ML20151T719
| ML20151T719 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/31/1986 |
| From: | Jocelyn Craig, Mcintyre R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151T679 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900401 NUDOCS 8602100343 | |
| Download: ML20151T719 (22) | |
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ORGANIZATION: COM3USTION ENGINEERING POWER SYSTEMS GROUP WINDSOR, CONNECTICUT REPORT INSPECTION INSPECTION N0.: 99900401/85-02 DATE(S):.11/18-22/85 ON-SITE HOURS:
122 CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Power Systems Group ATTN: Mr. Evan Woollacott, Vice President Quality and Administrative Services 1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, Connecticut 06095 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTACT: Mr. P. D. Ford, Supervisor, Group QA TELEPHONE NUMBER:
(203) 285-9210 PRINCIPAL PRODUCT: Nuclear Steam Supply Systems.
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ACTIVITY: The Power Systems Group Combustion Engineering (CE),
had contracts for 16 domestic reactor units to date, of which four (4) are in the design and construction phase.
In addition, CE has modification / repair /
service contracts for 16 reactor units.
ASSIGNED INSPECTOR:
k h N bbv if308(o R. P. McIntyre, Special Prc(jecls Inspection Date' Section (SPIS)
OTHER INSPECTOR (S):
P. J. Prescott, SPIS D.
Golden, EG&G Idaho Wg :. Townsend, EG&G Idaho i[3//S'S APPROVED BY:
t Jc hnW.Craig, Chief,KPIS,VendorProgramBranch
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INSPECTION BASES AND SCOPE:
A.
BASES:
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B and CE Topical Report CENPD-210-A.
l B.
SCOPE: The purpose of this inspection was to review recent design modifications for (CE) facilities and to review the implementation of the CE system for the distribution and evaluation of computer code error reports.
PLANT SITE APPLICABILITY: Multiple including Palo Verde (50-528, 529, 530),
Calvert Cliffs (50-317, 318), St. Lucie (50-335, 389), and Maine Yankee (50-309).
l 8602100343 960203 PDR GA999 EMVC-E 99900401 PDR
v ORGANIZATION: COMBUSTION ENGINEERING POWER SYSTEMS GROUP WINDSOR, CONNECTICUT REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900401/85-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 2 of 11 A.
VIOLATIONS:
None.
B.
NONCONFORMANCES:
1.
Contrary to CE Quality Assurance of Design Procedure (QADP) 5.2, Section 6.0, " Computer Code Error Reports," one manager and two supervisors on the CESEC Computer Code distribution list could not produce any documented evidence that they had circulated the latest three CESEC error reports to the code users within their groups.
(85-02-01) 2.
Contrary to CE QADP 5.2, Section 1.2, the Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS) Water Drainage calculation (19367-LOCA-026) for St. Lucie 1 and the RVLMS Phase III Prototype Testing procedure included supporting information within the calculations which was not properly referenced.
(85-02-02)
C.
UNRESOLVED ITEMS:
None.
D.
STATUS OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDIt:GS:
1.
(0 pen) Nonconfnrmance (84-02):
No internal audits have been performed on error reports pertaining to the CESEC computer code.
As of the date of the inspection no internal audits had been performed on error reports pertaining (EQA) is in the process to the CESEC computer code.
Engineering Quality Assurance of completing an internal audit including error reports on the CESEC computer code. This will be reviewed during a future inspection.
2.
(Closed) Nonconformance (84-03): Computer Code FATES 3A Verification analysis (0000-TH-186) was found to have insufficient information concerning the test problems to evaluate the intent or adequacy of the verification runs.
The inspector reviewed the FATES 3A original code verification file and the Revision 1 verification file as well as the code verification file for FATES 3, The FATES 3A verification analysis (0000-TH-186, Revision 1) included:
L ORGANIZATION: COMBUSTION ENGINEERING POWER SYSTEMS GROUP WINDSOR, CONNECTICUT REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900401/85-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 3 of 11 1.
~A summary description of the test problems 2.
A description of the basis for selecting the test problems 3.
A more complete discussion of the results of the test problems related to the verification intent and needs.
This item is considered closed.
3.
(0 pen) Nonconformance (84-03):
No verification calculations were available for the STRIKIN Il computer code.
Not inspected during this inspection.
4.
(0 pen) Nonconformance (84-03): The verification calculations performed for the CELDA and HCROSS computer codes were not independently reviewed.
Not inspected during this inspection.
5.
(0 pen) Nonconformance (84-03): A modification implemented in the 78226 version of the CELDA computer code was not tested and verified.
