ML20150C678

Summary of 880517 Meeting W/Util Re Fuel Insp & Reconstitution Planned by Util & GE W/Goal of Avoiding Fuel Failures During Fuel Cycle Following Restart.Viewgraphs Encl

ML20150C678
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	07/07/1988
From:	Gears G NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
To:	NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
References
TAC-00347, TAC-347, NUDOCS 8807120587
Download: ML20150C678 (22)

Text

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UNITED ST ATES 3

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j

g WASHINGTON, D. C 20666 j.

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July 7, 1988 Docket No. 50-260 APPLICANT:

Tennessee Valley Authority FACILITY:

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2

SUMMARY

OF MEETING HELD ON MAY 17, 1988 - FUEL INSPECTION AND RECONSTITUTION (TACNO.00347)

On May 17, 1988, members of the Office of Special Projects (OSP) stiff met with representatives of the Tennessee Valley A'!thority (TVA or the licensee).

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss NRC fuel inspection and reconstitution issues for Browns Ferry, Unit 2.

The OSP staff concerns were identified in a May 11, 1988 letter to Mr. S. A. White (attached as Enclosure 1 for background). is a list of meeting attendees and Enclosure 3 is a copy of the TVA handout for the May 17, 1988 meeting.

The fuel inspection and reconstitution program had been planned by TVA and GE with the goal of avoiding fuel failures during the fuel efela following restart. The NRC had approved the Cycle 6 reload.

The piant had never been restarted and the fuel from all three units hao been removed to fuel pools.

By letter of April 11, 1988 the NRC transmitted a Safety Evaluation which concluded that the proposed fuel inspection and reconstitution activities should be safely performed in the context of issues involving the adequacy of the Unit 2 secondary containment.

In a sub;equent letter and meeting notice.

both dated May 11, 1988, the NRC sought additional information on the scope and safety significance of the fuel inspection and reconstitution program.

l The requested information was provided primarily during the meeting of May 18, 1988.

In advance of the meeting, the NRC steff reviewed the TVA Special Test Procedure (ST-8814) developed for the BFN Unit 2 fuel reconstitution program. lists a consolidation of meeting agenda items and NRC comments on the adequacy of responses.

Discussion The handout provides background, history, planned scope and bases for the Reconstitution Plan.

The status as of May 15 reported that an excessively

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high percentage of unacceptable rods were being found.

Various alternatives to ST 8814 were being considered.

Alternatives included possible use of Unit 1 fuel, Unit 3 fuel or some combination of the fuel from all three units.

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~ TVA has. identified fuel limits-for; the reconstitution of the bundles which would avoid the4 necessity for analysis.

They have also committed to perform a reanalysis if they cannot provide a~ core fully satisfying the limit.

.l Followup Items The staff is to be kept inforned as to:

1.

Status of inspection and reconstitution program.

2.

Selection of an alternate program to ST-8814 and preparation of a new procedui e, if riccessary.

3.

Changes from the Cycle 6 refueling cycle )nd effects on assumptions of i

existing NRC safety evaluatic,n of Cycle 4.

Changes in secondary containment readiness to accommodate alternate fuel reconstitution program.

J If you have any questions on the above, please call J. Watt at -(301) 492-0793.

Original Signed by Gerald E. Gears, Project Manager TVA Projects Division Office of Special Projects

Enclosures:

1.

hay 11, 1988 Letter 2.

Attendance List 3.

May 17, 1988 TVA - NRC Meeting 4

Agenda Items With NRC Coments 5.

