ML20151T334
| ML20151T334 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 02/03/1986 |
| From: | DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151T288 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-83-37, NUDOCS 8602100229 | |
| Download: ML20151T334 (10) | |
Text
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i ATTACHMENT A 4
Revise the Technical Specifications as follows:
Remove Page Insert Pace 3/4 4-32 3/4 4-33 B 3/4 4-11 1
3/4 3-51 3/4 3-51 3/4 3-52 3/4 3-52 3/4 6-20 3/4 6-20 1
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0602100229ggo 34 PDR ADOCK PDR P
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a REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.12 All reactor coolant system vent valves, powered from emergency buses, shall be OPERABLE
- and closed ** for each vent path from the following locations:
a.
Reactor Vessel Head b.
Pressurizer Steam Space l
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 ACTION:
a.
With at least one vent path from each of the above locations OPERABLE and one or more power operated vent valves inoperable, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve (s) is maintained closed with power removed or with the manual isolation valve closed.
Power operation may continue until the next scheduled outage, at which time all reactor coolant i
system vent valves shall be OPERABLE prior to entry into MODE 1.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not 2
j applicable.
I b.
With all vent paths from one of the above locations inoperable, maintain the inoperable valves closed with power removed or with the manual isolation valves
- closed, restore at least one of the inoperable vent paths to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or, be in HOT STANDBY within 6
hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
c.
With all vent paths from both of the above locations inoperable, maintain the inoperable valves closed with power removed or close the manual isolation valves, and restore at least one vent path from one of the above locations to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.12 Each reactor coolant system vent path shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:
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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 4-32 PROPOSED WORDING
4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 1.
Verifying all manual isolation valves in each vent path are locked or sealed in the open position.
I 2.
Cycling each valve in the vent path through at least one complete cycle of full travel from the control room.
i 3.
Verifying flow through the reactor coolant system vent path to the Pressurizer Relief Tank.
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For purposes of this specification an inoperable vent valve is defined as:
a valve which exhibits leakage in excess of Specification, 3.4.6.2
- limits, or cannot be opened and closed i
on demand, or does not have its normai emergency power supply OPERABLE.
4 These valves may be' operated for required venting operations and leak testing in Modes 3 and 4.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 4.33 PROPOSED WORDING j
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BASES 3/4.4.12 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS 4
i Reactor Coolant System Vents are provided to exhaust noncondensible i
gases and/or steam from the primary system that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling.
The OPERABILITY of at least one reactor coolant system vent path from the reactor vessel head and the pressurizer steam
- space, ensures the capability exists to perform this function.
The valve redundancy of the reactor coolant system vent paths serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation l
while ensuring that a single failure of a vent valve, power supply or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path, i
The
- function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the reactor coolant system vent systems are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737,
" Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements", November 1980.
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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT,1 B 3/4 4-11 PROPOSED WORDING I
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TABLE 3.3-11 E
a m
ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION m
M.
TOTAL NO.
MINIMUM CHANNELS k
OF CHANNELS OPERABLE i.
C 1.
Pressurizer Water Level 3
2 e
2.
Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate 1 per steam 1 per steam r.
generator generator 3.
Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor 1
0 m
4.
PORV Accoustical Detector Position Indicator 2/ valve
- 1/ valve g
mw
@}
S.
PORV Limit Switch Position Indicator 1/ valve 0/ valve
$Y 6.
PORV Block Valve Limit Switch Position Indicator 1/ valve 0/ valve 8?
7.
Safety Valve Accoustical Detector Position Indicator 2/ valve
- 1/ valve g
o 8.
Safety Valve Temperature Detector Position Indicator 1/ valve 0/ valve 9.
PORV Control Pressure Channels (PT-RC-444, 445) 2 1
10.
Contaiment Sump Wide Range Water Level 2
1 11.
Containment Wide-Range Pressure 2
0 l
One Detector Active, Second Detector Passive
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m TABLE 4.3-7 5
t i
m to ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
- ~
E E
CHANNEL CHANNEL l
INSTRUMENT CHECK CALIBRATION 5Oe l.
Pressurizer Water Level M
R j
{
2.
Auxillary Feedwater Flow Rate S/U(1)
R m
}
g 3..
Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin M
R i
m j
@w 4.
PORV Accoustical Detector Position Indicator M
R 4
nN C *=-
5.
PORV Limit Switch Position Indicator M
R E w o r y[
6.
PORV Block Valve Limit Switch Position Indicator M
R 4
M$
7.
Safety Valve Accoustical Detector Position Indicator M
R l
8.
Safety Valve Temperature Detector Position Indicator M
R 9.
PORV Control Pressure Channels (PT-RC-444, 445)
M R
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10.
Containment Sump Wide-Range Water Level M
R 4
j 11.
Containment Wide-Range Pressure N/A R
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(ll' Channel check to be performed in conjunction with Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.a.9
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following an extended plant outage.
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- CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL HYDROGEN ANALYZERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.4.1 Two separate And independent wide-range containment hydrogen analyzers shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1 and 2.
ACTION:
a.
With one wide-range hydrogen analyzer inoperable, restore the inoperable analyzer to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 nours.
b.
