Safety Evaluation Re Fire Protection Issues & non-nuclear Heatup Prior to Restart of Facility.Based on Low Decay Heat Release Rate in Core & TVA Commitment Re Boron Concetration, Heatup ApprovedML20149M936 |
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Sequoyah |
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02/17/1988 |
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NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS |
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ML20149M924 |
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NUDOCS 8802290294 |
Download: ML20149M936 (4) |
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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
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[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20212J6311999-10-0101 October 1999 SER Accepting Request for Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Requirements for Certain Inservice Insp at Plant,Unit 1 ML20217G3721999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20212F0831999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from Certain Weld Insp at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) for Second 10-year ISI Interval ML20212F4761999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 246 & 237 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20212C4761999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20210L4361999-08-0202 August 1999 Cycle 9 12-Month SG Insp Rept ML20216E3781999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20210L4451999-07-31031 July 1999 Unit-2 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20210G6631999-07-28028 July 1999 Cycle 9 90-Day ISI Summary Rept ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML20209H3831999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20211F9031999-06-30030 June 1999 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage ML20196J8521999-06-28028 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative to Use Iqis for Radiography Examinations as Provided for in ASME Section III,1992 Edition with 1993 Addenda,Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20195K2951999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20206Q8951999-05-0505 May 1999 Rev 0 to L36 990415 802, COLR for Sequoyah Unit 2 Cycle 10 ML20206R5031999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for April 1999 for Sequoyah Units 1 & 2.With ML20205P9811999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20204C3111999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20205B6631999-02-28028 February 1999 Underground Storage Tank (Ust) Permanent Closure Rept, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Security Backup DG Ust Sys ML20203H7381999-02-18018 February 1999 Safety Evaluation of Topical Rept BAW-2328, Blended U Lead Test Assembly Design Rept. Rept Acceptable Subj to Listed Conditions ML20211A2021999-01-31031 January 1999 Non-proprietary TR WCAP-15129, Depth-Based SG Tube Repair Criteria for Axial PWSCC Dented TSP Intersections ML20198S7301998-12-31031 December 1998 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20199G3641998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20197J5621998-12-0303 December 1998 Unit 1 Cycle 9 90-Day ISI Summary Rept ML20197K1161998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195F8061998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20154H6091998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20154H6251998-09-17017 September 1998 Rev 0 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Cycle 10 Colr ML20153B0881998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20239A0631998-08-27027 August 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20236Y2091998-08-0707 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Relief Requests RP-03,RP-05, RP-07,RV-05 & RV-06 & Denying RV-07 & RV-08 ML20237B5221998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Snp ML20237A4411998-07-31031 July 1998 Blended Uranium Lead Test Assembly Design Rept ML20236P6441998-07-10010 July 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 980610,failure of Safeguard Sys Occurred for Which Compensatory Measures Were Not Satisfied within Required Time Period.Caused by Inadequate Security Procedure.Licensee Revised Procedure MI-134 ML20236R0051998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ML20249A8981998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20247L5141998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ML20217K4471998-04-27027 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Requests for Relief 1-ISI-2 (Part 1),2-ISI-2 (Part 2),1-ISI-5,2-ISI-5,1-ISI-6,1-ISI-7, 2-ISI-7,ISPT-02,ISPT-04,ISPT-06,ISPT-07,ISPT-8,ISPT-01 & ISPT-05 ML20217E2221998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ML20248L2611998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199J2571998-01-31031 January 1998 Cycle 9 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20202J7911998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199J2441998-01-29029 January 1998 Snp Unit 2 Cycle Refueling Outage Oct 1997 ML20199F8531998-01-13013 January 1998 ASME Section XI Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Snp Unit 2 Refueling Outage Cycle 8 ML20199A2931997-12-31031 December 1997 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20198M1481997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20197J1011997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199C2951997-11-13013 November 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 971017,vandalism of Electrical Cables Was Observed.Caused by Vandalism.Repaired Damaged Cables, Interviewed Personnel Having Potential for Being in Area at Time Damage Occurred & Walkdowns ML20199C7201997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1997 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant L-97-215, SG Secondary Side Loose Object Safety Evaluation1997-10-23023 October 1997 SG Secondary Side Loose Object Safety Evaluation 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
o e #ya rtaug'o, UNITED STATES
' ! " , t. t 'i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- .. j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
\...../ ENCLOSURE 2 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS RELATING TO SEQUOYAH FIRE PROTECTION ISSUES AND l THE NON-NUCLEAR HEATUP PRIOR TO RESTART f
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH UNIT 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-328
1.0 INTRODUCTION
l i
On Thursday, February 4, 1988, NRC received a phone call from Mr. Richard H.
