ML20149L547
| ML20149L547 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1997 |
| From: | Hebdon F NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149L550 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9708040104 | |
| Download: ML20149L547 (30) | |
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UNITED STATES p
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,j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- s s + * /j WASHINGTON. D.C. 2006f4001 o
FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CITY OF ALACHUA CITY OF BUSHNELL CITY OF GAINESVILLE CITY OF KISSIMMEE fdIV 0F LEESBURG i
CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH AND UTILITIES COMMISSION. CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH i
CITY OF OCALA ORLANDO UTILITIES COMMISSION AND CITY OF ORLANDO SEMIN0LE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE. INC.
CITY OF TALLAHASSEE DOCKET NO. 50-302 i
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT i
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE 4
Amendment No.156 i
License No. DPR-72 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
i A.
The application for amendment by Florida Power Corporation, et al.
(the licensees) dated February 17, 1997, as revised May 1, 1997, i
complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and l
regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; j
B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the prodsions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comm <sion; 4
C.
There is.'easonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by 1
this amendment car, be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliar.ce with the Commission's regulations; i
D.
The issuance, of this amendment will not be inimical'to the common defense an6 security or to the health and safety of the public; and 4
E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
9708040104 970724 PDR ADOCK 05000302 P
V i l
.l 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Technical Snecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.156, are hereby incorporated in the j
license.
Florida Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
j 9AJQ.un i
Frederick J. Hebdon, Director i
Project Directorate 11-3 i
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
)
Attachment-l Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: July 24, 1997 1
i f.
1
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 156 l
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 I
DOCKET NO. 50-302 i
the attached pages. g Jages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with Replace the followin j
T1e revised pages are identified by amendment number and
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contain_ vertical lines indicating the area of change.
Remove Insert
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3.6-2 3.6-2
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3.6-3 3.6-3 i
3.6-7 3.6-7 i
3.6-8 3.6-8 l
3.6-10 3.6-10 3.6-11 3.6-11 3.6-12 3.6-12 i
3.6-13 3.6-13 5.0-23A B 3.0-17 B 3.0-17
.B 3.6-1 B 3.6-1 B 3.6-2 B 3.6-2 B 3.6-3 B 3.6-3 1
B 3.6-4 B 3.6-4 j
B 3.6-5 B 3.6-5 i
B 3.6-6 B 3.6-6 B 3.6-8 B 3.6-8 J
B 3.6-13 B 3.6-13
.I B 3.6-14 B 3.6-14 B 3.6-14A B 3.6-16 B 3.6-16 B 3.6-18 B 3.6-18 8 3.6-21 B 3.6-21 B 3.6-24 8 3.6-24 B 3.6-25 B 3.6-25 B 3.6-27 B 3.6-27 i
B 3.6-28 B 3.6-28
l Containment i
3.6.1 l
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.1 Perform required visual examinations and j
leakage rate testing except for containment air lock testing, in accordance with the s
i Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
I
(
i The maximum allowable leakage rate, L, is In accordance 0.25% of containment air weight per day at with the the calculated peak containment pressure, Containment j
P,.
Leakage Rate Testing j
Program.
SR 3.6.1.2 Verify containment structural integrity In accordance in accordance with the Containment Tendon with the I
Surveillance Program.
Containment 4
Tendon Surveillance Program Crystal River Unit 3 3.6-2 Amendment No.156
f Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks LCO 3.6.2 Two containment air locks shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS
....................................-NOTES------------------------*-----------
1.
Entry and exit is permissible to perform repairs on the affected air lock components or for emergencies involving personnel _ safety.
I 2.
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock.
3.
Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.6.1,
" Containment," when air lock leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One or more
.----NOTES----------
containment air locks 1.
Required Actions A.1, with one air lock door A.2, and A.3 are not inoperable.
applicable if both doors in the same air lock are inoperable and Condition C is entered.
2.
Entry and exit is permissible for 7 days under adminstrative controls if both air i
locks are inoperable.
A.1 Verify the OPERABLE 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> door is closed in the affected air lock.
1 ANJ (continued) 1 Crystal River Unit 3 3.6-3 Amendment No.156 4
Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.1 1
NOTES-------------------
1.
An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate 4
the previous successful performance of the overall 3
air lock leakage test.
2.
Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1 in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
l Perform required air lock leakage rate testing in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
The acceptance criteria for air lock testing are:
In accordance Overall air lock leakage rate is s 0.05 L, when with the a.
tested at 2 P,.
Containment Leakage Rate b.
For each door, leakage rate is s 0.01 L, when Testing tested at 2 8.0 psig.
Program.
NOTE--------------------
Only required to be performed when an air lock is used for entry into containment.
184 days Verify only one door in the air lock can be opened at 4
a time.
i Crystal River Unit 3 3.6-7 Amendment No.156
i i
2 Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 2
3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves LC0 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS l
NOTES------------------------------------
1.
Penetration flow paths except for 48 inch purge valve penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.
j 2.
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flew path.
3.
Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for system (s) made inoperable by containment isolation valves.
4.
Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.6.1,
" Containment," when purge valve leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.
CONDITIONS REQUIRED ACTIONS COMPLETION TIME A.
NOTE---------
A.1 Isolate the affected 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Only applicable to penetration flow path penetration flow paths by use of at least with two containment one closed and isolation valves.
de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, One or more blind flange, or penetration flow paths check valve with flow
.with one containment through the valve isolation valve secured.
inoperable (except for 48 irch purge valve AND l
leakage not within limit).
(continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 3.6-8 Amendment No.156
V Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l
1 B.
NOTE---------
B.1 Isolate the affected I hour Only applicable to penetration flow path j
penetration flow paths-by use of at least with two containment one closed and isolation valves or de-activated I
penetration flow paths automatic valve, with one containment closed manual valve, isolation valve and no or blind flange, closed system.
AND One or more B.2
NOTE--------
penetration flow paths Valves and blind with all containment flanges in high isolation valves radiation areas may inoperable (except for be verified by use of 48 inch purge valve administrative means.
I leakage not within limit).
Verify the affected Once per penetration flow path 31 days for is isolated.
isolation.
devices outside containment AND Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside a
containment (continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 3.6-10 Amendment No. 156
Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 4
C.
NOTE---------
C.1 Isolate the affected 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Only applicable to penetration flow path penetration flow paths by use of at least with only one one closed and containment isolation de-activated 1
valve and a closed automatic valve, i
system.
closed manual valve, or blind flange.
One or more AND penetration flow paths with one containment C.2
NOTE-------
isolation valve Valves and blind inoperable or the flanges in high closed system radiation areas may breached.
be verified by use of administrative means.
l Verify the affected Once per penetration flow path 31 days is isolated.
4 D.
One or more D.1 Restore purge valve 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> penetration flow paths leakage to within l
with one or more 48 limits.
inch containment purge valves not within purge valve leakage limits.
E.
Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met.
AND E.2 Be in MODE 5.
36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> Crystal River Unit 3 3.6-11 Amendment No.156
l Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.1 Verify each 48 inch purge valve is sealed 31 days closed except for one purge valve in a penetration flow path while in Condition D of the LCO.
SR 3.6.3.2 Verify each 6 inch post accident hydrogen 31 days purge valve is closed except when the 6 inch post accident hydrogen purge valves are open for pressure control, ALARA or air quality censiderations for personnel entry, or for Surveillances that require the valves to be open.
NOTE-------------------
Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.
Verify each containment isolation manual 31 days valve and blind flange that is located outside containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed, except for containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls.
(continued) 1 I
Crystal River Unit 3 3.6-12 Amendment No.156
Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.4
NOTE-------------------
Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.
Verify each containment isolation manual Prior to valve and blind flange that is located entering MODE 4 inside containment and required to be from MODE 5 if closed during accident conditions is not performed closed, except fer containment isolation within the i
valves that are open under administrative previous controls.
92 days SR 3.6.3.5 Verify the isolation time of each power In accordance operated and each automatic containment with the isolation valve that is not locked, sealed, Inservice or otherwise secured in the isolation Testing Program position, is within limits.
NOTE--------------------
Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1 in rccordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
Perform leakage rate testing for each 48 Within 92 days inch containment purge valve.
after opening the valve AND 24 months (continued) l l
Crystal River Unit 3 3.6-13 Amendment No.156
Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6 l'
5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals l
Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program 5.6.2.20 A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions.
This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, " Performance-Based Containment Leak Test Program," dated September 1995.
The peak calculated containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident, Pa, is 54.2 psig. The containment design pressure is 55 psig.
The maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, L,, at P,,
shall be 0.25'/ of primary containment air weight per day Leakage Rate acceptance criteria are:
1.
Containment leakage rate acceptance criterion is 1 1.0 L,.
During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are 5 0.60 L for the Type B and Type C Tests and 1 0.75 L, for Type A Tes,ts.
2.
Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:
a.
Overall air lock leakage rate is s 0.05 L, when tested at 2 P,.
b.
For each door, leakage rate is s 0.01 L, when tested at 2 8.0 psig.
The provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to the test frequencies specified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
I l
Crystal' River Unit 3 5.0-23A Amendment No. 156
I SR Applicability B 3.0
(
BASES SR 3.0.1 conditions in the Applicability due to the necessary unit (continued) parameters not having been established.
In these t
(
situations, the equipment may be considered OPERABLE provided testing has been satisfactorily completed to the extent possible and the equipment is not otherwise believed i
to be incapable of perfo ming its function.
This will allow operation to proceed to a MODE or other specified condition where other necessary post maintenance tests can be completed.
SR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.2 establishes the requirements for meeting the specified Frequency for Surveillances and any Required 1
Action with a Completion Time that requires tne periodic performance of the Required Action on a "once per..."
interval.
SR 3.0.2 permits a 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency.
This extension facilitates Surveillance scheduling and considers plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance (e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities).
l The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the i
reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency.
This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the Shs.
The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply.
These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS.
Therefore, when a l
test interval is specified in the regulations, the test interval cannot be extended by the TS, and the SR include a Note in the Frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable."
An example of an exception when the test interval is not specified in the regulations is the Note in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable."
l This exception is provided because the program already l
includes extension of test intervals."
As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per..." basis.
The i
i 5
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.0-17 Amendment No. 156
Containment B 3.6.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1 Containment BASES BACKGROUND The containment consists of.the concrete reactor building (RB), its steel liner, and the penetrations through this structure. The structure is designed to contain water and steam, as well as radioactive material that may be released from the reactor core following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). Additionally, this structure provides shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.
The containment is a reinforced concrete structure with a cylindrical wall, a flat foundation mat, and a shallow dome roof. The cylinder wall is prestressed with a post tensioning system in the vertical and horizontal directions, and the dome roof is prestressed using a three.way post tensioning system. The inside surface of the containment has a carbon steel liner to ensure a high degree of leak tightness during operating and accident conditions.
The concrete RB is required for structural integrity of the containment under DBA conditions..The steel liner and its penetrations establish the leakage limiting boundary of the containment. Maintaining the containment OPERABLE limits the leakage of fission product radioactivity from the containment to the environment.
SR 3.6.1.1 leakage rate requirements comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B (Ref. 1).
The isolation devices for the penetrations in the containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:
a.
All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
1.
capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or 2.
closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LCO 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Valves";
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.6-1 Amendment No. 156
Containment B 3.6.1 BASES BACKGROUND b.
Each air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in (continued)
LC0 3.6.2, " Containment Air Locks".
APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the containment is that the SAFETY ANALYSES containment must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.
The DBAs that result in a challenge to containment from high pressures and temperatures are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), a steam line break, and a rod ejection accident 1
(REA) (Ref. 2).
In addition, release of sign'.ficant fission product radioactivity within containment can occur from a i
t l
LOCA or REA.
In the analyses of DBAs involving release of l
fission product radioactivity, it is assumed that the containment is OPERABLE so that the releise to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable i
leakage rate of 0.25% of containment air weight per day (Ref. 3). This leakage rate, used in the evaluation of offsite doses resulting from accidents, is defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B (Ref.1), as L.:
the I
maximum allowable leakage rate at the calculated maximum peak containment pressure (P.) resulting from the limiting DBA. The allowable leakage rate represented by L. forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on all containment leakage rate testing.
L. is assumed to be 0.25% of containment air weight per day in the safety analysis at P. - 54.2 psig (Ref. 3).
The acceptance criteria applied to accidental releases of radioactive material to the environment are given in terms of total radiation dose received by a hypothetical member of the general public who is assumed to remain at the exclusion l
area boundary for two hours following onset of the postulated fission product release.
