ML20151K741
| ML20151K741 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/18/1985 |
| From: | Speis T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Arlotto G NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151H810 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-REGGD-01.XXX, RTR-REGGD-1.153, RTR-REGGD-1.XXX, TASK-IC-609-5, TASK-RE NUDOCS 8503260301 | |
| Download: ML20151K741 (17) | |
Text
.
8
+* I\, UNITED $TATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i wAsmwarom, o. c. noses
. e, March 18, 1985
.~-
MEMORANDUM FOR:Wituy'A'.' Ariotto.tS1 rector e
~~ Division of Engineering Technology Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research FROM: Themis P. Speis. Director Division of Safety Technology *
- Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
NRR PEVIEW OF FESRUARY 21, 1985, VERSION OF PROPOSED REGULATORY GUIDE IC 609-5, " CRITERIA FOR ELECTRIC, INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL PORTIONS OF SAFETY SYSTENS" l
We have reviewed the proposed version of the guide and now believe that the staff positions satisfy our previous concerns about IEEE Std. 603-1980.
We understand that the standards comittee is generally in agreement with the staff positions. We have marked Section C of the enclosed copy of the Regulatory Guide with some minor changes. We suggest that Section 8 be rewritten to clearly discuss the regulatory positions.
- M Themis P. Speis, Director Division of Safety Technology Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
As Stated 1
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(9fo33oaoi D7 g.
M4M@ 6UW 14MF
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Fehtuary 21, 1985 g U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CON 11SSION 0FFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH f
- 4AAEE REGULATORY GUIDE APID VALUE/!!9ACT STATEENT Task
..... e _ ,9 A. -S. Hi.n. t.z.e..(.301.) .443.-769.
CRITERIA FOR ELECTRIC, INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL-PORTIONS OF SAFETY SYSTEMS 3.-
l
. A. INTRODUCTION i
}
Appendix A. " General Design Criteria for Nuclea lants," to 10 CFR Part 50, " Domestic Licensing of Production and Utif acilities,"
l contains, among other things, requirennents for s , reliability, <
qualification an systems that perform .
~ auheH__nn lur_r_d finnstestability _.__. .- of - ^'--the protec ,
^
tMr syshes (W as auxiliary rti features) that re the,eperation of the protect N s, taken collec-tively, have been designated as safat by the Institute of Electrical and Electroiics Engineers (IEEE) ute the safety systems addressed in this regulatory guide. The fell eral Design Criteria are applicable to the electric, instriesentati 1 portions of safety systems: I o Criterion 2, "Desi Ba for Protection Against Natural Phenomena " l requires systems 1eportant to y to be designed to withstand the effects (
of natural phenomena without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. !
o Criteri f ronmental and Missile Design Sases," requires syswas important to designed to accommodate the effects of and to be compatible wi the vironmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintene and postulated accidents. l o rien 10, "mescter Om.ign," requires protection systems to be !
I designed wi rgins to assure tha,t fuel damage limits are twt' encoedea.
o Criterion 12. "54ppression of Reactor Power Oscilletions," requir.es protection systems to be designed to prevent er detect ano sLppress power esc 111stions that can result in conditions exceedina fue' desion Ifnits.
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o Criterion 13, CInstrumentation and Control," requires that tstru- l mentation be provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated l ranges for normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and accidents to assure adequate safety and requires appropriate controls to maintain variables and systems within prescribed operating ranges. i o Criterlen 15, " Reactor Coolant Spte Oulen," regulnes '6st &c reac. tor l i
coolant sustsm and assoelated ansktlary, control, and prot *erlan aptsas sludt be destaned enin suffLclent narein to assurt 6At &c des 4en condillons of 6c reactor 1
coolant pressure boundry are not ene** dad during any condLtlen of normat operation, 1='"di g n nW&ted operational occurences.
~
- o Criterion 27, " Electric power Systans," requires electric power systems l to be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components japortant to safety.
o Criterion 18. " Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems,"
requires electric power systems important to safety to be designed to parwit periodic inspection and testing of such systems for operability and functional i performance, o Criterion 20, " Protection System Functions," requires a protection i system to sense anticipated operational occurrences and accidents and initiate i wperation of approp'rfate systems to assure that acceptable limits are not exceeded. l o Criterion 21, " Protection System teliability and Testability," ,
requires the protection system to be designed with high functional reliability and laservice testability. This criterion also requires redundancy and i . independence'to provide protection against single failures and retention of
- redundancy (except where justified) in the event equipment is removed for
' service. On-line testing is required.