- i King who had Mr. Andrew Bartlik in his offices. The NRC personnel involved in :
the phone conversation were Jane A. Axelrad Deputy Director Office of Special !
Projects. Hukam C. Garg, Senior Electrical Engineer. and Robert C. Pierson, Chief Plant Systems Branch. Mr. Bartlik was concerned that heat-up was taking place at Sequoyah despite concerns he had raised with NRC personnel during a ,
neeting on Wednesda.v. February 3, 1988. The phone discussion irvolved three :
concerns of Mr. Bartlik and his opinion that beat-up should be precluded until l these issues were resolved. l
{
2.0 EVALUATION {
t 2.1 First Issue l
l The first issue involved a scenario whereby the Pressure Operated Relief Valve !
(PORV) is opened spuriously with the pressurizer block valve open. The same !
initiating event could result in the spurious closure of the valves FCV-62-132 l and 63-133 and the loss of suction to the operating Centrifugal Charging Pump i (CCP). The ether CCP could be damaged in the fire and is, therefore, assumed to be lost. The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps subsequently become ,
unavailable through inability to line up the RHR supply line. As a result, j reactor coolant inventory is lost through the PORV and a source of Emergency
) Core Cooling System (ECCS) is not available. This analysis does not take
- credit for the Safety Injection pumps.
i i
The fuel in the core has a low decay heat because the fuel has decayed since plant shutdown in August 1985. This was evaluated by TVA in its submittal t
dated October 12, 1987 on repairs to the RHR suction valve 2-FCV-74-2. A test conducted by TVA on October 3, 1987 indicated a reactor coolant heat-up rate of 1.5'F/ hour. TVAcalculatedaheat-ugrateof3.6'F/hourbasedonaconservative decay heat release rate of 2.42 x 10 BTU /hr. The staff Safety Evaluation for the repair of 2-FCV-74-2 was dated October 10, 1987.
p&22lDocg o300294 a 000223
O As a result of the heat-up rate, the response time to provide cooling for the core is a matter of hours rather than seconds as measured under FSAR analyzed conditions. Assuming this event is initiated from normal operating pressure and temperature attained through a non-nuclear heat-up, the initial event would cause a loss of reactor coolant system inventory through the cpen block valve and PORY until the reactor coolant system depressurized to atmospheric pressure and approximately 212'F. The core would remain covered. The inventory of the reactor coolant system (assuming all coolant inventory in the pressurizer is lost) is approximately 10,000 cubic feet of water. In addition, there is upper head injection (UHI) available with approxingtely 1800 cubic feet of water .
Using a decay heat release rate of 2.42 X 10 BTV/HR divided by a phase change enthalpy (water to steam at 1 atmosphere and 212'F) of 970 Btu /lbm results in the following:
6 2.42 X 10 BTU /HR / 970 BTU /lbn = 2495 lbm/hr reactor coolant system water removed due to decay heat through boiling Thus, tne required rake-up for the reactor coolant system water loss due to boiling from the decay heat is 2495 lbm/hr or 5.2 gallons / min. The UHI alone will provide adequate make-up for nore than 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />. This is adequate time for TVA to take the necessary action to restore reactor core cooling.
