to ensure that appropriate containment integrity can be provided under station blackout conditions: (LIST). ;
The modifications and associated procedure changes identified "
i above will be completed (insert time) after the notification l provided by the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in I
accordance with 10 C.F.R. 50.63 (c) (3) . !
) Very truly yours, Company Official I i
cc: NUMARC l P
< t h
E NCL.OEB URE C GUIDEl.INES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR NUMARC INITIAT!YES NtSt ARC 87 00 DRAFT hly 18.1988 APPENDIX F: ASSESShlENTS OF EQUIPS 1ENT OPERABILITY IN DO511NANT AREAS UNDER STATION BLACKOUT CONDITIONS (REVISION I)
F.I Introduction This appendix outlines a methodology for providing reasonable assurance of the operability of equipment used to cope with a station blackout in the dominant areas of concern.
Station birdout is not a design basis accident and, therefore, is not subject to the requirernenu of 10 CFR 550.49 and the rigorous certification process for equipment operability. Howesar, since station blackout coping equipment needs to operate in order to achieve safe shutdown. reasonable assurance should be provided that no thermauy induced failures will result due to loss of forced ventilation. Station blackout environments in the dominant areas of concern outside containmerit are expected to experience increases in air temperature. The resulting temperatures are expected to range from slight to moderate in most cases not exceeding !!0* F.
Ston equipment is expected to operate in these station blackout environments with no los:, of function for the short duration (i.e., four hours). The basis for this general conclusion can be traced to previous studies and analyses performed, as well as plant operating experience. The approxhes discussed in this appendix provide acceptable ba es for reaching this conclusion on a plant specific basis. In particular, the approaches justify, removing classes of equipment (i.e., relays, switches) from furt!" onsideration and focusing attention on those components of concern.
Tne approaches may be used individu lly or in combination in reaching a conclusion that an acceptable basis exists for equipment operability in a stat > . ulackout environment. }
Six approaches may be used to establish equipment operability in a station blackouc (1) Equipment previously evaluated; j (2) Equipment design capability; f
(3) hiaterials; I (4) Equipment inside instrumentation and control cabinets; i
(5) Genene studies and expenence;or, (6) Plant. specific expnence and tests. f Exh of these approaches is desenbed in detail in this appenda: a general statement of a method guidance, speide l procedures, and examples are provided.
I a
' i F1 1
CUIDELINES AND TECl!NICAL B ASES FOR NU5tARC INITIATIVES NUM ARC 87 00 DRAFT ])g July 18,1988 In the development of approaches. it became cicar that station blackout response equipment fellinto several generic categories. It also became clear that reasonable assurance of operability for these categories could be established within certain temperature ranges. A topical report has been prepared and i. L.eing made a part of Appendix F to address this situation. De Topical Report provides a technical evaluation of these categories establishing a temperature for which reasonable assurance of operability can be generically established in a station blackout environment.
Due to the variety of equipment types in each category, the temperatures established are necessarily conservative. It is recognized that equipment specific analysis may establish reasonable assurance of operability for higler temperatures. The Nuclear Utility Group on Station Blackout (NUGSBO) has compiled an equipment operibility database (EODB) containing information which may be helpful for supporting such evaluations.
Users may refm., and use the Topical Report and the EODB database as follows:
(1) Determine the bulk room temperature for the dominant areas of concern in accordance with Secocn 7 of NUMARC 87 00; (2) Identify the station blackout response equipment located in these areas; (3) Determine the duration these components must remain operable under loss of ventilation conditions (i.e., up to one hour tor plants using altemate AC, up to two hours for plants in the PI A classincation identined in Section 3 of NUM ARC 37 00, otherwise up to four hours);
(4) Determine whether station blackout response equipment falls within any of the equipment catagories whose operability is evaluated in the Appendix F Topical Report. If so, determine whether the assessed temperature end duration for the category envelopes the temperatun of the dominant area of concem w here equipment is located for the duration the equipment is necessary; if not, (5) Establish reasonable assurance by following any of the 4proaches discussed in this appendia. The NUGSBO equipment operability database (EODB) may contain inforntation to help support the evaluation.
F
GUIDELINES AND TI'CilNICAL llASES FOR NUMARC INITIATIVES NUMARC 87 00 DRAFT July 18.1988 F.1.1 Assumptions and Definitions ne approaches descrtbed in this appendix are designed to establish reasonable assurance of operability of equipment and components in dominant areas of concern for station blackout environments. These methods are equally applicable to establishing the operability of individual components or of entire equipment categories. Table F 1 shows the results of evaluations supporting the operability of entire equipment categories pro.ided in the Appendix F Topical Report. t L
3 Table F.lt Operability Conditions Ily Category l t
Station Illackout Appendis F l Equipment Operability Tempe sture Duration Approac'aes Used ;
2 (*F) (hrs) 4
! MECilANICAL EQUIPMENT Pumps 180 4 F.4,F.6 i Turbines w/ Mechanical Govemors 180 4 F.4, F.6 DC Motors. Fans, and Blowers 180 3 F.4, F.6 .
Valves 200 4 F.4,F.6 i Motor Operated Valve Ac'uators l Limitorque 200 4 F.2. F.3 F.6 !
l
- Rotork 180 4 P.2 F.3. F.6
- Other 180 4 F.4,F.6 j l
j ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
, Cables 185 4 F.2.F.3,E.6 1 Switches and Relays 185 4 F.2. F.4. F.6 i
] Sensors and Electronic Transmitters ISO 4 F.3,F.6 r Electronic Turbine Governors 160 4 F.4,F.6 i
I
\
I F Assumrtions he following asssmptions are consistent with establishing reasonable assurance of operability for equipment in [
! station blackout environments:
t f
Documentatien standards for equipment operabinty are not to be as rigorous as are typically required to meet b (1) l the design basis requirements of 10 CFR 150.49. For example, there is no need to address the effects of I aging or synergisms. In addition, engineering judgement may be esercised to permit the acceptance of l installed configurations that diverge from test conditions. His is consistent with the scope and intent of 10 j CFR 150.63. Dese assumptions r.re reasonable due to the low temperatures (and correspondingly slower l {
reaction rates), and short durrions (and corresp3ndingy short reaction timen espected during a station j blackout. Documen:stion rect ds estaelishing operatility need not address more than: (a) the equipment l i
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GUIDELINES AND TECllNICAL BASE 3 FOR SUMARC INITIATIVES NUMARC 87 00 DRAFT hly 18,1988 narne and model number, (b) the dominant ues of concern, (c) the static t tlackout temperature (TDAC). (d) the station blackout operability temperature (Topp), and (e) the Appendix F method used or the Topical Report category.
(2) In accordance with Secdon 2.7.1 of NUMARC 87 00, only station blackout response equipment located in dominant areas of concem which have not been previously evaluated as a harsh environment need be assessed for operability, (3) Determination of similarity does not need to consider the efrecu (;t aging, fatigue life, or synergisms.
Definitions The terms definct! below were specifically developed for these guidelines and are consistent with the definitions used throughout NUMARC 87 00.
DOMINANT AREAS OF CONCERN (DAC)- The representadve analysis provided in this section addresses a limited set of plant areas deemed to be potendally susceptible to heat.up upon loss of ventilation, such as would occur in a station blackout. These areas are defined by three factors: (1) their containing equipment normally required to function early in a stadon blackout to remove decay heat (i.e equipment whose failure within the first hour of a station blackout would disable the anaillary feed. water or boiler makeup systems), (2) the presence of significant heat generadon terms (after AC power is lost) reladve to their free volume (i.e. process steam or DC electrical power supplies in small rooms or encloses), and (3) the absence of heat removal capability in a station blackout without operator action. These areas are have been determined to be:
(1) Steam Driven AFW Pump Room (PWRs only);
(2)IIPCLEPCS Room (BWRs only);
(3) RCIC Room (BWRs only); and, (4) Main Steam Tunnel (BWR only). ,
It should be noted that any eite specific plant area found meeting the thre,i factors above should a!!o be considered to be a dominant ans of concern.
STAT 10N BLACKOtJT EQUU' MENT .quipment located in dominant areas of concem w hich are used to bring the plant to safe shutdown dunng station blxkout condiuons.
STATION BLACKOUT TEMPERARJRE (TDAc) the aserage steady state bulk air temocrature in a dominant area of concem dunng a four hour station blxkout.
F-4
. GUIDELINES ANE) TECHNICAL BASES FOR NUMARC INITIATIVES NUMARC s7c00 DRAFT Jcly is,19ss STATION BLACKOUT OPERABII.lT('s EMPERATURE (Topp) . the temperature for which reasonable assurance of opersaility has been estabilshed for a specific component or for an equipment category. This temperature is established for a variety of equipment categories in the Appendix F Topical Report, and may be established for individual equipment using the approaches desenbed herein.
SIMILAR EQUIP.NENT equipment whose characteristics are such that (1) ine limitmg sub-components have comparable or less litniting thermal properties; and, J (2) the limiting *naterials have comparable or less limiting thermal properties.
In the context of static n blackout, limiring sub components or limitint materials are those sub-components or materials w hich are most susceptible to significant degradation at elevated temperatures. The application of this principle is illustrated in Example 3 of Section F.2.4.
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GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES FCR NUMARC INITIATIVES NUMARC 37 00 DRAFT hly 18.1288 F.2 Equipment Previously Evaluated M.
F.2.1 General Statement of Method Equipment that is similar to equipment already quallfied under 10 CFR 150.49 need not be further evaluated if the station blackout temperatures inet exceed qualification temperatures.
F.2.2 Guidance Existing tests and analyses of specific equipment may be used to establish operability in a station blackout.
Reasonable assurance of operability is met if the equipment or reasonably similar equipment hr.: been previcusly qualifted to a temperature and duration enveloping ToAc and the rcquired coping duration category.
F.2.3 Procedure Apply the f.niowing steps for station blackout response equipment located in dominant areas of concern experiencing a totalloss of forced ventilation.
l (1) Determine T DAC or f the area Containing the equipment in accordance with Section 7.2.4.
l l
(2) (a) Determine the time period that the equipment must remain operable for the appropriate sution blackout coping method; or. 7 (b) Assume the equipment must remain operable for the entire duration of the station blackout (i.e.,
one, two, or four hours).
(3) le 21 test or analysis that provides reaionable assurance of operability for the identified equipment (or dmi. .t equipment) for the temperature specified in Step 1 and the duration specified in Step 2. A partial list of equipment qualified under 10 CFR 550.49 for a number of participating utilities is available in the NUGSBO Equipment Oper,bility Database.
(4) Reasonable assurance of Operability is established if the specific equipment or similar equipment has been previously evaluated for conditions enveloping the temperature determined in Step 1 and the duration determmed in Step 2.
F.2.4 Eaamples The following examples illustrate the establishment of reasonable assurance of operability on the basis of previous quahrganon.
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GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR NUhtARC INITIATIVES SU31 ARC 87c00 DRAFT July 18,1988 Etimele h A limit switch is identified as being needed for station blackout response. The switch is located in a dominant area of concern with a TDAC - 145' F and is required to function for one hour. This switch was evaluated under another utility's equipment qualification program and qualified for a temperature of 180'F for two hours. Reasonable assurance of operability is therefore established.
Etsmele i A limit switch required for station blackout is located in a dominant area of concern with a TDAC - 150' F. The switch needs to function for one hout under station blackout conditions.The switch was evaluated for a temperature of 180* F for two hours under the plant's equipment qualification program. Reasonable assurance of operability is therefore established.
Eumete 3 A motor requhd for station blackout response is located in a dominant area of concern with a D T AC - 150' F.The NUGSBO equipmiint operability database shows that a potentially similar motor has been evaluated under ancther utility's equipment qualification program for continuous operation below 170' F. A review of the Appendix F Topical Report reveals that (a) the most limiting sub-components for motors are their bearings and windings, and (b) the most liminns materials used in motors are the winding insulation and the bearing lubricant. After contacting the other utility, it is verified that: .
(1) Both motors use journal bearings.
(2) Both lubricants used are rated tui continuous operation above 170* F.
(3) The winding insulation for both motors are rated for continuous operation above 170' F.
These motors may therefore be considered sinular for the purposes of determining operability in a station blackout.
Reasonable assurance of operability is, therefore, established.
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. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1
GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR NUMARC INITIATIVES NUMARC 57 00 DRAFT July 18, t988 F.3 Equipment Design Capability g F.3.1 General Statement of Method Equipment vendors generally provide a design temperature. associated with the continuous operation of their equipment. A n:argin may exist above design temperature which varies according to equipment class (e.g., smaller margins for electronic equipment reladve to electro mechanical devices) and the expected operating conditions (e.g.,
temperature levels, time at these elevated temperatures, duty cycle, etc.). Renonable assurance of equipment l
J operability is provided if it is shown that the design temperature plus the expected margin for the equipment or component class does not exceed the bulk air temperature expected in a 4. hour station blackout.
F.3.2 Guidance Vendors specify design temperatures associated with continuous operation of their equipment. In general, the 1 equipment may still operate for the limited duradon of a station blackout at even higher temperatures, his additional capability represents the equipment's thermal margin in a station blackout. His margin may be established on the basis of estimating thermally induced failure rates, by locaung vendor documentation. by performing tests cad r i experiments, or as derived from experience. Using the thermal margin approach, reasonable assurance of equipment 4
operability is established if the equipment's rated temperature for continuous operation plus its thermal margin i
envelopes station blackout conditions, j i Vendor documentation cerufying equipment operability at temperatures in excess of the rated temperature for conttnuous operation may be used to establish thermal margins.These documents include, but are not limited to. {
i
- (1) Published catalog data; 1
(2) Correspondence (including letters, memoranda, and technical advisories):
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(3) Technical manuals: and, l (4) Engineenng, design, or vendor test data. f
(
In addition to vendor documentation, test data and documentad operational occurrences may also be used to establish
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- thermsJ margins. Operational occurrences, for example, may have cretted conditions that exceed the design of the si f equipment without adversely atTecting operability, j I
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Also, the mean tirne betwee%ilures for some station blackout components may be sufficiently long to enabic f I reasonable assurance of operability to be established at elevated temperatures for short durations. Similarly, if l l operabtlity is established for higher temperatures for shorter durations than needed for coping, the thermal effects on ,
I equipment reliability may demonstrate operability at lower temperatures for the longer darauon needed far ecping
)
with a station blackout. Examples 4 and 5 i!!ustrate the applicauon of this methodology.
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GUIDELINES AN) TECHNICAL BASES FOR NUMARC INITIATIVES NUM ARC 87 00
. DRAFT July 18,1988 F.3.3 Procedure Mh.I.' - '
Apply the following steps for station blackout response equipment located in dominant areas of concern experiencing a totalloss of forced vendlation.
(1) Determine TDAc for the area containing the equipment in accordance with Section 7.2.4.