Evaluation of As-Reconstituted Bundle cc w/ enclosures:

See Next Page 4

i Distribution Docket File NRC PDR Local PDR Those on Attacher List

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L 7 plSTRIBUTIdN FOR MEETING

SUMMARY

DATED: July 7, 1988 Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3*

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Docket 4ilt-NRC PCR Local POR Projects Reading J. Partlow J. Axelrad S. Richardso S. Black B. D. Liaw G. Gears

0. Moran J. Kelly M. Sims OGC J. Rutberg F. Miraglia E. Jordan C. Wither D. Joy F. Whitt D. Fieno Shih-Liang Wu A. Marinos C. R. Brooks F. McCoy W. S. Little J. Watt L. E. Phillips ACRS(10)

I M. Callahan (S)

P. Gwynn J. Scarborough T. Elsasser C. Ader TVA-Rockville BFN Rdg. File

• cc: Licensee / Applicant & Service List y

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' Browns feFry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3 CC' General Counsel Regional Administrator, Region II Tennessee Valley Authority U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 400 West Summit Hill Drive 101 Marietta Street, N.W.

E11 B33 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Resident Inspector / Browns Ferry NP Mr. R. L. Gridley U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Tennessee Valley Authority Route 12,. Box 637 SN 157B Lookout Place Athens, Alabama 35611 Chattanooga, Tennesset 37402-2801 Dr. Henry Myers, Science Advisor Mr. H. P. Pomrehn Committee on Interior Tennessee Valley Authority and Insular Affairs Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant U.S. House of Representatives P.O. Box 2000 Washington, D.C.

20515 Decatur, Alabama 35602 Mr. S. A. White Mr. M. J. May Senior Vice President, Nuclear Group Tennessee Valley Authority Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 6N 38A Lookout Place P.O. Box 2000 1101 Market Street Decatur, Alabana 35602 Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801 Mr. D. L. Williams Tennessee Valley Authority 400 West Summit Hill Drive W10 885 Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Chairman, Limestone County Commission P.O. Box 188 Athens, Alabama 35611 Claude Earl Fox, M.D.

State Health Officer State Department of Public Health State Office Building Montgomery, Alabama 36130 i

UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATOMY COMMISSION o

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20666

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May 11, 1988 Docket No. 50-260 Mr. S. A. White Manager of Nuclear Power Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

SUBJECT:

FUEL INSPECTION AND RECONSTITUTION FOR BROWNS FERRY, UNIT 2 By letter dated April 11, 1988, we transmitted to you a Safety Evaluation pertaining to seismic qualifications of secondary containment penetrations.

Our analysis also included an evaluation of the proposed fuel inspection and reconstitution activities for Browr.s Ferry, Unit 2.

We concluded that the proposed fuel inspection and reconstitution activities were acceptable in the context of the issues involving adequacy of the Unit 2 secondary containment and the proposed control measures to be implemented prior to and during the fuel pin inspection and reconstitution work.

A sjor assumption relied upon in your submittal is that the reconstitution effort would not significantly change the nuclear characteristics of the fuel assemblies and, therefore, the reload core analysis, reload Technical Specifications and the NRC reload Safety Evaluation of-August 19, 1986 would remain valid. Due to initial iindings of your fuel inspection o"forts, verification that the reconstitution effort has not changed your core reload analysis is required prior to Unit 2 fuel reload. To detennine early detection of potential core reload reanalysis problems, you need to document your criteria and methods of accounting for fuel pin replacement. Two areas of accountability are of. concern. The first is the nuclear makeup of the reconstituted fuel to be placed in the reactor. The second is a record of the disposition of fuel to casks or to assemblies from where doner rods were removed.

The staff requires documentation of fuel assembly characteristics including a i

key for location of fuel rods and tables describing the reconstituteo bundle rods and the doner bundle rods. We also require your description of the method to be used to address the age and storage effects on fuel performance and TVA criteria which would support your position that a revised reload analysis would not be required as a result of the reconstitution program. We will review your documentation and criteria for acceptability.

In addition, we request you respond to the enclosed questions concerning accountability of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) with respect to your reconstitution effort.

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'2-May ll, 1988 Mr. S. A. White The responses to the questions contained in our request are required within 30 days from the date of the letter.