The limits established in 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 5) are a whole body dose of 25 Rem or a 300 Rem dose to the thyroid from iodine exposure.
The containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.6-2 Amendment No.156 I
I
Containment B 3.6.1
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BASES (continued)
LCO Containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting le. kage to le.ss than the acceptance criteria of the Containment Leakage l Rate Testing Program.
Compliance with this LCO will ensure a containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to l
those leakage rates assumed in the safety analysis.
Individual leakage rates specified for the containment air lock (LCO 3.6.2) and purge valves with resilient seals (LC0 3.6.3) are not specifically part of the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1.
Therefore, leakage rates exceeding these individual limits only result in the containment being i
inoperable when the total leakage exceeds the acceptance criteria of the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material into containment.
In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES.
Therefore, containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5.
The requirements for containment during MODE 6 are addressed in LC0 3.9.3, " Containment Penetrations."
i i
ACTIONS L.1 l
l In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be i
restored to OPERABLE status within I hour.
The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining containment during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
This time period also ensures the probability of an accident (requiring l
containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal.
B.1 and B.2 If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this i
(continued) i Crystal River Unit 5 B 3.6-3 Amendment No. 156
Containment 1
B 3.6.1 j -
BASES ACT70NS B.1 and 8.2 (continued) i status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating i
experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of the C'ontainment Leakage Rate Testing l
Program.
Failure to meet air lock and purge valve with resilient seal leakage limits for SR 3.6.2.1 and 3.6.3.6 does not constitute a failure of this Surveillance unless the contribution from these penetrations causes overall Type A, B, and C leakage to exceed limits.
SR Frequencies are as required by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) l Program.
does not apply.
These periodic testing requirements verify that the containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the safety analysis.
SR 3.6.1.2 This SR ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained in accordance with the provisions of the Containment Tendon Surveillance Program.
Testing and Frequency are consistent with the recommendations of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.35, Revision 3.
The guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.35 should be followed in the event abnormal degradation of the containment tendons is detected.
This includes testing additional tendons and i
submitting a Special Report to the NRC (Refer to Specification 5.7.2.b).
The impact of large-scale tendon degradation should also be evaluated with respect to Containment OPERABILITY.
In this context, containment structural integrity is analogous to containment OPERABILITY.
j (continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.6-4 Amendment No. 156 pp r
ti
Containment
{
B 3.6.1 l
BASES (continued)
REFERENCES 1.
10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B l
2.
FSAR, Sections 14.2.2 3.
FSAR, 5.2.1.1 l
4.
Regulatory Guide 1.35, Rev.3,1990.
5.
l 6.
NEI 94-01, Revision 0, " Industry Guideline for l
Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR 50, l
Appendix J" j
l 7.
ANSI /ANS-56.81994, "American National Standard for Containment System Leakage Testing Requirement" l
1 J
l I
J 4
l Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.6-5 Amendment No. 156
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_.. _ ~
'V Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 b 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks l
BASES I
l BACKGROUND Containment air locks form part of the containment pressure l
boundary and provide a means for personnel access during all i
MODES of operation.
l l
Each air lock is nominally a right circular cylinder,10 ft l
in diameter, with a door at each end.
The doors are l
interlocked to-prevent simultaneous opening.
During periods when containment is not required to be OPERABLE, the door interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when
~
frequent containment entry is necessary.
Each air lock door has been designed and is tested to verify its ability to l
withstand a pressure in excess of the maximum expected l
pressure following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) in containment. Therefore, closure of a single door supports L
containment OPERABILITY.
Each of the doors contain two i
L gasketed seals and local leakage rate testing capability to ensure pressure integrity.
To effect a leak tight seal, the i
air lock design uses pressure seated doors (i.e., an increase in containment internal pressure results in increased sealing force on each door).
Each personnel air lock door is provided with limit switches that provide control room indication of door position.
l Additionally, control room indication is provided to alert the operator whenever an air lock door interlock mechanism is defeated.
The containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary. Their integrity and leak tightness is essential for maintaining the containment leakage rate i
within limit in the event of a DBA. Not maintaining' air lock integrity or leak tightness may result in a leakage j
rate in excess of that assumed in the unit safety analysis.
All leakage rate requirements are in conformance with i
l 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B (Ref. 1).