(2) (a) Determine the time period that the equipment must remain operable for the approprfste station !
blackout coping method; or, f (b) Assume the equipment must remain operable for the entire duradon of the station blackout (i.e.,
one, two, or four hours). ;
(3) (a) Establishine Reitnnsble Attursece en the Bssit of Avsifsbfe Thermal Martin j (i) Determine the design temperature of the equipment.
(ii) Determine the available thermal margin based on vendor documentation, test reports, plant experience, or vender corretpondence for the specific equipment. The NUGSBO [
Equipment Operability Database contains a listing of equipment types sorted by vendor to allow utilities to locate other sites using eqt ipment supplied by the same vendor.
(8.il) Reasonable assurance of operability is established if the design temperature plus the ;
available thermal margin exceeds TDACfor the period determmedin Step 2.
1 1 OR i '
i (b) Establishine Seasonable Assurance by Estimstine Failure Rstet I
(i) Determine the spected mean time between failures under normal operating conditions for the equipment. ,
(ii) Calculate the thermal effects on equipment failure rate for conditions determined in Step 1 [
and Step 2 (see Examples 4 and 5 in Section F.3.4). !
i (iii) Reasonable assurance of operability is established if the mean time between failures [
determined in Step (b)(ii) is greater than the duration specified in Step 2. 1 i
F.3,4 Examples The following examples illustrate the establishment of reasonable assurance of opei hility on the basis of equipment I design capability. ;
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- GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR NUMARC INITIATIVES NUMARC 87 00 DRAFT J:ly 18,1988 Etsmele 1:
An electronic transmitter required for coping with a station blackout is located in a dominant area of concem with a ToAc of 170* F. De manufacturer's catalog states that the maximum continuous operating temperature for the electronic transmitter is 180* F. Based on the catalog data the transmitter is considered operable for the assumed station blackout event.
Etsmele i A motor operated valve actuator has a maximum continueus operating temperature of 140' F. Correspondence from the manufacturer indicates that they rou.inely supply st:tndard units for continuous operating temperatures up to 170* F with recommendations for increased grease surveillance and periodic mr.intenance. Based c,n this information, the utility concludes that the actuator is operable for a four hour duration at 170* F with additional special maintenance and surveillanca actions.
Etsmele 3:
A motor has published NEMA standa d rating based on a 40* C (104* F) ambient temperature, ne utility calculates a TDAC of 150* F. Using the guidance provided in NEM A standard MO 1, the utility determmes that the motor is rated for continuous operation at the higher temperature based on an operationalload less than the rated full load l. Based on this analysis the motor is considered operable for an assumed four hour duration.
Etsmele 4:
ne thermal effects on the failure rate of some components can be estimated by utilir.ing engineering methods such the 10' C rule. Dis rule states that a 10* C increase in the winding temperature of a mo,or decreases the mean time between failures of the motor by a factor of 2.TFs rule is represented by the following equation:
t 2 ((TDAC IT )/10}
where:
ti represents the mean time between failures for a motor operating continuously at a temperature Tt ,
ta represents the mean time between failures for a rnotor operating at a higher t,rmperature Tore, Toa.c represents the bulk air temperature in the dominant area of concem. and ,
Ti terresents tne temperature for w hich the motor is rated fer contmuous operation.
I It ss assumed that the insulat on temperature is based on amtiest ternperat.re plus a heat nse due to te motor load. !!
further assumes that the heat nse is proportional to Iactual bersepowerl / (rs:ed hersepowerp ans deter =2:es the heat nse for an operauonalload less than the me:ct s ra'.ed full load.
F.10
GUIDE /INES AND TECilNICAL DASES FOR NUMARC INITIATIVES NUMARC 57 00 DRAFT J:ly 18,1988
${
If, for example, the mean time bet veen failures for a motor operating in a 40' C (104' F) room is 500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br />, the 10 degree rule can be used to estimate the mean time between failures for when the rnotor is operating in a 60* C (140' F) room.
-((60* C 40' Cy10 'h t - 125 hours0.00145 days <br />0.0347 hours <br />2.066799e-4 weeks <br />4.75625e-5 months <br /> Since t2is still cor.siderably longer than the four hours for w hich the motor is needed to perform its station blackout function, reasonab!c assurance of operability is established.
Eumte 5-A pressure switch qualified for outside containment pipe break conditions of 100* C (212' F) for 30 minutes is requird to operate in a dominant area of concern with a Tore of 71.11' C (160' F) for four hours. This switch may be demonstrated operable for the blackout event by determining the thermal degradation equivalency.
Thermal degradation equivalency is demonstrated using the following form of the Arrhenius equation:
i g k*Innitig 1/Tg 1/TDAc -
where:
ti represents the mean time between failures for a motor operating at a temperature Ti ,
t2 represents the mean time between failures for a motor operating at a temperature ToAc, ToAC represents the bulk air temperature in the dominant area of Concem in Kehins (K),
Ti represents the temperature for w hich the motor is rated for continuous operation in Kelvins (K),
Eo represents the activation energy for the component necessary to achieve equivalency and k Boltzman's constant - 8.63 x 10-3 eV / K In this form, the activation energy (E ) necessaiy to achieve equivalency is determined based on the two temperatures o
m and time (t) values. In this example the resulting value for E, to achieve equivalency is 0.797 eV.
A review of EPRI NP 1558. Review of Equipment Aging and Theory. and Technoloty, Appendix C, teve.tls that activation energies for materials t>Ti cally used in pressure switches exhibit xtivation energies above 0.85 eV. Since this value is higher than 0.797 eV. reasonable assurance of operability is established.
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NU51 ARC 87 00 GUIDELINES AND TECilNICAL BASES FOR NU51 ARC INITIATIVES DRAFT J31y 18,1988 Thert.tal equivalency could also have beer, established using the 10' C rule, w hich is illustrated in Example 4.
EumNe 6.
The motor starters for selected coping equipment are located in a dominant area of concern. The stated maximum temperrture for the starters is 104' F. Operability is required for a four hour duration at a TDAc of 140' F. The utility reviews plant specific and industry generic data on failure rates for motor starters. The thermal effects on the failure rate can be conservatis ely approximated with the Arrhenius equation:
A - exp [Ea (1/T t/To)/k]
where:
A = Stress Acceleration Factor (decrease in reliability)
Ea - Activation energy (eV)(a unique constant for each specific chemicaliesetion or failure mechanism) k - Boltzman's constant - 8.63 X 10-5 eyfg T - Ambient temperature in degrees Kelvin (K)
To - Reference temperaare (K)(used for normalization to the given temperature)
By selecting a consenative activation energy it is possible to establish an upper bound for the decrease in the reliability of the component. From the utility's review of falh,re rates for motor starters, it is determined that 0.9 eV corresponds to a conservetively high activation energy. That is, when this activation energy is used in the Arrhenius equation to predict increases in failure rates due to operation at higher temperaures, the equation consistently predicts higher failure rates than those determined in the utility's analysis. By entering this figure into the Arthenius equation, a temperature increase from 40* C (IN* F) to 60' C (140' F) will result in a decrease in reliability by a factor of 18. Thus, if the mean time between failures (MTBF) for a component is only one year (8760 hours0.101 days <br />2.433 hours <br />0.0145 weeks <br />0.00333 months <br />) when
- operating at IN' F, then st 140' F the MTBF will be reduced to 486 hours0.00563 days <br />0.135 hours <br />8.035714e-4 weeks <br />1.84923e-4 months <br />. Since this number is still considerably higher than four hours, it can be concluded that motor starters designed for continuous operation at IN* F can be expected to operate at 140' F fo* the full four hour durat;on of a station blackout.
Since operability of a typical safety related motor starter is verified by monthly surveillance testing, the total l I
probability of a motor starter failure for the blackout duration should not exceed the failure probability for a 30 day l period during normal operation. Consequently, the Stress Acceleration Factor must be less than or equal to ISO (i.e.,
ISO - 24 hrs I day x 30 days / 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />). The use of a bounding activation energy results in a calculated Stress i Acceleration Factor less than 30.1 Consequently, operability is demonstrated for the four hour duration.
! I When performmg such analysis,it sNuld be noted thatlarger activation energy values rewitin larger Stress N :eleration
! Factors. If one conservausely assumes that relay components base values bounded by eV = 0.0, then the Stress 1
Acceleraton Factor ter amment ampera:ure mcreases from 104' F to 130' F is approumately 26.
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GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR N13f ARC INITIATIVES NIStARC 87 00 DRAFT July 18,1988 F.4 Materials Mb[k F.4.1 General Statement of Method ,
The primary consideration for equipment operability in a station blackout is the potential for thermally induced failure. Most materials used in p!mt equipment and components are not subject to physical ce chemical changes in the range of temperatures expected to result in a station blackout. Materials or combinadons of materials that are susceptible to significant changes in these ranges will be identified and used to screen components that are potentially sensitive to station blackout conditions.
l Reasonable assurance for equiprnent operability is provided if it is shown that the station blackout coping equipment does not contain materials that are suscepuble to significant physical or chemical changes in a station blackout environment.
F.4.2 Guidance Due to the relatively low temperatures expected to be encountered during a station blackout, the vast majority of matenals used in nuclear grade equipment and components are not expected to impair operation. Non metallic i materials (i.e. insulators and lubricants) are generally recognized as bsing most susceptible to potential thermal i degradation in the temperature ranges expected to be encountered in the dominant areas of concern. Reasonabic l
assurance of operability is provided if the specific component does not contain materials known to be susceptible to significant thermal changes wh.n exposed to TDACfor the limited duration of a stadon blackout. ;
A reference table showing the maximum condnuous service temperature for representative insulators and lubricants j which may be found in station tlackout equipment is provided in the Appendix F Topical Report.
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t i F.4.3 Procedure l Apply the following steps for station blackout response equipment located in dominant areas of concern experiencing l
a totalloss of forced ventiladon.
(1) Determine the T DACfor the area containinf, the equipment in accordance with Section 7.2.4.
f C) (a) Prepare a list of temperature sensitive materials for the station blackout equipment. (When the exact material types are not known but the material class is, the most thermally sensitive material type in the class should be used.)
(b) Determine w hether the materials listed in step 2(a) are operaung within their maximum continuous senice temperature. A reference list of temperature sensitive materials commonly used in station blackout equipment is provided in the Appendix F Topical Report.
I.
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. GUIDELINES AND TECIINICAL BASES FOR NUS1 ARC INITIATIVES NUStARC 87 00 July 18,1988 DRAFT q .s syd.g$;f (c) Reasonable assurance of operability is establ:shed if the materials identified have a maximum continuous service temperature above TDAc. Note:If the continuous service temperstare for some of the most temperature sensitive materials fa!!s below TDAC, it may still be possible to establish operability for the 1:mited duration or a station blackout. Section F.3 of this appendix intreduces methods for establishing the operability of equipment for short durations above their rated temperactre for continuous operation.
F.4.4 Examples ne following examples illustrate the establishment of t asontble assurance of operability on the basis of materials analysis.
Eumete 1:
An air operated diaphragm valve actuator ir. required for three hours in a cominant area of concem with a TDACof 140' F. A review of the components identified polystyrene as the only temperature sensitive material. A review of the Topical Report identifies a muimum continuous service temperature of 151' F which is greater than TDAC-Based on this materials review the ac:uator is considered operable for the three hour duration.
Eume!e 5 A manufacturer's generic qualification repon demonstrates qualification of a nuclear-grade solenoid operated valve (SOV) for in-containment conditions. A sin alar valve that has not been tested by the manufxturer is considered as station blackout response equipment and is located in a dominant area of concern. De manufacturer indicates that the only significant difference between the SOVs !s the use of Buna N instead of EFT as the valve elastomer. A review of the Topical Report reveals that the muimum continuous operability temperatures for Buna.N and EFT are 240' F and 300* F respectively, ne utility determines that reasonable assurance of operability is established since the valve is only required to function for two hours in a dominant area of concem with a TDAc of 145' F.
1 Eumele 3: - !
A pressure switch is rated for continuous operation at 125' F. De manufacturer believes the switch will function at higher temperatures but will not .'ormally state this opinion. De utility reviews the switch design and deterrmnes that the thermally limiting sub-components are the intemal snap acting switch and the Viton pressure retaining diaphragm and seals, ne snap acting switch is rated by its manufacturer for a 90' C (194* F) muimum continuous service temperature. General material informsuon indicates that the Viton pressure retaining diaphragm and sea'.s are acceptable for temperatures in excess of a 350* F maximum conunuous sersice temperature. Based on this data %e utility can conclude that the pressure switch is operable for the (cut hour duration of a station blackout at a TDAc of 160' F.
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GUIDELINES AND TECllNICAL D ASES FOR NU51 ARC INITIATIVES NU51 ARC 87 00 DRAFT July IS,1983 F.5 Equipment Inside Instrumentation and Control Cabinets
'$lf..!
F.5.1 General Statement of Method Components located inside instrumentation and control cabincts are normally exposed to the heat ger. crated by electrical power supplies. Most cabinets are not equipped with forced ventilation, relying, instead, on natural convection through louvers in the cabinet. Guidelines direct operators to open doors for cabinets containing energized equipment relied upon to cope with a station blackout within 30 minutes in order to provide more extensive air mixing with the general area. His action is expected to reduce the potential for building up higher air temperatures in the immediate vicinity of electrical and electronic equipment and components.
Reasonable assuran:e for equipment operability is provided if it is shown that the station blackout coping equipment and components inside instrunientation and control cabinets with open doors will not be exposed to a thermal environment that exceeds normal operating conditions with the doors closed.
F.5.2 Guidance Equipment located inside instrumentation and control cabinets normally operate at steady state temperatures which are frequently higher than the expected room temperatures in dominant areas of concern during a station blackout. If cabir.et doon are opened to improve venulation within the nrst 30 minutes of a station blackout these components are not expected to experierice temperature environments which would be substantially different from their normal operaung conditions. In fae: due to the size of the cabinet doors it is reasonable to assume t$at the cabinet intemal temperatures do not exceed the ambient temperatura of the room once the doors are opened. On this basis, reasonable assurance of equipment operability in a station blackout is established if it can be shown by analysis or measurement that such cabinets with open doors will not expose the components inside to a thermal environment that exceeds
~
normal operaung conditions with the doors closed.
Reliance nn this method requires station blackout response procedures w hich direct operators to open cabinet doors in dominant areas of concern (please see Section 4.2.!(10)) within the nrst 30 minutes of a station blackout event.
F.5.3 Procedure Apply the following tieps for station blackout response equipment !ccated in dominant areas of concern experiencing a totalloss of forced ventilation.
(1) Determine TDAC for the area containing the equipment in accordance with Section 7.2.4.
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. GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR NUMARC INITIATIVES NUM ARC 37 00 DRAFT - - , kly 18,1988
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. :8 (2) Determine the maximum design temperature for the equipment or measure the normal bulk air operating temperature inside the cabinet (whichever is higher). One measurement at a location near the top of the cabinet is sufficient for the purpose of establishing operability during a station blackout.
