ML20151Q672

Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Util 860513,0829,1002 & 880304 Responses to Bulletin 85-003, Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings. Info Requested within 30 Days of Ltr Date

ML20151Q672
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	04/18/1988
From:	Herdt A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Utley E CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8804270106
Download: ML20151Q672 (3)

Text

_. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _

~

APR 181988 k Docket Nos. 50-325, 50-324 License Nos. OPR-71, DPR-62 Carolina Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. E. E. Utley _

Senior Executive Vice President Power Supply and Engineering and Construction P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING BRUNSWICK UNITS 1 AND 2 RESPONSE TO IEB 85-03 (DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324)

Carolina Power and Light Company's letters of May 13, August 29, October 2, 1986 and March 4, 1988, pertaining to Brunswick, contained their responses to IEB 85-03, "Motor-0perated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings." The review of these responses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission indicates the need for additional information before the program to assure valve operability can be approved.

Please provide the additional information as stated in the enclosure. It is requested that you submit the additional information within 30 days of the date of this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact S. Tingen at (404) 331-2603.

Sincerely, i n f

3/

Alan R. Herdt, Chief Engineering Branch i

Division of Reactor Safety cc w/ encl:

P. W. Howe, Vice President Brunswick Nuclear Project C. R. Dietz, Plant General Manager I

bec w/ encl:

, NRC Resident Inspector l DRS Technical Assistant l Document Control Desk l R. Carroll, RII i

R. Kiessel, NRR $$$42 g g O!0410o O

RI! - RII RI STincen:gb FJap PFredr ckson 04/r/88 04/g/88 04//J/88 19 p,

a Enclosure REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Revise tablen 1 and 2 of the res, ...se dated October 2,1986 to include the following MOVs, or justify their exclusion. As required by Action Item a of the bulletin, assume inadvertent equipment operations.

(a) HPCI NOV F007 is shown normally open in Zone 8-6 of Drawing D-25023 Sheet 1, Revision 28 (Unit 1), and as MOV 8 on Page 68 of BWROG Report NEDC-31322 dated' September 1986. How would injection to the reactor vessel be ensured if this valve were to be (a) actuated inadvertently to the closed position upon intended initiation of the system or (b) left closed inadvertently?

(b) RCIC MOV F012 is shown normally open in Zone B-6 of Drawing D-25029, Sheet 1, Revision 31 (Unit 1), and as MOV 8 on Page 72 of the BWP.0G Report. The question in Item 1(a) above applies here also.

(c) RCIC M0V V8 is shown nonnall Sheet 1, Revision 31 (Unit ,1)y andopen inXZone as M0V C-2 on Page 74of Drawing of the BWROG D-25029, Report. How would steam supply to the RCIC Turbine be ensured if this valve were to be operated inadvertently as described in Item 1(a) above?

2. Revise tables 1 and 2 of the response dated October 2,1986, to include the following MOVs, or justify their exclusion. According to Pages 55 and 59 of the BWROG Report, these valves have no safety actions; however, utilities are expected to report differential pressures for testing, per Note o on Page 66 of that report.

i (a) HPCI MOVs F008 and F011 are shown normally closed in Zones C-5 l and F-3 of Drawing D-25023, Sheet 1. Revision 28 (Unit 1), and as l MOVs 5 and 6 on Page 68 of the BWROG Report.

I i (b) RCIC M0V F022 is shown normally closed in Zone D-5 of Drawing j

D-25029, Sheet 1, Revision 31 (Unit 1), and as MOV 5 on Page 72 of i

the BWROG Report.

3. Revise tables 1 and 2 of the response dated October 2,1986, to include values of differential pressure for opening MOVs F004 and F010, or justify exclusion of these pressures. These valves are shown normally open as HPCI MOV 3 on Page 68 and as RCIC MOV 3 on Page 72 of the BWR0G Report.

How would suction from the CST be ensured if these MOVs were to be operated inadvertently as described in Item 1 (a) above?

4. Revise Table 2 of the response dated October 2,1986, to replace "N/A" with a value of differential pressure for closing RCIC Turbine Steam Supply MOV F045, or justify its exclusion. This normally closed valve is shown in Zone 0-2 of Drawing D-25029, Sheet 1 Revision 31, is shown as MOV I on Page 74 of the BWROG Report, and is given a safety action for closing on Page 61 of that report, t

Enclosure 2

5. The method of handwheel turns described in Item B of the response ' dated October 2,1986, is not recommended. - For the reason, refer to the description of the Davis-Besse event on Pages 1 and 2 of IEB 85-03. If this method is indeed planned for use, additional justification is required.

6. The proposed program for action Items b, c and d of the bulletin is incomplete. Provide the following details as a minimum:

(a) commitment to a training program for setting switches and maintaining valve operators, (b) commitment to justify continue <i operation of a valve determined to be inoperable, (c) description of a method possibly needed to extrapolate valve stem thrust determined by testing at less than maximum differential pressure.

(d) justification of a possible alternative to testing at maximum differential pressure at the plant, (e) consideration of pipe break conditions as required by the bulletin, (f) stroke testing when necessary to meet bulletin requirements, and (g) consideration of applicable industry recommendations in the

preparation of procedures to ensure maintenance of correct switch j settings, l

i