The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P. L.96-511.

j If you have any questions, concerning this letter, please contact your Project or Lead Technical Reviewer, J. Watt at Manager, G. Gears at (301) 492-0767 (301)492-0793.

Sincerely,

)

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Robert A. Hennann, Acting Assistant Director TVA Projects Division Office of Special Projects Questions Concerning Accountability of Special Nuclear Materials cc w/ enclosure:

See next page a

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ENCLOSURE QUESTIONS CONCERNING ACCOUNTABILITY OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS BROWNS FERRY, UNIT 2 Before disassembly operations are actually initiated -- involving any 1.

fuel assembly to be inspected or any donor fuel assembly -- the total SNM Such content of each. fuel assembly must be determined and recorded.

total SNM content (i.e., total uranium elenent, U-235 and total plutonium element) shall be the original fuel fabricator's value corrected for burn-up and transmutation.

3NN content assigned to any individual fuel pin (rod) removed from a 2.

L.ent fuel assembly shall be the total assembly SNM content (from 1 above) divided by the number of fuel rods in the assembly.

The revised total SNM content assigned to each reconstituted fuel 3.

assembly and each donor. assembly shall be the value established in Step 1 minus the value of each fuel rod removed plus the value for each rod added (with rod valves being those determined from Step 2).

The SNM content assigned to any container used to storage damage fuel 4.

rods shall be the summation of the individual rod values for those rods in the container.

If the individual fuel rods are not uniquely identified, only rods from a single assembly shall be stored within a given container, and the container must be uniquely identified.

S',

Adequate documentation and records shall be mainta'inad to provide traceability of all assigned SNM values, i

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l ENCLOSURE 2-4 ATTENDANCE LIST MAY 17, 1987 Oroanization ime G. Gears OSP/TVA M. J. Ray TVA/DNLRP Jerry Robertson TVA/DNE Tom Rehm TVA/DNE T. A. Keys TVA/DNE Jim Robert TVA/DNE M. J. May TVA/ Licensing Carl Wither NMSS/SGLB Don Joy NMSS/SGLB Frank Witt NRR/ECEB Daniel Fieno NRR/f.RXB Shih-Liang Wu NRR/SRXB Angelo Parinos OSP/TVA B. D. Liaw OSP/TVA P. J. Polk TVA/Rochville C. R. Brooks OSP/DTVAP X. P. Barr OSP/TVA Jim Watt OSP/TVA L. E. Phillips NRR/SRXB

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ENCLOSURE 3 TVA - NRC MEETING l

l MAY 17, 1988

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-i BROWNS: FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT FUEL INSPECTION / RECONSTITUTION PROGRAM i

5385B

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l INTRODUCTION M. J. MAY l

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BACKGROUND J. D. ROBERTSON PHYblCS ANALYSES T. D. BEU INSPECTION AND RECONSTITUTION J. T. ROBERT RESULTS TVA ALTERNATIVES J. D. ROBERTSON 9

I 4

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5385B.

BACKGROUND

- CILC - CRUD INDUCED LOCALIZED CORROSION A CLAD-FAILURE MECHANISM UNIQUE TO BWRS WITH:

HIGH POWER DENSITY COPPER ALLOY CONDENSER TUBES FILTER DEMINERALIZER CONDENSATE CLEANUP SYSTEMS BFN HAS 3 0F 15 SUCH BWRS BFN FUEL FAILURES HAVE NEVER CAUSED TECH SPEC LIMITS TO BE EXCEEDED (0R EVEN APPR0 ACHED)

FIRST CILC FAILURES IN 1978, VY RESPONSE TO CILC GE - INVESTIGATIONS, R&D BEGAN SEGREGATING CLADDING DEVELOPED MORE CORROSION RESISTANT CLADDING UTILITIES - REMOVE FAILED AND SUSPECT FUEL INSPECT, RECONSTITUTE