(3) Reasonable assurance of operability is established if:
(a) The temperamre determined in Step 2 is higher than the temperature detenmned in Step 1; and.
j (b) Procedures requiring opening of cableet panels and doors witnin 30 minutes of the loss of ver.tilation event are implemented.
1 F.5.4 Example The following example illustrates the establishment of reasonable assurance of operability on the basis of equipment j toca:ed inside instrumentation and control cabinets.
EumMe-A cabinet containing heat generating station blackout instrumentation is located in a dominant area with a TDACof
) 140' F. The normal steady state bulk air temperature inside the cabinet. Teabinet, is determined to be 150' F. Plant procedures are implemented to open the doors to this cabinet within one half hour of loss of ventilation. Reasonable assurance of operability is established since TDAC < Teabinet. l 1
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. GUIDEI.INES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR NUMARC INITIATIVES NUMARC 87c40 DRAFT Ju!y 18,1988 F.6 Generic Studies and Experien:e .-
F.6.1 General Statement of Method ne current state of knowledge concerning equipment operability in elevated thermal environments provides a substantial basis for concluding that plant equipment can properly function in thermal environments above design conditions. Two recent studies support the conclusion that plant equipment can operate under loss of forced ventilation for periods longer than four houn:
(1) Letter Report on Equipment Operability During Station Blackout Events M. J., Jacobus, l
V. F. Nicolette , and A. C. Payne Sandia Nadonal Laboratories. (1986); and. ,
} (2) Efects of Ambient Temperature on Electronic Components in Safety Relatedlastrumentation and Control Systems. M. Chiramal, AEOD/C604, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (1986).
]
The Jacobus report found that censin classes of equipment will not be affected w hen exposed to temperatures above 150* F for eight hours or longer. The Chiramal report concluded that an actual loss of ventilation event did not ads ersely affect the performance of equipment needed for safe shutdown. .
i These studies can be used to support conclusions of equipment operability under elevated temperature conditions 3
- I estimated for the station blackout coping duration.
If the site. specific applicacon is not covered by the above data base or other generic studies, then other sources of data, such as Ucensee Event Reports (LERs) or the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS), can be used to j support conclusions of equipment operability under elevated temperature conditions estimated for the statioa blackout
{
! coping duration. l 1
t F.6.2 Guidance )
l A variety of studies and reports contain information on the operability of equipment above desis:n conditions. The ;
, 1 l infonnation contained in these reports can be used to establish reasonable msurance of operability. Examples of these
! include:
8 1
(1) Ucensee Event Reports:
j (2) Nuclear Plant Reliability Data Systems (NPRDS);
l (3) NUREGs:
1 (1) ANSI. ASME. ASTM.er ANS uandards:
)
i F 17 l
GUIDELINE 7 AND TECllNICAL BASES FOR NU51 ARC INITIATIVES NU51 ARC 87 00 DRAFT July 18,1988
(!) Scientific literature; and, (6) Vendorinformation.
F.6.3 Procedure Apply the following steps for station blackout response equipment located in dominant areas of concem experiencing a totalloss of fnt,ed ventilation.
(1) Determme TDAC for the area containing the equipment in accordance with Section 7.2.4.
(2) (a) Determine the time period that the equipment must remain operable for the appropriate stati,on blackout coping method; or, (b) Assume the equipment must remain operable for the entire duration of the station blackout (i.e.,
one, two, or four hours).
(3) Detennine whether any generic analyses, tests, or reports exist that address the operability of equipment exposed to the conditions which envelope Steps 1 and 2. A bibliography of reporu which may be helpful to establish reasonable assurance of operability sorted by equipment category is provided in the NUGSBO EqaipmentOperability Database.
(4) Reasonable assurance of operability is provided if the temperature specified in Step I and the duration specified in Step 2 are enveloped by the conditions for the equipment as determined from genene studies and expenments, r F,6,4 Examples ;
T1 a following examples illustrate the esublishment of reasonable assurance of operability on the basis of generic studies and expenence.
Etsme!e 1:
A solenoid valve is located in a dominant area of concem where TDAC - 150' F, Vendor documentation is available l
supporting operability at 120' F. A generic report, however, is available documenting events i7 which similar l
. *1 solenoid valves operated wiWout failure at 151' F fer time periods longer than four hours. Reasonable assurance of i operability is therefore established.
Etsmele 5 The expected TDAc for an operstmg BWR is ca!culated fer all dcminant areas of concem. These va'ues are ecmpared 1
to those calculated or measured for an actualloss of ventilat2on event at a sinular BWR. If the ToAc values at this j l l l
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GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR NUMARC INITIATIVES NUMARC 87c40 DRAFT July 18,1988 i ;
- second plant envelope those calculated for the first, then operability is established for similar equipment. Informadon describing the event and equipment performance should be obtained from the facility experiencing the event.
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l A utility determines that a piece of equipment is required in a TDAc of 140* F for four houn. Similar equipment ,
j installed in another plant area functioned appropriately when subjected to local temperature excursions which I exceeded the TDAC Value for four hours. Reasonable assurance of operability is based on this plant specific 3
information. ,
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GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL DASES FOR NUMARC INITIATIVES NOMARC 87 00 DRAFT hly 18,1988 t
F.7 Plant Specific Experience and Tests F.7.1 General Statement of Method .
Some plants have actually experienced the effects of loss of ventilation or have studied the issue for specific l applications. For such cases, reasonable assurance for couipment operability is provided if no failures of equipment !
needed to cope with a stadon blackout resulted from exposing the equipment to temperatures expected from a four I hour station blackout during .ests or operational er nts.
F.7.2 Guidance i This method allows the use of plant specific experience to establish operability. A loss of ventdadon event, for .
l example, may be used as a basis to establish operability. Reasonable assurance of operability for the duration of the i
< t event is established if the loss of ventilation dMs not impact the operability of station blackout components.
Alternatively, utilities may demonstrate operability in a station blackout environment by testing, i
F.7.3 Procedure Apply the following steps for station bl.t.kout response equipment located in dominant areas of concern experiencing a totalloss of forced ventilation. ;
(1) Determine TDAC for the area containing the equipment in accordance with Section 7.2.4. ,
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(2) ~ (a) l Determine the time period that the' equipment must remain' operable for the appropriate station - ~ '
- blackout coping method; or, t (b) Assume the quipment must remain operable for the entire duration of the station b!xkout (i.e one, two. or four hours).
- j J (3) Reasonable assurance of operability is established if any plant specific analyses, tests. or experient's ;
subjected the equipment, without failure. to conditions enveloping those determmed in Steps I and 2.
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F.7.4 Examples I The following examples illuwne the establishment of reasonable assurance of operability on the basis of plant j spectfic experience and tests,
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- i EmMe E j Durtng an extended loss of off. site power event a BWR achi
- ved safe shutdown without estoring normal Reactor l Building senulation for ten hours. Ventilation through the Standby Gas Treatment System wu available but i provided insigntficant cooling to the building areas. The RCIC system successfully operated throughout the event:
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. GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR NUMARC INITIATIVES NUMARC 87 00 DRAFT hly 15.1988 the HPCI system was secured after the first hour of operation. After restoration of off. site power, all systems and equipment functioned normally and the unit was returned to power. No subsequerr. failures of the equipment due to exposure to elevated temperatures during the loss of ventilation were identified. No replacements with new designs 4
had been made or were necessary for equipment required for coping with a station blackout in these dominant areas of t
concem. As a resuh of this operating experience, reuonable assurance is established that equipment in this BWR will perform during the four hout temperature environments anticipated during station blackout events.
Ersmnte $
1 Station blackout equipment located in the auxiliary feed. water (AFW) pump room is required to operate for one hour in order to cope with a station blackout event. The components in this room were shown to operate under station 1 blackout conditions for two hours as part of post TMI NRC requirements. Reasonable assurance of operability is,
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ENCLOSURE D
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NU51 ARC S7 00 Topical Report DRAFT GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BAS]S FOR NUMARC INITIATIVES ADDRESSING STATION BLACKOUT AT LIGIIT WATER REACTORS j Appendix F Topical Report J
July 21,1988 l
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- l NUCLEAR SIANAGE5 TENT AND RESOURCES COUNCIL, INC.
1776 Eye Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20006 2496 i
y)to&T7 T( y .....
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4 NUMARC 87-00 Topica1 Report -
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. GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES r 1
FOR NUMARC INITIATIVES ADDRESSING ,
I STATION BLACKOUT AT LIGHT WATER REACTORS I
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i Appendix F Topical Report l i i i
l July 21,1988 j U
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1 NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT AND ;
RESOURCES COUNCIL,INC. !
) 1776 Eye Stat, N.W.
2 Washington, DC 20006-24%
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 INTR O DU CTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ ~ . - ~ . . . .. . . . ~ . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.0 51 E C H AN I C A L E Q U I P hi E N T... . . ... . .. . .. . ... . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . . . ... .. . .. .. .. . . . . . . .. . .. . . . .. . ... .... . 2 2.1 E QU I Phi E N T E V A LU A U ON S .... .... .. .. - . .. .. .. . . .. ...... .. ....... . - .. - .. ..... .... 3 2.1.1 Famps...................................o............ ....................................3 i 2.i.2 Turbines...................................................................................5
, 2.1.3 DC h t o tors. Fans, an d B to we ts . . .. .. . . . ... .. .. . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. ..... .. .. . . .. . .. 7 2.1.4 Va1yes........................................................................................8 l
2.1.5 htotor Ove rated Valve Ac1u atots.. ... ........ .. . . ....... .......... . .. ... 9 2.1.6 ht ec h arsic a1 Tu rbine Goy e rnots ....... .... .............. . ............ . .... ... ..10 2.2 F A2.URE h! ODE EV Af .U A110N S .... . . .. .. . ... .... .. .. . .. .. .. . . . . . . . .... .. .. .. ..... .. .. ! !
2.2.1 Bearing Failuta ..... ... ...............................................................11 22.2 F a ti g u e . I n d u e e d Fa11 u r e .... ... ........... .- ... ........... .. .. .. . .. ...... . .. ....16 2.2.3 Creep-Ind uced Faihtre ... .. .. .. . . . . .. .. .. .~. .. .. .... -.-- .--~ ~ .-. . .e .. . .. . . ~ . . . - 20 2.2.4 Windin g F ailure . . . . . . .. .. . . .. . .. . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .. . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . .. . . . .. .. . . . . 22 2.2.5 S e a I F a i l u r e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. 0 3 2.3 EXPERIENCE %TTE htECMANICAL EQUIPhiENT... .... .................... ...... ... 25 2.3.1 hiotor Experience.e........ ....................................................25 2.3.2 hiuor Operated Yalve Aetuator Erperience...-.. .... .. ... .... ... . ... 27 2.4 AEFE RE N C ES . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 2 3 3.0 ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRON!C I!QUIPh!EN T. .... ......,... . . .... .... . ..... ..... 31 3,1 E QU ! Phi ENT E V ALU ATl O N S .... ...... .. ... .. ...... . ... .... .... ...... ....... . . ....... 3 2 3.1.1 Control and Ins'rumentation Cables .... . ................. .. .......... .. ........... 32 3.1.2 S w Pchet a nd R ela ys .. .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . .. .. . . .. . . . .. . .. .. . .. . . . . . .. .. .. . . . . .. . . .... . . .. . . . 3 3 3.1.3 Sensors and Electronic Transmitters . ........ .......... ...... .............. .. ... ...... 34 3.1.4 Eleetronic Turbine Governors .. ........ .................. .................... ... ........ 37 12 EQUIPhtENT FAILURE 3iODE EYA LUATIONS ........................... ............... 38 3.2.1 Thermally. Induced Reliability Deerease. .. ... .... ... . ...... .. 38 3.2.2 In s u i a tion De g ra d a t1on.................... ........ .. . . ... .. ...... ... ...... . ... 4 0 3.3 EXPERIENCE Wm! c_LECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPhtENT............ 41 3.3.1 S w ite h e s Ex pen enc e . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . .. .. .. .. . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . ... . . .. .. . . ... .. .. .. . .. . . . .. . . 41 3.3.2 Eleetrenic Tranimitter Ex perience..... . . ... ...... . ...... . ... ... .. . 4 2 3.3.3 Cables and Wire s Ex p: rime e .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ... .... . .... .. . .. ..... ....... .... ... 4 3 3.4 REFE RE N C .S .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 4 5
- .0 htATERIALS .................................................................................,................4t 4.1 THERh!AL PROPERTIES OF COhthtERCIAL PLASTICS................ ............ 49 4.2 THERhiAL PROPERTIES OF COhih!ERCIAL LUBRICANTS....... ................. 50 4.3 REFEREN C ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .m . . . .. .. . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 51
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' NUS1 ARC $9 00 I
, GUIDELINES AND TECitSICAL DASES FOR Nt.: MARC INITIATIVES Jul,e 21,1988 l DRAFT 4
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
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This report discusses the operabliity of ten t,ategories of equipment in mcderate thermti environments. In each case, a temperature for which the category is expected to operate during a four hout station blackout is determined. The j majority of equipment required for coping with a station blackout event are expected to fall within these categories !
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and therefore will not need to be individually evaluated for operability in environmenta enveloped by these !
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evaluations. ,
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I 4 Due to the variety of equipment types in each catescry the station blackout operability temperatures established in '
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! this report are conservatisely low. It is recognized that an equipment. specific analysis may establish reasonable i
1 usurance of operability for hisher 'emperatures, j
! i In order to facilitate the evaluation procest, the equipment categories are classified as either mechanical equipment or l
j electrical and electronic equipment. These classes are dixussed individually in Sections 2 and 3 of thh report. l Section 4 includes several referenas tables which may be used to evaluate the operability of indiddual equipment. f t
i A summary of the evaluations showing the maximum station blackout operability temperatures for each category is ;
l shown in Table 1 1. -
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l l i i Table 1,1 Operability Conditions By Category 1 -
3 Station Blackout Appendis F l Operability Temperaturc ('F) 1 Equipment Duration (krs) Approaches Used
} MECHANICAL EQUIPMEhT
- Pumps 180 4 F.4,F.6 i i Turttnes Mechanica!Governon 180 4 F.4,F.6
! DC Motors, Fans, and Bhwers 180 4 F.4,F.6 !
l Vahes 200 4 F.4,F.6 !
l Motor Operated Yahe Actuator 3 1 Limitorque 200 4 F.2.F.3,F.6 ;
i Rotork ISO 4 F.2,F.3,F.6 !
{ Other 150 4 F.2,F.3,F.6 ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQLVMEST l Cables 135 4 F.2,F.3,F.6 l Switches and Relays !!$ 4 F.2,F.4,F.6 ;
3enson and E!actronic Transmitters ISO 4 F.3,F.6 l
, Electronic Tabiw Governors 160 4 F.3,F.6 !