I l
I i
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.6-6 Amendment No. 156 I
.. - ~ _ -
. - - - = -
Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES LCO Each air lock is required to be OPERABLE.
For the air lock (continued) to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors 1
must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be opened at one time (Ref. 5).
This l provision ensures that a gross breach of containment does not exist when containment is required to be OPERABLE.
Closure of a single door in each air lock is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events.
Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry into and exit from containment.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment.
In MODES 5 and 6, the l
probability and consequences of these events are reduced due l
to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES.
l Therefore, the containment air locks are not required in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from i
l containment.
The requirements for the containment air locks during MODE 6 are addressed in LCO 3.9.3, " Containment Penetrations."
l ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note that allows entry and exit to perform repairs on the affected air lock component or for emergencies involving personnel safety.
If the outer door is inoperable, then it may be easily accessed to i
repair.
If the inner door is the one that is inoperable, however, then a s' ort time exists when the containment n
boundary is not intact (during access through the outer door).
In this context, repairs include follow-up actions to an initial failure of the air lock doer seal SR in order to determine which air lock door (s) is faulty.
There are l
circumstances where an at-power containment entry Mould be required during the period of time that one air lec% was i
In this case, entry would be made thrcugn the OPERABLE air lock if ALARA conditions permit.
However, the i
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.6-8 Amendment No. 156
.~.
Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 1
l BASES t
ACTIONS C.I. C.2. and C.3 (continued) l criteria, is acceptable when considering the historical intent of the overall/ individual door seal, air lock leakage rate tests. The overall test has historically been the true measure of an air lock's ability to perform its DBA function.
Periodic containment airlock tests should be performed at not less than P, at a Frequency of at least once per 30 months. Containment airlock test methods should be performed in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Containment airlock door seals should be tested within 7 days of opening. For periods of multiple containment entries where the airlock doors are routinely used for access more frequently than once every 7 days (e.g., shift or daily inspection tours of the containment),
door seals may be tes~ted once per 30 days during this time period.
Door seals are not required to be tested when containment integrity is not required, however they must be tested prior to reestablishing containment integrity.
Door seals shall be tested at a pressure stated in the plant Technical Specifications.
D.1 and D.2 If the inoperable containment air lock cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B (Ref. 1), as modified by l
approved exemptions. This SR reflects the leakage rate testing requirements with regard to air lock leakage (Type.B l
leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established during initial air lock and containment testing.
The 1
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.6-13 Amendment No.156 l
e Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall containment leakage rate.
The Frequency is as required by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
- Thus, I
SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply.
The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note I states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous l
successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.
This is considered reasonable, since either air lock door is capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA.
l Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the results to be evaluated against the-acceptance criteria of l
This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in dete~rmining the overall containment leakage rate.
l SR 3.6.2.2 The air lock interlock is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in a single air lock.
Since the inner and outer doors of an air lock are both designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident containment pressure, closure of either door will support containment OPERABILITY.
Thus, the door interlock feature supports containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment.
Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous opening of the inner and outer doors will not inadvertently occur.
Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when containment is entered, this test is only required to be performed upon entering containment but is not required more frequently than every 184 days.
The 184 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other indications of door and interlock mechanism status available to operations personnel.
l 1
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.6-14 Amendment No. 156 l
4 Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES 3
REFERENCES 1.
10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B l
i 2.
FSAR, Sr-tions 14.2.2 t
a 3.
FSAR, 5.2.1.1 l
l 4.
10 CFR 100 5.
FSAR Section 5.2.5.2.3.1 1
1 6.
ANSI /ANS 56.8-1994 l
1 l
i
-c i
5 i
P l
1 i
I l
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.6-14A Amendment No]56 i
i J
1 Containment Isolation Valves j
B 3.6.3 BASES i
l BACKGROUND airborne radioactivity caused by minor leakage from the RCS j
j (continued) prior to personnel entry into containment.
The. Containment i
Purge System consists of one 48 inch line for exhaust and 1
one 48 inch line for supply, with supply and exhaust fans capable of purging the p/ min.
ontainment atmosphere at a rate of 1
approximately 50,000 ft The containment purge supply and exhaust lines each contain two isolation valves that receive an isolation signal on a unit vent high radiation condition.
Each of the purge lines is provided with two 48 4
inch diameter butterfly valves, one inside and one outside of containment.