(>740 BUNDLES RECONSTITUTED) 53948 JDR 5/16/88

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1 HISTORY - 9/84 TO PRESENT TOOK ACTION TO MINDfIZE NUMBER OF FAILURES IN CYCLE 6, o

ASSUMING CILC 0F GAD RODS RB0VED ALL 50 FAILED ASSBBLIES RBIOVED 58 ADDITIONAL ASSBfBLIES WITH HIGH CILC SUSCEPTIBILITY RESTRICTED 54 LESS SUSCEPTIBLE ASSE4BLIES TO LOW POWER CORE LOCATIONS REDESIGNED (5/85) AND LICENSE JDORE (8/86)

DISCUSSED N FUEL RELIABILITY WITH NRC ON 10/31/85 AND o

2/20/86 JULY 87 DISCUSSIONS WITH GE WERE SIGNIFICANT o

MANY RECENT UO2 ROD FAILURES-(36% VS 20% IN 1984)

IMPROVED'. VISUAL STANDARD FOR CLASSIFYING FAILURE PROBABILITY e

1 REACHED AGREBfENT WITH BFN TO o

VISUALLY INSPECT BFN2 FUEL TO IDENTIFY LIKELY-TO-FAIL ASSEMBLIES KECONSTITUTE FUEL IF NECESSARY EXAMINE BFN 1 AND 3 FUEL ALSO PRIOR TO RESTART OF THOSE UNITS 4

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Number'of Bundles Priority for Reload Load in 0tola 6 Visual InsDect Tnneect Reconstitute PS 304 o

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R4 248 50 1

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}J 152 152 3

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1 764 262 t

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s. e Bases for Reconstitution Plau Make the reconstituted bundle look like the original bundle

- Ensure no special licensing, analysis, core monituing requirements Maintain validity of fuel design licensing bases

- Peak pellet exposure

- Conservative assumptions on cycle length and donor rod exposure

- Bundles grouped according to intended core location (power)

- Reconstitute within each group Maintain nuclear characteristics equivalent to original bundle J

i

- Restrict allowed rod exchanges

- End plug / upper tie plate matchup

- Donor bundle exposure

- Limiting criterion is increase in lattice power peaking n.

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- 35 limit based on NRC-approved criteria for significance of changes to input for GESTR (Amendment 7 to GESTAR-II)

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Evaluation of As-Reconstituted Bundles f

Check against list of allowable rod exchanges i

Physics analyses

- Actual recipient and donor exposures

- Check change in lattice physics

- Check axial effects

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Parameters of interest.

Acceptance Criteria

- Lattice power peaking 3 5 increase

- Peak pellet exposurt Limit at EOC (Lattice exposure peaking)

(1.10 at EOC)

- Reactivity 0.25 %dk

- Detector response 55 Evaluation confirms reccutituted bundla a or,iginal bundle e

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g Evaluation of Cycle Design Model reconstituted bundle.as the original bundle Redefine core loading / loading pattern Re-evaluate cycle dasign, saf oty and licensing analyses Make licensing submittals, if necessary t

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BWR Reload C2re D3 sign, Safety and Lic:nsing Analyses Cycle Operations

- Haling

- Stepwise Burn Nuclear Safety Calculations

- Cold Shutdown Margin

- Standby Liquid Control System Capability

- Hot Excess Reactivity

- Fuel Loading Error

- Rod Withdrawal Error

- Loss of Feedwater Heating Fuel Bundle Mechanical Design Limits

- L$GR Limits

- Thermal /Hechanical Compliance Check l

Transient Analyses l'

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- System Analyses

- CPR Analyses (Pressurization Events)

- CPR Analyses (Quasi-Static Events)

Accident Analyses

- Loss of Coolant Accident

- Control Rod Drop Accident Stability Analyses

l Effect of L ng Shutdown m

Negative reactivity effect

- Decay of fissile material

- Buildup of fission and activation products Analytical model

- Use TGBLA to define reactivity loss af ter shutdown

- Revise core sirulator's lattice physics library

- Perform BOC analyses Results

- 0 3 %dk reactivity loss at cold conditions

- 0.4 %dk reactivity loss at rated conditions

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- Comparable to PWR plants after long shutdown