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- GUIDELINES AND TECllNICAL DASES FOR NUS!AllC INITIATIVES NUS! ARC 87 00 DRAFT J ul.t 21, 1958 2.0 MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Stanen Blackout Omt:5thrv Temneraturec Pumps 160'F Turbines wI Me:hanical Govemon 180' F DC Moton. Fans, and Blow ers 180' F Vahes 200* F Motor Operated Yah e Actuaton Limitorque 200'F Rotork 150' F Ot.5er 180' F Durannn- Four Hours This section discusses the operability r.f mechani:al equipment in station blackout environments. Ea:h equipment category is discussed individuaDy. These discussions define the scope of the category, briefly describe the eperation of the equipment covered in the categcry, and introduce the most likely thermally induced failure mechanisms. The most lirrJting operability temperature for these failure mechanisn.s is selec'ed as the station bla:kout eperability temperature. The following equipment catescrits are discussei (a) pumps (t) turbines,(c) DC moton, fans, and blowen, (d) valves. (e) motor operated valve actuators, and (f) mechanical turbine governon.
Since many types of mechanical equipment are susceptible to the same general thermally indu:ed failure mechanisms, these mechanisms are discussed indhidually in Section 2.2. Ea:h possible failu.e me:hanism is '
! evaluated so that its most limiting operability temperature can be determined. These limiting temperatures are referenced in the equipment category evaluadons The following failure rnechanisms are evaluatei (a) beanns failure, (b) fadgue induced failure. (c) creep induced failure, (d) win 6ng failure, and (e) seal failure. Padgue aad creep has e been determined not to be a con:em in the temperatures associated with a stadon bla:kout as showt,in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. i l
A vanety of tests and espesiments base been performed to invesugate the operability of equipment e elesated temperatures. In addidon, there has teen a number of documented cperationaj events in whl:h stado: blackout l l
.i equipment have been exposed to elevated tempratares fee short duradons. This experien;c may be used to est.blish i cNrability dunns a station b!a:kout. A summary cf the esisting esprier.:e with meters and motor c; crated sahe a;tuaton is included in Section 2.3. The station bla: Lout crenbility temperatures suggested in these summanes are referenced in the equip ment cate; cry es atuations.
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NDtARC 87 00 '
. GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL DASES FOR SDIARC ISIT!ATIVES Jul? !!. 1988 DRAFT
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} 2.1 EQUIPMENT EVALUATIONS 1 ,
! 2.1.1 Pumps 1
Category Description his catescry includes all portiens of pmps necessuy for handlir.s fluid. in:!vding the i beutnts. shaft. cuing. pa: Ling. and gukeu, t
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! Operation in su:i:n bla:keut asents, pumps are required to provide condensate makeup for de (0110weg systems:
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- Auxiliry Feedaater(AFW)
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- High Pressure Ccolant Injection (HPCI)
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- Hish Pressure Ccre Spray (HMS)
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- Rea: tor C:ntainment Ise!ation Coeling (RCIC) i i
l All of these pmps ce cf the centrifugal design and are driven by steam tuttines. l.
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i l A centrifugal pump :enststs of a set of rotating vants called the impeller, enclosed within a housing or casing. In a :
! f j centrifugal pump, ce liquid is introduced into the center of the impeller through the intake port u show- in Figure l 21. The irnpeller dis:huges the liquid at its periphery at a higher velo: fry, which is th'en converted to pressure I i energy in the cuing.De fluid then exits through ce dis; huge pert at a higher pressure than it had whe:it entered j the pump. !n a mul:is'. age pump, the discharge from one impcDer can be fed into anecer imp!!er.The i. putts us
- 1. i dris en by a drive shaft, w hich is su; ported by shaft sleeves, and bearings. Pa: king is also used to centrol de leakage :
cf the liquid from de point where the shaft passes through the casing. The casing is often censtruered of two parts f j that are bolted togeder with a guket in betweerL 1
Penn DF ttria&aset 1 TD a8*tLLta wasg3 j -
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I rigure :.11 creis seciion of Ceniritusai romp is {
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- NU51 ARC 87 00 o GUIDELINES AND TECllNICAL D ASES FOR .NU51 ARC INITIATIVES Jult 21, 1988 DRAFT Failure Afechanisms The major temptature sensitise components are the bearings, pa: king, shaft casing, and gasket. The limiting thermally. induced failure modes are: bearing failure, seal failure, fatigue induced failure of the
, t shaft, and creep. induced failure of the shaft or casing. Fatigue and creep hase been analyzed in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 and have teen determined not to be a concem in station bla:kout environments. Fcr the remaining thermal:y.
induced failure modes, the four hour operability temperatures as determined in section 2.2 are:
Beari ,3 Failure iS0' F Seal Failure 200* F t
Reasonable assuran:e of operability for pumps is, therefore, generically established at tempratures up to !!O' F for at least four hours.
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Gt;IDELINES AND TECHNICAL D ASES FOR NO1 ARC INITI ATIVES NDI ARC M 00 r
J ul.t 1, 1955 DRAFT 2.1.2 Turbines Category Description This category in:!udes all portens cf steam turbines including reters, cas: ;s shafts.
and teuings. E! c::eni: and rne:hani:al gosemers will te es alvated separately in Sc:tions 2.1.6 and 3.1.4
- respe:cs ely, s
Operation Steam :stines ue quired to drise t' e AFW, RCIC and HPCLHP"S pumps in the esent cf a sution bla:keut. Steam ratines cens:, , the heat energy cf the inlet steam into v.ork in two steps. The stern is first espanded in no:.::es, censerting the heat energy in:o kinetic energy cf the steam. The kineti: energy :( this high i selocity steam is t'en ::ansfened to the turbine t!ades. :enserting the velo:ity energy into werk. A t>7i:al steam f turbine is shown in Figu/e 2 0.
l tVIe !at e sistg m b
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Eteea: - es cast ..- t ve..s,st s ett wte cas : I
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Figure 2 2: Component Parts of a Steam Turbinets J
I I Fallure Mechanisms The majcr tem;'erature sensitise cernponents fer steam turbines us the terings, shaft.
J casing, pa: Ling. and g uket, ne limidng thermc!) inda:ed faibre recides ue: tereg faikre. fadgue indu: d faihre I
cf the shaft. creep.indu:ed faibre cf the shaft er casing, and seal failure. Fadsue and creep hase been a .a!>ted in l Se:tiens 2.2.0 and 2.0.3 and hase been de. terr =ed net to te a cen:em in stawen bla:keut enurenme .:s. Fct the J
}
- remaining therme:) indu:ed faibre redes, the fe;r 5:ur cperati ity ten pernates u 4eteraned tn se: ten 2.0 re:
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Bering FCrc 150'F l
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GUIDELINES AND TECllNICAL DASES FOR NCS! ARC ISITIATIVES NCAtARC 89 00 Jol, 31, 1988
' DRAFT Seal Failure 200' F Reasonable assuran:e of eperability for turbines is generica!!y established at temperatures up to 180' F for at least four hours.
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GL*fDELINES AND TECllNICAl. BASES FOR NOI ARC INITIATIVES NOf ARC 89 00
. DRAFT Jul) St. 1988 2.1.3 DC Slotors. Fans, and Blowers -
Category Description This category includes all portions of DC motors, fans, and blowen. including the i
bearings, windings, shafu. and casing. .
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4 Operation For some planu the cperation of buametne condensers for the HPCI and RCIC systems may require 9
the operation of a condenser blower, t
i Failure Ster! anisms The dominant thermally induced failure modes for blowers ce summarized in Table 21.
These failure rnodes identify DC motors as the major temperature sensitive component.
5 Table 21: Failure'51 odes for Dlowers7 Part Failure Stods Approsimate ce Blower Winding failure 35 %
t Beving failure $0% i Other 15 % L The major temperature sensithe componsnu of moton we tl.: bevings, windings, shafts, and casings. The limiting thermally induced failee modes are: bearing failure, winding failure fatigue. induced failure of the shaft. and creep-induced failure of the shaft or casing. Fatigue and creep hase been analyzed in Sectioru 2.2.2 and 213 and hase been J determined not to be a concem in station blackout em ironmenu. For the remaining thermally induced failure incdes, i
the four hour operability temperatures as determined in section 2 : ve:
i i Bearing failure 180' F
, Winding Failure 338' F l
! Engrience also indicates that moton may operate in ambient temptatures of at least 150' F for at lent four houn (see Section 2.3.1). Reasonab!c assurance cf operability for moton, fans and blowers is, therefore, generically established at temptatures up to !!O' F for at least four hours.
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GlllDELINES AND TECllNICAL BASES FOR NtJ51 ARC INITIATIVES NU5t ARC 89.o0
. DRAFT Jul) 81, 1988 ,
2.1.4 Valves
, Category Description This category in:ludes all portions of vahes that a e exposed to the process duid. This includes the valve bc4y and bonnet, the s ahe stem and seat, and seals (pa king and gaskets).
Operation in a stat.on bla:kout esent a variety of vahe types will be called upon to perform one or more of the fo!!owing fun:tions:
I
- h1aintain containment integnty l
- Trartsfer s u:tien of condensate makeup
- !solat Culd systerits
- Regulate the now of process Culds The mechani:a! and Guld retaining components of these s ah es that need to be addressed in order to determine their ability to operate dr.ng a station blackout es ent in:lude the fo!!owing3 d:
- Vahe bcdy and bonnet Valve disk arid stem i
Vahe pa: Ling and gasken l hf at fials used in these components are generally selected in accordance with standards published by the American l So:iety for Testing and hf aterials ( ASTht). The design of me:hanical components typically adhere to the guidelines as shown in the Ameri:an Society of hfe hanical Engineers ( AShtE) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Ccdel?.
Failure hiechanisms The temperature sensitise components of sahes are the vahe bcdy, the bonnet. the disk, the stem, and seals. The limiting thermally induced failure modes are: seal faDure, fatigue indu:ed failure of the vah e
(
stern, and creep-irdu:e4 failure of the vahe stem, bcdy, bonnet, and disk. Fatigue and creep hase been a.nlyaed in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.0.3 and have been determined not to ee: a concem in station bla;kout environments. For the remaining thermally induced failure m:de, the four hout eperabdi ty temptatures as determined in secticei 2.0 is: l Seal Fadute 200*F Reasonab!c atscran:e cf cretability fer s sh es is generica!!y established at tervran;tes up to :00* F fce at least four [
h x rs.
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Gt'! DEL.lNES AND TECllNICAL DASES FOR NO! ARC INITIATIVES NOI ARC 87 00
. DRAFT hly 21.1988 2.1.5 Slotor Operated Yahe Actuators Category Description This category in !udes all motor operated vahe a:tuators manufa:tured by Liritorque and Rotork. Actuators with intemal electronic controls permitting interfa:es with computer or instrument control
- loops are not frequently unlized in nuclear plant appli ations and are escluded from this evaluation.
Fallure Slechanisms The major temperature sensitive components of motor operated vahe a:tuators are the bearings, windings, shafts, and cuing. The limiting thermally indu:ed failure me:han'.ims for motor operated valve actuaton are; bearing failure, fatigue failure of the shaft, creep of the linkage and shaft, and winding failure when subjected to elevated temperatures. Fatigue and creep has e been analyzed in Se:tions 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 and have been determined not to be a con:ern in station bla:kout environments. For the remaining thermally indu:ed failure modes.
i the four hour operability ten peratures as determined in se: tion 2.2 are:
{
Beanng Failure 1SO' F
, Winding Fa!!ure 338' F j Esperience with the operability of Limitorque and Rotork vahe a:tuators at levated temperatures, as dis:ussed in l
Section 2.3.2. suggesta that equipme.: manufa:tured by these sendon wit remain oprable during a fou. hour i station b! :kout at 200' F and 180* F respectisely. Thus, reasonable assuran:c of cperability is established for all Limitorqut s the a:tuators at 200* F. all Rotork actua on at 150' F. and all Rotork a:6ators with torque swit:h ,
material changes at 200' F. Reasonable assuran e of operability for all other actuarers is established at 110* F for at
- least four houn on the basis of beann; failure.
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. GUIDELINES AND TECilNICAL IIASES FOR SulARC INITIATIVET NDIARC 89 00 DRAFT Ju!! 21, 1988 2.1.6 hlechanical Turbine Gosernors Category Description Thh category includes all mechani al gosernors which may be employed in station bla:kout equipment. De govemor system in:ludes the speed monitoring devi:e and the asso:iated linkage. Electronic govemcts are evaluated in Section 3.1.4.
1 Operation Govemors are speed.sensithe control systems that att used in steam turbines. They ensure that t.he turbine speed veill not exceed the rated speed of its asso:iated pump. hischanical se vemors commonly meuure shaft l
speed through the use of spring opposed routtng weights. As the speed of the shaft in:reases, the centnpetal force ,
eterted on the weights wtil overcome the spring pressure and throw the weights out. At a certain speed the weights l signal the governing system to redu:e the steam inlet flow via the govemot vals e.
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l Failure hiechanisms ne limiting thermally indu:ed failure me:hanisms of snechnical gosemors are: creep-indu ed failure of the lever arms, linkage, and springs and fatigue. induced failure cf the speed sensing me:hanism j when subjected to elevated temperatures. Fatigue and creep hase been analyzed in Section 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 and have been determined not to be a con:ern in station bla:kout environments. l The generic turbine operability analysis shows that the tutbirie itself is the limiting component, with a station bla:kout operability temperature of 180' F (see Se: tion 2.1.2L Derefore, reasonable usurance of operability is generi: ally established for turbines incorporating me:hani;al gesernors in ambient temperatures as high u 180' F for at leut four hours.
Evaluation of the failure me:hanisms of electronic turbine governors in Se: tion 3.1.4 establishes renonable usuran e of eperability for temp:ratures up to 160' F for at leut four hours. l I
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. GUIDELINES AND TECl!NICAL DASES FOR SCSIARC INITIATIVES NUSl ARC 87 00 DRAFT Jul; gl,1958 l l
l 2.2 FAILL'RE MODE EYALUATIONS L
This section discusses the failure rnodes for the t mperature sensithe sub components of rnechanled equipment, Ea:h possible failee mechanism is evaluated so that its most limiting operability temperature can be determined.
These limiting temperatures are referenced in the equipment category evaluatiens. The following failure me:hanisms ;
us evaluate & (a) beanns failure, tb) fatigue induced failure, (c) creep induced failure, (d) winding failure, and (c) sea! [
t failure.