2.2 Second Issue The second issue involved spuricus actuation preventirg safe shutdown of the reactor. These could occur through several mechanisns including a cable to cable short. Associated circuits and spurious signal protection concerns were discussed in Section 5 b of the NRC Inspection Report 50-327/85-01 dated March 29, 1985. In regard to spurious signals the report states:
"A review of the licensee's spurious signal analysis was conducted to determine if the following conditions had been considered:
The false motor, control and instrument readirgs such as what occurred at the 1975 Browns Ferry Fire. These could be caused by fire initiated grounds, shorts or open circuits.
Spurious operation of safety-related or non-safety-related components (e.g., RHR/RCSthatIsolation would adversely)
Valves , affect shutdown capability i
l
4 The licensee's method for evaluation of fire induced spurious signals that could affect the circuits required to bring the plant to hot shutdown was reviewed. The licensee has treated the spurious signal-affected circuits and circuits that could affect the shutdown logic path through spurious actuation due to fire damage as shutdown circuits. Therefore, these circuits were evaluated for interaction between redundant shutdown paths. The circuits analyzed were control circuits that are powered from ungrounded AC or DC power sources.
The licensee intends to remove power and control voltages from several valves that could affect safe shutdown of a unit should they operate due to a fire induced spurious signal. The impact of this action in relation to the operability of the unit has been assessed by the licensee and submitted to NRC. The licensee's reevaluation and corrective action appears to adequately address the spurious signa? concerns." ,
The Inspection Report also stated: ,
"Appendix R Section III.G.2, requires that where cables or equipment including associated nonsafety circuits that could prevent operation or cause the maloperatior due to hot shorts, open circuits or shorts to ground of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve ard maintain hot shutdown conditions, shall be protected in accordance with either paragraph III.G.E.a.,
III.G 2.b., or III.G.2.c.
Based on the licensee's December 21, 1984, Appendix R reevalua-tion, 295 circuits were identified es having a corinon power source with shutdown equipment and the power source was not properly electrically protected from the circuit of concern or protected in accordance with Appendix R Section III.G.2. On August 10, 1984, these conditions did not meet the requirements of Appendix R and are identified as Violation Item (50-327, 328/85-01-02). Failure to provide adequate breaker / fuse protection for ecuipment required !
for hot standby."
The open item was closed in Inspection Report 50-327, 328/87-41 dated August 7 I 1987. In the inspection report, the NRC stated that TVA's submittal dated l December 21, 1984 identified the 295 circuits that required rodifications to meet Appendix R Section III.G.2. TVA replaced fuses and breakers, reset breakers / relay trip settirgs, changed loads to different circuits, wrapped cables with a fire resistant raterial, replaced cable and rerouted cable.
2.3 Third Issue The third issue involved the potential of the reactor core becoming critical in an Appendix R event.
1
e Mr. Bartlik subsequently proposed that a hypothetical Appendix R event could cause an unmitigated multiple steam generator blowdown which would result in reactor criticality due to the cooling of the reactor coolant system. He further stated that the classical analysis is from zero power and, when TVA goes to a non-nuclear heatup on Sequoyah, that will be the cordition of the plant. He also stated that during this non-nuclear heatup a steam generator blowdewn could cause the core to 90 to criticality.
The reactor will not be taken critical during this non-nuclear heatup. TVA committed to maintain the boron concentration of the reactor coolant above the cold plant shutdown concentrations until the staff approves the entry of Unit 2 into Mode 2. Boron is a neutron absorber and is used to previde plant shutdown nargin. As a result, the cooling effect of the postulated blow down of the steam generator will not make the reactor go critical. The classical analysis from zero power does not assume that the reactor coolant concentration of boren is at or above a cold shutdown concentration level.
3.0 CONCLUSION
Based on the NRC inspection effort to date, the low decay heat release rate in the core as discussed above under the first issue and the TVA commitment concerning the baron concentration discussed under the third issue, the staff concludes that it is safe for Sequoyah Unit 2 to heat up (i.e., enter Modes 4 and 3). This conclusion applies only to this heatup prior to the restart of Unit 2. It does not apply te the restart of Unit 2.
Principal Contributor: R. Pierson Dated: February (1 , 1988
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