- Effect burns out quickly after startup l

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Effect on core design, safety and licensing analyses

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- HOC and DOR analyses not affected

- BOC analyses will account for reactivity loss

- Cold shutdown margin

- Hot excess reactivity

- Target control rod patterns 4

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BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 FUEL INSPECTION RESULTS MAY 15, 1988 RELOAD 4

7 3

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ASSEMBLIES INSPECTED 19/50 14/96 5/208 UNACCEPTABLE RODS:

VS-5 149*

15**

37' VS-6 33 6-1 FUEL ASSEMBLIES ACCEPTABLE 2

2' 1

RECONSTITUTED ASSEMBLIES 0

11 2

TOTAL ASSEMBLIES ACCEPTABLE 2

13

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TOTAL ASSEMBLIES NEEDED 248 60 152 4

• U0 AND GD RODS 2

• GD RODS ONLY 5401B

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ALTERNATIVES FOR UNIT 2 CORE GOAL RELIABLE U2CY6 CORE LOADING THAT CAN. BE OPERATED AT 100 PERCENT POWER 1.

ONCE-BURNT FUEL.FROM UNIT 1 TWICE-BURNT FUEL FROM UNIT 2 RECONSTITUTION 2.

ONCE-AND 'DVICE-BURNT FUEL FROM UNIT 3 1

u 3.

ALL OR PART OF UNIT 3, FUEL ll u

4.

RECONSTITUTED FUEL FROM ALL THREE UNITS 5.

NEf. FUEL l

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i SUl41ARY AND CONCLUSIONS DEFINED EXTENSIVE FUEL INSPECTION PROGRAM TO o

LIKELY-TO-FAIL RODS IN-LINE RECONSTITUTION iVHERE APPROPRIATE WELL PLANNED AND EXECUTED INSPECTI'ON RESULTS WORSE THAN EXPECTED o

SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES AVAILBLE FOR REPLACING o

FUEL VALIDITY OF CURRENT CY6 LICENSING BASIS FOR REC o

i CORE WILL BE EXPLICITLY CHECKED _

IF NECESSARY,' NEW RELOAD ANALYSES (AND TECH SPECS)

WILL BE PRODUCED

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.b ENCLOSURE 4

,,g AGENDA ITEMS FOR MEETING ON FUEL INSPECTION AND RECONSTITUTION (WITH NRC COP 94ENT5 ON TVA RESPONSES)_

l l

l 1.

Requirements / Criteria for fuel inspection and reconstitution activities (TVA) a.

Criteria for fuel inspection b.

Criteria to verify current reload analysis (core physics accountability methods)

Response

The combination of staff review of Special Test Procedures ST 8814 and the TVA presentations at the meeting satisfactorily briefed the staff on the criteria for fuel inspection.

The core physics accountability methods were explained and illustrated by an example, Enclosure 5 was provided to NRR during the meeting.

2.

Findings on recent Unit 2 fuel inspections (TVA) a.

Significance b.

Alternatives to planned activitues

Response

The inspection of Cycle 4 fuel has revealed greater crud build up than expected. The sample of bundles inspected so far has indicated that more than 20 rods per bundle would need to be replacea with donor rods, this exceeding one criteria of the program.

Alternatives being considered include using Unit 1 fuel and/or Unit 2 fuel.

3.

Safeguards and SNM accountability (TVA),.What documentation will be available to NRC.

j

Response

Procedure ST 8814 and the presentation satisfied imediate concerns for a description of the program.

Although all infonnation will be available for NRC review, it was proposed that a copy of the sumary package to be submitted to PORC also be provided to the NRC PM.

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.o 4.