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2.2.1 Bearing failure Beanngs ue desigr.e4 to keep a rotsung shaft in correct alignment with the stnionuy pans of a component under the j a: tion of transverse and radialloads. Beanngs used for asial positioning of the shaft are called thrust L;eanngs, while j those that give radial positioning we called line bearings, In most mechanical equipment, thrust bearings a;tually serve as both thrust and line t<anngs, i
r The heat generated by the bearing will occasionally be more than that which could be removed by radiation oc l t
convection to the sarounding air. In these cases the beuings must be cooled by a force feed lubrication system ce through a jacket in:or? crated into the housing, through w hi:h cooling water is circulate 1, l l
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De two major r> pes of beving us anti friedon and joumal bearings, .
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Anti friction Bearings Ball type anti friction beanngs are used in most classes of mechanical equipraent since !
they can a: cept both thrust and radial 1615. Although roller type anti. friction beanngs we sin !lu in design, they can ,
not accept thrust leads. This limitation substantially restricts their employment in station bla:kout equipment. The analysis that follow s, hom es er, applies equally to both ball, and roller type bearings, l
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Since the coefficlini cf rolling friction is lower than that of sliding friction, the operation of anti fri: tion ball l branngs at a constant speed is practically frictionless. Howeser, the speed of a mechani a! desice can neser be absolutely constet and es:h acceleration will cause a slight sliding a: tion in the bearings. This phenomenon arises when the vanation in speed causes the balls in a ball beving to lag or lead the ra:e be:ause cf their inertia. .Mso, on cantng a leal esen the hardest metals will deform, upsetting the perfect point c(.ntact of the bearings and adding i
another sliding a: con. These sliding a:tions require that the beanns be lubricate 1 l
Most tall beanngs in me hanical equipment use greue u a lubricant. Industnal gresses are used in se'f,:entained
. j b<atings for many reuens, including reduced maintenance s:hedules and lower lubri: ant leakage rates, la grene. ,
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. GUIDELINES ASD TECllNICAL 11ASEs FOR NO!AltC INITIATIVES NO! ARC 39 00 DRAFT Jul) 21. 1988 lubntated beatmgs the greus is throw n out by the rotation of the ba]!s and creates a slight su; tion at the inner race.
As the expelled greve is cooled by conta:t wtth the housing, the su:uon at the inner ra:e attra:ts the cceled grease.
> The effe:t assures a cenunuous etreulaticn of grease tn the beartng, journalllearings Jcurnal teanngs Leep the mating surfa:es cf the rotattng equipment apan by a thin pressunzed film of cilinstead of by tall beannst.
- Figure 2 3 shows a cross se: tion of an enrating journal teanns. The load on the journal rushes the shaf t to one side cf the bearing, ro that the working clearan e is almost all con:entrated on one side. As the resching shaft drags the siscous oil around with it, the oil stream conserges toward the region of closest approa:h te: ween the mating surfa:es. This effe:t causes the pressure of the oil (Um in the region to in:rease and hold up the shift against the applied forras. Pressures cf 10 to 103 atmospheres are cerunon n cij films in journal beanngs. The cil film at its thinnest region is su!! thi:k enough to ecmpletely separate the mate; surfa:es assurrang the oilis s.tfi:iently viscous, ik 0 l F
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Figure 2 3: Operation of a Journal !! earingl '
Jour .al teanngs da are espcsed to heavy leads use a fct:ed feed lutrication system in whi:h ett is pumped through the bean 93 and cceled in an estemal beat en: hanger. Journal beanngs are usuauy in the form cf a cylindn:al shell, that is split on the center.line for easy assembly. They are usually constrveted of tin. and lead based battitt metal, w hi:h are relatis ely soft matenals and offer the best insurance against damage to the shaftlC.
Failure Mechanisms The most likely failure mcde fer beanngs due to eleisted egrating temperatures arises frcm the loss of sis:cstty cf the lutricar.t. The temperature dependen:e of vis:osity cf a lithium soap grease and a se:ecti:n cf cils is shown in Figures 4 and : 5.
Some jo=al teanngs are w ater l bnestes Increases m amtier.t tempea:.res ue n:t a ncem fx J.ese beanngs sm:e they use protest thid fer ecchng.
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GL'lDELINES AND TECHNICAL DASES FOR NOIARC INITIATIVES NDI ARC 39.04 DRAFT JWl? II 1988 i
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Figure 2 4: Viscosity is. Temperature:
i 100, I
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\00 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 !
Temperature l'F) t Figure 2 h Grease Viscosity ss. Temperature 8-Since both anu friction and jovinal bearings incerNtate a thin film to reduce fri:ti:n. a reduction in viscosity will j red 4:e the thi:kness of this lubn:ating film to su:h an estent that the beadrig may fait The irnpact of charges in siscosity, speci and Icad on the coeftkient of fri tien of a tearing is show11 in Figure 2 6.
where the dimensioMess ccnstant Zoiscesity)'Napee ,e P0 cad) is in:rodu:e1 This figvre is chara:teris:i: of es:h t
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GUIDEl.lNES AND TEctlNICAL DA5Es FOR NO1 ARC INITIATIVES NO1 ARC 89 44 h Dl? 4FT July 21.1988
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Guid Sim bearing. Since load and sped will not chsnge appreciably throughout a station blackout. Z.TP can be :
considered to be proporuonal to the viscosity. .;
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- Bearing Safety Factor . 4 b = $ j {
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Id* I f Operatin Point f
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Figure 2 6t Effect of Viscosity. Speed, and Load on Bearing Frielloal' l
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Figure 2 6 illustrates the failure mochtnism in detail. A dwrease in viscosity put point b will revlt in a rapid ;
1 i increus in the bearing's coefficient of frictici due to the loss of the thin f1!m. The portion of the cune feween l
points a and c is csued a mised film zone because momentary changes in load or speed may rup are the flaid film.
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Cood design pacti:e dictates operation in the region to the right of point c such as at point d. The ratio of the' [
operating ZMP (peint d) to the minimum ZN!F (point b)is ca!!ed the bearing safety facase and is commonly on the !
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6 A!!owing for a reasonable margin of safety, a reduction in viscostty by a factor of four should not order cf the .16.
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4 From Figure 2 4, an SAE 40 weight oil esperiencing a temperature incrone of 75'F abose its normal 130* F i i '
operatirig temMrature would suffer a fa: tor of four dwrene in siscc. ' / ifrom 100 cst r: 33 cst). The logwithmic
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j dennence of siscosity on temprature displayed in Figure 4 is generauy applicabs to oilt used as lubri:ans in i med.ani:41 equipment. Since the temptsture rise in the bearing should not e sceed the temperature rise in the room, oil.lubrwated teum s are expected to remain enrabic fonowing a 75* F rise in the room temprature for at leut i
, four heurs. Assumu's an 'nitial ambient temperature of 40* / (104' F), reasonable usurance of crerati!1ty fer ci'. t 1 '
- lubricated bearings is established for temperatures below 180' F fer at least fcus hours.
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l Sy compartson, the viscesity of grenes decteues relatively slowly u elevated temptatutes until it dreps rapidly (see j j Figure 2 St The temMrature corresponding to this sudden less in siscosity is called the drep Fint of the grease. I 4 ;
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- . GUIDELINES AND TECliNICAL BASES FOR NUA1 ARC INITIATIVES NUh1 ARC 87 00 DRAFT July 21,1968 Due to the high viscosity and lubricating properties of greases they provide adequrte lubricatic't to the bearings at temperatures below their drop points. The drop points for several greases are shown in Table 2 2.
Table 2 2: Drop Point Temperatures of' Common Greases 6 Greaves Droe Point ('A Silleon 340 Polyester 300 4 Silicone diester 280 Diester 270 Polyglyco! 250 Petroleum 250 As can be seen from Table 2 2, reasonable assurance of operability for grease lubricated bearings is established for ,
temperatures of 280' F acd higher, 1 !
i Ir.can therefore be concluded that, bearing fail;re is not a concern for ambient temperatures as high as 180' F for at least four hours.
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GUIDELINES AND TECIINICAL IIA.. FOR NU51 ARC INITIATIVES NU5f ARC 87 00 DRAFT July 21,1988 2.2.2 Fatigue. Induced Failure A primary cause of failure for mechanical equipment operating at elevated temperatures is fatigue. Fatigue is defined as a gradual reduction in a material's strength when subjected to repeated stress cycles. When a mechanical compon,:nt is initiaUy designed, the following major factors are considered:
- Cyclicload Operating temperature Desired operating life A change in either of the first two factors will produce a corresponding change in the third. Station blackout conditions will not affect the cyclic load; however, the operating temperature of the shaft may increase resulting in higher stresses.
The effect of these increased stresses on the shaft may be seen on endurance limit curves such as that shown in Figure 2 7. This figure shows that as the unit stress is decreased, the number of cycles required for failure increases.
This increase in the number of cycles for the lower values of stress makes the endurance limit curve asymptotic to a horizontal line. Should a stress less than that of the horizontal asymptote be imposed on a specimen, the material would not fail regardless of the number of cycles to which it was subjected. This maximum unit stress which may be appued to a material through an indefinite number of cycles without failure is called its endurance limit1. Table 2-3 shows the endurance limits for o number of commonly used materials.
l l 3.3 % Carbon Steelliest Treated 80,000
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60,000 ,x OTT 0.37% Carbon Annealed 0.37% Carbon Steellfeat Treated -
STRESS 40,000 ,
(p,j)
^-
0,000 0.02% Carbon Steel Cold Rolled 0
0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000 NU.illlER OF CYCLES (X 100000) l Figure f 7: Endurance Limit Curses for Common Steels! ,
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. GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAI. BASES FOR NU3!AR'C INITIATIVES NUMARC 89 00 DRAFT July 21,1988 Table 2 3: Endurance Limits!'
Material Endurance 'Imit (psi) l Plain carbon steel 0.25% carbon, as rolled 26,000 0.50% carbon, normalized 33,000 0.75% carbon, annealed - 38,000 -
125% carbon, normalized 50,000 Alloy steels Nickel steel, not quenched 50,000 Nickel steel, quenched 65,000 Chrome nickel steel, not quenched 50,000 Chrome nickelsteel, quenched 68,000 Cast iron 11,000 Aluminum, rolled 10,500 Duratumin, rolled 18,000 Magnesium forgings 16,000 Brosue,95 5 annealed 23,000 Broiue, cold ro!!ed 22,500 Brass,70 30, cold rolled 17,500 Copper, annealed 10,000 ,
Copper, cold rolled 16,000
The following examples illustrate the concept of operating life reduction by thermally induced fatigue using Figure 8
2 7.
Etzmele 1 L
Assume that a throttle valve is needed to operate during a station blackout and that it's valve stem is made of 0.37% heat treated carbon steel. Also consider that approximately two feet of the valve stem is exposed to the ambient air which has increased in temperature by approximately 100 'F l over the course of the event. This examale assumes that the valve stem has reached thermal ,
equilibrium with the ambient. The additional stress imposed on the valve stem by this increase in temperature can be calculated by the formula:
1 c = c E a 4T 1
where -
o = The added stress due to the temperature change of the ambient I I
- e = The elongation of the valve stem due to the temperature change a = The ccefncient of!!near expansion of the valve stem material l l
, aT = The temperature change of the ambient E The modulus of elasticity of the valve stem material 4
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i GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR Nt:51 AkC INITIATIVES NU51 ARC 87 00.
DRAFT July 21,1988 i
Using typical values for steel from Reference 1, the above equation would yield:
(6.5E 6)(100 'F)(30E6) - 19,500 psi l t
By conservatively assuming this temperature fecrease for the remaining operaung life of the valve, the utefullife of the stem is expected to be reduced from 30,000,000 cycles to 300,000 (see Figure 2 6). A valve operating for a four hour station blackout would be required to perform substantially
, fewer than 300,000 cycles.
EtsmNe 2 Suppose a pump operating at 2,000 RPM uses a shaft constructed from heat treated 0.37% carbon steel. During a statien blackout, room semperatures are not expected to increase by more than 100' F. The actual temperature increase of the shaft itself during a four hour station blackout d expected to be lower than this. However, for the purposes of this example, the shaft will conservatively be assumed to remain in thermal equilibrium with the room temperature.
The additional stress imposed on the shaft due to operation at this higher temperature can be calculated from the following relationship:
c - t E a AT i where l c - ne added stress due to the ambient temperature change 3
! e - ne elongation of the pump shaft due to the temperature change !
a - De coefflelent oflinear expansion of the pump shaft material AT = The temperature change of the ambient E - The modulus of elasticity of the pump shaft material Using typical values for steel from Reference 1, the above equation yields:
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(6.5E 6)(100* F)(30E6)- 19.500 pal l By conservatively assuming this temperature incresso for the remaining operating life of the pump an increase in stress from 55,000 psi to 74,500 psi, Ge usefullife of the shaft is expected to bc 1
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GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES F08t NU3f ARC INITIATIVES NUM ARC 87 00 DRAFT July . 21, 1988 reduced by approximately 2,700,000 cycles (see Figure 2 6). This reduction corresponds to a life loss of approximately 22.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for a pump shaft operating at 2,000 RPM.
l Dominant arcu of concern in'a station blackout are not expected to experience an ambient temperature rise greater than 100' F. As discussed in Examples 1 and 2, this temperature rise corresponds to a reduction in Cie component's . _;
expected lifetime on the order of hours for components whose continuous operadng lifetime is on the order of years. l Therefore,it is reasonable to assume that fatigue induced failure of mechanical equipment is not a concern for station.
blackout erwitonments.
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GtflDELINES ' AND TECllNICAL BASES FOR NOI ARC ' INITIATIVES ND! ARC 87 00-DRAFT July 21,1988 2.2.3 Creep. Induced Failure A dominant cause of failure for mechanical equipment operating at elevated temperatures is creep. When some materials are stressed at elevated temperatures, they deform gradually, bu permanently. This phenomenon is generally referred to as creep, and may uldmately lead to excessive displacements or rupture as shown in Figure 2 8.
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Constant Creep i UNIT STRAIN
% i (pd) -
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,lastic Deformation j i ,
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Time t
Figure 2 8: Unit Strain vs. Timel ;
At ordinary design temperatures, failure or unsatisfactory performance is expected to occur beyond the ordinary life of the component: however, if the operating temperature during maximum stress conditions is increased, failure due to !
creep is hastened and premature failure may result. For this reason the maximum allowable stress is speciSed during ;
design in order to establish a rate of creep that will insure satisfactory performance at the desired operating !
temperature over the projected lifetime of the component. This stress is known as the creep timit. Reference i states
, that a generally accepted rule in the design of structural cc.mponents is to set the creep limit at a stress which will ;
) produce a total elongation of 1% per 100,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> (11 A years). Figure 2 9 shows the thermal effects of creep for l three commonly used types of steel. ;
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soo soo sooo uoo teoo Tem perature 'F Figure 2 9: Creep Limit vs. Temperaturel t
As is shown in Figure 2 9, creep is not a concern for most steels unless the ambient temperature is in excess of 700'F. ,
As shown in the discussion of fatigue (Section 2.2.2) 100' F is considered to be a conservative ambient temperature rise for a station bla:kout. Since the onset of creep failute does not commence until 700' F, this arnple margin l indicates that creep. induced failure of mechanical equipment is not a concern in station blackout environments.
