ML20150C567
| ML20150C567 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/17/1988 |
| From: | Crutchfield D, Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8807120540 | |
| Download: ML20150C567 (2) | |
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JUN 2 7 3333 MEMORANDUM FOR: All BWR Project Managers FROM:
Steven A. Varga, Dire'ctor Division of Reactor Projects - 1/11 Dennis M. Crutett ield, Director f
Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, Y and Special Projects SUCJECT:
NRC BULLET ] N0. 85-03, SUPPLEMENT 1: MOTOP<0PERATED VALVE COMMON MODE FAILURES DURING PLANT TRAh51ENTS DUE TO IMPROPER SWITCH SETTINGS The original Bulletin, IEB 85-03, was issued November 15, 1985 as one consequence of the Davis-Besse event of June 9, 1985.
Subsequent responses fron BWk facili-ties indicated some misunderstanding existed concerning the scope of valves to be addressed and the meaning of the term "inadvertent equipment operations."
The primary purpose of Supplement I to IEB 85-03 is to clar,fy these misunder-standings and require license holders to revise their MOV programs and reports to incorporate any additional valves thi.t were originally intended.
The NRC issued Bulletin 85-03, Supplement 1 on April 27 1988 to all holders of operatinglicensesorconstructionpermitsforBWRs.
ThIssupplementalbulletin requires these holders to develop and implement a progran to ensure valve operator switches are properly selected, set, and aaintained for safety-relateo motor-operated valves in the HPCI, Core Spray, and RCIC systems.
Furthermore, within thirty days, each holder shall submit a written reput to the NRC documenting the results of their review to define the maximum differential pressure during valve operation, and establishing an implementation schedule in accordance with guidelines in the supplemental bullctin. A final report is also required within sixty days after the program is completed.
A co)y of Bulletin 85-03, Supplement 1 is attached.
The lead Project Manager is T11erry Ross (23016), and the technical review contact is Dick Kiessel (x21154). Plant specific TAC numbers and MPA number were not taken out for this supplemental bulletin.
Applicable NRR technical staff should already be on automatic distribution for all licensee responses.
Evaluation of licensee responses %r the original bulletin and its supplement is and will continue to be conducted by Paraneter, an NRC contractor.
Results of these evaluations Nill be submitted as feeder reports by the Generic Comunications Branch to each applicable region in 8
accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Temporary Instruction 2515/73. The regians, Jr
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JUN 17_1988 e
- in turn, are esponsible for transmitting these results to.their respective licu: sees. Consequently, the Project Manager's involvement will be minimal; primarily limited to checking that their. licensee responds as required.
Steven A. Varga, Director-Division of Reactor Projects - 1/II Dennis H. Crutchfielc', Director Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects
Enclosure:
As stated DISTRIBUTION:
Docket File SVarga NRC/ Local PDRs JThoma DCrutchfield GHolahan RDudley LLuthar L01shan 0GC-Rockville EJordan JPartlow ACRS (10)
PDIII-2 Plant File PDIII-2 R/F S. Varga B. Boger G. Lainas L. Rubenstein *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE OFC
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NAME :lluther
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DATE :0 /7/88
- 6 /7/88
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ENCLOSURE OMB No.: 3150-0011 i.
NRCB B5-03 Supplement 1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR PEACTOR REGULATION WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 April 27, 1988 NRC BULLETIN NO. 8S-03, SUPPLEMENT 1: MOTOR-OPERATED VALVE COMMON MODE P.ILUSES DURING PLANT TRANSIENTS WT TG IMPROPER SWITCH SETTINGS Addressees-All holders of operating licenses or construction pennits for be111ng water reactors (BWRs).
purpose:
The purpose of this supplement to NRC Bulletin 85-03 (B 85-03), "Motor-Operated Yalve Comon Fede Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings," is to clarify (1) which valves are to be included and (?) the meaning of the phrase "... inadvertent equipment operations (such as in-advertent valve closures or openings 1..." as used in the bulletin.