Not inspected during this inspection.
E.
INSPECTION FINDINGS AND OTHER COMMENTS:
1.
Recent design modifications at CE plants:
During this inspection several recent design modifications at Palo Verde and Calvert Cliffs were reviewed. These modifications included hardware changes as well as revisions to the FSAR, Technical Specifications, and analyses when appropriate.
a.
Loss of Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray System (APPS) (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 1):
On September 12, 1985, during a loss of load test at approximately 55% power, and the generator supplying onsite loads, the plant did not perform as expected. The scenario began when on loss of load the generator failed to provide power to onsite loads and included:
ORGANIZATION: COMBUSTION ENGINEERING POWER SYSTEMS GROUP WINDSOR, CONNECTICUT REPORT INSPECTION N0.: 99900401/85-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 4 of 11 turbine trip loss of all offsite power to non-essential loads when automatic transfer did not occur (including reactor coolant pumps)
Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) trip (caused by low bus voltage)
Reactor trip (caused by projected low DNBR resulting from RCP coastdown)
. ECCS initiation (resulting from low RCS pressure and projected low DNBR)
Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) volume control tank (VCT) supply to charging pumps was drained due to failure of VCT level instrumentation, which required manual alignment of charging pumps to the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) and the restarting of charging pumps due to gas binding RCP's restored in about I hour As a result of this event, Arizona Nuclear Power Project (ANPP) has proposed to the NRC three design modifications to Palo Verde.
The objectives are to:
improve the operators' ability to operate the charging / auxiliary spray system from the control room; provide an automatic function to reduce the a.aount of required operator action; and to improve the reliability of control grade level instrumentation on the volume control tank.
These modifications are:
(1) provide power to two critical alignment valves from 1E-Motor Control Center (MCC); (2) enhance the automatic realignment to the refueling water tank; (3) and enhance the volume control tank level instrumentation.
These proposed modifications and enhancements have been submitted to the NRC for review and approval. As of the week of the inspection these modifications had not been approved by the NRC.
ORGANIZATION: COMBUSTION ENGINEERING POWER SYSTEMS GROUP WINDSOR, CONNECTICUT REPORT INSPECTION N0.: 99900401/85-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 5 of 11 The inspector reviewed the revision to the transient analysis for the steam generator tube rupture accident (SGTR) with a loss of offsite power and a fully stuck open atmospheric dump valve (ADVS). The revised SGTR analysis indicates that auxiliary pressurizer spray is not needed in the first two hours to mitigate the consequences of the accident. Main pressurizer spray is supplied via the reactor coolant pumps.
The auxiliary pressurizer spray is supplied via the charging pumps included in CVCS. Also, the results of this analysis show that the response of the plant was acceptable, including off-site dose calculations which were within the acceptance criteria of 10 CFR Part 100.
The Palo Verde FSAR and Technical Specifications addressing loss of condenser vacuum and loss of load transients were reviewed with respect to the requirements of the auxiliary spray system. The review revealed that credit is not taken for the auxiliary spray system and that rapid primary coolant system pressurization is limited by the pressurizer safety valves. CE has provided the revision to the (SGTR) analysis as requested by Arizona Nuclear Power Pro,iect.
b.
Auxiliary Feedwater System (Palo Verde)
Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 85-008-00 was submitted to the NRC on March 6, 1985 concerning an unanalyzed safety condition related to the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) at PVNGS Unit 1.
The FSAR assumes that the maximum AFW flow rate to the steam generators following an automatic activation is 1750 GPM. A recent analysis and close examination of pump head flow curves indicated that AFW flow rates could exceed 1750 gpm for some accidents.
It was then assumed that operator action would prevent this from occurring.
After meetings and discussions between ANPP, the Architect-Engineer, Bechtel, and CE it was determined that operator action could not be guaranteed to prevent occurrence of an increased flow rate for certain types of accidents, i.e., main steam line break. CE performed subsequent analyses for a main steam line break transient and incorporated an increased AFW flow rate and different valve hysteresis characteristics. The analyses confirmed that an increase in
u ORGANIZATION:
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING POWER SYSTEMS GROUP WINDSOR, CONNECTICUT REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900401/85-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 6 of 11 AFW flow rate does not result in a DNBR less than that calculated in the limiting analysis and presented in the PVNGS FSAR, therefore there is no decrease in the safety margin of the analysis.
The inspector reviewed the analysis for technical content and compliance to CE Quality Assurance of design procedures and found it to be adequate.
c.
Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS) Calvert Cliffs The RVLMS is intended to provide the operator advisory information on liquid level in the upper plenum region during accidents such as the small break loss of coolant accident.
The RVLMS is based on the use of heated junction thermocouple pairs located at a number of axial positions in the reactor vessel upper plenum.
Each thermocouple pair consists of a heated junction and an unheated junction. When the water level in the probe, which is intended to closely represent the collapsed liquid level in the vessel, drops below th'e heated junction it will dry out and heat up relative to the unheated junction. When the temperature difference between the heated and unheated junction reaches the setpoint temperature the liquid level is determined to be at the levs! of the heated junction.
Two areas of the RVLMS program were reviewed during this inspection.
First, the Phase III tert program was reviewed as it applies to Calvert Cliffs.. Secondly, the performance calculation for Calvert Cliffs was "eviewed. Technical and procedural aspects of both os ta: were reviewed. The documents l
reviewed included RVLM Phase III test request, test requirements, test procedure and test report; Phase 11 test procedure; Calvert Cliffs water drainage calculation for RVLMS; St. Lucie 1 RVLMS water drainage calculation and the verification file for the RVLMS utility code.
The RVLMS Phase III testing was performed to provide design verification and determine the setpoint temperature difference at which a heated junction thermocouple pair will indicate the reactor vessel liquid level. The test program was found to provide a range of test conditions which bound the conditions which have been predicted for Calvert Cliffs during a small break loss of coolant accident.
l l
ORGANIZATION: COMBUSTION ENGINEERING POWER SYSTEMS GROUP WINDSOR, CONNECTICUT REPORT INSPECTION N0.: 99900401/85-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 7 of 11 The Calvert Cliffs RVLMS water drainage calculation was reviewed.
The Calvert Cliffs calculation incorporated the St. Lucie 1 calculation. The purpose of the calculation was to establish that this system would perform acceptably under conservative conditions. The calculation was found to be technically adequate.
It was noted that a properly verified computer code (RVLMS) was used.
Independent review of the calculation was noted.
Failure to follow CE QAPP requirements for referencing infor-mation was F und in two documents.
First, in the St. Lucie 1 Reactor Ve,sel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS) water drainage calculati,n, the splash guard area was incorporated from another calculat.on. The reference given for the splash guard area was to the author of a supporting calculation and not to a specific calculation as required b/ tha QAPP.
Further the supporting calculation for the splash guard area was not provided in the reference list of the above cited calculation.
It was noted that the independent reviewer of the cited calculation was able to provide the appropriate references in a timely manner.
Second, the "RVLMS Phase III Prototype Testing" document specified a range of depressurization rates from 0.0 to 10.0 psi /sec via bottom blowdown.
No specific reference for these depressurization rates was provided. However, the reference was listed in the reference list.
Nonconformance 85-02-02 was identified during this part of the inspection.
d.
Calvert Cliffs Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Setpoints:
In November 1984 Baltimore Gas and Electric (BG&E) requested CE to perform analyses to support an expansion of the MSSV setpoint range and increase the limiting steam pressure from design pressure to 110% of design pressure.
BG&E made this request to eliminate the LERs which were being written at the end of cycle due to the MSSVs drifting outside the allowable setpoint range between the beginning and end of cycle. This requires two changes to the technical specifications for Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2.
The first is for the change in MSSV setpoints and the second is for increasing the limiting steam pressure.
a ORGANIZATION: COMBUSTION ENGINEERING POWER SYSTEMS GROUP WINDSOR, CONNECTICUT REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900401/85-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 8 of 11 The inspector reviewed correspondence between CE and BG8E regarding the MSSV setpoint issue. The inspector also reviewed CE analyses in support of the MSSV setpoint change.
These analyses included complete loss of load, asymmetric steam generator operation and a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident calculation with reduced High Pressure Injection (discussed in item e) as it applies to the MSSV setpoints.
The inspector reviewed CE analyses to support application of the setpoint change to other than the reference cycle and the portion of the reload licensing package submitted to BG&E by CE for Unit 1 Cycle 8 as it applies to the change in MSSV setpcint and increasing the limiting pressure. A letter from BG&E to the USNRC requesting the technical specification change for Unit 2 was also reviewed. The inspector found that analyses were performed for changing the MSSV setpoints to allow for in cycle drift.
Independent reviews were noted.
No violations or nonconformances were found in this part of the inspection.
e.
High Pressure Safety Injection System (Calvert Cliffs)
This item involves a request from BG&E to evaluate applicable safety analyses with reduced High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) System flow, and thereby provide a leeway between actual PPSI flow and technical specification requirements in the event of reduced flow.