o Criterion 22, " Protection System Independence," requires that the effects of natural phenomena, normal operation *, enintenance, testing, and I postulated accident conditions on redundant channels do not result in loss of j the protective function.
o Criterion 23, " Protection System Failure Modes," requires that the protection system be designed to fall into a safe state er'into a state l l
demonstrated to be acceptable on same other basis if conditions'such as dis-l connection of the system, loss of energy, or postulated adverse environments
{ l are experienced4 , , _ , _
i
- 2 l
4 ,
o Criterien 24. " Separation:sf. Protection and Control Systems " requires
' separatten of p'retection and control systems to the extent that failure or ;
removal from service of control equipment er equipment common to protection and centrol 1 paves intact a system ..satisfying all reliability, redundancy, and indepeneence requirements of the protection systan and requires that _
safety not be impaired as a result of the interconnection of protection and control systems.
o Criterion 25. " Protection System Requirements for Reactivity Control l Na1 functions," requires that the protection system be designed to assure I
that specified acceptable fuel design limits will not be exceeded for any i
single malfunction of the reactivity control systems, o Criterion 29. " Protection Against Anticipated Operational Occurrences," {
~
- requires that protection systems and reactivity control systems (a protective' action system) be designed tp he bishly_ reliable in accomplishing their safety functions in the event of anticipated operational accurrences. ,
o Criteria 34, 'tesidual Heat Removal " 35. " Emergency Core Cooling,"
36, " Containment Heat Removal," 41, " Containment Atmosphere Cleanup," and 44, " Cooling Water," require suitable redundancy, interconnections, and iso- ,
lation capabilities to assure that, for onsite and for offsite electric power l system operation, the protective function of these protective action systems can be accesplished assuming a single failure. :
o Criteria 37, " Testing of Emergency Core Cooling System," 40, " Testing f of Containment Heat temeval System," 43, " Testing of Containment Atmosphere l Cleanup Systans," and 46, " Testing of Cooling Water System," require designs l l
to permit periodic functional testing of these systems, the aperability and ,
performance of the active components of the system, and the operability of each (
- of these protective action systems as a whole, including the full operational l I
l sequence that brings each system into operation.
I o Criterion 54, " Piping Systems penetrating Containment," requires
)
- redundancy, reliability, and performance that reflect the isportance of the isolation systems to safety. Capability for periodic testing is also required. .
In addition, 3 50.55a, " Codes and Standards," of 10 CFR Part 50 requires l in paragraph (h) that protection systems meet the requirements set forth in ;
" Criteria for protection Systems for Nuclear power Generating Stations,"
! IEEE Std 279-1971 (also designated ANSI M42.7-1972).
j l 50.49 "Envk-'t'f thalificatlan of Etactric Epipment fsportant to safety l for &ctaar Power Planta," of 10 CFR Part 50 444utra4 that a p4ogamm 6e establi4W l r
! 3
! i
for quellf9 t ag safety-astated etariale aqalpment and esMain non-safet electric equipment.
This guide describes a authed acceptable to the NRC staff for complyin l
with the Ceamission's regulations with respect to the design, reliability, ;
qualification, and testability of the electric, instrumentation, and contr This guide applies to all types of nuclear power portions of safety systems.
l plants. -
i
.. .1Ecos,1, 4 & tmeq ;
IEEE ftd 403-r*0, 8'Crothrla .for safety Systems for w/fds>A q . leer power Generat-l
.s ,re,.r.d my 5.ca ita. s, safety asisted sysums, ef
- in. Stati.ns IEEE Std 900 was the IEEE Nuclear powe (E gin g a gCa g tee (NpfC).
sesequently approved my arr. gene my the IEEE Standards " " non 1990. en the electric, The requirements and recommendations of IEEE 5td 603-1900 instementatten, and controls portions of safety systems incorporate the l 279-1971,* whose scope requirements and recammendations contained in IEEE Std Ceapliance with the provisions of 1s Ileited to protection systems only.
IEEE Std 603-1900, as supplemented in Section C, is considered by the NRC s 279-1971. (The converse is not
&ls f staff te satisfy true swins to the larger scope of IEEE Std the previsions of IEEE Std403-1900.)[14shouldb t .n.r.ar, sa fer mk e.id /sies , i i eulde seu 7
- mededs e assytging l sene M =le= p %M en l
. i 279-197f.-
' ' ' " ^
figytrief discussion of the basis for each regulato sitien 8, ',
l A -
and W' fy kt any pos ns added to l
e day
.s u tsa , . /
V - - - - - - - =
j
- < . Copies ar's available from the Institute of Electrical 10017. and Electron I
United Engineering Center, M5 East 47th Street, New York, NY i 4
i l'
4 .. ..
/ Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation for Light-Water-cooled ;
Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditienfja.urfgents# 0 an l l r en, ,
Following en Accident," provides specific recommenda,t, tonsj3eyg .nejsesign, T l installation,andmaintenanceofcertaininstrumentationjMetoeasTypeA in that regulatory guide. These u r . -d=#1ona, some of ukich sat at variance aslth l
.u. I de requirements of IEEE Std 497-1977, are acceptable for de 2dentification, j e
design, laata!!ntion, and malattnance of 6e dlspbu) laat="-1=fation reAuired 1
="*~+1r for et ==-"=' arm' inn of saft.ty functions for uklch there is no t r
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- f. Settlan 6.S.l(1) of IEEE Std 603-1980 kan bean thanged to carrett a painting i
- e4ror. Additlanally, it is the IstC staff position that the alternative channel or
! equipment should satisfy the single-failure criterion. This means that, for the case of interaction between eense and command features of safety systees and other systems, randos failures must be considered in addition to all consequences of the single crW 'ble event.
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Figurt 1 of 1EEE Std 603-1980 dich ptovidu an latan.p=_=t=Han of Sution 6.S.1 h confuelag and could be adsf*=dl=g in dat de upper left *dlanond' cannot accommodate an event alch, by Ltseti, results in a condLthn sexulring a safety function 6 Lit sinullaneously causing action by a non-safstg systen.. A modifLed chart kan bem su,Wed by 1EEE and h included sa Figure 1 of 61s gulde.
jam _A_ -L_. .A__ AL_ __AA__ .3 __3_g, __,,g _,,3g g A----- Am , ___
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MM*=n' 1EEE etniadande akt listad dn enetian S of 1EEE Std 605-1980, some of dich a44 4afe44 mead in oder sectline of 6e standa44. A4 de eftC staff may not hav W n est e ger n+= daad' a caution 4 provided ,
Asgarding 6tir use.
C. REGULATORY POSITION The requirements (indicated by the vert shall) contained in IEEE Std 603-1980 provide a method acceptable to the IIRC staff for complying with the Commission's regulations with regard to the design, reliability, qualification,
' and testaatlity of the electric, instruentatten, and control portions of
( safety systems as modified and supplemented by the following:
1
- f. 4eddusof Sution 7.'! of IEEE Std 40S-1980, the fatheolag W6e l
useds "Applienfinn. Tkt criterla estab!)shed htAtln are to be applled to att l
In power *, instrumatatlan, and control portions af the plant 4afety aystem.
applying but crLtarla, ne follossing should be undustood in be aynonymoust (f) ettetric portion 4 of de safety 4y4tema, (fI Ct444 FE, and (5) safety-4 l
l L
notated *fortale equipment a4 defined la 50.4, ,S CFR Part 50. t s :d ,
E .c ^- .' ^" t de 4 cope of de 4tandard la b4aader dan (!), (f), or (3) above .
A
.,41 ace., e.g., p=an=ntie instrument 4 may be part of de ufety 4.pten.)"
- power includes electric, p==~tle, andhf*="'1*.*' _
t.
The foltonelagthan deyr!.fp 4kould be ieadded Cf/2(O.M to Section t of 1EEE Std 603-1980s "4afety-s*Iated 4ptema. Those 4ptems noflod upon to remain functlanal during and follaning design ba4La events to saiure -
(f) n e integrity of 6 e amarrar coolant boundary;
~ '
(f) de to 44ut dann de reactor and maintain it la a afe .
condit'an; or (5) de capahitity ta p4 event u =lt>==t* de. canesquence4 of ac-l eldenta skich could 4eault 4x =a**=#1=f off-44tz exposure
- ^== Un to b e 10 CFR pant 100 guideline 4.*
? 3. m ll<= of 6e definillen of *4afety 4ptti in Section t of 1EEE Std 603-i 1980, de fetismalag should be used: "4afety 4ptem. Thesameassafety-sarated M ~
aptem." ;-
= te rse afete - tem is 4
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engineered 4ad l
. -g ,,s i,4<do 4 na. Aafety tem 11 e naifone ef any saf groupf pne >
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- 5. In Section 6.5.1 of TEEE Std 605-1980, de flAst sentence in 6.3.111)"
.s;wa^i k v' i s to read, "Altsanate ch====h not subject to fallwte resulting w ofa thia #a Y&
j from de same ALngte event, shall be provided to 21mit s mypw de conseg event to a value specified by 6e design basis." l_Lu.:4 ,4.L'atternate ,
t channel 4 of 6.5.1(1) and 6e equipment of 6.3.1(!) should meet &c requirtments of Section 5.1 of TEEE Std 605-1980.9 7
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- 6. See4Lon~6:5.1 of'1EEE--Std-605-198fratanneerFigurt:1 Df dM documed 1
.u.