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NU31 ARC 87 00 GUIDELINES AND TECilNICAL BASES FOR NU31 ARC INITIATIVES DRAFT July :), 1988 2.2.4 Winding Failure Winding failure is a dominant failure mechanism for motors operating at elevated temperatures. The failure of the windings is caused by the degradation of the winding insulation. Table 2 4 shows the relationship 'cetween the operating temperature of the winding insulation and its effective lifetime. Electrical insulating materials are commonly designed for a service life of 20.000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
Table 2 4: Winding Insulation Effective Lifetime vs. Operating Temperature Temperature Range (' C) Correspending to 20,000 Hour Failure 8 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 000 210 220 230 t o 109 119 129 139 149 159 169 179 159 199 209 219 229 239 Time (Days).
Exposure Temperature ('C) 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 49 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 100 200 210 220 230 240 250 23 130 14 0 150 160 170 ISO 190 200 210 220 230 240 250 260 14 140 150 160 170 15t0 190 200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 7 150 160 170 160 190 200 216 220 230 240 250 260 270 250 4
.A 170 130 190 200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280 290 2 170 180 i)0 200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 ".50 290 300 1 To illustrate the use of Table 2-4, consider an insulating material that is estimated to withstand a temperature of 115' C for 20,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />. Since this temperature falls between 110' C and 119' C, the second column of Table 2 4 applies. This insula:ing material is, therefore. expected to survive exposure temperatures of 180' C for 1 day,170* C for 2 days,160' C for 4 days, etc. As can be seen from Table 2 3, winding insulating materials designed for a 20,000 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> lifetimes should easily outlast a four hour station blackout with temperatures of 170' C (338' F).
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GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR NU51 ARC' INITIATIVES NUh! AP.C 87 00 DRA T Ju ; 21. 1988 2.2.5 Ses! Failure Seals used in valves. pumps, an$ turbines are designed to prevent or minimize leakage of the process Guid through openings in the casing. The two most common types of seals used in station blackout equipment are packing and gaskets. ;
l Packing This type of seat may be used in light. and medium duty services used to prevent or control leakage 1
along the shr,t.
The pxking material, placed into the stuf6ng box. through the packing gland, forms a ring around the shaft. The pressure of the packing on the shaft can be controlled through the stuf6ng box as show in Figure 210.
1.
ac h s Gland ;;;;;;;;;*;;;;;;;;;;;s; Stufnng Box s
l'2'l'2',2'2'2'2'2'2's'!'2'2'2'2'2',2'2'!'2' MS,WEEE<E4 ' ; ,< 'p Shaft Sleeve N
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Packing 9
( h%'(ns ,
Shaft
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Figure 210: Packing Arrangementl8 J ,
Packing materials are designed for a wide range of operating temperatures. Table 2 5 lists the common packing materials and the maximum temperatures of the process Guld. From this table, common packing materials are expected to withstand product temperatures as high as 450' F.
1 Table 2 5: Common Packing Staterials18 i
Packing 5faterial Pressure (psig) hf aximum Product Temperature (* F)
Plastic 100 600 Asbestos, grease or oil. Impregnated 100 750
- Asbestos, grease or oil. impregnated 250 500 Asbestos, TFE. impregnated 250 500 Lad 250 450 Aluminum or Copper 250 750 TFE Filament 250 $00 Aramid Filament 250 500 GraphiteCarbon Filament 250 750 Gr.tfoil 250 750 i
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GUIDELINES AND TECilNICAL DASES FOR SUNIARC INITIATIVES NUNI ARC 87 00 '
DRAFT July 21,1988 Gaskets Gasket seals can be used in places where packing seals would not conform to the required high tolerances.
These seals prevent leakage from around the shaft and the housing by means of a ring gasket or an O ring arrangement.
O rings are commonly used as secondary seal mechanisms on mechanical seals aroun; the shafts of valves. pumps, and turbines. A w :, range of operating temperatures of O ring mate:ials is presented in Table 2 6.
l Table 2 6: 0. Ring Operating Temperature Ranges 18 i Staterial 5finimum Temperature (' F) 5f aximum Temperature (* F)
Nitrile 75 200 Ethylene Propylene 50 300 Fluoroelastomer 15 400 Flurocarbon Resin 350 $00 Perfluoroclastomer 15 450 Chloroprene 25 250 I
d From this table,0 ring gasket seals are expected to withstand temperatures of at least 200' F.
Ring gaskets are used for sealing the joint where the pump or turbine upper and lot sasings are bolted together.
The most common ring gasket material is compressed asbestos cloth. Reference 2 states that the maximum operating temperature for this gasket type is 750' F. '
On this basis, seals are expected to operate continuously in ambient temperatures at least as high as 200' F. ;
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' NU3tARC 87 00 GUIDELINES AND TECilNICAL BASES FOR NUh! ARC INITIATIVES DRAFT July 21, ~ 1988 I
2.3 EXPERIENCE WITil SIECllANICAL EQUIPS 1ENT This section summarizes the available experience with motors and motor operated valve actuators at elevated temperatures.
2.3.1 Slotor Experience Insulation is used in a motor to electrically insulate the windings from mechanical parts of the motor u well as to insulate the spaces between the turns of the coil winding. Also considered to be insulation are those materials used to ,
j secure the windings and to make them rigid and impervious to ambient conditions.
i Dere are four basic classes ofinsulating materials currently recognized by the moet industry. Each differs according ,
to its physical properties and can withstand a certain maximum operating temperature (frequently termed total l
! temperature, or hot spot temperature) and provide a practical and useful insulation life. The insulation classes and their maximum operating temperatures arc9 ,10: ,
INSULATION CLASS '
RATED TE51PERATURE OF INSf1LATING SYSTE51 CLASS A 90' C CLASS B 130' C . ;
CLASSF 155' C CLASS H 180' C The thermal ratings for the insulating material in motor windings is assigned on the basis of a series of accelerated aging testsil.12, in these tests the insulating system is expo ed to temperatures significantly higher than those i experienced during normaj operation. Figure 211 shows actual tested time. temperature ife for various insulation
) classes. The shaded area represents the range of experimental results obtained for the insulation classes. This figure demonstrates that even the most limiting insulation classes should be expected to function at ambient temperatures
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6 above 180' C for the limited duration of i four hour station blackout.
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Figure 211: Range of Thermal Limit Curves for Tested Systems!'8 l
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' NUM ARC 87 00 GUIDr. LINES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR N131 ARC INITIATIVES DRAFT July 21,1988 '
2.3.2 Motor Operated Valve Actuator Experience Motor operated valve actuators manufactured by Limitorque and Rotork have been exttnsively tested and analyzed for environmental qualineation to 10 CFR 150.49 and related NRC staff guidance documents (e.g. DOR Guidelines and NUREG 0588). These efforu have demonstrat+
- actu. tor performance under in containment LOCA temperature,
! pressure, radiation, and steam conditions and have addressed the effects of thermal and mechanical aging during l normal service.
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While these actuators were specifically modified to tolerate these conditions, other qualification tests have been
$ performed on standard commercial actuators ur1er less severe pipa break conditions. For example, Limitorque in its i r
qualification test B0003 successfully tested a standard AC actuator with a Class B motor for 16 esys in an environment of 200* F 250' F steam 21. Similarly,in test B0009 a standard DC actuator with a Class H motor was successfully tested fer 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> in an environment of 212' F - 340' F : team 22. Limitorque product literature states that the maximum continuous operating temperature for their SMB and SMC units is 150' F24,25. In recent correspondence Limitorque indicated that standard commercial units have historically been supplied for applications j where temperatures approach 250' F for limited durations 23 j
j Rotork states a maximum continuous operating temperature of 160' F in their product literature 26. Rotork testing of standard units has demonstrated acceptable long term performance with temperatures is high as 180* F15. With modification to torque switch material the tecting demonstrated acceptable performance of the commercial actuator at 212'F steam condidons for 200 hour0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br />sl 3
{ Based on the stated maximum operating temperature in commercial product descriptions with due consMaration to available prcduct margin as demonstrated in qualification tests and vendor correspondence, motor operated valve ;
actuators are considered generically operable during the four hour temperature environments encountered in the :
I dominant areas of concern during station blackout events. The fo!!owing conse vative temperature catesones are z l
- ate.blished for the operability of actuatort /or at least four houru !
All Limitorque actuators 200* F Standard Rotork rtuators 180'F [
] R otork actuator with material change 200*F i l
1, 1 1
J J
27 1
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Gt IDELINES AND TECHNICAL !!ASES FOR NDIARC INITIATIVES NDIARC 89 00
! DRAFT July 21,1988
2.4 REFERENCES
i (1) Olsen. G.A Elements of Afechanics of Afaterials. Prentice. Hall. Englewood Cliffs. NJ,1974. ;
, (2) Baumeister. Avallone. Baumeister, Afarks' Standard Handbookfor Mechanical Engineers. Elghth Edition. 7
) hicGraw Hill. New York. NY 1978. !
i k (3) Nuclear Safety Criteriafor the Design of Stationary Boiling \\'ater Reactor Plane. ANSIIANS.STD 52.1 o
I
- 1983. American Nuclear Society. La Grange Park, IL.1983.
(4) Nuclear Stery Criteriafor the Design of Stationary Pressurised \\'ater Reactor Plants. ANSl;ANS.STD.
52.21983. American Nuclear Society. La Grange Park. IL.1983. !
J l (5) Boner. CJ Afodern Lubricating Greases, Scientific Publications, Broseley, England.1976. l 1 ;
i !
1 (6) Wilcock. D.F., Booser E.R Bearing Design and Application. hicGraw. Hill. New York. NY,1957.
4 i
j ,
(7) Fuqua. N.B Reliability Engineeringfor Electronic Design, htatcel Dekker, Inc.. Sew Yoth. NY,1987.
- 5 1 (8) IEEE Std 931984. IEEE Standard for the Preparation of Test Procedures for the Thermal Evaluation of I j Solid Elec ical Insulating hiattrials. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc New York, NY, 1984. l t
l l (9) Afotors ad Generators. ANS!SEhtA.STD.htG 1. American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park. IL. l t
1 3
1 (10) Safety Sta.ndardfor Construction and Guide for Selection installation, and Use of Electric Motors, l t
! ANSI /NEhtA.STD.htG.2. American Nuclear Society La Grange Park. IL. l j (11) IEEE Guide for the Statistical Ana!> sis of Thermal Life Test Data,1EEE Standard 101 1972, Institute of j j Electrical and Electronics Engineers. New York. NY,1972. !
i
~
l (12) IEEE Sran.brd Test Procedurefor Evaluonn of Systens cfinsulating Materialsfrom Random. wound AC l l
Electric Machinery. !EEE Standard 117 .',974. Institute cf Electrical and Ele::enics Engineers. New Yerk.
l j NY,1974 4
4 5
3 4
l
, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - ' ' ~ ~ ~ ~ - - " " ~ ~ ~ " " - " ~ ~ "
.i
~.
GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES I'OR NOIARC INIf.ATIVES NU3f ARC 87 00 l' l DRAFT July 21,1988 i.
(13) "A" Range High Steam Test Rotork Technical Report *TR3025, Rotork Corporation. Roche:ter. NY. ,
i l
(14) Commercial. Grade Afotors in Safety Related Applications EPRI NP 4917, Electric Power Rese:.rch
! Institute, Pajo Alto, CA.
! t 1
1 (15) Rotork Le:ter to STAR, Inc. Re: Rotork Electric Actuator Operating Temperature kange, June 22,1988. ,
i i i r
(16) Wills f.G Lubrication rundamentais,51arcel Dekker New York. NY,1980.
l W ,
Unfired Pressure Vessels Code Section VI!! ash!E, American Society of hiechanical Engineers.
f (17) i (18) Karassik. IJ.. Krutzsch, W.C., Fraser, W.H. 51essina. J.P., Pump Handbook. SicGraw Hill. New York, NY,1986.
}
i l l (19) Ashky, J., Engincertng bfaterials. An intreduction o Their Properties and Applications. Pergamon Press i j Oxford. England,1980.
l (20) O'Connor. Boyd. Avallone, Standard Handbook ofLubrication Engineering. htcQtaw Hill New York, NY, 1968. !
i i 1 (21) Qualification Test Report for Limitorque Valve Actuators for Class IE Service Outside Primary
}
Containmem Limitorque test report B0003, Limitorque Corporation, Lynchburg, VA.1976. l t
i
- (22) Qualification Tes
- Reportfor Lim!:oraue DC Valve Actuators Nuclear Poner Station Service Conditions, ;
} Limitorque ist report B0009, Limitorque Corporation, Lynchburg, VA,1976.
l l l
GJ) Limitorque Letter tr., STAR, Inc. Re: Limitorque Electric Actuator Operating Temperature Range, !
t j Limitorque Corporat en, Lynchburg, VA, hfay 31,1988.
j l i
i I
(24) Limitorque 'lspe SA!B Instruction and Ataintenance bfanual. Limitorque Corpotation, Bulletin ShlBI 82C, l
Lynchbu*g, VA. l, j (25) Limitorg. 53fC Series Afuni turn Actuators. Limiterque Corporation. Bu!!etin 11010000. Lynchburg, j VA.
i I
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_ . _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ ~.,_._. --.__._ - .
o GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL D ASES FOR NU.\1 ARC INITI ATIVES NU51 ARC 87 00 DRAFT July 21,1938 (26) "A" Range Double-Sealed Electric l'alve Actuators. Rotork Publication AEltl, Rotork Corporation.
Rochester. .NT. .
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NU51 ARC 87 00
. GUIDELINES AND TECl!NICAL BASES FOR NU51 ARC INITIATIVES July 21,1988 DRAFT 3.0 ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT Station Blackout ONrability Temnraturev Cables 185' F Switches and Relays 185' F Sensors and Electronic Transmitters 180' F Electroni: Turbine Governors 160*F Duranon: Four Hours This section discusses the operability of electri al and electronic equipment in station blackout environments. Ea:h equipment category is discussed individually.These discussions define the scope cf the category, briefly describe the operation of the components covered in the category, and mtroduce the most likely thermally induced failure mechanisms. The most limiting operability temperature (or these failure mechanisms is selected as the station bla:kout operability temperature. The following equipment categories are discussei (a) Control and Inseumentation Cables. (b) Switches and Relays. (c) Sensors and Electronic Transmitters, (d) Electronic Turbine Govemors.
Since many electri:al and electronic equipment are susceptible to the same general thermally indu:ed fallare mechanisms, these me:hanisms are discussed individually in Section 3.2. Each potential failure mechanism is evaluated so that its most limiting operability temperature can be determined. These limiting temperatures are referenced in the equipment category evaluations. The following failure mechanisms are evaluated: (a) material failure,(b) thermally indu:ed decrease in reliability, and (c) degradation of the insulating material.