The valves inside containment are electric motor operated, designed to close within five seconds, while d
the outboard isolation valves are pneumatically opened-spring closed, designed to close within two seconds of j
demand (Ref. 5).
Each of these valves was intended to be capable of closing against a differential pressure of 55 psig (the containment design pressure), such that closure j
would be assured in the event a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) occurred while containment purging was in progress.
Failure of the purge valves to clo:,e following a design basis event would cause a signi4 icant increase in the j
radioactive release because of the large containment leakage path introduced by these 48 iach purge lines.
Failure of j
the purge valves to close would result in leakage considerably in excess cf the containment design leakage rate of 0.25% of containment air weight per day (L.)
j (Ref. 2).
Because of their large size, the 48 inch purge valves are not qualified for automatic closure from their open position under DBA conditions.
Therefore, the 48 inch purge valves are maintained sealed closed (SR 3.6.3.1) in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
The 6 inch post accident hydrogen purge valves operate to:
l I
}
a.
Reduce the concentration of noble gases within i
containment prior to and during personnel access; and.
b.
Equalize internal and external pressures.
1 Since the post accident hydrogen purge valves are designed l
to meet the requirements for automatic containment isolation valves, these valves may be opened as needed in MODES 1, 2, 3,
and 4.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.6-16 Amendment No.156
1 l
Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 J
BASES APPLICABLE inboard and outboard isolation valves on each line are l
SAFETY ANALYSES provided with diverse power sources, motor operated and (continued) pneumatically operated spring closed, respectively.
This arrangement was designed to preclude common mode failures i
from disabling both valves on a purge line.
The containment purge valves may be unable to close in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, each of the 48 i
inch purge valves is required to remain sealed closed during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
In this case, the single-failure criterion remains applicable to the containment purge valves because of failure in the contrel circuit associated with each valve. Again, the 48 inch l
purge system valve design prevents a single failure from j
compromising containment OPERABILITY as long as the system is operated in accordance with the subject LCO.
The containment isolation valves satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
\\
l LC0 Containment isolation valves form a part of the containment boundary. The containment isolation valve safety function l
is related to control ( ' containment leakage rates during a DBA.
The automatic power operated isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits and to actuate on an automatic isolation signal.
The 48 inch purge valves must be maintained sealed closed in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
The valves covered by this LC0 are listed along with their associated stroke times in the FSAR (Ref. 4).
I The normally closed isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed, check valves have flow through the valve secured, blind flanges are in place, and closed systems are intact.
Purge valves with resilient seal:: must meet additional leakage rate requirements addressed as part of this Specification. All other containment isolation valve leakage rate testing is addressed by LC0 3.6.1,
" Containment," as part of Type C testing.
1 i
l (continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.6-18 Amendment No. 156 1
s Containment Isolation Valves i
B 3.6.3 L
1 BASES i;
)
ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) verification is necessary to ensure that containment 2
penetrations required to be isolated following an accident and no longer capable of being automatically isolated will be in the isolation position should an event occur.
This Required Action dces not require any testing or valve manipulation.
Rather, it involves verification, through. a system walkdown, that those isolation devices capable of 2
being mispositioned are in the correct position.
The Completion Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices i
outside containment" is appropriate considering the fact that the valves are operated under administrative controls j
and the probability of their misalignment is low.
For the isolation devices inside containment, the time period specified as " prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not j
performed within the previous 92 days" is based on i
engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of j
the inaccessibility of the isolation devices and other administrative controls that will ensure that isolation i
device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.
Condition A has been modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths i
j with two containment isolation valves.
For penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed i
j system, Condition C provides appropriate actions.
Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and i
allows the devices to be verified by use of administrative i
means.
Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable since access to these areas is i
typically restricted.
Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small.
i B.1 and B.2 i
With all containment isolation valves in one or more j
penetration flow paths inoperable (except for 48 inch ourge I
.)
valve leakage not within limit), the affected penetration i
flow path must be isolated within I hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation 1
I (continued) 1 Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.6-21 Amendment No.156 I
Containment Isolation Values B 3.6.3 BASES ACTIONS lhi (continued)
In the event one or more containment 48 inch purge valves in I one or more penetration flow paths are not within the purge valve leakage limits, purge valve leakage must be restored to within limits within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The specified time is a reasonable period for restoring the valve leakage to within limits, provided overall containment leakage rate remains within limits. With the purge valve seal degraded such that leakage exceeds the limits, there is an increased potential for the same mechanism that caused the initial degradation to cause further degradation.