.fc* a decicn-akad-for-applying de requirencQof fh.t_h.sg&iaWF"*^ttre ' ef-603-1980.
M9alde,,-skudd be used instead of. Fi.. gate 7 of IEEE Std. , . - . - - - - - - - - - . - . . . - ,
, ,_ _221.,__ .. .m ___..,_______ _, ________. , , , .u . , . . _ . . , . . .
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.?g Saeeiggg Std 603-198 oder Mandande, r c' ' E. d php54' .~hllst 1 6 43-/F#6 T4 Veferenced in oder a o the cu ent. ~~f. :,-_' t .^'a odirc n gnf>'&
uansanda epe e-9* lsepakato!y in oder regatatong guides, .% ^., ; = ,^ - '_^ t .
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l D. IMPLEMENTATION The purpose of this section is to provide information to applicants and l licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for us.ing this regulatory guide. !
,o_ _______2 _.,2_ <__ <___ __,___ 2 . ____..____ _..<,,_ ___.,_,__.,__
2- -
- ' -- . Except in those cases in which an applicant or._ licensee l proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying'with specif' led portions of the Commission's regulations, the method 6ede described in " thia guide - _ :t ' ; ; f ' f : :--- - ' will be used by the NRC staff in its evalua-tionofthedesign, reliability,qualificationg and testability of the electric, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems a64endho.
- - ^'- ' '---
'-;':--.txti:- it: t: i: :;:: "' ' ' 7- ='- ';
^i .^ ' ' : :::: 5: : : ^'-- 3; 1, '_"? for att con 4 Auction -
Punit W1**ti^ns issued afteA fissue date of nuide . Littnatu or other nW'""*Lis MGW uat $5A Ruidt in diacuaalona ebith 6e staff as justification for the adequacW of the functional and design criteAla for erortric, instAumentation, and conhet portions of de safety swattas. Howevth, the stafi dou not isttend to AnConRtnd Nt allattagtic aWientian of tutry s&ptct of this guide to afants currtntly operating or undtA Atvitse.
S 9
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SL4E ENT
' DOESEVENT NO -
- CAUSE ACTION SV A M
CRITIRfA ygg OF ACfl0N 83'UU IION Q 80 0 l Sees 0m00s R80Winofeo A8so i.
4 Pte0TECTivt '
ACT M 6.3.H12 010T APPLY GDR ffS C000850 1ALSO p N E 10 0 0
,,,0,,a,d,V,E,0,T, 0,.Ovie. s, ,*ggC,T_IVE. Crio AdmON. IN,T,M,0.,,,0 OmOn Tus t O SY IBON-ACTIOe87
' YES l
l T Au ..T l
PAfmCULAR TO 88 l g.wy Ass 0 Figure 1 INTERFRETATION OF SJ.1 OF IEEE Std 0031980
} $CPLM f' G**f 10 7 ef iggg pr/ de 1-/p".. I
. _ _ _ . _ . - ~ _ . - . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _
f l
P6STULATE A CREGISLE EVENT i
d 80 0 DOES WWENT l DOES EVENT SY - CAUSE ACTION SY A _
ITSELFRSSULTIII CON 0ffl0ef -
SIGIMAPETY 2E0U0818000 SAFETY MM7 fU8eCTieft? ,
l l
cama YES m
. . OF 00ES ACTt088 S3.1113 OF MSAFETY sgo SYSTEM RESULT IN !
COf00fTl08e REQU G '
AND i PROTECTIVE
! ACTiose? 6.3.1 YES 180T i
0086 APPLY 79800 EWS88T G0st OueseCESI ALSO ACTt001188 THE -
SYSTEM USl DES 4080E0 ~
TO OE PROTECT 1088 Teet CAUSEOSY 800N-SAFETY ACTIOW7 l
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DOCueAENT SMA&L SE WHTH PAflTICULAR ATTE
> TO SECTIOseS 4.3.N11 0 f S.3.163).