The analysis considered a 0.1 fte LOCA transient with the HPSI system flow reduced by 35 gpm (at every system performance point) as specified by BG&E. The analysis takes credit for the charging flow whereas the original SAR analyses does not credit the charging flow.
The analysis of the 0.1 ftr LOCA also incorporated a reduced peak linear heat generation rate as specified by the reload analyses guidelines.
The Quality Assurance requirements for design procedures were properly followed for the re-analysis, reload analysis guidelines and the revised FSAR and technical specification submittals to BG&E.
0 ORGANIZATION: COMBUSTION ENGINEERING POWER SYSTEMS GROUP WINDSOR, CONNECTICUT REPORT INSPECTION N0.: 99900401/85-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 9 of 11 2.
Availability Data Program InfoBulletin 85 RCP Motor Anti-Reverse Rotation Device During RCP maintenance at St. Lucie 1, the utility pulled the RCP motor rotor. This uncovered the Anti-Reverse Rotation Device (ARRD) when it was noted that a number of the pins which serve to lock the ratchet ring in the ARRD were stuck inside their cavities in the rotating disc. The specific ARRD involved consists of 36 pins, about 41" long, housed in blind holes in a large metal disc attached to the motor shaft. These pins are free to drop by gravity ento a stationary toothed ratchet ring. A number of pins and teeth are arranged such that, essentially, no reverse motion of the rotating assembly can occur since the pins engage when the pump stops.
The ARRD prevents reverse rotation of the RCP in the case of reversed power leads or in cases where reverse fluid flow could result.
CE performed a conservative calculation that indicates that only 4 cf the 36 pins are required to prevent reverse
~
rotation under worst-case loading. This criterion was met for the ARRD at St. Lucie. The RCP motor manufacturer at St. Lucie 1 and 2 is Allis Chalmers and the ARRD is a ratchet ring and pins type. St. Lucie is the only CE plant with this type of ARRD.
CE stated that Maine Yankee is also having problems with its ARRD. Maine Yankee also has an Allis Chalmers RCP motor but it has a Marland ARRD.
This item will be reviewed during a future inspection.
3.
Computer Code Error Reports The NRC inspector conducted a review of the CE system for distributing and evaluating computer code error reports.
QADP 5.2, Section 6.0,
" Computer Code Error Reports," defines the procedures to be followed for distribution and evaluation of these error reports. The last three error reports for the computer code CESEC III were chosen for review.
The inspector interviewed one manager and two supervisors who are on the CESEC distribution list.
They were not sure if they had received all the error reports and whether they had been circulated to the code users within their grbup. They could not provide the inspector with any documentation proving that this had been accomplished. 0ADP 5.2 requires managers and supervisors to circulate the error notice within his group to be
ORGANIZATION: COMBUSTION ENGINEERING POWER SYSTEMS GROUP WINDSOR, CONNECTICUT REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900401/85-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 10 of 11 signed and dated by code users on the response receipt section of the computer program error notification. This was not being accomplished within the groups reviewed.
Nonconformance 85-02-01 was identified during this part of the inspection.
4.
AE and Vendor / Supplier Interface Records and procedures involving vendor / supplier interface with CE were reviewed by the NRC inspector. The three (3) major areas involved in the review were; (1) vendor evaluation and the approved vendor list (Procedure QAP 7.1), (2) external audits (Procedure QAP 18.2), and (3) surveillance (Procedure QAP 10.1).
The NRC inspector reviewed CE's Approved Vendor List (AVL) and selected the files from two (2) of CE's suppliers. The first file reviewed was for Dresser Industries (File No. 37) to determine if the records were in compliance with CE procedure QAP 18.2 (external audits) and procedure QAP 7.1 (Vendor Evaluation). The second file reviewed was for the Crosby Valve Co. No. (P0 9601526) to determine if the records were in compliance with procedure QAP 10.1 (Surveillance).
All documents reviewed by the NRC inspectors were found to be in compliance with the applicable procedures and no nonconformances or violations were noted.
5.
Training Section 17.2.5 of the Quality Assurance Manual, and attendance records for training courses attended by personnel in the fluids and ccmponents department were examined by the NRC 'nspector.
All attendance records were found to be up to date and in compliance with Section 17.2.5 of the quality assurance manual.
All associated logs and files were found to be accurate and in compliance with Section 7.0 of the quality assurance of design procedures manual.
6.