With both wide-range hydrogen analyzers inoperable, restore at least one wide-range hydrogen analyzer to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.4.1 Each hydrogen analyzer shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:
a.
Performing a
CHANNEL CALIBRATION using sample gases containing:
1.
One volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen, and 2.
Four volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-20 PROPOSED WORDING
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ATTACHMENT B No Significant Hazard Consideration i
Proposed Change Request No. 94, Revision 1 amends the Beaver Valley Power
- Station, Unit No.
1 Technical Specifications to incorporate recommended changes resulting from NRC review of our previous submittal.
Description of Amendment Request:
Change Request No. 94, I
provided by application dated october 8, 1984 proposed a tecnnical
]
specification amenament to incorporate the applicable requirements of NUREG-0737 specified by Generic Letter 83-37.
The NRC subsequently reviewed the proposed changes and determined that various questions and ccmments must be addressed.
In our discussions with the NRC
- reviewer, it was agreed that revision to our previous submittal would be required.
These changes are proposed to satisfy the concerns identified.
Specification 3.4.12 has been revised to clarify the requirements and Action statements for the RCS vent system.
Bases 4
Section 3/4.4.12 has been revised to reflect the change to the RCS vent system specification.
Tables 3.3-11 and 4.3-7, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, have ceen revised oy adding tne j
Containment Wide Range Pressure Instruments as recommended by Generic 4
Letter 83-37.
Action statement b has been added to Specification i
3.6.4.1, Hydrogen Analyzers, to reflect the Stancard Technical Specification requirements as recommended cy Generic Letter 83-37.
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Basis for no significant hazard consideration determination:
the proposed changes impose additional requirements on portions of systems previously not governed by the technical specifications and incorporate additional administrative controls to comply with the requirements of NUREG-0737 for mitigating the consequences of an F
1 accident.
)
i Based on the criteria for defining no significant ha:ards consideration setforth in 10 CFR 50.92(c),
plant operation in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
j (1) involve a
significant increase in.the probability of j
occurrence or the consequences of an accident or -
r malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated.
The Reactor Coolant Vent System and Bases Sections nave been added to provide limitations, i
restrictions and controls on a system added to the RCS to satisfy the requirements of NUREG-0737.
The changes to this specification provide clarification to more closely match the specification requirements to the system design.
The Limiting Condition for Operation has Deen l
)
applied to tne solenoid operated vent valves in the piping from the vented locations.
Therefore, the Action i
statements specify actions to be taxen dependent upon valve and/or vent path inoperability.
An exception to
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Attachment B Page 2 specification 3.0.4 in Action statement (a) enables the plant to go from Mode 2
(Startup) to Mode 1 (Power Operation) with vent valves inoperable as long as there is at least one vent path f rom both locations operable.
The operability of at least one vent path from the reactor vessel head and the pressurizer steam space ensure the capability exists to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the RCS that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling.
Additional Action statements apply operating restrictions when one or more vent paths are inoperable.
Note
- has been aptiied to
" OPERABLE" to clarify when a
vent valve will be determined to be inoperable.
Note ** has been applied to
" closed" so the valves can be opened for required
- venting, leak testing and leakage determination.
These valves must be opened to vent the piping in order to determine which valves are leaking (and thus inoperable).
Containment Wide Range Pressure instruments have been added to Table 3.3-11 and 4.3-7 to ensure that wide-range pressure indication required by NUREG-0737 is maintained and calibrated.
Specification 3.6.4.1 has been revised by adding Action statement (b) to reflect the Standard Technical Specifications and comply with the requirements of NUREG-0737.
(2) create the probability for an accident or malfunction of a
different type than previously evaluated since the Reactor Coolant. Vent System piping is small enough so that its loss would constitute a small break LOCA, for which the plant is already analyzed.
The chanqis to the Accident Monitoring Instrumentation tables provide additional assurance that the Containment Wide Range Pressure instruments will be available during accident conditions; therefore, no new accicent will be created.
The additional Hydrogen Analyzer Action statement provides guidance when both analyzers are inoperable and will not create the possibility for a new accident.
(3) involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety, since the RCS Vent System Bases have been revised to reflect the revised specification requirements and is consistent with the margin of safety provided for similar specifications.
The Containment Wide Range Pressure instruments will be available to provide information to plant ~ operato'rs during accident conditions in addition to that already required by the technical specifications.
The addition of this instrument to the tables is consistent with Bases 3/4.3.3.3.8
" Accident Monitoring l
Attachmsnt B Page 3 Instrumentation" and will not reduce the margin of safety.
Action statement (b) has been added.to specification 3.6.4.1 to setforth the required action required when both Containment Wide Range Hydrogen Analyzers are inoperable.
This is censistent with the Action statements for similar specifications and does not affect Bases Section 3/4.6.4 " Combustible Gas Control".
The proposed changes reflect the requirements of NUREG-0737 by incorporating the applicable portions of Generic Letter 83-37.
These changes do not involve any physical changes to plant safety related
- systems, components or structures, will not increase the likelihood of a
malfunction of safety related equipment, increase tne consequence of an accident previously
- analyzed, nor create the possibility of a
malfunction different than previously evaluated.
Therefore, based on the
- above, it is proposed to characterize the change as involving a no significant hazards consideration.
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