ML20151L044

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Forwards Proposed Tech Specs 3.6.7.3 & 4.6.7.3,changing Requirements of Operability for Hydrogen Igniter Assemblies. Probability Values Associated W/Six & Four Inoperable Igniters Unacceptable.Tech Spec W/Mod Acceptable
ML20151L044
Person / Time
Site: River Bend 
Issue date: 07/11/1985
From: Houston R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Crutchfield D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20151K803 List:
References
FOIA-85-511 NUDOCS 8507180382
Download: ML20151L044 (11)


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UNITED STATES j

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION JUL 111985 rc 3, (4,s,r WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555

%; ~; d},,C MEMORANDUM FOR:

Dennis etSTIEF, Assistant Director for Safety Assessment, Division of Licensing FROM:

R. Wayne Houston, Assistant Director for Reactor Safety, Division of Systems Integration

SUBJECT:

RIVER BEND HYDROGEN IGNITER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION Enclosed is the latest proposed Technical Specification (TS) for the River Bend Hydrogen Ignition System.

Regarding Surveillance Requirement 4.6.7.3.a, we requested Gulf States Utilities.(GSU) to justify allowing up to three (3) igniter assemblies on each subsystem to be inoperable before action is taken to determine if the inoperable igniter assemblies are adjacent.

Based on GSU's proposal, there is a potential of six (6) igniter assemblies becoming inoperable without determining where they are located.

This is not consistent with the current proposed Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.7.3.b.

l GSU informed CSB on June 26, 1985,:via a telecon, that the results of a simplified probability analysis assuming six, four, and two igniters to be inoperable show that the probability of two being adjacent is 11%, 8% and 2%,

respectively.

We find the probability values associated with six and four inoperable igniters do not support continued operation witnout verification and therefore

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unacceptable.

If there are two inoperable igniters and the locations are

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unknown, we feel there is reasonable assurance that they will not be

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adjacent. Therefore, we recommen'd that Surveillance Requirement 4.6.7.3.a.2 and the supporting basis section be changed as indicated in the attached marked up copy of the T.S.

With the. inclusion of this modification', we find the River Bend Igniter TS to be acceptable.

'l R. Wayne Houston, Assistant Director for Reactor Safety, DSI

Enclosure:

As stated cc:

R. Bernero H. Thompson Qg %

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Novak TO c v

0. Houston

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. CONTACT:

A. Notafrancesco, CSB x29487 BM

Y CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL HYDROGEN IGNITION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.7.3 be operable consisting of:The containment and drywell hydrogen ignition system s a.

two indepenp g g containment and drywell hydrogen ignition subsystems amt consisting of ten circuits with no more than than five igniter assemblies inoperable per subsystem

, and b.

no adjacent igniter assemblies inoperable.

~ APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2 ACTION:

l With one containment and drywell hydrogen ignition subsystem a.

and/or circuit inoperable, and/or circuit to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be inrestore the i

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at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, b.

With any adjacent igniter assembly inoperable, restore all igniter assemblies adjacent to an inoperable igniter assembly to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the ne.yt 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.7.3 be demonstrated OPERABLE:The containment and drywell hydrogen ignition system sha At least once per 6 months by energizing all the igniter a.

assemblics and performing 3 current / measurement 3cf each circuit.

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If more than 3 igniter assemblies on either suAsystem are determined to be inoperable, Surveillance'Kequire-ment 4.6.7.3.a shall be performed at least once per 92 days until this condition no longer exists.

igniter assembi b on each subsystem are 2.

If more than determined to be inoperable, determine if the inoperable igniter assemblies are adjacent.

b.

At least once per 18 months by energ'es izing each igniter V'

assembly

  • and verifying by. current l9ne trement$ sufficient

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,to develop 1700*F temperature for those igniter assemblies in [riaccess;gte temperature of at least 1700*~r ror,assiEf,verirying a surrace areas each of theggf.;

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES ATN0 SPHERE CONTROL (Continued)

The operability of the containment and drywell hydrogen igniters ensures that hydrogen combustion can be accomplished in a controlled manner following a degraded core event that produces hydrogen concentrations in excess of LOCA conditions.

Adjacent igniters are considered to be igniters in different power divisions within approximately thirty-five feet of each other.

Inaccessible areas are defined as areas which have high radiation levels during the entire refueling outage period. These areas are the heat exchanger, filter jgr demineralizer, backwash, and holding pump rooms of the RWCU system.