A variety of tests and experiments have been performed to investigate the cperability of equipment at elevated temperatures. In addition, there has been a number of documented cperational events in which station bla:kout equipment have been exposed to elevated temperatures fer short durations. This exp:rience may be used to establish operability during a station bla:kout. A summary of the existing experience with switches and electronic ransmitters is in:!uded in Section 3.3. The station blackout operability temperatures suggested in these summaries att referenced in the equipment category evaluation;.
31
NU31 ARC 89 00 GUIDELINES AND TECilNICAL DASES FOR NUS1 ARC INITIATIVES DRAFT J ul.t 21. 1984 3.1 EQUIP 5f ENT EVALUATIONS
^
3.1.1 Control and Instrumentation Cables Category Description This category includes all wires and cables used inside, and interfacing with, station blackout equipment except pow et cables. Power cables. rated 600V and above, are not evaluated because they are not energized during station bls:kout conditions.
Operation Cables t>yically refer to single and multi. conductor jacketed wires installed in cable trays, duct banks, and conduits. Cables are used to electrically mterconnect a variety of devices and are typically manufactured to the requirements of the insulated C~ble Engineers Association (ICEA). Wires typically refer to the single and multi-conductor non. jacketed wires installed inside electrical and electronic equipment and cabincu. Wires are t>Ti cally manufactured to the requirements of Underwriters Laboratory (UL) and Canadian Standards Association (C$A) requirements. These organizations assign wires and cables specific thermal ratings (e.g.,60* C 75' C. and 90' C) based on the type of the insulation material utilized and the results of specific tests The thermal ratings define the maximum allowable continuous conductor temperature based on an assumed ambient temperature and a heat rise due to the maximum allowable current rating.
Failure Mechanism The limiting thermally. induced failure mode of cables is caused by degradation of thd insulation resistance. The limiting four hour operability temperature for this failure mechanism as determined in Section 3.2 is:
Insulation Degradation 185' F Experience indicates that cables and wires installed in nuclear power plants may operate for maximum temperatures of at least 185' F for at least four hours (see Section 3.3.3). Thus, reascnab!: assurance of operability for control and instrumentation cables are generically established at temperatures up to 185' F for at least four hours, u
GUIDELINES AND TECIINICAL DASES FOR NU51 ARC INITIATIVES NU5f ARC 87 00 DRAFT J ul,t 21, 1988 3.1.2 Switches and Relays Category Description This category in !udes all controi artli.eCatir; ,%itehts and relays necessary to mitigate a station blackout.
Operation In a stat:en black su: event swii hes and rely, J 1- necess.vy to perham a wid+ ,a!iety ef fan:tions such as to provide interlxts between fluid system components. 'h.. i Sc *t i. and process indication. De functions of switches and their associated relays that are evaluated can be sumtnarized ir the fotbwing subt*;ories:
Limit switches
- Pressure switches Level switches
- Temp:rature swi:ches Switches ne a:tuated by a mechanical action such as the pressure change in a line or the modon of a traveling valve stem. nis action causes contacts of a switch to either open or close an electrical circuit thereby energizing or de-energizing its associated relay.
Failure Mechanism De most limiting thermally induced failure mechanism in switches and relays arises from degradation of the insulating resistance. The limiting four hour operability temperature'for this failure mode as determined in Section 3.2 is:
Insulation Degradation 185' F Esperience indicates that cables and wires installed in nuclear ;ow er plants may operate in rooms with temperatures of at least 185* r for at least four hours. Reasonable assurance of operability of switches and relays is therefore genen: ally established at temperatures up to 185' F for at least four hours.
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GL'IDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR NOlARC INITIATIVES NDIARC 87 oo DRAFT July 21,198s 3,1,3 Sensors and Electronic Transmitters Category Description This category of components includes all instrumentation sensors and electronic transmitters producing 4 20 mA or 10-50 mA output signils neceJsary to cope with a station blackout event. This s
j category does not include devices measunng analytical variables such c', conductivity, pH, and other electro chemical parameters.
Operation Semors are used to detect process variables such as level Dow temperature, and radiation. Transmitters :
l take the mechanical or electrical output from the sensor, convert it to an electrical signal, and send it to an instrumenution console for analysis. During a station blackout incident, the process variables that may need to be monitored are: (a) the steam generator, reactor vessel, and condensate storage tank les els, (b) the HPC1HPCS, RCIC, i
j and AFW pump now s,(c) the cold leg, hot leg and lubricating oil temperatures, and (d) radiation levels. The following 3
types of sensors and their corresponding transmitters will be discussed individually below: (a) level sensors,(b) How 1 sensors. (c) tempera:ure sensors, and (d) radiation monitors.
1 i
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Level Sensor Operation Fluid levels in the reactor vessel, condensate storage tank, and steam generator can be [
l monitored by a variety of methods, including pressure differences and buoyancy devices. The pressure method 1
] involves determining the pressure difference caused by the height of a Guid column in order to determine the fluid
, level in the tank (see Figure 31). The buoyancy approach uses a sensor Coa'ing on the changing Guid level as shown in Figure 3 2. As the sensor is raised and lowered, its m,rchanical motion is transferred to a transmitter, which converu the movement into an electrical output.
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Flow Sensor Operation HPCI/HPCS, RCIC, and AFW pump nows are determined by a direct now l measurement. In this approach the pressure difference caused by the Guld velocity chinge across an orifice is f
l measured to determitie Guld now as shown in Figure 3 3.
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NUhl ARC 87 00
. GUIDELINES AND TECllNICAL BASES FOR NU31 ARC INITIATIVES July 21.1988 DRAFT t
Temperature Sensor Operation Temperature may be rnonitored by gas thermometers. vapor bulb '
I thermometers, bimetallic elements thermocouples, and thermistors. In each case the sensor is protected from the j l
environment by the process fluid itself. The ambient tempe'rature rise in a station blackout event is not expec:ed to be severe enough to significantly affect the normal operating temperatures of these sensors.
i h
Radiation Monitor Operation The only radiation monitors in dominant areas of concern in a station blackout 1
i are those locaud in the main steam tunnel of BWRs.These sensors are designed for the conditions resulting from a ,
j j break in the main steam line. Since the ambient temperatures associated with a station blackout are not expected to ,
be nearly as severe as those arising from a main steam line break, the operability of radiation monitors during a l
station blackout are not expected to be a concern.
f 4 !
Failure Mechanisms The most thermally sensitive part of a sensor is the sensing element itself. The limiting l
l thermally induced failure mode results from creep induced failure of the sensing element. Creep has been analyaed in I
Section 2.2.3 and has been determined not to be a concem in station blackout environments. Since these materials are normally metallic, the transmitter is the limiting component.
i The major temperature sensitive components of elec+ronic transmitters are the electronic circuit components. The
] I most likely thermally induced failure mechanisms result from a decrease in the reliabi!!ty ,
of the electronic circuit components. Experience with electronic transmitters, as discussed in Section 3.3. Indicate these devices operate reliably at tempera:ures as high as 180* F for at least four hours.
! Since sensors require transmitte s to perform their intended function. reasonable assurance of operability for sensors l and electronic transmitters is established for temperatures up to 180' F for at leut four hours.
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. GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL' DASES FOR NU31 ARC INITIATIVES NU31 ARC 87 00 I DRAFT July 21,1988 .
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3.1.4 Electronic Turbine Governors ,.
Category Description This category meludes all components of electronic govemors. including their electronic speed sensing mechanir.n. l l
Failure Mechanisms The most limiting thermally induced failure mechanisms in electronic govemors are
]
- shown in the table below
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l'able 31: Turbine Governor Failure Modes 11 j !
Part Failure Mode Approximate ". j Capacitors Open circuit 15 65 j Short circuit 30 70 j- Other 5 15 j a Relan electro-mechanich Contact frJures 75 l Open coils 5 i
) Other 20 l t
! Resisters Oren circuits 80 !
j Other 20 I i t The most limiting temperature sensitive sub components used in electronic govemors are their electrical circuit sub.
l I components. These electrical sub components generally fait due to a breakdown of their insulating materials. The j maximum operability temperature may increfore be estimated from the continuous temperature rating of insulating 4
f materials used in these sub components. Table 3 3 indicates that the lowest rated insulating materials are designed for !
4 I
continuous operating temperatures of 110* F. However, an estimate of the thermal effects on the reliability of l
electrical components based on the Arrhenius reaction rate model concludes that electrical components designed for j continuous operation at 104' F can be expec.ed to operate at 160' F for at least the full four hour destion of a j station blackout. This evaluation is discussed in Section 3.2.1.
Reasonable assurance of operability t)f electronic turbine governors is, therefore, generically established for 1 t
] temperatures up to 160' F for at least four hours, i
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. GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR NUNIARC INITIATIVES NUh1 ARC 37 00 DRAFT July 21,1988 3.2 EQUIPS 1ENT FAILURE 510DE EVALUATIONS This section describes the temperature. sensitive components of electrical and electronic equipment and their associated failure modes. A station blackout operability temperature is then determined for each failure mode.
3.2.1 Thermally. Induced Rellability Decrease The majority of thermally induced fauvre mechanisms involving electrical and electronic components involve a number or phys 8 cal and chemical process, nese processes are strongly temperature dependent. A considerable amount of effort has been expended in an attempt to correlate the reliability of electrical components with their ll*
operating temperature. The most widely accepted of these correlations is the Arrhenius reaction rate model 1 A20.22.23,30. His reliabuity model predicts an exponential increase in the rate of a given reaction with temperature and is described by the equation:
1- A exp [.Ea O/T ifr o)ik) where:
A - Temperature related failure rate A = A normallaing rate constant Ea - Activation energy (eV)(a unique constant for each specific chemical reaction or fauure mechanism) k - Boltzman's constant - 8.63 X 10-3e V/K T - Ambient temperature in degrees Kelvin (K)
To - Reference temperature (K)(used for normalization to the given temperature)
Figure 3-4 Ulustrates the sensitivity of reliability to temperature as predicted by the Anhenius equation. As can be seen from Figure 3-8, the thermauy. induced increase in the failure ra,e is a strong function of the activation energy.
Thus, by selecting a conservative activation energy it is possible to estab!!sh an upper bound for se decrease in the reliability of electrical and electronic sub. components eaposed to moderate temptatures. Using an activation energy of 0.9 eV in the Arrhenius equation, a temgrsture increase from 40' C (104' F) to 71.1l' C (160' F) wG result in a decrease in reliabillry by a factor of 20. Thus, if the mean time between failures (51TBF) for a component is only one year (8760 hours0.101 days <br />2.433 hours <br />0.0145 weeks <br />0.00333 months <br />) when cperating at 104' F, at 160' F the 51TBF will be reduced to 438 hours0.00507 days <br />0.122 hours <br />7.242063e-4 weeks <br />1.66659e-4 months <br />. Since this number is still considerably higher than four hours, it can be concluded that electrical components designed for continuous operation at 104' F can be expected to operate at 160' F for the full four hour duration of a station blackout.
31
a GUIDELINES AND TECllNICAL BASES FOR NU5tARC INITIATIVES NU5! ARC 87 00 DRAFT Jul) 21. 1988
. 100 i :
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Ea - 0.900 eV
, Ea = 0.400 eV
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t s *3 0 50 100 150 200 250 l Temperature. ('C) i Figure 3 4: Sensitivity of Reliability to Temperature as Predicted by Arrhenius Modell!
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s NDI ARC 87 00 GllIDELINES AND TECHNICAL DASES FOR NDIARC INITIATIVES July 21.1988 DRAFT i
3.2.2 Insulation Degradation The accura:y of cernin instrumentation can be affected b'y thermally induced decreases in their cable insulation resistance (IR). ne bdk insulation resistance of the cable's insulating materials can be cal:ulated from t.te fellowing equation 30: '
I i
- R - A e BT r
I wheret R = Insulation resistance (IR) ,
3
- T - Absolute temperature i
A - Consunt bas ed en insulating material and geometry B Constant based on insulating material r I
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Environmental Qualiti:aden of Cables has demonstrated that temperatures in excess of 300' F can potendavy reduce f l
the insulation resisun:4 (IR) of censin cable types to values w hi:h may affect instrumentadon accuracy. Figure 3 5.
I extra:ted from a $anf.ia report'. indicates that circuit insuladen resistance values must d: crease to values a ell below j $00 kohms to have any signifl: ant effect on instrument loop accuracies. For typicat instrumentaden systems needed for ccping with a sa:fon bla:kout, cable insuladon resistance values are expected to remain wellin ex:4ss of 1000 kohms for continue s temperatures below 185' F10.
l 200 , .
4 : vat.UE OF RT s :
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-- 500 konms -
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] Terminal Block Insulation Gesistance9 l
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GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR NU31 ARC INITIATIVES NUhlARC 37 00 Jult 21, 1988
> DRAFT i
3.3 EXPERIENCE WITil ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPSfENT
~
i This section summarises the available experience with three electrical and electronic equipment categories operating j at elevated temperatures: (a) switches, (b) electronic transtrutters, and (c) cables and wires.
, t i
3.3.1 Switches Experience j l
Virtually all pow er plant limit switches att manufactured by Microswitch or Namco. A review of available catalog
]
! datal$,16 ndicates i that a broad variety of mechanically operated ll nit switches are available. Namco rates its
! standard limit switches (EA040 / 060 / 080. EA150, EA170, EA$10. EA$20, v d EA700) for contir.uous operation
[ at 90' C (194' F). With material changes, switches can be rated for opeation in temperatures up to 1$0* C. Namco ,
i has developed special nuclear LOCA qualified switches with short temperature exposure ratings of 17$' C (347' j F)l7. The nuclear qualified product lines are very similar to the commercial lines, howeser, they utilize materials t
] with higher radiation and thermal stability limitsl8,19, l 1
i j Microswitch supplies a broad variety of limit switches for utility, industrial, and commercial uses. The continuous I
j operating temperature limit for the heavy duty industriallimit switches is 250' F,16 ,
l Table 3 2 is a list of switches and their operaung t:mperatures as specified for general use in various Military j Specificrtions (Mil. Spec). These temperatures reflect the combination of materials and sub components needed for i switch operation-l
! [
1 Table 3 2 Operating Temperatures of Common Switches from Milliary Specifications ;
t l '
J Military Specification Component Operating Temperature j i
j MIL S 880$/llt Unsealed trigger switch 85' C (1858 F) !
i MIL S 880$$4 Unseated switch, SPDT 125' C (257' F) .
l I MIL S 9395/43A Pressure switch 135' C (275' F)
MIL S 8803/48E Switch, self retum 8$' C (185* F) !
