ML20151K853

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Amend 112 to License DPR-3,revising Shutdown Margin Switching Temp to 470 F & Correcting Typo & Inadvertent Omission of Previously Approved Surveillance Requirement
ML20151K853
Person / Time
Site: Yankee Rowe
Issue date: 07/19/1988
From: Wessman R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20151K837 List:
References
NUDOCS 8808030298
Download: ML20151K853 (6)


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UNITED STATES j

  • j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e WASHING TON, D. C. 20S$5

_ YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY

_ YANKEE _ NUCLEAR POWER STATION DOCKET N0.50-029 _

AMENDMENT TO Fc ,ILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 112 License No. DPR-3 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Com'ssion (the Comission) has found that:

A.

(the licensee) dated March.ne application for amendment by Yankee Atom .

23, 1986 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the in 10 Act), and theI;Comission's rules and regulations set forth CFR Chapter B.

The facility will operate in confonnity with the application, the Comission; of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the provisions C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endargering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.

The issuance o* this amendment will not be inimical to the comen defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The of issucnce Comission'sof thesatisfied. this amendment regulations is in requirements and all applicable accordance with have 10 CFR P been 2.

Accordingly. the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment amended to read as follows:and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License

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2 (2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 112 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. -is license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMI'SION S

A Richard H. Wessman, Director Project Directorate I-3 Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: July 19, 1988

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 112 I FXtILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0e DPR-3 l DOCKET NO.50-029 I Pevise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the page identified )

below and inserting the enclosed page. The revised page is identified by the captioned amendment number and cor' ins marginal lines indicating the area of change. 1 PEMOVE INSERT l l

3/4 1-2a 3/4 1-2a 3/4 3-13 3/4 3-13 1 8 3/4 1-1 B 3/4 1-1 1

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1.2 The shutdown margin requirement is as follows:

1. 4700F 1 Tavg Shutdown Margin 1 6%dk/k for Tavg = 5160F
2. 3300F 1 Tavg < 4700F Shutdown Margin 1 5%Ak/k for Tavg = 3300F APPLICABILITY: MODE 3*

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than required, immediately initiate and continue boration at 2'26 gpm of 2200 ppm boron concentration or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is resto' red.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.1.1.2.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to that required:

a. Within one hour af ter detection of an inoperable control rod (s) and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the rod (s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod (s).
b. When in Mode 3, at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by consideration of the following factors:
1. Main Coolant System boron concentration,
2. Control rod position,
3. Main Coolant System average temperature, 4 Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
5. Xenon concentration, and
6. Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.1.2.2 During a reactor startup in which core reactivity or control positions for criticality are not established, a plot of inverse multiplication rate (or count rate) versus reactivity shall be made.

  • See Special Test Exception 3.10.1  !

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l YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 1-2a Amendment No. 82, JM( 112 )

TABLE 3.3-2 (Continued) l TABLE NOTATION

    • The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

(1) Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE with main coolant pressure

<300 psig.

(2) Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE with main coolant pressure

<1800 psig and main coolant temperature <4700F.

(3) Automatic initiation of Actuation Channel ill may be bypassed in this MODE during functional test of the Main Coolant System Loop 1 pressure channel.

Automatic initiation of Actuation Channel #2 may be bypassed in this MODE during functional test of the Main Coolant System loop 2 pressure channel. 1 l

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE channels or sensors one less than the .

1 total number of channels or sensors, be in at least HOT STANDBY '

within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following I 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />; however, one safety injection channel high containment  !

pressure sensor may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.

ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the total nu.nber of channels, STARTUP and POWER OPERATION may proceed provided both of the following conditions are satisfied: )

1. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition i within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. l l
2. The minimum channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however,  !

one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for  ;

surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.

1 ACTION 8 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the I minimum channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HO? STANDBY '

within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 22 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the total number of channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within one hour.

YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 3-13 Amendment No. 81, 83, JE(i 112

.3/4.1 P.EACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made suberitical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity trasients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently suberitical to preclude inadvertant criticality in the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements are a function of the plant operating status. For critical conditions, minimum shutdown margins are limited by the Power Dependent Insertion Limits (PDIL) as given in Figure 3.1-2. For 4700F 1 Ta vg, the requirement for a SHUTDOWN MARGIN is established by l postulated steam line break considerations with ECCS and NRVs available and covers '.he requirements to preclude inadvertent criticality. For 3300F 1T av < 4700F, the requirement for a SHUTDOWN MARGIN is sufficient to l precibdeinadvertentcriticalityandcoverstherequirementsofsteamline breaks with automatic initiation of ECCS and NRVs blocked. With Tavg

< 3300F, the reactivity transients resulting from a steam line break cooldown are minimal. SM k/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN (with all rods inserted) provides adequate protection to preclude criticality for all postulated -

accidents with the reactor vessel head in place.

To eliminate possible errors in the calculations of the initial reactivity of the core and the reactivity depletion rate, the predicted relation between fuel burnup and the boron concentration, necessary to maintain adequate control characteristics, must be adjusted (normalized) to accurately reflect actual core conditions. Normally, when full power is reached after each refueling, and with the control rod groups in the desired positions, the boron concentration is measured and the predicted steady-state curve is adjusted to this point. As power operation proceeds, the measured boron concentration is compared with the predicted concentration and the slope of the curve relating burnup and reactivity is compared with that predicted.

This process of normalization should be completed af ter about 10% of the total core burnup. Thereafter, actual boron concentration can be compared with prediction and the reactivity status of the core can be continuously evaluated, and any deviation would be thoroughly investigated and evaluated.

YANKEE-ROWE B3/4 1-1 Amendment No. 81, [ 112