SNM: Has ST 8814 been updated to account for fuel reconstitution activities simultaneously from two units; three units?

Response

New procedures will be written for inspection and reconstitution programs involving two or three units. The alternate program has not been selected j

as yet.

5.

OSP/NRR:

Discuss critera for fuel going back into spent fuel pool; i.e.,

criticality criteria, structural criteria.

Response

Criticality is not considered a problem with the donor assemblies being returned to the fuel pool.

If rods are not structurally sound, they will be placed in casks rather than being restored to assemblies.

6.

OSP/NRR: What are the visual criteria being used?

Response

The inspection tech'niques:abd criteria were presented by the TVA at the May 17, 1988 meeting. TVA's presentation resulted in a satisfactory description of TVA's visual criteria.

• 7.

OSP/NRR: Are there any Exxon rods at Browns Ferry?

i

Response

No. Browns Ferry has no Exxon fuel.

8.

OSP/NRR:

Discussions on possible causes of crud formation leading to fuel problems. What plans are in place to prevent reoccurrence?

Response

This discussion was then called because of time. The crud of concern is the result of copper interaction with the zircaloy cladding.

The source of the cooper has been the bronze tubes in the condenser.

The condenser is being retubed with stainless steel.

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Evaluation of As-Reconstituted Bundle LJD987

. Recipient Bundle: LJD987 Donor Bundle: LJD967 Parameter Acceptance Criteria Analysis at 40% Yoid Lattice power peaking 3 5 increase 1.45 5 decrease

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Lattice exposure peaking 1.10 at EOC 1.10 at 80C Reactivity 0.25 $dk 0.19 %dk increase Detector response 55 0.63 5 decrease Evaluation oonfirms reconstituted bundle a original bundle i

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SUMMARY

TABLE RECIPIENT: LJD987 RODS SWAPPED: 7 DONOR:

LJD967 405 VOID (NODE 11)

EXPOSURE RECIPIENT Ef&H 1 DbTA K-INF:

22.819 1.0168 1.0181 0.13 5 DELTA K P2.824 1.0167 1.0182 0.14 5 DELTA'K 28.319 0.9674 0.9692 0.19 5 DELTA K 33.819 0 9220 0 9240 0.19 5 DELTA K 39.319 0.8813 0.8832 0.19 5 DELTA K 44.819 0.8453 0.8471 0.18 5 DELTA K 50 319 0.8144 0.8159 0.16 5 DELTA K LPF:

22.819 1.0903 1.0746

-1.45 22.824 1.0903 1.0747

-1.44 28.319 1.0852 1.0735

-1.08 33.819 1.0773 1.0693

-0.75 39.319 1.0660 1.0608

-0.49 44.819 1.0517 1.0488

-0.28 50 319 1.0718 1.0685

-0 31 DETECTOR 22.819 0 9836 0.9783

-0.54 A/P:,

22.824 0 9838

'O.9785

-0.54 l

28.319 1.0598 1.0534

-0.61 33 819 1.1382 1.1310

-0.63 c.63 j

39.319 1.2174

. 1.2097 o

44.819 1.2942 1.2863

-0.61 50 319 1 3661 1.3564

-0.57 EIPOSURE PE11/ AVE:

22.824 1.105 1.192 7.58 28.319 1.099 1.154 4.88 33.819 1.094 1.130 3 24 39 319 1.089 1.113 2.18 44.819 1.084 1.100 1.47 50.319 1.07 8 1.0 90 1.10 CURRENT EXPOSURE 22.8190 23 0923 1.19 CURRENT U235 CONC 6.1512E-05 6.1902E-05 0.63

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Rod Tvoe U02/G4 Number Rod Tvoe UO2/Gd Number 1

3 95/ 0 16 5

2.00/ 0 4

2 3 30/ 0 to ST 2.00/

0 2

2T 3 30/ 0 4

6 1.70/ 0 2

3 3 00/ 0 4

7 1 30/ 0 1

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