]
. MIL S 880$/49E Switch, rotary linkage 85'C (18$'F) +
1 i
j Based on this expt;ence, switches are espected to remain operable at room temperatures of at leut 185' F for at leut l four hours, i
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' NUM ARC 'ANC9 GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR NU31 ARC INITIATIVES July 21, ;.8 DRAFT J
3.3.2 Electronic Transmitter Experience t 1
A number of manufacturers provide electronic transmitters used in power production facilities. These include j
~
j Foxboro, ITT Barton, Rosemount, Bailey Instruments. OE. and Westinghouse (Veritrak), whose nuclear grade
! Instruments are generally derivati ves of the manufacturer's standard commercial product lines. Devices in the commerciallines are also utilized in certain plant applications. Because these commercial devices are designed to be l compatible with the environments in industrial, petrochemical, pulp and paper, and pharmaceutical facilities.
transmitters are ;apable of sustained operation at relatively high temperatures. A review of the standard product .
l literature provided by various manufacturers indicates that virtually all devices are rated for continuous operation at maximum temperatures of at least 180' O*29 ,
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. GllIDELINES AND TECHNICAL DASES FOR ND! ARC INITIATIVES July 21,1988 l CRAFT I
3.3.3 Cables and Wires Experience Instrumentation and control cables csperience negligible heat rise due to their low current loads. Consequently, these l
cables are expected to essendally remain at ambient temperature throughout the station blackout transient. Table 3 2 lists the maximum continucus operating temperatures of the common materials used for insulauon. The majority of cables and wires used in nuclear power plants are rated for continuous operation up to 90' C (194' F); how ever, the Icwest UL rating for wires and cables is 60' C (140' F)(principa!!y due to the lowest grades of PVC insulation 2 3). ,
Table 3 3: Sfaximum Operating Temperatures of Common Conductors 21 ,
Type Insulation Operating Temperature RUW Moisture resistant latex rubber 60' C (140' F)
T Thermoplastic 60' C (140* F) i I TW Moisture resistant thermoplastic 60' C (140* F) !
TF Thermoplastic covered. solid or 7 strand 60' C (140' F) :
TFF Thermoplastic < overed, flex stranding 60' C (140' F) l RH Heat resistant rubber 75' C (167' F) .
RHW Moisture and heat resistant rubber 75' C (167' F) !
RUH Heat.esistantlatex rubber 7S' C (167' F) i THW Moisture and heat resistant thermoplastic 75' C (167' F)
XHHW Moisture and heat resistant cross linked polymer 75' C (167' F) ;
MI Mineralinsulated(metal sheathed) 8'5' C (185' F) l RHH Heat resistant rubber 90* C (194* F) !
THhN. Heat resistant thermoplastic N' C (194' F)
SA Silicon asbestos 90' C C94' F)
FEP.FEPB Fluorinated ethylene propylene 200* C (390* F) l PF,PCF Fluorinated ethylene propylene 200* C (390* F) l SF 2 Silleone tubber 200' C (390' F) l TFE Extruded polytetrafluoroethylene 250' C (480' F) !
PTF c.atruded polytetrafluoroethylene solid or 7 strand 250' C (480' F) i i
All wires and cables are capab!c of shott term operation at temperatures above their continuous rating despite marked {
decreases in physi:al strength at.d insulation resistance. The UL, ICEA, and CSA standards require such thermal ,
aging, heat shock and heat deformation tests for all wires and cables!*8. The testing fa the lowest rated l I thermoplastic wires and cables requires no insulation era:ks to occur for wire :xposures to 121' C (250' F) for one ;
hour. De CSA standard Ifor 75' C (167* F) rated wires requires a heat resistance test at 131' C for 14 days. ne l ICEA standard requires for 90' C (194* F) EPR insulated cable hot creep testing at 150' C (302' F) and thermal aging testing at 121' C C50' F) for 163 hours0.00189 days <br />0.0453 hours <br />2.695106e-4 weeks <br />6.20215e-5 months <br />.
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s GUIDELINES AND TECl!NICAL DASES FOR NUS1 ARC INITIATIVES NUS1 ARC 8740 DRAFT Jut) 21, 1988 These standards demonstrate the short term capability of cables and wires of operadng 25' C (45' F) above theia thermal rating. Integradon of this thermal margin into the lowest rated insuladng material allows reasonable assurance of operability for all cables and wires for maximum tcmperatures of at least 85' C (185' F) for at least four hours.
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.. . GUIDELINES AND TECilNICAL DASES FOR NU'.lARC INITIATIVES NUM ARC 87 00 DRAFT July 21,1983
3.4 REFERENCES
(1) Equipment \Pires.CSA Standard C22.2 No.1271981. Canadian Standards Association 1981.
(2) flexible Cord and rhture \Vire, UL 62, Underwriters Laboratory.
(3) Thermeplasac Insula:ed \Pires and Canes. UL 83. Underwriters Laboratory.
(4) R.rference St.mdardfor Electrical \ Vires. Cables, and Flexible Cords. UL l581, Undersriters Laboratory.
(5) Rubber Insulated \Vire and Cablefor the Transmission and Distribution of Electrical Energy, ICEA S 19 81SEhiA WC 31950, National Electncal hianufacturers Association,1980.
(6) Thermoplastic. insulated \Vire and Cablefor the Transmission and Distribution of Electrical Er.ergy,1CEA S61-402SEhtA WC 51973, National Electrical bianufacturers Association,1973.
(7) Cross linLed thermosetting polyethylene insulated \Vire and Cablefor the Transmission and Distribution of Electrical Energy. ICEA S 66 524/NEh!A WC 71982. National Electrical bianufacturers Association, i
1982. .
(8) Ethylene propylev - . r. insulated Wire and Cable for the Transmission and Distribution of Electrical l
, Energy. ICEA S 68 516/NEhlA WC S 1976, National Electrical blanufacturess Association,1976.
1 l
(9) An Assessment of Terminal Blocks in the Nuclear Power Industry, NUREG:CR 3691, September,1984 (10) latulation Resistance vs. Temperature cf FirewallillInsulation During LOCA Conditions, Rockkestos I Report sTR65000.
(11) Fuqu a. N.B., Reliability Engineeringfer Electronic Design, ht arcel Dekker, Inc., New York, NY,1957, 1 .
(12) Review of Equipment Aging. Theory, and Technology, Appendit C, EPR! NP 1558. Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, September,1950.
(l3) Dummer. G.W A.- and Crif.1n N. B., Electronics Reliability Calcula:icn and Design, Pergamon Press, Oxford Ergl. .4.
I 43
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,, , GlllDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR NtStARC INITIATIVES NIStARC 87 00 l DRAFT July 21,1988 f 1
t 1
i i (14) Kraus, A.D.. Bat. Cohen, A., Thermal Analysis and Control of Electronic Equipment.bicGraw Hill Book {
Company, New York, NY,1983.
(15) 51arian, R., Na.nco Sensor Selector, Natnco Controls, bientor OH, hiarch,1988.
1 Spec &r's Guidefor Limit & Enclosed switches Crtalog 401ssue 8, hticroswitch, i
} (16) l 4
t 4
(11) btarian. R.,Catalogsfor Namco EA170 3021602 EAJSO.3021602.EA 740, and EA730 series lirit l-f
! switches, Namco Controls, Mentor, OH, blarch,1958, 1 i
(
< (18) htarian. R.Jiistorical Ataterial comparisonfor D2400.LAlio. EAl70 302 and EA!SO Series. Namco 1
Controls, bientor, OH, 51 arc h,1988.
]
i j (19) hiarian, R., Historica: Material comparisonfor SL3, EA700, LA 730 and EA740 Series, Namco Controls, bientor, OH, htarch,1988. ;
i (20) Reliability Prediction ofElectronic Equipment, hill.HDBK.211E. United States Derattment of Detense, ,
i j October,1986. j i i (21) Baumeister, Avallone, Baumeister, Mar &*s Standard Handbookfor Mechanical Engineers, Eighth Edition, hicGraw Hill, New York, NY,1978. .
t i
(22) Anenault 1.E., Roberts, J.A.. Reliability and Maintainability of Electronic Systems. Computer Sctence (
J
! Press, h!aryland,1980. .
! G3) Ar:denon, R.T., Reliability Design Handbook. Reliability Analysis Center, United States Deparunent of l I Defenee, ITT Research Institute, Chicago, IL, h1areh,1976. !
i, l,
{ (24) lastrumentation Catalog The Fotbom Company, Foxboro, htA, January,1938. l i
1 (25) Product Data Sheetsfor Electronic Transmitters. Rosemount. Santa Clara. CA.
I !
j !
j C6) Prodact Bul!<tinsfor Electronic Transmitters, ITT B as ton, City of Industry, CA. July,19!8. [
] l i :
I l 46 t
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e ' GUIDE 1.!NES AND TECilNICAL DASES FOR NDIARC INITIATIVES NO! ARC 87 00 DRAFT Jul.i 21, 1988 (2)) Data Sheetsfor GEMAC 331, $32. !33. 334. and $$$ Series Transmitters (Bulletins 80JJA. 6041. 8034
- 2. and 6GJ2AJ, General Elecuic Insnmentation Def attment.
(28) Descriptb e Bulletinsfor Veritrak $2. !6. and $ 7 Series Transmitters tBulletins 101 103,101 103.101
))O.101 1220.101 130,101 140.101 170.101 180. and 101 190), Wesunghouse Cornputet and Inswmenta: ion Division.
(29) Product Specylcationsfor Bailey BC and BQ Series Transmitters (Spectl1 cations E21.:S-S. E212618 and E21 181), Bailey Controls.
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- GUIDELINES AND TECl!NICAL CASES FOR NOlARC INITIAT!YES July 21.1988 DRAFT 4.0 MATERIALS Due to the relatively mild temperatures anticipated during a station blackout, the vast majority of matenals used in nuclear grade equipment and components are not expected to be adversely affected. In general, the most temperature sensidve materials used in these components are either plastics or lubricants. This section describes maximum acceptable operati ng temperatures for plastics and lubricants which may be encounteredin station b!a kout equipment and components.
This section is intended to support Section FA of N1; MARC 57 00 Appendix F by facilitating the iden Scation cf temperature. sensitive materials in equipment located in the dominant area of concern and their associated acceptable operability tempera ares.
1 41
w GUIDELINES AND TECl!NICAL DASES FOR NUMARC INITIATIVES NUhlARC 87 00
. .. . July 21,19ss DRAFT 4.1 TilERhlAL PROPERTIES OF COSISIERCIAL PLASTICS Of the many types of plastics commercially available in eac'h chemical class, a few have been selected for Table 41 as r>Ti cal of their clus. It is impractical to include a comprehensive list of materials in a table of teasonable size.
The information shown refers to material in the fabricated form, which, in the case of therrnesetting materials, means commercially cured. The maximum continuous service temperature refers to unloaded structures. De information for this uble has been obtained from the specifications of the American Society for Testing blaterials. A variety of additional sources ofinformation on material properties are available.
Table 41: Thermal Properties of Commercial Plastics6 hlax Cont.
Chemical class Resin Type Subclass Service Temp ('F) cellulose aceute thermoplutic soft 111 cellulose acetate thermoplastic had 140 cellulose acetate bur > Tate thermoplutic soft 120 cellulose acetate but> Tate thermoplastic hani 158 nylon thermoplastic .' 7 6 polycarbonates 'hermoplastic
. unfilled 275 polyethylene thermoplastic low density 140 polyethytene thermoplastic medium density 160 polyethylene thermoplastic high density 193 rnethylmethacrylate thermoplutic unmedifed 140 pol >Tropylene thermoplastic copolymer 374 polystyrene thermoplastic unmcdified 151 polyst>Tene acrylonitrile thermoplutic unnoffied 171 polytetrafluoro ethylene thermopletic unmodified 500 ,
I polythrifluorochloro ethylene thermoplutic unmcdfied 392 polyvinylchloride & vinylchloride thermoplutic rigid 140 polyvinylchloride & vinylchloride acetate the:Tnoplutic plasucized(non rigid) 176 epoxy thermosetting unfdled 248 melamine formaldehyde thermosetting cellulose filled 210 melamine formaldehyde thermosetdng mineral filled (electrical) 266 phenolformJdehyde thermosesting cadfdled 250 phenol formaldehyde thermosaung cellulose fdled 239 phenol fctmaldehyde thermosetting unfdled cut 165 polyester (st>Tene a!kyd) thermosetting glasfiber mat reinforced 199 siliecnes thermosetting mineral fdled 500 urea formaldehyde thermosetting cellulose filled 266 acrylortitnle buudiene styrene thermeplastic high heat resistant 244 a eu! thermeplastic homopolymer 183 alkayd resins thermosetting synthetic fiber ruled 300 I
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- GUIDELINES ASD TSCHNICAL BASES FOR NUSIARC INITIATIVES July 21,1988
' DRAFT f
1 4.2 THERMAL PROPERTIES OF COS151ERCIAL LUBRICANTS i
- Of the many different types and grades of commercial tubdcants, only the most commonly used have been relected i for Table 4 2. The temperature ranges listed are for the typical lubricant of each type.
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Table 4 2t Operating Temperature Ranges Of Common Commercial Lubricants!*8 i
Low High !
Type Temperature Temperature !
j
('C) ('C)
- i
- Mineral Oil -
4 Typical Mineral Oil 0 150 Mineral Oil w/ anti-oxidant 0 200 4 Mineral Oil w/no Oxyger. Present 0 425 ;
Smthetic I ubricia's ,
l Di ester 35 210 i Typical Phosphate Ester 55 120 !
T)pleal Methyl Silicone 50 180
! Typical Phenyl Methyl Silicone 30 250 L d Polyglycol(uninhibited) 20 200 j Chlorinated Diphenyl 10 145 0 320 l
- Polyphenyl Ether
- Fluorocarbon 50 300 i Alkyl Bernenes 42 150 l l Dibasic Acid Esten 34 205 Casmet I Silicone 34 170 ,
l Polyester -45 149
] Silicone diester 73 138 '
Diester 56 132 Polyglycol 34 121 !
l Petroleum 29 121 ;
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- *** GUIDELINES AND TECHNICAL BASES FOR NUMARC INITIATIVES NUStARC 87 04 DRAFT July 21,1988
4.3 REFERENCES
(1) Boner. CJ., Afodern Lericatint Greasts. Scientibe Publicadons. Broseley. England.1976.
(2) Ounderson R.C. and Han. A,W., Synthetic Lubricants. Reinhold Publishing. New York NY,1962.
(3) Landst'own, A.R Lubrication: A Practical Guide to Lubricans Selection. Pergamon Press, Ontord.
[
England 1982. !
1 (4) Wills, J.O., Lerication fundamentals. Marcel Dekker, New York, NY.1980. j l-f (5) Wilcock and Booser. Bearing Design and Application. McGraw Hill. New York. NY.1957. [
h (6) Chemical Rubber Company, Handbook of Chemistry and 7Aysics. CRC Press. Boca Raton. FL 1980. [
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