Internal Audits Three (3) procedures were reviewed by the NRC inspectors for the Engineering Quality Assurance (EQA) internal audits: QA of design procedures Section 9.0 quality assurance instruction T
ORGANIZATION: COMBUSTION ENGINEERING POWER SYSTEMS GROUP WINDSOR, CONNECTICUT REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900401/85-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 11 of 11 section 18.01 and quality assurance manual Section 17.18. The EQA audit file (No. E-PE-0484-01) was also reviewed for compliance with QA of design procedures manual Section 7.0.
All records and files examined were found to be accurate and in compliance with the applicable procedures.
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DOCKET NO. 99900401 DOCUMENTS EX AMINED INSPECTOR: 0 W Golden REPORT NO. 85-02 SCOPE:
PAGE 1
0F 2
DOCUMENT TITLE / SUBJECT No DOCUMEN DOCUMENT NO.
REV.
DATE 1
QAM 20 10/25/85 Quality Assurance of Desian Procedures 2
QAM CENPD-210-A 3
11/77 Quality Assurance Procram CE 3
Analysis 1
4/23/85 FATES 3A Code Verification CE 4
Analysis 6/18/81 FATES 3 Code Verification CE Test 5
Report 9/82 Heated Junction Thermocouple Phase III Test Reoort CE Analysis of HJTC/RVLMS Performance During Accident 6
Report 6/83 Conditions Task 469 Final Report CE Small Break LOCA Reanalysis /0.1 ft" Break 7
Analysis 4/9/85 Reduced HPSI Flow 8
12/13/82 Test Reoort RVLMS III Prototyoe Testing Calcula-(0wner's Group Calculation) 9 tion File SBLOCA Calvert Cliffs 0.1 ft" (RVLMS Performance)
CE 10 Analysis Calvert Cliffs Water Drainage Calculatinn for RVIMS CE 11 Analysis 4/82 St. Lucie 1 RVLMS Water Drainaae Calculation 12 TR 3/9/82 HJTCS Phase III Test Reauest 13 TP 1
6/22/82
_RVLMS Phase III Prototyoe Testing CE 14 Analysis) 11/29/82 Verification File for RVLMS Utility Code oTYPE OF DOCUMENT DWG
- DRAWING INM INTERNAL MEMO LETTER SPEC - SPECIFICATION LTR PROC - PROCEDURE TR Test Reauest QAM
- QA MANUAL TP Test Procedure P.O.
- PURCHASE ORDER
DOCKET NO. 99900401 DOCUMENTS EX AMINED INSPECTOR:
D. W. Golden REPORT NO. 85-02 SCOPE:
PAGE 2
0F 2
+
ITEM
- TYPE OF DOCUMENT TITLE / SUBJECT NO.
DOCUMENT DOCUMENT NO.
REV.
DATE CE 15 Analysis 6/9/81 Data for ECCS Evaluation in BG&E CE 16 Analysis 6/3/81 Hydraulic Environment within the RVLMS of the BG&E 1&P CE Impact of Changing MSSV's Setpoints on Calvert Cliffs 17 Analysis 1
8/20/R5 Unit 2 Cycle 6 Reload Analysis CE 18 Analysis 00 1/6/82 HJTC Phase III Test Reauirements 19 TP 3/11/81 RVLMS Phase II Test Procedure 20 LTR
?/8/85 Internal CE Letter Transmittimo Reoort on CC-MSSV Change Letter from C. H. Poindexter (BG&E) to USNRC for MSSV 21 LTR 8/29/85 Tech. Spec. Change for Unit 2' CE Calcu-22 lation 00 2/22/g5 Calculation for MSSV Tech. Spec. Change Calvert Cliffs 23 LTR 3/1/85 Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 Cycle 8 Reload License Submittal LTR to a Mihalcik (BG&E) from R. R. Mills (CE) Providing 24 LTR 1/22/85 Proposal for Analysis of MSSV Setting Changes Applicability of Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 MSSV Setpoints 25 01 8/28/85 and Supporting Safety Analysis to Unit 2 Cycle 6 Ltr to J. Mihalcik (BG&E) to Baum (CE) Requesting Calculations 26 LTR 11/14/84 to Sunnnrt a Channo in Calvort Cliffe MS%V totnnintt CE 27 Analysis FATFS3A Cnde Verificatinn
- TYPE OF DOCUMENT DWG
- DRAWING INM INTERNAL MEM0 LETTER SPEC - SPECIFICATION LTR PROC - PROCEDURE QAM
- QA MANUAL P.O.
- PURCHASE ORDER
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