1 Figure 1 INTERPRETATION 6.3.1 OF IEEE Std 9031900
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. 1
'VALUE/ IMPACT ASSESSMENT
- 1. Background The licensee of a nuclear power plant is required by the Commission's regulations j to provide for the design, reliability, qualification, and testability of the pro- ,
tection systems, systems that perfom protection functions, and othir' systems that i are essential to the operation of protection systems and the accomplishment of the t
protection functions. IEEE Std 279-1971, " Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuc-lear Power Generating Stations " is incorporated into the regulations and provides l
requirements and recommendations for the protection systems. IEEE Std 603-1980,
" Criteria for Saf sty Systems for Iluclear Power Generatin'g Stations" provides the same criteria as IEEE Std 279-1971 for pmtection systems, but is expanded in scope and provides additional guidance by including criteria for protection system actua-tion functions and auxiliary systems. This mgulatory guide endorses this additional guidance provided by IEEE Std 603-1980, with appropriate supplementary material.
- 2. Value/Ispact Assessment i
2.1 General The guidance for the design, reliability, qualification, and testability of the
! electric, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems in IEEE Std 603-
[ 1980 is endorsed by this regulatory guide.
2.1.1 Value This action should usult in more effective design, reliability, qualifica':fon l It and testability of safety systems, including auxiliary supporting features. ,
establishes the NRC position on a national consensus standard and therefore reduces uncertainty as to what the staff considers acceptable in the area covered.
11
-,-.--.,_...-,,-.,w y. , . . -~ - ,_,,.__.. _ ,,_ _ _
-,,e--,._,,y,.-_--._,,m-,-._..,..,-,_-.-m.,,,-,_. -,--,,..-_....--.-----...--------,,_..y----
l
'. l 1
1
- 2.1. 2 Impact ,
There should be no impact. IEEE Std 603 was developed with the intent that it eventually supersede IEEE Std 279. Its scope includes the protection system !
as covered in IEEE Std 279, and is further expanded to include power sources ,
and execute features as well as protection systems. In the proce'ss of this expansion in scope, no new requirements are imposed than those already in the Code of Federal Regulations as augmented by the Standard Review Plan. The guld-ance given in this expansion in scope is essentially included in guidance pro-vided in existing regulatory guides. For instance. Regulatory Guide 1.32 en-dorses IEEE Std 308, which provides similar guidance for power sources. Reg-ulatory Guide 1.53 andorses IEEE Std 379 and provides similar guidance for meet-ing the single failure criterion. Regulatory Guide 1.75 endorses IEEE Std 384 and provides similar guidance for physical independence of redundant systems ,
)
and equipment.
- 2.2 Application and Definitions Regulatory Positions 1. 2. and 3. were included to correct the error of citing the fire protection system as an example of a safety-related system and e
to provide clarification to terns used in'the standard.
2.2.1 Value The error should be corrected and the definitions clariffed to eliminate the possibility of misunderstanding.
i 2.2.2 Impact There is no impact since no new requirements are imposed.
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l 2.3 Information Displays Regulatory Position 4 was included to replace the guidance of IEEE Std 497- )
l 1977 with Regulatory Guide 1.97 as it pertains to display for manually controlled actions. .
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2.3.1 Value Regulatory Guide 1.97 was developed to provide the staff's position with re-gard to display for manually controlled sctions. The acceptability of all of the guidance of IEEE Std 497-1977 has not yet been detemined by the staff, although it is known that some of its provisions are at variance with staff recommendations, i.e.. some ways of meeting the single failure criterion.
j 2.3.2 Impact There is no impact since no new requirezents are imposed.
i 2.4 Interaction Regulatory Position 5 was included to cornet a printing error. In addition, a statement was added to make it clear that requirements cf the single failure i
criterion also apply to interaction between sense and command features and other systems.
2.4.1 Value The error should be corrected in order that proper understanding of the stand-ard can be obtained. Additionally, it is important to make certain the understand-ing that all parts of system should meet the single failure criterion.
2.4.2 Impact ,
i There is no impact since no new requirements are imposed.
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2.5 Interaction Chart Regulatory Position 6 was included to replace a figure that was confusing but which was intended to help in the decision process for applying the require-ments of Section 6.3.1 of IEEE Std 603-1980.
2.5.1 Value l The new figure eliminates the confusion that was in the original figure and accomplishes the intent of aiding the decision making process in applying requirements.
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2.5.2 Impact There is no impact as the new chart was supplied by the writing group who authored IEEE Std 603-1980 and it imposes no new requirements.
I 2.6 References Regulatory Position 7 was included to provide the staff position regarding i the referenced national consensus standards in IEEE Std 603-1980.
2.6.1 Value It provides the user of the standard with information, where applicable, regarding the staff position of using the standards listed as references.
2.6.2 Impact f
There is no impact since no new requirements are imposed.~
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