If left unchecked, this could result in a loss of containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is necessary to limit the length of
)
time the plant can operate in this condition.
E.1 and E.2 If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are j
not met, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Each 48 inch containment purge valve is required to be verified sealed closed at 31 day intervals.
This Surveillance is designed to ensure that a gross breach of containment is not caused by an inadvertent or spurious opening of a containment purge valve.
Detailed analysis of 1
the purge valves failed to conclusively demonstrate their ability to close_during a LOCA in time to maintain offsite doses to within licensing basis limits.
Therefore, these valves are required to be in the sealed closed position during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
A containment purge valve that is sealed closed must have motive power to the valve operator removed.
This can be accomplished by de-energizing (continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.6-24 Amendment No. 156
Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 1
I BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.1 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS i
the source of electric power or by removing the air supply to the valve operator.
In this application, the term
" sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness.
The Frequency is a result of an NRC initiative, Generic Issue B-24 (Ref. 6), related to containment purge valve use during unit operations.
In the event purge valve leakage requires entry into Condition D, the Surveillance permits opening one purge valve in a penetration flow path to perform repairs.
SR 3.6.3.2 This SR ensures that the 6 inch post accident hydrogen purge I valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an allowable reason.
The SR is not required to be met when the post accident hydrogen purge valves are open for pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or for Surveillances that require the valves to be open. The post accident hydrogen purge valves are capable 1
of closing in the environment following a LOCA.
Therefore, these valves are allowed to be open for limited periods of time.
The 31 day Frequency for verifying valve position is consistent with other containment isolation valve requirements discussed in SR 3.6.3.3.
SR 3.6.3.3 This SR requires verification that each containment isolation manual valve and blind flange located outside i
containment and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.
The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the containment boundary is within design limits.
This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation.
Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those valves outside containment and capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.
Since verification of valve position for valves outside containment is relatively easy, a 31 day Frequency, based on engineering judgment was chosen to provide added assurance (continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.6-25 Amendment No. 156
Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Verifying that the isolation time of each power operated and automatic containment isolation valve that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the isolation position is within limits 1: required to demcnstrate OPERABILITY.
The isolation time test ensures the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses.
The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.
SR 3.6.3.6 For 48 inch containment purge valves, additional leakage l
rate testing beyond the test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J is required to ensure OPERABILITY.
Operating experience has demonstrated that this type of valve seal has the potential to degrade in a shorter time period than do other seal types.
Based on this observation and the importance of maintaining this penetration leak tight (due to the direct path between containment and the environment),
additional purge valve testing was established as part of the NRC resolution of Generic Issue B-20, " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration" (Ref. 7).
The specified Frequencies are based on plant-specific as-found/as-left leakage rate data for these valves.
The data indicates the CR-3 purge valve resilient seals do not degrade during the operating cycle with the valves in the l
sealed closed position. The 92 day Frequency after opening the valves recognizes the seals are prone to excessive leakage following use and is consistent with the NRC resolution of B-20.
A Note to this SR requires the results to be evaluated against the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
This l
ensures that excessive containment purge valve leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall containment leakage rate to verify containment OPERABILITY.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.6-27 Amendment No. 156
Containment Isolation Valves l
B 3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.7 l
REQUIRE 4ENTS (continued)
Automatic containment isolation valves close on a i
containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment following a DBA. This l
SR ensures each automatic containment isolation valve that l
15 not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the isolation position, will actuate to its isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance
{
under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and j
the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating i
experience has shown that these components usually pass this i
Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.
l Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
i The SR is modified by a note indicating the SR is not applicable in the identified MODE.
This is necessary in j
order to make the requirements for automatic system response consistent with those for the actuation instrumentation.
I REFERENCES 1.
FSAR, Section 5.3.1 2.
FSAR, Section 5.2.1.1 l
3.
FSAR, Sections 14.2.2 4.
FSAR, Table 5-9.
5.
FSAR, Section 5.3.3.1 l
6.
Generic Issue B-24 7.
Generic Issue B-20 8.
10 CFR 100 Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.6-28 Amendment No. 156