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. 1'l G6 ENCLOSURE

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UNITED STATES j

7, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION U

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Those on Attached List FROM:

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Assistant Director for Safety Assessment Division of Licensing Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing

SUBJECT:

FINAL DRAFT OF THE RIVER BEND UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

The attached final draft technical specifications for River Bend Unit I (enclosure 1) are being forwarded to you at this time for review. We request that you review those sections which pertain to your particular area of responsibility and that the results of this review, identifying the secticas reviewed, be forwarded to the Technical Specification Review Group (TSRG) by May 6, 1985. We are distributing tnese technical speci-fications at the NRR branch level, however, we request that the re:;pnnses be consolidated, reviewed and returned at the Assistant Director level.

By issuing these technical specifications in the final draft form at this time without benefit of a formal proof ano review period between the second i

draft and the final draft, we are making a significant deviation from our normal technical specification preperation process. This deviation is being made in the interest of expediting the review process so as not to unneces-sarily delay the planned plant startup date of some time in June 1985. It is important to note, however, that even though we are skipping one of the steps in the preparation process we are not skipping any of the ~ steps in our independent review and certification process to assure the safety adequacy of the technical specifications. These steps, su-h as, the NRC Regional review, the internal NRC technical branch reviews, the independent NRC consultant review, and the applicants certification of the correctness of the technical specifications will be performed as shown on the enclosed marked up schedule for River Bend (enclosure 2).

This is a very ambitious schedule we will be working to and will require. the complete cooperation of all the parties involved. The schedule has been reviewed by both the NRC and applicant's management and has been established

-as the goal both organizations will be striving to achieve.

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In making judgements about the correctness or adequacy of these technical specifications for River Bend you should be guided by the principles of NRR Office Letter No. 38 Deviations from the (GE) STS should not be proposed.

or accepted by the staff or applicant unless they are:

(1) necessary because of unique design features or unique organization characteristics, or (2) represent a significant improvement over the STS which should be included in the next revision to the STS and do not represent a change in generic requirements whTch must be reviewed prior to implementatio.n by CRGR.

Deviations from the STS which have merit but are generic and require CRGR review should not be proposed at this ti:ne for River Bend.

Instead they should be processed thru CRGR as a revision to the STS which can later be applied to River Bend at the licensee's request or as a backfit by the staff.

Those generic changes involving an immediate safety concern should, however, not be delayed for CRGR review. Any such cases should be highlighted for expedited action by DL and other appropriate NRC Divisions.

Mr. Den Houston, of TSRG will be available during the final review period to answer any questions which arise. He is located in Room 521, of the hillips Building and his telephone number is 49-28933.

Even if you have no conwnents and are in agreement with the technical specifications content in your area of review, it is requested that a written response to that effect identifying those sections of the technical

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specifications reviewed be provided by the above specified date.

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Assistant Director for Safety Assessment i

Division of Licensing Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing i

l Division of Licensing i

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Enclosures:

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River Bend Nuclear Power Plant, Unit I l

Technical Specif. cations l

2.. River Bend marked up schedule l

cc: w/o enclosure see next page.

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$$k5Y' Distribution for River Bend Unit 1 Date: April 22,1985 ATTACHED LIST Al Schwencer, Chief Olan D. Parr, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2, DL Auxiliary Systems Branch, DSI a---.

Gary Holahan, Chief William P. Gannill, Chief Operating Reactors Assessment Meteorology and Effluent Branch, DL Treatment Branch, DSI B. D. Liaw, Chief Lewis G. Hulman, Chief Materials Engineering Branch, DE Accident Evaluation Branch, DSI Victor Benaroya, Chief Frank Congel, Chief Chemical Engineering Branch, DE Radiological Assessment Branch, DSI Vincent Noonan, Chief Willian Regan, Acting Chief Equipment Qualification Branch, DE Human Factors Engineering Branch, DHFS Robert E. Jackson, Chief Dennis Ziemann, Chief Geosciences Branch, DE Procedures & Systers Review Branch, DHFS George, Lear, Chief Robert D. Martin Structural & Geotechnical Regional Administrator i

Engineering Branch, DE Region IV Ronald L. Ballard, Chief John Jaudon Environmental & Hydrologic Senior Resident Inspector l

Engineering Branch, DE Region IV William H. Regan, Chief Harold R. Bocher, Chief.

Site Analysis Branch, DE License Qualifications Branch, DHFS i,

Frank C. Cherny, Acting Chief Mechanical Engineering Branch, DE.

I Brian W. Sheron, Chief l

Reactor Systems Branch, DSI Faust Rosa, Chief G. Ted Ankrum, Chief lastrumentation & Control Quality Assurance Branch, I&E Systems Branch, DSI Walter R. Butler, Chief Steve Stern, Project Manager Containment. Systems Branch, DSI Licensing Branch No, 2, DL M. I. Srinivasan, Chief Applicant: (3) 1

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Power Systems Branch, DSI Carl Berlinger, Chief Core Performance Branch, DSI l

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