Backoround:
B 85-03, which was issued on November 15, 1985, was p sipted by the June 9, 1985 event at the Davis-Besse plant in which the inability to reopen two vaives that had inadvertently been closed led to a loss of both trains of the auxiliary feed-water system.
Discussion:
Review of the responses to B 85-03 from BWR facilities, including those from the owners group, has indicated that there is a misunderstanding in regard to the related issues of (1) which valves are to be included and (2) the meaning of the phrase "... inadvertent equipment operations (such as inadvertent valve closures or openings)..." as used in the bulletin.
The first misunderstanding pertains to which valves are addressed by the bulle-tin. As written, the action portion of B 85-03 applies to rotor-operated valves in selected systems that "... are required to be tested for operational readi-ness in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g).. ? At the time the bulletin was issued, the staff believed that the inservice testing programs required by 1
10 CFR J.55a(g) were applicable to most, if not all, of the safety-related valves in the selected systems. However, recent conversations with the owners group and several licersees have indicated that a number of valves in these systems are nonnally kept in their safety positions and are not covered by the
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NRCB 85-03, Supplement 1 April 27, 1988 Page 2 of 4 inservice testing program. However, if the proper precautions are not taken, these valves which are nonna11y properly positioned could be mispositioned, either before or during the initial phases of an event. This would render the safety system inoperable unless the valves could be repositioned to the proper position. Therefore, the heading of the action section of R 85-03 has been revised to include all safety-related valves in the selected systems.
The meaning of the phrase "... inadvertent equipment operation (such as in-advertent valve closures or openings)..." used in action item a of the bulletin can also be nisundersto.ed. This phrase stems from the desire to address the salient feature of the Davis-Besse event -- namely, the inability to reposition either of two redundant valves that had been mispositioned earlier in the event. Althouoh it was not the intent of the bulletin to expand the design-basis events fer plants, it was intended to ensure the high reliability of individual safety systems. To this end, and given the chain of events associated with the Davis-Resse event, the staff felt that the only way to ensure this high reliability was to verify the ability of all valves to recover from mispositioning. Therefore, action item a of B 85-03 has been revised to clearly indicate that each motor-operated valve must be able to recover from an inadvertent mispositioning.
This revision to B 85-03 may expand the number of valves addressed by some licensees.
In addition, some of these licensees may have already completed their scheduled activities to comply with the bulletin, Therefore, the time limits for completing all the activities (action item e) have been modified to allow additional time for those licensees who have already completed their planned activities.
Actions for All BWR Holders of Operatina Licenses or Construction Permits:
For safety-related motor-operated valves in the high pressure coolant infection /
core spray and reactor core isolation coolirig systems not included in the actions planned or completed in response to the original bulletin, develop and implement a program tc ensure that valve operator switches are selected, set, and main-tained properly. This should include the following:
a.
Review and document the design basis for the operation of each valve.
This docuwntation should include the maximum differential pressure expected during both opening and closing of the valve for both nomal and abnormal events to the extent that the events are included in the existing, approved design basis (i.e., the design basis documented in pertinent licensee submittels such as FSAR analyses and fully approved operating and emergency procedures, etc.).
In addition, when 6etemining mispositioned,{ferential pressure for valves that can be inadvertently the maximum di the fact that the valve must be able to recover from such mispositioning should be included.
IAny motor-operated valve that is not blocked from inadvertent operation from either the control room, the motor control center, or the valve itself should be considered capable of being mispositioned.
l NRCB 85-03, Supplement 1 April 27, 1988 Page 3 of 4 b.
Perform action item b of the original bulletin for any additional valves identified above.
The intent is to provide assurance that a program exists for selecting and setting valve operator switches to ensure a high reliability of sefety system valves.
If changing the switch settings is not sufficient to ensure the capability for repositioning a particular mispositioned valve, a justification for continued operation should be provided in the bulletin response if the licensee does not elect to implement additional actions, such as administrative or procedural controls or equipment modifications, to 'ninimize the likelihood of valve malfunction.
c.
Perfom action item e of the original bulletin for any additional valves identified above, d.
Perfom action item d of the original bulletin for any additional valves identified above.
e.
Within 30 days of receipt of this supplement, sutunit a written report to the NRC that, for any additional valves:
(1) provides the revised results of item a, above and (2) contains a schedule for completion of items b through d, above.
1.
No char.ges from the schedule for complying with the original bulletin are anticipated for plants with an OL that, e.s of the date c# this supplement, had not yet begun the refueling outage during which the j
activities in the original bulletin were scheduled to be accomplished, 2.
Plants with an OL that, as of the date of this supplement, have com-pleted their planned activities in response to the original bulletin have until the completion of their next refueling outage to coeplete any additional activities resulting from this supplement. The final report covering the activities already completed in response to the original bulletin shall be submitted in accordance with the original schedule.
3.
No changes from the schedule for complying with the cricinal bulletin are anticipated for plants with a CP.
f.
Revise the report requested by the original bulletin to include any eddi-tional valves. This revised report shall be submitted to the NRC with'n 60 days of completion of the program for the additional valves.
Additional Related Generic Communications' B 85-03 identified a number of related generic comunications. Since its issuance on November 15, 1985, the following additional related information notices have been issued:
a.
Infomation Notice No. 86-29, ' Effects of Changing Va'.'ve Motor-Operator Switch Settings," was issued on April 25, 1986.
l NRCB 85-03 Supplement 1 1
April 27, 1988 Page 4 of 4 b.
Infomation Notice No. 86-93, "IEB 85-03 Evaluation of Motor-Operators Iden-tifies-improper Torque Switch Settings," was issued on November 3,1986.
c.
Infonnation Notice No. 87-01, "RHR Valve Misalignment Causes Degradation of ECCS in PWRS," was issued on ianuary 6, 1987 l
The written reports requested above shall be addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, ATTN: Docisnent Control Desk, Washington, D.C.
- 20555, under oath or affirmation under the provisions of Section 182a, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
In addition, a copy shall be submitted to the appro-priate Regional Ac'ministrator.
This request for information was approved by the Office of Management and Budget under clearance number 3150-0011. Comments on burden and duplication should be directed to the Office of Management and Budget. Reports Management, Room 3?08, New Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C.
20503.
Although no specific request or requirement it intended, the time required to complete each acticn item above would be helpful to the NRC in evaluating the cost of this bulletin.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
}q-f Charles E. Ro[ssi, m Director Division cf Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Technical
Contact:
Richard J. Kiessel, NRR (301) 492-1154
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Bulletins
'g' Attachment NRCB 85-03. Supplement 1 April 27, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC BULLETINS Bulletin Date of No.
Subiect Issuance Issued to l
87-02, Fastener Testing to 4/22/88 All holders of OLs Supplement 1 Detemine Confomance or cps for nuclear 1
with Applicable Material power reactors.
Specifications J P8-03 Inadequate Latch Engagement 3/10/88 All holders of OLs in HFA Type Latching Relays or cps for nuclear Manufactured by General power reactors.
Electric (GE) Company 88-02 Rapidly Prcpagating Fatigue 2/5/88 All holders o' OLs Cracks in Steam Generator or cps for W-designed Tubes nuclear podr reactors with steam generators having carbon steel support plates.
88-01 Defects in Westinghouse 2/5/88 All holders of OLs Circuit Breakers or cps for nuclear power reactors.
87-02 Fastener Testing to 11/6/87 All holders of OLs Detemine Confomance or cps for nuclear with Applicable Meterial power reactors, Specifications 87-01 Thinning of Pipe Walls in 7/9/87 All licensees for Nuclear Power Plants nuclear power plants holding an OL or CP.
86-04 Defective Teletherapy Timer 10/29/86 All NRC licensees That May Not Teminate Dose authorized to use cobalt-60 teletherapy units.
86-03 Potential Failure of Multiple 10/8/86 All facilities ECCS Ptmps Due to Single holding an OL or Failu u of Air-Operated Valve CP.
in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line OL = Operating License CP = Construction Nmit
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